German Heavy Brigade Attacks: The Concept of Capabilities Demonstration Exercises in the Context Of Leader Development

by MAJ Jens-Uwe Rohrmoser

“The Capabilities Demonstration Exercise is of crucial importance for the German Army...

“We are an Army constantly on deployment, and we have gained considerable experience on operations abroad, a good share of which also in combat operations. Every year we get new soldiers, and we want to familiarize them with the character of a deployment Army as quickly as possible. That is why we show them those live vignettes during their professional development training in order to purposefully prepare them for future deployments.”

— LTG Werner Freers
Chief of Staff of the German Army, 2011

The German armed forces started a process of transformation in 2011 in order to better prepare for possible future challenges. This process is known as “Army 2011,” marking the year when it was initiated. A reduction in numbers should not lead to a reduction in capabilities and combat power; on the contrary, the new, leaner structure is aimed at improving the combat effectiveness of the brigade level, which is to become the core element in future deployments.

The German Army is no longer the only service conducting land-based operations. The Joint Support Service, established in October 2000, plays a vital role in supporting the Army during operations at home and abroad. Consequently, the German Chief of Defense decided in 2012 that, instead of conducting separate demonstrations for the Joint Support Service and the Army, he wanted to use a more realistic scenario in which both services demonstrate their capabilities jointly.

The Army Chief of Staff tasked Armor Demonstration Brigade 9 (located in Munster, northern Germany) to represent the Army during this joint demonstration and showcase all aspects and capabilities of a modern army brigade.

The target audiences were mainly young leaders (officer candidates and lieutenants), participants of the National and International General Staff Course, as well as high-ranking officials from the German armed forces and our allied partners.

Historical Excursion

Back in the 19th century, officers and NCOs were sent to so-called “Lehrbataillone” (demonstration battalions) on a temporary basis in order to practice exemplary training and tactical behavior or to test new materiel, force structures, and tactics. Finally, these new insights were then demonstrated to representatives of higher commands, international guests, and students of the Army Officers Academy.

While the Reichswehr (1919-1935) did not have such units, the Wehrmacht (1935-1946) embraced this idea and used it to develop ideas for highly mobile warfare (better known by the unofficial name “Blitzkrieg tactics”). The Bundeswehr (1955-present) adopted this principle and transformed it several times. During the past 10 years of constant overseas deployments, the former Lehrbataillone have had a double role as demonstration units and as operational units. Although the principle of demonstration exercises remains and has since been conducted by rotating army brigades, these battalions were officially stripped of their demonstration tasks during the most recent army restructuring.

Leader Development and Capabilities Demonstration Exercises

Since 1995, the German armed forces have been engaged on a larger scale in stabilization operations ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan. It is quite obvious that some deficits (e.g., in large-scale combined arms and high-intensity combat operations) have become apparent over time. Generations of young German leaders have never experienced such military operations and have therefore no clear picture in mind when it comes to applying the necessary skills.

As the armed forces are downsizing and looking for new ways of efficiency, large-scale exercises will become rare. Furthermore, the German Army Chief of Staff wanted to have certain standards and standardized live vignettes to provide Army leaders with.

Consequently, the tradition of capabilities demonstration exercises was used to not only show the latest developments in technologies and tactics, but to give leaders of all echelons the opportunity to hone their professional knowledge and regain lost skills through watching situation vignettes.

The overall scenario named “Obsidia” is the common basis for all tactical scenarios at Germany’s Army Officers Academy and at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College. It is also well known throughout the German Army as a basic scenario for all training projects and exercises.

Ideally, the students at the Army Officers Academy have already had their first staff exercises and battlefield tour based on this scenario. During the demonstration, they will be shown what all the things they have learned look like in reality. With these fresh impressions in mind, they will then go back to their academy and conduct their final simulation-based command post exercise, hopefully with a better understanding of what high-intensity warfighting could look like.

The 2013 Joint Capabilities Demonstration Exercise

“The Capabilities Demonstration Exercise is an excellent learning tool: its images and sounds have a formative effect on the spectators.”

— LTG Werner Freers
Chief of Staff of the German Army, 2011

This exercise was the first joint showcase in the history of the German armed forces and consisted of 12 different stations to show the joint capabilities in land-based operations to the audience.

Two rotations were conducted, each lasting two days, with six stations per day.

The stations were:
1) Dynamic display
2) Forward operating base
3) NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) event
4) Logistics in theater
5) Convoy operations
6/7) Static display
8) Brigade command post and network operating center
9) Combat supply operations
10) Battalion command post
11) Medical role 1
12) Live-fire exercise (LFX)

The highlight every year is the live-fire exercise conducted at Europe’s largest LFX training area, the NATO Training Area Bergen in northern Germany. As the culmination of the overall exercise, this LFX incorporated and/or referred to all other stations that have contributed to a better understanding of the battle. Therefore, the LFX was the best showcase when it came to the capabilities in land-based operations in the framework of Army 2011.

Situation — The exercise’s overall situation described a conflict between two states of which one is part of an overarching alliance while the other one is relatively strong militarily but economically weak. The scenario led up to a high-intensity conflict including the civilian population and a hybrid threat in the given area of operations. A mechanized enemy with modern equipment is attacking along two axes of approach from the north in order to gain control of his southern neighbor.

The multinational alliance is conducting a delaying operation with two brigades abreast while the division reserve, a mechanized infantry brigade, is preparing for a counterattack. In order to shape the battlefield for this brigade-size counterattack, the enemy has to be stopped at a certain line and his combat strength has to be reduced by a certain degree. To reach this mission objective, the commander of the left brigade has decided to conduct a battalion-scale counterattack against opposing forces. This counterattack is the scenario on which the LFX is based.

Force Design — The new German Army structure provides for a strengthening of the brigades by adding a new light and/or mechanized infantry battalion in order to improve combat effectiveness and long-term sustainability for future operations within the framework of stability operations.

Battalion Structure — The structure of the battalion-size task force is derived from the brigade structure. It reflects not only the capabilities of a mechanized brigade, but also incorporates assets that have been newly assigned to the division level such as joint fires.

Sequence of Events — The previous stations prepared the audience for the battle demonstrated in the LFX by leading them from the beginning of the delaying operation to the very last moment in the command post before the counterattack begins. Therefore, all scenarios shown at the individual stations are grounded in the overall scenario, fit into the timeline, and aim to show the complexity of modern mechanized high-intensity warfare.

Technical Remarks — In order to give the audience the best possible impression, all tactical communication was carried out uncoded and transmitted to loudspeakers at the platform. Helmet-mounted cameras and dismounted mobile camera teams were used to give detailed impressions of complex and sophisticated situations by transmitting them to TV screens in front of the audience.

The Battle — In order to have a solid situational awareness, reconnaissance was conducted in every phase, especially during the movement to contact.

The brigade commander used his light and medium reconnaissance forces as well as medium-range (MR) unmanned aerial systems (UASs) for gathering information about the opposing forces long before the actual battle began. The resulting intelligence was then communicated to his subordinate units.

The battalion commander used his own assets — short-range (SR) UAS, recon platoon, and his preliminary forces — to consolidate and update the intelligence obtained and to provide an operational picture to his subordinate units.

During this reconnaissance, a platoon-size regular formation — along with irregular forces and civilians — was spotted in the village (Heidedorf), north of a chokepoint the battalion had to pass. The commander decided to pass this enemy formation quickly on their right flank, leaving this enemy to the follow-on forces in order to rapidly close in with the enemy’s main force.

While conducting this maneuver, the armor company ran into an undiscovered minefield at the chokepoint and received heavy small arms and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire from the village northwest of their position. The following mechanized infantry company was immediately tasked to provide flank cover and support by laying fire on the enemy formations in this village.

While the armor company returned fire and the mechanized infantry company moved into position, the battalion commander decided, in order to regain the initiative, to outflank the enemy on his respective left flank and engage his position in the village. He tasked his second mechanized infantry company and his attached light infantry company to conduct a short flanking maneuver while his recon platoon provided intel with the SR UAS and dismounted recon teams.

The mechanized infantry company, reinforced with a tank platoon, led the attack on Heidedorf, followed by the light infantry company, while the enemy returned fire with RPGs and small arms and used prepositioned improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to defend positions. The mechanized infantry company on the hilltop provided the necessary flank cover, mainly with the sniper squad, while the infantry destroyed the enemy line defense in close combat, minimizing civilian casualties.

As the battalion maneuvered into position and attacked the enemy in close combat, the brigade recon assets spotted enemy formations closing the distance and moving into position to open fire. The battalion prepared for a second line of defense. The brigade commander therefore ordered to destroy these enemy formations. While the artillery UAS provided real-time information on the enemy, the attached artillery battalion destroyed them with howitzers. Simultaneously, a swarm of Tiger attack helicoptersdestroyed armored formations with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and infantry formations with both heavy machine-gun fire and unguided missiles.

After destroying the enemy in Heidedorf, the engineer company moved into position to clear the minefield in front of the armor company. Meanwhile, the attacking infantry forces maneuvered into position to consolidate their gains and prepare for the continuation of the attack. The Tiger helicopters continued to provide long-range fire support, disrupting enemy forces in the depth of the battlefield.

While the enemy continued to maneuver and try to establish a second line of defense, the engineer company managed to clear a path through the minefield, allowing the armor company to pass the chokepoint and to reengage the enemy.

After securing the village and clearing the chokepoint, the battalion commander ordered his units to engage the enemy with the reinforced armor company in the main effort of this attack. While the main effort is in the center, the battalion commander issued warning orders to his mechanized company to be prepared for flanking maneuvers on both sides and ordered the artillery to deal with the enemy in the depth. The battalion reconnaissance company provided flank cover and intel with their SR UAS.

With overwhelming fire and maneuver from multiple directions — in close coordination with indirect fire provided by attack helicopters, howitzers, and at very long distances by artillery rockets — the forces disrupted the enemy and set the stage for the division counterattack later on.

While all this happened in the depth of the battlefield, the light infantry company exploited the gains in Heidedorf, working closely together with elements of the Joint Support Service (such as military police, psychological operations, and civil-military cooperation elements) to fight against the last remnants of the regular and irregular forces in the village. They also cleared a helicopter landing zone for medical evacuation elements and coordinate the materiel evacuation to the logistical facilities both seen prior to the LFX

Summary

The final LFX was designed to show a heavy brigade of the German Army 2011, reinforced by elements of the Joint Support Service and the Joint Medical Service, in a high-intensity conflict. During this culminating point of the overall exercise, the audience should have witnessed the close coordination of fire and maneuver at all echelons, joint fire support, and combat and combat service support acting closely together against a hybrid threat. They should have also witnessed the importance of reconnaissance at all echelons and in every stage, and the close coordination between reconnaissance, joint fire support, and fire and maneuver at all times and at all echelons. Finally, the audience should have witnessed leadership during combat operations; for example:

• Leading upfront and by example,
• Executing mission command at all levels (Auftragstaktik),
• Taking action and gaining the initiative,
• Demonstrating sound understanding of the capabilities of the fielded elements even at the lowest level.

German Army Major Jens-Uwe Rohrmoser is currently serving as German liaison to the U.S. Army Infantry School. In his last assignment, he served as the battalion deputy commander of the Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92, which planned and executed the 2013 live-fire exercise discussed in this article.

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