

Infantry

Winter 2021-2022




Headquarters, Department of the Army
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
PB 7-21-4

BG LARRY BURRIS
Commandant,
U.S. Army Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor

MICHELLE J. ROWAN
Deputy Editor



FRONT COVER:

Paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment conduct an airborne operation from a U.S. Air Force 86th Air Wing C-130 Hercules aircraft onto Juliet Drop Zone in Pordenone, Italy, on 7 December 2021. (Photo by Paolo Bovo)

BACK COVER:

Paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, engage targets during a live-fire exercise as part of Rock Klesman 21 at Pocek Range in Slovenia on 15 September 2021. (Photo by Paolo Bovo)



This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MARK F. AVERILL
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2135506

Distribution: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Infantry

WINTER 2021-2022

Volume 110, Number 4

DEPARTMENTS

- 1 COMMANDANT'S NOTE
- 3 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
- 3 THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE AT THE COMPANY AND BELOW
CPT Nick Gruning
SSG Vance Meier
- 8 EXEGETING THE ARMY ETHIC: THE TWO QUESTIONS ARMY PROFESSIONALS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES
Chaplain (MAJ) Jared L. Vineyard
- 13 ADDRESSING THE PREGNANT LEADER: FAMILY PLANNING FOR FEMALE COMBAT ARMS OFFICERS
1LT Christine Hogestyn
- 16 FIELD HYGIENE: THE INTERSECTION OF TRAINING, READINESS, LEADERSHIP, AND CARING FOR SOLDIERS
MAJ Robert W. Stillings Jr.
- 20 ONCE AN EAGLE: IDOL OR IDLE?
1LT Christopher L. Wilson
- 22 LOOKING FOR A FRONTAL ASSAULT? SUPPRESS THE ENEMY, THE RIGHT WAY
Anant Mishra
- 25 A BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM AND THE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
Mark A. Farrar, U.S. Army Retired
- 30 UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
CPT Dakota Eldridge
- 37 TRAINING NOTES
- 37 YET ANOTHER GUIDE TO RANGER SCHOOL
CPT Zachary C. Gust
- 40 UNDERSTANDING OUR FIRST ENEMIES IN THE COLD
LTC (Retired) Charles D. Henry
- 44 LESSONS FROM THE PAST
- 44 ENCIRCLED AT BASTOGNE: A CASE OF PROLONGED CARE
Dr. Grant Harward
- 49 U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS: A COLD WAR FOCUS
LTC (Retired) Brent C. Bankus
LTC (Retired) James O. Kievit
- 56 BOOK REVIEWS

Infantry (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.

Contact Information

Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-142, Fort Benning, GA 31905
Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951
Email: usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@army.mil

Commandant's Note

BG LARRY BURRIS



From the Challenges Arise Initiatives

Today — as throughout our Army's history — we face uncertain times. Such uncertainty includes: a revisionist Russia poised to threaten Ukraine; a Communist-led China threatening a democratically led Taiwan; a nuclear-hungry Iran preventing regional stability; and a rogue North Korea threatening some of our most valued allies — South Korea and Japan. During such times, the necessity of the Infantry Soldier always comes into question in light of technological solutions or waging war from other domains. However, history always bears out that regardless of technological innovations, armed conflict requires the Infantry Soldier to close with and destroy the enemy and then hold valuable terrain. Readers can survey many examples in which the Infantry was called on to do so in the article by retired LTCs Bankus and Kievit entitled "U.S. Involvement in Small Wars: A Cold War Focus." Therefore, during such uncertain times, the Infantry Branch must make an even more concerted effort to maintain its health, credibility, and future survivability. To accomplish this effort, we must first take measures to maximize the contributions of all our members regardless of gender or ethnicity. Three critical areas for consideration include acknowledging the value of diversity within our formations, recruiting diversity into our ranks, and developing each and every Soldier regardless of their demographic. Secondly, we must acknowledge the Infantry dismounted rifle squad is the fundamental building block of any Infantry formation.

All Infantry Soldiers — men and women alike — come to us with diverse life experiences and various levels of potential. It is their leaders' job to maximize the contributions to the organization that come from that diversity and develop those various levels of potential to ensure the greatest return for the Infantry. An inclusive leadership approach is critical to these efforts. Inclusive leadership is a willingness to grasp and consider multiple opinions and solutions from various unit members regardless of background or demographics. Inclusion allows divergent opinions and solutions to emerge, yielding more options for unit leadership than the singular solution sets resulting from a group of people with the same backgrounds and experiences. Infantry leaders can practice inclusive leadership by understanding the unique concerns that impact particular Soldiers within their formations. All Infantry leaders should read ILT Hogestyn's article in this edition, titled "Addressing the Pregnant Leader," to understand better how to coach and mentor our female Infantry Soldiers regarding the balance of motherhood and service as an Infantry leader.

Along with these diverse backgrounds, each recruit and young Soldier has a varying level of commitment to the Army

and the nation. It is inherent we protect the aspirations of those who have selflessly chosen to serve in the branch that incurs the most danger. We should provide them with the protection we expect anyone to provide our children or close family members. First, we provide such protection by establishing clear standards that enhance professional discipline and combat readiness. Second, we must communicate and apply those standards consistently.

We must provide an inclusive environment that communicates to everyone that they belong. The productivity of any work environment or profession increases when all members can envision a future in which they may play a more prominent role in the organization. However, some pundits, and more importantly, our Nation's enemies, point to diversity and inclusion efforts as our Army becoming weaker or less cohesive. We must inform and show them, that like our Nation, diversity and inclusion make us stronger, more resilient, and ultimately a more lethal force.

Ensuring diversity through our recruiting efforts provides two critical benefits to the Infantry Branch. One benefit includes ensuring the Infantry does not miss out on top talent due to inaccurate perceptions or historical events. Inaccurate perceptions may come from self-doubt regarding their ability to succeed in the Infantry and perceptions the Infantry does not want them based on its current demographics. The recruitment of our Infantry Soldiers falls under other organizations of the Army, and most of us can only play a supporting role in this effort. However, as discussed in the preceding section, we all can play a more defined role by establishing an inclusive environment.

Additionally, more maneuver room exists in recruiting talented and diverse officers into the Infantry. The majority of cadets spend almost four years learning about the Army and deliberating on their preferences for branch assignment. Over the past year, the U.S. Infantry School and the Office of the Chief of Infantry made concerted efforts to engage commissioning sources and individual ROTC programs. These engagements helped educate cadets on Infantry requirements and the Infantry career model. These efforts resulted in a significant gain in female officer accessions for the Infantry during the 2022 academic year branching cycle over previous years.

The second crucial aspect of recruiting diversity into the Infantry is that it helps establish the inclusive environment needed to allow diversity to flourish. Recruits must see

themselves when they see the unit's leaders. Such reflections help remove the bias of categorizing between them and us or automatic perceptions of unit leadership as preferential to one demographic. Also, when there is someone in leadership that the Soldier feels comfortable confiding to, the leadership team can identify systemic or emerging issues before they become debilitating to the organization. Additionally, leadership teams that reflect a cross-segment of the American population increase the chances that new Soldiers and officers will envision themselves rising in the Infantry Branch. The Infantry Branch will continue its current efforts. It will also work with the commissioning sources to develop new approaches for ensuring opportunities to acquire the best talent available.

The dismounted infantry squad provides the fundamental building block of any infantry formation. In this edition, LTC (Retired) Mark Farrar delivers a very descriptive article that compares a brigade combat team with an orchestra with the Infantry squad represented by orchestral strings. To quote LTC Farrar on the importance of the Infantry squad, "no strings — no orchestra." Hence, it follows that our Infantry squad leaders serve at the tip of the spear for mission accomplishment and provide the most influence during a Soldier's most impressionable years. Too often, we have tried to replace the value of the Infantry squad leader with technology and firepower. Often, our Infantry staff sergeants fail to receive enough time in this key developmental assignment. Alternatively, some argue that other assignments are adequate substitutions for squad leader time, such as a vehicle commander. While positions such as vehicle commander are essential to the force, such positions are not common to all infantry formations. Hence, counting time spent in these positions the same as dismounted infantry squad leader time can reduce an NCO's ability to serve across all formations. Ultimately, a lack of dismounted squad leader time can lead to a lack of career diversity as NCOs try to stay with what they know.

As we continue to move away from the paradigm of COIN-centric war to one of large-scale combat against peer threats, the value of time spent as a dismounted squad leader becomes ever more valuable. Our adversaries are building their armies in terms of technology and numbers. The Infantry squad leader will serve as the tip of the spear in future fights against a foe with superior numbers and much more advanced equipment than our adversaries in the past couple of decades. While obvious, it is worth emphasizing the following — the squad leaders of today will be the platoon

sergeants of tomorrow and possible company first sergeants in the next war. The time devoted to staff sergeants to serve as dismounted squad leaders contributes to their capability to train platoons and companies in their future leadership roles. Therefore, all of our Infantry staff sergeants must have the opportunity to serve for at least 12 months as dismounted infantry squad leaders.

We must also recognize that the dismounted infantry squad consists of individual Soldiers. Their ability to operate as part of the squad necessitates their mastery of individual tasks. An Infantry Soldier's attainment of the Expert Infantry Badge (EIB) is the most direct indicator for whether a Soldier has mastered these fundamental skills. Barring the issuance of any new regulations, the number of Soldiers in a squad with EIBs is probably the only metric of squad readiness currently available. Not all Soldiers may qualify for the EIB; however, the greatest value of the EIB lies in preparation for the test. There is no other time on a training schedule that the unit focuses solely on the basic Soldier skills for which a squad leader is generally responsible.

Additionally, there is no individual skills training event institutionalized throughout our Infantry formations as well as the EIB. The EIB provides a format for training that grounds the Infantry Soldier in the same tasks, conditions, and standards as his or her peers. At present, USAIS Pamphlet 350-6, *Expert Infantry Badge*, outlines the standards for the intent, training, testing, evaluation, and awarding of the EIB. Such specification certifies that the wearer has met the criteria of mastering the tasks required of an Infantry Soldier. This commonality provides each squad with a standard for individual readiness prior to collective training. Such progression ultimately leads to ready and capable Infantry squads.

The proceeding ideas are not novel or revolutionary; however, they bear repeating as much as possible. As budgetary pressures increase, organizations tend to turn inwards. Because of such organizational behavior, the training and development afforded to the dismounted infantry squad becomes an acceptable area for risk. However, these nine men and women are fundamental to the success of every echelon and type of Infantry formation and, thereby, any future conflict characterized by large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary. Like organizational fears, individual worries can cause leaders to turn inwards and surround themselves with those that resemble themselves the most. Only by rising above those fears will we ensure that we have the most talented and lethal Infantry force needed to defeat our Nation's enemies.





The Common Operational Picture at the Company and Below

CPT NICK GRUNING
SSG VANCE MEIER

At its essence, the common operational picture (COP) is a tool which feeds commanders information to inform decisions. In its entirety, this is comprised of running estimates and statuses across all warfighting functions that feed operational decisions. However, COPs are only as useful as the accuracy and timeliness of their content, which is often lacking even without the stress of ongoing operations. There are two principle reasons for this information shortfall. The first is the inability of battalion staffs to translate running estimates into coherent and prioritized information requirements that are tailored to their commander's COP. The second is an institutional lack of emphasis on command post (CP) operations at the company level and below, which translates into poor COP (information) management.

Information Management and Prioritization at the Battalion and Company Level

Management of information is one of the functions of a CP and is critical to an accurate COP. As COPs are designed to facilitate decisions by commanders, they are not “one size fits all” and must be informed by both staff estimates and the commander's intuition, which when prioritized and articulated in information requirements are then refined by company and below headquarters. For example, during summer months at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) for Class I (food and water) on-hand status and consumption rates are as critical to mission accomplishment as Class V (ammunition). For an infantry company tasked to conduct a movement to contact, accurate reporting of liquid, ammunition, casualties, and equipment (LACE) from the team to the battalion level will confirm or deny staff estimates of consumption rates. This will keep the battalion commander aware of whether or not that company is able to maintain tempo with the rest of the battalion or will require a halt to resupply.

The systemic failure points within the generic rifle battalion COP system

A Paratrooper assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division studies a map during Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation 21-05 at Fort Polk, LA, on 7 March 2021.

Photo by SGT Justin Stafford



are lack of analysis, lack of prioritization, and untrained or unrehearsed CP systems. Lack of analysis by warfighting function of each staff running estimate will not generate mission-specific information requirements. For example, if S2 and S4 cells do not collaborate and account for weather effects to adjust water consumption rates, they will provide their commander with an unrealistic expectation of resupply windows and consequently not generate pertinent reporting requirements for the companies. The inability to prioritize information requirements will result in information oversaturation and a consequent lack of focus at the company and below level, which is not equipped with a staff that can manage a wide swath of information requirements. Given that in summer conditions a company on the move can expect to deplete a water buffalo in 36 hours or less, an example of prioritization of an FFIR would be a consumption report of every 100 gallons of water depleted from the company water buffalo. Finally, at least for the battalion level, information may not be managed or updated due to lack of training (or cross-training) in CP operations, poor layout, or inadequate talent management. If a radio-telephone operator (RTO) receives an update in Class I status from a company but does not update and display that information requirement to inform the commander (whether by lack of knowledge of information requirements, lack of understanding of CP systems, or lack of care or competence), then the COP fails.

Institutional Lack of Emphasis of the COP at the Company and Below

At the company and below level, the problem of information management is similar. Lack of training, competence, and emphasis can result in critical information being mismanaged or not reported in a timely manner. For example, lack of junior leader development or emphasis can result in late or improper LACE reports from the team through squad levels, which provides inaccurate information to platoons and companies which will then blindside staff running estimates at the battalion level and consequently impact the commander's awareness of the battlefield. Poor information management techniques at the platoon and company level through a lack of rehearsed systems and poor headquarters personnel cross-training will also lead to late and lost reports to battalion, resulting in the same confusion at higher echelon.

The increasing brevity in length of CP appendixes from the battalion to company to platoon level exemplifies the decreasing level of institutional capital invested in information management at each echelon. Defined by Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, "the common operational picture is a display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command." Obviously this is a critical function that requires personnel, equipment, and training to systematically function (a CP). At the battalion level, this is accomplished by a staff operating both digital and analog systems, doctrinally guided by a 13-page appendix in Army

Poor information management techniques at the platoon and company level through a lack of rehearsed systems and poor headquarters personnel cross-training will also lead to late and lost reports to battalion, resulting in the same confusion at higher echelon.

Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.20, *Infantry Battalion*. At the company level, which by doctrinal definition is the lowest echelon at which the COP exists (informs a commander), it is accomplished with a company headquarters using primarily analog systems guided by a three-page appendix in ATP 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company*. Finally, while platoon CPs are referenced in ATP 3-21.8, *Infantry Platoon and Squad*, their functions are not defined in doctrine. Despite the fact that any appendix supporting platoon CP functions would be undeniably simplistic, by not defining roles and offering techniques for the operation of a platoon headquarters, doctrine has failed to instruct the lowest echelon of headquarters on how to manage information.

As defined by ADRP 6-0, the COP is a commander's tool. This definition precludes its existence at the platoon level, at least in the U.S. Army. However, when one takes a step back from visions of a COP as a suite of electronics and necks it down to what light infantry rifle companies and below use to maintain situational awareness, which is typically a map board capable of holding several overlays and a margin for notes, the company COP looks suspiciously like the same product that exists in a platoon headquarters. Beyond the doctrinal language that makes it exclusive to commanders, it is the same product used to maintain situational awareness and inform decisions by the lowest level of infantry headquarters.

Acknowledgment that the COP exists at the platoon level is more than a superficial gesture. It needs to drive an update to doctrine and professional military education which will begin teaching new infantry lieutenants the importance of understanding the wider operational environment and managing information at their level. Due to the restricted nature of the terrain at JRTC, the wide variety of non-habitual attachments that infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) employ, and the complexity of the environment, companies and platoons that can synchronize their understanding of their area of operations have a significantly increased ability to coordinate efforts with adjacent and supporting units as well as avoid fratricide.

Observed Trends: COP Systems at the Company and Below

In quixotic terms, developing and maintaining the COP at the company level is a windmill joust. While a challenge at any echelon, the reason that companies and, by exten-

sion, platoons are unable to build or maintain a COP is due to a lack of institutional knowledge, manning, and training. If company command teams understand what information they need to manage, select the right personnel to fill the company headquarters, cross-train those personnel to operate the company's communication systems within the battalion's PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan, and enforce timely and accurate reporting of their information requirements, they will be successful at COP management. Unfortunately, the norm for IBCT companies is astride the back of a geriatric equine, visor down and lance in hand, hurtling towards an eco-friendly power source.

Some companies arrive at JRTC with a robust analog system full of trackers and a map. Most of the time, these systems are accurate throughout reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) but lose relevance almost immediately upon entering the training area. Other companies arrive with a 1:50,000 map and nothing else beyond a vague concept which resides solely in the commander's head. Rarely does a unit actually understand and prioritize the information it needs to successfully own its COP, and cross-training across the company headquarters personnel is never sufficient to successfully manage the COP for the duration of the rotation.

What is undefined, or at least under-defined, by most company commanders is what constitutes relevant information at the company level. This results in either an overcrowded and overcomplicated product that overwhelms the operator with a mix of essential and impertinent information or an undeveloped product that provides nothing more than subordinate unit locations. Both of these examples are detrimental to providing the commander with relevant information. Successful companies adjust systems throughout the rotation until they develop a manageable product that facilitates information management. Some of the most effective examples are simply a laminated piece of a Meal, Ready to Eat (MRE) cardboard or the margins of a map board; as long as it is reliably systematic, looks do not matter.

Defining relevant information is a mission-specific task and should start with a dissection of battalion-level information requirements. After those information requirements are either adjusted or mirrored on the company COP, then commanders can determine what additional information they need to prompt a decision. In the defense, this might be anti-tank (AT) weapon system status and round quantity by type. In the offense, it might be platoon estimates of quarts of water per Soldier during an extended dismounted movement. In all operations, combat power is critical to timely decision making.

Beyond the physical format of the COP, selection and cross-training of headquarters personnel are the other two points of COP management failure for rifle companies. Fully manning a company headquarters is part of the challenge. Given that rifle platoons are typically at 75-percent strength, there is a temptation to either not fill both junior and senior



Photo by Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division take part in training at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk on 14 October 2020.

company RTO positions, or to fill one or both of them with profile Soldiers to alleviate burdens on platoons. While this may work in garrison, this is significantly detrimental in the field environment as both RTOs are needed to facilitate 24-hour CP operations both with company trains or forward with the commander. Reluctance to fill all 11B headquarters positions with able-bodied personnel is directly related to the trend of utilizing the company 25U communications sergeant to dual-hat as the company RTO. While this seems like a "two birds with one stone" economization of manpower, it limits the 25U from focusing on the management and troubleshooting of all of the company's communications systems and removes depth from the command post's personnel bench, which impacts its ability to conduct continuous operations and maintain the COP.

Another common friction point for company headquarters that is rooted in home station is the relationship with its fire support team (FIST). Appendix A of ATP 3-21.10 lists the FIST as part of the company headquarters. However, the FIST's integration into company headquarters operations is

only as successful as the frequency with which it trains with the company and masters the company's systems. FISTs that spend more time integrated into their rifle companies are well conditioned to manage the company COP, while FISTs that spend most of their time consolidated either at the infantry or artillery battalion are less familiar with company systems and subsequently less effective at managing the COP as well as other headquarters systems. To ensure FISTs remain integrated into company CP operations, a standard operating procedure (SOP) for headquarters operations must be developed and shared by the company.

The cross-training of all headquarters personnel on digital, radio, and analog systems is chronically under conducted. To achieve redundancy across multiple CP nodes, all headquarters personnel need to have the technical competence to operate all radios and digital systems within the company and battalion's PACE plan. Headquarters personnel also need to understand each of the company's analog tracking systems to ensure information is managed timely and effectively. However, companies often arrive at JRTC with less than half of their headquarters personnel who can effectively operate a Joint Battlefield Command Platform (JBCP), even less who can troubleshoot an Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP), and only one or two who can use a Distributed Tactical Communication System (DTCS). Analog systems are even more abused, barely surviving RSOI with any degree of accuracy and promptly forgotten about once the unit enters the training area.

Units also struggle with common operational picture redundancy. Overall, this is a graduate-level problem considering that there is enough difficulty in managing one COP. However, if the company headquarters is split, the company executive officer (XO) needs to maintain situational awareness and be prepared to assume command if the commander is taken out of the fight. If the XO has the time to manage a COP, a semblance of situational awareness will exist. Unfortunately, the trend during most rotations is that the XO's bandwidth is entirely consumed by running the company's sustainment operations, resulting in no COP management occurring at the company trains due to the lack of trained headquarters personnel besides the XO.

Techniques for a Successful Company COP and CP

At the core of an accurate company COP is a trained and competent company headquarters. All positions need to be filled to create the depth in the bench that facilitates continuous operations across both primary and alternate command posts. Mature, intelligent, and fit Soldiers who can operate communications systems and update the COP's analog systems need to be selected to fill these positions. Cross-training of communication and analog systems must be completed across all duty positions. The analog products companies bring to the field need to be utilized daily by headquarters personnel in garrison as well, which will create muscle memory.

When all elements of the company are collocated and the threat is low, one COP is sufficient. While conducting operations in a contested environment, both the primary CP (with the commander) and the alternate CP (with the XO) need a COP. The commander's COP will be primarily operations and intelligence focused, run by his fire support officer (FSO) and RTO (similar to a tactical command post — TAC). The XO's COP, often run from company trains and typically further from contact, will be the full COP to support all of the company's and battalion's information requirements across all warfighting functions. If the commander is dismounted, the XO can also serve as the digital crossover point with higher and adjacent units via the JBCP.

The most effective physical system for the company COP is the map board, even for the XO's COP on company trains. While the fold up "football" concept white boards and/or tri-folds are alluring for their ready display of information, the ease of portability of the map board makes it more user friendly to update for the RTO either in the patrol base or sitting in the commander's high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV); it also facilitates rapid displacement in case of compromise. Additionally, if the commander becomes a casualty and the XO assumes command, he or she will already have a dismountable map board COP ready. Overall, the best practice is a small map board with enough unformatted space (usually one-quarter to one-third of one side of the board, or the back) to fit the battalion and company-level information requirements and statuses. Formalizing a common size for map boards across a company also facilitates the production and distribution of overlays. Finally, if they are commonly understood, sterilized graphics can be used to reduce risk of compromise if the unit is overrun.

Although ideally the COP is updated in real time, this sometimes does not happen due to stresses of operations or lack of training. Companies must synchronize their COPs with the battalion's via operation orders (OPORDs) and commander's update briefs (CUBs), pulling information from the battalion RTO or physically travelling to the battalion main CP or TAC to gain relevant information. They must then ensure that platoon COPs are updated via either time- or conditions-based syncs or through the orders process. Units successfully manage to keep COPs up to date by enforcing conditions-based COP syncs either as a condition to cross the line of departure or as part of priorities of work during patrol base operations.

Techniques for a Successful Platoon COP and CP

The platoon COP is as robust as it needs to be for the platoon leadership to manage information which supports the company's information requirements as well as for the platoon leadership to stay informed of the fight two levels up. As the lowest level of headquarters in the Army, the platoon still needs to manage information, maintain situational awareness, and make decisions, all which are facilitated by the COP. The functionality of platoon leaders' map

boards should mirror their commanders' for ease of overlay exchanges.

The majority of the time, the COP will be managed by platoon leaders, their RTOs, and their forward observers (FO). When conducting patrol base operations, however, the platoon must formalize CP operations to ensure key leaders get rest. The platoon CP is comprised of the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, RTO, and medic. Across this group, what constitutes higher headquarters information requirements must be understood, along with how to physically make updates to the platoon COP. This can be augmented by the sergeant of the guard (SOG) and a radio guard, if codified in a platoon SOP.

Way Forward

The nature of the Army is to stovepipe information within individual entities. A conscious effort needs to be made to prioritize information requirements from the top down to clearly articulate what the higher headquarters needs to know from subordinate elements. Hand in hand with that, institutional investment in clear and concise reporting from the team to the company level, along with the question of "what do I know, and who else needs to know it?" through focus in entry-level training and professional military education, would reestablish the framework for information sharing and management. In

lieu of a formal doctrinal solution, units and installations would benefit from providing companies and platoons courses on COP systems and information management.

The COP needs to be doctrinally redefined from being solely a commander's tool to encompassing all levels of headquarters, including the platoon. The implications of poor situational awareness can be as dangerous at the platoon level as they are at the company level, and the COP is a mechanism for maintaining situational awareness. If it is truly a common operational picture — and not a commander's operational picture — then we collectively should acknowledge that it already exists on many platoon leaders' map boards across the Army, as well as provide some training on how to manage a COP at maneuver basic officer leader courses and the Maneuver Captains Career Course.

CPT Nick Gruning served as a company team senior observer-coach-trainer (OCT) in Task Force 2, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group at Fort Polk, LA, from February 2019 to July 2021. He is currently a student at the Command and General Staff Officers Course.

SSG Vance Meier served as a platoon sergeant OCT in Task Force 2, JRTC Operations Group from 2017-2021. He is currently assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY.

Soldiers assigned to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division take part in training operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, on 20 August 2020.

Photo by Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group



Exegeting the Army Ethic:

The Two Questions Army Professionals Should Ask Themselves

CHAPLAIN (MAJ) JARED L. VINEYARD

Exegesis. While this may not be a word that is often or ever used in everyday conversations, it is a very important word. A very basic definition of exegesis is “a critical explanation or interpretation of a text or portion of a text.”¹ This term is familiar to most pastors and chaplains who regularly look at and wrestle with sacred scriptures. The purpose in doing so, for many, is to uncover the meaning of the particular verse or passage in order to first understand and then to apply what is written. While deep thought on religious doctrine is absolutely appropriate, what about deep thought on Army doctrine? The word doctrine, coming “from (the) Latin *doctrina*, generally means the body of teachings presented to a group for acceptance.”² The Army defines doctrine as “fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and as a guide for actions of operating forces, and elements of the institutional force that directly support operations in support of national objectives.”³ And while Army doctrine covers almost every conceivable aspect of Soldiering, at its heart is a desire for the American Soldier at echelon to “do the right thing for the right reasons.”⁴ While a noble goal, one might ask if Army doctrine provides a guide to help leaders and Soldiers make the right decisions?

Fortunately, the answer is yes. The purpose of this article is to exegete and explain how the Army ethic answers this question while demonstrating that every Army professional regardless of position or rank should always ask themselves (and be able to answer) two basic questions: “**Can I?**” and “**Should I?**”

These two questions, while not explicit in doctrine, are yet deeply rooted in the ethos of the American Soldier. This idea is foundational when one understands the purpose of the Army ethic. The Army ethic is the set of enduring moral principles, values, beliefs, and laws that guide the Army profession and create the culture of trust essential to Army professionals in the conduct of missions, performance of duty, and all aspects of life.⁵

According to doctrine, this ethic is “the basis of the Army’s shared professional identity... guides institutional policy and practice... and unites all Army professionals to live by and uphold.”⁶ And while the Army ethic is discussed at length in doctrine, one might be challenged to hear a conversation about it in the operational force. This lack of discussion may occur for many reasons, one of which could simply be a misunderstanding of what it means. If the ethic is

Soldiers discuss mission plans during training at Pohakuloa Training Area, HI, on 18 October 2021.

Photo by SPC Rachel Christensen

misunderstood, it will likely be misapplied in the operational environment. Or as in many cases, the Army ethic is simply unknown and not thought about by Soldiers and leaders. If this is the case, it will therefore never be applied, at least intentionally. Both of these scenarios are unsatisfactory.

But before continuing, a brief defining of terminology is appropriate. The Army often uses terms such as morals and ethics loosely and interchangeably. And while these terms are most definitely related, they are not exactly the same. A recent publication, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 165-19, *Moral Leadership*, helps explain the differences between these two terms. The definitions include:

Morals: A sense of right and wrong in principles, values, and conduct. Federal law recognizes the moral responsibility of every Army leader...

Ethics: A system of moral principles, or rules of conduct recognized in respect to a class of human actions, a particular group or culture. Ethics reflects upon how morality is practically applied to a decision made in contexts and communities.⁷

Additionally, the word “ethic” itself needs defining. A definition for an ethic is “a set of moral principles guiding decisions and actions.”⁸ Thus, for Army leaders, it might be helpful to understand that the difference between morals and ethics and specifically the Army ethic is similar to the difference between the tactical and the strategic levels of war. Morals can be viewed as tactical, that is on a lower level or more personally focused, while ethics and the Army ethic specifically are more strategic or big picture. What this means is that every Soldier has his or her own set of moral beliefs. These are formed over time from a variety of sources such as family, faith, education, experiences, and so on. These beliefs are cemented in the conscience of each person, which directly impacts leadership. Leadership doctrine tells us that “a leader’s character consists of their true nature guided by their conscience, which affects their moral attitudes and actions.”⁹ And while high personal morals are encouraged in Army leaders, all leaders must also remember that they are charged to live under the Army ethic as well. Therefore, Soldiers must look to both personal (tactical) values as well as Army (strategic) values to make decisions. When ethical issues arise, Army leadership doctrine affirms, “Soldiers make the best judgement possible based on their understanding of the Army ethic and their conscience, as applied to the immediate situation.”¹⁰ The individual conscience along with the Army ethic assists personnel in making tough decisions. And while the individual moral compass may vary from person to person, the Army ethic frames all Soldiers within the force. The Army ethic gives each and every Soldier that broad understanding of what is right and wrong. But how should it be understood? This brings us back to the Army ethic itself.

While it may be true that after a quick reading of the Army ethic, one may walk away confused at what is truly being conveyed, a closer look will reveal much with regards to depth and guidance. The first half of the Army ethic’s defini-




Figure 1¹⁴

tion focuses on “what it is,” while the second half focuses on “what it does.” Let’s take the second part first, that is the “what it does” part. This part states that the ethic helps to “guide the Army profession and create the culture of trust essential to Army professionals in the conduct of missions, performance of duty, and all aspects of life.”¹¹ The two verbs in this section highlight what the ethic does for the organization which are to guide and create. The Army ethic guides the profession and creates a culture of trust for professionals. And while much could be said about the profession in general, it is enough for now to simply define it. The Army profession is “a trusted vocation of Soldiers and Army civilians whose collective expertise is the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower; serving under civilian authority; and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.”¹² This is the context of the Army ethic. And when the ethic is applied well, it both guides and creates within this context and within its people.

But one cannot expect to reap the benefits of what the ethic does if one does not first understand what the ethic is, which is often and unfortunately missed by many Army leaders. This hypothesis can be easily tested by asking a group of leaders to define or describe the Army ethic. The standard answer is typically no answer. If leaders hope to reap the benefits of the Army ethic, then they must first understand what the Army ethic is. So, what is it specifically? It is “the set of enduring moral principles, values, beliefs and laws...”¹³ While it may seem that this is a list of separate and unrelated ideas, the conjunction breaks the definition into two distinct categories, the first being “moral principles, values, beliefs” while the second is “laws.” With this distinction one can see the two general categories that emerge to create the ethic. The first is moral (which includes principles, values, and beliefs) and the second is legal. Again, “an ethic” represents a strategic or big picture concept while “moral” represents a more tactical or individually oriented idea. This means that if an Army professional is going to live the Army ethic, he or she must take into consideration both moral and legal principles. Thus, to answer the question “is it ethical or

does it comply with the Army ethic?,” one must first ask the questions: “Is it legal?” and “Is it moral?” A graphical way to depict this concept can be seen in Figure 1.

While legal and moral are very broad categories, they give the Army professional two areas to begin to think deeply about. All Army professionals must follow the law, which means to do what is right legally. This large category could be further



Figure 2

subdivided into two categories which include national laws (including state and local laws) as well as organizational laws (including directives, policies, and Uniformed Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]). When talking about national laws, it is a given that all citizens of a nation must follow the laws of the land, no matter what their occupation or profession. But when it comes to a profession, all professionals must also follow the rules and codes of their organization or profession. These rules and protocols help “members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart... (which) has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence...”¹⁵ Therefore, for an Army professional, doing what is legal implies both categories, national as well as organizational. To neglect either of those would imply punishment or punitive action.

While the legal side of the ethic is focused on law, the moral side of the ethic is focused on conscience. These moral principles, values, (and) beliefs, while learned over a lifetime, are implemented daily by Soldiers and leaders through their conscience. The White Paper entitled “The Army’s Framework for Character Development” was very explicit about this idea when it defined the conscience as “beliefs about right and wrong.”¹⁶ When put together, legal is what a professional will do (or not do), while moral is what a professional ought to do (or ought not to do). The moral category, just like legal, could also be broken into two subcategories; this time the first is organizational while the second is individual. Organizational conscience is not an area that Army leaders talk about much, at least not in those terms, but this is exactly what they mean every time a leader mentions Army Values or the Warrior Ethos. Every time these ideals are spoken, leaders unknowingly point to the “conscience of the Army,” which again are moral principles, values, (and) beliefs that

Army professionals ought to know and believe in.

And while the “conscience of the Army,” as seen through Army Values and other principles, is absolutely necessary, the individual Army professionals do not simply leave their beliefs and values at the door when they join the profession. Army leaders are called to have a high set of personal moral beliefs which they must

personally rely on. These morals help leaders as they make hard decisions in harder circumstances with little help and in little time. Army doctrine has a strong sense that a leader’s moral compass is at the heart of every ethical decision that he or she makes. This is easily shown from the sentence quoted earlier: “Soldiers make the best judgement possible based on their understanding of the Army ethic and their conscience, as applied to the immediate situation.”¹⁷ This sentence states that while the conscience of the Army must be taken into consideration (in the Army ethic) so must the conscience of the Army professional. Only when both are consulted and agreed upon does a decision carry full moral weight. Graphically, what has been described above might look something like Figure 2.

Now coming back to the two larger categories of moral and legal, the Army ethic demands that all Army professionals take both areas into consideration in order to make a proper decision. And while this is fairly understandable, a leader may still look at those two categories as very nebulous and broad. This is true due to the fact that they must cover a range of decisions that a leader will make. And while giving guidance, it is impossible for doctrine to fully guide every

Figure 3¹⁸

Foundations of the Army Ethic		
Applicable to:	Legal Motivation of Compliance	Moral Motivation of Aspiration
Army profession <i>Trust</i> <i>Honorable service</i> <i>Military expertise</i> <i>Stewardship</i> <i>Esprit de corps</i>	United States Constitution United States Code Uniform Code of Military Justice Executive Orders Treaties, Law of Land Warfare	Declaration of Independence Universal Declaration of Human Rights Just War Tradition (Jus ad Bellum) Army culture of trust Professional organizational climate
Trusted Army professionals <i>Honorable servants</i> <i>Army experts</i> <i>Stewards</i>	Oaths of Service Standards of conduct Directives and policies The Soldier’s Rules Rules of engagement	Natural moral reason – Golden Rule Army Values Soldier’s and Army Civilian Corps creeds Justice in War (Jus in Bello)
The <i>Army ethic</i> , our professional ethic, is the set of enduring moral principles, values, beliefs, and applicable laws embedded within the <i>Army culture of trust</i> that motivates and guides the Army profession and <i>trusted Army professionals</i> in conduct of the mission, performance of duty, and all aspects of life.		

individual in every ethical decision or circumstance that he or she may face. But in order to help, doctrine does present a matrix which forms the foundation of the Army ethic and creates a baseline for proper ethical decision making. This matrix (see Figure 3) presents 22 specific ideas, documents, or principles, depending on how one counts them, which set the standard for leaders in the fulfillment of the ethic.

A brief description and explanation of this matrix is now appropriate. At the bottom (or foundation) of the matrix is the Army ethic itself. The audience of the ethic, that is who it is applicable to, is annotated on the left-hand side, which is the Army profession at large (top left) and Army professionals specifically (bottom left) along with the corresponding attributes. The two other general columns give Army professionals specific guiding ideals and principles that they will comply with legally along with ideals and principles that they ought to aspire to morally. One could say that these are what a professional “will do” and what a professional “ought to do.” These principles are more specifically depicted in four quadrants which are graphically portrayed. The top two boxes focusing on the legal and moral principles that give overarching guidance to the profession at large while the bottom two boxes present principles for individual professionals to apply in their specific situations. For instance, a Soldier must not legally violate the Law of Land Warfare (top legal box), which can be applied by following the Soldier’s Rules or theater-specific rules of engagement (ROE) (lower legal box). The general legal principle is the Law of Land Warfare, which is specifically lived out by the Army professional knowing and following the Soldier’s Rules or ROE. Another example, this one on the moral side, is that all Army professionals are charged with creating a culture of trust within their organization (top moral box). One way that an Army professional may choose to accomplish this is by personally living and teaching the Army Values (lower moral box). The general moral principle is the Army culture of trust, which might be specifically lived out by the Army professional knowing and living Army Values. The bottom line is that this matrix is foundational to the Army ethic as it instructs Soldiers and leaders “what they will do” and “what they ought to do.”

One final point on “what the ethic is” needs to focus on the word enduring. Enduring can be defined as “existing for a long time,” with synonyms that include imperishable, durable, lasting, and even permanent.¹⁹ What does this added word convey to the Army professional? At a minimum, it implies that decisions must not be made on whims nor made from hastily created norms. The ethical decisions made by Army professionals must be thoughtful and thought out. It demonstrates that the ethos of the Soldier is rooted in a long heritage of tradition and honor. In fact, doctrine itself states



Figure 4

this very point. The four strains of thought that have come together to create the Army ethic include “the philosophical heritage, theological, and cultural traditions, and the historical legacy that frame our Nation.”²⁰ These durable streams of ideas running into the mighty river of the Army ethic form the enduring ideals that the ethic represents. It is the moral and the legal principles of the Army ethic that Army professionals must consult to guide them in their decision making. These principles are time-tested and enduring.

This brings us full circle back to the two questions that every Army professional must ask themselves: “Can I?” and “Should I?”

These two questions encompass the fullness of the Army ethic in that they represent the two components in question form. “Can I?” is a legal question. Can I do this or can I do that? The response would be to ask: “Are there any laws, policies, directives, etc., preventing you from doing (or not doing) something?” “Should I?” on the other hand is a moral question. Should I do this or should I say that? This is the question of “ought” as opposed to “will or must” and points back to the conscience of both the organization and individual. Graphically, the questions can be added to the previous illustration, seen in Figure 4.

Therefore, to know what the Army ethic would say in a specific situation, a Soldier would ask “can I...?” and “should I...?” before making a decision.

Thus, assuming the Army ethic is what it says it is, which is “the basis of the Army’s shared professional identify... (that) guides institutional policy and practice... and unites all Army professionals to live by and uphold.”²¹ And assuming that the Army ethic is made up of both moral and legal ideals and principles, what happens when an Army professional is faced with complying with an illegal order? Or, to change the scenario, what happens when an Army professional is faced with executing an immoral order? What is a leader to do? While it may seem intuitive that both of these would go directly against the words and spirit of the Army ethic, doctrine

Figure 5²³

is also very clear on what a leader or any Army professional must to do in those cases. The bottom line is that “Army forces reject and report illegal, unethical, or immoral orders or actions... Soldiers are bound to obey the legal and moral orders of their superiors; but they must disobey an unlawful or immoral order.”²² Quite simply, Army leaders do not follow illegal or immoral orders. The difference is with conjunctions or connecting words, and specifically the conjunctions “and” vs “or.” For an order to be ethical, it must be legal AND moral. While an order could be unethical if it is illegal OR immoral. Graphically, using the red light/green light concept, it might be portrayed like Figure 5.

Living the Army ethic demands that leaders know and do what is both morally and legally allowable and reject what is not. Compromise on these issues is nonnegotiable because it is not merely a compromise of one decision or a compromise by one individual; it represents a compromise for the entire profession.

And this profession by its very nature, above most others, must be rooted in an ethic. The reason for this statement is that the Army profession deals with violence. This was viewed earlier in the definition of the profession. The Army’s ultimate role involves the “application of landpower.”²⁴ Applying landpower involves many things, one of which is violence. But it is not simply violence because it is not simply the “application of landpower” that the Army is responsible for conducting — it is the “ethical... application of landpower.”²⁵ The Army must be ethical when it is lethal. This principle is powerfully illustrated in a quote by Carl von Clausewitz: “The soldier trade, if it is to mean anything at all, has to be anchored to an unshakable code of honor. Otherwise, those of us who follow the drums become nothing more than a bunch of hired assassins walking around in gaudy clothes... a disgrace to God and mankind.”²⁶ While explicitly extolling the need for a code of honor, Clausewitz implicitly appeals to the ethos or the ethic of the Soldier. Therefore, at some level every Soldier is an ethicist, and all who think about lethality must also think about ethicality. A more modern affirmation of this idea comes from GEN (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, who wrote, “Maintaining our force’s moral compass was not a difficult concept to understand. Armies without discipline are mobs; killing without legal and moral grounds is murder.”²⁷ Army professionals must be ethical, or bad things will happen in already bad situations, which includes combat. The Army must know and train in the area of ethics.

Fortunately, Army doctrine has not left leaders or Soldiers on their own to “figure it out” for themselves. Army profes-

sionals have the Army ethic to assist them in doing “the right thing for the right reasons.”²⁸ Exegeting or looking critically at the Army ethic allows Soldiers to ask themselves “can I?” and “should I?” It is only after answering these two ques-

tions that Soldiers can truly make ethical decisions and thereby live out the calling as Army professionals that they are legally and morally obligated to fulfill.

Notes

- ¹ “Exegesis,” Dictionary.com, 3 May 2021, accessed from <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/exegesis>.
- ² Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-01, *Doctrine Primer*, July 2019, 1-1.
- ³ Ibid, 1-2.
- ⁴ ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, July 2019, 2-6.
- ⁵ Ibid, 1-6.
- ⁶ Ibid, 1-7.
- ⁷ Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 165-19, *Moral Leadership*, 27 November 2020, 2.
- ⁸ “The Army’s Framework for Character Development,” Army White Paper, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2017, 17.
- ⁹ ADP 6-22, 2-1.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, 1-4.
- ¹¹ Ibid, 1-6.
- ¹² Ibid, 1-2.
- ¹³ Ibid, 1-6.
- ¹⁴ “United States Constitution” and “Declaration of Independence,” accessed from archives.gov on 30 April 2021, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs>. According to ADP 6-22, 1-7, these are the foundational legal (Constitution) and moral (Declaration) documents of our nation and Army.
- ¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 10.
- ¹⁶ “The Army’s Framework for Character Development,” 17.
- ¹⁷ ADP 6-22, 1-4.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, 1-7.
- ¹⁹ “Enduring,” Cambridge.org, 30 April 2021, accessed from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/enduring>.
- ²⁰ ADP 6-22, 1-7.
- ²¹ Ibid, 1-7.
- ²² Ibid, 1-4.
- ²³ Traffic light clip art was taken from www.all-free-download.com, 30 April 2021.
- ²⁴ ADP 6-22, 1-2.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Shannon French, *The Code of the Warrior* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 6.
- ²⁷ GEN (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task* (NY: Penguin Group, 2013), 135.
- ²⁸ ADP 6-22, 1-6.

Chaplain (MAJ) Jared Vineyard currently serves as the Ethics Instructor and Writer at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA. He has served as a chaplain for the past 12 years. Prior to that, Chaplain Vineyard served as a Field Artillery officer. He has been deployed as both a Field Artillery officer (Iraq, 2003-2004) and as a chaplain (Afghanistan, 2010-2011). He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, in 2002 and has earned two graduate degrees, a Master of Divinity from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2008 and a Master of Sacred Theology from Yale Divinity School in 2019.

Addressing the Pregnant Leader: *Family Planning for Female Combat Arms Officers*

1LT CHRISTINE HOGESTYN

Consider this: An Infantry officer discovers that she is pregnant two months into her platoon leader time. She is highly competitive among her peers in her battalion, and she was looking forward to leading a platoon and developing her subordinate leaders. This pregnancy came at an inopportune time in her career, and she is initially very hesitant to inform her commander for fear of immediately losing her platoon. She understands, however, that she will not be able to continue physically leading her platoon from the front throughout her entire pregnancy. She is unaware of how her pregnancy will affect her physical performance, and of how her unit will respond and perceive her once they learn that she is pregnant.

Her company and battalion commanders, meanwhile, have never had a pregnant subordinate leader before. They are unsure of what measures she will need to take to guarantee her own safety and that of her baby. If this pregnant infantry platoon leader is stripped of her platoon and treated as though she no longer adds value to her organization, this will keep her from being competitive with her peers and likewise cause her to believe that becoming a mother is inherently at odds with infantry leadership. If, conversely, this officer is allowed to remain a platoon leader throughout much of her pregnancy in order to “check the box” of her critical leadership role as a lieutenant, she will take away from her unit’s lethality rather than adding to it. In addition, her peers and her Soldiers might develop negative perceptions of her as a leader because of physical restrictions that keep her from leading at full capacity. This leader faces a relatively new and puzzling dilemma: Should she relinquish her platoon and lose the experience that had drawn her to the Infantry in the first place? Or should she complete her platoon leader time during her pregnancy? With few examples and mentors of combat arms leaders who have faced this predicament, this leader is alone in her decision.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the discussion vis-à-vis pregnancy in the Army has shifted dramatically. During 20 years of enduring conflict, pregnancy and motherhood were often seen as factors that compromised female Soldiers’ ability to deploy and their focus on performing missions overseas. In accordance with the Army’s recent announcement of a “people first” initiative, it now must navigate supporting female Soldiers as they grow their families while fully leveraging them as assets to their respective teams, despite physical constraints that may alter some aspects of their performance.¹

This is easier said than done. Army leadership does not intend to professionally penalize women on the basis of pregnancy and family planning. However, there are many challenges that inherently accompany the physical limitations that a pregnancy (and the initial postpartum period) imposes, which ultimately do temporarily compromise a pregnant woman’s readiness. Addressing these challenges will help the Army to retain serving mothers and to put its “people first” initiative into practice.

Protections in Place (the Pregnancy Profile)

The Army’s policies regarding pregnancy allow women extensive protection from conditions that might harm themselves or their children. The pregnancy profile that all pregnant Soldiers fall under prohibits them from riding in military vehicles on unimproved roads, restricts them from wearing body armor, and protects them from standing in formation for periods of more than 15 minutes. It additionally states that women who are over 28 weeks pregnant should not work more than 8 hour days, to include the time they spend at physical training (PT). The profile furthermore removes pregnant Soldiers from PT with their unit to participate in the Army’s Pregnancy and Postpartum PT (P3T) program, among more restrictions.²

While these protections are in mothers’ best interests, they also inherently limit leaders from performing many aspects of their jobs, depending on their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). This begs the question: How can the Army allow pregnant leaders to remain competitive within their respective fields without compromising unit readiness or violating the Army’s Equal Opportunity (EO) policy regarding pregnancy discrimination?³

The Pregnancy Dilemma

In the absence of clear doctrine surrounding what positions women may or may not fill professionally, a pregnancy profile allows a woman’s chain of command to have discretion over whether to assume risks based on where they place the pregnant leader. The chain of command is aware, thanks to her profile, of what a pregnant leader can or cannot do; and should she violate her profile and incur injury to herself or her baby, the chain of command assumes responsibility. However, while they are aware of restrictions to her daily duties and activities, her leaders are not equipped with any guidance of how to place this pregnant woman or help manage her career.

With the recent integration of women into combat arms roles, women may be subject to pressures to occupy key

developmental (KD) positions while pregnant. Their respective chains of command, likewise, might feel uncomfortable removing them from leadership positions due to a pregnancy, especially since the Army's updated EO policy guarantees Soldiers equal opportunity regardless of sex and pregnancy.⁴ This poses problems in newly integrated combat arms branches in which a pregnancy profile directly limits a woman's ability to perform basic functions in a field environment.

Social Repercussions and Perceptions

Women who experience an unexpected pregnancy when beginning a KD assignment may fear professional repercussions of stepping down from their role or not filling a leadership role due to their physical constraints. Some might be inclined to assume a greater risk to themselves or their child than their profile allows in order to effectively perform their duty. On the contrary, women who choose to relinquish their position during a pregnancy might worry that they have compromised their professional timeline or foregone the opportunity to lead. They might further feel that they will be perceived by their male peers, chains of command, and by their Soldiers as not being assets to the unit.

Ultimately, units and particularly leaders have a duty to be ready to "fight tonight." A leader who is on profile and non-deployable due to a broken leg, for example, is unfit to occupy a leadership position, since he/she is unable to perform his/her job and is inherently less effective than and competitive with his/her peers as a result of this injury. The pregnant leader falls into a very similar predicament; her position demands that she maneuver in kit, lead live fires, and accomplish a myriad of tasks that are at odds with her medical profile. Her temporary inability to lead in these situations compromises her effectiveness, both real and perceived, as a fighting leader.

The Way Forward: Protecting Opportunities for Future Mothers

Army policy grants women access to a wide range of protections and options to help them through their pregnant and postpartum periods. As it stands now, pregnant leaders and their chains of command have little guidance and are left to their own devices to determine appropriate positional decisions. Many commanders in branches that integrated recently oversee pregnant combat arms Soldiers for the first time in their careers, and they might not understand how their expectations of those Soldiers might need to be altered as a result of a pregnancy. What is missing are examples of family planning along certain trajectories and specific guidelines outlining what roles can or cannot be performed under a pregnancy profile.

This would be particularly helpful in combat arms branches, in which commanders are leading pregnant subordinate leaders for the first time and are not equipped with any guidelines or training that enable them to understand these Soldiers beyond their profiles. Recommendations on the optimal time frames or assignments around which to

It is both unwise and unfair to allow a pregnant woman to lead while she cannot safely perform the tasks expected of her Soldiers. It is equally unfair to rob an expecting mother of opportunities to lead rather than simply deferring them until she has recovered from pregnancy and childbirth.

plan families could benefit women who want to synchronize family planning with their career trajectories, as well as their respective chains of command who can be equipped with a better understanding of what roles pregnant Soldiers can and should occupy that will be minimally limited by their profiles. Branches should identify which points in one's career are the most conducive to pregnancy — this would prevent the spread of the impression that pregnant women cannot be assets or leaders. It would furthermore potentially help retention by making women feel as though they are not only sanctioned to but supported in their pursuit of growing their families while continuing to lead and serve, particularly in more physically demanding branches.

Women would benefit from a guarantee that their pregnancy will not detract from the quality of their KD time, rather than the mere assurance that they can complete these assignments. It is both unwise and unfair to allow a pregnant woman to lead while she cannot safely perform the tasks expected of her Soldiers. It is equally unfair to rob an expecting mother of opportunities to lead rather than simply deferring them until she has recovered from pregnancy and childbirth. Thus, women who face a pregnancy prior to platoon leadership or command, for example, should be able to trust that they can defer these roles until after they are pregnant. Such a guarantee would ensure that they can fully lead in every capacity once they are no longer pregnant. It would be helpful should the Army implement a policy that would allow pregnant women to enter into the year group behind them if necessary in order to accommodate those key experiences after carrying their baby to term and recovering.

Let's return to our hypothetical Infantry officer discussed in the beginning. Key to helping her and maintaining the unit's lethality is for her leaders to be aware of the range of options that they should present to her. Her leaders know that the best outcome for this leader is for her to temporarily relinquish her platoon and take it over after recovery from delivery. If her timeline demands that she be moved to the following year group in order to accommodate this leadership experience, then the Human Resources Command (HRC) should implement a system that makes this course of action feasible so that mothers are not penalized for growing their families.

Conclusion

We do both women and their Soldiers a disservice if we allow women to lead in KD roles, such as those of platoon leader or company commander, when they are under an extremely restrictive profile that keeps them from performing a range of activities in addition to being in a deployable status. Combat arms branches do not have the luxury of losing female leadership to these circumstances, and likewise, expecting mothers deserve quality experience in leadership roles that their peers receive. By integrating women into combat arms branches, the Army messages that women are assets to these branches and increase their lethality. The logical next step to help female retention within these branches is to ensure that family planning for those who choose to be mothers is professionally feasible and does not make them less competitive with their male counterparts who do not pay a physical toll when growing their families. The Army has protections in place to safeguard pregnant women and their babies; what combat arms leaders are missing are guarantees that their leadership opportunities will work around their pregnancies, should that be necessary. Such a measure would force leaders to learn how to accommodate pregnant combat arms leaders, and it would

assure these women that motherhood will not compromise their career progression and their aspirations to lead Soldiers in challenging training and operational environments.

Notes

¹ Transcript, "Army Senior Leaders Update Reporters on Army Operations," 13 October 2020, accessed from <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2381563/army-senior-leaders-update-reporters-on-army-operations/>.


² Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 40-502, *Medical Readiness Procedures*, 27 June 2019, accessed from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN8672_P40_502_FINAL.pdf.

³ Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 1350.02, *DoD Military Equal Opportunity Program*, 4 September 2020, accessed from <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/135002p.pdf?ver=2020-09-04-124116-607>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

1LT Christine Hogestyn is a Field Artillery officer. She graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, in 2018 with a bachelor's degree in international relations. 1LT Hogestyn is a graduate of Ranger School and most recently served as an executive officer at Fort Campbell, KY.

NEW FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED



Handbook 21-14: Building Cohesive Teams

Leaders at all levels should take pride and ownership in their units and eliminate the behavior that is corrosive to building cohesive teams.

This handbook contains information for leaders on how to build teams and contribute individually to team success, including how to create a cohesive climate and resolve conflict. There are vignettes throughout the handbook to help illustrate key points. These vignettes are experiences from Soldiers across the Army. Some are from the Sergeant Major of the Army's (SMA's) "This is My Squad" panel, while others were gathered from interviews with leaders and squad members at various locations. The first section is for the leader of the team/squad, and discusses climate, conflict, and building the team. The second section covers individual characteristics, including values and emotions, stressors, and commitment and compliance.

Find this publication online at <https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/21-14>.

SOF-CF Interoperability in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Warfighter exercises (WFXs) train special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF) in a simulated, multi-domain, large-scale conflict against a peer-level threat. While these forces have distinct mission sets, their interoperability is essential for a unity of effort to achieve success on the battlefield. These exercises have highlighted two interrelated areas that consistently impact SOF-CF interoperability, particularly within the division and corps command posts. These two areas are: knowledge of SOF capabilities and roles of liaison officers. The purpose of this article is to discuss these two areas, highlighting the observed challenges and best practices from the exercises over the last few years. This article also discusses some unresolved issues still requiring additional attention and provides recommendations for improving SOF-CF interoperability.

Find this article online at <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/08/23/1b322a74/21-652.pdf>.



Field Hygiene:

The Intersection of Training, Readiness, Leadership, and Caring for Soldiers

MAJ ROBERT W. STILLINGS JR.

For the most part, field hygiene is an individual Soldier responsibility. Not to be simply conflated with field sanitation or handwashing before chow, field hygiene often occurs as the fourth priority of work. It frequently consists of hoping to have time to brush your teeth and shaving with uncomfortably cold water, primarily so the command sergeant major does not find you unshaven in the field. These activities normally take place after three hours of sleep while your Meal, Ready to Eat (MRE) is heating up and just before the range or training area goes hot. This scenario reflects reality for many of our Soldiers in a high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) training environment; it is also hospitalizing our Soldiers. Relegating field hygiene to an afterthought unnecessarily reduces readiness, degrades training value, and undermines Army senior leaders who prioritize preserving our #1 resource, the Soldier. While tough, realistic training is a top priority, simple solutions can dissolve the fictitious zero-sum game that has been created between tough, realistic training and Soldier well-being.

As an Army leader, I am interested in addressing this subject for the protection of our Soldiers — and because it almost cost my life. In March 2019, I was part of National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 19-05 at Fort Irwin, CA. I began experiencing symptoms on Training Day 11, and within four hours I was evacuated to Weed Army Community Hospital with a 104-degree temperature. Within 12 hours, I

became septic and needed emergency surgery. The on-call Army surgeon saved my life.¹ I was infected with Necrotizing Fasciitis (flesh-eating bacteria) — accompanied by its 30-percent fatality rate.² I was air transferred to a civilian hospital and underwent multiple surgeries and operations, including a skin graft. My chain of command was incredibly supportive. The brigade commander personally ensured my wife was on an airplane within 12 hours out of fear I would not recover. For 17 days I was an inpatient, being treated with three of the strongest intravenous antibiotics available. In the end I survived, with permanent disability in my dominant hand. I was fortunate; that same year one service member died and another lost his leg from the same bacterial threat.³⁻⁴

After two years of reflection on these three cases, I was left with four questions:

- Is this a subset of a larger issue?
- What is the cost to the Army?
- Are we missing this in our risk management?
- How can we mitigate the risk without impacting training?

Is There an Issue?

Necrotizing Fasciitis is a severe bacterial infection, one of many skin and soft tissue infections (SSTIs). From 2013-2016, there were 282,571 SSTIs reported by medical providers across the active-duty military.⁵ That number accounts only for those service members (SMs) who sought treatment



The author's finger following initial surgery, 36 hours after first symptom (Photo courtesy of Dr. P.J. Chandler)

Twenty-four hours later, arrival at Sunrise Hospital in Las Vegas (Family photo)

Ten days later, before final surgery, debridement, and skin graft (Family photo)

Two hours later following surgery and skin graft (Family photo)

and amounted to 558 infections per 10,000 SMs/year or 5.6 percent per year.⁶ There were an additional 10,904 infections in the deployed environment, which amounted to 460 infections per 10,000 SMs/year or 4.6 percent per year.⁷ Stated more clearly, each year 5.6 percent of home-station service members and 4.6 percent of deployed service members developed an infection requiring treatment. Of those, 238,925 required treatment by a medical provider (as opposed to a combat medic).⁸ Those 238,925 cases of SSTIs resulted in 395,361 office visits and 19,213 hospital bed days.⁹

In a separate data analysis from 2017-2020, there were 90,251 infections across all U.S. Army components. Those infections resulted in 123,698 doctor visits and 7,240 hospital bed days.¹⁰ In the active-duty Army, that amounted to 337 infections per 10,000 SMs/year or 3.4 percent.¹¹ These numbers account only for reported incidents and do not account for where the infections took place. SSTIs are more likely to occur where infrequent handwashing and bathing, abrasions, environmental contamination, and close Soldier proximity are more frequent. This suggests that SSTIs are more likely to occur in a field environment amongst maneuver forces. This assertion is supported by the study's finding that eight of the top 10 sites for SSTI rates housed brigade combat teams: Fort Benning (1), Fort Bragg (2), Fort Hood (3), Fort Campbell (6), Fort Bliss (7), Fort Sill (8), Fort Carson (9), and Fort Stewart (10) were all in the top 10 for case rates in the Army.¹² Considering environmental factors and duty-station infection rates, it is likely the problem for active-duty maneuver forces in a field training environment is well above 3.4 percent.¹³

What is the Cost?

As I considered potential costs, I began to realize how complicated the issue is. I identified the following categories of cost: treatment dollars, readiness while deployed, Soldier well-being, duty days/training days and unit medical readiness, and schoolhouse dollars and certifications.

Treatment dollars: A typical outpatient medical visit can range anywhere from \$200-\$700 per visit.¹⁴ Based on 2017-2020 statistics, there were 123,698 outpatient visits across all U.S. Army components for SSTIs.¹⁵ Using a low-end figure of \$250 to avoid any argument, that translates to a cost of \$30.9 million. This number does not account for any service members who were treated without military knowledge, outside of the military healthcare system. Additionally, among that same population, there were a total of 7,240 hospital bed days (meaning patients admitted overnight).¹⁶ A search of a variety of reputable websites yielded a low-end cost for a hospital bed day of approximately \$3,000. The low-end total for hospital bed days is about \$21.7 million. The cumulative cost for treatment of military healthcare system reported infections from 2017-2020 was about \$52.64 million. These low-end estimates are further supported by a peer-reviewed journal that determined the four-year cost at initial entry training sites alone was \$48 million.¹⁷ Based on the previous discussion, estimates should slant toward the active-duty maneuver force, meaning high-end estimates may be closer

to accurate than the low-end estimate of \$52.6 million.

Readiness of deployed units: From 2013-2016 there were 10,906 cases of SSTIs in the deployed population, which amounted to a 4.6 percent infection rate/year.¹⁸ If a maneuver company with 100 personnel deployed for a year, it would have roughly four Soldiers off mission due to SSTIs alone. Many of these cases will require 7-10 days with open wound(s) and antibiotics. Those four Soldiers would each require an average of two doctor's visits to the battalion surgeon.

Soldier well-being: Although this cost is not quantifiable, it is equally important. In my case, I lost the use of part of my hand, can't grip a golf club, have permanent nerve damage, and will inevitably qualify for disability. Also immeasurable were the psychological effects on my extended family as they feared the worst for several days as I recovered in the hospital. The same can be said for the Gold Star Family of the less fortunate service member mentioned earlier in this article. All leaders should endeavor to do what they can to ensure our Soldiers exit the service as close as possible to the health conditions with which they entered. Any Soldier who leaves the service with degraded health, or even has a temporary degradation in health, is a cost that should be considered and avoided.

Duty days/training days: From 2017-2020, there was a 3.4-percent case rate per year across Army components.¹⁹ In a company of 100 Soldiers, the commander will train without three or more Soldiers per year for an undetermined period of time.²⁰ Those may be platoon leaders, gunners, or squad leaders. These leaders will likely be precluded from field environments for 7-10 days, may have open sore(s), require antibiotic treatment, and require two doctor's visits. If each patient has seven limited duty days, the U.S. Army loses 631,757 training days to SSTIs every four years or 157,939 days per year. Additionally, each of these SSTIs will carry either a temporary or permanent profile and impact medical readiness and deployability to varying degrees.

Schoolhouse dollars and certifications: Reconsider the top 10 installations for case rates and consider the schoolhouses that are represented (Forts Benning, Bragg, Hood, Jackson, Leonard Wood, Campbell, Bliss, Sill, Carson, Stewart).²¹ If a Soldier is unable to graduate due to missing 7-10 field days, there is an associated cost. Any of the following are possible: the Soldier is missing from the unit longer due to recycle, which then requires additional funding and time for a new course slot; the Soldier returns to unit without qualification; a lieutenant arrives late to first BCT, hindering the unit and professional development; a requirement to send a replacement Soldier to gain certification, creating gaps in additional skill identifier (ASI) coverage in a unit; and a temporary loss of promotion readiness pending school completion. When a Soldier lost his leg at Fort Benning in 2019, they identified that the streptococcus bacteria that caused it had spread to 60 other Soldiers. In addition to the financial cost of treating those 60 Soldiers, there was an additional cost in time and money when lead-

ers decided to preventively treat 10,000 Soldiers at Fort Benning with antibiotics.²²

What about Risk Management?

Some leaders view additional constraints and risk mitigation as obstructions to their training efforts — they are wrong. Risk management is an enabler to organizational readiness, and the third principle of risk management is “accept no unnecessary risk.”²³ As the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army GEN James C. McConville stated, “People are always my #1 priority: Our Army’s people are our greatest strength and our most important weapons system.”²⁴ It is worth the time and effort to invest in his priorities.

There is clearly a risk associated with SSTIs; the next question is how to address it. First, identify the hazard. Using specific language from Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19, *Risk Management*, the hazard or source in this case is bacteria; the mechanism is cuts, abrasions, trauma, or germ spread. The outcome is skin and soft tissue infections in troops. Assessing the hazards in accordance with ATP 5-19, this would be classified as frequent; the severity would be moderate, resulting from the likelihood of losing duty days due to injury/illness. Based on Table 1-1 in ATP 5-19, SSTI carries a high risk. That classification should frighten leaders or at the very least cause hesitation and reflection. How many training events have I supervised with a high-risk hazard without controls or mitigation in place? I immediately think back to every risk assessment I’ve seen in the last 15 years. I am certain I never saw SSTIs on a risk assessment or risk management worksheet.

How Do We Mitigate without Impacting Training?

In the case of SSTIs, hazard controls fall neatly into “Educational (Awareness) Controls” and “Hazard Elimination Controls.” There is an NCO professional development (NCOPD) and combat medic responsibility associated with SSTI prevention. NCOs and combat medics share a responsibility to educate and enforce good field hygiene. This not only involves brushing teeth and shaving but also cleaning your body, changing socks and undergarments, and cleaning your hands. Most SSTIs occur on extremities. NCOs checking socks, boots, and feet used to be commonplace, and medical experts agree that catching these infections early is key. There is no reason why NCOs and combat medics cannot ensure Soldiers are taking the time to use baby wipes and hand sanitizer as well as change undergarments. Incorporating these into medic training, NCOPDs, and risk management planning will help ensure they happen.

Within the hazard elimination controls in ATP 5-19 are engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Showers would fall within engineering. In some training environments showers are feasible, and in others they are not. If they are available, leaders should not view them as a luxury; they should view them as a risk control mechanism. Squad leaders should ensure their Soldiers are showering not only to prevent risk to the Soldier, but more importantly, to prevent the spread of bacteria like streptococcus and staphy-

lococcus within the formation.²⁵ If showers are not available, then wipes and hand sanitizer fall into the PPE category.

Wipes should be an enforced item on a packing list; their daily usage in the field should be enforced as well. For long duration training environments (i.e., NTC, Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC], and Ranger School), units should consider budgeting hygiene kits. I recommend that every NTC and JRTC rotation purchases ~10,000 hospital bathing wipe kits. That is roughly two kits per Soldier and would allow them to bathe twice during rotation, cleansing themselves entirely with wipes that provide enhanced protection. National stock numbers (NSNs) for products such as Medline™, Readybath™, and Theraworx™ are already in the Army supply system. Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, TX, is currently issuing the “Medline Ready Bath Select Bathing Clothing” available at \$45 per 30 pack.²⁶ Issuing two packs per Soldier for 20 CONUS training center rotations per year for four years would cost about \$1.8 million. That cost is considerably less than the low-end treatment cost of \$46.4 million... and notably, is less than the combined cost associated with myself, the Soldier who lost his leg, and the service member who lost his life. Army hospitals issue wipes like these frequently because their patients are at higher risk and cannot shower. As evidenced throughout this article, our Soldiers are at higher risk the longer they are in the field. In fact, Soldiers are at a 21-percent higher risk than civilians in general.²⁷ In light of this, it could be negligent to not provide an on-hand, improved product for our Soldiers and enforce usage, as risk increases over time at CTC rotations. Future studies should consider broadening this recommendation to include high-risk populations like basic trainees. Usage of wipes transitions to the administrative controls to SSTIs.

As part of “making risk decision,” commanders get to determine how to integrate this. At a gunnery density, as an example, it can be as simple as: “After 72 hours, we will conduct a 30-minute pause. No activities are permitted during that time other than field hygiene. Leaders will ensure all Soldiers clean themselves and change undergarments.” Every commander has either a senior line medic, physician’s assistant (PA), or physician. Those individuals can advise the command on when to take precautions, how often, if precautions are necessary, and the risk level based on training duration and environmental conditions. Regardless of what advice commanders receive, the important part is that it is their risk decision to make until they delegate it. NTC already has breaks in training; there are safety stand downs, maintenance stand downs, after action reviews (AARs), and live-fire transitions. The Operations Group and rotational unit have a variety of condition checks that are communicated over radios. There would be no impact to training to issue two sets of hospital wipes to each Soldier in the rotational unit bivouac area (RUBA) and use an already scheduled training pause and conditions check to enforce their usage.

Would Mitigation Measures Work?

In conducting research for this article, I interacted with multiple health professionals. Each of them in their own way

said this question was not worth researching because it was already answered. The conversation went something like this:

Me: "Will cleaning your body prevent SSTIs?"

Doctor: "Yes, that's not even a question."

Me: "How do you know?"

Doctor: "Really? Because cleaning yourself reduces bacteria, and bacteria cause infection."

Me: "Is that common knowledge?"

Doctor: "Yes."

In 1917 the French Army had already mandated standards for daily cleaning of the feet and hands, daily bathing, weekly showering, and frequent washing and changing of uniforms.²⁸ These standards were proper then and should be integrated and enforced now. Given the medical advances of the early 1900s, if the Army has gone 100 years in reverse with regards to field hygiene, we are probably doing it wrong.

Per ATP 5-19 the risk is high, and these solutions meet the requirements of being feasible, acceptable, and suitable. The support is available, controls are explicit, and standards are clear. Training can be conducted in-house, leaders should be ready and willing, and individual Soldiers should be disciplined to execute.

Conclusion

Skin and soft tissue infections affect more than 22,500 Soldiers per year, which costs the government well over \$12 million per year.²⁹ Deployed forces consistently operate at a 4.6-percent degradation due to SSTIs while separating numerous "Soldiers for Life" with degraded quality of health. The Army hemorrhages 157,939 limited duty days per year along with other unquantifiable training and schoolhouse costs attributed to SSTIs.

GEN McConville's #1 priority is the Soldier. This article has identified SSTIs as an often unaddressed, expensive, and preventable risk to his #1 priority. There are only three reasons to overlook the threat that SSTIs pose in risk management: ignorance, apathy, or negligence. If readers made it this far in the article, then ignorance is no longer an option. Field hygiene is where leaders, training, readiness, and caring for Soldiers intersect. In a training environment, caring leaders set and enforce standards that build and maintain readiness and keep our Soldiers safe. Maneuver leaders owe their Soldiers hospital-free training exercises.

Notes

¹ Dr. P.J. Chandler, Weed Army Community Hospital, Fort Irwin, CA.

² Current mortality estimates are 24-34 percent according to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), although they can be as high as 74 percent if treatment is delayed.

³ Meghann Myers, "Basic Trainee Got Strep, Then Lost His Leg to Flesh-Eating Bacteria. Now His Treatment Is Under Investigation," *Army Times* (4 April 2019), accessed from <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/04/04/basic-trainee-got-strep-then-lost-his-leg-to-flesh-eating-bacteria-now-his-treatment-is-under-investigation/>.

⁴ Meghann Myers, "Her Son Died of a Flesh-Eating Infection. Now a Marine Mom Wants Justice," *Military Times* (15 November 2019), accessed from [https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/11/15/her-son-](https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/11/15/her-son-died-of-a-flesh-eating-infection-now-a-marine-mom-wants-justice/)

[died-of-a-flesh-eating-infection-now-a-marine-mom-wants-justice/](#).

⁵ Shauna Stahlman, Valerie F. Williams, Gi-Taik Oh, Eugene V. Millar, and Jason W. Bennett, "Skin and Soft Tissue Infections, Active Component, U.S. Armed Forces, 2013-2016," *Medical Surveillance Monthly Report* 24(7) (July 2017): 2-11.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Armed Forces Health Surveillance Division, Defense Medical Surveillance System, as of 25 January 2021.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ It is impossible to develop hard numbers because costs vary based on the facility, location, medications required, x-ray requirement, labs, and severity. This range was developed based on searches of reputable insurance and hospital sites.

¹⁵ Defense Medical Surveillance System.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Stephanie M. Morrison, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Hygiene-Based Strategies Aimed toward Prevention of SSTI and MRSA-Associated SSTI among U.S. Active Duty Army Trainees," (diss., Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, 2015).

¹⁸ Stahlman et al., "Skin and Soft Tissue Infections," 2-11.

¹⁹ Defense Medical Surveillance System.

²⁰ The three Soldier approximation is significantly underestimated due to service in a maneuver unit with long duration field training time.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Myers, "Basic Trainee Got Strep."

²³ Army Techniques Publication 5-19, *Risk Management*.

²⁴ GEN James C. McConville, "40th Chief of Staff of the Army's Initial Message to the Army Team."

²⁵ Elias B. Chahine and Allana J. Sucher, "Skin and Soft Tissue Infections," *PSAP – Infectious Diseases* (2015): 5-26.

²⁶ Cost is based on open market and does not account for bulk contract pricing.

²⁷ Stahlman et al., "Skin and Soft Tissue Infections," 2-11.

²⁸ Saville C. Thorndike, "Military Sanitation in the Present War," *American Journal of Public Health* Vol. VII, No. 6 (June 1917): 527-547.

²⁹ Derived from four-year statistics mentioned earlier in the article.

Editor's Note

This article first appeared in the Fall 2021 issue of Armor.

MAJ Rob Stillings is an Armor officer currently assigned to the Cyber National Mission Force, Fort Meade, MD. His previous assignments include serving as executive officer (XO) of 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Infantry Division (ID), Fort Riley, KS; XO of 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 1st ID; G3 (Forward), 1st ID in Poznan, Poland; and commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and K Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA. MAJ Stillings earned a bachelor's degree in psychology from Washington University in St. Louis and a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

Author's Note: I would like to offer special thanks to the following:

- Dr. P.J. Chandler, who did the initial surgery and administered medication immediately. He saved my life and then fought through bureaucracy to get me flown and admitted to a civilian hospital. His follow-on actions saved my arm and my career.

- Nancy Estocado, my physical therapist and wound care specialist, who passionately cared for me; her expert wound care saved my finger.

- The nursing staff at Sunrise Hospital and Weed Army Community Hospital, which cared for my family, aided my recovery, and treated me like I mattered.

- Leaders in the 1st Infantry Division who cared and kept me in the fight.

- Dr. Michael Superior (Health Surveillance Division) for assisting in my research and encouraging me to continue.

- Dr. Matt Pflipsen for pointing me in the right direction and getting my research started.


Once An Eagle: Idol or Idle?

1LT CHRISTOPHER L. WILSON

Anton Myrer's *Once an Eagle* has topped reading lists of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commandant of the Marine Corps, countless higher headquarters, and U.S. Military Academy at West Point since being published in 1968. No other book has enjoyed such durable preeminence, especially not a work of fiction. Why the obsession for a 1,000-page novel? By simple induction, we see that it is senior military leaders with the fixation. Such leaders committed to a career in their organizations and are charged with the task of forming the current and raising up its future leaders. Their reading lists are one means of executing this responsibility, and a closer look at one book that has never left their lists is revealing. *Once an Eagle* undoubtably influences the American military psyche. However, the true dichotomy that Myrer brings to life in Sam Damon and Courtney Massengale is not the "troops' commander" versus the "savvy staff officer," but selfless service versus self-serving ambition. The former, false dichotomy is proliferated when senior leaders presume reading lists are sufficient formators.

Make no mistake, *Once an Eagle* enjoys unparalleled influence in our profession. It really has "a cult following in the Army," according to COL Jerry Morelock, a retired professor at the Command and General Staff College.¹ The effects of its influence, however, are nuanced. In a good way, it de-romanticizes combat. Over and over again, Damon demonstrates heroism at great personal cost, even earning the Medal of Honor. But is it worth it in the end? "The elation he dreamed of would not come," said Damon.² Myrer's own combat experience in World War II left him with an acute "awareness of war as the most vicious and fraudulent self-deception man had ever devised."³ Such critical realism is healthy for junior leaders to consider before we find ourselves in similar situations. It also gives us a virtuous hero to emulate, one who faces the same personal and professional struggles all Soldiers do.

There are many, however, that argue *Once an Eagle's* influence is detrimental to the profession. When I asked a senior Chaplain his thoughts on it, he decried it for propagating the "West Point officer bad, mustang good" mentality. In an article published in *Foreign Policy*, MG (Retired) Robert Scales said, "the Army today venerates Sam Damon too much and castigates Courtney Massengale to its detriment."⁴ For example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs



of Staff GEN Henry Shelton admits that Courtney Massengale was a "household name."⁵ He used it "to say we shouldn't have an individual like that in the ranks" at events as consequential as promotion boards.⁶

Once an Eagle casts an unfair shadow not only on staff personnel, but on any means of achievement beside through command. To emphasize how nonsensical this heuristic is, a lieutenant colonel with 20 years of time in service is lucky to spend just five years of it in a command billet. What our senior leaders do not realize is that they aide the "drive and brilliance" exodus every time *Once an Eagle* is copy-and-pasted onto the next reading list without a platform for dialogue.⁷

I was handed my copy from former CPT Richard Spinelli before I even made it up to West Point, but I think he got it right. Instead of telling me to not be a Massengale, he looked at me and said, "Everyone wants to be like Sam Damon, but you can be better." The danger with *Once an Eagle's* outsized influence is that the reader is often led to mistake the vessels for the morals. It is a font of professional, relational, and emotional virtue-ethics. We are invited to learn these lessons from both Damon and Massengale, but if we count Damon as the perfect model and Massengale as the villain, we fail to learn from the former's shortcomings and the latter's genius.

The more edifying dichotomy in *Once an Eagle* is between selfless service and self-serving ambition. Both Damon and Massengale have that type-A mix of aptitude and ambition, but Damon sought to serve Soldiers, whereas Massengale sought to serve himself at their expense. The difference is character. Damon emulates the war heroes he read about every night while working as the night clerk at his hometown's hotel. Massengale imitated the men he looked up to: wielders of power and status like his father and uncle. Both leaders were hungry to learn, but Damon searched for truth, whereas Massengale searched for ways ahead. The greatest differentiator lied in Damon's mentorship relationships, like the one he had with his former battalion commander, George Caldwell. If we junior leaders want to be like Damon, then we can start by imitating his humility to seek out and learn from others' experiences. This also requires that the senior leaders with said experience humble themselves to share it with us, straight and uncensored.

Stories are important because they frame our outlook.

How is a deceased, medically-discharged corporal like Myrer still influencing generations of military leaders today? Because he cared enough to tell the story. After visiting West Point in 1977, he later wrote of the cadets: “they are all of them your sons — all our sons, in a very real sense.”⁸ In the same way a son or daughter inherits virtues from his or her parents, Myrer illustrates the preeminence of the mentor-mentee relationship not only in his life, but also in his characters. As a recently demoted first lieutenant after World War I, Damon credits Caldwell with being the sole persuader of his staying-on. Good leaders invest in their unit; transformational leaders invest in individuals.

Reading a story is low threat; it’s the conclusions we draw from stories that are consequential. If we draw these conclusions in a vacuum, then we run the risk of categorizing others as Damons or Massengales: a product of our intellectual lethargy and producer of dangerous predispositions. It is the dialogue and shared experience of mentors that offer the anecdote. So, if you have the experience, then reach out and start the dialogue. If you are like me and 37 of the 39 Soldiers in my infantry platoon without combat experience, then reach out and start the dialogue. One day, I bet we will be glad we did.

Love it or hate it, *Once an Eagle* enjoys an outsized influence on our profession; negative where it is recommended en masse, positive where leaders follow-up with dialogue. In the end, reading is good, but relationships are better. *Once an Eagle* is just one place to start.

Notes

¹ Elizabeth Becker, “Military Goes by the Book, but It’s a Novel,” *The New York Times* (16 August 1999), accessed from <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/16/us/military-goes-by-the-book-but-it-s-a-novel.html>.

² Anton Myrer, *Once an Eagle* (NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), 115.

³ Sydney B. Berry, “No Time for Glory in the Infantry,” *Assembly*, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, March 1998.

⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, “O! The Damage ‘Once an Eagle’ Has Done to My Army — and Yes, It Is Partly My Fault,” *Foreign Policy* (18 December 2013), accessed from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/18/o-the-damage-once-an-eagle-has-done-to-my-army-and-yes-it-is-partly-my-fault/>.

⁵ Becker, “Military Goes by the Book.”

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ricks, “O! The Damage ‘Once an Eagle.’”

⁸ Berry, “No Time for Glory in the Infantry.”

Editor’s Note: This article was first published by the Center for Junior Officers (<https://juniorofficer.army.mil/>).

At the time this article was written, 1LT Christopher Wilson was serving as a rifle platoon leader in Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY. He earned a bachelor’s degree in international relations from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY.

CMH Releases 2-Volume Book about OEF

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) recently released *Modern War in an Ancient Land: The United States Army in Afghanistan 2001–2014*, a two-volume history.

These volumes, prepared by the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Study Group, present a first cut operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. At the same time, it delves into the tactical realm when such insights amplify the implications of operational decisions or occurrences.



To write this history, the study group, led by Edmund J. “E.J.” Degen, embarked on an extensive research program that relied heavily on primary source documents. The group also conducted dozens of oral history interviews with key military and civilian leaders. These volumes include 50 maps, a wide range of campaign photography and artwork, and volume-specific indexes.

The Army routinely conducts after action reviews of operations that capture lessons learned and are intended to help guide and inform future decisions by military leaders at all levels.

The process of researching, analyzing, and writing the history can take several years; Degen noted that, “It’s important to capture these historical lessons as soon as we can as they may apply to future wars.”

As part of the Army’s continuous campaign of learning, CMH will write more in-depth histories of all aspects of the war in Afghanistan, including operations from 2015 to 2021, the evacuation of Kabul, and security force assistance.

The two-volume book set will be released as CMH Pub 59-1-1 and will be available in print, as an eBook, and as a free pdf download. Access to these options can be found at: <https://history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-1/>.



Looking for a Frontal Assault?

Suppress the Enemy, the Right Way

ANANT MISHRA

Consider a situation where an infantry combat platoon is involved in an offensive action in some corner of the world. The platoon has engaged a company-sized enemy element which is defending from a fixed position. In this action, some enemy are killed and some are wounded; the larger force has decided to withdraw while a few surrendered. The platoon was engaged in a fierce firefight, forcing them to fire several rounds including medium ordnances such as under-barrel grenades. Out of several thousand rounds fired, only some of them managed to hit the enemy. From this engagement, we can conclude that the fire maneuver employed by the platoon was ineffective and inefficient. There is, however, one more element missing in this situation, and that element needs to be further understood. The platoon's inability to understand this missing element resulted in its failure to employ fire maneuver tactics effectively. This missing element is suppression. The objective of this article is to discuss and analyze the importance of suppressive fire and provide tactical solutions to fire team leaders to carry it out effectively.

Offensive Action and Defensive Maneuver

Since the Anglo-Afghan War dates (or even before), foot soldiers faced numerous challenges in initiating frontal assaults against a well-fortified/heavily defended enemy equipped with high-caliber weapons. The casualties were simply too great for commanders to accept and so frontal assault remained a last resort. Interestingly, the requirements for a decent defensive weapon were simple: large and small caliber rifled weapons with high muzzle velocity cylindro-conoidal bullets, fired from a short distance using single or double barrel quick-loading rifles. Any weapon other than that (such as the Gatling with multiple barrels and a magazine emplacement at the top) would make frontal attack difficult to resist. To overcome this challenge, different militaries came up with different plans in the latter half of the 20th century.

Some armies advised supplementing frontal assault groups with artillery, while others later suggested tanks. Some restructured weapons allocation to grenadiers, while some deployed mortars. Whereas most recalibrated their strategy by restructuring operational requirements and supplementing them with new tactics, some restructured small arms

An Infantryman with A Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, fires at enemy forces during a live-fire exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, on 27 October 2020.

Photo by SPC Demi Jones



fire and maneuver to effectively suppress the enemy. This brought some success to the attackers as they successfully came close enough to a point where hand-to-hand combat was feasible. At this range, they could fix bayonets, throw grenades, and use small arms at a very short range (ranges were limited to very few feet) to eliminate any active defender. Ironically though, there was never a logical explanation or a straightforward assessment to identify the probable reason behind its success.

However, numerous studies carried out on this issue do suggest some interesting points. To best examine this, it is important to revisit the relevant ranges of engagement. At the range, the ability of soldiers to hit a designated target falls steeply when they are tasked to move from a static firing range to a field range where they are required to perform cover, duck, shoot, and reload while underway. Their performance further falls steeply when they are in a firefight with the enemy. Their ability is even further compromised when the enemy possesses superior fire power such as light machine guns (LMGs), mortars, artillery, or tanks and even completely diminishes when the same enemy is numerically superior.¹ This may be the reason as to why attacking forces are unable to effectively hit the enemy even after firing at least a thousand rounds.

However, other research suggests a theory contradicting the earlier analysis. It gives special emphasis to the military's shock-and-awe tactics and concludes that covert action employed by attackers can inflict shock on the enemy, especially from a position the defender least expects. This tactic may be more successful than employing aggressive action in large numbers or using heavy weaponry of any kind.² On tactical terms, if the attacking platoon is able to identify vulnerabilities in the enemy flank or its rear and maintain constant pressure by concentrating fire to these points, the enemy will not be in a position to fight on all fronts. It will then be either forced to retreat (if the odds are in favor of the attacker) or maybe even surrender. However, a few challenges emerge through this action.³ Undoubtedly, taking a covert route and flanking the enemy from a position it least expects is an effective approach, and employing indirect action such as mortars or artillery could reduce a defender's resistance, but the successful suppression depends on the ability of the attacking force to suppress the enemy's fires. This is the driving push that decides how far the attacker will go: either to a close proximity of the defender, enabling the former to employ bayonets or under-barrel grenade launchers, or flank the enemy from the rear and attack from an unexpected position.

Furthermore, exceedingly small portions of the enemy force receive casualties from small arms; their location, position, and topography too add valuable support to their tactics. One such example is the case of trench warfare. By clearing one trench, the attacker can often maneuver behind many more trenches and slowly move ahead from his position.

In my opinion, suppression is an art involving synchronization of effective firepower delivered from small/large caliber

Undoubtedly, taking a covert route and flanking the enemy from a position it least expects is an effective approach, and employing indirect action such as mortars or artillery could soften the area, but the successful suppression remains on the ability of the attacking force to suppress the enemy.

weapons or heavy ordnance onto a specific location, temporarily compromising the enemy's ability to initiate retaliatory fire. In non-tactical terms, the enemy will not raise his head or move from his location. This is of utmost significance in combat. If employed in an offensive action, it will allow the attacker to move swiftly, identify and assess vulnerabilities of the enemy's position, and deal with them. If employed in a defensive action, it temporarily halts enemy fire and movement, making the enemy subject to counteroffensive action. In both scenarios, the enemy's firepower is temporarily incapacitated and he is tactically pinned.

The Man and His Machine

For the last century or so, weapons manufacturers have focused on producing more accurate small arms in an effort to improve shooter performance. A rifle (semi-auto or bolt action) will form a tight shot group on a target from a distance of 40 meters or at least better at 100 meters when fired with a fixed mount. If well-trained soldiers are equipped with the same weapon and sent to the range, they can form a tight shot group at 100 meters. Not every military establishment keeps its focus on training its soldiers to this standard regularly. This is a huge flaw, which not every instructor agrees with. Since most small arms manufactured for modern warfare have higher accuracy, it is no longer a deciding factor for the latter on choosing the right weapon. Numerous factors such as weight, reliability, operational control, rate of fire, ergonomic design, and handling are critical. So, the question of a weapon's accuracy is largely a matter of training as most modern weapons are fairly accurate.

It is critical for leaders to train soldiers in small arms handling and firing maneuver in an effort to maximize their weapons' capabilities in any environment. In most militaries, soldiers are trained to engage targets from 600 meters or more. But in combat, the enemy will not be generous enough to let the attacker choose the engagement range. Some militaries' trainees, on certain occasions if they are lucky, receive training on elements that are of vital importance, such as learning the art of suppressing enemy fire. Numerous studies conducted on the Korean and Vietnam Wars provide vital information on combat troops' ability to employ suppression, which supplements recent research.⁴⁻⁵ For further clarity, let us take three cases into account: the need to suppress the enemy, the volume of fire to sustain the suppression, and the

necessity to provide enough suppression to deny the enemy any possibility of a counteroffensive. Generally, for small arms the attacker must fire from an area enabling the rounds to deliver effective grazing fire over the target in an effort to maximize their advantage. Significant rounds passing through that position (roughly five to seven rounds in some seconds) will effectively suppress the enemy and maintain that rate in case the firing momentum is lost, whereas roughly two rounds in six seconds will keep the enemy completely pinned. This mechanism suggests 100-percent success.

Should We Bring the Heavy Machine Guns (HMGs)?

On enquiring with automatic weapons instructors about employing LMG/HMG for suppression, many were convinced that the enemy could easily be suppressed with superior firepower, while some even gave historical accounts of battles regarding its effectiveness. One particular research study analyzing the effectiveness of superior firepower for suppression found no evidence to support the instructors' claims.⁶ According to the research, the 5.56x45mm NATO fed L86 LSW (Light Support Weapon), equipped with a quick release bipod, is highly effective in suppressing the enemy at 500 meters and more if retrofitted with the SUSAT (Sight Unit, Small Arm, Trilux) optic kit. This is precisely possible because it is able to provide accurate fire for almost all rounds fired.

On the other hand, the FN Minimi/M249 SAW performs far worse in such trials.⁷ At most, the first round from a quick burst would fall close to suppression; however, shots fired from the subsequent bursts would yield greater dispersion at greater ranges on the battlefield. As three to six rounds in three to six seconds can successfully suppress, even experienced LMG gunners could not perform this maneuver effectively. They would have to fire three to six rounds for many seconds. Since the rounds from the first burst could nearly make it to the area, they would have to fire three to six rounds in so many seconds in an effort to keep the target suppressed. Training is critical here; this maneuver will consume more ammunition than the LSW and SAW combined until weapons crews gain experience.

The Reason to Suppress Fire

In this section, we need to discuss the biggest source of wastage of small arms ammunition in combat and understand the reasons for suppression. In numerous accounts, we have seen firers wasting thousands of rounds for an unclear idea of suppressing the enemy. Even if it is by some miracle successful, we do not intend to speculate on the reasons behind its success: That it should be carried out to prevent the enemy from employing any maneuver and forcing them to hug the ground; the attacker can then break enemy lines and force them to submit. Military leaders have been using such a maneuver because according to them: "The combat platoon can do it." Instead of "get some heavy fire down there," team leaders must demand suppressing fire, which is an effective approach. The platoon must suppress the enemy before

enabling an attack from the rear; this maneuver is still productive. Providing suppressive fire with no proper plan of action is a waste of effort.

Conclusion

To summarize, small arms engagement will kill and incapacitate very few actors in direct action. To achieve a 100-percent result, it is vital for platoon leaders to know the location and estimated number of enemy combatants before the assault. Nonetheless, the impact of small arms fire in pinning the enemy down remains vital. Suppression restricts any future maneuver from the enemy, pins them down, and denies any chance of a quick counteroffensive action. It is of utmost criticality but must not be exercised by troops ineffectively and without knowledge. Devising new tactics and equipping combat teams with appropriate weapons will further prevent wastage of ammunition. Sadly, some weapons remain highly ineffective during suppression but by procurement are some of the most preferred weapons of choice for the infantry. This is possible because the procurement criteria cannot predict a weapon's effectiveness in the field.

Undoubtedly, small arms should have effective fire power. Most are effective and have been proving their effectiveness for decades. Other factors to consider in weapons procurement include design, weight, and customization options to name a few. But these weapons should be procured on the basis of their effectiveness and utility, a deadly combination which is rare. Suppression is a critical maneuver for combat platoons, especially as it may dictate the outcome of a battle.

Notes

¹ John France, "Close Order and Close Quarter: The Culture of Combat in the West," *The International History Review* 27 (2005, 3): 498-517.

² Edward N. Luttwak, "Attrition, Relational Maneuver, and the Military Balance," *International Security* 8 (1983, 2): 176-179.

³ James C. Crowley, Bryan W. Hallmark, Michael G. Shanley, and Jerry M. Sollinger, "Improving Small-Arms Training Strategies" in *Changing the Army's Weapon Training Strategies to Meet Operational Requirements More Efficiently and Effectively*, RAND Corporation, 2014, 41-52.

⁴ George Raudzens, "Firepower Limitations in Modern Military History," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 67 (1989, 271): 130-153.

⁵ Wayne P. Hughes, "Two Effects of Firepower: Attrition and Suppression," *Military Operations Research* 1 (1995, 3): 27-35.

⁶ D. Rowland, "The Effect of Combat Degradation on the Urban Battle," *The Journal of the Operational Research Society* 42 (7, 1991): 543-553.

⁷ Crowley et al, "Improving Small-Arms Training Strategies," 41-52.

Anant Mishra is a web manager and researcher at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in New Delhi, where his research is focused on military strategy and tactics. He is also a visiting research fellow at the Terrorism & Security Directorate of the International Centre for Policing & Security, University of South Wales, Pontypridd.

A Brigade Combat Team and the Symphony Orchestra

MARK A. FARRAR, U.S. ARMY RETIRED

When I was 19, I knew it was all over. I assessed there was never going to be a connection between playing a cello and putting food on the table. So what does a college sophomore do when he realizes he's pursuing the wrong major? He changes majors and pursues a different career option. So in light of not making it as a music major, I switched to history and knew I was destined to have a military career — in the Army of course.

Despite changing majors, I remained a fixture in the music department. Later after I'd joined the Army, I went back for a visit. I still knew a lot of people. They all asked, "Mark, you are a very creative person. Don't you find the Army a bit rigid and over disciplined?" They all imagined that anything I learned in the music department and college orchestra would have no application to soldiering. No was my immediate answer. In fact, a lot about being a serious musician and being part of a symphony orchestra are very similar to being in the Army. Huh? Yes, that's right, and as I continued an Army career, I found that there were quite a few parallels/similarities to orchestra life and being a part of a combined arms team.

The modern symphony orchestra is just like a brigade combat team: i.e., it is a combined arms/musical instruments team. A symphony orchestra consists of different sections strictly divided by musical disciplines that can be easily task organized depending on the composition (what in the Army we call the mission). Each section has a separate mission that when combined with other disciplines (Army = branches)

contributes to the unit's overall mission (musical mission = deliberate carrying or supporting the theme of a composition). These different sections (what some in the Army call their "slice") are: strings, brass, woodwinds, and percussion.

Just like a combined arms team, orchestras have an established chain of command, universally and internationally understood doctrine, a distinct professional language, and codes of conduct that apply to each member. The discipline required to be in an orchestra is as equally tough as being in any military organization worldwide. In short, it's not something that just anybody can do. Preparation, training, and ultimately teamwork are crucial. Sound like what is required of a combined arms brigade? There is more.

The "Strings" or Welcome to the Infantry

About the same time European armies were formalizing methodology, doctrine, and procedures (like the then novel concept of marching in step), string orchestras (the nucleus of what would become the modern symphony orchestra) were codifying their "TO&E" (table of organization and equipment) structure and musical missions. Just like the development of heavy/light (and eventually airborne and mechanized) infantry units, composers discovered that a mixture (i.e., perfecting their TO&E) of different voiced string instruments worked effectively together and produced a unique and consistent sound.

The U.S. Army Japan Band and a local orchestra perform during a holiday concert on 11 December 2015.

Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Japan Band





Photo by Patrick A. Albright

Trainees from 3rd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment move to their next objective during Infantry One Station Unit Training at Fort Benning, GA, on 5 November 2021.

The four instruments that won out over other string instruments were the violin, viola, cello, and bass. As listed (small to large) these instruments (just like the Queen of Battle) remain the essential instruments in an orchestra. No strings — no orchestra. Here is where the infantry comparison continues. Orchestral strings are organized in what can legitimately be compared to platoons/squads, each with a defined mission and chain of command. Strings are grouped by distinct sections 1st violins, 2nd violins, violas, cellos, and basses. Each section has a section leader who is in charge of all section operations. He (or she) might be compared to a squad leader. Each stand (where the “music” — or mission details rest) is like a fire team with a fire team leader. Just like 18th century armies learned to march in step and fire as a unit, string section leaders determine when their section will “up” bow/“down” bow, what fingerings will be used, and where on the instrument’s neck the positions will be played that is used to achieve the sound required by the piece of music. Everybody except the section leader is a private — i.e., do what you are told to do and in strict unison.

As a young Infantryman in the Old Guard, what I was being asked to do was no different from what I had experienced being part of a string section: left/right/fix — bayonets — up bow/down bow. The discipline and group effort finesse were the same. No difference except this time it was moving an M14 with the same accuracy and deliberation as a cello bow. To see strings (the orchestral infantry) in action, I recommend viewing a YouTube video of any composition by composers like Vivaldi or Telemann. (*To hear these combinations of instruments, listen to Samuel Barber’s “Adagio for Strings” or Dimitri Shostakovich’s “String Quartet No. 8.”*)

Brass — Heavy Cavalry

Towards the latter half of the 18th century, composers started adding brass instruments like trumpets and French

horns to what was up until that time predominantly a string orchestra. With the permanent addition of brass instruments, orchestras truly became combined arms teams. Still because of the technology limitations, brass instruments were used like cavalry — i.e., not committed until the Infantry needed support on a flank — or in the case of an orchestral composition to add to a theme that was being played by the strings. Towards the latter half of the 19th century, brass instruments evolved so they could actually play or augment a theme and their mission (i.e., ability to contribute to the composition) evolved to more prominence. Imagine brass players counting measure after measure waiting to be committed, very much like 18th century cavalry waiting to be told what side of the battlefield they were going to be committed to as the Infantry developed the main fight. (*To hear this combination of instruments, listen to Aaron Copland’s “Fanfare to the Common Man” and/or Richard Strauss’ “Also Sprach Zarathustra.”*)

Woodwinds — Light Cavalry

Woodwind instruments include all the higher range instruments (however, some are lower range like bassoons) that can cover the same octaves as the first and second violins. Modern woodwind instruments — flutes, piccolos, clarinets and oboes — are fully capable of taking the lead or carrying the melody of an orchestral composition. Why are they identified as light cavalry? In the days when light cavalry were asked to secure objectives like bridges (critical pieces of terrain), woodwinds perform similar thematic musical missions. They figuratively fly in out of nowhere, secure an objective (i.e., take the musical lead from the first violins for short periods), and then disappear from whence they came. They are the section closely resembling a flight of “birds” (think Air Cav) when employed. They sound so much like a musical flock of birds (i.e., swooping in) that I once ducked during a performance of Korsakov’s “Scheherazade” when the woodwinds came in out of seemingly nowhere. (*To hear this combination of instruments, listen to Mozart’s “Serenade for Woodwinds.”*)

Lower Brass, Tympani, and Basses — Artillery

By the middle of the 19th century, brass instruments had technically advanced to a point where strictly wind instruments were very popular (now known as bands) and cross-over brass (like the tuba and the trombone plus the baritone) were starting to be regularly used in used orchestral compositions. These instruments combined with the tympani (kettle drums had been around since the 18th century but technology allowed them to be “tuned” to specific notes and more than just two were now regularly used). In some instances combined with the largest string instruments — the bass



Photo by SSG Alan Brutus

Combat engineers assigned to the 25th Infantry Division emplace a Bangalore torpedo during a fire support coordination exercise at Pohakuloa Training Area, HI, on 5 June 2021.

— this group combines to make a very loud, formidable combination. Why are they the artillery of the orchestra? Usually most composers write for them where something loud and distinctive is needed. To the listener when these instruments are employed, it is literally a sudden booming. There is no missing it when they suddenly explode into the piece of music. (To hear this combination of instruments, listen to the third movement of Hindemith’s “Symphonic Metamorphosis” or select Rossini overtures.)

Percussion — The Engineers

If it can be beaten, hit, struck, banged together (like cymbals), shaken, or played with a mallet or stick, it’s a percussion instrument. Many, many different types of percussion instruments are used in modern orchestral works. They are truly the jack of all trades and the engineers of the orchestra. Just like brigade engineers are used to create obstacles, create effects, or shape the battlefield, percussionists are asked to do the same type of musical missions. Unlike other musicians, percussionists are required to play a huge variety of instruments and usually don’t perform the same mission twice, even in the same piece of music. Patience and precision (professional percussionists are some of the best musicians) are the hallmark of percussionists. For example, cymbal players will count and wait an entire piece just so they can deliver a cymbal crash precisely when the conductor cues and wants it delivered and for how long. Just like engineers wait for the command to blow a crater or open a lane — percussionists work under the same mission execution standards: “hurry up and wait/stand by.” (To hear this combination of instruments, listen to E. Varese’s “Ionization.”)

Command and Control — The Conductor

When a commander enters the tactical operations center (TOC), everyone stands; when the conductor walks into the concert hall, the orchestra stands and only sits when the conductor indicates. The level of authority of the two figures is very similar. Just like a commander is responsible for everything his/her unit does or doesn’t do, the same can be said of a conductor and the orchestra’s performance. In short, it is his or her job (and reputation/career) to perform the orchestral work via the musical abilities of the orchestra. I once heard a famous conductor say “The _____ orchestra is a marvelous instrument” — i.e., talking about the orchestra in the “singular.” His comment was not necessarily an exaggeration. In short, he was saying

that orchestra was so proficient and unified its members executed his intent as if they were a single entity. Quite a statement and it isn’t said often.

Unlike a brigade combat team that maintains constant digital and radio communication with the commander, the conductor executes his/her command and control (C2) via very well understood hand, body, facial, and arm signals.



Photo by SSG Joel Salgado

The 3rd Infantry Division Band commander directs his Soldiers during a ceremony at Fort Stewart, GA, on 18 November 2021.

Why? Because his or her primary job is to communicate (to the orchestra) a musical conception of how the piece is supposed to be executed. Visual C2 is so critical to an orchestra; a conductor will not lift his baton to begin until all eyes are on him. Just like subordinates are never supposed to break radio contact with higher, orchestra members have to read the music and maintain observation of the conductor's visual guidance. Soloists (within a particular piece) literally are cued by the conductor when to start. Woe be to a soloist that misses the cue.

The conductor is so much the overall commander that when the piece is concluded, the audience is not supposed to begin to clap until the conductor puts down the baton. Only then will he or she turn around and acknowledge the appreciation. If satisfied with the performance, he or she will turn back around and ask the orchestra to rise and receive the audience's applause. If a curtain call is demanded, only the conductor and the soloists will return to the stage, but the orchestra always remains in place.

Chain of Command

As stated earlier, an orchestra has a formalized chain of command and rank structure just like a brigade. The conductor is the brigade commander, but he/she also has an executive officer (XO) and staff. An orchestra's XO sits right next to the conductor; he/she is the principle of the first violins but also has other duties so he/she goes by a special title — the concert master. Five minutes before the performance begins, the concert master will walk on stage. If he or she is a well-known violinist, the audience will briefly applaud. The audience knows the music will begin shortly so they become silent as the concert master prepares the orchestra for the imminent arrival of the conductor. The concert master walks to his or her seat and stands facing the orchestra. Very silently raising his or her instrument, the concert master places it under chin and sounds the official concert "A." The entire orchestra tunes to that "A," or if deemed necessary for the piece, the oboist's "A." Once the concert master is satisfied the orchestra is tuned, he or she will sit down and await the conductor. In a brigade combat team what just happened with the orchestra would be the equivalent of a net opening radio call and a status check (by the XO) prior to the commander SPing with the tactical command post.

But the conductor and concert master aren't the only personnel operating the orchestra and they sit in the immediate vicinity of the podium (main TOC equivalent) — they are the closest thing the orchestra has to a staff. Rank structure in an orchestra is easy to analyze — the closer one sits to the podium, the more significant and higher rank are the musicians. As such all section principles sit right at the base of the podium. The conductor can easily cue the orchestral infantry (strings) because they are literally within arm's length and certainly within visual range.

All conductors have a preference how the orchestra is arranged, but typically orchestras are seated in a fan. First row is always (from left to right) 1st, 2nd violins, and violas

As the individual musicians are reading just one line of music, the conductor is reading all of them — simultaneously... Just like a brigade commander, they have to know what is happening everywhere.

with cellos on the far right. This arrangement can vary sometimes — a conductor can put the cellos in the middle and flip flop the first and second violins. But that's just the first row. Behind them are the upper brass, woodwinds, lower brass, and the string basses. The percussionists are always in the back with the tympani. Under this arrangement, the conductor can see everyone and control what he wants to happen and when.

Symbology and FM 101-5 Equivalentents

Unlike the military (which literally took centuries to standardize symbology and terminology), music terminology/symbology has been standardized for centuries. In fact, it's so standardized it is a legitimate form of international communication — some would even opine it's even a separate unspoken language.

As such, musical notation is the same from one side of the world to the other. Being able to read music means one can sit and play with someone who doesn't speak your language but you can (and without saying a word) make music together. However, there is a standard language for music details — Italian. Yes, Italian is the language connected with all music symbology — each piece of symbology has an Italian phrase or word connected to it. It's the equivalent to an international Field Manual 101-5. Trained musicians know what they all mean at a glance. Being able to do so is basic/advanced required knowledge to be part of the professional music world. These are one of the tools conductors will use to adjust how they want to interpret (perform) a particular piece of music.

Speaking of control. Musicians have a copy of "their" part of the composition sitting on their stand written just for that instrument. Unlike individual instruments, conductors have on their stand what legitimately could be called a decision support template (DST). They have a reduced-in-size version of what every instrument is playing (the score) and can visually see what is supposed to happen next. Conductors use that to cue soloists and special instruments. As the individual musicians are reading just one line of music, conductors are reading all of them — simultaneously. As such, one easily can see why conductors are extremely talented and skilled musicians. Just like brigade commanders, they have to know what is happening everywhere. I had several brigade commanders who had memorized the DST and the synch matrix prior to startex and executed intricate and compli-

cated plans just staring at a map. They had the whole battle and the parts associated in their head. Many conductors will conduct pieces of music solely from memory and never miss any significant cues for critical solo instruments. They have the ability to see the entire score (DST) in their head.

Rehearsals

When I was a brigade S2, my section made countless terrain boards (sand tables) so our brigade could have meaningful rehearsals. We would construct elaborate details for particular objectives or even do enlargements of objectives so the brigade commander could ensure his subordinate commanders understood his intent. He would always use this phrase: “We will go into excruciating detail.” He expected his commanders to arrive at the rehearsal fully conversant with the brigade order and ready to talk details. This concept was not new to me based on years of orchestral participation.

While battalions/brigades usually only have time for one major rehearsal, orchestras have the option to take rehearsals to the next level of excruciating detail. Just like a brigade staff prepares the brigade for the rehearsal (orders distribution, terrain board, etc.), a conductor expects orchestra members to arrive at rehearsals ready to take the piece to the next level of interpretation. Just like I had all intelligence products complete before the battle staff met, the orchestra chain of command/staff had better have the orchestra ready to work when the conductor steps onto the podium. As such there is “practice” (which an orchestra member does privately) and there is a “rehearsal.” The two are mutually exclusive in the music world. Rehearsals cost money so woe to a musician who shows up not ready to rehearse. Although I was never a professional musician, I have seen college orchestra conductor eruptions that equaled any of the commanders’ I worked for during my Army career. I once met a professional musician who said this about rehearsals

(via referencing his French horn): “I blow in this end (pointing to the mouth piece). If the right notes don’t come out of this end (pointing to the bell), my family doesn’t eat”.

The commander’s intent paragraph is a key part of the brigade order. He must make it clear and decisive so subordinate commanders clearly understand what is to happen and how. On a good day, a productive orchestral rehearsal is used for the conductor to explain his intent via rehearsing select portions of a piece. Just like officers take extensive notes when the commander speaks, a key feature of every music stand includes a pencil to make musical annotations when the conductor issues guidance. In both a combat brigade and orchestra, the guidance is solely directive in nature.

Conclusion

Think all this comparison is a bit silly and far-fetched? There are quite a few crossover terms/concepts the Army uses that are directly borrowed from the professional music world. For example, within the first few hours of arriving at Fort Benning, we had drill sergeants telling us that the purpose of basic training was to “get everybody on the same sheet of music.” Later as a staff officer, I was introduced to such concepts as developing a realistic “battle rhythm” for orders production and how as a staff we needed to “synchronize” the unit’s effort based on our commander’s “intent.” It all sounded very familiar. There is a whole lot of musical philosophy crossover in a modern combat brigade than one might first suspect.

LTC (Retired) Mark A. Farrar had an interesting Army career that crossed two branches and took him from private first class to lieutenant colonel. In 1981 (the same year he joined the Army), he graduated with a degree in history from America’s sixth oldest college, Moravian College, in Bethlehem, PA. Over the course of his career, he had a variety of worldwide assignments with units such as the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), 3rd Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, and III Corps. He started out in the Infantry as a 11B. After Officer Candidate School, he served as a Bradley platoon leader and 4.2 mortar platoon leader. As a Military Intelligence officer, he worked in staff assignments all the way from battalion through corps. He earned the Expert Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab, and Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Identification Badge number 262. Now retired, he plays cello/bass in the University of Campbellsville Symphony, Campbellsville, KY.

Author’s Note: The musical selections suggested in the opening paragraphs were selected by Saulo Moura, a professor at Campbellsville University, where he is also the main conductor of the university orchestra.

A Soldier from 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division conducts registration and calibration for the M777A2 howitzer weapon system in Syria on 30 September 2021.

Photo by SPC Isaiah J. Scott



Understanding Transnational Criminal Organizations:

Implications for the U.S. Army

CPT DAKOTA J. ELDRIDGE

The United States has historically held several national interests constant with respect to interstate relations with Latin America to include: “protecting the U.S. Southern flank, advancing democracy and human rights, promoting economic growth, reducing the flow of illicit drugs, and limiting illegal immigration.”¹ Despite the seemingly clear and concise national interests for the region, the unique nature of the threats growing in Latin America, along with the cultural challenges of each individual country, presents a dilemma for the United States to ensure tranquility and stability in the Western Hemisphere.

Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) present a unique threat to most countries in the Southern Hemisphere due to the growing globalization of networks that enable the movement of drugs, arms, explosives, human trafficking, and funds across national boundaries.² These transnational threats include both state and non-state actors, adding to the complexity of the issues. Additionally, the relationship between the United States and its southern neighbors has deteriorated over the course of time due to cultural, ethnic, and ideological differences between all the states.³ Combating these threats requires a complete understanding of the threats, the international relationship barriers and enhancers, and how specific organization capabilities and competencies can contribute to the fight.

Defining the Threat

Defining, describing, and understanding criminal threats to national interest is an essential task for states or organizations to complete so they can effectively neutralize or eliminate those threats. Understanding the threat enables the targeting state to identify strengths and weaknesses of the opposing force. States are then able to do a relative analysis of power that provides them with a wholistic knowledge of how to combat a threat. Building understanding is critical because it drives additional steps and will improve interstate communication on how a multinational effort can effectively defeat a transnational threat.

Central America and Mexico are forced to counter several threats at one time. TCOs are the first threat to inter- and intra-national security. Additionally, most states in the region combat both domestic and international gangs. As a result of these threats, most states experience security issues with displacement of refugees across borders, compounding security considerations at those borders.

TCOs are characterized by their unique organizational structures and desired objectives. Most TCOs will task organize and employ both lawful and illicit means to accomplish their desired goals: obtaining power and influence and maximizing economic profit.⁴ Their operations are highly coordinated across state lines, thus the title of transnational threat. Their illicit activities include but are not limited to: drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, extortion, cyber-crime, and significant racketeering activities (bribery, counterfeiting, mail fraud, etc.).⁵

Transnational criminal organizations are extremely complex because they maintain unique hierarchies, networks, and structures, and consistently operate in three zones within the Western Hemisphere: source zone, transit zone, and retail zone.⁶ Zones are not limited to a single country. Each zone may consist of multiple countries and group organization, compounding the complexity for understanding the nature of each threat.

TCOs are significant threats rivaling the statistic of civil wars. In his research, Stathis Kalyvas further highlighted that criminal organizations, namely the Mexican cartels, have elevated their ability to operate independently and establish their own network stability through the contracting of an estimated 30,000 “professionals of violence.”⁷ Four dimensions illustrate Kalyvas’s effort in establishing these “wars” on criminal networks: onset and termination, organizational features, dynamics of combat and violence, and relationship to governance and territory.⁸ TCOs establish the military means for the utilization of violence to protect the supply routes from manufacturing, to shipment, to selling.

These criminal organizations seek to delegitimize governmental institutions and security forces to accomplish their goals. Unlike conventionally fought civil wars, TCOs use asymmetry and clandestine operations to effectively undermine state police efforts and demonstrate the organization’s ability to provide for the local populace.⁹ Providing for the local population both increases recruiting ability within neighborhoods and further incentivizes politicians and security force personnel to defect, allowing their organizations to operate freely.

Transnational criminal organizations adapt to power and influence changes quickly. Removing a TCO (or a TCO leader) from power creates a vacuum and increases market competition. Power and influence changes lead to increased

amounts of violence and raise the “cost” to the governing body to demonstrate, or give the impression, that the government can provide security and services to the population. TCOs further gain power and influence when governments demonstrate the inability to capitalize on power consolidation after the collapse of a TCO.

Transnational criminal organizations are evolving along with the globalization of the world. According to John P. Sullivan in his *Small Wars Journal* article “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs, and Intelligence,” criminal organizations will exploit globalizing economies of nations and further expand their criminal enclaves, progressing through his concept of TCO generations.¹⁰ First- and second-generation TCOs are the typical forms identified in contemporary conflict, most extending their influence into the transnational capabilities through business. Sullivan highlighted the critical importance of understanding that TCOs evolving to the third generation will further elevate the negative impacts of the organizations, but with the added latent political objectives.¹¹

Transnational criminal organizations are unlike traditional insurgency threats in the international community. Sullivan wrote that unlike traditional insurgencies that have political aims, “criminal insurgents” seek to maximize their ability for economical advancement by establishing deeply rooted networks to maneuver.¹² These networks include the political and national security sectors within the countries they operate and other criminal entities that operate within those states.

Domestic and international gangs are the second threat to Central American and Mexican security. While the United States has focused on the war on terrorism in the Middle

East, the phenomena of gang proliferation in the United States and Central America has increased.¹³ According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), transnational gangs are present in almost every state and continue to grow their memberships through aggressive recruitment of youth.¹⁴

Gangs are organizations that share similarities of TCOs but differ in their methodology and purpose for violence. First, their organizational structure is more horizontal, and the power authority is less centralized for developing strategy.¹⁵ Gangs operate more often in areas where formal government structures are weak, allowing them to utilize violence as a means of control.¹⁶ Although gangs are identified to occasionally take part in drug trafficking, they do not take part in the large-scale transnational movement of those products.¹⁷

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and “18th Street” (M-18) gangs are the two most well-known for threatening citizen security and government authority in Central America.¹⁸ These gangs originate from Los Angeles. Their “expansion” into Central America is partly a result in the deportation of a significant amount of individuals to their respective countries. Both gangs have grown substantially since the end of the 1990s, rising to an estimated 85,000 members combined across all of the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).¹⁹

The MS-13 and M-18 gangs are thriving in Central America due to weak national governments. The Northern Triangle countries are especially weak, enabling the gangs to flourish with limited counteraction. The weak governments are unable to coordinate multilateral action to combat the gangs, proving them to be “a destabilizing menace, more immediate than any conventional war or guerrilla.”²⁰

The increase of violence in areas controlled by TCOs and gangs raises another national concern for most Central American states: displacement of citizens. Displacement of citizens occurs both internal to Central American countries and internationally throughout the region. Displacement of citizens from urban and population centers is most common due to the varying and persistent levels of extortion.²¹

A woman walks past graffiti of the gang La Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. Transnational gangs like MS-13 and 18th Street are extremely violent and routinely make money by extorting citizens. The government of El Salvador has designated both gangs as terrorist organizations.

Photo courtesy of Federal Bureau of Investigation



Displaced citizens across state boundaries significantly increase international security risks. National economies are impacted as large groups of people move from one country to another seeking asylum from the violence in TCO and gang-controlled territories. Additionally, mass movement of people “raises the probability that the strategies of violence and displacement will be exported to disputes in the rural areas of [other] countries.”²² Displacement along international borders also significantly increases the security risk in protecting those borders.

Defining Relationships

Understanding relationships is critical in countering transnational threats. Threats within Central America and Mexico establish relationships by creating networks that assist in maximizing outcomes for each component, further increasing the complexity to counter threats within the region. Additionally, understanding the current status of relationships between nations combating these threats is also critical to identifying where information sharing and joint operations are strong and weak.

Transnational criminal organizations develop networks to enable freedom of action across national boundaries. TCOs protect their operations across all three zones through corruption in government and security forces. “Bankrolling” a politician or local police unit ensures that those forces will not implement any action the formal institution is responsible to complete (that is, if there is a formal institution present). These relationships enhance the power of the TCO or gang while diminishing the power of the formal government or institution.

Gangs develop a similar relationship with institutions for autonomy over their respective territory. As noted in the RAND Corporation paper “Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks,” “the key driver of violence is... change: change in the negotiated power relations between and within groups, and with the state.”²³ Violence typically decreases with respect to gangs when their territory and power remain unchallenged.

Transnational criminal networks develop networks with gangs to protect their supply routes through international boundaries. As noted above, gangs are significantly territorial. TCOs acknowledge and capitalize on their control of territory to ensure their trafficking routes remain secure. TCO and gang joint networks provide an additional complexity for states to counter.

International relationships within the Western Hemisphere are critical in combating TCOs and transnational gangs. Kalyvas states that a significant portion of the Latin American “experience” is characterized by recently democratized states that have emerging economies and weak institutions. TCOs and gangs are capitalizing on these weaker institutions to enhance their business. The United States must play a significant role in building relationships within the Western Hemisphere as the leading democracy without encroaching on national sovereignty of Central American states.

Plan Colombia was a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort in building strong relationships to defeat international threats from Central America. From Fiscal Year (FY) 2000-2016, the United States provided more than \$10 billion for Plan Colombia and other programs to primarily combat drug trafficking issues funding Colombia’s 50-year insurgency.²⁴ The implementation of Plan Colombia and follow-on projects prevented Colombia from becoming a failed state as feared in the 1990s.

Plan Colombia enabled Colombia to suppress two violent extremist groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). Both insurgency groups established a deep, interconnected network with transnational illicit drug-trade organizations for funding.²⁵ The bilateral effort focused on security posture and institutional building to diminish the production of illicit drugs.

The United States provided the means to strengthen, equip, and professionalize the military and police forces. The United States provided support by enhancing the Colombian National Police and counter-narcotics battalions in the Colombian Army through specialized training.²⁶ Colombia also benefited from the use of planes and aerial equipment from the United States to destroy coca plants (of which Colombia was the largest producer in the source zone).

Plan Colombia significantly reduced the amount of corruption within the Colombian security forces and governance. The plan enhanced the quality of life by focusing efforts on protecting citizens from violence and promoting human rights through United States inspections. Enhancing this relationship that will “fight against corruption at all levels of society... [and] demonstrate a commitment to governance transparency, and strong institutions” is visible in the outcomes of Plan Colombia.²⁷ Although security issues persist within Colombia, the “unwavering commitment to achieve [the] five year goal [to eradicate coca production] from the highest level of the Colombian government” indicates that the future for U.S.-Colombian bilateral efforts will remain positive.²⁸

The Merida Initiative is a bilateral effort, much like Plan Colombia, between the United States and Mexico to build security and stronger relationships in the Western Hemisphere. Mexico holds significant national interest to the United States because it is the only territory that borders the U.S. to the south. The Merida Initiative is an enduring effort focused on four primary objectives: disrupting organized criminal groups, creating a 21st century border, building strong and resilient communities, and institutionalizing the rule of law.²⁹

Disrupting organized criminal groups along the U.S.-Mexico border is the top U.S. drug control policy. Mexico is the primary foreign supplier of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana to the United States (Mexico is the leading nation in the transit zone for TCOs).³⁰ The Sinaloa organization is one of six primary TCOs that operates across the U.S.-Mexico border. As a result of these organizations



Photo courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard

Navy Adm. Craig Faller discusses the importance of dismantling criminal organizations that seek to profit from narcotics smuggling during a press conference for the U.S. Coast Guard offload of more than 34,000 pounds of seized cocaine in 2019.

gaining power, the estimated crime-related homicides within Mexico have exponentially increased since 2014.³¹

Denying drugs from Mexico into the United States, and conversely preventing firearms and bulk currency from the United States into Mexico, is an ongoing issue that both countries have failed to adequately accomplish.³² The growing TCO and gang issues within both countries continue to exacerbate the immigration issues between the two countries. Looking to the future, expanding the success of the Joint Border Intelligence Group (GCIF) is critical in establishing the desired border outcome.³³

The Merida Initiative has significantly shaped the police forces within Mexico over the past decade. Vetting examinations for police officers were implemented as a subcomponent of the bilateral agreement, with oversight by the United States, to prevent corruption in security forces. From initiation of the vetting exam to May 2015, roughly 14,100 of 134,600 municipal police had failed the exam and were removed.³⁴ Providing the Mexican government with a stronger, more reliable police force contributes significantly to the legitimacy of the government in their fight against TCOs.

Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative are positive examples of coalition relationship building within the Western Hemisphere. Both policies have advanced governance, security cooperation, and built relationships between

the United States and the Latin American region despite not fully accomplishing the desired end states to date. The United States, as the strongest democracy in the Western Hemisphere, must take lead in multinational relationships to defeat TCOs and transnational gangs.

Culture and regional characteristics are important considerations in relationship building. Building an understanding of the threat is essential, but understanding the local governance and population of a country that is fighting TCOs is also critical. The United States has significant leverage in the international community due to economic dominance and unrivaled military might or “hard power.”³⁵

Historically, the United States has hurt relationships due to a lack of cultural and regional knowledge. The United States’ approach to national policy with its southern neighbors has been characterized as “to reflect arrogance and unchecked hubris... that fail to take Latin American interests into account.”³⁶ Such sentiment has a direct negative effect on the United States’ ability to implement what is known as “soft power” in Latin America to achieve national interest.

The United States must understand how to build relationships with “soft power.” Soft power is the ability to influence other nations to achieve desired national policy through providing “attraction” through a variety of means for other states to comply.³⁷ The elements of soft power vary depending

on the definition and are highly debated, but Craig Hayden's official working definition comes from Joseph Nye's description that "soft power" is "the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction."³⁸

The United States seeks to develop relationships by encouraging democracy to enhance cooperation through mutual respect. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated in a speech to the University of Louisville that "our foreign policy is built on respect... [to include] respect for how our neighbors and allies run their affairs."³⁹ The Latin American region has a heterogeneous mixture of cultures that are significantly different from state to state. Interstate relations are enhanced with cultural respect and understanding.

Defining Issues to Shared Understanding

Shared understanding is an essential element of leading and effectively fighting criminal organizations and gangs. A shared understanding of the threat is critical to identifying strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited in the conflict resolution process. Shared understanding of the relationships between coalition forces is critical because it enhances the threat-fighting capabilities of the coalition force.

There are multiple threatening agents to dissolution of shared understanding. TCOs thrive on the ability to derail police operations to protect their supply routes. Some criminal organizations have further built militant forces capable of conducting counterintelligence operations to ensure their economic profit and long-term protection is secured.

Military intervention is a sensitive subject when dealing with "crime" because the threats are inherently an issue that the state department of nations should address. As stated by Vanda Felbab-Brown, "modern militaries were not designed or trained to deal with illicit economies and organized crime."⁴⁰ Military power further exacerbates the issue by militarizing the threat and increasing the collateral damage and civilian casualties affected by the conflict.

In some cases, military action results in increased violence and TCO growth. Whether manifested in perceived cultural disrespect or the collateral damage created in warfare, a rising dissent among the population initiates additional conflict. Acting within the micro level of operations without consideration of effects at the macro level leads to "interveners... isolate themselves from local populations, ignore local dynamics, and privilege universal over local knowledge."⁴¹

A lack of cultural sensitivity in action encourages local populations of people to defect against the state or intervening element. David Kilcullen describes this phenomenon as creating the "accidental guerrilla." Building legitimacy for a local government without compounding the conflict is an essential task to defeating TCOs and gangs.

Defining Organizational Capabilities and Competencies

Combating TCOs and transnational gangs within Central

Shared understanding is an essential element of leading and effectively fighting criminal organizations and gangs. A shared understanding of the threat is critical to identifying strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited in the conflict resolution process.

America and Mexico requires the synchronization of efforts and information sharing between organizations. The United States alone has countless departments and organizations that must work together with multinational organizations in Central America. The Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense are three of the primary departments that are controlled by the United States government that have specific capabilities and competencies in combating TCOs and international gangs.

The Department of State primarily combats TCOs and transnational gangs through interstate relations (ambassadors, diplomats, etc.). The Department of State is the primary diplomatic office under the President of the United States. Department of State efforts contributed to the success of programs like Operational Regional Shield I and II in 2017.⁴² The Department of State has several subordinate offices to include the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

ICE combats TCOs and transnational gangs by focusing on identifying, disrupting, and dismantling criminal organizations.⁴³ It is task organized into several subordinate components that form joint task forces (JTFs) with the ability to conduct geographic-focused investigations. The JTFs focus specifically in the areas of narcotics, weapons and contraband smuggling, human trafficking, and transnational gangs.⁴⁴

DHS primarily combats TCOs and transnational gangs by focusing on the homeland of the United States. It ensures that domestic affairs are investigated through the use of subordinate organizations. The FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are primary contributors for the department in its efforts to combat TCOs.

The FBI leverages political and law enforcement relationships both domestically and abroad to defeat transnational threats.⁴⁵ It has Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces (TAGs) that work internationally to conduct investigations of gangs within the boundaries of Central American countries. These organizations are critical links between domestic and international information sharing to further understanding international criminal organizations.

The National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) enables tactical FBI units to receive fast and accurate information.

The NGIC is responsible for analyzing information collected on organizations to provide additional support to FBI and other agencies to perform investigations. The NGIC shares information from the local, state, and federal levels with multinational agencies to ensure efforts are synchronized in collection.⁴⁶

DHS is leading the initiative in developing academic partnerships to analyze TCOs and transnational gangs. George Mason University leads a partnership with nine other universities, in conjunction with DHS, known as the Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis Center (CINA). The CINA was created in 2017 to “develop strategies and solutions to enhance criminal network analysis, forensics, and investigative processes for on-the-ground use by agents and officers to counteract transnational crime.”⁴⁷ It combines the efforts of scholastic research in advancing network communications ability and information sharing.

The Department of Defense uses military intervention and training in combating TCOs and transnational gangs. The United States does not have an enduring presence in a majority of Latin America like other parts of world. The majority of forces from the U.S. military come from frequent rotations by U.S. special operations forces, Marines, and National Guard personnel.⁴⁸

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the geographic combatant command responsible for the Latin American area of responsibility. In the 2019 posturing statement before Congress, then SOUTHCOM Commander ADM Craig S. Faller noted that information sharing and multinational training have provided the best return on investment for combating TCOs and transnational gangs.⁴⁹ JTF and multi-agency cooperation has been highly effective in combating threats in Latin America.

Military intelligence organizational capabilities provide the most to the multi-agency efforts in combating TCOs and transnational gangs. Enhancing the threat-link analysis products allows the military to contribute by focusing on activities that have “confluent actions between TCOs and violent extremist networks [counterterrorism].”⁵⁰ Linking TCO, transnational gangs, and violent extremist groups will enable joint and multi-national agencies to create a better common operating picture of the transnational threats within Central America.

Conclusion

TCOs and transnational gangs are key matters of national interest to the United States. Understanding the nature of the threats demonstrate that they differ from conventional armed conflict and the traditional insurgencies experience by the United States. Their ability to influence and gain power in countries with weaker governments indicates Central America and the surrounding regions to be of concern.

Combating TCOs and transnational gangs is highly dependent upon building relationships. Building relationships based on respect enables multi-national efforts to synchronize

capabilities and competencies across international borders. Without strong relationships, TCOs and transnational gangs will continue to proliferate in Central America.

The current capabilities and competencies of all organizations must continue to advance to achieve success in eliminating TCOs and transnational gangs. The diplomacy of the State Department is critical in joining the “hard power” and “soft power” elements of international influence. The Department of Homeland Security, and all other organizations, must improve information collection and sharing across agencies and countries to keep up with the pace of TCOs reactions. The Department of Defense must continue to develop counter TCO and gang doctrine through continued training and partnership.

Notes

¹ Michael J. Meese, Suzanne C. Nielsen, and Rachel M. Sondheimer, *American National Security* 7th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 603.

² *Ibid.*, 613.

³ *Ibid.*, 612.

⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 9 December 2019, accessed from <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “How Civil Wars Help Explain Organized Crime – and How They Do Not,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(8): 1519.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1522.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1528; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime-War Battlefields” in *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift*, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015), 232.

¹⁰ John P. Sullivan, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence,” *Small Wars Journal* (2009): 3-5, accessed from www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/248-sullivan.pdf.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³ Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” *Foreign Affairs* 48(3): 98.

¹⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Gangs,” 9 December 2019, accessed from <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/gangs>.

¹⁵ Clare R. Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” Congressional Research Service, 20 February 2014, accessed from <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/585a987a4.pdf>.

¹⁶ Sinisa Vukovic and Eric Rahman, “Sympathy for the Devil: When and How to Negotiate with Criminal Gangs-Case of El Salvador,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2018): 5.

¹⁷ Oliver Jutersonke, Robert Muggah, and Dennis Rodgers, “Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Latin America,” *Security Dialogue* 40(4-5): 373-397.

¹⁸ Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰ Jutersonke et al, “Gangs, Urban Violence,” 9.

²¹ David J. Cantor, “The New Wave: Forced Displacement Caused by Organized Crime in Central America and Mexico,” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 33(3): 46.

²² *Ibid.*, 51.

²³ Angel Rabasa, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Peter Chalk, Douglas Farah, Gregory Midgette, and Howard J. Shatz, *Counter-network: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 71.

²⁴ June Beittel, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 2012 [Updated 2019], accessed at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf>.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁷ Department of Homeland Security, “Building Capacity to Fight Corruption and Impunity,” DHS.gov, 16 June 2017, accessed from <https://>

www.dhs.gov/2017/06/16/building-capacity-fight-corruption-and-impunity.
²⁸ Kirsten D. Madison, "U.S.-Colombia Relations: New Opportunities to Reinforce and Strengthen Our Bilateral Relationship," testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues, 19 September 2019, accessed from <https://www.state.gov/u-s-colombia-relations-new-opportunities-to-reinforce-and-strengthen-our-bilateral-relationship/>.

²⁹ Clare R. Seelke and Kristin Finklea, "U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond," Congressional Research Service, 2017, accessed from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf>.

³⁰ Ibid, 3.

³¹ Ibid, 3.

³² Ibid, 9.

³³ Madison, "U.S.-Colombia Relations."

³⁴ Seelke and Finklea, "U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation," 16.

³⁵ Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 5.

³⁶ Meese et al., *American National Security*, 613.

³⁷ Hayden, 33.

³⁸ Ibid, 29.

³⁹ Michael R. Pompeo, "Diplomatic Realism, Restraint, and Respect in Latin America," speech given at the University of Louisville, 2 December 2019, accessed from <https://www.state.gov/diplomatic-realism-restraint-and-respect-in-latin-america/>.

⁴⁰ Felbab-Brown, "Crime-War Battlefields," 229.

⁴¹ Lou Pingeot, "United Nations Peace Operations as International Practices: Revisiting the UN Mission's Armed Raids Against Gangs in Haiti," *European Journal of International Security* 3(3): 365.

⁴² Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Fact Sheet: The Second Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America," State.gov, 12 October 2018, accessed from <https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-the-second-conference-on-prosperity-and-security-in-central-america/>.

⁴³ Raymond Villanueva, "Combating Transnational Gangs through

Information Sharing," written testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, last published 26 November 2019, accessed from <https://www.dhs.gov/news/>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Stephen E. Richardson, "Combating Transnational Gangs Through Information Sharing," statement for the record before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 18 January 2018, accessed at <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-transnational-gangs-through-information-sharing>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis Center." DHS.gov, 2017, accessed from <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/st-cina-fact-sheet>.

⁴⁸ Craig S. Faller, "United States Southern Command Posture Statement," statement before the 116th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 February 2019, accessed from https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2019_Posture_Statement_Final.pdf.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 12-13.

⁵⁰ LTC Gerald A. Boston, "The United States Military's Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime" (Army War College, 2013), 3.

At the time this article was written, **CPT Dakota J. Eldridge** was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, GA. He currently serves as the assistant professor of Military Science at Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro, TN. His previous assignments include serving as an Infantry One Station Unit Training company commander (E Company, 3rd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment, 197th Infantry Brigade) at Fort Benning, GA; and as a rifle and heavy weapons platoon leader with Task Force 1-28, Fort Benning. He earned a master's degree in international relations (national security concentration) from Troy University in 2020.



INFANTRY NEEDS YOUR ARTICLES

INFANTRY is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, training tips, and experiences while deployed. We can also use relevant historical articles with an emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. If you're unsure whether a topic is suitable, please contact us.


Our fully developed feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 3,500 words, but these are not rigid guidelines. We prefer clear, correct, concise, and consistent wording expressed in the active voice. Also, please spell out all acronyms and abbreviations the first time you use them. Sketches, photographs, maps, and line drawings that support your article are encouraged.

When you submit your article, please include the original electronic files of all graphics. Please also include the origin of all artwork and, if necessary, written permission for any copyrighted items to be reprinted. Authors are responsible for ensuring their articles receive a proper security review through their respective organizations before being submitted. We have a form we can provide that can aid in the process.

Find our Writer's Guide at <https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/about.html>. For more information or to submit an article, call (706) 545-2350 or email us at usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@army.mil.



Training Notes



Yet Another Guide to Ranger School

CPT ZACHARY C. GUST



Various articles have been written over the years about the U.S. Army Ranger School. There has not been an article written in a while and although the school has not changed much over the years, I thought it would be helpful to go over a few things in depth on how to prepare for the Army's premier leadership school. There will always be different opinions on how to best prepare for Ranger School. These tips and suggestions are my personal thoughts on how to be successful after working in the organization that runs Ranger School, the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade (ARTB).

There is no point for me to ramble on without letting you know who I am and what my qualifications are to prove they are valid. First, I graduated the course in December 2018 with Class 01-19 after spending 87 days at the school. I initially started with Ranger Class 11-18 and had the pleasure of doing Darby Phase twice, as I recycled for patrols. I completed platoon leader (PL) and executive officer (XO) time with the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, at Fort Wainwright, AK. I deployed with the battalion to Iraq in 2019-2020 as a mortar PL and then did a short year of work at ARTB.

The article will give advice on how to prepare for Ranger

A student in Ranger Class 3-21 completes the push-up event during the Ranger Physical Assessment.

Photos by SGT Jaerett Engeseth

School no matter your rank, gender, or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). I will cover three areas: fitness (or physical), mental (or knowledge), and miscellaneous, which will include some tips on gear to bring. The point is to discuss ways you can better prepare yourself for Ranger School in a casual manner to make it easier to read and understand.

Bottom line up front (BLUF): Report to Ranger School in the best shape possible. Fitness is no surprise to anyone trying to go to Ranger School. Although it is not a surprise, a chunk of students will fail day one during the Ranger Physical Fitness Test (RPFT). My initial advice revolves around the RPFT: Be able to do 75 push-ups prior to going to the course. The Ranger standard is 49 but expect multiple push-ups not to be counted, hence being able to do 75 push-ups



will minimize your chance of failure. Practice your push-ups with a metronome so they are methodical and not too fast or slow. Steady push-ups that follow the Army standard are the key.

When training for the five-mile run, run farther than that distance and be able to do the five-mile in 38 minutes or faster. The Ranger standard is five miles in 40 minutes, but if you cannot do the run in 38 minutes or faster, do not expect to be able to run faster than 40 minutes when you are stressed already on day one of Ranger School. Do not go all out during the RPFT and Ranger Assessment Phase (RAP) week. Ranger school is a marathon, and staying healthy is key. The school is a minimum of 61 days, and going all out in the first week can easily lead to injury or burning out.

Ruck, ruck, and ruck some more. After the RPFT, you are on your legs most of the day throughout the course and can have up to a 115-pound rucksack in Mountain Phase (the second phase of Ranger School). Being able to ruck with a heavy pack is crucial. Prepare yourself by rucking twice a week and gradually increase the weight each week to get used to rucking with a heavier pack. Also practice going through an obstacle course. Practice some of the obstacles such as climbing a rope because you will absolutely climb a rope multiple times while at Ranger School. Every military base has an obstacle course somewhere; find a way to use it and practice prior to your report date. Confidence is a major factor, and we will discuss this further later.

Taking care of your body is also part of the fitness/physical side of Ranger School. You will only have access to showers in the beginning of each phase. When patrols start, there will not be a chance to shower and what is in your ruck is what you have. Make sure to switch your socks out each day. Taking care of your feet is crucial and can make or break your Ranger School experience. Wipe yourself down with wet wipes every day and do basic hygiene as much as possible. You will have medic checks every morning; this is a great time to brush your teeth, wipe down, and change socks/shirt.

Knowledge and mentality boil down to the individual, and the mindset you bring to the course is on you. There are multiple pre-ranger courses out there, and I highly suggest attending one. I am biased towards the Ranger Training Assessment Course (RTAC — <https://www.benning.army.mil/Tenant/WTC/RTAC.html>) because I graduated from that course prior to starting Ranger School. Go to a pre-ranger course as it will only help hone your skills and prepare you for the grueling course to come. Some key things to know before arrival at Ranger School are the Ranger Creed, knot



At Ranger School, being able to ruck with a heavy pack is crucial.

tying, and Ranger Tactical Tasks (RTTs). It is a simple task to memorize the Ranger Creed prior to the course, but you would be surprised at how many students show up without knowing any of it. Do yourself and your Ranger buddies a favor and memorize it. You will say it every time before you eat, and if you mess up there will be remedial training. Knot tying is another critical skill that you will constantly be doing. You have to pass a knots test in Mountain Phase, so take the time to learn the Ranger knots. At a bare minimum, know how to tie a bowline knot, square knot, and overhand knot. The RTTs are a drop event, which means if you fail you will go home. Practice at your unit with a subject matter expert (SME). The tasks are the same standard as the Expert Infantry Badge (EIB). Most pre-ranger courses will cover RTTs, but you do not want to be the Soldier dropped because you failed RTTs. If you absolutely cannot get your hands on the radios and machine guns, then watch videos that can be found online.

Always be positive. The school will get hard and will challenge you. Being positive will help your mental attitude and rub off on your Ranger buddies as well. This goes along with being a team player. Help your buddies out and do not be the one complaining all the time. Being a “good dude” goes a long way and will always help you in Ranger School. The buddies to your left and right help you earn your Ranger tab. A positive attitude and optimistic outlook each day will make Ranger School a little less miserable. Along with being positive, be confident. Ranger School is about leadership, and part of that is making a plan and making decisions. Be

confident with your decisions. You may make the wrong decision and that is okay; failure to make a decision at all is worse than making the wrong one. Do not be so confident that you come across as arrogant, but you do not want to be timid either. Brief loud and clear and own your plan. The confidence you bring to the course will be noticed, and as long as you are not arrogant and pompous, this will help you succeed.

Physical and mental preparation are the two main factors on how to set yourself up for success, but I will add in some miscellaneous tips and gear to bring with you. Get yourself a solid pair of kneepads. You will spend a ton of time on a knee while in short and long halts. Bring multiple head lamps (it is likely you will lose one or two); you do not need a fancy one — ones from one of the large retail stores work just fine. Make sure the headlamps take AAA batteries; it is easier to get your hands on AAA batteries than AA. Bring some socks that you are used to rucking in, and I highly suggest wearing underwear while at school to reduce chafing (compression shorts are not allowed). I watched many of my Ranger buddies chafe badly (which we all know can make rucking miserable), and underwear can prevent this. Get a couple sets of the permanent map markers; you only need the black, red, blue, and green markers. I will not go into the depths on which pair of boots are the best, but bring a pair that are broken in and you like to ruck in (everyone has their favorite brand). A good terrain model will help your squad/platoon out. Simple things to put in your terrain model are golf tees, yarn, notecards, and colored chalk. I had some buddies swear by a foot product that you spray on your feet

Be confident with your decisions. You may make the wrong decision and that is okay; failure to make a decision at all is worse than making the wrong one.

to toughen them up. It worked for them, but I have no real research on the product so make the call yourself. I previously mentioned that taking care of your body (especially your feet) is important.

Last word of advice is to be a team player. Be the buddy who carries the 240B machine gun. Be the buddy who offers to take the rope or extra weight that day. Do not be the last one to wake up or the one to always fall asleep. Everyone has bad days at Ranger School and everyone will fall asleep, just do not be the guy that it does it consistently.

Whether it takes you 61 days or 237 days, take Ranger School one day at a time. Prepare yourself physically, mentally, and with the right gear/tools. If this article helps one person get their tab, that is all that matters. Everyone has his/her own opinions, but these are some of the things that I believe will set you up for success. Remember to be a “good dude” and things will fall into place. The school is challenging but not impossible. Many before you have earned their tab and many after will as well. Rangers lead the way!



Ranger students plan a mission during the school's swamp phase at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.

Visit ARTB's website for the latest Ranger School information — <https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/ARTB/Student-Information/>.

CPT Zachary C. Gust is currently serving as the assistant S2 for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Strike), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He previously served as an assistant operations officer in the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. His other assignments include serving as a Stryker platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, and executive officer with 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, at Fort Wainwright, AK. His military education includes graduating from the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course, Stryker Leader Course, Advanced Situational Awareness Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course and Air Assault School. He earned a bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse.

Understanding Our First Enemies in the Cold

LTC (RETIRED) CHARLES D. HENRY

Throughout history, the essential ingredient to the quality of any fighting force is the individual warfighter. It is in how we train these Soldiers and the knowledge and discipline they carry within them. As we have found in increasing heat, we also find in increasing cold — not a single challenge but a spectrum of increasing potential threats for warfighters which needs to be understood and individually countered for survival and success. Any environment is a whole integrated complex that cannot be thought of and treated as just one consistent threatening factor. As it gets colder, Soldiers face more and harder challenges.

We can be physically fit and optimally trained and supported for the tasks that we face, but our bodies cannot fully adapt to the new situation and attain maximal performance without first a whole body, full time exposure and the days spent taken to physiologically respond to the environment's demands. Our bodies always adapt to meet the environment that it is in at that present moment. Our bodies will have to acclimate to any change in our environment, and sometimes that means, in the worst case, that it may be literally weeks before new stability may be reached and supported by our new behaviors. This can be very complex with changing seasons, the ascents to altitude, and the arrival of storms. The first enemy we must always consider is the environment. The current changing global strategic environment is requiring that we, once again, regain our aptitude to operate safely in cold climates at all altitudes.

The basic challenge in the cold is to understand and reduce or prevent the body's loss of moisture and heat to the environment. Cold air is dry air which dehydrates the body. The steaming breath we see is the visible evidence of the water and warmth leaving our bodies. The cold environment is constantly leaching the energy and moisture from our bodies that we need to live. If we are climbing to altitude, the situation becomes more complex as the oxygen we need for energy diminishes.

Cold temperatures can quickly drop to levels that our bodies simply cannot acclimatize to. What we do is habituate by adding deliberate behaviors that supplement and support our bodies' abilities to survive the challenge of the cold. To do this we need food and water; shelter; clean, dry clothes; adequate rest; and sources of warmth. We also need to understand how to continually be aware and act in the environment to safely sustain ourselves. Simply put, our bodies in the cold become engines that we need to constantly observe and sustain on top of all our other requirements for resources and concerns so that we can survive and pursue our goals.

Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, cross-country ski at the Chilean Army Mountain School in Portillo, Chile, on 21 August 2021.

Photo by SGT Gregory Muenchow



Cold and Mountainous Regions

Army Techniques Publication 3-90.97, *Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations*, defines cold regions as “where cold temperatures, unique terrain, and snowfall have a significant effect on military operations for one month or more each year.”¹ It describes regions that are either moderately cold or severely cold, each comprising about approximately one quarter of the Earth’s land mass.²

- **Moderately cold** — Where the mean temperatures during the coldest month of the year are below freezing.

- **Severely cold** — Where mean annual air temperatures stay below freezing, maximum snow depths exceed 60 centimeters (24 in), and ice covers lakes and rivers for more than 180 days each year.

Weather Conditions That Create Hazards

Temperature, wind, snow, and freeze/thaw cycles are the primary environmental conditions that affect the winter and mountain battlefield and challenge the physiology of the warfighter. The lack of stability in these factors can stress our body by forcing it to frequently try to adapt and can possibly magnify our fatigue, distress, and distraction.

Cold Weather Characteristics

The Army categorizes cold temperatures into the following operational groups:³

Wet cold — +39° Fahrenheit (F) to +20° F (4° Celsius [C] to -7° C).

Dry cold — +19° F to -4° F (-7° C to -20° C).

Intense cold — -5° F to -25° F (-20° C to -32° C).

Extreme cold — -25° F to -40° F (-32° C to -40° C).

Hazardous cold — -40° F (-40° C) and below.

Wet Cold

*Wet cold conditions occur when wet snow and rain often accompany wet cold conditions. This type of environment is more dangerous to troops and equipment than the colder, dry cold environments because the ground becomes slushy and muddy and clothing and equipment becomes perpetually wet and damp. Because water conducts heat 25 times faster than air, core body temperatures drop if troops are wet and the wind is blowing. Troops become casualties due to weather if not properly equipped, trained, and led. Wet cold environments combined with wind is dangerous because of the wind’s effect on the body’s perceived temperature. Wet cold leads to hypothermia, frost bite, and trench foot. Wet cold conditions are not only found in mountain environments but in many other environments during seasonal transition periods. Under wet cold conditions, the ground alternates between freezing and thawing because the temperatures fluctuate above and below the freezing point. This makes planning problematic. For example, areas that are trafficable when frozen could become severely restricted if the ground thaws.*⁴

When reading the broad spectrum of physiology sources,

Simply put, our bodies in the cold become engines that we need to constantly observe and sustain on top of all our other requirements for resources and concerns so that we can survive and pursue our goals.

we encounter a different definition of “wet cold” and find many arguments from Midwesterners and Canadians about the subject. The climatic conditions that bring it on are ill-defined, and there are those who deny that it exists. What is to be remembered is that the U.S. Army is creating an operational category while the civilian sources are attempting to define a subjective description. However, once one has experienced it, you become wary of it. It seems that under certain climatic conditions as the temperature drops moisture appears to be trapped in the air rather than dissipated and the air becomes a very clammy cold. One report indicates this seems to happen down to about 15° F (-8.5 C). The basic problem is that moisture in the air sucks the warmth right out of our bodies, chilling us very quickly. When experiencing this, you find yourself hoping the temperature will drop to dehydrating levels so you can be dry and cold instead of miserably wet and cold. The only apparent counter to this condition is enough dry clothes and food for heat production.

Leaders must know and follow the guidance provided by Table C-1 of ATP 3-90.97 for required training, specialized uniforms and equipment, support requirements, and the ration types and amounts for operations in wet cold.

Dry Cold

*Dry cold conditions are easier to live in than wet cold conditions. Like in wet cold conditions, proper equipment, training and leadership are critical to successful operations. Wind chill is a complicating factor in this type of cold. The dry cold environment is the easiest of the cold weather categories to survive in because of low humidity and the ground remains frozen. As a result, people and equipment are not subject to the effects of the thawing and freezing cycle, and precipitation is generally in the form of dry snow.*⁵

Associated with this is the decline of manual dexterity as our skin temperature drops below 55° F (13° C).⁶

Leaders must know and follow the guidance provided by Tables C-2 and C-3 of ATP 3-90.97 for required training, specialized uniforms and equipment, support requirements, and the ration types and amounts for operations in dry cold.

Intense Cold

Intense cold exists from -5° F to -25° F (-20° C to -32° C) and can affect the mind as much as the body. Simple tasks take longer and require more effort than in



Photo by SSG Daniel Love

A Soldier with the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division awaits transportation after a successful airborne operation in Deadhorse, AK, on 22 February 2017. The Soldiers completed the operation in -30 degrees temperatures, with a wind chill factor of -56 degrees.

Hazardous Cold

In hazardous cold conditions, commanders and planners assume greater risk if they engage in operations when the temperature falls below -40° F (-40° C). Units are extensively trained before undertaking an operation in these temperature extremes.⁹

Experience has shown that consistent leadership by veteran warfighters who carefully keep troops clothed, fed, warmed, rested, and supplied with hot liquids will allow all needed tasks to be accomplished, although requiring up to about four times the amount of time scheduled for those tasks in a temperate environment.

Leaders must know and follow the guidance provided by Table C-5 of ATP 3-90.97 for required training, specialized uniforms and equipment, support requirements, and the

ration types and amounts for operations in hazardous cold.

Altitude and its Effects

The effects of altitude are pervasive and potentially lethal, so they must be considered whenever changes in altitude are involved in operations. Warfighters live and work in a whole integrated environment, and it is a mistake to focus on one aspect without considering its interaction with all the other environmental factors.

In mountainous areas, the general rule is for every 1,000 feet of elevation gained, the temperature decreases 3° F to 5° F. At high elevations, there may be differences of 40° to 50° F between the temperature in the sun and that in the shade, which is similar in magnitude to the day-to-night temperature fluctuations experienced in some deserts.

At higher elevations, air is considerably dryer than air at sea level. Due to this increased dryness, Soldiers must increase their fluid intake by approximately a third.

For most warfighters between elevations of 2,438 meters (8,000 feet) and 5,486 meters (18,000 feet), 70 to 80 percent of the respiratory component of acclimatization occurs in seven to 10 days, and 80 to 90 percent of overall acclimatization is generally accomplished within two to four weeks. All of this depends on the amount of physical stress then being experienced by the warfighter. Maximum acclimatization may take months to years. Acclimatization cannot be accelerated as some people acclimate more rapidly than others, and a few may not acclimate at all. There is no reli-

warmer temperatures, and the quality of work degrades as attention-to-detail diminishes. Clothing becomes more bulky to compensate for the cold so troops lose dexterity. Commanders must consider these factors when planning operations and assigning tasks.⁷

It must be remembered that the diminishment of our thought processes starts at about 40° F and continues with the drop in temperature if we do not protect ourselves against it. Leaders must know and follow the guidance provided by Tables C-3 and C-4 of ATP 3-90.97 for required training, specialized uniforms and equipment, support requirements, and the ration types and amounts for operations in intense cold.

Extreme Cold

Extreme cold occurs from -25° F to -40° F (-32° C to -40° C) and the challenge of survival becomes paramount. During extreme cold conditions, it is easy for individuals to prioritize their physical comfort above all else. Personnel withdraw into themselves and adopt a cocoon-like existence. Leaders expect and plan for weapons, vehicles, and munitions failures in this environment. As in other categories, leadership, training, and specialized equipment are critical to the ability to operate successfully.⁸

Leaders must know and follow the guidance provided by Table C-4 of ATP 3-90.97 for required training, specialized uniforms and equipment, support requirements, and the ration types and amounts for operations in extreme cold.

able way to identify those who cannot acclimate except by their experience during previous altitude exposures. When brought to lower altitudes, all Soldiers will lose their acclimatization in perhaps as little as 10 days.¹⁰

Altitude exposure may result in changes in vision, taste, mood, and personality. These effects are directly related to altitude and are common above 3,048 meters (10,000 feet). Some effects occur early and are temporary, while others may persist after acclimatization or even for a period of time after descent.

Hypoxia, the lowering level in the oxygen reaching the body's tissues, and cold can impair judgment and physical performance, resulting in a greater risk of injury while operating in rugged terrain. Because hypoxia-induced psychological effects can result in poor judgment and decision making, a higher incidence of cold injuries must be anticipated.

Heat Injury in the Cold

A hazard we virtually never think of is heat injury in the cold. All the standard heat injuries, such as heat cramps, heat exhaustion, and heat stroke, can occur in the mountains and at altitude. For Soldiers this may "occur during movements, especially upslope with heavy loads or at high altitude with heavy loads. Personal protection equipment can restrict evaporation of sweat (body cooling) and also cause heat injuries. Commanders need to balance the load, personal protection equipment, and pace with the altitude and degree of slope."¹¹ This is a double-edged sword in that the overheating that threatens warfighters causes sweat which in the cold can freeze into ice inside their clothing and then threaten lethal cooling. A balance needs to be obtained in effort and mode of dress that allows Soldiers to heat up while working without injury and avoid the soaking sweats which take away the insulative protection of their clothes.

Summary

As cold increases with the fall in temperature, "more is just not more of the same" but new combinations of potentially lethal challenges. We need to understand the differing level of challenges in the different categories. Much of the increasing challenge is in our body's growing struggle to prevent or offset the increasing loss of body heat and moisture and the additional energy this demands as an offset. This includes choices of clothing, choosing the right work/rest schedule, supply of food and water, support requirements, and perhaps, special equipment.

Whenever we humans move over the general range of 4,900 feet in altitude, we must always consider that the environment is always reducing air pressure as we climb and diminishing our energy supply. As the temperature drops below 40° F (5° C), the cold begins to suck the energy out of our bodies and take with it the moisture we need to stay alive. These two separate forces begin to undermine our physical abilities to function and survive no matter how fit we may be to begin with.

Time is also a planning consideration. A rule of thumb is that it generally takes two to four weeks to acclimatize to a stable cold environment. It takes approximately two weeks to adapt to the changes associated with the hypobaric conditions at 2,268 meters (7,500 feet). For every 610 meters (2,000 feet) above that requires an additional week of acclimatization to altitude. It must be remembered that a single day's ascension of over 8,000 feet predisposes Soldiers to potentially lethal Acute Mountain Sickness.

A warfighter's body is not a machine but a biological organism that always attempts to adjust to its current environment. It has real limits and needs help in the form of disciplined behaviors to survive and succeed in cold environments. A thorough understanding of Appendix A, Altitude and Environmental Hazards, of ATP 3-90.97 is essential for all leaders and medical personnel prior to deployment. Recognizing the differences in the threats posed by the cold categories will help us understand and prepare ourselves and our Soldiers for those challenges.

Notes

¹ ATP 3-90.97, *Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations*, April 2016, 1-3.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 1-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Lawrence E. Armstrong, PhD, *Performing in Extreme Environments* (Human Kinetics, 2000).

⁷ ATP 3-90.97, 1-9.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Armstrong, *Performing in Extreme Environments*.

¹¹ ATP 3-90.97, A-4.

Other References

TB Med 508, *Prevention and Management of Cold - Weather Injuries*, 2005

Training Circular (TC) 3-97.61, *Military Mountaineering*, 2012

TC 4-02.3, *Field Hygiene and Sanitation*, 2015

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.70, *Survival*, 2012

FM 4-25.11, *First Aid*, 2002

FM 31-70, *Basic Cold Weather Manual*, 1968

FM 31-71, *Northern Operations*, 1971

FM 90-6, *Mountain Operations*, 2000

GTA 5-8-12, *Individual Safety Card*, 2005 (this is a good pocket guide for Soldiers)

Technical Note No. 92-2, *Sustaining Health and Performance in the Cold: Environmental Medicine Guidance for Cold-Weather Operations*, USARIEM, 1992

LTC (Retired) Charles D. Henry's career has allowed him to earn both the Expert Infantryman Badge and the Expert Field Medical Badge. His service included operations in the Andes, the Alaska Range, the Huachucas, the Rockies, and the Sierras — all over 5,000 feet. He was inducted into the "Below 50 Club" at the Northern Warfare Training Center for training in the field at temperatures measured below -50 F. His service included winter operations in Korea, Alaska, Europe, and the eastern and northern United States. He also experienced operations in South and Central America and the southwestern and southeastern United States. LTC Henry earned a Master of Science in Physiology.



Encircled at Bastogne: *A Case of Prolonged Care*

DR. GRANT HARWARD

At 2200 on 19 December 1944, the clearing and surgical station of the 326th Airborne Medical Company near the small crossroads town of Herbaumont, eight miles west of Bastogne, was surprised by an enemy reconnaissance force. German tanks and infantry machine-gunned the American tents before seeing red crosses and realizing they faced a hospital. LTC David Gold had thought the location was safe in the rear when he and the division supply officer had chosen it that morning, but the division surgeon now had to surrender. Some medical personnel had escaped capture by running into the nearby woods. A few more now evaded being rounded up in the chaos after a convoy of jeeps transporting wounded arrived and was shot up as well. The Germans then withdrew taking Gold, four of his staff, 130 men of the 326th, all but one of an eight-man attached surgical team, dozens of patients, and whatever equipment and supplies that they did not destroy.¹

Paratroopers reoccupied the vacated meadow around midnight, but it was not until the morning that they realized the scope of the catastrophe as abandoned medical tents emerged from the mist. "It was even worse when we got into the operating tents. We saw two paratroopers on gurneys ready for surgery. Apparently they were too severely wounded for the Germans to take them prisoner so they'd cut their throats," recalled one private.² Casualties were redirected to a medical company at Molinfaing, a town 15 miles to the southwest, but that route was cut by evening. The 101st Airborne Division; Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division; 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 755th



National Archives

An ambulance sits on a street in Bastogne after the relief of the town and evacuation had resumed.

and 969th Field Artillery Battalions; and remnants of other units were encircled in Bastogne for six days, requiring the remaining medical personnel to administer "prolonged care" to wounded, injured, and sick.

Prolonged care is a new term for an old reality. It is officially defined as the need to provide patient care for extended periods of time when evacuation or mission requirements surpass available capabilities and/or capacity to provide that care.³ Or, more colloquially, it is "holding onto a sicker patient than you can care for, for longer than you want, with fewer resources than needed, in a place you don't want to be."⁴ Starting in 2013, Special Forces studied prolonged care because they operated in remote areas where distance, weather, or other factors often delayed evacuation. However, even regular forces in Afghanistan or Iraq could not always rely on evacu-

ation within the ideal 60-minute window known as the “golden hour.” The Army’s shift of focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) highlighted the vulnerability of the evacuation system. As then Chief of Staff GEN Mark Milley testified to Congress in April 2019, “Currently, in the combat we’re involved in now, we have dominance over the air, and we pretty much can guarantee ourselves ground evacuation and/or air evacuation within this so-called golden hour... In future combat, that may or may not be true.”⁵ In an LSCO scenario with a near-peer adversary, the scale and scope of casualties will be much greater than in recent counterinsurgency campaigns, and evacuation will likely be delayed — or even totally interrupted — due to enemy anti-aircraft defenses and heavy artillery. Prolonged care is difficult to prepare for because whatever the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) sets as the standard for field care, prolonged care is beyond that, resulting in a sub-optimal level of treatment when Soldiers cannot be evacuated to receive definitive care. Prolonged care is a worst-case scenario that no one can certify for; however, being aware of the possibility can help mitigate losses in the event.

The encirclement of Bastogne is a perfect case study of prolonged care. The Ardennes Counteroffensive, more popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, was a final futile attempt by Adolf Hitler to inflict a defeat on the Western Allies by seizing Antwerp, which he hoped would split the alliance with the Soviets. Three German armies penetrated the First Army’s thin line in Belgium and Luxembourg in a pre-dawn attack on 16 December.⁶ Once the size and scope of the breakthrough became clear to Allied leaders, they identified Bastogne — with its seven major roads leading in and out of the town — as a key point to defend to slow the enemy.⁷ The 10th Armored Division was the first to receive marching orders, detaching Combat Command B (an armored brigade-sized element) from the Third Army, then the 705th


In an LSCO scenario with a near-peer adversary, the scale and scope of casualties will be much greater than in recent counterinsurgency campaigns, and evacuation will likely be delayed — or even totally interrupted — due to enemy anti-aircraft defenses and heavy artillery.

Tank Destroyer Battalion from the Ninth Army, and lastly the 101st Airborne Division from the theater reserve. Tankers and paratroopers began arriving, meeting up with retreating Infantrymen and artillerymen with the enemy hot on their heels. On 19 December, German attacks started probing toward Bastogne, and by evening American defenses were forced back into a tightening circle around the town. The capture of the 326th Airborne Medical Company was part of the encirclement of Bastogne completed the next day. It took until 21 December for BG Anthony C. McAuliffe, the acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division, to recognize this fact and take command of all forces in the pocket.

The roughly 18,000 men isolated in the pocket had only limited — and rapidly dwindling — medical support. The 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment had established an aid station on the east side of Bastogne in the chapel of the Petit Seminaire, tearing out pews to make room for litters and emptying the sacristy to create an operating room. It now became the collecting station for the entire 101st Airborne Division. “The casualties continued to come in while none could be taken out. The wounded were laid in rows along the

floor of the church with barely enough room left between them for aid men [medics] to walk. To one side, in front of an altar in an alcove, two battalion surgeons worked steadily, hour after hour, under the silent gaze of the Blessed Virgin,” related CPT Charles Phalen, a Medical Administrative Corps officer.⁸ After evacuating south under fire from Noville, an aid station with Combat Command B set up on the southwest side of Bastogne in a three-story building with a grocery store named Sarma that was located on the town’s main thoroughfare. This location acted as the primary collecting station for tankers. The aid station had lost much of its equipment and supplies,

Map — Bastogne, 19-23 December 1944



The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge by Hugh M. Cole

so it lacked even basic necessities such as scalpels, antiseptic, and morphine. The medical personnel scrounged up some medical supplies, meeting two Belgian nurses who volunteered to help along the way. Yet the surgeons could only treat walking wounded and less serious cases since none had the training to perform major surgery. “The patients who had head, chest, and abdominal wounds could only face certain slow death,” remembered battalion surgeon 1LT John “Jack” Prior.⁹

In the small towns near the fighting on the perimeter, airborne battalion medical detachments created aid stations in the usual manner with a main section located in a farmhouse or another convenient building and a forward section in a timber and dirt-covered foxhole near battalion headquarters. Each airborne division only had one medical company, but each airborne regiment had five to seven jeeps and one or two ambulances to assist with collecting and evacuating casualties. The absence of litter bearers in airborne units added to the burden of medics who struggled to evacuate casualties through dense forests where even jeeps could not go.¹⁰ The 101st Airborne Division’s medics had not arrived with the usual allotment of medical supplies due to “the acuteness of the situation and the rapidity with which the division was committed,” although they had brought as many extra blankets and litters as possible.¹¹ Fortunately, a detachment from a medical depot company had reached Bastogne with a few tons of medical supplies, and an abandoned First Army supply dump discovered in the town yielded even more.¹² Yet without resupply, surgeons and medics rapidly depleted these meager stores because they had to care for more wounded for far longer than normal because evacuation was impossible.

Already on the first day of the encirclement, the number of wounded, injured, and sick threatened to overwhelm the treatment capacity in Bastogne. The collecting station in the chapel held 157 casualties.¹³ Consequently, surgeons and medics from the 101st Airborne Division’s antiaircraft, engineer, and artillery units and the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion formed an ad hoc medical team, establishing another collecting station on the northern side of town at Heintz Barracks, a disused Belgian Army installation. The chapel was almost full and under intermittent artillery fire because it was located near a key intersection; a pair of jeeps and ambulances had already fallen prey to enemy shells while unloading casualties in the chapel courtyard, prompting the decision.¹⁴ The medical personnel at the barracks occupied a maintenance garage that fit their needs as more casualties streamed in from the fierce fighting around Bastogne.

Prolonged care in the Bastogne pocket presented a gruesome challenge for even veteran surgeons and medics. In the chapel

aid station, surgeons had no anesthesia and cut into patients on litters suspended between medical chests. The air became heavy with the smell of blood and sweat and loud with screams as morphine ran low. Conditions worsened as another hundred or so casualties crowded inside. The medics stacked the dead in frozen piles under canvases in the courtyard. In search of more space, paratroopers took over the adjoining girls school, the Institut Notre-Dame, where nuns helped care for Soldiers — and civilians who sought help.¹⁵ The garage aid station presented a similar sight. Surgeons tried to triage arriving casualties by putting them into specific rows on the sawdust floor depending on how serious they were wounded; those who were beyond medical capabilities, labeled “expectant,” were placed along the back wall. Trying to help them would cost other lives. An ad hoc graves registration office operated nearby.

Once the garage filled up, surgeons directed all walking wounded to an indoor rifle range.¹⁶ Casualties laid on the dirty ground, and blankets could not keep away the freezing cold (the horizontal garage door had to be kept partially open for access, and the rifle range had holes in the ceiling). Lifesaving plasma ran low, and ripped cloths replaced bandages. “I returned to my aid station very depressed,” recalled 1LT Prior after visiting the barracks aid station in search of medical supplies. “In regard to the care of the wounded in Bastogne, I have always believed, and still do, that this did not constitute a bright page in the history of the Army Medical Department... This decaying medical situation was worsening — with no hope for the surgical candidates, and even the superficial wounds were beginning to develop gas gangrene.”¹⁷

The overcrowded and dirty conditions meant that infection and gangrene were rampant at every aid station. Many wounded Soldiers never made it to one of the main collecting



Paratroopers recover medical and other supplies air dropped into the pocket.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

stations, but they were treated in ones or twos in whatever shelter was nearest with surgeons or medics periodically making rounds to check up on these casualties but unable to do much.¹⁸ Medical personnel could do little without more medical supplies and additional surgeons with training to perform major surgeries.

The First Army made great efforts to resupply Bastogne. Bad weather had frustrated any plans to resupply the pocket by air until 23 December when a group of Pathfinders dropped in with special radios that they used to direct three resupply air drops that day, plus two more the following day, delivering hundreds of tons of ammunition, food, and medical supplies. These air drops alleviated most of the shortages that surgeons and medics faced, providing whole blood (although most was lost when glass bottles broke on landing or an enemy shell that hit the room they were stored in), Vaseline gauze, litters, blankets, atropine, tetanus toxoid, pentothal sodium, distilled water, syringes, and sterilizers.¹⁹ By now surgeons and medics, assisted by nuns and nurses, cared for 250 Soldiers at the chapel, 600 Soldiers and civilians at the girls school, 580 Soldiers (almost half were non-battle injuries like trench foot or frostbite) at the barracks, and 100 more Soldiers at the grocery store. Every case was serious enough, only those who could not fight were evacuated from the front line where every Soldier was desperately needed, but a third were judged as more severe cases — and every passing hour all patients, whether a frostbite or a chest case, deteriorated.²⁰ The friendly air drops during the day were marred by an enemy air raid during the night on Christmas Eve. One random German bomb scored a direct hit on the grocery store collecting station, collapsing the upper stories, setting fire to the ruins, and killing 30 patients and a Belgian nurse.²¹ The surviving medical personnel and patients, many now burned, moved to the barracks collecting station. Renewed bad weather grounded transport aircraft on Christmas Day, but the Third Army sent another form of aid by air.

LTG George S. Patton's personal pilot had volunteered to fly a skilled surgeon into the pocket. MAJ Howard Serrell had also volunteered to take the dangerous trip in the small, two-seat reconnaissance aircraft that dropped him off in the afternoon. The number and condition of the patients shocked him when he arrived at the barracks collecting station. "It was a frightful and terrible sight... Triage at first impossible."²² Serrell reluctantly decided the best use of his time was to treat gangrene and other minor cases first because repairing belly and chest wounds took far too long. So many wounded were dying who could live if just given proper care that the Americans began parleying with the Germans to evacuate



Photo courtesy of AMEDD Center of History and Heritage

Medical teams traveled by glider into the pocket to provide desperately needed surgical skills.

casualties under a flag of truce. On 26 December, relief arrived before any agreement between foes occurred.²³ Two surgical teams — six medical officers and four enlisted technicians, all volunteers from the 12th Evacuation Hospital and 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group — arrived mid-afternoon by glider with operating equipment and medical supplies. By nightfall, the new arrivals, aided by 1LT Prior and three local nurses, set up a four-table operating theater in a tool room inside the garage at the barracks collecting station and began working on patients — some of whom had lain untreated for a week. Over the next two days, they completed 50 major operations with just three postoperative deaths.²⁴ At 1845, just 15 minutes after the surgical teams started operating, forward elements of the 4th Armored Division broke through to Bastogne.

Now began the final stage of prolonged care. Immediately behind the armored spearhead came 22 ambulances and 12 trucks. "There was no time to celebrate. The task of selecting the first to go out had to be accomplished," reported CPT Phalen.²⁵ Most of the drivers were African Americans. 1LT Robert O'Connell recalled, "Many of our 101st men were in poor shape from their wounds; I remember how these black soldiers picked us up and carried us with words of encouragement. 'You're going to be all right now — I'll take care of you men.'"²⁶ The convoy transported 260 of the most critically wounded on back roads with battles to either side because all the highways remained blocked to Villers-de-vand-Orval, 40 miles south, where a medical company had set up to receive casualties. It took two days to evacuate all 964 patients in Bastogne while at the same time establishing a provisional medical battalion in town to provide medical support for paratroopers still locked in combat.²⁷ The two surgical teams at the barracks that had arrived by glider now departed by truck

after being relieved by a 100-bed section from the 60th Field Hospital, which treated another 96 casualties in two days before being relieved in turn.²⁸ The Third Army restored regular supply and evacuation of Bastogne, which allowed the medical situation in the town to improve greatly even though fighting remained intense through New Year's Day.

The cost in life during prolonged care in Bastogne is unclear. After the capture of the 326th Airborne Medical Company, there was no central management of collecting and only a few fragmentary records were kept. One report counted 33 deaths during treatment from 19-31 December. A Third Army medical investigation later concluded that the mortality of casualties in Bastogne was actually surprisingly low.²⁹ So long as no vital organ was damaged, Soldiers with even serious wounds to the stomach or chest often survived to be evacuated and treated, although they were in excruciating pain. Yet less serious wounds often became so infected or frostbitten that amputation was the only treatment, so many survivors were maimed for life. By the time the 101st Airborne Division was pulled off the frontline in early January 1945, it had lost 482 killed, 2,449 wounded, and 527 missing or captured. The armored, tank destroyer, and field artillery units in the Bastogne pocket reported 117 killed, 422 wounded, and 134 missing or captured.³⁰ The totals certainly would have been higher without the ceaseless efforts of the surgeons and medics in Bastogne.

The Battle of the Bulge offers important insights into prolonged care. First, surgeons and medics must take quick action to establish facilities to collect and treat patients indefinitely when it becomes apparent that evacuation has been delayed or interrupted. Second, medical personnel should give extra attention to trying to prevent infection in conditions that are likely to become overcrowded and unsanitary very quickly. Third, triage priorities will have to change as limited time and resources must be focused on those who have the best chance of surviving. Fourth, the crisis does not end once regular evacuation resumes because it will take time to transfer existing casualties while ongoing fighting causes more casualties, so prolonged care triage and treatment must continue even when relief arrives.

AMEDD continues to identify skills and capabilities needed for prolonged care even as it recognizes that prolonged care is a mitigation strategy rather than a solution to the challenges of the tactical situation, terrain, number of casualties, and other variables during a disruption to evacuation. Surgeons and medics are trained to a much higher standard today than in World War II because of new developments in medicine as well as the expectation that the "golden hour" is not likely to be the standard in LSCO. Instead, there will be "golden windows" for resupply and evacuation of casualties. There are ongoing experiments in using drones to deliver medical supplies by air.³¹ During LSCO, one may expect more casualty evacuation (without a medical attendant to provide en route care) and less medical evacuation. The AMEDD is restructuring forward surgical teams and developing patient care augmentation detachments that can work in the brigade or division support

areas to provide prolonged care.³² The AMEDD is doing its utmost to be ready to provide the Infantry Branch, and the rest of the Army, prolonged care on the future battlefield.

Notes

¹ Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 415-417.

² Thomas S. Helling, *The Agony of Heroes: Medical Care for America's Besieged Legions from Bataan to Khe Sanh* (Yardely, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2019), 216.

³ "Medical Detachment (Patient Care Augmentation) (PCAD)," Operational and Organizational Concept Paper, Medical CDID, June 2019.

⁴ "Introduction to Prolonged Field Care (PFC)," Jointed Trauma System Battlefield Trauma Education Program, https://jts.amedd.army.mil/assets/docs/education/ewsc/Prolonged_Field_Care_EWSC_1.0.pdf.

⁵ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "The Army's Plan to Save the Wounded in Future War," *Breaking Defense*, 12 April 2019, accessed 22 January 2020 from <https://breakingdefense.com/2019/04/the-armys-plan-to-save-the-wounded-in-future-war/>.

⁶ Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 393.

⁷ Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 203.

⁸ Charles S. Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," *Military Surgeon* 100, no 1 (January 1947): 39.

⁹ Quoted in Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 213.

¹⁰ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 38, 40.

¹¹ "Annual Report, Medical Department, 101st Airborne Division," U.S. Army Medical Department Office of Medical History, <https://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/bulge/101stAbnDiv1944/101stABNDivSurg1944.htm>.

¹² Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 419.

¹³ "326th Airborne Medical Company, 101st Airborne Division, In the Battle of the Bulge," U.S. Army Medical Department Office of Medical History, <https://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/326thAirborneMedCo101stABDiv/326thAirborneMedCo101stABDivBastogne1944.html>.

¹⁴ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 39.

¹⁵ Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 216-217.

¹⁶ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 39-40.

¹⁷ Quoted in Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 216-217.

¹⁸ Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 220.

¹⁹ Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 419-420.

²⁰ Quoted in Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 217, 226.

²¹ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 41.

²² Quoted in Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 238.

²³ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 41-42.

²⁴ Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 421-422.

²⁵ Phalen, "Medical Service at Bastogne," 42.

²⁶ Quoted in Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 246.

²⁷ Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 422-423.

²⁸ Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 243, 248.

²⁹ Cosmas and Cowdrey, *The Medical Department*, 424.

³⁰ Helling, *The Agony of Heroes*, 256.

³¹ Tomaz Mesar, Aaron Lessig, and David R. King, "Use of Drone Technology for Delivery of Medical Supplies During Prolonged Field Care," *Journal of Special Operations Medicine* 18, no 4 (Winter 2018): 34-35.

³² "Medical Detachment (PCAD)," Medical CDID.

Dr. Grant Harward currently serves with the AMEDD Center of History and Heritage, U.S. Army Medical Center of Excellence, Fort Sam Houston, TX. He previously served as a graduate research assistant, HQDA Support Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He earned a bachelor's degree in history from Brigham Young University, a master's in history of the Second World War in Europe from the University of Edinburgh (UK), and a doctorate in history from Texas A&M University. He earned a Fulbright Award to Romania and the Norman Raab Fellowship at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Dr. Harward wrote *Romania's Holy War: Soldiers, Motivation, and the Holocaust* and has also authored numerous articles on various aspects of AMEDD history for *Army History* magazine, *Armor* magazine, and *The AMEDD Historian* newsletter.

U.S. Involvement in Small Wars: *A Cold War Focus*

LTC (RETIRED) BRENT C. BANKUS
LTC (RETIRED) JAMES O. KIEVIT

Small wars have been called several names in the late 20th and early 21st century, including military operations other than war (MOOTW) and operations other than war (OOTW). For purposes of this article, the term represents military operations short of large-scale force-on-force hostilities (such as World Wars I and II), ranging from guarding American interests and citizens in foreign lands to humanitarian operations to foreign internal defense to small-scale military interventions.

From the latter part of the 18th and throughout the 19th century, with four exceptions (War of 1812, Mexican American War 1846-48, American Civil War 1861-65, and Spanish-American War 1898), the U.S. military — particularly the U.S. Army — found itself acting more as a constabulary force than a regular fighting Army: protecting wagon trains, conducting small unit tactics against Native Americans until approximately the 1890s. The same can be said of much of the first three decades of the 20th century (except WWI - 1917-1918), only with the opponents now being indigenous peoples of Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Southwest Pacific.

In his book *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860–1941*, Dr. Andrew J. Birtle examines the American Civil War, Indian Wars Campaigns, Cuba and the Philippines, China and the Philippines, Vera Cruz, and the Mexican Punitive Expedition. He does exceptionally well describing how throughout history America's standing military has been principally organized to fight and win the nation's large-scale wars, yet most operational missions are small-scale contingencies. Birtle points out small-scale contingencies are volatile and complex and often require much more than just "warfighting" skills in their execution. He goes into great detail relating how when confronted with OOTW the U.S. Army has adapted its existing warfighting doctrine (written or unwritten) to fit the contingency.¹ Void of any political message, Birtle concludes that while each "small war" may be different, there are also similarities (i.e., knowing the culture and identifying and accounting for the second and third level effects of how military operations will affect the population).


The point here is two-fold. First, America's military gener-

ally trains for "worst case" conventional operations but is most frequently actually committed to small war operations. Second, all too often ambiguous policy decisions — or the absence of clear and concrete policy guidance — have left the military to figure out an operational campaign plan to execute what they interpret as the National Command Authority's intent. The consequences are often unsatisfactory and can be a disaster. These two findings apply equally to the U.S. throughout the period of the Cold War.

The Cold War

At the conclusion of World War II, the new menace of communism threatened America's potential for expansion of its interests and values, past merely economics. The specter of widespread communism threatened not just capitalism but also America's political ideology, that of democracy and the ability of a nation — any nation — to enjoy democratic rule vice a totalitarian regime (i.e., influences from the Soviet Union and later East Germany, Cuba, and China). From the start of the Cold War circa 1946, American presidents beginning with Harry Truman instituted containment policies to check the spread of communism, first in Europe and then Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Central and South America. The Truman Doctrine issued in 1947 promised U.S. support to "any nation who was anti-communist or under siege from a communist nation. The support could be military, economic, and/or political assistance."² Chief among the contributions of Truman's doctrine was publicly expressing U.S. determination to take action to stop the spread of communism using all elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).³

The Eisenhower administration went a bit further and ratified several bilateral and multilateral treaties focused on encircling the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). These arrangements included the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).⁴ Additional bilateral defense or security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines highlighted the effort. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the most prominent advocate of global containment, and he traveled the world tirelessly to ensure its success. In 1954, the United States took a strong stand in favor of Chinese nationalists when the PRC bombarded Taiwan's island strongholds. In 1955, assistance began to



flow to the new nation of South Vietnam, which was created after the withdrawal of France from Indochina. In 1958, the United States again rattled the saber to protect the Chinese nationalists' offshore islands.⁵

Cold War Case Study #1: U.S. Troops to Beirut — 1958

An early small war involvement of U.S. troops in the Cold War occurred in 1958 in Lebanon. Lebanon's Christian president Camille Chamoun requested assistance from President Eisenhower as his government was under siege from a pan-Arab movement led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, an ally to the Soviet Union.⁶


After the Suez Crisis of 1956, during which Israel, Great Britain, and France invaded Egypt to protect their interests in the Suez Canal, Nasser instituted a communist/socialist regime in Egypt and formed the United Arab Republic. Anger at Lebanon's refusal to sever ties with Great Britain and France led to unrest among Lebanon's Muslim population and threatened to destroy the Lebanese government.

As tensions heightened and there was no resolution via either bilateral or United Nations (UN) diplomatic actions, Eisenhower intervened with a military force of approximately 14,000 service members (8,509 Army and 5,670 Marine Corps personnel). The mission of the task force was to occupy and secure Beirut International Airport a few miles south of the city and then secure the port of Beirut and approaches to the city.

The U.S. task force deployed from July to October 1958 and departed only after a new government was installed and tensions diminished.⁷ On the diplomatic front, author Zina Hemady provides a short but informative synopsis of the situation:

Eisenhower sent Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy to Beirut. While his initial mission was to address the tensions between the military and the U.S. Embassy officials, which turned out to have been defused, Murphy quickly turned his attention to the Lebanese situation. After shuttling back and forth between the different parties, the emissary determined that the country's internal strife was a local issue which should be handled as such. He gave the rebel leaders assurances that the U.S. military's presence was not intended to keep Chamoun in power which promptly defused the situation and reduced attacks against the Americans. Moreover, Murphy openly declared his support for immediate presidential elections, a call which was surprisingly heeded by Chamoun without resistance.⁸

The Lebanon campaign can be likened to that of a United Nations Chapter VII mission. In essence, the job of the intervening force is to separate the belligerents and stabilize the situation until a diplomatic solution can be reached, which was exactly the outcome in Lebanon.⁹ Further research



Marines in Lebanon, 1958, Marine Corps Historical Pamphlet

Map 1 – Marine Landings and Objectives, 15-19 July 1958

suggests President Eisenhower's decision to intervene in Lebanon was not only a military success but did not cause any credibility issues for the U.S. on the world stage.¹⁰

Cold War Case Study #2: Troops Deploy to the Dominican Republic — 1965

A few years after the intervention in Lebanon, at virtually the same time as U.S. was widening its involvement in Vietnam, another suspected Cold War communist threat was playing out closer to home in the Dominican Republic. Political upheaval had gripped the Dominican Republic since 1961 when long-time dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated. Although a brutal dictator, his strong anti-communist stance put him in good stead with Washington. His death led to a more reformist government headed by Juan Bosch, who was elected president in 1962. The Bosch regime was short lived, however, as his policies ran afoul of the Dominican military and he was deposed in 1963. For the next two years, chaos reigned in the Dominican Republic as multiple entities vied for political power.

By 1965, forces demanding the reinstatement of Bosch began attacks against the military-controlled government. In the U.S. government, fear spread that "another Cuba" was in the making in the Dominican Republic; in fact, many officials strongly suspected that Cuban leader Fidel Castro

was behind the violence. On April 28, more than 22,000 U.S. troops, supported by forces provided by some of the member states of the Organization of American States (a United Nations-like institution for the Western Hemisphere, dominated by the United States) landed in the Dominican Republic. Over the next few weeks, they brought an end to the fighting and helped install a conservative, non-military government.¹¹

Although the military operation in the Dominican Republic was concluded successfully, the Johnson administration lost some credibility domestically and internationally by intervening in the Dominican Republic's internal affairs. His publicly reported reason had been to protect American lives, but further research suggests otherwise.

However, there is no doubt that the real reason for the invasion was to prevent another Cuba. "Having seen Eisenhower criticized for 'losing' Cuba and Kennedy humiliated by the Bay of Pigs failure, Johnson was determined that no similar disaster would befall him: There would be no 'second Cuba.'" Johnson also confronted managing the growing U.S. intervention in Vietnam, another battleground of the Cold War. Johnson realized that American credibility was on the line. If he could not demonstrate U.S. resolve to curtail communist expansion of "the American Lake," how would be the result in Vietnam?"¹²

The point is that as communism was on the rise from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, but it was also closer to home in Cuba. The Johnson administration was determined to ensure America, as the lead democratic nation, would assist nations attempting to ward off communist influence, even at the expense of criticism from critics both in Latin America and the United States. However, Johnson's assumptions about Castro's Cuban involvement in the Dominican Republic's internal affairs proved false.

Johnson's public explanation for sending the Marines into Santo Domingo was to rescue Americans endangered by civil war conditions in the Dominican Republic. But his

main motivation, the tapes and transcripts confirm, was to prevent a Communist takeover. Basing his decision largely on assertions by the CIA and others in the U.S. government that Cuba's Fidel Castro had been behind the recent uprising, Johnson confided to his national security advisor, "I sure don't want to wake up ... and find out Castro's in charge."¹³

Those intelligence estimates, "along with other information Johnson received during the crisis, turned out to be erroneous — a possibility LBJ himself worried about at the time."¹⁴

An excerpt from History.com summarizes the political capital paid by the Johnson administration for invading the Dominican Republic:

Many Latin American governments and private individuals and organizations condemned the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic as a return to the "gunboat diplomacy" of the early-20th century, when U.S. Marines invaded and occupied a number of Latin American nations on the slightest pretexts. In the United States, politicians and citizens who were already skeptical of Johnson's policy in Vietnam heaped scorn on Johnson's statements about the "communist danger" in the Dominican Republic. Such criticism would become more and more familiar to the Johnson administration as the U.S. became more deeply involved in the war in Vietnam.¹⁵

Cold War Case Study #3: U.S. Troop Intervention in Vietnam

It was during the Kennedy administration that U.S. communist containment policy changed dramatically from being more covert to overt in nature. In his inaugural speech on 20 January 1961, President Kennedy stated: "Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty. This much we pledge, and more..."¹⁶

Although suffering its setbacks (i.e., the Bay of Pigs disaster), the Kennedy administration was more willing than those before him to directly challenge communist incursions rather than just with economic or other material support. In fact, during the Kennedy administration there was a marked increase in the support of South Vietnamese efforts to stem the tide of communist incursion. For example, in May 1961 JFK authorized sending 500 Special Forces troops and military advisers to assist the government of South Vietnam. They joined 700 Americans already sent by the Eisenhower administration. In February 1962, the president sent an additional 12,000 military advisers to support the South Vietnamese army. By early November 1963, the number of U.S. military advisers had reached 16,000.¹⁷ Kennedy further stated in an interview:

In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them,



U.S. Army photo

Soldiers stand behind a barricade in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.



U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 by COL Francis J. Kelly

Special Forces Soldiers conduct a medical visit to a Montagnard hamlet in Vietnam.

we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it — the people of Vietnam against the Communists... But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake... [The United States] made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate — we may not like it — in the defense of Asia.¹⁸

In the final weeks of his life, JFK wrestled with the need to decide the future of the United States' commitment in Vietnam — and very likely had not made a final decision before his death.¹⁹

America's involvement in the Vietnam War is by far one of the most written about controversial conflicts in American history. From the end of World War II and America's support for the French return to its former colony, to escalation of assistance to the fledgling South Vietnamese government, to our direct involvement in Vietnam and our less than honorable retreat, there were innumerable strategic miscues that haunted the U.S. before, during, and after the conflict.

The marked increase of American involvement in Vietnam began during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and culminated in the Johnson and Nixon administrations. First providing additional advisors and support troops in the 1950s during the Eisenhower administration,

advisor support progressively increased in the early 1960s during the Kennedy administration and then ended in the full-fledged implementation of combat troops in 1965, which lasted until the fall of the South Vietnamese government in April 1975.

Given America's stance on communist containment, it is not hard to figure out the importance at which several American administrations placed a premium on support for South Vietnam. Michael Lind's book *Vietnam, The Necessary War* provides excellent commentary of the trials and tribulations of America's involvement in Vietnam from the Eisenhower to the Nixon administrations. Further, he provides readers with well-thought-out alternative strategies of those used in the conflict, both from foreign policy and military viewpoints.

While the list of major issues that hindered U.S. efforts in Vietnam is too lengthy to do any real justice to in this article, two of the most significant were the amount of "blood and treasure" spent on the conflict and the time spent. Lind contends that the period from the initial incursion of major troop units in 1965 to 1968 "destroyed public support for an open ended commitment in the defense of the noncommunist states in Indochina, while the additional costs of the prolonged withdrawal between 1968 and 1973 endangered public support for the Cold War on any front."²⁰ The importance of the real estate in Indochina, as perceived inside the beltway, was not at all understood by many rank and file Americans. Thus, as the war dragged on with no end in sight, it should be of no surprise that domestic support declined precipitously.

According to Lind, there were at least two causal points that did the most damage to the American effort. One was the Kennedy administration's support of the Diem coup in 1963, after which there was non-stop political turmoil in Saigon. The second was Johnson's desire for a speedy solution, which he attempted via GEN William Westmoreland's plan for a "massive high-tech war of attrition against the Hanoi-controlled insurgency in South Vietnam."²¹ Lind suggests that a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) officer should have been chosen over GEN Westmoreland due to the USMC's experience with counterinsurgencies, reaching back to the beginning of the 20th century.²² Indeed, that experience had been refined to the point the USMC had published its own doctrine: "Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps 1940." Lind believes and argues that, through experience, the USMC learned from and codified



Buying Time 1965-1966 by Frank L. Jones

GEN William Westmoreland addresses Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam.

its experience, whereas he believes that the U.S. Army disregarded past experiences in counterinsurgency in favor of a focus on large-scale operations.

In 1968, when GEN Creighton Abrams replaced GEN Westmoreland, he changed the emphasis from large-scale operations and “body counts” to smaller-scale “focused” operations and broader population protection, wherein more effort was placed on training the South Vietnamese village/hamlet regional and popular forces. These changes seemed to promise great dividends as they paved the way for increased assistance from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) that helped increase farming productivity, the major source of jobs in South Vietnam. Increased agricultural productivity resulted in the rice crop yield in South Vietnam growing from less than five million tons in 1967 to a self-sustaining crop of more than six million tons in 1972.²³

Unfortunately, this was a case of “too little too late.” Perhaps if Johnson had directed a population-centric strategy earlier, the outcome in Vietnam may have been quite different. But by the time Richard Nixon came to the presidency in 1969 on his promise of “Peace with Honor,” the situation in Southeast Asia was in a downward spiral. Domestic support of U.S. Cold War foreign policy was in a shambles, the U.S. domestic political situation was in dire straits (fractious partisanship, massive anti-war protests, and race riots), and the U.S. Army in Vietnam was disintegrating through acts of indiscipline and the destruction of its NCO Corps. The final straw for South

Vietnam came when, despite being reelected overwhelmingly in 1972, President Nixon was forced to resign in 1974 amid the Watergate scandal.

In a nutshell, America’s involvement in the Vietnam War serves as an excellent example of “how not to do it.” From the Eisenhower through the Nixon administrations, policy decisions on foreign policy, military strategy, and ending our involvement were nothing less than an unmitigated disaster. After the war’s end in 1975, it took many years — some would say decades — for the U.S. military to regain its military bearing as a profession, for foreign policy to regain at least a modicum of respectability, and to reestablish domestic confidence in the government.

Cold War Case Study #4: U.S. Troops deploy to Grenada²⁴

The political situation in Grenada had been a U.S. concern since the late 1970s as several leftist governments were in place, first that of Maurice Bishop and then after his assassination in 1983 that of Bernard Coard. Both were Marxists with ties to Cuba. As the situation worsened, President Ronald Reagan, citing as justification the need to protect American citizens on the island, sent approximately 2,000 U.S. troops to stabilize the situation. Resistance to the American military incursion came from not only the Grenadian military but also from Cuban troops ostensibly sent to rehabilitate the island’s airport.²⁵



Photo by SGT Michael Bogdanowicz

Rangers with the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment are briefed on plans for a night patrol during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.



U.S. Army photo

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of Task Force 120, speaks to a group of U.S. Army Rangers at Point Salines Airfield in Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury.

The operation was short, 25-29 October 1983, but at its conclusion nearly 6,000 U.S. troops were in Grenada. Of that number, 20 were killed and more than 100 wounded. Enemy casualties included more than 60 Grenadian and Cuban troops killed. Politically, the Coard government collapsed and was replaced by one acceptable to the United States.²⁶

Although militarily a success and domestically President Reagan was congratulated for the timely rescue of American medical students on the island, the operation was not without its critics.²⁷ Robert Longley's December 2018 article states:

While the invasion enjoyed broad support from the American public, mainly due to the successful and timely rescue of the medical students, it was not without its critics. On 2 November 1983, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 108 to 9, declared the military action "a flagrant violation of international law." In addition, several American politicians criticized the invasion as a rash and dangerous overreaction by President Reagan to the deadly bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that had killed over 240 U.S. troops just two days earlier.²⁸

Conclusion

In rank order of most successful to least successful of the Cold War small war case studies, President Eisenhower's incursion into Lebanon stands out as being the most successful and least damaging. The operation was in answer to Lebanon's Christian president Camille Chamoun's request for assistance, so the decision was acceptable to the host nation leadership and also to significant elements of its general population. The operation was of short duration, and the prime directive was to keep the belligerents separated while a diplomatic solution settled the matter at least for the near term. In addition, there was little loss of life on the part of American forces.

The next most successful case study was Operation Urgent Fury and the invasion of Grenada in 1983. While President Reagan garnered both accolades and criticism, research suggests the operation was a military success, and more importantly, the U.S. military had finally found its stride again after a decade of separation from the Vietnam War. In addition, the criticism he received did not seem to damage his reputation or U.S. foreign policy. In point of fact, before the end of the 1980s, Reagan received more than his share of accolades for the demise of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989.

President Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Republic ranks next as we move into the least successful of the case studies. Although the Dominican Republic operation was of short duration, it was premised on flawed assumptions. Intelligence sources led the president to believe Cuban infiltrators were

at the bottom of the civil war in the island nation. As a result, Johnson sent both U.S. Marines and 82nd Airborne Division troops to stabilize the situation. While the operation was a military success and law and order was restored, the political backlash from the news media was intense and would carry over with a vengeance in Vietnam.

Without doubt, of these Cold War small wars the most damaging to U.S. foreign policy credibility both at home and abroad and damage to the military was the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Kennedy to Nixon presidencies caused undeniable damage to international credibility and domestic confidence (not to mention the damage done to the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army as an institution) by their wrongful policy decisions. It took until the 1980s and the presidency of Ronald Reagan before any improvement was noticeable on foreign policy credibility and repair to the military.

As most of these case studies demonstrated, flawed foreign policy decisions — coupled with ambiguous directions to the military — frequently spelled disaster for U.S. foreign policy credibility, a loss of confidence in the National Command Authority, and damage to our military's reputation, which in at least one case — Vietnam — took decades to recover from.

If American government and academic leaders haven't learned these lessons from America's involvement in Cold War small wars, their efforts in the 21st century risk being equally as uncertain and ineffective.

Notes

¹ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860 – 1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001), 271.

² The Cold War Experience.weebly.com, "The Cold War, Containment, and the Truman Doctrine," accessed 25 April 2019 from <https://thecoldwar-experience.weebly.com/containment--the-truman-doctrine.html>.

³ Ibid. For a detailed examination of the first military intervention under the Truman Doctrine, see Paul T. Calbos, "Cold War Conflict: American Intervention in Greece," accessed 16 July 2019 from <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a274662.pdf>.

⁴ Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/cento>; <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato>.

⁵ Department of State, United States of America, Office of the Historian, "Foreign Policy under President Eisenhower," accessed 25 April 2019 from <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/eisenhower>.

⁶ Jack Shulimson, "Marines in Lebanon, 1958," Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet, Historical Branch, G-3 Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., accessed 7 April 2019 from https://archive.org/stream/MarinesInLebanon1958/MarinesInLebanon1958_djvu.txt.

⁷ Global Security.org, "Operation Blue Bat," accessed 20 April 2019 from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/blue_bat.htm.

⁸ Zina Hemady, "Operation Blue Bat: The 1958 U.S. Invasion of Lebanon," *Photorientalist*, accessed 2 March 2019, <http://www.photorientalist.org/exhibitions/operation-blue-bat-the-1958-u-s-invasion-of-lebanon/article/>; for other diplomatic insights, see also "The 1958 U.S. Marine Invasion of Lebanon – It Was No Day at the Beach," Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, accessed 27 June 2019, <https://adst.org/2013/07/the-1958-u-s-marine-invasion-of-lebanon-it-was-no-day-at-the-beach/>.

⁹ UN.org, "Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," accessed 8 May 2019 from <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>.

¹⁰ Shulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," 36.

¹¹ History.com, "U.S. Troops Land in the Dominican Republic," November 13, 2009, accessed 13 April 2019 from <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-troops-land-in-the-dominican-republic>.

¹² Salvador E. Gomez, "The U.S. Invasion of the Dominican Republic: 1965," *Sincronia* (Spring 1997).

¹³ David Coleman ed., "Lyndon Johnson and the Dominican Intervention, 1965," *National Security Archive*, 28 April 2015, accessed 21 April 2019 from <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB513/>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ History.com, "U.S. Troops Land in Dominican Republic."

¹⁶ Ian Howarth, "Kennedy and U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War," *imowarth.wordpress.com*, accessed from <https://imhowarth.wordpress.com/2013/07/14/kennedy-and-us-foreign-policy-during-the-cold-war/>.

¹⁷ JFK Library, "Cold War, Vietnam," accessed 25 April 2019 from <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Michael Lind, *Vietnam, The Necessary War* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 258.

²¹ Ibid., 258.

²² Ibid., 259.

²³ Orrin Schwab, *A Clash of Cultures, Civil Military Relations During the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 117-118.

²⁴ For more coverage of the background, planning, and execution of Operation Urgent Fury see "Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada" by Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997, accessed 24 June 2019 from https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/cold_war/urgfury.pdf.

²⁵ History.com, "United States Invades Grenada," 13 November 2009, accessed 20 April 2019 from <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-invades-grenada>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The operation was deemed militarily a success since all the objectives were accomplished; there were, however, numerous criticisms focused on individual service and joint shortcomings during the execution.

²⁸ Robert Longley, "Grenada Invasion: History and Significance," *Thoughtco.com*, accessed 8 May 2019 from <https://www.thoughtco.com/grenada-invasion-4571025>.

LTC (Retired) Brent C. Bankus began his military career in 1979 and held various command and staff positions through the battalion level in Armor/Cavalry, mechanized, and light Infantry units. He completed assignments within the United States and Germany as well as fact-finding missions to Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, Eritrea, Guam, and Hawaii, and a staff training mission to Tirana, Albania. At the operational and strategic levels, he served as the executive officer of the National Guard Bureau's Counter Drug Directorate; director of Joint Training and Exercises, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, U.S. Army War College (USAWC); and the National Guard advisor to the director, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC. Since his retirement, LTC Bankus has done contract work with several organizations to include the United Nations Environment Program; SERCO, North America; Blackwater USA; Northrop Grumman's African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program; Metro Productions; Excalibur Associates; and the U.S. Naval War College's Defense Institute of International Legal Studies with training missions to Honduras and Ecuador. In 2009 as a DA Civilian, he worked for the USAWC's National Security Issues Group, where his areas of focus included environmental security; the United Nations; stability, stabilization, and reconstruction operations; homeland defense/security; insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. In January 2012, he was reassigned to the U.S. Army Military History Institute as a supervisory historian in charge of all oral histories. LTC Bankus earned a bachelor's degree in history from Bloomsburg University, PA; a master's degree in information management from Strayer University, VA; and a master's degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is also a graduate of the Information Management Course (a master's equivalent certificate) from National Defense University as well as the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff Colleges and the U.S. Army War College.

LTC (Retired) James O. Kievit was commissioned an Engineer officer from the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, NY, in 1972. He served in a variety of combat engineer leadership, command, and staff assignments in Germany and the continental United States. He also served as an instructor of the History of the Military Art at USMA, as director of Support Force Requirements' Analyses with the U.S. Army's Center for Army Analysis, and as a future warfare strategic analyst with the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute. While on active duty, he earned both a Master of Science in Engineering (construction management) and an Arts Master in military history from the University of Michigan, and a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. LTC Kievit retired in August 1996. From February 1997 until August 2017, he served as Professor of National Security Leadership at the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership, where he worked strategic wargame activities; offered elective courses examining Military Urban Operations and historical U.S. Military Governance operations; and facilitated academic, interagency, joint military and Army seminars and workshops on topics relevant to national security, landpower, and military leadership and its development.



National Archives

American Soldiers protect a child during a firefight on 5 May 1965 in Santo Domingo.


Book Reviews



Under Fire with ARVN Infantry: Memoir of a Combat Advisor in Vietnam, 1966-1967

By Bob Worthington
Jefferson, NC: McFarland,
2018, 240 pages

Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck,
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve



Bob Worthington's *Under Fire with ARVN Infantry: Memoir of a Combat Advisor in Vietnam 1966-1967* is a must-read memoir for those seeking to understand America's involvement with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam at the tactical level during the early years. Written with humility, honesty, and keen self-reflection, Worthington's writing is absent much of the bravado or exaggeration found in many military memoirs. Instead, readers will find an honest assessment of American and South Vietnamese soldiers as Worthington saw them at the company and battalion level, along with his own role and performance. His later life as a psychologist and journalism professor is evident in the writing and analysis present.

In 1968, David Halberstam released *One Very Hot Day*, a short novel which followed a group of American advisors awaiting an ambush in South Vietnam, early in the American engagement there. The book captures the essence of the advisor mission: confusion, isolation, and the ever-present sense of "otherness" when living and working with foreign forces. The advisors in *One Very Hot Day* would not look out of place in Worthington's memoirs nor he in theirs. Indeed, many advisor veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan will find common ground between Worthington's experience and theirs.

Chronologically organized, the book tells the training, deployment, and personal growth of its author in a meaningful and thought-provoking way. In 1966, America's involvement in Vietnam was growing, causing an increased need for liaison and advisors forces to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Worthington, after lengthy training, was assigned to support ARVN units operating in northern South Vietnam, including the ARVN garrison at DaNang. Initially disappointed by the lack of frontline combat opportunities, Worthington was reassigned to an ARVN infantry battalion conducting operations near Hoi An. His unit, the 3rd Battalion of the 51st ARVN Regiment, was one of the better South Vietnamese units and led by largely competent officers and senior NCOs.

Direct action operations, followed by training and more

operations, continued with Worthington gaining increased proficiency and familiarity with the ARVN troops. The book's narrative high point is the eight-day battle between ARVN and North Vietnamese Army troops near Nong Son, South Vietnam's only working coal mine. The 320-man ARVN battalion engaged the significantly larger 1,200-man NVA regiment in a battle whose outcome was by no means certain. Here, again, Worthington's writing is reflective and self-aware. He openly admits to the mistakes he made when interacting with the Vietnamese.


Overall, the author's experiences as a combat advisor during the early American buildup in Vietnam are clear and lack much of the self-aggrandizement seen in other autobiographical works. Worthington does not portray himself as a particularly heroic nor valorous Soldier. He was, as he comments in the end, "a competent infantry leader." *Under Fire with ARVN Infantry* is recommended for Soldiers assigned to advisor teams, security force assistance brigades, and those looking to better understand this crucial aspect of irregular warfare.

(As a civilian, Timothy Heck is the deputy directing editor of the *Modern War Institute* at West Point. While on active duty, he served as an advisor in Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces.)

The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army

By Raymond Callahan and Daniel Marston
Lawrence, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2020, 369 pages

Reviewed by LTC (Retired)
Rick Baillergeon



There was a time not so long ago when World War II's China-Burma-India (C-B-I) Theater received scant discussion by military historians. Just as it was during the conduct of the war, it was clearly the "forgotten theater" for decades following the war. However, in recent years, we have seen a significant increase in interest and books published on subjects related to the C-B-I Theater. One of the newest volumes released in this genre is Raymond Callahan and Daniel Marston's outstanding volume, *The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army*.

As the title suggests, this is not a general overview of the 1942-1945 Burma Campaign. Instead the authors have narrowed down their focus dramatically. They specifically, as the title suggests again, key on two areas. The first area is to discuss and analyze the Indian British XIV Army's reconquest of Burma from the Japanese in 1945 after a demoralizing retreat just a few years earlier. The other focus is on detailing the changes the British Indian Army went through following the retreat and how these changes set the conditions for future success. Let me address the treatment of both next.

I believe the volume does an excellent job of concisely providing readers an understanding of the 1945 Burma Campaign. In order to fully appreciate the campaign, readers must fully grasp what the British Indian Army overcame to get to that point. The authors do an excellent job of doing this for readers. With those conditions set, they highlight the key battles, leaders, and turning points which were a part of the campaign. This discussion is outstanding and will be especially beneficial to readers who may possess limited knowledge and understanding of the campaign.

For those who do own a solid background, the discussion on the transformation of the British Indian Army is the clear highlight. I found this conversation to be incredibly valuable. The authors address the significant changes and reforms which took place in the organization following the 1942 retreat. They stress the criticality of these actions in this passage: "Without these reforms, including recruiting enough volunteers from South Asia to create the largest all-volunteer army in history, and the need and desire for Indian officers to fill command and leadership positions, the outcome in 1945 could have been very different."

Any book focused on the Burma Campaign will undoubtedly feature Field Marshal William Slim. Callahan and Marston have not strayed from this. Throughout the entire book, the authors emphasize Slim's influence and the incredible leadership he displayed throughout the overall Burma Campaign. They summarize Slim's entire performance in the following segment: "After leading Burcorps out of Burma in 1942, he played a crucial role in the remarkable military renaissance that transformed the Indian Army and then, with that reborn army, won two defensive battles in 1944 that fatally damaged the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma. In his campaign of 1945, the most brilliant feat of operational maneuver by any British general in World War II, he reconquered Burma, shredding his Japanese opponents."

To craft a focused book such as this, it is imperative that it is written by authors with subject matter expertise, and Callahan and Marston clearly possess these credentials. Both of these authors have firmly established themselves as experts in particular areas of the Burma Campaign. In regards to Callahan, he has crafted several highly regarded volumes on aspects of the overall Burma Campaign. In the case of Marston's catalog, he has been much more focused on the British Indian Army itself. Each of their niches is displayed prominently within the book.

I believe there are three significant strengths which contribute to the superb quality of the volume. The first is the exhaustive research conducted by the authors. Obviously, the authors make outstanding use of the previous sources they have utilized in their past books. However, they have significantly augmented this by delving into newly discovered personal accounts and archival holdings. In total, it is one of the most thoroughly researched books I have read tied to the C-B-I Theater.

The outstanding readability of this volume is the second impressive strength of the book. When a book is crafted by two authors, you wonder about the flow of the volume and if the authors' writing styles will conflict. In both cases, this is not an issue. This is a volume which is very well-organized and extremely conversant. These attributes enable the authors to seamlessly tie-in their discussion on the transformation of the British Indian Army within the context of the 1945 Burma Campaign. Having read previous Callahan books, I anticipated a well-crafted book and this did not disappoint.

The final strength of the book I would like to highlight is the superb notes section the authors have inserted. The authors have dedicated 50 pages to creating a section which is incredibly beneficial to readers. It includes providing them with the rest of the story, expounding on points made in the main section of the volume, and offering recommendations for further reading on areas and subjects. This is clearly not one of those standard fare notes sections which you simply gloss over.

The 1942-1945 Burma Campaign highlights one of the most remarkable turnarounds of a unit in history. It is an incredible story which fortunately in recent years is now being told by more historians. Raymond Callahan and Daniel Marston have superbly focused on a portion of this campaign. In doing so, they have crafted a volume which will greatly benefit all who read it.

Book Reviewers Needed

INFANTRY is in need of book reviewers! Have you read a book lately that you think would be of interest to the Infantry community and want to submit a review? We also have books on hand that we can mail to interested individuals to review.

Send us an email at:

usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@army.mil

or call (706) 545-2350.





PIN: 211523-000