# Infantry

April-May 2011

PTSD and Leader Resiliency

Organizing, Manning, and Equipping the IBCT Recon Squadron

COIN Operations

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
Infantry

FRONT COVER:
Soldiers with Company B, 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, move behind mud walls to take over a sniper position during a mission in Logar Province, Afghanistan, 5 April 2011. (Photo by SGT Sean P. Casey)

BACK COVER:
A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, provides security atop a mountain in Paktika Province, Afghanistan on 20 May 2011. (Photo by SPC George N. Hunt)

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
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BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE

TODAY'S INITIATIVES FOR TOMORROW'S ARMY

Today's Army — Active, Reserve, and Guard — is in the 10th year of the global war on terrorism. The operating force whose primary mission is participation in combat and its integral supporting elements are totally committed to winning this fight, as is the generating force which is tasked with generating and sustaining the operational Army's capabilities upon which joint force commanders will rely. The Civilian workforce provides the sustainment, continuity, and institutional knowledge to facilitate the Army's operations at home and overseas, and our Families deserve the very best — in terms of medical care, housing, family life programs, morale support services, educational opportunities, spiritual counseling, and family support groups, to name but a few.

In this Editor's Note, I want to highlight some of the initiatives and focus areas that are currently receiving attention, and I invite your input on what we are doing. Some of these will be high on the agenda for future discussions of force structure, manning levels, weapons and other equipment, and other issues. Many of these will be addressed in greater detail in upcoming issues of *Infantry* Magazine.

The Infantry's traditional mission — to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack — is what our deployed Soldiers do every day on the other side of the world, while we safely go about our lives and work here at home. In dealing with a determined, highly adaptable enemy, we have gained a better understanding of the close fight and what it takes to win it. Close combat demands absolute proficiency in small unit operations.

This has been true throughout the history of our Republic. Whether that meant New England colonists fighting off marauding native Americans in 1675; Winfield Scott's Infantry storming the Mexican fortifications at Chapultepec; Doughboys clearing enemy trenches in World War I; or World War II's bitter fighting at Normandy, Aachen, the Huertgen Forest and Manila, the outcome of the fight hung on the determination and resiliency of Americans fighting at the small unit level. This was no less true in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and in later conflicts. Today, it is our Infantry squads who are disrupting enemy ambushes, clearing built-up areas, and conducting night patrols and stability and civil support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We recognize that the current operating environment is evolving even as we and the enemy study one another's tactics, techniques, and procedures and adapt accordingly. We never lose sight of the fact that it is the agile, innovative, and adaptive leaders at squad level who first take the fight to the enemy. The future of the Infantry squad will be a hot topic within the Infantry community, and we will see force development planning as starting with the squad as its cornerstone. Lethality, mobility, survivability, and sustainment are but a few of the considerations that will drive the development of future small units.

Another critical focus for the immediate and long term will be the human dimension. Our Army and her Soldiers and Families have demonstrated astonishing resiliency and commitment in the face of 10 years of conflict and multiple deployments. We have made considerable progress in this dimension over the last decade, and we cannot let up now. We will continue to assess the programs in place and evaluate them to prepare to address known and future challenges to the physical, emotional, spiritual, and social dimensions of the Army Family.

The United States Army entrusts its leaders with enormous responsibilities and concomitant degrees of authority in accomplishing its diverse and challenging missions, and it invests considerable time and assets in their professional development. We must continue to assess our leader development strategy to make sure that we have identified the knowledge, skills, and qualities for tomorrow's leaders. Our military education and training programs are structured and evolve to develop and sustain those attributes, and our policies governing the training, development, and sustainment of leaders will continue to undergo close scrutiny to make sure tomorrow's leaders are ready for the challenge.

The complexity of the current operating environment will remain a reality for the immediate future as the Army conducts global offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations in support of our national interests. The Army and the Infantry School will continue to produce the Soldiers and leaders to fight and win wherever and whenever they are needed, and we need your input. We welcome your thoughts on training, your recommendations for future articles, and your own experiences and lessons learned during deployments. Together we can make sure that we give the warfighters the timely, relevant information they need to defeat the greatest threat our nation has faced in this century.

Infantry News

SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN GET GPS-GUIDED MORTAR CARTRIDGES

AUDRA CALLOWAY

In March, U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan received 120mm GPS-guided mortar precision capability. The Program Executive Office (PEO) for Ammunition fielded Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) cartridges to one Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) and is scheduled to field cartridges to the seven other IBCTs in Afghanistan within six months.

"APMI is a 120mm GPS-guided mortar cartridge that provides the Infantry commander precision-strike capability, which he has never had before," said Peter Burke, PEO Ammunition's deputy product manager, Guided Precision Munitions and Mortar Systems.

"Typically, mortars are fired in volleys against an area target because of their inherent inaccuracy, but with APMI, you have the potential to destroy a target with only one or two rounds," Burke said.

The APMI cartridge has a requirement of 10 meters CEP (circular error probable), but Burke said the program is exceeding this requirement. Ten meters CEP means that if you drew a circle around a target at 10 meters radius, the rounds have to fall inside the circle 50 percent of the time.

Current CEP for 120mm mortars at their maximum range is 136 meters. Mortars with the most advanced features, such as precision position and pointing systems, can achieve a 76-meter CEP, which still makes APMI seven times more accurate than any formerly fielded mortar.

While APMI will not replace standard 120mm mortars, its accuracy will allow a commander the ability to defeat a target with precision if there is danger of collateral damage, Burke explained.

Insurgents deliberately plan attacks in populated areas in the hope that opposing forces don't want to retaliate and risk accidental harm to civilians or damage to non-military property.

"Sometimes, if the risk of collateral damage is too high, you might not be able to fire (a standard 120mm) at all," Burke said of enemy engagements. "In that case, instead of firing a mortar from a protected position, you would have to send troops in to engage with direct-fire weapons, exposing them to more risk."

But because of APMI's GPS technology, which provides an accurate, first-round fire-for-effect capability, troops will have opportunities to employ APMI's precision where they previously would not, such as nearer to friendly forces or in urban areas.

Besides reducing risk to the local population and keeping U.S. service members out of harm's way, APMI reduces the logistical burden of ammunition resupply.

A mortar unit typically carries high explosive (HE) rounds with them, Burke said, and they will now carry a mixture of standard and APMI rounds. Instead of firing large quantities of HE rounds, troops can fire one or two APMI and eliminate the target, so their resupply needs should be reduced.

The APMI, Inside and Out

The APMI XM395 cartridge uses a standard M934 high-explosive 120mm projectile body. In the nose, a GPS receiver and computer controlled aerodynamic directional fins keep the round on its programmed trajectory. Folding fins in the tail provide stability.

APMI also has a multi-functional fuse, which allows the round to be programmed to explode in the air, once it hits a hard surface, or after it penetrates inside a target.

The Armament Research Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) develops advanced fire control systems that help mortar operators improve the speed of their operations and the accuracy of their fires. These include the Lightweight Handheld Mortar Ballistic Computer and the Dismounted 120mm Mortar Fire Control System, which were modified for the APMI fielding to ensure mortar operations remain streamlined.

The APMI cartridge is fired from the M120 mortar system, which is compatible with the M326 Mortar Stowage Kit. The M326 Mortar Stowage Kits are now in full scale production and will be fielded to IBCTs over the next several years.

As of right now, Burke said there is no requirement for precision capability for 81mm and 60mm mortars.

"The 120 gives you a lot more room to work with," Burke said. "To fit all the electronics into smaller cartridges, with today's technology, is not feasible. They started with the biggest size to give us the most room to work with. Plus, you're getting the lethality of a 120, which is leaps and bounds above what a 60mm HE round can do."

(Audra Calloway works for the Picatinny Arsenal Public Affairs Office.)

ARMY DEPLOYS GUNSHOT DETECTOR

KRIS OSBORN

U.S. Army forces in Afghanistan began receiving the first of more than 13,000 gunshot detection systems for the individual dismounted Soldier in March, service officials said.

"We're really trying to ensure that every Soldier is protected," said BG Peter Fuller, Program Executive Officer (PEO) Soldier.

The Individual Gunshot Detector (IGD) — made by QinetiQ North America — consists of four small acoustic sensors worn by the individual Soldier and a small display screen attached to body armor that shows the distance and direction of incoming fire.

The small sensor, about the size of a deck of cards, detects the supersonic sound waves generated by enemy gunfire and instantaneously alerts Soldiers to the location and distance toward the hostile fire,

said LTC Chris Schneider, product manager for Soldier Maneuver Sensors.

"When you get fired on, instead of trying to figure everything out, you will have technology to assist you in knowing what happened and where the shot was coming from," Fuller said.

The entire IGD system weighs less than two pounds, Schneider said.

The idea is to strategically disperse the systems throughout small, dismounted units to get maximum protective coverage for platoons, squads, and other units on the move, Schneider explained.

In the future, the Army plans to integrate this technology with its Land Warrior and Nett Warrior systems. These are network-situational-awareness systems for dismounted units, complete with a helmet-

Photo courtesy of PEO Soldier

Individual Gunshot Detector

mounted display screen that uses GPS digital-mapping-display technology, Fuller said.

(Kris Osborn writes for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.)

USAMU Hosts Small Arms Championship

MICHAEL MOLINARO

More than 300 Soldiers from across the Army descended on Fort Benning, Ga., 19-28 March to take part in the 2011 U.S. Army Small Arms Championship, also known as the "All-Army" — the preeminent marksmanship training and competition event the military has to offer.

Army Reservist SFC Russell Moore from the 91st Small Arms Readiness Group, Camp Bullis, Texas, won the overall individual championship, his third championship in a row. Winning the title is a significant accomplishment, but the ultimate goal of the event is to raise the overall combat readiness of the Army.

"The All-Army Small Arms Championship not only provides the training every Soldier needs to excel in marksmanship, it also provides a means in which to test it among their peers as well as some of the best shooters in the world," said Moore. "When we all signed up to be a Soldier, we volunteered to take on innumerable challenges and new experiences. The All-Army should be one of those experiences for every Soldier. Come out with a desire to learn and do your best, and it will be a great time."

Hosted by the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU), Soldiers competed in rifle, pistol, and combined arms matches. The long-range championship was held after the conclusion of the rifle/pistol week, and competitors shot at targets 800-1,000 yards downrange. The training and competition is like no other Soldiers receive in the military, said LTC Daniel Hodne, USAMU commander.

"General Douglas MacArthur's words, 'Upon the fields of friendly strife are sewn the seeds that on other fields, on other days, will bear the fruits of victory,' put this one-of-a-kind training event in the proper context," Hodne said. "The seeds have been sewn here at the All-Army. The responsibility now lies with those Soldiers who took part to incorporate what they learned into the training of their units. Their efforts will bear the fruits of victory in Afghanistan, Iraq, or wherever the requirements of national security may take us."

The field of Soldiers was the highest in 18 years. While a number of wily All-Army veterans such as Moore found their way back to Fort Benning, a large contingent of first-timers embraced the challenges and uniqueness of the championship.

"This is the best thing in the Army," said SFC Daniel Byler, 1-335th Infantry Brigade, Division East-First Army, Camp Atterbury, Ind. "Marksmanship is a perishable skill. Soldiers should really make it a point to come here for this event. It's great."

Byler came with seven others from his unit on their first trip to the All-Army. They spent two weeks at Fort Benning late last year taking part in a Close Quarters Squad Designated Marksman Course conducted by the USAMU. Between the advanced training they received at the course and then competing at the All-Army event, they are more confident than ever in their marksmanship ability.

Soldiers were split into four main categories: novice, open, pro, and cadet. The following Soldiers were honored at the awards ceremony:

Service Pistol Champion — SFC Moore

Service Rifle Champion — SSG Matthew Waechter, 132nd Fighter Wing, Iowa Air National Guard

Combined Arms Champion — Cadet Matthew Ray, U.S. Military Academy

Long Range Champion — SFC David Perdew, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 44th Chemical Battalion, Illinois National Guard

High Drill Sergeant — SFC George Pickowicz, Regional Training Center-East, Fort Dix, N.J.

High Cadet — Cadet Ray

High Novice — SFC Perdew

High Active-duty Soldier — SFC Nelson Ashbrook, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning

High active-duty Soldier (E1-E4) — SPC Kevin Kelley, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division

High Reservist — SFC Moore

High Reservist (E1-E4) — SPC Benson Munyan, 2nd Battalion, 91st Small Arms Readiness Group, Fort Douglas, Utah

High National Guardsman — SFC Perdew

High National Guardsman (E1-E4) — PFC Jason Parsons, 507th Engineer Battalion, Michigan National Guard

(Michael Molinaro serves as the USAMU's public affairs officer.)

Photo by Michael Molinaro

SFC Daniel Byler, 1-335th Infantry Brigade, Division East-First Army, competes during the combined arms match on 25 March at Krilling Range on Fort Benning.

Professional Forum

ARE INFANTRY OFFICERS BROAD ENOUGH TO BE FUTURE STRATEGIC LEADERS?

LTC THOMAS BOCCARDI

*W*hat will Army key strategic leaders look like in the next six to 10 years? Will the Army have the experienced strategic talent to be able to compete in the Pentagon's annual battle for resources? Certainly, Army officers execute the tactical fight better than any time in history. Those officers who will lead the Army in the strategic resource fight may, because of lack of experience, be ill-equipped to be successful in that fight.

The strategic resource battle is just one example of keeping our Army operating. With more than one in five Army general officers being Infantrymen, it is vitally important for Infantry officers to embrace their broader service to the Army. But, in today's Army, Infantry officers, especially young majors, sometimes fear assignments for the "broader strategic purpose." Brigade combat team (BCT) commanders are key in dissuading those fears and in encouraging Infantry officers to embrace the broader Army.

Today, Infantry officers stay "tactical" for years. Who will lead the Army in the inevitable resource battle of 2018 when potentially so few will have ever served the Army for a broader purpose?

In the following article, LTC Tommy Boccardi, Infantry officer assignments branch chief, puts into historical perspective the "broader purpose" for military leaders. As a former battalion commander, LTC Boccardi is completing his first broadening assignment. His perspective indicates how he previously misunderstood Army operations beyond the tactical fight.

Using Thermopylae as an example of a time when military leaders embraced a broader purpose for their subordinate leaders, this historical vignette shows that military leaders have been down this path before.

— COL Mark Lessig
Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Army Human Resources Command

Thermopylae's First Theater Take-outs

In popular culture, King Leonidas sent a character named Dilios home from battle to serve a greater purpose. Due to Dilios' great oration skills, he was chosen by the King not to die in battle but to live to tell the story of the Spartans and ultimately inspire all of Greece. Upon his return, Dilios was not considered a coward and is later credited with leading a Greek alliance to final victory over the Persians at the Battle of Plataea.

Conversely, the Greek historian Herodotus recounts a different set of characters as early returns from Thermopylae — Eurytus and Aristodemus. The fates of these two do not end with as much gallantry as Dilios' return. On one hand, a blinded Eurytus forced his slave to return him to Thermopylae and die with him in battle — selfishly to preserve his perceived sense of honor. On the other, Aristodemus returns to Sparta and is widely criticized as a coward who disgraced the Spartan brotherhood. In an attempt to regain his name, Aristodemus conducts a suicidal charge at the final battle of Plataea. He fought in an uncontrolled fashion and with such undisciplined fury, that the Spartans never awarded him for valor because his actions were contrary to the disciplined Spartan culture.

When we take a reflective look at our own modern-day practice for theater take-outs, we see similar contradictions (both popular and historical). The current Army Manning Guidance, dated 17 December 2010, implements three control measures to shape command/

key developmental (KD) tour lengths. These control measures serve as policy implementation to ensure officers get "broadening assignments," which, akin to King Leonidas, is the overarching purpose. Recent analysis shows that the Army's bench of leaders has shortened because high-performing officers are not getting broadening opportunities, which can be directly attributed to extended command/key developmental assignments; hence these policy changes serve to improve leader development.

These three control measures are:

1. Maintain company command tour length at 12-18 months (or up to 24 months total when commanding two companies).

2. Maintain field grade KD assignments at 24 months (may be extended, by exception, to 36 months).

3. Officers who are KD-complete should be released to attend professional military education (PME) and/or meet requirements in the generating force. In order to enable this guidance, BCT commanders in coordination with their chains of command, coordinate directly with the U.S. Army Human Resources Command to ensure what is best for the officer and unit while contributing to the "needs of the greater Army."

When we reflect on our own history, we find that we are not abiding by these control measures. DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, dated 1 February 2010, defines company command as a professional development objective for captains focusing on tactical

skills. However, for maintaining company command tour lengths, Infantry is in stark contrast to this guidance. The average company command tour length for Infantry officers is now 31 months. There are 50 majors ranging from year group (YG) 99-01 still in company command. YG02, soon promotable, has nearly 50 in command. Majors currently fill 25 percent of the available company commands for Infantrymen. The strain on Infantry progression increases when a BCT redeploys and extends its company commanders until 90 days after redeployment (R+90) and sometimes to R+180. This practice virtually eliminates a captain's opportunity for fellowships, U.S. Military Academy faculty/staff positions, and/or advanced civil schooling.

Many junior officers believe a second company command carries a higher weight than Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) internships, Office of Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) assignments, joint assignments, or other broadening assignments. Those officers are misinformed. Clearly, the latter are a better characterization of "broadening assignments." This misinformation may be attributed to outdated counseling. The key is informing senior leaders, specifically our BCT commanders, of the importance of enforcing the control measures listed above while conveying the benefit of broadening opportunities — the benefit for the Army and the officer. Most junior officers are still coached that they need to stay tactical and that "more KD time is better," which is a model that many of our BCT commanders follow. This counsel is dated and inaccurate.

If you look at the contradiction between the two stories of Leonidas' first theater take-outs — pop-culture versus the historical example — Leonidas sent Dilios back because he had a "broader" purpose for him. Without question, Dilios would've remained loyal by fighting/dying next to his brothers, but then history would have been lost and the future of Sparta perhaps changed. Nor should the broader purpose be met with the same guilt of Eurytus' which compelled him to sacrifice himself and

"DA PAM 600-3 defines a major's professional development objectives as: expanding the officer's tactical/technical experience and broadening him; increasing his understanding of how the Army operates; and preparing for future battalion command and increasingly complex developmental assignments."

Photo by SGT Ben Brody

his escort — not just his life but another person's life as well. I find this a particular point when demonstrating YG targeting blockage. Older YGs that are KD complete should change out to allow opportunities for younger YGs. If they do not, they forfeit someone else's career developmental timeline for both KD and broadening opportunity.

In regard to field grade KD tour lengths, Infantry as a branch falls short of the Army Manning Guidance while developing and perpetuating undesirable trends. Roughly 30 percent of YG94 is still in MAJ KD assignments at the BCT level. These officers will not get a broadening assignment post-KD and if they are competitive for command selection list (CSL), they will likely go straight from BCT-level KD to battalion CSL. Essentially, these officers will go from deployment to deployment.

Army-wide there are roughly 250 KD assignments for Infantry majors and only 160 serving (25 percent of the overall grade-plate aggregate). YG94 officers are lieutenant colonels; they are KD-complete (average 36-40 months) and CSL boarded. Those presently in major KD positions now block YG95/96 officers. YG95 officers will show the same trend — and fate — as 42 of 84 are still in major KD positions. In a few months, they will be lieutenant colonels; these officers are promotable majors and have processed through the CSL board. Those in major KD positions are blocking the opportunities of younger YGs. BCTs should have their aim point on YG95, 96, 97, with 97 as S3s, 96 as XOs and 95 at BCT-level. Each year this aim point should scroll forward; however, we are not executing this progression. Infantry branch is loading BCTs with YG98 this summer from Intermediate Level Education (ILE), yet we still have more than 100 YG97/98 officers

who have not started their KD clocks.

DA PAM 600-3 defines a major's professional development objectives as: expanding the officer's tactical/technical experience and broadening him; increasing his understanding of how the Army operates; and preparing for future battalion command and increasingly complex developmental assignments. YG94 developed primarily at the tactical level. As a YG, they are not broadened. Failure to meet Army guidance has created an ultracompetitive model for CSL-selects. In fact, so competitive, that every one of FY12's 11P CSL-selects (YG94) never received a center of mass (COM) report as a major; most never received a COM officer evaluation report in their file. If we reviewed all CSL-selects, we'd find only one officer with a COM in KD. If we gathered all 70-plus Infantry CSL-selects into one room and asked those that were below-the-zone (BZ) to raise a hand — 70 percent of the room would raise one hand. If we asked those that were twice BZ to raise a hand, 40 percent would raise their other hand.

Additionally, we find the most common broadening assignment among all CSL-selects was aide-de-camp. In all, there were only a handful of broadening assignments (Combat Training Centers and Joint assignments) compared to the 17 aides. The CSL-select average KD time was 31 months, three deployments, 36 months deployed, 18 months dwell. We've created, and we reward a true Spartan culture. The rest of our officers (60-65 percent of us) fall short. It's concerning that they will meet the same fate as Aristodemus. Where a Spartan's loyalty is challenged, he becomes an outsider; then, in a fit of rage he fights uncontrolled, undisciplined and is ultimately rejected by his own.

In closing, this will not have the longevity of Greek history; however, the trends potentially will remain. We've driven, guided, and counseled a cohort of officers to be heavily armed foot soldiers

> **"At every level (captain, major, lieutenant colonel), we are solely focused at assignments at brigade and below. Infantry officers will be peerless when it comes to proficiency at brigade and below tactics, but few will have the requisite understanding of how the Army operates in increasingly complex developmental assignments."**

or hoplites and avert broadening. At every level (captain, major, lieutenant colonel), we are solely focused on assignments at brigade and below. Infantry officers will be peerless when it comes to proficiency at brigade and below tactics, but few will have the requisite understanding of how the Army operates in increasingly complex developmental assignments.

There are three ways to avert the same tragedies of Thermopylae's early returns of Eurytus and Aristodemus. First, follow the Army Manning Guidance and maintain KD for company command and field grades at 24 months. Second, manage exceptions only for BCT S3 or XO at plus 12 months; target ILE at YG+11. Third, senior leaders should counsel young officers to seek at least one broadening assignment in their career. If that assignment doesn't happen at the company-grade level, then it must happen at the field-grade level. If we are unable to do so, when the current conflict ends, our BCT-centric experience may resemble history at Thermopylae.

LTC Thomas Boccardi currently serves as the Infantry officer assignments branch chief, U.S. Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Ky. He has served three combat tours during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His assignments include serving as a rifle platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, and company executive officer with the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division; company commander and battalion staff officer with the 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Division; liaison officer/planner with the 75th Ranger Regiment; and commander of A Company, 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment (IOBC) where he supervised the pilot program for the Basic Officer Leader Course. He was later assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division where he served as a battalion S3 and XO for the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment during OIF I. He then served as the brigade S3 and XO in OIF 05-07. LTC Boccardi commanded the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division from May 2007 to June 2009 and participated in OIF 07-09 from December 2007 to March 2009.

A Silent Warrior's Struggle: PTSD and Leader Resiliency

MAJ RONALD W. SPRANG

There has been a lot of discussion throughout American society and the military culture of late on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and resiliency. After experiencing it firsthand, I realized there are still many misperceptions and a definite stigma related to those who experience PTSD. This article is by no means an all-inclusive look, but I would like to provide an account of my experiences in the hopes of encouraging others to get help if they believe they may be suffering from PTSD as well.

Post-traumatic stress disorder is defined by the Department of Veteran Affairs' National Center for PTSD as, "an anxiety disorder that can occur after you have been through a traumatic event. A traumatic event is

> **SYMPTOMS OF PTSD**
> - Reliving a trauma, intrusive memories
> - Staying away from places/people that remind you of the trauma
> - Feeling on guard, irritable, startling easily
>
> **PTSD MAY OCCUR WITH OTHER PROBLEMS**
> - Depression
> - Anxiety
> - Substance abuse
> - Fear
> - Social Anxiety

something horrible and scary that you see or that happens to you. During this type of event, you think that your life or others' lives are in danger. You may feel afraid or feel that you have no control over what is happening."

There are four primary symptoms of PTSD as defined by the National Center for PTSD:

1. Reliving the event (also called re-experiencing symptoms)

2. Avoiding situations that remind you of the event

3. Feeling numb

4. Feeling keyed up (also called hyper-arousal)

It is possible to experience some or all of those symptoms, or as in my case, to feel them all very vividly.

My Story

I have deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) three times: as a rifle platoon leader during OIF I; as an internal battalion military transition team (MiTT) S3 and rifle company commander in OIF 06-08; and as an HHC commander (being used as a maneuver company) and battalion assistant S3 in OIF 09-10.

By far the worst violence and combat I personally saw was during the OIF 06-08 rotation in east Baghdad. I received a concussion and was knocked temporarily unconscious when my Bradley fighting vehicle was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED). I also participated in numerous other firefights. I witnessed the death of a Soldier and injury to others; I personally killed enemy combatants and gave orders that resulted in the deaths of several more combatants and injuries to my Soldiers. I made a personal choice, however, to not seek help following that deployment. I thought I could handle it on my own and at the time didn't feel like I was experiencing any symptoms of PTSD. I also didn't want to address any issues because I knew I was headed back in 12 months on my third deployment. I remained distant from my family and continued to focus myself on preparing my company for deployment.

It was not until my current assignment in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that I had the time to process my three combat tours and reintegrate fully with my wife and daughters. At a time when I should have been able to relax and enjoy my family and my time, I started to feel overcome with grief, guilt, depression, anger, and I was always edgy and hypervigilant. I began to train physically twice a day and lost 30 pounds. I started to lose feeling below both knees and from my back down my right side from an injury during a firefight on my third deployment. (I unknowingly had dislocated a disc in my spine.) The back injury and history of concussions contributed to me not being able to maintain my balance with my eyes closed. I started struggling with insomnia, and after a week with only three hours of sleep a night, I experienced my first flashback. Then I knew I needed help. I was able to use Military One Source and the Martin Army Community

Hospital team along with the Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) clinic to get treatment. I continued to have vivid nightmares, but with the help of my counselor, a supportive family and church, and my faith in God, I was able to make it through. I haven't had any nightmares in almost a year, and the physical therapy for TBI and my back have brought me back to almost pre-injury fitness levels. I have found a new sense of balance and happiness that I haven't felt in years.

There is one aspect of my experience that was surprising as it happened and is definitely still in need of work in the Army culture today. There is a stigma attached to PTSD that those experiencing the disorder are not worth keeping in the Army and don't deserve to be Soldiers. I had a wonderfully supportive chain of command and peers throughout the process of receiving treatment and, thankfully, had a work schedule that supported my appointments. I was able to receive treatment while working and am now no longer in need of the additional medical support for physical or psychological injuries. Still, however, there were those in the workplace who found my diagnosis as a point of comic relief and water cooler gossip and rumors. A few select individuals began spreading lies about what happened to me; they said I was faking it for disability, was somehow now unworthy of continuing to serve, and not worthy of promotion. Although these individuals were small in numbers, those attitudes and actions are counterproductive to a healthy work environment and an Army culture as a whole. I hope through this article and more individuals speaking out about PTSD and continuing to serve with honor, the culture will change to a 100 percent supportive environment.

Resiliency

The Army recently introduced a powerful and worthwhile program in regard to comprehensive Soldier fitness and resiliency. Resiliency is defined as "the capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after **deformation** caused especially by compressive stress; an ability to recover from or adjust easily to **misfortune** or change" (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary). Comprehensive Soldier Fitness focuses on training

> **"Through my experience, I have found that human beings by nature are resilient, and programs like the Army resiliency program remind us that resiliency is innately in us all."**

Soldiers to gain and maintain balance in their personal and professional lives. The Army has definitely taught us how to face the enemy as a team, and we need to come together as a warrior community to face the aftermath of war as well. Facing the effects of combat takes individual strength, but it also requires collective support and a change to the stigma that if one has PTSD he cannot continue in the Army and is somehow a weaker person.

Through my experience, I have found that human beings by nature are resilient, and programs like the Army resiliency program remind us that resiliency is innately in us all. There are five major strengths one must develop to face PTSD and personal growth.

The first is the strength to face one's past. Those of us who have stared death in the face and struggled through killing the enemy and seeing our own Soldiers wounded or killed need to accept that we did the best we could in those circumstances and honor those we lost.

Second is the strength to seek help. A Soldier should never feel like he needs to face this on his own. Professional help is available and accessible through local hospitals, chaplains, and counselors. Their experience and an outside view will allow the Soldier to get appropriate perspective on the violence and carnage he has seen and been a part of.

Third is the strength to forgive oneself. This for me was one of the hardest steps. As a deeply religious person, I had difficulty forgiving myself for killing so many people. They were all combatants and definitely warranted, but as I reflected back on the actions I had taken, I felt enormous and almost overwhelming guilt. Through counseling, I was able to get proper perspective and reconcile those feelings of guilt.

Fourth is the strength to honor and never forget those we have lost.

Lastly, fifth is the strength to move forward. Those of us who have survived war can still enjoy our lives moving forward, setting goals, and honoring those we have lost through dedication to our core values and our country.

Conclusion

There is no doubt in my mind that I can continue to serve and lead Soldiers in combat. It was by far one of the most awesome responsibilities of my life, and I look back on it with fond memories. I am continually in awe of American Soldiers who risk their lives for what we all believe in. I thank you all for your dedication and service to our nation and my thoughts and prayers are with you all. There is no greater asset our nation possesses than the sons and daughters willing to lay down their lives in her defense. I encourage anyone who has or who is currently experiencing any symptoms of PTSD to seek help and leaders to stay involved to ensure they get help as well.

At the time this article was written, **MAJ Ronald W. Sprang** was serving as a small group instructor with the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He previously served as assistant battalion S3 and a company commander with the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment and has completed three tours as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

WHERE TO GET HELP
• **National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder** —
(800) 296-6300 or http://www.ncptsd.va.gov
• **Military One Source** — (800) 342-9647 (If overseas precede number with U.S. access code)
• **Military Mental Health Organization** — www.mentalhealthscreening.org
• **National Depression Screening Day** — www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org (anonymous screening)
• **Emergency** -- call 911
• **Chaplains, Troop Medical Clinics, Mental Health Providers, Emergency Rooms, and National Depression Screenings**

MAP BOARDS TO CPOF

AN AIRBORNE INFANTRY BATTALION AT JRTC AND THE CHALLENGES TO PROVIDING SA DURING AN FSO ROTATION

LTC CURTIS A. BUZZARD

Having recently returned from the first full spectrum operations (FSO) rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, La., in almost a decade, it is critical to share the lessons learned from operations conducted by an airborne Infantry battalion. As expected, we found that our paratroopers inherently will always complete the mission; however, the demands of the FSO rotation brought to light a few key issues, particularly in terms of command and control (C2) and associated capabilities. The primary challenges revolved around how to create situational awareness (SA) using both the analog and digital systems at different echelons as well as managing these systems during key transitions. Aside from Blue Force Tracker (BFT), companies on the full spectrum battlefield fight using analog systems (maps) while brigade and above fight primarily from

Photo by SSG J. TaShun Joyce

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment fire at a tank approaching their fighting position during the final portion of the defensive operations phase at JRTC.

digital systems. Thus, battalion staffs must serve as a transition and translation point for both analog and digital systems and master both in order to facilitate situational awareness at all levels.

In this article, we will discuss our training plan prior to JRTC, the FSO rotation itself, and key lessons learned from our training. Ultimately, we discovered that the real key was understanding the nature of the problem in ensuring a common operating picture (COP) across tactical echelons and then focusing our training for the battalion staff on the high payoff analog and digital systems that facilitate situational awareness.

Before delving into observations and lessons learned, a summary of our pre-rotation training as well as the rotation itself is necessary to provide context. Our unit was roughly five months out of the "reset" phase of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. Prior to the rotation, we primarily focused on basic skill level training; the paratrooper essential task list (PETL); offensive collective tasks at the squad, platoon, and company; and airfield seizure training exercises. We leveraged our experience in stability and support operations and conducted leader development on the deliberate defense. In terms of staff training, the battalion executed two digital exercises with the brigade combat team (BCT) headquarters as well as established and operated our tactical operations center (TOC) on airfield seizures and select

company training exercises. The staff also attended the Leaders Training Program (LTP) at JRTC; however, approximately half of the staff changed out between the LTP and the actual rotation. As JRTC approached, we conducted additional TOC training and professional development, but we were not able to execute a battalion or brigade field training exercise prior to JRTC. Due to limited training time, we chose to focus on company and below training and envisioned JRTC as an excellent TOC and staff training venue. Though the learning curve was high throughout the rotation, the underlying fact is that our Soldiers are flexible and adaptive and quickly mastered tasks and operations that they had not trained on or minimally trained on prior to the rotation.

The rotation itself was built around a forcible entry operation into a failing country, which had internal strife from a rogue, host nation conventional army and a growing insurgency fueled by a neighboring state. The conditions for U.S. forces were generally austere until the airfield was secure and the flight landing strip (FLS) was cleared and repaired. The BCT built combat power via C-130s landing on the FLS and unloading key capabilities in accordance with our priority.

Following the airfield seizure, the BCT prepared a deliberate defense to defeat an attack by the rogue forces, who were trying to secure the local seat of government and also disrupt U.S.

forces' ability to build combat power. Simultaneously, the brigade combat team fought a growing insurgency and tried to defeat enemy mortar and improvised explosive device (IED) cells that harassed U.S. forces. Also, U.S. leaders conducted numerous key leader engagements (KLE) with local leaders in an effort to develop relationships, reinforce our mission, and gather intelligence on enemy activities. Additionally the BCT executed three noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) to secure U.S. civilians spread across its operating environment. Following the defense, the BCT commenced offensive operations to include two battalion (-) attacks and a time sensitive target operation while maintaining security of the lodgment. Overall, it was a challenging mission set that fully exercised the requirement to conduct operations across the full spectrum, often simultaneously, and challenged our ability to gain and maintain SA.

At the battalion level, the greatest challenge concerned the battle staff's ability to master both analog and digital C2 systems and establish SOPs for transitioning between them. This was critical in order to facilitate planning at battalion and company levels as well as maintain a COP throughout the fight. Our challenge existed in two primary areas:

(1) Transitioning from analog to digital after conducting our forcible entry (parachute assault) operation, and

(2) Serving as a two-way transition and translation point for analog to digital, where a company is primarily operating via FM and analog mechanisms, and a brigade is almost completely using digital systems on a tactical internet. Additional issues were also identified as key leaders from the battalion displaced from the main command post found themselves in a primarily analog environment.

The first challenge in situational awareness and communications during FSO stems from the initial entry and the need to ensure that critical information that is tracked on maps and handwritten logs is captured in our digital systems as our command post matures. During an airfield seizure, our communications infrastructure is primarily FM and satellite-based with leaders using map boards and associated overlays as well as FM radios and satellite communications (SATCOM) for voice and the Global Rapid Response Information Package (GRRIP) for chat. These systems enable long-range communication with the intermediate staging base that we departed from and enable a way to gather critical information on the airborne operation, i.e. any issue, whether maintenance or other, that prevented Soldiers from jumping or the dropping of heavy equipment. In the assault command posts on the drop zone, information is primarily tracked with an alcohol pen and shared over the various traditional FM nets (command, operations and intelligence [O&I], and administration and logistics [A&L]). Once aircraft begin to arrive, our capability increases as our TOC equipment flows into the airhead and connectivity and systems are established.

COL Carl Alex, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, briefs Chief of Staff of the Army GEN George W. Casey, Jr. on the full spectrum operation exercise being conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La., on 23 October 2010.

The critical issue is the transition of significant events and enemy contacts from the map to a computer system, which aids in analysis and our ability to determine enemy and friendly patterns. This was not fully appreciated prior to our airborne operation and was a key take away from our rotation. Failing to plan this transition resulted in lost situational awareness and missed opportunities. Had we performed this better, we would have been able to earlier identify enemy mortar firing points as well as other enemy actions that fit a pattern of employment. This would have increased the likelihood of defeating these enemy capabilities. Thus, it is critical to plan deliberate transition and forcing mechanisms to ensure that information captured during initial entry and reflected in pen on a map is captured in the system providing the digital COP at the battalion level and above.

The second challenge revolves around the battalion's function as a transition and also a translation point for digital communications to and from brigade and analog communications with the companies in the field. The only digital system currently in use by our companies during the rotation was BFT, which is satellite-based and generally just in a rifle company's single vehicle. The brigade SA and COP, orders process, and battle tracking are centered around the digital network that is facilitated by its joint network node (JNN) and the battalion's command post node (CPN), which are the technical systems that provide secure internet. They create the ability to use a variety of tremendously useful internet-based systems, such as command post of the future (CPOF) that is generally used as the COP at brigade and above. However, these systems go no lower than the battalion level. A rifle company remains primarily an analog outfit in FSO where situational awareness is on the commander's map — and with a little luck on a BFT screen if a vehicle is available — and the primary means of communication is FM.

For both the battalion staff and company commanders, the analog-to-digital-to-analog requirement creates unique challenges since we have become accustomed to operating on forward operating bases with mature network infrastructure. Battalion staffs, company commanders, and even platoon leaders are accustomed to planning orders or concepts of operation (CONOPs) in PowerPoint and not producing overlays on acetate or view graph transparencies (VGTs). The latter is a lost art. We (the battalion command group) found ourselves clumsily explaining to the battalion staff how to make map boards and overlays for the battalion operations, fires, and intelligence cells, and the need to ensure that the maps and bolts for hanging the overlays were in the same location on each board so you could transfer overlays between map boards easily. Obviously, there is great capability in what the network and computer systems offer, but they must be weighed against ensuring that the battalion provides the right products to commanders working out of a fighting position and under a poncho with a red lens flashlight. This creates tension as higher headquarters generally prefer computer-generated products. At the bare bones, company

> **"A rifle company remains primarily an analog outfit in FSO where situational awareness is on the commander's map — and with a little luck on a BFT screen if a vehicle is available..."**

commanders need an understanding of the enemy and likely courses of action, a task and purpose, commander's intent, and the CONOPs with associated graphic control measures — all prepared in an analog format that facilitates their military decision-making process (MDMP) at the company level. Providing PowerPoint or CPOF-generated graphic control measures fail to provide the specific detail that an overlay does on a map and causes the company to lose valuable time in their MDMP process as they try to translate the content to a map. In the end, this requires staffs to now master both analog and digital systems. Ultimately, this merely requires a training solution, SOPs, and a certification process.

As previously stated, the one system that we found most useful at all levels was BFT. Since it generally exists at every echelon, it is the one capability that can provide shared understanding from company to brigade. We evolved into using that as our primary COP and means for sending and receiving information. Our TOC sent warning and fragmentary orders over BFT and spent countless hours drawing in graphic control measures as well as providing overlays to company commanders. This proved useful and redundant to FM communications. Originally, we intended to distribute key information (enemy update/analysis, fragmentary orders, etc.) through the daily logistics package or the commander's battlefield circulation but found it easier to send over BFT and confirm understanding in daily commander's updates over FM. However, we did also use battlefield circulation to enable confirmation briefs and have myself and key staff (S2, S3, and fire support officer) meet with company commanders. Through our experience, we did again recognize the need for additional BFT training, digital SOPs, and a certification process for users.

As we grew to depend on BFT, we recognized that CPOF and BFT were not completely compatible either. Initially, CPOF was the primary COP for the BCT TOC. We received graphic control measures over CPOF yet had to input them into BFT for our companies' situational awareness because the CPOF graphic overlays do not automatically populate in BFT. So not only were we doing analog to digital translation but also digital to digital between CPOF and BFT. Our BCT TOC understood the challenge and recognized that they should initiate putting graphics into BFT to ensure the widest common understanding, and then battalions would make refinements and adjustments and send back up to the BCT TOC.

Additionally, a unique challenge worth noting occurred when the battalion's tactical command post (TAC) left the TOC and assumed control of the fight. This was not an easy decision for the commander as there is now so much capability for situational awareness in a TOC, but there is also something intangible about having eyes on the fight and seeing and understanding what key decisions must be made to ensure success. Battle command on the move for an airborne Infantry battalion remains an austere exercise, especially when the TAC is dismounted. During our

deliberate attack, I chose to deploy the TAC. Upon leaving our vehicles, we forfeited BFT, power amps for radios and long distance communications, and the remote viewing terminal to observe unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds. Once again, the leaders were primarily using analog systems (i.e., a map) aside from the potential to use a few satellite-based systems, such as SATCOM or GRRIPs. But, both of these systems can only be used when stationary. Quite frankly, we were even challenged with FM communications in rolling terrain, and the inability to retransmit more than two nets at the battalion level.

At the end of the day, our leaders and staff must understand how to use both analog and digital systems. The network is not 100 percent reliable, and conditions may preclude its establishment for some time as the tactical situation develops. We can solve a good portion of the challenges through a solid training program, SOPs, and a process to certify leaders. However, it clearly appears that we also need to focus increased emphasis on bringing better situational awareness through digital capability to the Infantryman who is dismounted from a vehicle. We need to leverage the capability of the network to the smallest formation possible. While we have been at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of the emphasis has been on vehicles and associated digital systems, and no one is questioning that focus. However, it is time to place increased prominence on providing greater situational awareness for the tip of the spear — the dismounted Infantryman and the junior leaders — in order to support our ability to conduct operations across the full spectrum. Ideally, this should be in the form of a small, BFT-type device that would facilitate situational awareness and an ability to communicate. Providing dismounted leaders with a small, wrist-mounted device akin to a Droid or iPhone (mini-tactical computer) that was networked and equipped with a variety of applications that could provide a chat capability, access to imagery and location/disposition of friendly units, a built-in global positioning system, a camera, and ideally remote viewing capability for UAVs — all while on the move — would be enormously useful and bridge that analog-digital gap identified during our rotation.

In conclusion, full spectrum operations present a variety of unique though not necessarily original challenges in terms of the ability to gain, maintain, and share situational awareness and execute mission command. Leaders must begin with a solid understanding and training on both basic analog systems and digital systems, because both currently play an important role in our ability to gain and provide situational understanding. However, we need to bring to bear our focus on providing increased digital capability to the tip of the spear. Failing to do so is a disservice to our junior leaders and contradicts the fact that tactical success is attained at the company level and below.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp

Newsletter 11-20 — Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Training Newsletter
This newsletter discusses considerations and initiatives for incorporating joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational opportunities in all levels of rehearsals, exercises, and other military training.

Handbook 11-16 — Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook
This handbook is a guide to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. It contains part of the ISAF PRT Handbook as well as background information on each of the provinces. There is also a chapter on the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework currently used in Afghanistan.

Handbook 11-07 — Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook
Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) within the U.S. is not a new mission for the military. Despite this, CALL collection and analysis teams (CAAT) routinely reveal observations that tactical units do not understand the restraints or constraints of the body of statutes, regulations, and presidential orders pertaining to responding to disasters and incidents at home.

FRENCH WAR PLAN XVII

WHY DID FRENCH MILITARY PLANNERS NOT FORESEE THE TACTICAL INEVITABILITY OF GERMANY'S SCHLIEFFEN PLAN?

MAJ JASON WAGGONER

The French can rightly lay claim to some of the ablest military thinkers in Europe. Some of the most advanced tactics and new weapon innovations have led France to great victories. After the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, France was at peace, and military leaders began planning for its next war. Time was on their side as they studied the lessons of their defeat in that war and planning began for the next invasion of France, deduced to come from Germany. So with time to plan and recent experience on their side, why did French military planners not foresee the tactical inevitability of Germany's Schlieffen Plan in 1914? While the answer was contained within War Plan XVII and while its opening moves were carefully worked out by the general staffs, it was hampered

French troopers drive back the Germans with their machine guns amongst the ruins of a cathedral near the Marne in 1918.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration

by built-in tactical blunders, ignorance of technical realities, and was not based upon realistic strategic goals to win a war against Germany's Schlieffen Plan.

The Plan

Before there was French War Plan XVII, there was French War Plan XVI. The French military progressively numbered their war plans based upon tactical need, technological advancement, or political objectives. Personality was a driving force, too; when a new chief of staff was appointed, his personality and belief of future conflict usually necessitated a change. That was the case with the development of War Plan XVII. Beyond that, several elements combined to lead the French to erroneously believe that the best plan against a potential invasion by Germany was War Plan XVII.

In order to understand the circumstances surrounding the development of Plan XVII, they must be analyzed based upon early 20th century European military theory. The elements of this theory combined to become the recipe for French military strategy and would change little throughout the war. Any one element on its own was not a fatal flaw, but when combined they became an international example of how not to defend a country.

Common understanding of French military theory at the time holds that there was an evolution of thinking that dictated a strategic static defense transitioning to a

German infantry soldiers move across the battlefield on 7 August 1914.

counteroffensive under any circumstances. After its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France was the first to codify its tactical lessons and begin to plan for the next invasion by Germany. However, "In the 1870s, France was so weak that it had no choice but to fortify itself for a defensive conflict with the much stronger German Army," wrote Jonathan House in the December 1976 *Military Affairs* article "The Decisive Attack: A New Look at French Infantry Tactics on the Eve of World War I."

To this end, French tactical thinking dictated that strategic planning for the next war would follow a path of an initial defense utilizing the frontier fortresses to be followed up with a counterattack. These frontier fortresses, arrayed from Belfort to Verdun, helped to offset France's numerical inferiority and would channelize the Germans where the French wanted them. This would thereby deny the Germans the ability to mass, negating their numerical superiority. However, this thought process was based on the theory that Germany would invade France directly through those defenses and not conduct an envelopment movement around them.

Versions of this line of thinking evolved through the numbered war plans, eventually forming the basis for Plan XVI, which was drafted by General Henri de Lacroix. "In August 1907, de Lacroix sent Georges Picquart, the Minister of War in Clemenceau's government, two brief studies emphasizing the need for a new war plan," wrote Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. in his 1969 book *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914.* "There were practical reasons as well for drafting a new war plan: the vastly improved French rail system would permit new flexibility and quicker offensive action; the loss of manpower from the two-year service law had to be compensated."

The rationality behind this mind-set stemmed from the teachings of Generals Henri Bonnal and M.J. de Miribel. House explained, "Essentially, these men believed in the need for offensive action but felt that France's slower mobilization necessitated waiting until the first German advance spent its momentum and then counter-attacking vigorously. The French War Plans XIV (1898) through XVI (1909) and the draft Plan of 1911 all embodied this basic concept of the defensive-offensive."

What War Plan XVII allowed in theory, it lacked in reality. The strategy was plagued with inflexibility. When an army is in a defensive posture, it gives its enemies the elements of the initiative,

mobility, and surprise. All these elements were absent from French training methods as it was unnecessary in fulfilling the intent of Plan XVII. As it was a plan of reaction rather than of action, it still did not fulfill the intent of the "cult of the offensive."

In 1911, General Joseph-Jacques-Cesaire Joffre became the new Chief of the General Staff. He immediately set out to train the troops in the spirit of the offensive and to revise the now obsolete War Plan XVI. Using Plan XVI as a framework, Plan XVII was completed in April 1913. In her 1962 book *The Guns of August*, Barbara W. Tuchman wrote, "A brief general directive of five sentences, classified as secret, was all that was shown in common to the generals who were to carry out the plan, and they were not permitted to discuss it." Further, "The rest of the general directive stated merely that French action would consist of two major offensives, one to the left and one to the right of the German fortified area of Metz-Thionville." The intent of the plan was to counterattack to the Rhine and simultaneously isolate advancing German elements, destroying them in turn. This would be France's plan even after intelligence reports indicated elements of the Schlieffen Plan were to be executed through Belgium.

Cult of the Offensive

The defensive strategy of Plan XVI surely means that the battles would take place on French soil. This unwritten concept is present in Plan XVII, and it was believed that as the Germans made advances into France, they would move further away from their sources of supply, become weary, and begin to make riskier tactical decisions. From that point, the French could execute its transition in military thinking that took place between Plans XVI and XVII, more influenced by French pride than by technical or tactical innovation: the offense.

In the decade before 1914, a new school of thought argued that the offensive was more in tune with French character and tradition. The thought of the offensive as a "new" concept stemmed from France's experience in the Franco-Prussian War where not a single offensive frontal assault was successful. After France was defeated, Service Regulations of 1875 dictated that it was necessary to gain fire superiority before a counterattack could begin.

Not everyone accepted this new regulation, according to Joseph C. Arnold in his April 1978 *Military Affairs* article "French Tactical Doctrine 1870-1914." "Students of Napoleon I feared that

the Service Regulations of 1875 would doom the offensive spirit of the French army. They clamored for a return to the irresistible attacks of the Napoleonic columns," he wrote.

The biggest proponent for this emerging offensive mind-set was General Ferdinand Foch, head of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre. His advocacy for the offensive was rooted in his heavy misunderstanding of Clausewitz. "He stressed the importance of the will to victory and the value of the offensive. To these strategic attitudes he added four somewhat redundant principles: economy of force, freedom of maneuver, security of forces, and the free disposition of forces. Although Foch occasionally recognized that the strategic defensive had merits, his works betrayed an uncompromising faith in the offensive," wrote Williamson.

When General Joffre became the chief of the general staff in 1911, he brought with him a firm belief in Foch's ideals of the offensive. Immediately after arriving in his new position, he began to modify Plan XVI, attempting to take away the danger of giving Germany the first opportunity to gain time and the initiative.

The Germans also recognized the need for the offensive, and this was reflected in their Schlieffen Plan, which, on the western front, was purely offensive.

"The French, however, soon went one up on their traditional enemy," according to Phillip M. Flammer in his article "The Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII: A Short Critique," which appeared in the Winter 1966-67 issue of *Military Affairs*. "While a plan was important to the offensive, even more important was the 'spirit' or 'élan' with which the offensive was conducted. [Service Regulations of 28 October 1913] announced that 'success in war depends much more on perseverance and tenacity in the execution of the plan than on the skill with which it is devised.'"

This French spirit of the offensive would permeate French tactical thinking throughout the war as France continued to look for a resumption of offensive maneuver warfare as trench lines were breached.

As French tactics focused primarily on the defensive with follow-on offensives, so did its use of modern weapons to facilitate this ideal. As technology advanced and artillery became more fast-firing, some in the French leadership were not receptive to its effects or its potential in shaping new tactics, defensive or offensive. Further, the use of the machine gun was viewed as a purely defensive weapon without accuracy, a gadget with limited effectiveness. It was believed that the spirit of the bayonet and French élan would carry the day.

"Forgetful of the lessons of 1870, they imagined that élan was proof against bullets," wrote Liddell Hart in his 1930 book *The Real War*. "Napoleon's much quoted saying that 'the moral is to the physical as three to one' has much to answer for; it has led soldiers to think that a division exists between the two, whereas each is dependent on the other. Weapons without courage are

Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs

General Joffre

ineffective, but so also are the bravest troops without sufficient weapons to protect them and their morale."

In addition, Hart wrote, "In the years preceding the war, too, a sharp division of thought had arisen which did not make for combined action. Worse still, the new French philosophy of war, by its preoccupation with the moral element, had become more and more separated from the inseparable material factors. Abundance of will cannot compensate a definite inferiority of weapons, and the second factor, once realized, inevitably reacts on the first." This traditional fighting technology coupled with will and discipline would demonstrate more daring and honor, thereby restoring French prestige and international credibility. This idea was surely needed in order to restore French honor on the world stage after its humiliating defeat in 1871. However, its implementation led to reckless tactical risks, handicapping France's ability to meet the emerging German threat.

Short War Mentality

An element missing from Plan XVII was a consideration for the second and third order effects of the counter-offensive phase of the plan. It was a counterattack that needed somewhere to go.

"Unlike the Schlieffen Plan, Plan XVII contained no stated overall objective and no explicit schedule of operations," wrote Tuchman in *The Guns of August*. "It was not a plan of operations but a plan of deployment with directives for several possible lines of attack for each army, depending on circumstances. But without a given goal." The intent of the plan was in keeping with the idea of the cult of the offensive, which it did, but without a stated finish line to cross.

The general European expectation of war was based upon recent history: The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), Italian wars of unification (starts and stops between 1859 and 1871), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The common thread among these is that they were considered "short wars." This mentality is reflected in Plan XVII as it was not planned or resourced for long-term fighting.

"The first and most basic conclusion which France and Europe as a whole drew from these conflicts was that future wars would be short, with the first battles deciding the issue," wrote House. "The reasons for this 'short war' mentality are well known, and will only be summarized here: modern warfare has such great mobility and destructive capacity, and would in any event so dislocate society and industry, that anything other than a short war seemed impossible militarily and unthinkable socially."

This paradigm of short war thinking applied to both France and Germany. However, it affected France's ability to recognize Germany's Schlieffen Plan in that it was believed that: Germany would invade; its momentum would run out of energy; a vigorous counterattack would ensue; and based upon recent wars, it would

be over rather quickly. This expected invasion was war-gamed to take place through France's frontier fortresses between Belfort and Verdun. The reasoning for this location is that it recognized the inherent danger of infantry crossing open fields. It was reasoned that, "depressions and woods would enable the advancing units to approach to within one kilometer of the enemy without casualties and perhaps without detection," according to House. "To achieve this, the attacking units were expected to make use of all available cover and to infiltrate individuals across open areas, although this last technique was not to be used so often that it slowed the advance." This region provided those topographical elements.

With this understanding, an analysis of the France-German border dictated where

the frontier fortresses would be placed there by channeling German units at their most likely avenue of approach based on this maneuver paradigm. "To this end Plan XVII deployed five French armies along the frontier from Belfort in Alsace as far as Hirson, about a third of the way along the Franco-Belgian border," wrote Tuchman. "The remaining two-thirds of the Belgian frontier, from Hirson to the sea, was left undefended."

Coupled with this strategy, after conducting this terrain analysis, was the faulty notion that Germany would not use their reserve divisions for immediate action in the same way as regular divisions. The assumption that Germany was limited in its manpower capability further justified a direct attack as opposed to a major operation through Belgium which required

more soldiers. "The French hope was that an all-out attack on the main German forces could achieve a quick decision — partly because Joffre calculated that Germany would commit 20 divisions to the war against Russia in the east rather than the seven that they actually did," wrote James Joll and Gordon Martel in their book *The Origins of the First World War*.

Missing the Mark

As with any military, information about your adversary drives the operational planning process. The concept is to eliminate the fog of war and to stay one step ahead of the enemy's movements. Plan XVII had an annex to the operation order devoted to the intelligence assessment of German capabilities. This annex was completed based upon information

Map 1

Source: *The Great War* by James Mowbray, Air War College

gathered by its well-organized intelligence secret service agencies and coupled with information from France's allies.

When reviewing the annex, several questions about German capabilities and intentions were asked, and the answers are given to support the intent of Plan XVII, not contradict it. In other words, French intelligence estimates manipulated their information to cope with political necessity. "The intelligence annex to French War Plan XVII appears to have been lacking altogether or decidedly deficient in certain decisive elements that should have been considered of basic importance in the preliminary estimates of French GHQ prior to launching its armies into combat against the combined strength of the Central Powers," wrote James N. Caperton in his Command and General Staff School paper "Study of the Intelligence Annex to French War Plan No. XVII. Was It Sound and Adequate?"

While it appears some of the correct tactical and political questions were being asked, the answers lacked depth, flexibility, and acceptance of variations to what Joffre had envisioned for his plan. The key question that was not evaluated properly did ask if the Germans would deliberately violate Belgian neutrality. This notion was dismissed as being contrary to international honor and policy. However, the French were familiar with German policies of aggression, and this contributed significantly to the successful surprise of the Schlieffen Plan.

Even though Joffre expected the Germans to violate the corner of Belgium as they advanced across parts of Lorraine, he was given political guidance to not attempt any spoiling attacks himself through Belgium. Resigned to this restraint, he continued to maneuver his divisions anticipating the Germans would honor Belgian neutrality.

Joffre's hopeful thinking was bolstered by his assessment of German reserves and their quality of effectiveness. Stuck in the paradigm that Germany utilized their reserve forces in the same method as France, Joffre and the general staff gave little credence to reports of German reserve mobilization and troop movements. "But contrary to this pre-conception, the Germans had constituted 14 reserve corps, thanks to which they were able to mass in their right wind not eight corps, as we had expected, but actually 16 corps. The result was a genuine surprise, which, from the very beginning, placed our left wing in a glaring condition of inferiority," wrote Lawton J. Collins in his Command and General Staff School paper "Did the German Envelopment Maneuver Through Belgium in 1914 Surprise the French General Staff?"

Further, the quality of these troops was grossly underestimated. In 1921, Lieutenant Colonel Nuyten, General Staff, Belgian Army, published an article titled "The German Enveloping Maneuver of August 1914: Did it Surprise the French General Staff?" As the article relates to the knowledge of German reserve corps and their quality, he quotes from the "French Deputy Von Dome to General De Castelnau, and dating back to June 14, 1912: 'The Germans will not be able to concentrate, at the beginning of the mobilization, more than 23 to 25 corps at the most. We cannot admit that their reserves will be in line from the beginning of operations.'"

Nuyten continued using references to original documents to make his case of French estimates of German reserve quality. Collins wrote that "Nuyten also quotes the following from the information bulletin of the French Fourth Army, dated 26 August 1914: 'It is proper not to liken a reserve corps to an active corps; the reserve corps is, in reality, only a division intended to act separately.' These two quotations, one dating before the war and the other after the first encounters, would seem to be a fair indication that the French had not given serious consideration to the employment of German reserves units as front-line troops."

This brushing aside of the idea that the Germans would use their reserves on par with the regular troops continued to influence Joffre and the general staff even as intelligence reports were coming in reporting that the Germans intended to use them as such. Additional evidence of reserve troop integrations continued to be reported even after August 1914. It would take the loss at the Battle of the Frontiers to completely confirm to Joffre what had been reported to him in the weeks prior to the battle. With Joffre unwilling to flex his Plan XVII based on these reports, he allowed himself to be surprised by the Schlieffen Plan. He facilitated Germany's cult of the offensive and put himself on an unbalanced defensive, fighting the battles he did not want to plan for.

In August 1914, Germany executed the Schlieffen Plan — an offensive maneuver involving five armies sweeping in a counterclockwise motion through Belgium and into France with the final destination of Paris. This maneuver was designed to outflank the French and attack them from the rear, their most vulnerable position. In the final analysis, both Schlieffen and Plan XVII had conceptual errors and well as material and tactical errors. However, the Schlieffen Plan gained the initiative and carried the cult of the offensive.

War Plan XVII was originally envisioned to give more weight to the counteroffensive and was never really able to be executed according to Foch's and Joffre's original intentions. Numerous elements led to France not foreseeing the tactical inevitability of the Schlieffen Plan. No one element by itself was the cause of the tactical surprise but when the elements were combined, it can be concluded that Plan XVII needed an honest reassessment of its feasibility. This reassessment would surely have taken into account all the shortcomings and have been published as War Plan XVIII.

"The partial rehabilitation of Plan XVII and of offensive mindedness, and the argument that the French army was fundamentally sound in 1914, might rest on firmer ground if French Generals had demonstrated a greater degree of strategic sanity and tactical adaptability after 1914," wrote Douglas Porch in his October 1989 *Journal of Military History* article "The Marne and After: A Reappraisal of French Strategy in the First World War." "Alas, the French army's record, at least until the arrival of Petain as commander in chief in the summer of 1917, was far from brilliant in either category."

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A complete list of references is on file and available through *Infantry* Magazine.

How to Build Relationships in COIN Operations

1LT JARRIN JACKSON

Building relationships is the most important task in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations because it best achieves the strategic principle of securing the population. Although many counterinsurgents in Afghanistan know they must build relations with local Afghans, there is a lack of literature describing how to build those relationships. This omission of on-the-street, tactical writings may arise from the realization that many solutions are region-specific and do not travel well from one district to the next. In other words, there are no universal solutions to fighting an insurgency — just an unwavering principle of the need to "secure the population." The benefits and advantages of this mantra are easily understood, but an emphasis on the methodology of constructing intimate relations with locals will benefit the forces on the ground who want to engage in successful COIN operations. The purpose of this article is not to establish textbook solutions but to explain tactical solutions that demonstrate mission-focused methodology and constant area analysis.

During Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11 at Combat Outpost (COP) Sabari, Company D, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, achieved tactical success by making COIN conducive to the population. Leaders recognized that local Afghans did not interact with Soldiers because they feared violent retribution from insurgents; intimidation was the largest obstacle to building relationships. Although other units used phones to have private conversations with locals, officers at Sabari used private phone conversations to satisfy a major security concern for the local population. They identified insurgent intimidation as the major obstacle to building relationships and adapted their approaches to remove that obstacle.

The tactical solution resulted from a long process of trial and error. The first iteration of the process involved publicizing a

Soldiers with Company D, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, patrol alongside Afghan National Army soldiers in Sabari, Khowst Province, Afghanistan on 6 April 2010.

Photos by SGT Jeffrey Alexander

phone number for locals to call when they needed help. Public interactions, however, scared locals and invited insurgent violence. Phone numbers initially were written on scraps of paper and given to locals, but the Afghans feared that just reaching for a paper from coalition soldiers guaranteed insurgent violence. Next, contact information was dropped on the ground and around the corner of a house; the local was supposed to go around the corner and pick up the paper after our conversation. This method did not work because locals did not want to make the effort to retrieve the information.

For the final attempt, the Afghan National Army (ANA) helped American leaders design an "Afghan friendly" flyer that appealed to Sabaris. The flyer displayed a picture of the Afghanistan national flag, the seal of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the ANA's phone number, and a short message of unity. Coalition patrols tried to distribute the flyer

The author, who serves with Company D, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, interacts with local children while on patrol in Sabari, Khowst Province, Afghanistan on 7 April 2010.

during day patrols but were met with the same level of aversion as previous efforts. Leaders had believed that an Afghan friendly flyer would surely overcome the suspicions of the population, but its application still did not respect the primary concern of insurgent intimidation.

The solution came when Soldiers distributed the flyers during night patrols. There are several reasons why distributing the flyer at night worked as a tactical solution to build relationships with locals. First, insurgent intimidation decreased because night patrols disrupted their freedom of movement in the area. Locals complained that insurgents committed most of their crimes after sunset, so an increase in coalition night patrols made evening intimidation dangerous for insurgents. Second, a flyer was delivered to each house privately. When locals woke up and found a piece of paper inside their walls, they could look at the paper without fearing insurgent violence. And because no one witnessed the distribution at night, locals could look at the flyers, program the ANA's number into their phones, and read the message of unity. Lastly, the flyer worked because it was Afghan in origin; U.S. forces identified the need to publicize contact information, but Afghan designs made the flyer uniquely Afghan in its appeal.

Successful tactical solutions often produce a new set of challenges for counterinsurgents because they reveal more intimate problems which require a greater amount of attention to solve. After locals began to feel more comfortable interacting with GIRoA, the diversity of the locals' personal issues required more individualized solutions. Locals in one village wanted a well, whereas the next village had a well but wanted a school. Moreover, individuals had unique problems — one man wanted restitution for his destroyed crops, while his neighbor wanted a job in the bad economy. Successful COIN efforts led to more challenging problems that required individual solutions.

Although an increase in public interactions with locals made building relationships easier, with increased intimacy came increased responsibility. Relationships, though more easy to build, were time- and resource-consuming to maintain. Ignoring individual concerns would not only destroy newly formed relationships but would also create a deficit in which future relationship-building would be much more difficult. The tactical solution had to address individual concerns of the population and avoid ignoring locals. In short, COIN efforts had to impact every individual in the district.

In response to this new, increased responsibility, leaders in Sabari sought to give local Afghans individual attention. Their first approach used patrols to satisfy local concerns. Soldiers gathered information, asked questions, and gained familiarity with the locals. With the previously established relationships, locals were not afraid to speak with coalition soldiers in public. The difficulty of this approach was the logistic inability of a patrol of 20 American Soldiers to speak to every Afghan in a village of 400-500 villagers while maintaining security. Saturating the area with Soldiers was not possible and information gained from patrols did not fully catalogue the population's concerns, so the tactical solution needed to be refined. Building off the first approach, telephones were used in conjunction with patrolling in order to give the population more individualized attention. In what resembled a "quality assurance" telephone call of a commercial company, Soldiers called locals throughout the day to ask about their well-being. Afghans had never experienced the individualized attention of a quality assurance call; this effort seemed to succeed in gaining intimacy with locals. The limit to this tactical solution was a lack of telephones in some Afghan homes.

There were two important realizations that helped solve the problem of how to provide individualized attention for local Afghans. Ironically, the first and most important realization was that the coalition could not provide individualized attention to

every Afghan. The second realization was that the coalition could use local leaders to provide a greater degree of intimacy with the population. Empowering local leaders to represent the population reduced the coalition's need to gain intimacy with every local by decentralizing power to respected leaders. Local Afghans respected the elders of communities, but the majority of elders in Sabari did not interact with GIRoA. As a result, the elders' influence over the locals did not link the population with the government. Coalition leaders focused on gaining intimacy with local leaders because the inherent respect of the population made village elders an effective alternative to efforts at gaining intimacy with every local.

Although the tactical solutions revealed additional challenges for Soldiers, they also created opportunities for resourceful counterinsurgents. After coalition Soldiers gained greater intimacy with the population, locals became more receptive to ideas that continued to link the population with the government. The increase in both communication and trust made the ANA's phone number an "Afghan 911." Locals knew that help and security resided with the coalition and that they only had to call and ask for help in order to receive assistance. Secondly, patrols recommended that village elders begin weekly shuras (similar to town hall meetings) to improve local governance and strengthen the ties between GIRoA and the population. Lastly, improved relations set the conditions that allowed for more aid from the coalition to the locals. Soldiers gathered a higher quality of information from their daily patrols that legitimized localized COIN efforts; moreover, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) projects addressed the needs of the population and governmental initiatives, such as the Afghan local police (ALP) program, became viable options for local Afghans to defend themselves

against future insurgent violence. The combination of increased intimacy and mission-focused ideas strengthened the bond between the population and GIRoA, and as a by-product made significant strides to fight the insurgency in Sabari.

The population is not a weapon for the coalition to use against the insurgency, but strong relationships create an environment where the population acts as a weapon against the insurgency which benefits the government. Soldiers do not focus on defeating the insurgency because the strategic mission is to secure the population. Tactical solutions, therefore, seek to build a strong relationship between the government and the population. In Sabari, increased communication between the coalition and locals led to increased reporting against insurgent activity. Patrols were warned of emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs), impending attacks, and cached weapons. Voluntary turn-ins of illegal weapons and explosives also increased because of strong relations with the locals. On one occasion, locals from a house brought more than 200 meters of lamp cord — to be used as the command wire in an IED — to COP Sabari, gave the specific location of the device, pled their innocence, and apologized for its emplacement. Locals began to work with the coalition against the insurgency because the population recognized the long-term viability of COIN efforts. The strong link between locals and the coalition made the population the most efficient weapon against the insurgency.

These tactical solutions represent the lessons learned by D/3-187th Infantry throughout its deployment — which were developed by trial and error. The purpose is not to consider these tactics doctrine or approved solutions, but to observe the process of identifying existing problems against COIN efforts, brainstorming potential solutions, and implementing them as tactical solutions.

Furthermore, success may invite additional responsibilities. Solving one problem may reveal more important tasks for leaders to address, but it might also present them with unique opportunities to capitalize on and strengthen relations with locals. There is not a metric that signals sufficient knowledge of the area; leaders must trust their intuition and use local perceptions to guide the application of COIN tactics. Lastly, the population can be used as a weapon against the insurgency, but it must never be seen as a weapon. Strategic success does not occur from focusing on the enemy but from building long-lasting relations with locals.

A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment talks with a villager while on patrol with Afghan National Army soldiers in Sabari, Afghanistan on 13 April 2010.

1LT Jarrin Jackson has served as an Infantry platoon leader for 26 months (12 months in Khowst Province, Afghanistan) with Company D, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division.

WHERE THERE IS WATER, THERE IS LIFE

WATER COMPLEXITIES IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT

COL (RETIRED) MARTIN A. LEPPERT

The Challenge

Flying low and fast over the seemingly endless, barren landscape of southern Afghanistan never ceased to amaze me and sharpen my senses to search for the unexpected in the desert below. In a land so dry, so void of accessible or available water, I would often be amazed to spot the small, humble villages straddling a small green belt of land. "Another small miracle in this endless wasteland," I would tell myself. What is it that allows these hardy souls to scratch a living from the hot, arid land? In many cases it is the availability and accessibility of groundwater —water found in the myriad openings between the grains of sand and silt, between particles of clay, or even along the fractures in granite below the Earth's surface.

The traditional, rural people of Afghanistan's mountainous areas have mastered the art of taking water from the ground, giving life to their small farms, animal herds, and family members. The groundwater that these Afghans tap into is key to their survival. It is accessed through a series of underground tunnels known as a karez system (Figure 1). Where a karez's telltale hand-dug vertical shafts dot the landscape, a horizontal canal has been constructed underground to move water from a surface water table source (typically at the base of a mountain) to a village or agricultural field. These Afghans' ancestors would be able to recognize the karez method as the one tried and true process for collecting water used by them hundreds of years ago.

Unfortunately, in today's Afghanistan, the traditional karez system is failing because general drought and groundwater overdraft from thousands of modern pump wells are drawing down the water table.

Getting out into the villages brings a whole new reality to the plight of the average Afghan farmer and his family. His is truly a hard life best witnessed up close and personal. The actual daily struggle to get the appropriate amount of water to field, animal herd, and family is a never-ending task. Water is truly the number one key and essential basic need throughout the entire country of Afghanistan. This is true for rural areas as well as urban population centers such as Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Water resource management skills

Children from a village in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, wash their families' clothes in a local irrigation canal fed from a karez.
Author's photos

Figure 1— Sketch of a Karez System in the Unconfined Surface Aquifer

and the ability to assure water quality offer the counterinsurgency (COIN) warrior additional tools in his planning kit bag. If used correctly to develop water security, these could be key to success in the greater COIN "clear, hold, build, transition" strategy within a unit's area of interest/area of operation (AOI/AO).

Since my retirement from the military, I have continued to apply my experience in Afghanistan as a part of the Civil-Military Operations-Human Environment Interaction (CMO-HEI) team within the Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) in Alexandria, Va. The mission of the CMO-HEI team is to develop methodologies to examine and evaluate the interaction of humans (socio-economic/cultural/demographic) and environment (water, soil, land cover) to address and yield actionable information for decision makers and address civil-military operations (CMO) security and stability challenges specific to COIN operations.

Given the current situation in Afghanistan and the critical need for water infrastructure-related work, the CMO-HEI team has gravitated to looking at the relationship of water supply availability, accessibility, and quality to assist military planners in their COIN planning efforts. There is no doubt the team's work will have a direct and positive impact on the many facets within the military decision-making process (MDMP) and assist the staff and commander in making wise decisions regarding development efforts in his area of responsibility (AOR). The new reality for commanders and their staffs at all levels is that they can no longer solely focus on the friendly and enemy soldier situation. They must also devote a high proportion of planning time to the civil-military aspects of the operation, i.e. planning for and then carrying out operations that will have a direct and positive outcome for the local population. Water is the key to life in Afghanistan and other places of potential conflict in the world. As it is in short supply, any effort to provide or assure access and make water increasingly available for all required needs (human, agriculture, and industrial use) will have a positive impact on a given population in a unit's AO.

The Tools

I would advocate that the tools and structure for incorporating the water complexity methodology are already in place for commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers to properly develop CMO missions that would facilitate improved water resource management. Our current MDMP — along with a focused planning framework to include the use of areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) — provides the commander and staff an effective road map and framework to collect, organize, and analyze civil-military-related information. This framework facilitates the planning effort and can ultimately have a positive effect on the civilian population in the unit's AO. As leaders, we must now train ourselves, our staff officers, and our Soldiers to use these tools and overlay our current battlefield paradigm with a new way of thinking to properly plan and execute CMO-related missions with a focus on water supply, accessibility, availability, and quality.

The Application

The MDMP, in its various forms, is a tried, true, and tested decision-making methodology. It enables commanders and their staffs across all levels of our military to develop, evaluate, and make tactical and operational decisions to bring about a desired effect or outcome in full spectrum operations to include current COIN operations in Central Asia. According to FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, "During the MDMP process, effects are planned and identified to achieve objectives. Planning is fundamentally about integrating all actions within the operational environment in time, space, and purpose to create the desired effects to achieve the commander's objectives. As a precursor to execution, planners seek to promote unity of effort — to harmonize joint, combined, and interagency actions into an integrated, comprehensive plan to achieve desired effects."

Once a commander receives a mission from his higher headquarters, both he and the staff must quickly become familiar with the battlefield and all those various actors who reside within its boundaries. It is crucial that in this early mission analysis process the commander and staff begin to incorporate the CMO ASCOPE framework. Understanding this planning framework is crucial as Civil Affairs (CA) officers are not always readily available. However, if properly used, the framework will enable the commander and staff to better define the tactical and/or operational challenges they must solve to achieve mission success. FM 3-05.40 states, "The CA planners' civil considerations systems analysis identifies nodes and associated links for directed tasks to influence or change system behavior and capabilities to achieve desired objectives or effects. Understanding each system's ASCOPE characteristics and their interrelationships enables a holistic perspective of the operational environment. It also increases the

understanding of how individual actions on one element of the system can affect other interrelated system components."

Using the MDMP process as the tool and ASCOPE as a specific framework to analyze the area of operation during mission planning can have a very positive impact on a unit's operational success. Within the MDMP seven-step process, perhaps no single step is more important than to clearly understand the mission and to conduct a thorough mission analysis. It is within the detailed 17-step process of mission analysis that the current work of the CMO-HEI team is best applied to guide the staff. When the mission analysis process is broken into its sub-component steps (see Figure 2), one can gain a better appreciation as to how the precise points that the CMO-HEI groups' work can influence the planning process with regard to water infrastructure considerations.

For example, in Step 2 (conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB]), our CMO-HEI team's work on water complexity issues will assist the commander to better define the complete "battlefield environment" with respect to finite water resources and civilian water use. Moreover, it will better focus human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets to address challenges that the local population may face, such as water scarcity or accessibility challenges. It could lead the commander to meet and then to develop a close working relationship with the local mirab (water supervisor). The knowledge and insight gained by working with local water leaders such as the mirab could help delineate

| Step 1 — Analyze the higher headquarters' order |
| Step 2 — Conduct initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) |
| Step 3 — Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks |
| Step 4 — Review available assets |
| Step 5 — Determine constraints |
| Step 6 — Identify critical facts and assumptions |
| Step 7 — Conduct risk assessment |
| Step 8 — Determine initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) |
| Step 9 — Determine the initial reconnaissance annex |
| Step 10 — Plan use of available time |
| Step 11 — Write the restated mission |
| Step 12 — Conduct a mission analysis briefing |
| Step 13 — Approve the restated mission |
| Step 14 — Develop the initial commander's intent |
| Step 15 — Issue the commander's guidance |
| Step 16 — Issue a warning order |
| Step 17 — Review facts and assumptions |

Figure 2 — 17-Step Mission Analysis Process

a list of specified and implied tasks, such as conducting initial village visits to determine actual water challenges on the ground that could then be dealt with as an organized priority. The CMO-HEI teams list of water complexity questions can facilitate Step 6 (identifying critical facts and assumptions). The survey questions, when used to conduct village assessments, will provide ground truth, real-time data pertaining to water quantities, accessibility, and quality for a given AO, thus giving a staff a better view of the condition of an area based on its most critical and scarce resource — water. The use of "Buckeye" image data would help the staff develop a clear view of the seasonal differences in river flow as well as help determine previous agriculture patterns, further facilitating a more complete list of facts and assumptions regarding a given AO. Steps 8 and 9 (determine initial commander's critical information requirements and determine the initial reconnaissance annex) could both be supported by providing Soldiers and Marines with a focused water complexity questionnaire that would provide hard data that commanders could then use in developing their commander's intent and guidance and priority of effort once the plan was approved and ready to execute.

When used as a framework for CMO planning, ASCOPE planning guidance can effectively focus the commander and his staff in their efforts. The CMO-HEI team's work will have a valuable influence in focusing a command and staff team as they consider these various planning sectors. Political, economic, social and infrastructure considerations are already being impacted within the MDMP process as the CMO-HEI team prepares to support a large U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Kandahar Water Distribution Project in Regional Command South (RC South). The CMO-HEI team will develop and design a battery of survey questions focused on water demand and social issues. The survey effort will enable military and civilian planners to prioritize their water distribution master plan and ensure accessible, available, clean potable water to the local population, thus providing a direct service to the Afghan public which supports our current doctrine in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

U.S. forces travel down a typical road in rural Afghanistan. Getting out into the villages and the local population is critical to understanding the challenges they face and discovering how we may assist them. However, getting there can also be a challenge.

"Essential services provide those things needed to sustain life. Examples of these essential needs are food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Stabilizing a population requires meeting these needs. People pursue essential needs until they are met, at any cost and from any source. People support the source that meets their needs. If it is an insurgent source, the population is likely to support the insurgency. If the host nation government provides reliable essential services, the population is more likely to support it. Commanders therefore identify who provides essential services to each group within the population" (3-68, FM 3-24).

One of the keys to success in the IPB process is to, "describe the battlefield effects, including the evaluation of all aspects of the environment with which both sides must contend, to include terrain and any infrastructure and demographics in the area of operations" (FM 101-5, *The Military Decision-Making Process*). CMO planners, commanders, and staff are using ASCOPE to frame their view of their respective AO. However, we can still use the acronym OAKOCC (obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and cover and concealment) to help commanders and staffs to effectively view the battlefield and focus their planning efforts during IPB. We just have to be open to using it in a slightly modified way. Although considered directed more at the tactical terrain level, COIN operational planners can gain insight into their AO using OAKOCC, specifically with regard to key terrain. Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, defines key terrain as: "Some terrain features natural or man-made which if controlled will give a marked advantage to whoever controls them." In the current COIN environment, that key terrain may now be a large fresh water reservoir that supplies drinking water to a large urban area and or irrigates large tracts of crop land. It could be the work site for a large group of local contractors boring new water

"... the CMO-HEI work of focusing on water complexity-related issues must have a direct and decisive impact and influence on the MDMP process. Where water is scarce, there too is friction within a society. Where there is water, however, there is life, and I would argue, better potential for long-term stability."

wells to improve access to fresh water for a local population or it may be a series of check dams located along a mountain stream designed to slow runoff and reduce erosion and recharge local well aquifers. If a specific location is important to your effort to facilitate stability operations, it is just as important to the enemy to attempt to neutralize that key terrain by targeting it. Thus "key terrain" must be secured for the good of the local population in a given AOR. So, when a staff is working in a COIN environment, they must consider the infrastructure that will enable clean, accessible water to flow in the quantities necessary to sustain a given population; if not, the insurgents could potentially exploit the opportunity and gain an upper hand.

Clearly security is still the key to success, there can be no doubt. FM 3-24 is very explicit on this topic: "During any period of instability, people's primary interest is physical security for themselves and their families. When host nation forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This situation can feed support for an insurgency. When host nation forces provide physical security, people are more likely to support the government."

However, it is those well-planned and precisely executed civilian-military engagements with the local population that are critical and essential for gaining a deep understanding of both the water-related issues as well as other overarching social issues and challenges facing Afghanistan and other struggling countries. This tough yet necessary work, what I would advocate as the "main effort" for Afghanistan, provides opportunities to identify gaps and grievances related to the water sector; create local buy-in for water sector projects; facilitate water supply and sanitation data collection; and guide water sector decisions for security and stability operations.

Ultimately, our CMO-HEI work will enable commanders to triage a given AO and prioritize their finite resources yet maximize the impact for a specific population. Whether that is in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, on a small island in the Pacific Ocean, or in the Caribbean in a post-disaster operation, the CMO-HEI work of focusing on water complexity-related issues must have a direct and decisive impact and influence on the MDMP process. Where water is scarce, there too is friction within a society. Where there is water, however, there is life, and I would argue, better potential for long-term stability.

Photo by SSgt. Quinton Ross, USAF

An Afghan National Security Force member provides security while Afghan officials visit a dam project in Chesht-e Sharif, Afghanistan, in July 2010.

COL (Retired) Martin A. Leppert is currently working as a research fellow assigned to the Civil-Military Operations - Human Environment Interaction team with the Engineer Research and Development Center, Alexandria, Va. Prior to retirement, COL Leppert served as a brigade commander for an embedded training brigade in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, and upon his return home stood up the Afghan Agribusiness Development Mission within the National Guard.

USASOC Team Takes Top Hon[ors]

Best Competition

KRISTIN MOLINARO

The "super team" of SGM Walter Zajkowski and MSG Eric Turk won the 28th annual David E. Grange, Jr. Best Ranger Competition held 15-17 April at Fort Benning, Ga. At an awards ceremony on 18 April, Secretary of the Army John McHugh congratulated the finishing teams on their accomplishment.

"I can't begin to express how truly impressed I was," said McHugh. "It's truly a test of tactical, mental, and technical proficiencies and those are the tools that every successful Soldier, every successful leader, has to have on the battlefield."

Zajkowski, a 2007 Best Ranger Competition champion, and Turk, who won last year, are the first repeat winners in more than two decades. Both are from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, making it the command's third victory.

Turk is only the second competitor in BRC history to win the competition back to back. SGT Paul Scurka won in 1985 and 1986.

The second-place team of the 75th Ranger Regiment's SSG Charles Cogle and SPC Chris Broussard were in a tight battle with Zajkowski and Turk leading into the last day of the competition.

Cogle said finishing second, while an honor, is bittersweet; the pair is already planning another run at the title.

SFC Mason Riepe and SSG Raymond Santiago of the Ranger Training Brigade came in third but didn't go home empty-handed. Riepe and Santiago were awarded the Richard A. Leandri Award for being the top night orienteering team.

The CPT Russell B. Rippetoe Trophy went to 3rd Infantry Regiment's CPT Hunter Southerland and SGT Sean McAlpine, who finished first in both road marching events.

Of the 50 teams that began the competition before dawn Friday, 31 crossed the finish line Sunday afternoon.

The rigorous, 60-hour endurance challenge tests the mental toughness, tactical knowledge, and physical strength of the contestants, said COL John King, commander of the Ranger Training Brigade, which puts on the event.

In a departure from previous competitions, this year's events featured two road marches and two night orienteering events.

Of the seven years he's competed in Best Ranger Competition, Zajkowski said Friday's combination of events was the toughest "Day 1" he's experienced. Sixteen teams were eliminated the first day of competition and three more on the second.

Zajkowski said his strategy consisted of timing and opportunity. The team pulled ahead early heading into Friday's day orienteering but "we still knew we had to pull ourselves up into first place, couldn't let our guard down," he said.

The pair dominated most of the events and remained in tight contention heading into the final day. The team moved into first place following the second night's orienteering event and held on with enough points despite finishing seventh in the final buddy run.

ORS AT

A Best Ranger competitor takes part in a portion of the water confidence course during the last day of the competition.
Photos by Todd Hibbs

Above, SFC William Greenwood of the 75th Ranger Regiment climbs up a wall as part of the urban assault course during the first day of the competition. At left, 1LT Brett Latsha and CPT Zachary Seidel of the 25th Infantry Division pull a Skedco during the second day of the competition.

2011 BRC FINAL STANDINGS
1. SGM Walter Zajkowski and MSG Eric Turk
2. SPC Chris Broussard and SSG Charles Cogle
3. SSG Raymond Santiago and SFC Mason Riepe
4. SFC William Greenwood and SSG John Pasciak
5. Staff Sgt. Jason Santo and Sgt. John Isenberg
6. SFC David Boesch and SSG Thomas Payne
7. 1LT Thomas Goodman and SSG Bryan Achee*
7. SFC Jerry Higley and SFC Derek Wise*
9. MSG Jamie Newman and SFC Jonathon Biltz
10. CPT Nathan Lokker and SFC Conrad Kaluzny
11. MSG Robert Carter and SSG Thomas West
12. CPT Hunter Southerland and SGT Sean McAlpine
13. MAJ Edward Arntson and SFC John Rhoten
14. CPT Randal Waters and CPT Jonathan Norton
15. 1LT Nicholas Fender and 1LT Joshua Gorczynski
16. CPT Danial Strathman and SFC Robert Allen
17. CPT Zachary Seidel and 1LT Brett Latsha
18. CPT Timothy Cox and SSG David White
19. CPT Joshua Hunsucker and CPT Steven Ackerson
20. 1SG Joshua Pentz and SFC Russell O'Donnell
21. CPT George Rhynedance and 1LT Kevin Werner
22. SSG Kanaan Merriken and SSG Matthew Zosel
23. 1LT Benjamin Franklin and SGT Joshua Rolfes
24. SGT Peter Hartnett and SGT Christian Henry
25. CPT Michael Herbek and 1LT Travis Boudreau
26. SPC Jeffery Journeycake and SPC Cristobal Cruz
27. SFC Brett Graves and SFC Cedric King
28. CPT Nicholas Stavros and CPT Robert Mulkey
29. CPT Thang Tran and CPT Michael Luth
30. MAJ Aaron Bush and MAJ Reid Furman
31. CPT Steven Crowe and SFC Dustin Kirchofner
* Denotes a tie

2011 Best Ranger Competition winners SGM Walter Zajkowski and MSG Eric Turk cross the finish line of the final event of the competiion on 17 April.
Photo by John D. Helms

At the time this article was written, **Kristin Molinaro** was serving as the news editor for Fort Benning's post newspaper, *The Bayonet.*

ORGANIZING, MANNING, AND EQUIPPING THE IBCT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

LTC BRIAN K. FLOOD, MAJ JAMES A. HAYES, AND MAJ FORREST V. COOK

Editor's Note: *This article is the third part in a series about the Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron in full spectrum operations (FSO). The 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment (Airborne) (Reconnaissance), 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, participated in an FSO rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, La., in September 2010. Part I — Reconnaissance Squadron as the "Chief of Reconnaissance" and Part II — Tactical Observations on Full Spectrum Recon Operations appeared in the January-March 2011 issue of* Infantry.

Above, a gunner with the 5th Squadron, 73rd Calvary Regiment, readies the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System on his vehicle.

Photo by SGT Christopher Harper

The 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry's experience during its recent FSO rotation at JRTC and its observations during the train-up for that event identified some challenges in terms of organization, personnel, and equipment for the IBCT reconnaissance squadron. The rotation also identified new challenges as the squadron exercised forcible entry operations as part of FSO. Although the recommendations included in this article are always mindful of the forcible entry aspect of this particular brigade, the majority apply to the IBCT reconnaissance squadron design in general.

Organization Challenges and Recommendations

Unity of command for BCT reconnaissance assets and elements. During the JRTC rotation, the brigade elected to centralize all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron — designated as the "chief of reconnaissance." This method was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the brigade combat team's reconnaissance operations and its deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) employment to better answer the brigade commander's priority information requirements (PIR).

While that mission command method was effective, we (the squadron commander and staff) experienced some friction in integrating and directing attached ISR assets that came from the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) — mainly due to an underlap in those elements' understanding of squadron tactical standards of operation and the squadron commander's command style. By contrast, the Stryker BCT modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) organizes all BCT ISR assets (signal intelligence; unmanned aircraft systems [UAS]; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]) under the reconnaissance squadron in a surveillance troop with human intelligence personnel integrated directly into the squadron's organic reconnaissance troops. This type of organization, where the majority of the ISR assets are organized in garrison and during training, facilitates coordination, synchronization, and standardization of reconnaissance operations. This creates ISR unity of command in addition to temporal unity of effort during specified missions.

We recommend the continued centralization of all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron in the "chief of reconnaissance" role in order to achieve better unity of effort for BCT ISR assets. This mission command model should be incorporated into reconnaissance and security doctrine, particularly FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*; FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*; and FM 2-01, *ISR Synchronization*.

We further recommend that the Army re-examine the factors that led to assignment of ISR assets to the BSTB in the IBCT and HBCT designs, in stark contrast to the SBCT design's organization of ISR assets within the reconnaissance squadron. The forthcoming redesign of the BSTB into the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) also reinforces the requirement to relook the command structure of ISR assets in IBCTs and HBCTs.

Squadron-level mortars. The FSO experience at JRTC demonstrated the need for a responsive and reliable fire support capability at the squadron level, in addition to the capability resident at the troop level. The mounted troops are currently each authorized a troop mortar section equipped with two towed 120mm mortar systems, while the dismounted troop is authorized a mortar section equipped with two 60mm mortar systems. Unlike Infantry battalions (which have a four-gun platoon of towed 120mm mortars) or the legacy light armored cavalry squadron design (a six-gun battery of towed 105mm howitzers), the reconnaissance squadron retains no organic indirect fires capability at the squadron level. The squadron, as currently designed, depends on brigade assets acting in a direct support (DS) role — such as the

Photo courtesy of JRTC Operations Group

A mortar platoon at the squadron level would allow the commander to better reinforce and assign priorities of fire for internal assets and would provide a squadron-level, large-caliber indirect fire system to support the dismounted troop and the forward support company. It would also standardize 11C training across the organization.

field artillery (FA) battalion, attack aviation, and close air support — to provide any required fires assets beyond the capability of the troops' organic mortars.

By design in FSO, the reconnaissance squadron operates forward of the Infantry battalions across the brigade's entire area of operations to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). While the BCT may allocate fire support assets and supporting aircraft to reinforce the squadron, artillery assets can easily be redirected by the brigade and air assets, which are specifically subject to the effects of weather and other factors that decrease reliability and may hinder responsiveness. A mortar platoon at the squadron level would allow the commander to better reinforce and assign priorities of fire for internal assets; would provide a squadron-level, large-caliber indirect fire system to support the dismounted troop and the forward support company; and would standardize 11C MOS training across the organization. We recommend allocating a dedicated mortar platoon at the squadron level to give the commander the necessary flexibility to position fire support assets as needed based on the tactical situation while allowing the recon troops to maintain control of their troop-level mortars and eliminating the need to task troop-level fire support assets with squadron missions.

Manning Challenges and Recommendations

18-man mounted platoons. With the current reconnaissance squadron MTOE strength of 18 personnel (organized into six three-man crews), mounted recon platoons are severely limited and are challenged to conduct the most basic of reconnaissance tasks such as local security, dismounted observation posts (OPs), or clearance of intervisibility lines. The designed manning affects the duration of named area of interest (NAI) coverage with troop commanders electing to run with four-vehicle platoons instead of six as designed. We recommend immediate sourcing of the six additional personnel (per mounted platoon) authorized in the FY12 "R" series MTOE in order to enhance the capabilities of

the mounted platoon while adding a much needed dismounted capability.

Troop-level intelligence analyst. During the squadron's JRTC rotation, the absence of an intelligence analyst at the troop level, combined with the severely degraded nature of personnel familiar with company intelligence support team (CoIST) operations, was readily apparent to the squadron battle staff. A trained analyst at the troop level provides much needed support to the troop commander who often is conducting operations well forward of the squadron tactical operations center (TOC). This addition also benefits the squadron by providing bottom-up analysis and refinement to the squadron intelligence section. Analysts located forward with the recon troops would provide the capability to analyze and exploit time sensitive information and material collected by the troops' platoons. They would also be able to assist the troop command post in verifying reports and correcting errors prior to the reports being sent to the squadron headquarters. We recommend the addition of a troop-level intelligence analyst to each reconnaissance troop to improve analysis and understanding at the lower levels while allowing the squadron to better integrate and synchronize ISR assets with increased situational awareness.

All-source intelligence tech (MOS 350F). The squadron's role as chief of reconnaissance for the brigade creates a requirement for increased intelligence analysis capability at the squadron level. Similar to the initial MTOE for the reconnaissance squadron in the SBCT, the presence of an all-source intelligence warrant officer would provide a tremendous analysis tool for the squadron commander. We recommend adding an all-source intelligence technician to the squadron intelligence section to assist in analyzing the volume of information coming into the TOC in an FSO environment and to assist in the management of the multiple ISR assets provided in support of reconnaissance missions.

Staff engineer officer. Currently, there is no authorization for a dedicated staff engineer representative on the reconnaissance squadron staff. However, our experience at JRTC demonstrates there is a valid requirement for an engineer to assist in planning and executing reconnaissance and security operations. Our squadron was fortunate to receive an engineer officer to support our FSO rotation, and he proved to be invaluable. He assisted in obstacle and survivability position planning in support of screening operations during the defensive phase, provided recommendations for mobility efforts during the offensive phase, and participated as a subject matter expert in intelligence preparation of the battlefield for all phases. We recommend adding a dedicated engineer officer to the squadron staff to provide expertise in the planning and execution of mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability tasks. We also recommend reviewing the potential to add a third sapper platoon to the BCT in order to provide mobility and counter-mobility support to the squadron during reconnaissance and security operations.

Ranger-coded billets. The "G-series" MTOE provides no ranger-coded NCO billets in the squadron. All of the reconnaissance platoon leaders, both dismounted and mounted, are coded as ranger-qualified, but their subordinate platoon sergeants and section leaders are not identified as ranger-qualified by the

> "(Intelligence) analysts located forward with the recon troops would provide the capability to analyze and exploit time sensitive information and material collected by the troops' platoons. They would also be able to assist the troop command post in verifying reports and correcting errors prior to the reports being sent to the squadron headquarters."

MTOE. We feel this is a disservice to the NCO Corps and the BCT commander. Reconnaissance operations by their nature, particularly those performed in IBCTs, benefit from being led by ranger-qualified NCOs; in fact, NCOs in the scout platoons of the Infantry battalions hold ranger-coded billets on the MTOE. We recommend the Army apply the ranger-qualified designator ("V" in the case of an airborne-ranger billet) to the section leader and platoon sergeant billets within the reconnaissance troops.

Equipping Challenges and Recommendations

Improved command and control (C2) on-the-move (OTM) vehicle. The squadron's FSO rotation demonstrated the need for a C2 vehicle outfitted with a communication package that includes FM, satellite communications OTM, and Blue Force Tracker (BFT). These assets would enable control of squadron elements located forward throughout the brigade's area of operations. The squadron was unable to maintain a fully-capable mobile C2 element (tactical command post [TAC]) using MTOE vehicles and equipment while conducting operations in the offensive phase where squadron elements were spread over 110 square kilometers throughout the brigade's area of operations. The TAC personnel could not monitor the multiple required nets, maintain noise and light discipline, and effectively synchronize maneuver, intelligence, and fires while spread between three or four tactically positioned gun trucks. They also experienced challenges in viewing ISR feed. We recommend the development and addition of a C2 vehicle that is air-droppable and outfitted with a communications package and video downlink (VDL) capability designed to provide C2 forward in an expeditionary role prior to the establishment of the TOC during forcible entry operations and then subsequently positioned forward as required.

Improved long-range communications capability. The lack of mobile, beyond line-of-sight communications directly impacted the squadron's ability to command and control elements exceeding internal FM capabilities. Currently, the squadron is only authorized seven SATCOM radios: two in headquarters troop, five in the dismounted troop, and none allocated to the mounted troops. The authorized equipment consists of the radio systems without vehicle-mounting capability. To overcome this current lack of mobile SATCOM capability and mitigate the lack of SIPRnet connectivity below the squadron level during expeditionary (e.g. non-FOB) FSO, we recommend the procurement of the Harris RF-7800M-AD250 and AN/PRC-117G or similar systems with similar capabilities. This particular system is a vehicle-mounted, 50 watt, multi-band radio which enables both voice and mobile data communications. We recommend a distribution of two per platoon, two per troop headquarters, and five at the squadron headquarters — a total of 27 systems.

Troop and squadron-level One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) capability. The squadron and its reconnaissance troops have no organic capability, by MTOE, to view the full-motion video (FMV) of aerial ISR platforms such as UAVs and VDL-equipped fixed-wing aircraft. This deficit hinders situational awareness and the ability to manage ISR assets, particularly when the squadron is

employed as the BCT's chief of recon. The current IBCT MTOE provides this capability to only the military intelligence company. The OSRVT is used to receive ISR feeds, but it is bulky, heavy, and not ideal for use during forcible entry operations. OSRVTs also have a limited battery life, which requires a form of power generation to recharge the system. In addition, the current BCT MTOE lacks a system by which to broadcast organic ISR feeds across the SIPRnet to its subordinate elements. This inability to view and share ISR feeds across the BCT creates an unnecessary time delay and affects the squadron's situational awareness, the brigade's common operational picture, and inhibits ISR handoff to other units within the brigade.

To overcome this current shortfall within the squadron, we recommend one ISR viewing system (preferably lighter and more durable than the OSRVT) be authorized for each reconnaissance platoon and for each troop headquarters; this would allow the platoon leaders and troop commanders to view the feed of those aerial ISR assets that are operating in their immediate vicinity. We recommend an additional four systems be authorized for the squadron headquarters to provide the battle staff with the ability to view and manage multiple assets while maintaining the ability to establish both a TOC and a TAC. This allocation of 15 total OSRVT-like systems would enable platoons and troops to view both RQ-11 Raven and RQ-7 Shadow feeds while the squadron headquarters maintains the ability to feed up to four ISR systems into the network. For the squadron headquarters to achieve the ability to stream multiple ISR feeds across the SIPRnet, the headquarters also requires the acquisition of an internet protocol (IP) based media package such as vBrick Streaming Gateway and Office Communicator.

Forcible entry/FSO vehicle platform for the IBCT recon squadron. The current standard-issue forcible entry mounted platoon vehicle platform (the M1151/M1167 variant HMMWV) in the reconnaissance squadron is incompatible with the Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) and the Improved

Target Acquisition System (ITAS). The turret on both the HMMWV variants and the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle are not designed to accommodate the above mentioned systems without modification, which requires considerable investment of unit operational and maintenance funds. We recommend conducting a review of available forced entry reconnaissance platform options to ensure the selected vehicles can be moved by C-130, are compatible with modern surveillance and anti-armor systems, and provide sufficient force protection to the crew.

"Ultra" lightweight laser/target designator. Based on the nature of forcible entry operations in an FSO environment, there exists a need for a lightweight laser/target designator specifically for the dismounted troop of the reconnaissance squadron. The current system, the AN/PED-1 lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR), weighs approximately 35 pounds and is not suited for forced entry operations or for dismounted movements over extended distances. We recommend the addition of the AN/PEQ-1B ground laser target designator (GLTD II) or also known as special operations forces laser marker (SOFLAM) for the dismounted recon troop as the SOFLAM has all the capabilities of the LLDR with a total weight of 12 pounds.

Platoon-level UAS. The current reconnaissance squadron MTOE allows for one RQ-11 Raven per line troop, for a total of three systems. Considering the extended distances the reconnaissance squadron is expected to operate, with most operations being conducted at the platoon level and below, the current number of Ravens is insufficient to provide NAI coverage within the squadron's AO. We recommend increasing the Raven system authorization to provide UAS capability at the platoon level — for a total of 11 systems (one per recon troop and one per recon platoon) in the squadron. Note: along with any increase in UAS within the brigade, there will be a corresponding increased requirement for spectrum management and Army airspace command and control (A2C2) measures.

The authors recommend increasing the Raven system authorization to provide UAS capability at the platoon level.
Photo by SPC Michael J. MacLeod

Additional gun trucks (M1151 or like variant) for headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) and forward support company (FSC). The JRTC FSO rotation highlighted the requirement for additional gun trucks in order to secure the squadron TAC operating in forward areas. The FSC also has a requirement to self-secure the distribution platoon's resupply operations which will traverse long distances to reach mounted and dismounted troop trains.

Currently, the squadron is internally resourcing the TAC security vehicles — four gun trucks pulled from the mounted troops — to maximize reconnaissance units forward in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance. This is only possible at current manning levels since, as mentioned above, the troops typically man four vehicles (of six) per platoon in order to generate a dismounted capability. We recommend the HHT gun truck allocation be increased by an additional four trucks (the current MTOE authorizes gun trucks only for the squadron command and the S3) in order to provide a security element for the TAC. This will allow reconnaissance troop assets to remain focused on reconnaissance tasks. The personnel to man these trucks can continue to be an internal bill to the squadron.

The squadron is currently using other undermanned gun trucks to resource a security platform for the FSC. This is also possible only because of current recon platoon manning levels. However, manning the gun trucks and their resupply vehicles exceeds the manpower authorized for the reconnaissance squadron distribution platoon — which is the smallest distribution platoon in the BCT, despite having arguably the greatest distance to travel. We recommend that the FSC be outfitted with six gun trucks and authorized an additional 18 88M MOS personnel in order to self-secure FSC missions. These additional internal security platforms and personnel would allow the FSC the flexibility and freedom of maneuver to perform two simultaneous sustainment missions to different troop AOs.

Additional distribution platoon assets in the FSC. Sustainment operations identified the requirement for additional assets to support resupply operations. The FSC is currently not authorized the palletized loading systems/load handling systems (PLS/LHS) platforms, despite having the ammunition resupply mission. These platforms provide flexibility for ammunition transport, recovery platforms for vehicles and other equipment, and water resupply when using water blivets. The current MTOE only authorizes the use of light medium tactical vehicles/medium tactical vehicles (LMTV/MTVs), which have significantly less cargo space and cannot be used for recovery missions. We recommend authorizing two additional PLS/LHS with trailers for the recon squadron FSC.

Summary of MTOE Observations

Reconnaissance squadrons in an IBCT, while capable, are in need of additional organizational, manpower, and equipment modifications in order to realize their full potential. Organizing all of the IBCT's ISR assets under one headquarters would provide unity of command in addition to the unity of effort achieved through the "chief of recon" employment technique. Providing the squadron with additional ground reconnaissance personnel, intelligence analysts, and an engineer subject matter expert would increase the capability of the squadron and troop command posts to support the subordinate elements' reconnaissance efforts. Equipping the squadron with additional C2, communications, intelligence, force protection, fires, and fires support capabilities

Photo by SSG James Selesnick

Equipping the squadron with additional C2, communications, intelligence, force protection, fires, and fires support capabilities greatly enhances its ability to act as the BCT commander's "eyes and ears" for the reconnaissance, security, and deep targeting functions inherent to FSO.

greatly enhances its ability to act as the BCT commander's "eyes and ears" for the reconnaissance, security, and deep targeting functions inherent to all FSO.

Conclusion

The Army, particularly the units assigned to the ARFORGEN Contingency Expeditionary Force pool, is renewing its emphasis on FSO — which includes offensive, defensive and stability missions conducted simultaneously across the BCT's operational environment. The experience of 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division and 5-73 Cavalry ("Panther Recon") during the recent FSO rotation at JRTC highlights particular operational methods, tactical observations, and MTOE challenges that inform the ongoing discussion concerning FSO. While the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by 5-73 Cavalry at JRTC may not fit every FSO scenario, they should serve as a start point for consideration as units train for FSO and the institutional Army revises its doctrine.

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MAJ James A. Hayes is currently the operations officer of 5-73rd Cavalry; he was the squadron's executive officer during the unit's FSO rotation. He received a bachelor's degree from Pacific Lutheran University and a master's from Webster University. He has served in various command and staff positions to include serving as battalion operations officer and executive officer for 2nd Battalion, 358th Armor, Fort Lewis, Wash.; and as commander of C Troop, 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Lewis.

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TRAINING AN INFANTRY OSUT BATTALION 'HOW TO TRAIN'

LTC LANCE OSKEY

I assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment, an Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) battalion at Fort Benning, Ga., on 26 May 2010. I previously served as the chief of training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. Additionally, I have had the privilege to be part of high performing, training-focused units with commanders throughout the chain of command who served as role models and taught how to train. Using these recent and previous experiences, I had strong ideas and influences on how to train initial entry training (IET) Soldiers. It was my intent to bring all of the best practices from my operational units to my assignment commanding a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) OSUT battalion.

What Does "Right" Look Like?

Establishing the climate for innovative, realistic training through the publishing of a standing battalion commander's training intent

As with most commanders, I had my training philosophy completed prior to assuming command. Fortunately, I inherited a battalion that already had a strong training ethic that emphasized many of the same training traits that were present in my philosophy. I distributed my training philosophy to the entire cadre at my in-brief and then reinforced this training philosophy at every opportunity. Figure 1 is my standing training intent that applies to all training events, especially formal program of instruction (POI) training. The format is deliberately structured similar to a commander's intent that would accompany a tactical operation order (OPORD) as all NCOs and officers are familiar with the importance and necessity to understand the commander's intent in a tactical environment. This intent serves the same function in this training environment.

Why Not Simply Restate Army Training Doctrine?

Battalion Commander's Training Intent

Mission: To transform civilians into agile and adaptive Infantrymen who possess both Infantry skills and Army values and are ready to join a fire team in combat.

COMMANDERS INTENT ON TRAINING
Expanded purpose: Training needs to be presented, checked, applied, and assessed in a manner which pushes all Soldiers to learn at the highest levels so we truly create agile and adaptive Soldiers
Key tasks:
- Define the OUTCOME (broad, holistic statement that describes what the Soldier should be able to accomplish and describes the Soldier's behavior and values upon completion of the training)
- Plan and execute this training with the outcome in mind
- Explain the overarching principles that govern the training
- Emplace the conditions so that a learning environment is present
- Implement a gradual increase of stress as the Soldier's proficiency improves
- Ensure the task remains relevant in the context of actual combat - full spectrum operations
- Challenge the Soldiers to solve the tactical problem, increase the difficulty of the problem over time, add tasks to the problem over time
- Ensure the task standard is met by coaching, teaching, mentoring the Soldier as he solves the tactical problem
- Dictate the Soldier's reactions by varying the scenario and the environment, not through the drill sergeant's correction
- Simultaneously train the intangibles (behaviors)
- Assess the training based on the OUTCOMES desired, not just the single task to be trained
- The commander trains his unit (vs. external agencies)
- Commanders will utilize the eight-step training model

End state:
- Tasks/Conditions/Standards: All tasks are trained to standard, but trained in a manner that will be applied in a combat/deployed environment … Soldiers are better trained
- Learning: Soldiers will have learned and retained the tasks at higher rates because they were forced to think, solve problems, and apply their knowledge … Soldiers will truly be both agile and adaptive
- Intangibles: Soldiers behaviors (Army Values, Soldiers Creed) will be deliberately addressed in the training, not just in classroom instruction and lectures … Soldier behavior will be trained simultaneous with task training
- Assessment: All assessments will focus on the outcome, and the assessment details will be generally known in advance… Both trainers and Soldiers will be focused on what training is important because they know they will be soon tested accordingly

Figure 1 — Battalion Commander's Training Intent

The battalion training intent is more than just FM 7-0's principles of training

Although informed by the principles of training, my training intent is fashioned to serve as more than just a statement of what training should generally embody. My intent provides standing guidance on how to establish a training environment that truly fosters learning, empowers the trainer, and specifically focuses on all aspects of the training equation (tasks, stress, cadre and Soldier roles, and learning environment.)

One of the unintended consequences of an Army that has necessarily been solely focused on deployment cycles is that basic training management skills by company commanders, first sergeants, and NCOs have greatly diminished. The recently published FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*, does a good job emphasizing the key tenants of training management and when paired with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Army

- **Acceptance and willingness to live by the Army Values**
- **Teamwork**
- **Discipline**
- **Self confidence**
- **Ability to recognize and solve problems appropriate to his circumstances and level of responsibility**
- **Ability to work under stress**
- **Proficiency in key basic tasks (see next slide)**
- **Feeling at graduation that he has been challenged and treated correctly**

Figure 2 — Infantry OSUT Outcomes

Learning Concept 2015, these documents help frame the training environment. However, a gap still exists when putting these training tenets into action in a realistic (often resource-constrained) environment. Nevertheless, true learning will only occur when that principle is demonstrated and applied by the learner — in this case the company leadership and cadre. I also contend that the Army is still too narrowly focused on singular task competencies (which are relatively easy to train and assess) versus applying tasks in realistic tactical context (which are more difficult to train and assess). Significantly, the published outcomes for a graduate of Infantry OSUT include not only the tangible tactical and technical tasks, but also intangible outcomes that describe the values and behaviors that a graduate should display (see Figure 2). It is my strong belief that building both tangible task competencies and intangible behaviors is critical to the overall OSUT mission.

Showing What 'Right' Looks Like
Teaching my training intent

I knew that simply handing out my training intent on a PowerPoint slide was not sufficient to affect change within the battalion. My intent was designed in part to counter the tendency in TRADOC that left unchecked can lead to a narrow training focus on rigidly executing a micro-managed, step-by-step training philosophy where the individual task is completed out of the tactical context of its combat setting and the emphasis is on training throughput versus true training proficiency. Also common in basic training units, the source of stress for the task is too often the drill sergeants' pressure on the Soldier to complete the task, instead of the stress created by adjusting the task through varying the conditions. In order to train the cadre of each company, I execute a half-day battalion training program during each company's cycle break to illustrate an example of a training event accomplished IAW my intent (see Figure 3). The first event is a PT event where I relate the difference between a tangible task (complete a PT event)

and the various intangible training end states (or outcomes) that include teamwork, confidence, and accountability. I also use this session to check on the personal fitness of the cadre.

The next event is a tactical scenario where each of the cadre becomes members of a squad and fully participates in the training event. I use these scenarios to demonstrate how my training intent should look on the ground. I have purposefully varied the scenarios from cycle to cycle but have used clearing an urban area, conducting a reconnaissance, conducting a fire team live fire, and completing a stress-shoot as the training event. In each of these battalion internally resourced events (I have used paintball guns for the live-fire events), I ensure that there are realistic training enablers with each of these lanes so that the training conditions, task combinations, and training realism serve as the source of stress for the cadre squad. I also explain that in order to plan and execute this training, it requires me and my S3 shop to apply the same training methodology (eight-step training model) as I require of my company commanders. For example, one of the scenarios requires the cadre squad to treat a casualty. Since this is a squad of cadre, I ensure that the casualty is as realistic as possible — a fellow Soldier with a moulage kit wound and with the role player rehearsed on his actions over time. Replacing a simple medical dummy that would be unresponsive to the actions of the cadre, this displays the realism that is important to replicating the conditions that I expect to see during cycle. Once complete, I then conduct an after action review (AAR) and short discussion that links the training events to my training intent. My desired end state for the day is that the company fully understands what my training intent looks like from the perspective of both Soldier in training and the cadre.

Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance
Reinforcing my training intent with the company commanders

To further ensure that the commanders understand and plan

Figure 3 — Examples of Events Used to Teach BN Training Intent

Cadre PT Event

INTENT: Conduct an event where the tasks (various PT related events) are used as a vehicle to train an unrelated training end state/outcome (Army Values).

CONCEPT:
- PT "scrambler" with various stations.
- Teams solve problems while executing the PT tasks.
- BN Cdr-led AAR facilitates the learning point, as the Warrior Ethos is the AAR focus.

END STATE: The cadre understands all training events should also be used to train intangible behavior.

Cadre Training Events

INTENT: Conduct an event where the tasks are used as a vehicle to train a related training end state/outcome.

CONCEPT (examples of cadre tactical missions):
- Buddy team "live fire" (paintball) with related tasks embedded. Additional tasks, target placement, round allocation, time constraints all designed to increase the complexity of the individual tasks and to stimulate learning.
- Squad tactical mission: clear urban area of enemy forces. Urban area included combatants and noncombatants, and include the need to treat a casualty, react to IED, and report information to higher.

END STATE: Cadre understands that training events should be designed such that the scenario creates the learning environment through increasing the stress not through the DS prompting/yelling. They should understand that stress comes from the complexity of the scenario.

At the completion of these events, the cadre understands through active learning how to implement my training guidance.

training IAW my intent, I created my weekly battalion training meeting slides to reflect a simple, yet consistent format that allows me to see if the commander's plan matches my expectations for that event (see Figure 4). The format is also deliberately designed around the eight-step training model to reinforce this best practice used in all units. At this same training meeting, I provide my training guidance on the major training events to remind the commanders what right looks like. I have the commanders brief their concepts at T+6 weeks but also have them re-brief the status of their concepts at T+2 to ensure that the necessary progress towards planning and resourcing their concepts is complete.

Small Changes Lead to Big Results

Training intent in action

The following are two examples of small but significant changes to the training program that can transform the training event from a generic, check-the-block training event that trains to the lowest common denominator to a training event that fully engages and challenges all of the Soldiers, and furthermore, truly trains the task in a more effective, realistic manner.

Land navigation: The OSUT POI provides for 27 hours of training on land navigation and culminates with a standard 3/5 point GO/NO GO training requirement.


Photo by Sue Ulibarri

A drill sergeant with the 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment directs a Soldier during phase testing at their company training area on Fort Benning on 25 February 2011.

The training provides for the basic tasks required to pass the test (read a map, plot a point, shoot an azimuth), but the training methodology is focused on solely having all Soldiers culminate with a GO on this test. The worst case (and if left unchecked all too often realized) training scenario in land navigation is that the buddy team or fire team returns to the start point after five hours on the course with no correct points found. This training methodology does not embrace the concept of establishing a learning environment where the true outcome of the event is not whether the team is able to find three out of five points, but whether the team learns the critical skills of land navigation using every hour and every event as a learning opportunity. To realize this, I encourage the company commanders to actively shape this event to focus on the learning rather than focus on the final test. For example, drill sergeants are actively present on the land navigation course with the intent of finding and engaging Soldiers (even on test day) to help them learn this new task. Standard leading questions (where are you?) are followed by assistance if necessary. I encourage the companies to establish additional checkpoints along major terrain features manned by drill sergeants so that the Soldiers can get assistance and their progress can be checked. Some companies (acknowledging the challenge of not enough drill sergeants) have placed water points on the range with eight-digit grids on the water cans to provide another self-correction mechanism. Varying the time allotted on the course to give the Soldiers more time to find more points (instead of focusing on finding the minimum number of points) is another way to positively influence this event. Of course, the drill sergeants' attitudes toward this event must also be changed, encouraging these NCOs to actively (and not aggressively) seek the Soldiers and provide helpful information to aid the Soldiers' learning. Of note, none of these procedures required additional

Figure 4 — Sample Training Meeting Slide

resources to implement. The more likely case at the end of land navigation block of instruction is that more students will have received assistance in learning this task from their drill sergeants when they needed it most — on the land navigation course.

Buddy team live fire: The worst case training scenario for this event is that Soldiers bound from position to position based on the commands of their drill sergeant; engage targets without adherence to the skills they just learned in advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM); and they leave the training thankful to have completed one more event in the POI. In this event, similar small changes to the event can result in increased learning of the tasks by the Soldiers. Magazine allotment is one example. Instead of providing each Soldier with two 20-round magazines, provide the Soldiers with multiple magazines (at least four) and include dummy rounds that force the Soldier to apply immediate action. As this event occurs after ARM, all Soldiers should have the skills to apply these procedures. Additionally, require the Soldiers to communicate their magazine status when they reach for their final magazine. This trains on the intangible outcome of accountability in the Soldier. Too often, I witness Soldiers simply firing all of their magazines and then declaring "LOA." This obviously does not mimic the realities of combat where the tactical situation dictates the LOA, not the fact that a Soldier has expended all of his ammunition. Another example is the source of stress. For the average Soldier, applying all that he has learned in ARM with the added stress of movement to subsequent firing positions is adequate stress on the Soldier. If necessary, the lane can include pyrotechnics as well as (at the conclusion of the lane after the Soldiers' weapons have been cleared) the requirement to conduct a medical evacuation off of the lane or a requirement to recall the enemy composition similar to how they will help contribute to a debriefing report at the end of a combat mission. The drill sergeants yelling at the Soldiers to simply "hurry up," "get down," or "move now" not only introduces unnecessary stress, but also programs the Soldier to wait for and react to the drill sergeants' commands versus the requirement for the Soldiers to assess and make decisions based on the tactical situation. (Is the enemy present in his sector, has the enemy been destroyed, does the team have ammunition to continue the movement, has the team reached their tactical objective?) Lastly, the cadre can increase the realism by pasting realistic targets on the targetry to include civilians on the battlefield. These small changes result in the Soldiers applying the same skills, but in a tactical scenario that is more similar to combat and requires more thinking, individual accountability for actions, and problem solving.

What Gets Checked Gets Done
Battalion-level assessment of the training

Of course, my command sergeant major (CSM William R. Jones) and I reinforce the training intent as we conduct our battlefield circulation, but the final opportunity to formally assess if the company (both Soldiers in training and cadre) understands and has implemented my training intent is during my battalion end-of-cycle (EoC) assessment. Similar to my pre-fill training, my EoC assessment consists of four events.

* Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test: This is to determine if the Soldiers are fit for combat, not merely able to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). The Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test has an established task, condition, and scoring standard as the Marines have implemented this combat-focused event for over a year. (I will transition to the Army Combat Fitness Test once that is available.)

* Tactical Lanes: This is to determine if the Soldiers and drill sergeants are able to apply all of their skills in a complex full-spectrum environment that includes clearing a portion of a village, applying first aid while under fire, and reacting to an improvised explosive device (IED). The drill sergeant is the team leader, so the Soldiers only have to focus on the tasks that the team leader designates.

* Soldier Board: This hands-on Soldier board has the Soldiers conduct land navigation to points on the ground, and at each point the Soldier executes a tactical task such as machine gun assembly or treat a casualty.

* Soldier Assessment: This is to gain a standard feedback mechanism on both the quality of training as well as the Soldiers' opinion of their drill sergeants (see Figure 5).

Upon the completion of all of these EoC events, I review the results of all of these assessment tools with the company chain of command. Additionally, the highest cumulative score from these tests earned my battalion "Top Company" banner for the company to affix to their guidon until the next EoC testing.

Lessons Learned
No one is "taking a knee" in an IET assignment

I have now executed more than 12 company cycles implanting this training methodology within the battalion. Highlighted below are key lessons learned. The bottom line is that the sum of these programs has resulted in the establishment of a training environment where company leadership does not feel limited by the POI but still trains all of the requirements of that document. Additionally, both Soldiers and cadre are better trained as a result of these initiatives.

Photo by John D. Helms

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment conduct urban operations training.

Questions:	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I am trained and prepared to join a fire team (or mortar section in combat upon graduation	0%	0%	4%	63%	33%
2. I am personally prepared to engage the enemy in combat	0%	0%	6%	31%	63%
3. I believe and live the Army Values while in uniform/ on duty	0%	0%	0%	22%	78%
4. I feel that the training was "dumbed down" so that all could succeed, which did not allow the top 20% of the platoon to advance to more challenging training	0%	13%	19%	41%	28%
5. I am physically trained and prepared for the rigors of daily combat patrols (mountain terrain, urban patrolling)	0%	0%	17%	56%	28%
6. I have been treated with dignity and respect	0%	7%	19%	50%	24%
7. I can effectively engage the enemy with my M4 assault rifle while under fire	0%	0%	4%	26%	70%
8. I can effectively engage the enemy and non-compliant civilians using the combatives training	0%	2%	13%	54%	31%
9. I will live the Army Values while out of uniform/off duty	0%	0%	4%	30%	67%
10. I can provide effective medical aid to my fellow Soldier in combat	0%	0%	6%	48%	46%
11. I believe that team (squad/platoon) success is more important than individual success	0%	0%	9%	30%	61%
12. I can apply the training I learned here to different, more complex situations. (You can move under fire on the range; can you move under fire on the streets of Kabul?)	0%	2%	11%	56%	31%
13. I have been personally challenge and feel a real sense of accomplishments in completing my training	0%	7%	13%	37%	43%
14. I have more discipline now than when I joined	2%	6%	19%	30%	44%
15. I am proud to be a U.S. Army Infantryman	0%	0%	4%	7%	89%
16. The Soldiers Creed now is more than a statement, it represents who I am and how I conduct myself	0%	0%	4%	33%	63%
17. At some point I felt like quitting ... but now am glad that I stuck it out (if yes, explain why you didn't quit below)	44%	22%	13%	13%	7%
18. I feel prepared for my next military assignment/ military school	0%	0%	7%	33%	59%

Figure 5 — Sample Soldier Survey

-The training focus and hard work in emplacing the philosophy is worth the effort — but it is a lot of work and requires a willingness to accept deviations in training approaches. Although I have standardized some of the best practices across the battalion (one company established a company land navigation site in our local training area which is now the battalion local land navigation site. Other companies have established robust concurrent training tool kits which now have resulted in battalion-wide implementation), I allow and encourage each company team leadership to approach the training in a way that matches his Soldiers' abilities, his drill sergeants' capabilities, and the training calendar — as long as it meets my overall training intent. At times, this can be slightly frustrating, but I have chosen to emphasize a standardization of the outcomes, not a standardization of the way to achieve those outcomes.

- Battalion assessment provides measurable metrics to help inform and improve training. The 360-degree feedback from the EoC assessment captures insights into the company that otherwise simply are not provided. During my EoC counseling with the commanders, I review all of this material and expect them to adjust their training approaches accordingly. In this process, I enforce accountability by the company commander for the results of his cycle, not merely contentment in graduating Soldiers to the minimum standard.

- The S3 shop incurs additional work to plan/ resource/execute the pre-fill and EoC training. None of us have robust S3 shops, and they are responsible for this training. To ensure this training does not waste the time of the companies, I conduct my own eight-step training model to ensure the training is planned and resourced so I am able to meet my training end state with each company. Often, the S3 shop will task other staff sections or other companies to assist in the execution of these tasks.

- Command group emphasis and participation is critical to the overall success of these programs. With six companies in the battalion and Fort Benning executing a company fill plan, I often find myself attending either a pre-fill or EoC event. However, I believe that these events are critical components to the battalion's training methodology. In particular, I view my time during the pre-fill training events as my personal investment in leader training within the battalion.

- A support chain of command is necessary to allow this training methodology to succeed. The 192nd Infantry Brigade command group and staff support all of my battalion and company training initiatives. This overt support of this aggressive training methodology is very helpful in fostering a positive command climate and empowerment down to the company level.

- Lastly, and perhaps counterintuitive to this article, cadre balance must be weighed. In order to meet the training intent outlined in this article, all members of the company cadre must use all available time to plan, execute, and AAR their results. However, if at the end of a two-year tour as a drill sergeant, an NCO that I have provided back to the operating force is unable to immediately resume his role as a leader, then I view that as a failure equal to providing the operating force with Infantry Soldiers who are unable to accomplish their mission. I have published a battalion cadre resiliency policy letter that specifies actions on how the company and battalion must balance the requirements of accomplishing the OSUT training mission with caring for the cadre. I spot check adherence with the policy, and my CSM ensures that these procedures are followed.

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Training Notes

Training for Mission Command in FSO:
THE 4E FRAMEWORK

MAJ MATT DENNIS AND COL TOM GUTHRIE

The current Army training doctrine is in a state of transformation. At its roots lies the legacy of systematic deconstruction of collective tasks down to individual Soldier actions devised by GEN William Depuy as the first U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander. His model served us well. It was purposely built to optimize superior weapons against a known threat, using known tactics and equipment on largely known European terrain. The system that resulted from his training model was showcased in the 1991 Gulf War and validated by overwhelming success. The geo-political landscape of the world began to change after the collapse of the Soviet Union and has since become more fragmented and complex with regard to determining threat. Our military — optimized to meet a large, peer-competitor army — would have to change.

After more than 10 years of war against an adaptive enemy, our training doctrine is beginning to catch up to the reality of the current complex environment. The term "learning organization" is used frequently to describe how our units must behave. Too often, this term is used without acknowledging that it is a proper name for a well-defined concept comprised of five disciplines that was developed by Peter Senge.

Nonetheless, our doctrine is beginning to capture the essence of Senge's concept. (Though it would be easier to package the concept as defined by Senge and teach it to all officers as part of their basic course.) The result is a blend of old and new thoughts that creates a cognitive dissonance for practitioners and relies on a laundry list of principles that is hard to remember and, in some cases, cliché.

The description of the requirement is clear in FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations* (FSO). It states, "They [units] employ synchronized action — lethal and nonlethal — proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment." Mission command, it says, is how leaders will convey understanding of the environment and adapt as required. Later, mission command is defined as, "…the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable initiative within the commander's intent and to empower agile and

Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division meet at a rally point during an exercise at the Nevada Test and Training Range on 18 November 2009.
Photo by TSgt. Michael R. Holzworth, USAF

adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations." For a commander to effectively employ mission command, he must have a developed and cohesive unit that understands his intent and is comfortable making decisions in the absence of orders. FM 7-0 reinforces this idea by stating, "Training assists Soldiers and leaders in developing mutual trust through a shared understanding of the units' strengths and weaknesses."

Chapter 2 of FM 7-0 is where the cognitive dissonance begins. Most readers with combat experience from the last 10 years will understand the picture being painted in chapter 1. The discussion in paragraph 2-2, however, is reminiscent of the assembly line process of old: "Commanders select the few tasks their units will train…" These few tasks are compiled into the mission-essential task list (METL). Clear descriptions of these tasks are found in the Army Universal Task List (FM 7-15) and then broken down into sub-tasks all the way down to the individual level. Evaluations for successful completion of the tasks are in checklist form and therefore encourage Soldiers and leaders to learn the checklist in order to get a favorable "go" for the task.

The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Soldier Training Publication (STP) manuals are valuable for a stepping stone approach to training but have limited utility in training evaluations. Army training and education is theoretically rooted in Blooms Taxonomy of educational goals. At the lowest level is the psychomotor domain. This, as the name implies, is about learning physical, motor skill-based tasks. In this domain, we learn safe handling and physical manipulation of our equipment. Soldier skill manuals and ARTEP manuals are good tools for the basic psychomotor level training required to establish a foundation, but we must get beyond the psychomotor domain in order to achieve adaptability. The next level is the cognitive domain. At this level we begin to understand how our equipment works, why we perform tasks, and recognize the conditions in which a particular task may be appropriate. Dialogue and discussion are required for this level of understanding and must be encouraged in our training. Last is the affective domain, also called synthesis. In this domain, we are able to combine information from our knowledge of tasks, the surrounding environment, differing perspectives, and our experience to create new knowledge. This is where improvisation and adaptation are born. This is where we are trying to get our units, but following the checklist won't get you there.

As mentioned above, FM 7-0 identifies 11 training principles. While these principles make sense when reading the manual as a text, they are hard to remember offhand and therefore may be less useful in guiding a leader to the true goal of training — adaptive units capable of mission command in combat. Perhaps a simpler set of principles are in order; one that is easy to remember and guides leaders to develop learning organizations.

We propose units focus training based on creating understanding in four categories, the 4Es — **equipment**, **each other**, the **environment**, and desired **end state**. These categories are consistent with the 11 principles found in FM 7-0. The 4Es, allow a leader to "chunk" the 11 principles into easy-to-recall categories. Finally, the 4Es are intended to help bridge all three of Bloom's domains in a relatively seamless and transparent fashion. Regardless of whether the unit is an Infantry squad, artillery platoon or plans shop in a corps headquarters, training should be focused on understanding these:

Equipment. Equipment is simply "stuff" that allows us to reach solutions more easily. We should not be confused and believe that equipment is the solution, however. No amount of skill on the use of equipment can substitute for understanding the problem at hand. That said, in an environment where innovation and adaptability are required, it is paramount that we master the tools we use. Mastery begins with training on the basics by blending psychomotor and cognitive goals. Full knowledge of our equipment includes knowing how and why it functions, gaining proficiency in its physical manipulation, and knowing its capabilities and limitations. Understanding equipment should span all three learning domains over time and with increased experience. Armed with this knowledge, a Soldier can masterfully employ his equipment for its intended purpose as well as improvise when conditions are appropriate. Once basic understanding is reached, Soldiers should be encouraged to improvise and be presented with problems that allow them to develop these skills along with the confidence to do so.

Each Other. The foundation of our units is our small teams. Each small team is made up of individuals who come from varied backgrounds and experiences. More often than not, in FSO, it is our life experience and/or expertise outside of traditional military training that leads us to understanding and problem solving. Training should encourage the implementation of these skills as well as skills related to military doctrine to arrive at acceptable solutions to training problems (even if they aren't the 'ARTEP answer'). Just as we strive for full knowledge of our equipment, full knowledge of the capabilities resident in each other also expands the range of possible solutions to any given problem. As teams realize the capabilities each of their members have, they become closer and form bonds. These teams establish standards that all members acknowledge. The pride and ownership that result mean that training to the lowest common denominator is no longer tolerated. The team pulls together to ensure that each member meets the collective expectations of each other. Leaders hold small teams accountable. At the collective level, teams of teams cooperate to achieve the unit mission. The cohesiveness and esprit de corps found in these small teams, and teams of teams, make them a formidable fighting force, infinitely stronger and more resilient than the sum of the individuals. Each shared hardship and challenge makes the team stronger.

Environment. We must understand the environment we are operating in if we are to be successful in the end. METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations) is a good tool for initially understanding the physical environment, but we need to have a deeper understanding. What are the effects of each of the components of METT-TC relative to our opponents? If operating in a counterinsurgency environment, what is the population's opinion of us? How will they perceive our actions? Leaders need to ensure collective understanding of the environment prior to a mission. Decisions made during the mission should account for environmental impact, and the leader should be able to articulate why. Cultural and atmospheric ignorance is unacceptable. Subordinates should be encouraged to provide observations to the leader during the mission when appropriate. Leaders must be

Paratroopers with the 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade sprint from building to building under simulated enemy fire during a training exercise at Fort Polk, La.

During the course of a mission, leaders must evaluate their environment and always ask themselves if accomplishing the mission, as directed, will contribute to the end state. Cases may exist where a leader makes minor modifications to assigned tasks. Other cases may exist where it becomes apparent that accomplishing a particular mission is actually detrimental to the commander's end state due to a change in the environment or a bad assumption. If leaders are unable to report and obtain a decision, they must have the confidence to make the appropriate decision on their own (abort criteria for missions is a useful planning tool, but will not account for unforeseen circumstances). Mission command must be practiced in training if we are to successfully employ it in combat. For a given unit with subordinate elements, functional responsibilities may be different, but the overall end state is the same. Having all sub-units contributing to the overall movement of the unit towards the end state is captured by the term "alignment" by Senge. Alignment is a prerequisite for mission command. Without alignment, empowered and decentralized sub-units can drive in different directions. Alignment is the responsibility of the commander. Achieving alignment in the training environment will condition the teamwork and unity of effort required for successful combat operations.

Risk is present in everything we do. While planning and executing training, using the 4E construct or otherwise, we must address risk. Leaders should not take risk lightly in training situations, but the proper mind-set is required to avoid unintended consequences when mitigating risk. There is a fundamental difference in planning a safe training event and training in a way that creates safe execution. The ways we mitigate risk in training must not contradict how we execute in combat.

Focusing on the 4Es while planning and conducting training will help units build the trust and confidence required for execution of mission command in a combat environment when faced with ambiguous situations where tactical decisions can have strategic impact. Striving to incorporate psychomotor through affective domain goals in the training environment conditions Soldiers for the expectations of the combat environment. Commanders have to create the conditions for mission command. Ensuring the entire unit holds the same shared vision and that subordinates' actions are aligned enables an environment of trust where leaders are free to make decisions and all Soldiers take ownership of results.

empowered to recognize when their action or inaction can lead to an advantage, and be confident enough to make decisions accordingly. In the CONUS training environment, leaders must be encouraged to make decisions and allowed to follow through with them. Using the resources of the installation, adjacent units, and the community (where legal and applicable), small units and leaders should be encouraged to build relationships, network, collaborate, and be creative with training. This mirrors the creative environment deployed units thrive in, and we should replicate it in training. When planning training, we should use the same terminology we use while deployed. Knowing that we will have garrison obligations and school commitments, we should speak in terms of main effort, supporting effort, economy of force, etc. Training with these terms, used correctly, reinforces our doctrinal knowledge base. When a unit is designated as the main effort (green cycle in most units), why not replicate the deployed environment? Do we have the flexibility to replicate a day in combat while in garrison? Can we assign units tactical tasks in the form of missions to complete during the day, and allow them to figure out how maintenance, PT, and meals get worked in? Why not? With the proper mind-set and command climate, this is possible.

End state. Commanders are responsible for describing the end state to subordinates and assigning missions designed to accomplish this end state. This description is based on information available to the commander. This information may be incomplete and certainly may change in a dynamic environment. Feedback from subordinates and observations made by the commander is what allows modification. Dialogue, discussion, and direction must be understood and employed appropriately. Dialogue is the open exchange of information among all present. Discussion is aimed at making a decision and is normally driven by the leader. Finally, direction is the transmission of instructions after the decision is made. Adaptive units, through practice, must be comfortable with these forms of communication. Blindly following orders to accomplish a mission when factors become apparent to a subordinate leader that may change the situation is negligent. When conditions are clearly not consistent with assumptions used in planning, it is appropriate to re-enter dialogue. It is imperative that we understand the end state.

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MAJ Matt Dennis is a Field Artillery officer and has served in fire support positions from the troop to BCT level. He commanded B Battery, 5-3 FA (MLRS) in OIF I, and HHB, 17th FA Brigade in OIF 05-07. He has served as an operations officer in the Asymmetric Warfare Group and is currently serving as a plans officer in ISAF Joint Command in Kabul, Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Intermediate Level Education and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Students from the first class of Lion Leader Forge begin a patrol on 16 December 2010.
Photos by SPC Angel Washington

OPERATION LION LEADER FORGE:
2-7 CAV'S LEADER TRAINER MODEL FOR 2ND IA DIVISION

MAJ THOMAS SILLS

With the onset of Operation New Dawn last September, the focus of U.S. forces in Iraq shifted to an advisory mode. The days of U.S. troops leading or conducting unilateral operations were events of the past. The Department of State's Provincial Reconstruction Teams assumed the lead role in economic development and support to government institutions. One of the Army's newer tactical organizations, advise and assist brigades (AABs), began developing approaches to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In the Ninewa Province of Iraq, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment from the 4th AAB, 1st Cavalry Division, maximized on their partnership activities with the 2nd Iraqi Army (IA) Division by developing and executing Operation Lion Leader Forge.

The 2nd IA Division's area of operations includes the eastern half of Mosul and extends into the rural areas to the north, east, and south of the city. The division has a substantial portion of their combat power committed to static checkpoints, fixed-force protection sites and daily searches.

The division does not have the flexibility to shift units from operational assignments to conduct collective, complex exercises that enables the development of confident and experienced junior leaders.

Arriving in late September 2010, 2-7 Cavalry had 700 Soldiers spread across 11 positions (eight combined checkpoints, known as CCPs) and more than 6,000 square kilometers. The CCPs contain at least a U.S. platoon and combine with platoons from the ISF and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF). Simply manning these CCPs dramatically limits the battalion's ability to conduct additional advise, train, and assist (ATA) actions. At the CCPs, U.S. junior leaders mentor and train their ISF and KSF counterparts on individual and small unit tasks. Clearly, the unit met the commander's intent to capitalize on ATA opportunities. But, they chose to increase their partnership efforts by building a sustainable leader and instructor development program which they hope will lead to significant improvements within the echelon's of the 2nd IA Division. The major questions became how to create the training model, what tasks should

be conducted, and who would teach the material given the squadron's significant operational requirements.

Lion Leader Forge I

The Lion Leader Forge training model became the product of a collaborative effort between LTC Gerald Boston, 2-7 Cavalry commander, COL Frederick Choi, senior U.S. advisor on the 2nd IA Division's transition team, and the operations officer for the transition team. With input and concurrence from the 2nd IA Division, the three officers envisioned developing a light infantry combat leader's course that focused on traditional individual and small unit tactics. The modularity aspect of the course was one of many innovative approaches. The 2-7 Cavalry described this ability as "scalable and exportable." For example, Phase II is marksmanship training. At any point, an Iraqi instructor could take the teaching material in Phase II to produce a marksmanship class. The first Lion Leader cycle consisted of four phases and 22 training days. This initial iteration began on 1 December 2010 with 20 students.

The 2-7 Cavalry developed a mobile training team from one Infantry platoon to serve as primary instructors. During actual class instruction, there are occasional "under the shelter ranger school" sessions on whiteboards. Primarily, however, practical application learning approaches are used most frequently to teach Infantry concepts. Although 2-7 Cavalry teaches U.S. Army doctrine, instructors are quick to point out that they are showing the 2nd IA leaders a method, not necessarily the "absolute right" method.

The 2-7 Cavalry teaches and incorporates the U.S. Army's eight-step training model to plan and execute the patrols.

MAJ Timothy Gittins, 2-7 Cavalry's operations officer, said he believes in using the eight-step training model or the 10-step training model and that these models should be used to develop programs and influence partnered units.

"Even if they don't call it an eight-step training model, as long as they get the foundation of the model and plan ahead for the training," he said. "This is probably the biggest lesson. Anytime you sell the eight-step training model, you cannot go wrong."

To better assess themselves, the battalion conducts two after action reviews (AARs). The first AAR consists of U.S. personnel only. Then, the unit conducts an AAR with the entire group. Another innovative technique used by the squadron is the general climate of the training. Lion Leader Forge is more intense than typical short duration ATA training, which usually lasts less than a week and consists of six-hour training days. The 2-7 Cavalry lengthened the training days during phases I and II to eight hours (0800-1700) with remedial training after 1800.

When describing the key aspects of Lion Leader Forge, MAJ Gittins remarked, "I think the important take away is that it has Iraqi input. The Iraqis are going to change it to suit them. The modular, scalable, and exportable part of this program helps them to suit it for their needs."

He said the basic tasks are what U.S. forces have been teaching all along, but they are now just testing them on those tasks.


Figure 1 — The Eight-Step Training Model (This model is a template for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training.)

PLAN TRAINING

TRAIN AND CERTIFY LEADERS

RECON SITE

ISSUE PLAN

REHEARSE

EXECUTE

CONDUCT AAR

RETRAIN

"We are asking them to turn around and instruct the tasks," said MAJ Gittins, who added that this type of training has probably been conducted before. "But the concerted effort, based on our mission set alone and the amount of available 2-7 personnel, is requiring us to have the Iraqi promulgate the ability to instruct themselves. This is the sustainable piece that we are really trying to sell and pass on to other U.S. units conducting ATA with ISF formations."

During phase III, patrol classes incorporate many qualities found in the U.S. Army Ranger School and other small unit leadership courses. The students begin patrolling exercises within a combined security area (CSA) around 0600 and extend into the evening hours of limited visibility. They conduct two combat patrols within the CSAs every

24 hours (one day and one night). The patrols consist of simulated ambush and reconnaissance scenarios. Each student serves in at least one leadership position for one day and one night patrol. These positions include patrol leader, platoon sergeant, or squad leader. For many of these Jundi (Iraqi enlisted Soldiers), this training provides one of the few opportunities in their careers to execute a mission with little guidance or supervision. By the end of the week, the students overcome their initial mistakes and refine their ability to lead and train. The course has extra important benefits because the additional patrols help the residents of the CSA feel safer.

In phase IV, the Iraqis execute a simple, but effective, buddy team live-fire exercise. Essentially, the training event is a culminating exercise for the tasks covered during the previous weeks. Each trainee receives 60 rounds and one partner. They move through a simple range consisting of a few Hesco barriers and wooden walls. They cover each other's movements and engage targets that range from 50 to 200 meters. Because the exercise uses live ammunition, 2-7 Cavalry emplaces a series of risk mitigation measures. These measures include multiple dry-fire rehearsals and demonstrations. Additionally, the battalion places various safeties to oversee the range activities. The exercise has the additional benefit of demonstrating to the Iraqi trainers how to properly and safely develop a training range. Based on the AAR comments, the Iraqis welcomed the event and found it an effective training exercise.

Figure 2— Phases of Lion Leader Forge

Phase I – Individual skills (6 days)
 - Movement techniques
 - Movement formations/roles
 - First aid
 - React to contact/ambush

Phase II – Marksmanship (5 days)
 - Basic marksmanship techniques
 - Reflexive fire techniques

Phase III – Patrolling (6 days)
 - Day and night patrols
 - Execute an ambush
 - Execute a point reconnaissance

Phase IV – Buddy team live fire (4 days)
 - Maneuver thru dry/live-fire range
 - Safely establish live-fire range

Lion Leader Forge II

On 8 January 2011, 2-7 Cavalry began Operation Lion Leader Forge II. Unlike the previous course, U.S. instructors stepped aside to allow the Iraqis to be the primary instructors.

"I was paying attention and learned a lot from watching the U.S. troops when I was in the class last month," said IA CPL Husam Hussem. "Now, it is paying off as I teach my own class. I want to help make these IA leaders successful so they can do great things when (U.S. troops) leave here."

In all, 16 IA soldiers returned from the December course to serve as primary instructors for the new students. In fact, some of the Cavalry troopers found that the new students absorbed the knowledge better under the Iraqi tutelage rather than via U.S. demonstrators. The U.S. instructors transitioned to assistant instructors and observed actions to ensure that the Iraqi coaching remains consistent within basic standards. Other changes included the development of two additional phases. Phase V consisted of a junior officer course, and phase VI became an advance marksmanship qualification course.

Over four weeks, the candidates maneuver through a challenging course. They develop the foundation to instruct other members of their division, whether at their unit or subsequent Lion Leader Forge candidates. Clearly, this type of training has been executed in Iraq prior to 2010. However, the commendable achievement is that 2-7 Cavalry developed an initiative that not only improves

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>
> **— Iraqi Army CPL Husam Hussem**

the junior leadership within the 2nd IA but could lead to enduring improvements should the Iraqis choose to continue the training model. Had the battalion limited training activities to the CCPs and nearby division-level units, such as the 2nd IA Division Commando Battalion (located adjacent to the battalion at an Iraqi base), the battalion could easily argue that they made the most of their available Soldiers. Instead, 2-7 Cavalry asked how they could best improve formations with the 2nd IA Division's subordinate brigades.

Their answer was to create a targeted program that facilitated the development of cadre within those brigades. Complicating the matter is the fact that all U.S. forces must be out of Iraq by December 2011, and the squadron departs in the fall of 2011. Considering 2-7's operational and time challenges, Operation Lion Leader Forge is a commendable initiative that can lead to improvements within the 2nd IA and the entire Iraqi Army.

MAJ Thomas Sills served as a theater observer from the Center for Army Lessons Learned in support of 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from November 2010 to March 2011. His previous deployments include OIF I and OIF 06-08. He is an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) instructor with the U.S. Army Reserve and deputy sheriff with Mecklenburg County, NC.

MAJ Sills also wrote "Innovative Approaches: Highlights of 4/1 AAB's ATA Methods During the First 100 Days," which appeared in the May-June 2011 issue of *Armor*.

An Iraqi soldier teaches a class during Operation Lion Leader Forge II. The instructor had attended the first Lion Leader Forge class.

MANEUVER CAPTAINS COURSE INCORPORATES LEADERS DECISION EXERCISE

CPT DAN FALL

In March, selected students attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Ga., participated in the pilot of a dynamic new development for the instruction of Infantry and Armor captains — the leaders decision exercise (LDX). During the LDX, MCCC students execute a company-level operation order (OPORD) in a 3D virtual environment using the Army Program of Record (PoR) Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2). Because the MCCC's mission is to train captains in the art and science of combined arms mission command in full spectrum operations, a blended learning approach incorporating the LDX prepares them for the rigors of command in combat.

"This new element we've added to the MCCC allows us to give our captains more meaningful, comprehensive feedback on their performance in a blended learning environment," said LTC Louis Zeisman, director of the Maneuver Center of Excellence's (MCoE) Directorate of Training (DOT). "This means that when they leave here to go command companies, they will have at least seen complex combat situations and handled and commanded modern combined arms assets in the virtual world."

VBS2 is a simulation-based training engine designed by Bohemia Interactive Studio and is based around the "first-person shooter" video game model. The students are doing much more than just playing video games, however. The VBS2 system was initially designed in support of the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) to train individual Soldiers; however, LTC Zeisman and MAJ Greg Curry, the deputy chief of tactics for DOT and project lead, saw much greater potential for VBS2. With small improvements, the system had meaningful applications that could be used for training leaders in complex and fluid mission command situations. Working in concert with JTCOIC for nearly a year, DOT cadre transformed the basic VBS2 system into a simulation engine that helps prospective company commanders practice making combat decisions in real time.

In the scenario the MCCC uses, the systems' developers have built geo-specific terrain from downtown Columbus, Ga., into the virtual environment. This is done so that MCCC students have an opportunity to walk the actual ground as they plan their order. They then write their OPORDs and prepare for their LDX training iterations. The students then report to a technologically advanced computer lab that has stations for the company commander, each platoon leader, enablers (which could be allied or indigenous forces, attack aviation, artillery, and others), the opposition forces commander, and the administrative "white cell." Each computer workstation features a monitor and control system for VBS2; a Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) terminal; and a Ventrilo-equipped headphone set.

"The inclusion of some of the Army's latest mission command systems into the VBS2 suite was essential; it means that each LDX training iteration closely replicates a company commander's actual command and control capabilities," said LTC Zeisman.

There is also a very deliberate and extensive preparation process for students. Before participating in the LDX, student seminars not only conduct a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) in downtown Columbus, but MCCC students also participate in one or two tactical decision exercises as well as classes covering urban terrain analysis, the history of insurgency, asymmetric intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the targeting process, the task organization and capabilities of a Stryker brigade combat team, and tactical considerations for urban operations. After all of this training, MCCC students then write an OPORD for a Stryker Infantry company attack in an urban environment and brief it to their small group leaders (SGLs) and four lieutenants from the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (I-BOLC) role-playing as platoon leaders. Once the SGL approves the OPORD and conducts an after action

MCCC photo

BG Bryan Owens (second from bottom left) talks with CPT Michael Ferriter and other exercise participants about the decisions made during a recent leaders decision exercise iteration.

review (AAR), the MCCC and I-BOLC students conduct rehearsals before they participate in the LDX.

Students currently conduct LDX iterations one seminar at a time. Future classes will execute this training in multiple concurrent iterations at Fort Benning's Warrior Simulation Center. Each student plays a role (platoon leader, company fire support officer, etc.) after the designated company commander briefs his OPORD. Training iterations last about 75 minutes in the simulated environment but also include an organized, instructor-led AAR. During the event, because the company commander can only see a small, first-person view of the battlefield, subordinates must report constantly to the commander while he coordinates fires, attack aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles and other enablers, and also reports to his higher headquarters — a role played by his SGL. This immersive environment forces the commander to deliberately position himself on the battlefield, rely on his subordinates to accomplish assigned tasks without direct oversight, and manage a broad scope of information and reporting requirements.

One element that makes the LDX an improvement over other simulation exercises is that the opposing forces (OPFOR) are controlled by people. If the company commander is having difficulty because of inexperience or some other factor, the LDX scenario can be adjusted; cadre can instruct the OPFOR to be less aggressive, restrict OPFOR resources, and other similar impacts. Conversely, if the company commander has the experience of several repetitions and is a more capable commander, the cadre can reinforce the OPFOR and direct them to act in a way that will force a major alteration of the commander's plan. The sort of quick thinking and battlefield understanding a captain gets when exposed to those obstacles, even if it's in a simulated environment, allows for rapid leader development.

To further enhance the broad scope and great value of the LDX, once the AAR is complete and the company commander emerges from the simulations experience, he is greeted by a media role-player: Joanie Horton, a MCCC Communicative Skills instructor who has taught career course captains at Fort Benning for the last 26 years. "Placing the officer in a position to have to answer tough questions about the operation he just completed added another level of complexity to the exercise," she said. Her interview questions and techniques varied from iteration to iteration based on how the event was conducted and what lessons the cadre were trying to ensure were learned. After the interview, the students' performances were evaluated by their cadre and peers. The unifying purpose remained the use of technology and an immersive environment to have MCCC students execute the OPORDs they write.

After only a handful of training iterations, the tremendous value of the LDX was immediately apparent to both MCCC students and the school's seasoned cadre. "The greatest advantage of using VBS2 as a command training tool here at the MCCC is that it teaches our captains battlefield patience and the importance of a commander's tactical awareness in a way that we just can't replicate in other ways," observed MAJ Jason Pieri, a senior SGL.

> **"By giving our students the opportunity to actually execute an OPORD they've written, they begin to appreciate how the enemy and the situation plays into their plan. They can hone their instincts on when to stick to their plan, and when and why to deviate from it."**
>
> **— MAJ Jason Pieri**
> **Senior MCCC SGL**

CPT Michael Ferriter, an LDX company commander agreed. "It was an excellent training tool to replicate the friction points in battle and the fog of war," he said. "It accurately replicated what it would take for a company commander to synchronize multiple assets, and it was a great training tool for clear and concise, real-time reporting during the mission."

The core benefit of VBS2 and the LDX is not just how they replicate certain essential aspects of company command in combat. Execution of the LDX also adds value to our training because it allows prospective company commanders the opportunity to execute a plan in a low-risk, controlled environment where feedback is immediately available. This aspect is one of the things BG Bryan Owens, commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School, appreciated about the LDX. "VBS2 is a great tool to train our young leaders on the importance of repetition and the ability to communicate with subordinate leaders on the virtual battlefield," he said. "This training event shows the leader what they did or failed to do and allows them to be evaluated not only by their peers but also senior leaders/instructors that have been in their position before."

This combination of the opportunity to execute an OPORD and the chance to learn from repetitions and comprehensive feedback in a safe but realistic environment is what makes the LDX so valuable. "By giving our students the opportunity to actually execute an OPORD they've written, they begin to appreciate how the enemy and the situation play into their plan," said MAJ Pieri. "They can hone their instincts on when to stick to their plan, and when and why to deviate from it."

There are broader opportunities on the horizon for VBS2 training as well. MAJ Curry described a future involving VBS2 training as an integral component of leader training at not only the MCoE's MCCC, but also in coordination with other centers of excellence around the Army.

"The way ahead involves students conducting troop leading procedures (TLPs) with aviators from Fort Rucker (Ala.) as well as fire support officers from Fort Sill (Okla.) because this enables us to train the combined arms fight," he said.

Because the system has value for training leaders at all levels, not just company command, there are applications for it outside of institutional training, which is why VBS2 is a fielded PoR to all major Army posts.

"The long term value is that this system will hopefully be fielded by not only TRADOC units, but also to FORSCOM units, so they will have the ability to train their young sergeants and specialists when they are not in the field training," said BG Owens.

While simulations-based training can never replace more traditional methods and can only replicate the stresses and rigors of combat, using it via the LDX to augment the MCCC experience has been an invaluable improvement. By giving students the opportunity to execute their plans and then learn from their mistakes, the next generation of combat company commanders will be better prepared when they assume command.

CPT Dan Fall is currently serving as a military history instructor with the Directorate of Training, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Ga.

FROM ONE NCO TO ANOTHER:

SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES NEED TO BE USED

SGM PATRICK OGDEN

A Soldier returning from World War II was asked if he had received training on the weapon he carried into battle. His response was, "No, but I sure learned really quick when the enemy started firing!"

That answer should never again be given by American Soldiers when asked about their training, especially on their individual weapons. When our Soldiers find themselves in kill-or-be-killed scenarios, their response needs to be a highly confident, instinctive reaction that takes out the enemy before they can even fire a shot.

Thanks to technology, today's warriors and leaders have some superb training options for individual weapons training. Rather than competing for extremely limited space on the live-fire ranges to zero on pop-up targets, devices like the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000 provide superb training for individual and crew weapon qualification in a simulated environment.

The EST 2000 is an indoor, multipurpose, multilane, small arms training simulator that provides the medium for training leaders of fire teams and squads in command, control, and distribution of fires

Above, Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division complete marksmanship training using the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000.
Courtesy photo

while in a realistic, collective mode. The EST 2000 provides such realistic and accurate training that it is used in the Army's annual Best Warrior Competition to evaluate a competitor's judgment in escalating or de-escalating a situation in shoot/don't shoot scenarios at a traffic control point and a marketplace ambush.

Best yet, the EST 2000 saves ammunition resources, travel time, and costs to and from ranges and other range support resources while simultaneously providing meaningful, effective training to dismounted Soldiers.

I recently had the opportunity to visit a basic combat training company at Fort Benning, Ga., to find out firsthand how effectively the EST 2000 was being used in today's training cycles. What I found was pretty eye-opening. I discovered that during a training cycle, each platoon gets only about two hours to use the EST. This simply is not enough.

Having been a drill sergeant and a first sergeant for a One Station Unit Training (OSUT) company, as well as having served as an Infantryman since 1983, there are some truths for marksmanship training that have remained consistent over the years. They are:

• New Soldiers need a lot of practice on basic fundamentals of rifle marksmanship.

• Drill sergeants have to grasp the desire of the Soldier to succeed in a manner that does not induce a stress level that will deter from a trainee's progressive performance. This is an art.

• Soldiers need to believe in what they see with their eyes in relationship to sight picture and sight alignment.

• Soldiers need performance feedback via a system of measurement.

• Progressive repetition is required to train the eye and other shooting muscles to develop an acceptable level of strength in a short time period.

Today's drill sergeants have many of the same issues I had when under the "Hat." Limited time, shared resources, "Soldierization," and prevention of injury restrictions and requirements all loom large on the list of obstacles to overcome. While the drill sergeants are getting the job done regardless of impediments, there are still opportunities for improvement in both marksmanship training and efficiencies realized by including ample time on the EST during the training cycle. Unfortunately, many NCOs are using outdated training systems.

I was surprised to learn that some of today's drill sergeants still use the Weaponeer system to give training in the platoon bays at night. Really? The Weaponeer? This device was first introduced in the early 1970s. That's back when the audio cassette tape was first introduced. Imagine using a cassette tape today instead of an MP3 player. Unfortunately, the EST 2000, which has been in service for 10 years and has some 831 systems across the Army to include National Guard and Reserve units, is nearing its programmed life cycle, meaning that its end is imminent. As NCOs, we can't let that happen.

Today's Soldier is adept in the cellular, digital, virtual, cyber world. To really grasp their cognitive processes, we need to

"Including simulated training with live training has proven to be a significant way to greatly enhance performance on these very expensive-to-operate platforms. We need to now bring it to our Infantrymen and the rest of the Army who must accept the battlefield of today for what it is."

maintain and improve the EST program. It needs to be funded and given an opportunity to refresh its technology. We must look to the future and face reality. With budget cuts and force reduction, we must strive to maintain our skills gained in this decade of war.

Using the latest high-tech simulation training devices for our marksmanship skills will provide our Soldiers the same level of training the aviation, armor, and mechanized Infantry have had for decades. Including simulated training with live training has proven to be a significant way to greatly enhance performance on these very expensive-to-operate platforms. We need to now bring it to our Infantrymen and the rest of the Army who must accept the battlefield of today for what it is. Everyone must be a rifleman as the fight is 360 degrees.

While we, as NCOs, may realize just how valuable modern training devices are for our mission and trainers, we must use the influence of our rank and experience to send the message to those who prioritize funding. We owe it to our Soldiers to let senior leaders know the value we find in the EST or to share with them how it could be improved. To be the technical and tactical advisor to the officer corps that NCOs are meant to be, we must inform the leaders of our needs in order to meet the requirements they need to fulfill the units' missions. We must ask for the upgrade and modernization of this marksmanship trainer to keep it relevant.

How can you help in this mission?

First, use the EST. Then, document what requirements it fulfills and what requirements it falls short in. Send those comments to your commander, command sergeant major, operations sergeant major, first sergeant and training officer so they fully understand the benefits of using the EST over not using it. NCOs who have worked with some hard-core shooters fully realize the many training benefits this system provides in a low-cost, climate-controlled environment that is free of distractions.

The Army of the future is in our hands and we owe the truth to our leaders to inform them of the best way to set ourselves up in the training and simulation environment to maintain the edge we have as the most powerful fighting force on the face of this earth.

After all, other than war, everything else is simulation!

SGM Patrick Ogden is the senior enlisted advisor for the U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI). SGM Ogden's career in the Infantry has included assignments as a division master gunner, a drill sergeant, a first sergeant, and a regimental operations sergeant major. He has completed three combat tours.

Photo by SPC Daniel Schneider

Soldiers with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division participate in a simulated weapons qualification at Camp Liberty, Iraq, on 25 February 2010.

PROFESSIONAL READING CRITICAL TO INDIVIDUAL, UNIT DEVELOPMENT

MAJ SCOTT SHAW AND CPT KELLY JONES

If one thing is clear about our current fight, it is that junior leaders are being given much more autonomy than many of us ever had. In order to deal with the ever increasing responsibilities of today's platoon leaders, we — the company commanders and field grade officers of our Army — must give these young bucks the tools to succeed. This includes the nurturing of analytical skills (troop leading procedures) in conjunction with the intuitive leadership skills that are necessary in combat, and the ability to deal with the aftermath of combat as well. The question is how to do that without breaking the bank. When the price of a platoon leader learning his trade could be the life of a Soldier or several Soldiers, then we owe it to those Soldiers to educate their leaders before entering the fray.

One powerful way to develop your leaders is through a professional reading program. The fundamental assumption in forming this article is that professional reading is critical not only to individual development but also to collective learning and development in our units. Many of you are undoubtedly saying, "It's too hard. My platoon leaders aren't interested. And, I don't have the time to do it when I am in between deployments." We hear what you are saying and counter it with, "If we could figure out how to do it, then you can, too." A dedicated professional reading program costs the unit less than a hundred dollars (if you have a library near-by, possibly nothing) and builds the mental Rolodex of a platoon leader.

To jump-start a reading program, you have to start out with some sort of "What do I want to get out of this?" That may seem intuitive, but many leaders just throw out random books, and the result is less than desirable. With the hundreds of books and multitudes of reading lists out there for a platoon leader, how do you narrow down the scope of your reading to what is applicable to you? We don't have *the* answer, but we would like to share some suggestions. Based on our experience, we offer six books that we believe are classic volumes to give to platoon leaders to start discussion on issues from the tactical to the ethical and everything in between:

* *The Killing Zone: My Life in the Vietnam War* by Frederick Downs (ISBN-10: 0393310892)
* *Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account* by Stuart Herrington (ISBN-10: 0345472519)
* *The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa: With E. D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift"* by Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert J. Marckwardt (ISBN-10: 0226080935)
* *Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat* by James McDonough (ISBN-10: 0891418008)
* *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* by Stephen Ambrose (ISBN-10: 074322454X)
* *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace* by Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christensen (ISBN-10: 0964920514)

Note to company commanders: Choose a book and the Pro-Reading team will mail you copies to read and discuss with your platoon leaders. Part of this includes creating a space in the online forum specifically for you to discuss the book.

When you and your leaders read together with an eye toward practical applications, the conversations that result will improve your unit's performance. The emphasis of the pro-reading challenge is on the conversations about the reading, which happen when the leader creates space for it — during a meal, around the HMMWV hood, and online.

Leaders who participate in the Pro-Reading Challenge are very intentional about choosing books that tie in with what they are trying to accomplish. If you are interested, visit http://ProReading.army.mil and send an e-mail to pro.reading@us.army.mil).

(This article first appeared in Infantry*'s November-December 2009 issue.)*

CSU OFFERS MASTER'S DEGREE OPTIONS FOR MCCC STUDENTS

MARK L. RIDLEY

Columbus State University's (CSU) Graduate School is now offering nine credit hours towards a Master of Public Administration (MPA) with a governmental concentration or a Master of Education in Educational Leadership with the completion of the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC). Students can start before they even arrive for MCCC because both of these programs are offered on-line.

If students cannot get started prior to beginning MCCC, CSU is willing to work with each MCCC class to provide a minimum of one classroom course while at Fort Benning. This would give a minimum of 12 semester credit hours towards a degree while attending MCCC. Then, once students leave Fort Benning, they will have less than two years remaining towards their master's degree.

CSU provides an out-of-state tuition waiver of all officers assigned to Fort Benning. Students can also use Army tuition assistance (TA) through GoArmyEd (https://www.goarmyed.com/login.aspx). With TA, the Army will pay a maximum of $4,500 per year towards a degree. Books are not included. Officers do incur a two-year active duty service obligation (ADSO) at the end of the last class paid for by TA. The ADSO runs concurrent with other ADSOs.

For more information, visit CSU's Graduate School Web site at http://gradschool.columbusstate.edu/ or contact Paula Hecht at (706) 507-8967 or hecht_paula@colstate.edu

Students should let CSU officials know that they will be using the MCCC for credit towards their master's degree. The GRE is waived for these two degree programs. CSU will require an official copy of students' bachelor's degree transcripts.

(Mark L. Ridley is CSU's director for Military Affairs.)

Book Reviews

The Good Soldiers. By David Finkel. NY: Sarah Crichton Books/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, 316 pages, $26.

Reviewed by MAJ Scott B. Cheney.

David Finkel, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter with the *Washington Post*, has written a must read for all Infantry company-grade officers and senior NCOs. *The Good Soldiers* is a brilliant account of what daily life was like for U.S. Army Infantry battalions serving in Iraq during President George W. Bush's last-ditch strategy for victory — "the Surge." Specifically, *The Good Soldiers* follows Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment through their trials and tribulations in southeastern Baghdad during 2007-2008.

Finkel initially meets the unit's Soldiers and its illustrious battalion commander, LTC Ralph Kauzlarich, in January 2007 at Fort Riley, Kan., just prior to the unit's deployment to Iraq. While at Fort Riley, Finkel carefully illustrates two important points. First, he demonstrates to the reader the reality of war by mentioning how deploying Soldiers fill out "Family Contingency Workbooks" that ask them where they want to be buried should they be killed in action. Little nuisances such as this truly show the blunt reality of death and its constant presence in the daily life of Soldiers — at home or deployed. Secondly, Finkel highlights that 2-16 IN, like so many Infantry battalions during the surge, was a recently re-activated Infantry battalion and part of a newly formed brigade combat team. As a result of being a newly formed unit, many of the "green" Soldiers have a strong desire to prove themselves in combat because of their naïve understanding of war.

From Fort Riley, Finkel deploys to Iraq with 2-16 IN and spends a total of eight months embedded with the Soldiers at their forward operating base. In a chronological pattern, Finkel then walks the reader through the unit's time in southeastern Baghdad during its 15-month deployment. Finkel goes into detail describing what daily life was like for all ranks; however, he generally spends most of his time focusing on the 2-16 IN battalion commander and a key group of NCOs and enlisted Soldiers. One particular NCO Finkel profiles during the book is SSG Adam Schumann.

According to Finkel, "Schumann was regarded as one of the best Soldiers in the battalion," and goes on to articulate this by describing Schumann's actions during a mission that involved another Soldier, SGT Michael Emory, who was shot in the head by a sniper. Schumann's actions resulted in Emory being quickly moved from a rooftop to an awaiting Humvee and transported to an aid station where medical personnel were able to save his life. However, it is not the heroics of Schumann that Finkel seeks to convey to the reader; instead, it is the reality of what the war does

to him. Schumann, who is on his third tour to Iraq, is later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and sent home early to recover. This all-too-common reality highlights what young officers and NCOs will face during combat deployments — how war affects each Soldier differently.

In addition to documenting the lives of the Soldiers in 2-16 IN, Finkel also profiles the numerous leadership styles within the battalion, from the usually happy battalion commander to the pragmatic battalion executive officer, MAJ Brett Cummings. In doing so, Finkel demonstrates that regardless of the unit patch you wear on your left shoulder, the true measure of a great unit is its leaders — both officer and NCO. In the end, *The Good Soldiers* is more than just a book about 2-16 IN — it is a chilling account of what life was like for most Soldiers that served in Iraq during the surge.

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7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century. By Andrew F. Krepinevich. NY: Bantam Dell, 2009, 334 pages, $27.

Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

"Some argue that the best course of action is simply to await events and adjust to threats as they confront us. But this approach essentially avoids thinking about the future. It represents a strong vote for business as usual and a mindless stay-the-course mentality that assumes that tomorrow will be only slightly different from today. This approach fails just when it is most needed, when a new type of threat emerges."

With this as a backdrop, Andrew F. Krepinevich begins his superb book *7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century*. It is a volume sure to spark emotions in every reader. Above all, it is a book which will simply make readers think. They will consider the threats of the future and the country's current preparations to confront those threats.

As the title aptly suggests, *7 Deadly Scenarios* focuses on seven distinct situations the U.S. could face in the upcoming decade. There are probably no surprises for many in the selection of the scenarios. Krepinevich discusses such events as a series of black-market nuclear weapons detonating in U.S. cities, a pandemic of bird flu sweeping the globe, and the acceleration of tensions between China and Taiwan and within the Middle East. However, what will surprise and impress readers is the author's creativity and ability to mesh today with tomorrow.

In making a book of this genre truly work, the credentials of the author are critical. In the case of Krepinevich, the qualifications are impeccable. He has spent the preponderance of his career truly

thinking about and preparing for the future. These credentials include a long career in the U.S. Army, serving as a key consultant for a wide variety of organizations within the Defense Department, and being a highly regarded and sought after speaker and author on this field of study. In total, Krepinevich has garnered a well-deserved reputation as one of the world's preeminent experts on scenario-based planning and thinking the 'unthinkable'.

Before detailing the numerous merits of the book, it is prudent to define scenario-based planning and its subsequent value. Personally, I had some misconceptions on the concept before reading the volume. Krepinevich assists readers in gaining an understanding of this concept early in his introduction. This "primer" sets the conditions for the reader to put the scenarios in a far better perspective.

In articulating the importance of scenario-based planning, Krepinevich states, "Militaries seem prone to assuming the next war will be an updated version of the last war rather than something quite different. Consequently, they are often accused of preparing for the last war instead of the next. This is where rigorous, scenario-based planning comes into play. It is designed to take uncertainty explicitly into account by incorporating factors that may change the character of future conflicts in significant and perhaps profound ways. By presenting a plausible set of paths into the future, scenarios can help senior Pentagon planners avoid the default picture in which tomorrow looks very much like today."

Having read several other books of this genre, perhaps what most impressed me with *7 Deadly Scenarios* is Krepinevich's ability to mold creativity with realism. Nowhere is this exhibited more than in the author's use of endnotes. Krepinevich interestingly develops sources from the future. For example, he has developed future quotes from newspapers or interviews from the time of the scenario. This separates this volume from any I have read.

I found each scenario extremely captivating, thought provoking, and truly realistic. Therefore, it is nearly impossible for me to define my most powerful and personally impacting scenario. However, the most timely and currently relevant scenario is one entitled, "Who Lost Iraq." In it, Krepinevich takes readers to March 2014 and the time when the final U.S troops depart Iraq. The author then details the battles that take place both militarily and politically following the U.S. exit. It is a brilliant piece and is characteristic of the remaining scenarios.

As mentioned earlier, the most unsettling scenario for most readers will be "War Comes to America." Krepinevich places readers in the shoes of the President of the United States as a series of black market nuclear weapons begin detonating in U.S. cities. Readers will share the President's challenges as he determines the threat, his viable courses of action, and the potential repercussions of his actions. For many, the scenario will remind them of a decision game and spark the question, "What would I do?"

In summary, Krepinevich has crafted a superb volume. In a literary world where creativity and mental stimulation are often in short supply, *7 Deadly Scenarios* is a welcome addition. It is a book that grips the reader from its opening paragraph. After consuming each scenario, readers will want to step back and digest its contents. It is the book's ability to invoke this reflection that makes it an enormously valuable and truly special book.

Days of Valor: An Inside Account of the Bloodiest Six Months of the Vietnam War. By Robert Tonsetic. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2007, 288 pages, $32.95.

Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Kevin E. Brown.

Days of Valor: An Inside Account of the Bloodiest Six Months of the Vietnam War is a proud salute to Soldiers who fight at the tactical level of war under the most challenging of small unit combat operations. The book encompasses the period of December 1967 through May 1968 and chronicles operations of the "Redcatchers" — the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) — in and around Saigon. Although the 199th LIB was assigned four battalions and was originally created as a rapid reaction force for Indochina, most of the book addresses the operations of 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (Warriors); 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry (Cottonbalers); and 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry (Old Guard). Robert Tonsetic has thoroughly researched and factually detailed events and provides a firsthand account of many of the operations through his eyes as the commanding officer of Company C, 4-12 Infantry before, during, and after the 1968 Tet Offensive.

The book primarily focuses on offensive and defensive operations to defeat the ongoing insurgency. However, it can serve as an engaging vehicle for tactical-level leaders to discuss many of the doctrinal principles included in the recently published FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* and FM 3-0, *Operations,* as they apply to full spectrum operations today. Principles from our current doctrine can be analyzed in the context of the operational environment (OE) encountered by the 199th LIB and then can be further analyzed within the context of the current OEs of Iraq and Afghanistan.

In terms of challenges faced by the 199th LIB that contain relevant lessons for contemporary leaders, there are four that readily come to mind. First, this book offers a great venue for analyzing the components and manifestations of an insurgency. Second, it allows readers to understand the role of offensive and defensive operations in relation to the civil security and civil control counterinsurgency lines of effort. Next, it portrays how populace and resource control, coupled with clear-hold-build operations are integral to securing a population over time. Lastly, due to the ever-changing missions experienced by units, it emphasizes the importance of exercising mission command in complex and uncertain environments.

I recommend this book to all leaders who are striving for ways to stimulate critical reasoning and creative thinking as part of officer or NCO professional development activities. It is a well-written narrative with appropriately placed maps to help readers visualize the narrative account of the unfolding events. Tonsetic links facts from the documented history of the 199th LIB into a story that can serve as a means to demonstrate the timeless fundamentals captured in our current doctrine.

Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I. **By Justus D. Doenecke. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 416 pages, 2011, $40.**

Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

This book is being published close to the 95th anniversary of our entry into World War I, but the factors that influenced that action are still pertinent today, so this is more than ancient history. It covers the public and private papers of President Wilson and his advisors and the complex interaction of the administration and Congress. Public opinion was formed then on issues different from those that divide us now but was also a major player.

The book helps us understand how we went from being "too proud to fight" to the divisive force that ended the war 11 November 1918. When it started, there was no desire or expectation that the U.S. would become involved. Rather, our traditional neutrality seemed the best course of action and was favored by most of the people, though a fair number inherited sympathy for one side or the other and an antipathy for the Redcoats who burned Washington.

Yet, by 1917, we declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary but not Bulgaria and Turkey. We chose not to be an "Ally" this time but instead an "associate" of the Western powers. Our experience with Allies went back to the Revolution and recently to the Boxer Rebellion. It was uncertain in 1917 whether we would send troops overseas but ended up dispatching two million. This was not our first foreign foray, but the Mexican and Spanish-American conflicts had been wars of conquest and the Quasi-War with France and the War of 1812 was to protect our Rite of Passage and Freedom of the Seas.

It's hard to remember how strong the opposing points of view were then, although no vital interests, economic or military, were actually at stake.

The book does an excellent job of quoting varying reactions in the press and from public figures. The close and exciting 1916 election is well covered. For those with military interests, there is a good amount about the Preparedness Movement, which actually started at the beginning of the 20th century with the Elihu Root Reforms of a general staff, chief of staff, Army War College, and the Militia (Dick) Act. There was Pershing's Punitive Expedition and the call-up of the National Guard for service on the border in 1916. The latter provided a shake-down, some training, and elimination of deadwood (18 percent failed the physical examination). The chief of staff, MG Hugh Scott (November 1914 to September 1917) saw little benefit, but 30 years later I served under three major generals of the California National Guard who had been company grade in 1916 and thought it invaluable when mobilized in 1917.

The bibliographic essay of 24 pages shows the wealth of material used. The numerous photographs help bring life to the story. There is more detail and explanation than I've read before, but it is intended for those with a special interest in this topic and not for the general public.

Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. **By Thomas P. M. Barnett. NY: G. P. Putnam's and Son, 2009, 472 pages, $16 (paperback).**

Reviewed by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Dr. Thomas Barnett served previously as Assistant for Strategic Futures at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Force Transformation and was a senior strategic researcher at the Naval War College. His books have stimulated thought and debate on America's national security and, in particular, the use of America's awesome capabilities.

Barnett opens the book with a proposition that 9-11 exposed America's vulnerabilities in the network age and the previous administration undertook a mad rush of rules to fill those gaps. The book argues that it is up to the executive branch to overreach in response to crisis, and for the judiciary to trim those excesses over time. I do not believe this proposition, and believe that policymakers and the executive need to consider the constitutionality of decisions before crafting rules to address a crisis.

Perhaps one of the most insightful aspects of the book is for the United States itself not to fear globalization. This may seem counterintuitive as the catalyst of a globally tied economy. The problem is our own adjustment to the rise of other economies trying to attain the prosperity of the United States and directly competing with us. Barnett answers the charge that he is ruining the military; instead he advocates aligning the force structure towards items that will dominate our security priorities in the years ahead. This includes less stealth aircraft, more close air support, more linguists, less large naval platforms, more helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicle technologies.

Readers will peer into more agile basing, like contingency operating locations (COL); an example is Manda Bay COL which served as a launching point for special operations strikes against Somali-based al-Qaida affiliates. Barnett urges that we look upon examples from Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for a future entity that blends diplomacy, developmental aid, and military capabilities in a region of interest to the United States.

Barnett has many ideas in this book regarding social, environmental, health, and military challenges to name a few. If you read this book from the vantage point of attempting to solve all these issues, it can seem overwhelming. However, if you read this book from a perspective of provoking thought over issues of America's national security challenges and proposed solutions, you will find this book an interesting read. The object is not to necessarily agree with the author but to stimulate debate.

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Photo by PO2 Jason Johnston, U.S. Navy

Soldiers from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team visit an Afghan National Police checkpoint in an effort to build further cooperation on 18 March 2011.

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