

# Rifle Company Temporal Overmatch in LSCO

CPT ZACHARY J. MATSON

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and its world-class opposing force (OPFOR) “Geronimo” at Fort Polk, LA, challenge Army brigades every month across the spectrum of conflict and along each warfighting function and domain. Even if units are particularly well trained and well led, the legendary OPFOR will challenge the rotational training unit (RTU) not just in the mechanical “science” of warfighting, but also in abstract capabilities such as surprise, tempo, and audacity. The 1st Brigade Combat Team (Warriors), 10th Mountain Division deployed to JRTC in January 2022 for rotation 22-03 with the intent to offer a hard fight for the OPFOR throughout its duration in “the box.” The 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment harnessed the potential of its subordinate units by adhering to the tenets of mission command and the principles of the offense, and by striking the historically difficult balance between tempo, safety, and control. This article details how rifle companies, enabled by their battalion headquarters (HQ), can offer an equal challenge for the OPFOR on its home turf across the spectrum of warfighting. Rather than debilitating decision-making, the modern battlefield offers infinite opportunities for tactical units to exploit. Anvil Company, 2-22 IN exploited the chaos of multidomain battle during JRTC 22-03 by taking calculated risks and relentlessly maintaining contact with the enemy.

## Home-Station Training

Anvil Company’s tailored pre-JRTC preparations began immediately following 1st BCT’s Expert Soldier Badge testing. Beginning with fire team live-fire exercises (LFXs) and in accordance with JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Cell suggestions, Anvil Company designed training that forced leaders to react to enemy vehicles and employ attached weapons. Fire team leaders were forced to engage a mounted enemy counterattack, and squad situational training exercises (STXs) challenged squad leaders on reacting to a Russian T80 visual modification and employing an attached Carl Gustav. The squad LFXs assessed squad leaders on employment of an attached M240B and back-blast considerations of the Carl Gustav to defend against a counterattack. Company-designed STX lanes during our brigade-level home-station training focused on squads conducting anti-tank (AT) ambushes



Squad situational training exercises (STXs) challenged squad leaders on reacting to a Russian T80 visual modification. (Photo courtesy of author)



**Soldiers in Anvil Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, conduct a squad live-fire exercise in August 2021. (Photo by SPC Pierre Osias)**

independently, and pre-JRTC classroom blocks of instruction refreshed our understanding of minimum arming distance and round types to ensure all Soldiers took this into consideration. Anvil Company simply followed the JRTC home-station battle drill handbook as closely as we could during the training cycle. Empowered by monthly leader professional development (LPD) sessions hosted by the brigade commander and staff, leaders at echelon understood how the Warrior Brigade intended to fight as a team.

The brigade- and division-level home-station annual exercises prioritized time for companies, batteries, and troops to execute their own training plan, which turned out to pay dividends in developing and refining the initiative of our squad leaders to operate semi-independently in support of a company effort. Mountain Peak, the division exercise, validated time and again that squad leaders proactively executing counter-reconnaissance patrols will interdict enemy small units while they are vulnerable. Anvil Company integrated counter-recon patrols as a battle rhythm at JRTC with platoon leadership automatically conducting them whenever the company had to halt. Anvil Company's experience at JRTC during force-on-force showed that the company echelon is used for command and control, sustainment, consolidation and reorganization, and to mass for fires-supported attacks on key terrain, while during movements to contact or hasty attacks and defenses, the squad or section is the preferred unit of action. We found that we needed 360-degree security (provided by the platoons), while reacting to enemy armor was best done with control from the company commander and executed quickly by a squad leader employing an attachment with engagement and reporting criteria. Combined with the emphasis placed on extended dismounted movements, the JRTC home-station training glide path, a willingness to take calculated risks nested with the brigade's concept of "how we fight," and an aggressive patrolling culture, Anvil Company exploited the complexity of the decisive action training environment (DATE) to compete and win in the temporal realm at JRTC 22-03.<sup>1</sup>

A year before the Warrior Brigade deployed to Fort Polk, the JRTC Operations Group CALL Cell published its latest collection in the series "Light Fighting at the JRTC: DATE Is Not a Slow Dance."<sup>2</sup> The title alone offers a clue about the realm in which large-scale combat operations (LSCO) is going to challenge units: the temporal one. What Robert Leonhard outlines in his prophetic text *Fighting by Minutes*, and what the JRTC CALL Cell attempts to assist the RTU in understanding, is that the pace of the future fight is measured in minutes and sometimes seconds, and it is trending towards a tighter connection between information inputs and decision-making.<sup>3</sup> The tightening loop of decisions is a challenge for RTUs that are still under the similar manning and training model that the Army has used for most of the last 20 years. Without a policy change in personnel turnover, operational tempo, or the current Army readiness model, it's growing harder for RTUs to both certify on their mission-essential tasks and

grasp the more challenging cognitive competencies required to make decisions that can outpace an adversary. Factoring in the overwhelming amount of installation tasks applied to garrison units and achieving these competencies becomes nearly impossible. All is not lost, however; units can achieve at home station the necessary training required to survive and win in modern combat, but it does require an increased level of competence and commitment at the company, troop, and battery level to make decisions faster than the enemy. These echelons will always have a vital role on the battlefield, but their utility to their platoons and squads needs to evolve to keep pace with modern combat.

### **Achieving Overmatch in the Temporal Realm**

How do maneuver units achieve overmatch in the temporal realm? Working literally from the ground up, the strength of a light infantry brigade is its ability to operate in severely restrictive terrain. Additionally, light infantry units are expected to move on foot for long distances and arrive prepared to fight. The two most effective methods of preparing a light infantry unit to move further and faster than their counterparts are spending the appropriate time at home station conducting forced marches and properly employing the organic sustainment capabilities of the rifle company. The battalion commander manifested the first effort by envisioning a 52-mile leader trek in the Adirondacks. The latter effort was a continued emphasis of the company commander with particular attention paid to the maintenance of the small but vital company fleet, notably the company's mule which is the medium tactical variant (MTV) on its modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The company marched to the training area for more than half of the collective training events and incorporated long movements during all other training events. Notably, the battalion training guidance included conducting an extended tactical road march of 22.2 miles with all company-assigned equipment during the training cycle.<sup>4</sup>

Leadership emphasis on fighting light and moving fast became the cultural norm leading into JRTC 22-03. Besides building both mental and physical toughness, an extended or forced road march also provides an example of the time it takes to move large formations and gives commanders a running estimate of attrition during movement. More than any other event, the extended dismounted movements during the training cycle gave all leaders in the battalion a realistic expectation of unit movement times while also making intuitive the enduring consideration of soldier load. During our rotation, Anvil Company averaged dismounted movement of 1 kilometer an hour.

The persistent concern of Soldier load is directly tied to the importance of the company trains, which allowed the company to pack most of its rucks both inside and outside of the Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) or in a trailer hauled behind one of the company's high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Anvil Company incorporated this method of moving the company during every single training event. The number of rehearsals conducted during the training cycle on packing, loading, unloading, and linking up with the company trains paid dividends at JRTC and single-handedly contributed to our ability to sustain ourselves. LMTV maintenance is the single most important priority of the company executive officer as this single truck allows the company to sustain itself, rather than forcing the battalion to provide for it. Distributed operations are only possible after properly synchronizing the sustainment warfighting function with the maneuver plan. An increased proximity to the battalion HQ also increases risk to the company as battlefield signatures magnify.

The faster and farther a company can move, the faster it can close the decision loop and challenge the enemy in the temporal realm. To further understand the importance and tactical applicability of the cognitive domain and how it relates to the tempo, consider the timeless, although often oversimplified, observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, as described by U.S. Air Force COL John Boyd (see Figure 1).<sup>5</sup> The ground combat manifestation of "getting inside the enemy OODA loop" is showing up where the enemy least expects you. Units achieve success by conducting forced marches, aggressively pursuing the enemy, and mounting relentless attacks, even when in contact. At JRTC, the OPFOR conducts a superior military decision-making process (MDMP), often much quicker than the recently formed battalion and brigade staffs of the RTU. The OPFOR still has a battalion-level plan that features branches and sequels. Moving faster than the OPFOR soldiers can report and execute their respective branch plans is going to deprive them of their inherent advantages and expose the inflexibility in any preconceived plan.

Anvil Company integrated into the 2-22 IN concept by bounding past a sister company that had seized key terrain to secure the western most flank of the brigade area of operations (AO) while maintaining direct contact with




Figure 1 — OODA Loop (Graphic from [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA\\_loop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop))

enemy forces. To achieve the desired effects at the desired time, Anvil Company was tasked with moving near-continuously for 48 hours to reach our objectives. The ability to plan and execute long movements with minimal rest validates the Infantry Branch's emphasis on its officers volunteering for and completing the Ranger Course.<sup>6</sup> All Anvil officers, including our attached fire support officer (FSO), were graduates of the course and thus were familiar with planning for long foot movements under heavy load. Most Soldiers carried upwards of 85 pounds of gear during the patrol, and the company FSO carried more than 100 pounds, including a coax cable and a dismantled OE-254 antenna that were essential for constructing a field expedient antenna. With just enough pause during the initial movement following joint forcible entry (JFE) to refill water sources and synchronize fires, Anvil Company moved to secure a hilltop that had been assessed as key terrain in the brigade AO. As other battalions in the brigade fixed the enemy in the north, Anvil Company was able to approach this piece of key terrain from an unanticipated avenue of approach, marching through the night to launch a dawn attack on Hill 95.

Enabled by the company mortar section located in the assembly area, we launched our attack on Hill 95 amidst a shower of high explosive (HE) from the artillery battalion as well as our battalion mortar platoon and our own 60mm mortar section. The decision and resources to support this attack were approved and resourced at the brigade level as the commander and S3 were determining when exactly they could shift and provide the invaluable fire support across the entire AO. Using the barrage to cover our advance, we seized the hilltop, defeating a small contingent of OPFOR. Our ability to hold the terrain against attempts to retake it forced the enemy commander to redirect his ongoing assault on adjacent battalions. While our company eventually endured unsustainable losses, the seizure of Hill 95 achieved the desired surprise. The OPFOR commander personally commanded the efforts to retake the hill, an indicator that the OPFOR had not anticipated such a bold maneuver from the RTU.

Anvil Company's failure to hold Hill 95 following a successful seizure was a vital collective learning point. It became clear that all leaders still subconsciously took for granted that if we had communications with higher that we were going to receive assets, such as an air weapons team (AWT) or more indirect fire support, that would help the ground forces. Despite excellent communication between the company FSO and the brigade FSO throughout planning, movement, and actions on the objective, Anvil Company discovered that the transition to the division as a unit of action requires a paradigm shift for subordinate echelons.<sup>7</sup> Leaders at all levels are accustomed to habits formed during the global war on terrorism (GWOT), namely asset allocation for company- and platoon-centric operations that are enabled by battalion and brigade HQ. The growing complexity and pace of the anticipated division-centric LSCO fight will make this impossible. While internalizing this hard-earned lesson, Anvil Company's adherence to integrating fires and maneuver produced tactical advantages that challenged the enemy in the cognitive domain and forced them to make an emotionally driven decision which threw their operational plan off balance. Fortunately, Anvil Company had the support of the battalion HQ to execute our assigned mission by providing mission orders, an enemy and friendly intelligence picture, and an umbrella of indirect fires. Anvil Company's adherence to the principles of the offense and the support from the battalion HQ are far from new ideas, but they provided an already proven relationship between these two echelons.<sup>8</sup>

## Communication and Coordination

Following these actions, Anvil Company enjoyed a brief consolidation period before battalion tasked it as the main effort to retake the key terrain of Hill 95. During this period, we were able to refine the common operational picture (COP) with face-to-face adjacent unit coordination with both our Charlie Company, which was located within supporting distance and also anchored on key terrain, and the brigade cavalry squadron's Bravo Troop, which was screening near a high-speed avenue of approach. Our communications capabilities at this point were vital to maintaining tempo. Anvil Company deployed to the box with the Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP) as its primary FM radio and a PRC-150 as alternate in the high frequency spectrum. Additionally, the brigade's emphasis on home-station training with our HF platforms maximized our ability to disperse during JRTC. Our Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) located in the command vehicle did not make it to the field during this rotation, and our end user devices (EUDs) were marked for code out, so they remained at Fort Drum in preparation for turn in.

To mitigate the obvious shortfalls, the company deployed to the box with a common-sense plan for being out of communication with higher and adjacent units. The battalion allowed Anvil Company to confidently operate independently as necessary and work through frequent periods of communications blackout and discrete reporting windows. Anvil Company spent a little over 10 percent of our rotation and one of our four multi-hour company movements without communications capability. Instead of potentially losing tempo troubleshooting sophisticated platforms to maintain persistent communication with higher, we continued moving with the intent to establish communications as the terrain permitted. Each minute without communications with higher is a minute lost to an enemy who can move faster than we can in the competition to seize key terrain. Units will always struggle to replicate operating in a denied and degraded communications environment at home station, and they risk wasting time troubleshooting and reacting to jamming, if recognition of jamming is even feasible.<sup>9</sup> Not underestimating the OPFOR, we expected to be jammed during all periods of force-on-force and were prepared to react to this form of contact. During one of our longer movements to seize key terrain, all handheld Global Positioning System (GPS) devices appeared to be much different than our maps and pace counts. Without hesitation, the lead platoon leader assessed that the formation was the victim of GPS jamming, and the lead fire team's compass-man maintained azimuth and pace, negating the impact of the enemy's actions.

With my command truck out of the fight, I maintained an analog COP, while the 1SG maintained the primary personnel status in the field litter ambulance (FLA), and the executive officer managed the logistics COP in the MTV with the rest of the company trains. Availing myself of the opportunity to link up with Bravo Troop and see



**A Soldier with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division engages opposing forces during training on 17 January 2022 at the Joint Readiness Training Center on Fort Polk, LA. (Photo by SGT Kevin Dunnaway)**

the brigade digital COP using their JBC-P, I was afforded the opportunity to reorient their 120mm mortars on my assessed likely enemy avenues approach to cover my formation. With our 60mm used effectively to respond to enemy probing or counterattacks and running low on ammunition for suppression missions, Bravo Troop's 120s were a welcome addition to the fire support plan, if even for a day.

Adjacent unit coordination after crossing the line of departure needs to be the concern of the company commander as he or she will most likely have the best understanding of the battlefield. My face-to-face interactions with adjacent units allowed a brief update that kept all surrounding units informed, engaged, and mutually supportive. I chose to devote my time to sharing information and ensuring that assessments were disseminated to the lowest level to allow mission command. While the minimalist approach to mission command has room for improvement, feedback that I received from company NCOs affirmed that they knew what the enemy was capable of doing or planning to do throughout the duration of force-on-force. My abbreviated running estimates informed by battalion and adjacent unit reporting allowed us a best assessment of the enemy situation, and these were delivered no fewer than six times a day and at least following all enemy contact. Commanders will have to take a risk if they intend to maintain at least some form persistent contact with the enemy or try to achieve the ideal doctrinal level of enemy understanding. JRTC 22-03 validated that if you dictate when you make contact with the enemy, you can anticipate his actions and reactions with more fidelity than passive measures allow. A good American historical case study is that of General Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign against General Lee. Grant recognized the key terrain of Richmond as vital for the Confederate cause, so he threatened the southern capital but kept Lee's Army of Northern Virginia his main effort, forcing Lee to fight him.<sup>10</sup> Like the Union forces in this campaign, 2-22 IN moved Anvil Company as quickly as possible and made direct contact with Geronimo as often as possible by threatening control of key terrain.

A rifle company consisting of somewhere between 75 and 125 Soldiers offers a huge audible and visible signature, and all leaders are challenged to maintain control of a formation this size, especially during periods without communication or limited visibility. During nighttime movements, I was particularly active in patrolling the line and finding subordinate leaders to stay in touch with.<sup>11</sup> Before our dawn attack on Hill 95, we stopped in the middle of a swamp for a couple hours to allow the brigade to develop the situation and shift priority of fires to Anvil. Controlling the tempo of this attack was vital to staying synchronized with the battalion and brigade, and controlled halts as we crept closer to our objective were our best way of achieving this. All battalion training at Fort Drum emphasized the difference between tempo and speed, and we recalled the doctrinal definition of tempo: "the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy."<sup>12</sup>

Halting movement in low terrain during limited visibility carries outsized risks to tempo. I assessed it as more important to maintain control and keep my formation extremely tight because the time a company spends searching for a lost Soldier with a break in contact could threaten the battalion's mission to relieve pressure on our sister battalion that was defending a northern drop zone. Anvil Company's movement to seize Hill 95 mirrored almost exactly that of the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry in Vietnam during its movement towards Hue. The 2-12 CAV S2 recalls in his memoir that "in night moves the first aim is to keep people from getting lost."<sup>13</sup> Our need to synchronize maneuver with fires to dislodge a dug-in enemy from key terrain, and our desire to prioritize tempo, meant that we could not afford a single minute lost to a break in contact.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, since this movement took hours and threatened to drain our invaluable ASIP batteries, we also communicated primarily through touch, and like the 2-12 CAV commander, the only radio we did not turn off during movement was the artillery radio.<sup>15</sup> The platoon leaders expertly maintained control of their units, tirelessly trooping their respective formations and further validating their Ranger School experiences.


While preparing to lead the battalion effort to retake Hill 95, Anvil Company Soldiers spent brief moments in their assembly area (AA) preparing their equipment for another uphill fight while I spent a minimal amount of time deconflicting actions on the objective with fellow company commanders. Harkening to techniques and tactics reminiscent of the GWOT's small kill teams, our company formed an advance element consisting of a four-man recon element so we could make contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible.<sup>16</sup> The most senior staff sergeant in the company carried the new M110A1 rifle, and he was accompanied by a platoon radio-telephone operator (RTO) with ASIP, a M249 gunner, and a rifleman. With the minimal amount of guidance including reporting and disengagement criteria, the recon element moved out while the rest of the company finished the

troop leading procedures. This small element moving even just an hour ahead of the main body allowed the company to modify our movement technique and formation to get to our probable line of contact (PLC) as fast as possible with minimal risk to force. This simple temporary task organization allowed us to maintain our edge in tempo during the first few days of force-on-force.

Following the battalion seizure of Hill 95 from the enemy, the brigade prepared to transition to the defense. It took the company most of the day to secure our assigned sector of Hill 95, and we received notification to move out to meet the horizontal engineers at the anticipated engagement area around midnight. Minutes lost in the defense are doubled since you must walk the terrain twice — once to get there and again during a full-dress rehearsal as the seventh step of engagement area development.<sup>17</sup> Knowing each minute the engineers are without guidance is a minute given to the enemy, we picked up our rucks and conducted a 1-mile forced march in the dark within 15 minutes. I led the column and the pace and immediately planted my command post (CP), which consisted of my RTO and the Fires Cell, near a tree. I then dropped my ruck, grabbed a rifleman for security, and moved out in the middle of the night to meet up with the engineer company commander. After confirming linkup, we ran to the furthest point I assessed we could engage the enemy, and I began to request armored vehicle obstacles by providing the engineer company commander with a desired friendly task, purpose, and effect. Working backwards toward my company's direct fire weapons range, we confirmed a likely enemy scheme of maneuver, how I intended to engage them, priority of dig assets, and lastly the obstacles we needed to emplace along the mounted avenue of approach. This hyper-abbreviated planning process runs counter to the conventional approach to planning outlined in both the troop leading procedures and MDMP, which fortunately gave us another advantage on the clock. Though this can seem risky, the battalion commander provided the companies everything they needed to exercise disciplined initiative.<sup>18</sup>

After confirming the engineers had tasks that would take them the next eight hours to complete, I returned to my CP to update battalion HQ. Although I had the horizontal engineers at the moment, these precious assets were to transition to our sister companies immediately following an allotted time block. Not a single minute in the defense was relinquished to fatigue or the enemy, and Anvil Company defeated repeated attempts from all cardinal directions to dislodge us from our position overlooking the single low water crossing in the southern area of the box. We enjoyed the benefit of training with our habitually attached sapper squad. The engineer battalion commander ensured that sapper squads attached to their respective maneuver unit for squad STX, squad LFX, Warrior Peak, and Mountain Peak.<sup>19</sup> The rehearsals and assigned tasks paid off as our first engagement with

**Figure 2 — Forms of Contact (Graphic courtesy of author)**



the enemy destroyed their breaching assets as they attempted to reduce the first obstacle. The JRTC Operations Group recommends that RTU “anti-tank units should remain mobile.”<sup>20</sup> Maintaining the principle of flexibility in the defense, the squad leaders fully understood the engagement criteria and destroyed multiple enemy vehicles while the enemy engaged us across multiple forms of contact over roughly 14 hours.<sup>21</sup> Anvil Company survived multiple mechanized attacks on our position, but unfortunately we lost our company trains to enemy aerial-delivered family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) munitions.

Following a successful defense, the battalion wasted no time pondering our losses. The battalion commander immediately directed our Charlie Company to move out across the low water crossing and seize as much terrain as possible towards the west, knowing that the following phase of brigade operations was going to be determined by how much ground we took between direct engagements with the enemy and not forgetting the offensive principle of audacity. Watching Charlie Company move past our position, Anvil Company leaders planned to move the next 9 kilometers without reliable communications because our batteries were depleted after the long hours in the defense. Charlie Company passed our Bravo Company to an objective further west overlooking a key low water crossing defended determinedly by the enemy. Using simple graphic control measures, I defined an AA behind Bravo Company, connected timed phase lines on linear danger areas for our company trains to leapfrog to, and assigned a few linkup points. Anvil Company turned our radios off for hours until we linked up with the battalion tactical command post to receive final coordination for a battalion attack on another piece of key terrain. While not perfect, this plan allowed us to save the precious batteries we had left for planned actions. This long daylight movement transitioned into a full period of darkness two-company fight to seize and hold a key intersection. The company-level energy-saving plan paid off as we had enough battery power to sustain us until our company trains linked up with the forward line of own troops (FLOT) the following morning.

During the hasty defense of an enemy counterattack, it became apparent that we had to maintain 360-degree security around the intersection of two high-speed avenues of approach while also quickly employing our anti-tank teams in the hunter-killer role. In the center of the company formation, I was able to dictate to platoon-level leadership to destroy incoming threats, and they in turn led respective anti-tank teams to destroy all enemy armored vehicles that approached our position. The employment of anti-tank teams led by either a squad leader, platoon sergeant, or platoon leader was the result of following a deliberate home-station training path that reflected the recommendations of the JRTC CALL Cell.<sup>22</sup> Every member of Anvil Company understood the capabilities and limitations of our organic anti-tank weapon systems, most importantly the M3 Carl Gustav.

While this is not a comprehensive review of everything Anvil Company and 2-22 IN accomplished at JRTC 22-03, it simply serves to offer anecdotal experience that worked for an aggressive rifle company enabled by a supportive and equally aggressive battalion HQ. The LSCO environment replicated at JRTC is intended to provide the RTU a worst-case scenario, which the OPFOR achieves with superior results. A LSCO environment will also provide an environment permeated with risk, but commanders that understand proactive and consistent risk management will enjoy the dividend of increased battlefield initiative. Risk management cannot be treated as a discrete event; instead, it is a persistent pursuit.<sup>23</sup> Commanders and units that limit their capabilities due to perceived constraints will never exploit the initiative. Communications issues, unclear enemy situation, or being tethered to a logistics package are all not excuses to wait for orders. Tactical units exist and fight in a realm of minutes, and they cannot yield the most precious thing they have — time — willingly to the enemy. Attack!

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> “How We Fight” is the white paper written by the brigade commander and distributed to battalion and company commanders during the training cycle. It emphasized mission command, communications architecture as an extension of mission command, and integration of all enablers and assets in the brigade to fight and win in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

<sup>2</sup> Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group series, “Light Fighting at the Joint Readiness Training Center, DATE Is Not a Slow Dance,” 15 December 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Robert R. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).

<sup>4</sup> Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.20, *Infantry Battalion*, December 2017, 2-46.

<sup>5</sup> Air Force COL (Retired) John Boyd theorized that “conflict is a series of time-competitive observation, orientation, decision, action cycles ... If one side in a conflict can consistently go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the other,





**Soldiers in Anvil Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, conduct a squad live-fire exercise in August 2021. (Photo by SPC Pierre Osias)**

it gains a tremendous advantage,” according to William S. Lind in his book *The Maneuver Warfare Handbook*.

<sup>6</sup> Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 3 December 2014. Notably absent from the 2019 edition of this pamphlet is specific branch guidance, but importantly the line: “The Ranger Course is essential in developing the knowledge, skill, abilities required to serve as a rifle platoon leader” (8-3).

<sup>7</sup> Dennis S. Burket, ed., *Large Scale Combat Operations: The Division Fight* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press, 2019).

<sup>8</sup> COL (Retired) Dandridge M. Malone, *Small-Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach*, (NY: Ballantine Books, 1983), 26.

<sup>9</sup> JRTC CALL Cell, “LSCO at JRTC,” January 2021, 55. (ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, July 19).

<sup>10</sup> Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters 1839-1865* (NY: Library of America, 1990), Overland Campaign.

<sup>11</sup> MG (Retired) Robert Scales, *Scales on War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), Chapter 12. Scales mentions what psychologists term “pallination,” which is the amplifying effect that physical touch has on keeping soldiers’ morale high, especially in low visibility.

<sup>12</sup> Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations*, 2-43: “Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.”

<sup>13</sup> Charles A. Krohn, *The Lost Battalion of TET: Breakout of the 2/12th Cavalry at Hue* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 210.

<sup>14</sup> JRTC CALL Cell, “BCTs in LSCO,” Echelonment of Fires, 16 (ATP 3-09.42, *Fire Support for the BCT*, March 2016, 2-60, accessed via JRTC Milsuite group).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> CPT William C. Baker, “The Anatomy of an Ambush: Small Kill Teams in the Contemporary Operating Environment,” *Armor* (July-August 2009).

<sup>17</sup> ATP 3-21.8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, April 2016, 3-172.

<sup>18</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 2017, 1-26.

<sup>19</sup> JRTC Operations Group, “The LSCO Fight at the JRTC,” 10. Conduct an Attack: “It becomes clear that BCTs lack a systematic approach to maximizing the various tools of each battalion/squadron and said units have rarely worked together.”

<sup>20</sup> JRTC Commander of Operations Group (COG) Strategic Engagement – 3Q, FY22, “IBCTs Kill Tanks.”

<sup>21</sup> ATP 3-21.20, *Forms of Contact*, 2-171.

<sup>22</sup> JRTC CALL Cell, "Home-station Battle Drills to Help Achieve Success in Large Scale Combat Operations," 2020.

<sup>23</sup> DA Pamphlet 385-30, *Risk Management*, December 2014, 1-1.

**CPT Zachary J. Matson** is an Infantry officer serving as a rifle company commander in the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, NY. His professional military education includes the Air Assault, Airborne, Jumpmaster, Pathfinder, and Ranger Courses; Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC); Bradley Leader Course; and the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, in 2016 with a bachelor's degree in English.