


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
**Smarter Patrolling: Dismounted
Movement in Eastern Afghanistan
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MG MICHAEL FERRITER
Commandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor

MICHELLE J. ROWAN
Deputy Editor

MEREDITH DALZELL
Editorial Assistant



FRONT COVER:

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment take a knee while descending a mountain ridge in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 8 March 2009. (Photo by SSG Adam Mancini)

BACK COVER:

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment scan for enemy activity during operations in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 8 March 2009. (Photo by SSG Adam Mancini)

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GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
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Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
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Commandant's Note

MG MICHAEL FERRITER

POPULAR SUPPORT KEY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY



The era of persistent conflict has come to characterize the global war on terrorism and reflect the determination of insurgents to dominate nations and their populations. It also demonstrates our own commitment to protecting the people of threatened nations as we assist democratically elected governments in defeating insurgencies. Unable to stand against the massed firepower that high intensity conflict against coalition forces would imply, the insurgent must create asymmetry to survive. The people are the key to winning the counterinsurgency fight; if we gain and retain their support, we defeat the insurgent. In this Commandant's Note, I want to address counterinsurgency in the context of our efforts to elicit the support of the civilian populace as we strive not simply to kill insurgents — for they can be replaced — but also to deny guerillas the psychological and logistical support and the intelligence they need to survive, operate, and recruit.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. forces operate among populations who could be either pro-government, neutral or passive, or who support the insurgents outright. Today, information operations continue to play a critical role in the global war on terrorism as we strive to inform indigenous populations in order to consolidate their support, to present better options to uncommitted factions, or to turn insurgents from the path they have chosen. We must always be first with the truth. The enemy we face today has become adept at employing media to disseminate misinformation, and we must remain alert and proactive in dealing with this threat. Our enemy has the advantage of familiarity with the local languages and dialects to tell his version of events, but as conditions stabilize and the legitimate governments consolidate their own control it is becoming possible to quickly and accurately communicate the correct version of events to a much wider audience. The seven COIN Lines of Effort (LOE) outlined in FM 3-24.2 firmly address information engagement as a key element of the counterinsurgency effort.

The inclusion and support of the civil government in full-spectrum operations remains as crucial today as when T.E. Lawrence advised and led Arab irregular troops against the Ottoman Turks during World War I. Lawrence established respect and credibility with his counterparts, just as we do today. As we interact with local civilian and military centers of influence, we must ensure continuity of effort between what we start and what our successors will see to completion, and we must introduce and improve on the relationships we have established. The connections and trust which Lawrence formed with Arab leaders were to affect British foreign policy in the post-war years. The credibility we build begins with

the awareness of local culture, and that starts with language comprehension. Long before he entered military service, Lawrence had traveled throughout the Middle East and learned Arabic; later, when he found himself interacting with the same young tribal leaders who would become leaders of the Arab world, he found he had ready access to them because he had taken time to learn their language.

Today's COIN operations focus on a clear-hold-build concept for the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that take place in the course of a counterinsurgency, including the establishment of civil security and civil control, the restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development. As democratically elected governments assume steadily increasing roles in securing their future, our efforts to earn the credibility and support of the people will remain a priority as we protect the population, meet their needs, and make them aware of their opportunity for a better future. We cannot win their loyalty, confidence, and trust with promises we or our successors cannot fulfill. The locals know our resources are not unlimited. However, easily delivered assets such as school and medical supplies, well drilling, and community projects delivered by the community leaders who have requested them will show that the U.S. delivers on what it promises. This will undermine much support for insurgents who can offer only suffering. The war on terrorism is being played out in regions that have known war for decades, and we must train our small unit leaders to make those sensitive, high-stakes decisions that will earn and keep the support of the very people we are trying to protect. As we exercise patience and restraint in the employment of our military arms we demonstrate that we are prepared to exercise a comprehensive strategy as introduced with the seven Lines of Effort to provide more options in dealing with insurgents. We offer the technology and resources to facilitate recovery and transfer greater responsibility to the civil authority. This will further separate the insurgent from the people and resources he needs to sustain himself.

The U.S. Infantry has long been the point of the spear in the global war on terrorism, and has through her sacrifice, determination, and commitment continued to restore stability and introduce democratic principles across the globe. We can point with pride to the example our Soldiers continue to set in this era of persistent conflict. Follow me!



PEO SOLDIER DEVELOPS LIGHTER, MORE LETHAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS

J.D. LEIPOLD

Two weapons in development are expected to be more precision-oriented, lighter and lethal: the laser-sighted XM-25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System and the Lightweight .50-Caliber Machine Gun.

The XM-25 will undergo field-testing this summer while the LW50MG is already being tested by Soldiers.

XM25: First shoulder-fired 'smart' weapon

The semi-automatic, shoulder-fired XM-25 with a five-round magazine of 25mm dual-warhead ammunition weighs in at about 14 pounds (about the same as an M-16 with a 203 grenade launcher) yet it's

only a few inches longer than an M-4 Carbine with the shoulder stock extended. Decked out in Army Combat Uniform camouflage, its toy weapon appearance belies its expected lethality.

Richard Audette, deputy Project Manager Soldier Weapons, said the technology behind the XM-25 is a leap ahead because it's the first smart weapon system with a smart round in small weapons.

"The way a Soldier operates this is you basically find your target, then laze to it, which gives the range, then you get an adjusted aim point, adjust fire and pull the trigger," he said. "Say you've lazed out to 543 meters ... when you pull the trigger it arms the round and fires it 543 meters plus or minus a one-, two- or three-meter increment, then it explodes over the target." That, he added, makes it a full-solution fire control weapon.



U.S. Army photo

The XM-25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System is the Army's first "smart" shoulder-fired weapon.

Audette said the evaluations this summer will test accuracy and effectiveness, and because it's a completely different type of weapon system its use will call for different tactics.

"For example, in Iraq we had many instances where there was a sniper firing from a rooftop and you have a squad trying to engage that target, but the Soldiers couldn't get to him with the weapons they had, so they'd call in the Air Force to drop a JDAM (joint direct attack munition)," he said. "We can take out the target at \$25 per XM round as opposed to a \$20,000 to \$50,000 JDAM."

According to Audette, ranges in Afghanistan are longer than in Iraq. He said the XM-25 has an effective range of 750 meters, which is longer than an M-16 and M-4 and outperforms the 40mm M-203 grenade-launcher range by more than double.

LW50MG: Less weight, better accuracy

The MK-25 doesn't offer a Soldier any weight-savings, but the LW50MG definitely will come in with tripod at 64 pounds — half what the M-2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun weighs.

With the addition of a modified M-145 machine-gun optic, the LW50MG will be more accurate and quicker to reach its target because it will also have 60-percent less recoil than the M-2, which has been an Army staple in some form or another since 1921.

COL Doug Tamilio, program manager for Soldier Weapons for Soldier lethality and weight reduction, said

the Army has more than 34,000 of the M-2s, each weighing in at 128 pounds with 256 moving parts, but the prototype LW50MG has not only half the weight, it also has only half the moving parts.

"The M-2 is a great weapons system, but before you fire it, you have to set the head space and timing and if you want to change a barrel out, you have to unscrew it, pull it out, then insert and screw in a new barrel; then you have to open the feed tray cover... if you fail to check it or do something improperly, you could have an issue with a round going off because it doesn't have a safety on it," he said.

To fix that problem, PEO Soldier developed a quick-change barrel kit which allows Soldiers to simply pull out the barrel without having to screw in a new one.

(J.D. Leipold writes for the Army News Service.)

BEST RANGER 2009

4th RTB NCOs Clinch Title

LORIEGAN

Two Soldiers made history this year during the 26th annual LTG David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition May 8-10.

SFCs Blake Simms and Chad Stackpole, 4th Ranger Training Battalion Ranger instructors, won the overall competition, and also came in first on the road march that began Friday night and first in Saturday night's orienteering, earning both the Rippetoe and Leandri awards, respectively.

This is the first time one team won the three major awards.

The Best Ranger Competition challenges the technical, physical, and mental abilities of two-man Ranger teams. Out of a starting field of 49 teams, only 24 finished the three-day event.

One team fell out during the first event, the buddy run at Camp Darby, which took the Rangers, wearing Army combat uniforms and individual body armor weighing more than 32 pounds, on a 4.8-mile run through rugged, unimproved terrain with a swamp and a chest-high creek, said SFC Troy Reed, a Ranger instructor with 5th Ranger Training Battalion in Dahlonega, Ga., who walked the course earlier in the week. Team 8, SSGs Luke McDowell and Brandon Farmer, with the 75th Ranger Regiment, crossed the finish line first in the buddy run, followed by Team 22, MSGs Daniel Jenkins and Walter Zajkowski, with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and Team 46, CPT Samuel Linn and 1SG Robert Carter, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash. Simms and Stackpole came in fourth. The second event was the Darby Queen, which is more than a mile long with 26 obstacles.

With names like easy balancer and island hopper, the obstacles are anything but, said CSM Matt Walker, U.S. Army Infantry School command sergeant major. Three teams did not complete the Darby Queen, two teams were injured on the Island Hopper and one team didn't complete the Tough One.

"I always thought the Darby Queen was the toughest obstacle course in the Army," said SFC Jeffrey Vazzana, with the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C., who competed for the first time this year after supporting the competition for years when he was assigned to the Ranger Training Brigade. "It's even worse than Nasty Nick," he said, referring to the obstacle course for Special Forces Assessment and Selection at Fort Bragg.

After the Darby Queen, the remaining 45 teams had a series of marksmanship challenges to complete on the Malone Ranges before making their way through the woods to the field expedient litter carry at Coombs Range, where competitors administered first aid to a "casualty."

Friday's last event was the road march, which was 18 miles long, and the Rangers carried rucksacks weighing about 65 pounds.

"Having the Darby Queen right after the buddy run was tough," Vazzana said. "(After) three hours into the road march, I was tapped out. I had three bags (of fluids) put into me."



Lori Egan

SFCs Blake Simms and Chad Stackpole of the 4th Ranger Training Battalion hold the Colt .45 pistols they received for winning the 26th annual LTG David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition.

Only 26 teams completed the road march. Simms and Stackpole finished it in four hours, 23 minutes.

Stackpole said he and Simms wanted to be one of the top two teams during day one and win the road march.

"Historically, it's impossible to win every event. Our goal was to be in the top three to five percent for every single event," Stackpole said.

Simms, who competed in the last three competitions, was the strategic mastermind, and he broke every event down, Stackpole said.

During day two, most teams aren't competing anymore but just trying to finish, he said.

"Going into the night, we knew to win (orienteering) we had to stay out there all night," Stackpole said. "Five hours from finish time, we were at the farthest point you could be away from the finish point, and we ran for five hours just to make it back and made it back with eight minutes to spare."

Team 22 won Day Stakes on Todd Field, followed by Team 21. Team 7, SGTs Jesse Collins and Michael Malchow, 75th Ranger Regiment, came in third.

At the start of day three, two more teams were eliminated from the competition during the orienteering event. When the helocast began at Hurley Hill, Simms and Stackpole were in first place with 1914 points, Jenkins and Zajkowski were in second with 1857 points, and Collins and Malchow were in third with 1637 points.

After the helocast was the water confidence test, and then the teams were flown to Rotary Park on the Chattahoochee River for the legacy event — canoeing for nearly nine miles to the pet cemetery on Main Post where the final event, another buddy run started and ended nearly four miles away at Lawson Army Airfield's Freedom Hall, a change from previous competitions.

"It's good to change it up," said SFC Corey Hawkins, 5th Ranger Training Battalion. "A lot of these guys have competed before, and the changes keep it interesting."

(Lori Egan is the editor of Fort Benning's post newspaper, The Bayonet.)



Jennifer Gunn

Second-place finishers MSGs Daniel Jenkins and Walter Zajkowski complete the canoeing event during the third day of the competition.




Kristin Molinaro

SFC Chad Stackpole tackles the tri-tower challenge during the second day of the 2009 David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition.

2009 BRC Top 20 Team Standings

- 1st** - (2483 points) SFCs Blake Simms and Chad Stackpole, 4th RTB
- 2nd** - (2396) MSGs Walter Zajkowski and Daniel Jenkins, USASOC
- 3rd** - (2165) SGTs Michael Malchow and Jesse Collins, 75th Ranger Regiment
- 4th** - (2151) SSGs Brandon Farmer and Luke McDowell, 75th Ranger Regiment
- 5th** - (2138) SSGs Michael Mutchie and Miguel Antia, 4th RTB
- 6th** - (2094) CPT Samuel Linn and 1SG Robert Carter, 5th SBCT, 2nd ID
- 7th** - (2050) SGM Jesse Boettcher and MSG Eric J. Turk, USASOC
- 8th** - (1976) SGT Jeremy Billing and CPL Troy Jenkins, 75th Ranger Regiment
- 9th** - (1970) 1LTs Thomas Halverson and Michael Luth, 4th BDE, 4th ID
- 10th** - (1920) SSGs Benjamin Hunter and Ian Hunter, 75th Ranger Regiment
- 11th** - (1904) SSGs Raylan Heck and Adam Angisano, 6th RTB
- 12th** - (1864) 1LT Chris Migliaro and SFC Jordan Martell, 4th BDE, 4th ID
- 13th** - (1863) MAJs Jose Salinas and Edward Sedlock, 199th INF BDE
- 14th** - (1852) SGT Edward Killmeier and SPC Michael Pierce, 75th Ranger Regiment
- 15th** - (1779) MAJ Pete Kranenburg and SFC John Przytulski, 1st SWTG
- 16th** - (1735) CPTs Ronald Garberson and Anthony Aguilar, USASOC
- 17th** - (1638) SFCs Mark Breyak and Steve Fields, SWC NCOA
- 18th** - (1592) SFC Derek Wise and SGT David Paul, 25th ID
- 19th** - (1554) CPTs Stephen Magennis and Todd Tompkins, 199th INF BDE
- 20th** - (1534) CPT Lloyd Wohlschlegel and 1LT Raymond Kuderka, 25th ID

NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM OPENS



CHERYL RODEWIG



“I had an odd feeling when I came through the door — like I’m going back in time; I got goose bumps,” said SFC (Retired) John Rangel, one of more than 4,000 who visited the National Infantry Museum during its grand opening June 19.

“It was due, to have something like this,” said the 72-year-old Vietnam veteran. “It’s a tribute to the Infantry Soldier. Being an Infantry sergeant like I was, it was my duty to protect my men during this war in Vietnam, and I lost a lot of them.”

Many veterans, from World War I to Iraq and Afghanistan, never came home, Rangel said. They never had the chance to marry or have children.


“They gave their lives for this,” he said. “To me, that is meaningful. It is history today for this community and for Fort Benning and for all Infantry Soldiers.”

The museum honors Infantrymen of all generations, from the

At left and below, the National Infantry Museum covers more than 190,000 square feet and has six galleries. It also includes a restaurant, an IMAX theater and a World War II Street.

Photos courtesy of National Infantry Foundation





earliest battles of the United States to the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“You have to give everybody a good view of what the Soldier went through as an Infantry Soldier,” he said. “I think a lot of people take for granted that you’re alive today, you can do what you want to do. That is because the Soldiers are here to protect this country.”

Soldiers of today and yesterday toured the galleries, many sharing memories and experiences. CPL Dave Broening, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, said he enjoyed talking with the older veterans, particularly one who pointed out a weapon he carried in Bastogne, France, during World War II.

“We’re Infantry Soldiers, and we’re paying respects to the ones who came before us,” Broening said. “That’s the reason why we’re Infantry, because these are the people who led the way for us to do it, to carry on. Anybody who walks through here and actually reads some of the stuff or talks to some of these guys who did what’s going on in these pictures, they’d have a better understanding, a better appreciation of the life they have now.”

The museum features six era galleries, a family gallery honoring those who love and support Infantrymen, a marksmanship simulator and halls of honor for Rangers and officer candidates. Next to the museum and part of the 200-acre Patriot Park is the World War II Street, which includes a chapel, barracks, the headquarters of GEN George S. Patton, and other original 1940s buildings.

The museum will draw around 400,000 visitors annually to the tricommunity, according to an economic impact study conducted by the Columbus State University School of Business.

“It’s a tribute to all who have served as Infantrymen,” said keynote speaker GEN (Retired) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “It’s a wonderful facility because you get some sense of what battle is all about.”

Visitors can get a sense of battle in the realistic walk-through of America’s conflicts during the Infantry’s 234-year history. In the Vietnam portion of the Cold War gallery, the floor rumbles at the sound



The Hall of Valor is a glass-enclosed space dedicated to recognizing deeds of exceptional bravery. Plaques honoring each of the nearly 1,500 Infantry recipients of the Medal of Honor line the walls, and a computer kiosk allows visitors to read the full citations for each recipient.

of explosions and the temperature and humidity mimic the jungles of Vietnam. Visitors can look through a periscope at “no man’s land” from a boardwalk trench in the World War I exhibit. In World War II Street, located outside the museum, the scent of cherry pie wafts through the mess hall. For the museum’s signature exhibit, the Last 100 Yards, lifelike figures modeled after Fort Benning Soldiers depict infantrymen from the Revolutionary War to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

“This place makes a hero of the Infantry itself—the legions of anonymous patriots whom history does not record but whose service and sacrifice (were) crucial to the success of our country,” Powell said. “Indeed, no war in all of history in any land has been won without an infantry ... Planes fly away, ships sail away, our brothers in the army are nearby, but to take and hold land and to dare anyone to try to take it away from us is our core mission. Our weapon is the rifle. We go the last 100 yards.”

As an Infantryman himself, Powell said he learned his most important lessons, including trust and leadership, at “the Benning school for boys.”

“This was our first Army home,” he said. “Benning molded me ... and made me a professional Infantryman as it has done for hundreds of thousands of others over

the years. People often asked me after I became Chairman or Secretary of State, ‘Where did you learn about leadership? Was it in graduate school? Was it at the war college?’ and the answer is always the same: ‘No, it was at Fort Benning.’”

The museum that now stands just outside the gates of the Home of the Infantry is “much more than a mere memorial,” Powell said, for its depiction of the Soldier’s story from the point of view of the Soldier.

“Insofar as the National Infantry Museum serves as a reminder and a salute to the millions of men and women who have worn the military uniform on behalf of this country, it is a welcome and much needed addition to America’s commemorative institutions,” he said. “You’re not just reading about these places and these wars. ... You are seeing history living itself out, history in action. But more importantly, a place like this puts the individual Soldier into the history book. It’s all about the Soldier, the one man with the rifle.”

For more information about the National Infantry Museum and Soldier Center at Patriot Park, the IMAX Theater, the Fife and Drum Restaurant, or the World War II Street, visit www.nationalinfantrymuseum.com.

(Cheryl Rodewig writes for Fort Benning’s post newspaper The Bayonet. This article first appeared in the 26 June issue of The Bayonet.)

National Infantry Museum Honors MOH Recipient



CARRIE MCLEROY

Editor's Note: *Medal of Honor recipient SPC Ross McGinnis, who was killed 4 December 2006 in Iraq when he covered a grenade with his body to save the lives of four others, was the first infantryman honored with a plaque on the outside wall of the National Infantry Museum. The plaque was unveiled during a ceremony on 12 June.*

McGinnis was the second U.S. Soldier to receive the medal for actions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and a special Web site has been created by the Soldiers Media Center at www.army.mil/medalofhonor/McGinnis. The site includes a profile on the 1st Infantry Division Soldier; battlescape, background on the medal, video news reports and a number of other resources.

Story of a Hero

McGinnis began his transformation from scrawny boy to standout Soldier at 17, enlisting in the Army through the Delayed Entry Program in June 2004. Although by and large an average student, McGinnis was not interested in academics and spent his teen years struggling to get by.

"He put us through our trials, definitely. From little up, he liked to push the limits," his mother, Romaine, said. "You never knew what was going to come out of his mouth or out of his actions."

In high school, McGinnis never made the honor roll or played sports. According to teachers, he made his mark, but in ways that were uniquely Ross.

"He stood out, but just by bits and pieces," said Franki Sheatz, McGinnis's 9th and 11th-grade French teacher at Keystone High School. "When he stood out, a lot of times it was because of his wit, or because he was trying to get away with something. He never did any more or less than a lot of the other kids I had in class, although he was charming in his little way."

His parents and teachers agreed that the catalyst that sparked a change in McGinnis was his decision to join the military.

"He came to us and said he wanted join the Army, and we accepted that," said McGinnis's father Tom. "The way we looked at it was that he had no intention of going to school, and there really aren't very good jobs for a person (who) doesn't have higher education. The Army was an opportunity for him to be able to get the kind of education that he wanted."

The younger McGinnis had aspirations of one day becoming an automotive technician. The Army, in his eyes, was a means to that end — a place where he could serve his country as an infantryman, but receive an off-duty education that would prepare him for a future career.

McGinnis left his rural Pennsylvania town for basic training at Fort Benning, Ga., within days of graduating from Keystone High School, just before his 18th birthday. During the first stage of training, McGinnis's parents received a phone call from him. "He



U.S. Army photo

SPC Ross McGinnis was the first infantryman honored with a plaque on the outside wall of the National Infantry Museum.

said the first week was boring, a lot of, 'Hurry up and wait,'" Romaine said. In subsequent calls, he conveyed his increasing enthusiasm.

"He really liked the physical part of the training. Ross wasn't one to push a pencil. He wanted to be actively involved," she said. "He was really excited about the weapons training. While in Boy Scouts, they went to a shooting range once and he really liked that, so it didn't surprise me when he said he wanted to go with the gunner position."

According to reports from fellow Soldiers, McGinnis's interest in weapons was crafted into a skill set that would serve him well in his position as a .50-caliber machine gunner.

Soldier's Soldier

McGinnis finished basic and then infantry training in Georgia and headed home to Knox on leave before reporting to his first assignment in Germany. He arrived in Schweinfurt, Germany in November 2005 and reported to 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment with an influx of Soldiers as the company was preparing for its upcoming mission to Iraq. According to retired SSG Ian Newland, he immediately became an instrumental part of the team.

"His personality and humor made him stand out. He was the comedian out of everybody," Newland, a squad leader with 1st Platoon at the time, said. "You could be having the worst day in the field, or the worst day in the rear 'D', and Ross would come in a



room and everybody would be laughing within three minutes.”

Ross was known as the funny guy with an infectious smile from the day he joined the unit, Newland said. “I have this image of him, even today. We were in Germany and he was up on a .50-cal gunning. We had been doing a convoy for probably around eight hours. I was in the vehicle behind him and he turned around and smiled at my gunner. His teeth were just covered in dirt from being up on the gun, but he’s just still smiling ear to ear. That right there was just him.”

His gifts extended beyond platoon funny man according to his leaders, who said he was also a top-notch Soldier.

“I had four platoons, roughly 190 Soldiers in my command. There were certain Soldiers that would stand out. McGinnis was definitely one of those Soldiers,” said MAJ Michael Baka, commander of C Company from June 2005 to March 2007. “He was one of the top members of his platoon. His platoon sergeant handpicked him to serve as the machine gunner on his Humvee, which speaks highly of his performance.” McGinnis excelled in weaponry, marksmanship, and physical training as well.

He was also a born leader, Newland said, who knew how to read and react to different Soldiers in a variety of situations. “People responded to him, and he knew how to respond to people’s personalities and characters. That is one of the hardest traits to build as a leader, to be able to adapt, per Soldier. He had that naturally.”

Adamiyah

The first unit from the battalion on the ground, C Company arrived in Iraq on 4 August 2006, following a week of training in Kuwait. Combat Outpost Apache in Adamiyah, a northeast section of Baghdad steeped in sectarian violence, was to be their home. The area had lacked a U.S. presence for eight months.

“There were a lot of kidnappings, killings and a lot of enemy activity in our sector,” Baka said. Insurgent attacks, sniper fire, grenade contact and IEDs were all part of daily life in Adamiyah.

In October, just two months into the deployment, C Company had already lost two of its Soldiers: SSG Garth Sizemore to a

sniper’s bullet, and SGT Willsun Mock in an IED explosion. In November, after Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against humanity, the battalion fought a five-hour battle against enemy insurgents who attacked the outpost.

By December, the men of 1-26 were battle hardened, but McGinnis had a way of taking the focus off the tragedies.

“He was constantly motivating and positive all the time, and that really helped the platoon out a lot. He was key in our platoon because of that,” Newland said. “Right after we lost SGT Sizemore, we were all really shocked — it really hit home. And then SGT Mock — we were getting pretty depressed. But Ross, he knew how to take our attention off of that — all of us — from senior leaders to your private Joe. He knew how to respond.”

That Fateful Day

It was 4 December 2006, and 1st Platoon was gearing up to patrol the streets of Adamiyah and deliver a 250-kilowatt generator to provide increased electricity to the area. Insurgents had been lobbing grenades at vehicles on patrols, and in response the platoon had honed its reaction skills through a series of training scenarios Newland likened to fire drills. He had experienced such an incident nine days earlier on patrol, but the grenade turned out to be a dud.

As they rolled out of Apache’s gates, the men in the six-vehicle patrol felt up to their mission, despite ever-present dangers, as they did each time they patrolled Adamiyah’s streets, Baka said. “We had only just left the gate. We were moving deliberately down the streets, and had just taken a left-hand turn on a main road just south of Abu Hanifah mosque.”

Baka’s was the fourth vehicle in the order of movement. The platoon sergeant’s vehicle was the last, and McGinnis manned its machine gun.

According to official statements from SGT Lyle Buehler (the driver), SFC Cedric Thomas (platoon sergeant and truck commander), SPC Sean Lawson (medic) and Newland, McGinnis sat in the gunner strap, .50-cal at the ready, facing backward to ensure rear security. Buehler and Thomas rode in the front of the vehicle, and Newland and Lawson in the back.



SPC Ross McGinnis used his body to cover a grenade, which had been thrown by an insurgent into his vehicle.


As the sixth vehicle made the left turn, Baka heard a loud explosion. His initial thought was that a grenade had exploded outside his own up-armored Humvee. Baka’s machine gunner got on the intercom and said, “Sir, it looks like our last vehicle got hit.” All four of the Humvee’s doors had been blown off. Baka ordered his vehicle and the one behind it to turn around. “Once I saw the vehicle I knew right away that we had a hand grenade that had entered the vehicle, and that we had a large number of casualties,” he said.

Baka got a new driver for the crippled but still running Humvee, and they headed back to Apache. He said he knew the Soldiers had sustained injuries, but did not know to what extent until arriving at the outpost. He didn’t know that McGinnis was dead, or that he died a hero.

Thomas pulled Baka aside within minutes of arriving at Apache and said, “Sir, McGinnis saved our lives today.” Then he told the story that would support that statement.

An insurgent on a nearby rooftop threw a grenade at McGinnis’s vehicle. He unsuccessfully attempted to deflect the grenade, and it entered the vehicle behind him. McGinnis quickly announced, “Grenade!”

According to official accounts by survivors, McGinnis stood up and was preparing to jump out of the vehicle. “That is what the machine gunner is supposed to



do,” Baka said. “He’s supposed to announce the grenade, give a fair amount of time for people in the vehicle to react, and then he’s supposed to save himself. No one would have blamed him if he did that, because that is what he was trained to do.”

This time, the 19-year-old Soldier would not heed his training.

The other Soldiers asked, “Where?” McGinnis’s response: “It’s in the truck!”

McGinnis saw the grenade sitting on the radio mount behind him and realized the others weren’t aware of its location. They were combat-locked in the Humvee and would not have time to escape. As he gave his response, he pushed the gunner strap out from under him and laid his back on top of the grenade. It detonated, killing him instantly.

Buehler and Thomas received minor shrapnel injuries, and Lawson suffered a perforated eardrum and concussion. Newland received more of the blast and was severely wounded, but would survive. “The driver and truck commander I am certain would have been killed if that blast had taken full effect,” Baka said.

Newland, who was medically retired because of his injuries, was able to protect himself because of McGinnis’s warning. “He put his arm over his face, which I think saved his life, because a piece of shrapnel hit him in the arm. Another hit him in the chin and some in his legs. But he’s alive today,” Baka added.

Within 24 hours of McGinnis’s sacrifice, Baka gathered statements from the survivors and wrote the recommendation for his Medal of Honor. He received the Silver Star, the third-highest award for valor, as an interim award.

Magnitude of his Sacrifice

“The first time it became full magnitude for me was when we were loading his body onto the helicopter for the hero flight — that’s standard,” Baka said. The unit held a small, informal ceremony and Baka led them in a prayer, as there was no chaplain at the combat outpost. As the helicopter flew away, they saluted the young man who laid down his life so the men he loved and served with could live.

“We have hero flights for every Soldier, and every Soldier that gives his life’s a hero. But McGinnis, in my mind, is the definition of hero,” Baka said. “From this day forward if anyone ever asks me to define the word hero, I would simply tell them the story of SPC Ross McGinnis and the actions he took that day to save four of his brothers.”

For the men who survived, each breath they take serves as a reminder of McGinnis’s courageous sacrifice.

“By all means I should have died that day. He gave me a life that he can’t have now,” Newland said. “There isn’t a single day or

hour that goes by that I don’t take in everything. The smell of my daughter’s hair, the smile my son gives me out of nowhere, the soft touch of my wife’s hand just driving in the car. Normally those are things people might take for granted. I’m able to appreciate and have these things all over again, every day, every hour, because of what Ross did.”

Regular Guy Who Did an Extraordinary Thing

Tom McGinnis is still adjusting to the fact that his son, whom he described as average, often to the point of being an underachiever, is receiving the Medal of Honor.

“I never pictured what a Medal of Honor winner is supposed to look like, but I guess I would think of somebody like a John Wayne character in the movies, where the guy is macho and tough and fear is nothing,” Tom said. “But of course, that’s not anywhere close to what my son, Ross, was like. Although he had very little fear in him, he wasn’t a tough, macho type of person. He was just like you and me.”

Remembering Ross McGinnis

For his brothers in arms, the best way to remember McGinnis is to tell the story of what he did for them 4 December 2006, and to live their lives every day with purpose and meaning.

“I think for me to thank him, is to do everything I can to live my life to the fullest,” Newland said. “Because if he can have courage like that, if he can give up his 19-year-old life, then I can live the rest of my life, however long it is, to every day’s fullest.”

The McGinnis’s remember their son as an average kid who made mistakes but found purpose and direction as he became a young man, just like many other kids out of high school. For them, it is difficult to think of Ross as the larger-than-life character others may see him as because of his sacrifice.

“I’ve had people ask me if I’d like a book or a movie written about him, and I say, ‘No.’ They would have to write so much into this to make it readable or viewable that Ross wouldn’t even be in there. It wouldn’t be him,” Tom said. “It would be somebody else, because his life was dull, boring and nothing to write about. He was just an ordinary person who, when it came time, did the right thing, and that’s the most important thing to remember about him.”

(This story was written from videotaped interviews of the sources. SFC Pete Mayes and SSG Ray Flores of Soldiers Radio and Television conducted the interviews.)



Courtesy photo

The plaque honoring SPC Ross McGinnis is posted outside the entrance to the National Infantry Museum.



BRING BACK THE LIGHT INFANTRY! *Projecting Combat Power More Effectively*


MAJ JOE LABARBERA
CPT ROB NEWSOM

The only way to effectively manage a Soldier's load and to prescribe the most effective uniform for the mission at hand is to regulate it at the appropriate level. Our current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are centralized around armored guntrucks and are constraining our adaptability to defeat insurgents who find sanctuary in restrictive terrain. The freedom to make decisions that enhance our small unit's rapid adaptability needs to be authorized by combatant commanders. An infantryman should not be limited by his vehicle platform, load or his uniform because he will not be able to maintain the tempo of the operations required. This burden becomes an issue for mobility and resupply when operating in restrictive environments for lengthy periods of time. Soldiers who are fatigued by their gear will lose focus and inadvertently surrender initiative to the enemy. In addition, the infantryman who is bound to a vehicle platform for resupply and mentally conditioned that armor is an essential factor for his survival loses the mobility and mental lethality that a light infantryman brings to the battlefield.

It should be understood that this is not an article that analyzes how to manage a Soldier's load or describes its effects because it targets an audience that already understands that. There are many articles written about the Soldier's load and also to educate leaders on how to manage it. Instead, this particular work intends to focus entirely on the infantryman who conducts lengthy dismounted operations that are intended to project combat power into areas that are not reachable by vehicles. For the purpose of this article, the term "lengthy" is defined as operating for more than 48 hours away from shelter and mobile support platforms, such as armored gun trucks, Bradleys, and Stryker vehicles. In addition, advanced skill level training should be emphasized such as long range marksmanship, orienteering, direct fire control (as to conserve ammo) and fire support coordination which will enable small light infantry units to operate for long periods in insurgent safe zones (An "insurgent safe zone" is defined in this article as an area where the insurgent can operate with impunity). This article will then identify the appropriate decision level in which the composition of an infantryman's load can be determined and his uniform modified or standardized.

A Soldier with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division looks out onto a valley during a mission in northeastern Afghanistan.

SSG David Hopkins



The Infantryman's Role in COIN and His Tempo

"It was particularly significant that in this modern age of troop movement by aircraft, helicopters and sophisticated armored personnel carriers, the ability of infantry to move overland on foot became a strategic issue."

— Harry G. Summers, British Army;
Falklands War

The light infantryman's unique value in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is that he can project combat power in the non-permissible terrain that becomes an insurgent safe zone. He does this by moving constantly under austere conditions, fights within small arms range, and closes with his enemy to destroy him. His tempo is maintained through operating in this manner because from this he arrives without warning and suffocates the enemy in his own sanctuary. This ultimately gains the initiative that enables follow-on full spectrum operations. In doing this, light infantry combat differs from other ground combat because of the intense physical and personal nature of it.

The operational need for light infantry to project combat power in this fashion is because the insurgent sanctuaries will most likely be out of range of the Army's ground vehicle platforms and nestled in terrain that is not accessible by tracked or wheeled vehicles. By seeking sanctuary there, the insurgent finds a safe zone and from there he can refit and project his lethality and influence into areas occupied by the Army. For the Soldier to penetrate these insurgent safe zones and conduct successful COIN operations, he will need to move by foot himself. To perform this function, his load and uniform will have to be modified based on the unique and immediate needs of the mission. The importance of this modification is described by USMC MAJ William L. Ezell in his 1992 Marine Corps Command and Staff College report "Battlefield Mobility And The Soldier's Load." He wrote, "The weight a soldier can carry is based upon his weight, the climate, the terrain over which he will move, and the stress he has faced and is currently under."

This is also true for his uniform. The infantryman's uniform includes heavy and cumbersome body armor that is not always

mission essential but yet is mandated from the theater level. It has become an issue that directly affects survivability and mobility. If one is to mandate the infantryman's load and uniform, one has to consider the practicality of its use in the mission as an essential factor in composing it. Not one standard uniform set or one load is compatible with the needs of all missions.

Also, the complexity of the COIN environment further complicates the mandating of the uniform and load for the individual infantryman. MAJ Ezell goes on to cite: "About 1900, the French, British, and Germans began experimenting with the weight and placement of the individual soldier loads. Working separately, all three countries reached the same conclusion: the maximum load which soldiers carry should not exceed one-third of their own body weight."

The weight of the current body armor requirement generally reaches almost half of that factor, and if the Soldier carries a sustainment load then the combined weight will far exceed it. Considering this inhibiting factor, the light infantryman — clad in body armor — must discard a significant portion of his sustainment load and thus be constrained to immediate access to his vehicle platform for support. This constraint greatly limits the light infantryman's flexibility to pursue the enemy into his sanctuary.

The differences between urban, rural, mountain, and jungle operations make the task a small unit must accomplish reliant upon using customized uniforms and loads. Mandating an all encompassing standard may be convenient for higher echelons to comfort themselves with the idea that standards and discipline are being maintained, but it's at a terrible cost to the infantryman who is actually at the point of execution. An example of this is when an infantry squad or platoon has to leave behind critical supplies like water and food because they can't afford to carry the extra weight coming from carrying excessive body armor, such as side plates and layers of Kevlar in addition to his ballistics plates and helmet, not to mention the cumbersome Kevlar arm guards known as DAPS (Deltoid and Axillary Protector Set). In many cases, during lengthy operations in restrictive terrain, the infantryman's stealth and speed will enhance his survivability more than his body armor. However, for the infantryman

to project combat power in COIN he needs mobility in restrictive terrain. This creates an additional burden on the unit to conduct frequent resupplies in order to maintain the squads and platoons during these lengthy operations. The whole focus of the company and/or battalion can easily become consumed with the resupply of these lower echelon units. The choices will have to be weighed on choosing the trigger where we will we sacrifice the *appearance* of survivability for actual mobility and lethality.

Maintaining the Light Infantryman in COIN

"In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements."

— Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals, ii, (1747)

Supplying infantry platoons operating in terrain impassable to vehicles is a difficult task for the battalion's forward support company. The typical solution is to resupply them by air, using either rotary wing assets (sling load or internal load with speedballs/kicker pallets) or fixed wing assets (low or high altitude drops). Aerial resupply is beyond the scope of this article. The concepts of employing them are well understood, and many excellent articles have been written about their employment. Unhappily, the demand for aviation assets in theater far exceeds the available supply, and thus can't be relied upon for routine replenishment of small, autonomous light infantry units operating several kilometers from their base. Still, Soldiers operating under those circumstances can be replenished forward without using aviation assets. One TTP for doing this is for the forward support company (FSC) to move the logistics package (LOGPAC) to a specified logistics release point (LRP), and for the platoons to come pick up their supplies. Logisticians may be tempted to use this method in an austere environment. However, doing so severely limits the range of the dismounted Soldiers, who now must march from their positions to the LRP, and carry two or three days' worth of supplies

that distance. The issue is not that our Soldiers are incapable of doing that; rather, it is that the time and energy they spend on their own logistical support could be better spent going after the enemy. These resupply issues affect a company-level unit's ability to plan and conduct lengthy operations in restrictive terrain and hence affect the insurgent safe zone. The Army unit then becomes limited to where his trucks can take him, or dependent on delivery by air, which is subject to the weather and vulnerable to enemy fire. The endstate of these limitations is a light infantry unit that is mentally attached to its maneuver platforms and is limited to these capabilities.

When higher echelons set conditions that constrain the small unit to being bound to operate within arms length of a vehicle support platform, the vehicle then becomes the signature around which all of his planning and execution revolves. With the vehicle as the support node, it becomes the hub of the wheel from which the spokes protrude to project combat power and thus limits the infantryman to its capabilities. More critical is the second order effect on the mentality of the U.S. infantrymen that is being forged as a result of this *modus operandi*. This is that the infantryman who is bound to a vehicle platform for resupply and mentally conditioned that his platform is an essential factor for his mobility, sustainability and survivability and will forgo the mobility and mental lethality that a light infantryman brings to the battlefield.

Techniques and Constraints

"Every unit that is not supported is a defeated unit."

— Maurice de Saxe,
Mes Reveries, XIII, 1732

When looking to penetrate, disrupt and destroy insurgent safe zones, the infantry Soldier will be out of his comfort zone having to exist without his truck, Stryker, LAV or Bradley. He will feel vulnerable against an enemy and automatically assume the enemy has the advantage. Throughout the military, the mentality that equates success with being dependant on armored vehicles is extending into the perceived need to armor up the Soldier to the same extreme. New, exuberantly heavy body armor is being issued that credible leaders are beginning to question.

According to a FOX news report on 27 February 2008, "Marine Commandant GEN James Conway wants to know who authorized the costly purchase of the nearly 30-pound flak jackets and has ordered the Marine procurement officers at the Quantico base in Virginia to halt the rest of an unfilled order, FOX News has learned. 'I'm not quite sure how we got to where we are, but what I do know is it is not a winner,' Conway told FOX News at the end of his recent trip to Iraq... The Marine Corps commandant and his sergeant major, Carlton Kent, became aware of the problem during a Thanksgiving visit to Iraq. At town hall meetings, few Marines raised their hands when asked if they liked the new equipment. Conway and his team refused to wear the vests during their visit to Iraq last week due to their weight and impracticality."

The immobilization of a Soldier due to his load can also be seen from operations in Grenada. A firsthand account of an 82nd Airborne Soldier in Operation Urgent Fury stated: "We attacked to secure the air head. We were like slow moving turtles. My rucksack weighed 120 pounds. I would get up and rush for 10 yards, throw myself down and couldn't get up. I'd rest for 10 to 15 minutes, struggle to get up, go 10 yards, and collapse. After a few rushes, I was physically unable to move, and I am in great shape. Finally, after I got to the assembly area, I shucked my rucksack and was able to fight, but I was totally drained."

Though the Soldier is referring to his ruck sack, 30 pounds of body armor could have had a similar affect on today's light infantryman. His body armor, ammo, weapon, night sight, water and food can easily amount to a load that he cannot both carry and fight in. Since body armor is part of the uniform in both Afghanistan and Iraq, its weight many times becomes overlooked when planning the Soldier's load. This leads the units into executing their missions in manners which always keep them within distances of their vehicle platforms, since they already are encumbered by the load which is their body armor.

There are techniques that can supplement light infantry in lengthy, autonomous operations in restrictive terrain. An optimal technique is known as "tailgate resupply," although here the term "foxhole resupply" is more apt, as the supplies are

being pushed to Soldiers in positions that are impassable to vehicles. By pushing supplies from the forward operating base (FOB) to the foxhole, the Soldiers of the FSC sustain combat power twofold: they extend the number of days the infantry company can operate in an insurgent sanctuary, and they conserve their energy by sparing them the requirement to move long distances under heavy loads. The question then becomes: How will the FSC push supplies to troops in the field if HMMWVs are unable to reach the fighting positions, and air isn't available?

One recommendation would be the use of light vehicles, either off-road capable utility vehicles or 4WD civilian trucks. The Toyota Hilux is a good example of the latter, and examples of the former include the John Deere Gator and the Polaris Ranger. Many other companies manufacture similar vehicles and some are available with diesel engines. Also, host nation forces typically use civilian-type 4WD trucks. These all have an advantage over up-armored HMMWVs in that their smaller frame allows them to traverse narrower roads and trails, while still hauling over 1,000 pounds of gear. A less conventional method is the use of pack animals, as established by FM 3-05.213, *Special Forces Use of Pack Animals*. The requirements for employing and caring for pack animals, along with their acquisition, training, and movement to theater, presents a logistical challenge in its own right. However, an innovative solution was employed by 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division in Afghanistan. According to the 1 June 2008 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Lesson of the Day, elements of 3-1 IBCT were able to contract for animal support through local sources. This enabled them to push supplies forward without relying on air assets. Further, it provided economic benefit to the local communities who provided the service. These vehicles and/or animals can be cached out of the enemy's range of awareness, and the unit can then move by foot in order to maintain stealth, still having a more feasible support platform that enhances rather than compromises their mobility.

There are two constraints with these techniques. The first is the obligation of the unit to commit to the defense of the equipment if compromised and attacked.

Instead of evading, the unit is restricted by the platform because to abandon the equipment to the enemy further signifies failure. The other constraint is the compromise to their lethality. Because the small unit must guard these platforms while conducting the next phase of the mission, it then loses a portion of its combat power which reduces its lethality. Hence the use of a small, more maneuverable platform is feasible given the unit is composed of two squads or greater, so that there will be ample combat power to secure the cache and still project lethality.

Another method, whose history possibly predates the use of pack animals, is the use of porters (colloquially referred to as Sherpas when operating in mountainous terrain, such as in some regions of Afghanistan). It would be possible to contract local laborers to serve as Sherpas. Further, just as the light infantryman would be capable of marching to an OP to reach a resupply point, so would FSC Soldiers be able to march to the OP. The model proposed here would be for an FSC CLP to push supplies as close to the Soldiers as terrain would allow using vehicles. They would rendezvous with a dismounted security team from the supported unit, who would proceed to escort them on foot to where the

supplies need to be delivered. Supplies could be carried in rucks, either to be unloaded on site or exchanged for rucks with (securely bagged) trash for backhaul. The security team would proceed to escort the Sherpas back to the LRP. These resupply techniques are congruent with the concept of using light infantry as it is intended, to locate and destroy the enemy in restrictive terrain.


However, the burden of armored vehicle platforms and heavy body armor, and also the limitations on our conventional resupply system limit the light infantry from accomplishing this task.

Armored protection in the form of vehicles or body armor is a temporary solution against lesser forms of enemy combat power, but the small unit must have the autonomy to flex its combat power uninhibited by the burden of armor or vehicle support platforms. While providing variable degrees of protection against ambushes, the culture of armored technology only works until the insurgent develops weapons and techniques to counter the armored protection, which he will get time to do being left alone in his sanctuaries. The current decision level in which the composition of the infantrymen's load can be determined and his uniform

modified or standardized is echelons above the tactical level in the COIN environment. A lower level for making load and uniform decisions should be authorized so that leaders at these levels will be enabled to enhance the infantryman's lethality in order to project combat power into insurgent safe zones.

According to numerous leaders in the Army, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are captains' wars and platoon leaders' fights. We trust these officers with strategic decisions and the lives of Soldiers on the ground. It is these officers whose decisions directly result in the accomplishment of their mission and the survivability of their Soldiers, and they should have the flexibility to operate in a uniform that best fits the mission.

As the insurgency in Afghanistan gains momentum and the political climate simultaneously limits our ability to use air-delivered munitions and artillery that cause civilian casualties, we will have to fall back to meeting the enemy on his ground and force him to fight us face-to-face. The more we hide behind our armor, the more emboldened and adaptive our enemy will become. Yet we are constrained by the armored truck which has become our small unit support platform, and this is the second order effect of carrying cumbersome body armor that makes it unfeasible to carry a sustainment load capable of lasting more than two days. This constraint is preventing us from hunting our enemy where he finds sanctuary. To change this we need to decentralize the decision-making authority on the individual uniform to the company level. The mitigation to assuming risk by operating without armored protection should be extremely good tactical planning and dynamic leadership on the lowest levels. Greater errors have been made by higher echelons and to lesser consequence. With the company commander having the authority to upgrade or downgrade body armor and the support mechanisms to resupply his small units on lengthy operations, the conditions will be set for aggressive and innovative missions that will penetrate insurgent sanctuaries and suffocate his support network. Until we can accomplish this we will not be able to set the conditions for full spectrum operations with all the non-lethal enablers that are so necessary for victory in counterinsurgency operations.



MAJ Joseph Labarbera was commissioned as a Marine Corps officer in 1998 from Officer Candidate School and served as an artillery officer in the 10th Marines until transferring to the Army Infantry in 2002. His assignments include serving as assistant division plans officer for 10th Mountain G-3; Task Force 2-14 civil military operations officer (S5); commander of A Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; an Iraqi Army brigade S-3 trainer as part of 2-15 Field Artillery; and the advisor to an Iraqi brigade's commando company. MAJ Labarbera also served as a reconnaissance troop trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. He will next serve as a transition team chief and is set to deploy as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

CPT Robert Newsom was commissioned through the New Mexico Military Institute. He is currently a forward support company trainer at the NTC. His past assignments include serving as transportation officer for the Joint Logistics Center, CJTF-76, Afghanistan; commander of Alpha Company, 277th ASB at Fort Drum, N.Y.; and brigade chemical officer for 1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. He will next serve on a transition team, which is set to deploy as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

GAME THEORY, PREDICATIBILITY AND ROUTE SELECTION

CPT BRANDON COLAS



MC2 Robert Whelan, USN

A U.S. Soldier works with Iraqi Army soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Division as they plan a patrol through Abu Ghraib, Iraq.

Although it's not one of the five principles of patrolling, it should be. Learning how to avoid setting patterns is vital for the small unit leader, especially in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The concept that "constant and unpredictable activity ... over time, deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment" had been discovered by our NCOs and lieutenants long before David Kilcullen's "28 Articles" was first published. But Army doctrine stops at this point. We are told to be unpredictable with the implication that this is easy. Unfortunately, humans are inherently predictable — unless they learn how to make decisions that cannot be patterned.

In this article, I'll discuss how the basic principles of Game Theory can aid in route selection during your mission-planning process. Game Theory is a mathematical method used to determine the various results from competing strategies, but you don't need much math to make it work. Think of Game Theory as a tool, like an S-2 brief, that can help with troop-leading procedures.

After reading this article, you'll know enough to never pattern yourself again, which will disrupt the enemy's planning cycle. Of course, that doesn't mean you won't get attacked. However, when attacks occur, they will be because the enemy got lucky — not because they knew your route based on previous patrols.

The use of game theory and randomness as a security measure is nothing new. Security officials at the Los Angeles International Airport have been using game theory (via a computer program) to generate truly random patrols since 2007, according to the November 2007 *Hypercube* article "Practice Random Acts of Security" by Lauren Cox. COL Kevin Brown, the garrison commander of Fort Riley, Kan., observed that the concept of randomization of activity for installation security measures is well established. If we need random activities to protect our airports and CONUS bases, it is much more vital to do so with our combat patrols.

You're Not as Random as You Think

Humans think and act in habits and patterns. For instance, when asked to think of a random number between one and 10, the majority of people say three or seven. Likewise, marketing campaigns are based on humans acting in a consistent manner. For instance, people spend

more money at grocery stores on products placed at eye-level.

In a similar manner, the Army trains Soldiers to fall back on previous patterns, like battle drills, when they are tired and under stress. This isn't always a bad thing, but it's a problem when it comes to route selection.

Not only are you naturally predictable, "the harder you try to be random, the more predictable you become," wrote Mark Burnett and Dave Kleiman in their book *Perfect Passwords: Selection, Protection, and Authentication*. By trying to avoid patterns, you create them. For instance, when people are asked to scatter a handful of pennies randomly, patterns emerge such as all pennies being equally spaced apart. Although the subjects of the test might not realize it, they are far less random than they think, according to Burnett and Kleiman.

Why do humans struggle with being unpredictable? In his book *The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy*, J.D. Williams observed, "Habits, prejudices, orderliness, and so on all militate against ... being random."

When humans try to be unpredictable, they aren't. And whether or not you realize it, you are probably fairly predictable in your patrolling.

What Is Game Theory?

As mentioned, Game Theory determines the various results of different strategies. It attempts to predict benefits and costs for competing groups when they make choices.

Game Theory began in the mid-20th century with a mathematician, John von Neumann, who was looking for new ways to model economic behavior. In the *Small Wars Journal* article "Game Theory: Can a Round of Poker Solve Afghanistan's Problems," author Richard Gash wrote that von Neumann discovered three key components to games of strategy, such as poker. He wrote, "First, a player without a strategy was doomed. Second, a player who failed to adapt his strategy to that of the other players was equally doomed. Third, a novice player, without a strategy, although doomed to failure in the long run, could disrupt a seasoned, strategic player."

Why would the novice disrupt the veteran? Because the experienced player is unprepared for the random and sometimes illogical choices made by the newcomer. Let's interpret these components in military terms: First, you need a plan. Second, the enemy gets a vote; we must adapt based on their actions. Third, our enemies — many of whom are experienced fighters — can do a significant amount of damage to us, in part because most U.S. forces do things the same way.

Von Neumann concluded that **seasoned players who use randomness in their strategies are generally the most successful**. This is because randomness hides your strategy from your opponents, according to Gash.

How Can I Use Game Theory?

By deliberately inserting randomness into your choices for route selection, you'll negate the insurgents' ability to predict your choices. Let's use the city of Hawijah, Iraq, as an example. Hawijah is divided in half by a canal that runs north to south, and only three bridges cross from the eastern half of the city to the western half: North Bridge, Market Street Bridge, and South Bridge.

Let's say that each of the three bridges offers similar cover and concealment for the insurgents, who can only ambush one bridge at a time. They have no tactical advantage in choosing a particular bridge. Likewise, coalition forces have no defensive advantage in choosing a particular bridge. Finally, let's say you have an escort mission every Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday, and there is no particular intelligence about where the insurgents will ambush — only that they will attempt an attack.

Game Theory can offer an effective way to choose which bridge you cross on the way there, and which way you cross on the way back. However, the math gets quite involved, so we'll simply use the key idea: inserting randomness into your strategy will mask your decision. Since all other factors are equal, **you should choose your route by a random method**, in order to avoid patterning yourself.

Devices of Chance

Here's how it works: you have three choices to cross the city and three choices on the way back. Six choices in total. For this decision, you could use a die. Let 1 be

49	62	33	44
40	86	49	48
12	22	15	52
05	26	06	07
33	90	77	03

Figure 1

North Bridge, 2 be Market Street Bridge, 3 be South Bridge, 4 be North Bridge, 5 be Market Street Bridge, and 6 be South Bridge. The odds are one in three for any of the bridges. Roll it twice, once for going there and once for your way back. Now you've inserted chance, or randomness, into your strategy. Although headquarters has patterned when you patrol, you can improve your safety by using a device of chance to select your route, thus guaranteeing your unpredictability.

Another device of chance when you only have two choices (all other factors being equal) is a coin. A deck of cards could be used for four choices.

What if the situation is more complex, and not all of the choices are equal? When this is the case, you should **skew the probabilities depending on the situation**. Higher headquarters instructions, intel reports, previous experiences, the weather, and many other factors will all affect how you "value" each route. For instance, if Market Street Bridge offers the enemy a significant advantage, and North Bridge is better defensively, while South Bridge is neutral, let 1, 4, and 6 represent the choice of North Bridge, 3 and 5 represent South Bridge, and 2 be Market Street Bridge. Now your chances of going on Market Street Bridge have lessened (but in order to be unpredictable, it must stay as an option).

A deck of cards could also be used to skew the odds, by using choices such as face cards and aces versus non-face cards (odds are 4:9) or hearts, spades and diamonds versus clubs (odds are 3:1), depending on how many choices you have.

One other popular device of chance is a table of random numbers. RAND publishes a table of a million random digits that can be used for any sort of problem involving chance.

Suppose that Hawijah had 10 bridges.

Here's how you could use this table. Start at the bottom right and work your way left. All other factors being equal, if the digit is 00 to 09, you'll take the first bridge, 10 to 19, the second bridge, 20 to 29, the third, and so on. You could also work your way across diagonally, top to bottom, or bottom to top. Regardless of how you use such a table, your selection will be random.

In summary, **the complexity of your choice affects the device of chance you use and how you skew the probabilities**.

Objections

My company commander/platoon sergeant/Soldiers will panic if they see me flip a coin during my planning process. In other words, it seems that ...

Chance is an irresponsible way to select a course of action that has people's lives at stake. In his book, Williams wrote, "there is nothing irresponsible about it: all the cogent reasoning which you feel should go into the decision does go into it."

The Hawijah example is deliberately simple. As mentioned, other factors such as enemy patterns, friendly support, headquarters instructions, and so on will all affect your decision when it comes to weighing the odds of one route against another. However, you still have to choose. And when you have done your planning, collected all of that information, analyzed all your options, and weighed your odds, *only then* do you deliberately add in a device of chance.

The Role of Instinct

Instinct, of course, can't be measured. Don't leave this article thinking that you can't trust yourself — there will be times when you get a bad vibe from South Bridge and suddenly decide to take Market Street Bridge, despite what your deck of cards recommended. It's your decision. Sometimes changing your route based on instinct will be the right choice — but that will be the exception, not the rule.

Chance makes things far tougher for the enemy. Because you're inherently predictable, the use of controlled randomness will make things safer for your Soldiers and yourself.

CPT Brandon Colas is a 2006 graduate of Cedarville University and was commissioned from Central State's ROTC program.

THE 7 DEADLY SINS OF PSYOP

MAJ PATRICK MCCARTHY, JR

Author's Note: *The following is an adaptation of Dante's epic poem "The Divine Comedy" as applied to the art of influence and pitfalls to avoid in tactical application. The Seven Deadly Sins are a direct correlation to the ones listed by Dante, but defined as observed during a combat rotation in Iraq. All comments are the personal observation of the author and do not reflect official policy, doctrine or Psychological Operations (PSYOP) endorsement.*

The purpose of this article is to address a common thread observed during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations while deployed in Iraq. Unfortunately, the term Psychological Operations has a negative connotation within the tactical Army and is often misunderstood by the common Soldier on the ground. Comments are often fraught with snide remarks such as, "You guys mess with people's minds." The term "litterbugs" proliferates in the vocabulary of commanders and Soldiers alike. While often unintended, these remarks have a detrimental effect on PSYOP Soldiers who must demonstrate their worth to brigade combat teams and their respective staffs.

The biggest challenge to effective PSYOP is that there is a constant rift between Information Operations (IO) and PSYOP commanders; as a result "IO Products" are often mistaken for PSYOP efforts. The sins listed below are common issues that lead to the breakdown between all levels in the influence business. As a guideline for success, awareness of these pitfalls highlighted in this article can serve as a template for excellence in the conduct of influence operations.

LUST – While defined with regards to sexual desire and thoughts of an impulsive nature, lust can also be applied to PSYOP products. Both PSYOP leaders and maneuver commanders can become obsessive over the product layout, colors, and message while disregarding how it may be interpreted by the receiving audience.

These obsessive compulsions lead to a breakdown in the approval process, which has the secondary effect of delaying the process and rendering the message ineffective due to timeliness. Additionally, it breaks down confidence of those in both the supported unit and those in the PSYOP force, who begin to speculate that the approval chain does not trust the "experts" in military marketing and trained agents of influence.

Arguing over colors, the English message, and the layout becomes a moot point in counterinsurgency operations, where timeliness and message content matters most. While the insurgent propaganda machine marches on, the ability to mass information capabilities and influencing specific products is lost during the development and production of PSYOP messages.

Both PSYOP and maneuver commanders at several levels have an idea or "concept" of what the product should look like in order to convey a message. However, our collective inability to share our

vision to achieve an effect hampers our ability to respond in a timely fashion to an exploitable event prior to insurgent capitalization.

The axiom, "He who gets the message out first, wins" is tantamount in counterinsurgency operations. The truth must always be nested within the message, but once the truth is established, the message can be sent. This enables commanders and PSYOP forces to exploit Dr. David Kilcullen's principle of "exploit a single narrative."

Insurgents stage spectacular events for the sake of information exploitation, and they have a multifaceted, multimedia approach to exploitation. American masters of information relegate themselves to how the product looks well before release in order to appease multiple people prior to even considering the target audience.

GLUTTONY – While gluttony is often associated with overeating to the point of wanton waste, it can be applied very much to the dissemination of PSYOP product and messages. PSYOP forces like to appease maneuver commanders, and therefore, like to provide quantifiable measures of performance by disseminating vast quantities of product. This in itself is gluttonous of an asset that is already in high demand. During the years of operations in Iraq, untold amounts of paper product have been disseminated with minimal measures of effectiveness or analysis completed. Leaflet drops, while sexy and attractive to all forces available, should have a targeted, effects-based approach to achieve or complement an effect.

Without the judicious and multi-faceted approach to the application of influence operations, PSYOP forces cannot honestly measure effectiveness. A cursory study of human emotion reveals that people respond to different aspects of stimuli, and therefore, different forms of media need to be utilized to evoke emotion and change of heart and mind. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we have vicariously disseminated much product without evaluating the outcome of the product or studying the anticipated effect.

GREED – Greed, the desire to accumulate wealth without the desire to share, is a terrible problem across all aspects of humanity, but has resounding impacts with regards to PSYOP. Synchronization of effort is a difficult task to master in lethal operations and maneuver warfare. True masters of the art of warfare and the science of battle have been students for years and perfected their approach and visualization of the battlefield. PSYOP and information operations need to be synchronized, and must conduct adjacent unit coordination in order to measure that the desired effects and messages are resonating within the target audience outside of unit boundaries.

The lack of information sharing can also lead to "stove piping," which is a common issue across the Army. By guarding information and not properly sharing across all elements of the brigade staff, actions cannot be taken and maneuver commanders are not fully informed on the psychological impact and patterns within their operational environment. Soldiers are hesitant to "give up the gold,"

out of fear of stealing the good ideas. This behavior and thinking is not isolated in PSYOP; it permeates the Army throughout. A change in culture and in thinking can result in astronomical effects — the coordinated effort to achieve a specific effect in the lethal and non-lethal operational environment.

SLOTH – While this term emanates and conjures images of a slow and belching animal of South America, the definition implies laziness. The realm of influence operations permeates with “too little, too late” due to the nature of approval, staffing, and production.

Additionally, when met with hesitance and lack of understanding on the means of employment, PSYOP forces can easily retreat to their shadows and avoid exposure, which can be misconstrued as not being effective in operations. While this is a deadly sin that can be easily associated with PSYOP forces, it is usually a result of a conglomeration of other “sins” that have facilitated the growth of sloth.

If commanders recognize this challenge, and facilitate production and approval, PSYOP efforts could rapidly exploit events in conjunction with the commander’s intent.

WRATH – Anger, fury, and disgust categorize this noun, and it is demonstrated daily across the operational environment by all elements of influence operations. “Where is my product?”; “What is taking so long?”; “Why does it not say what I want it to say?”; and “Do you know the target audience like I know the target audience?” While Soldiers and leaders, especially PSYOP professionals, understand that timeliness is tantamount in COIN operations, this wrath is in fact *counterproductive* to PSYOP efforts.

More often than not, PSYOP elements are suspect to playing to the wrong target audience, and develop products out of frustration to appease the target audience of our supported maneuver commanders. As advisors to maneuver commanders, PSYOP professionals must enforce that behavior change is consistent with time, and that it can take days, weeks, sometimes even months to fully develop, recognize, and implement a significant change in behaviors. As emotional experts, wrath collectively destroys a participatory effort in



SSgt Quinton Russ, USAF

A PSYOP Soldier places a poster identifying possible IED makers in Mosul, Iraq.

synchronizing a deliberate attempt at changing behavior.

ENVY – Of all the deadly sins, envy is the greatest threat of all PSYOP elements. As the battlefield application of influence and the use of information as a weapon is so difficult to master, PSYOP elements must guard themselves from defaulting to door-kicking and assisting civil-military operations. These tasks are not easy by any standard — but they are sexy. They are attractive to all members of the armed services because they yield immediate results.

Lastly, in the category of envy, the decentralized nature and manner of employment of the tactical PSYOP company (TPC) could foster an unintended environment of envy. Once a TPC is task organized, the company commander is not going to see (and may not hear from) his subordinate units for some time. This may have the inadvertent effect of “pitting” one detachment or element against each other, fostering a sense of envy.

Separating PSYOP forces from themselves is necessary, yet it can be detrimental when PSYOP Soldiers do not share ideas or suggestions. Advances in communication devices and the proliferation of internet assets facilitate cross talk and communication, which in theory would encourage information and idea sharing.

Some maneuvers commanders understand the full employment of IO, and as a result, PSYOP elements enjoy planning, implementing, and executing full spectrum PSYOP. Maneuver commanders who

understand the benefits of influence operations tend to have more creative thinking and the free-flowing ideas outside of the norm.

PRIDE – Every Soldier suffers from pride; everyone is the best in their own mind. Pride has a tendency to get the best of PSYOP forces in the manner of “I can’t do that, because of...” Instead of looking at a target set, and choosing a better method of weaponeering the target, the PSYOP Soldier could lose instantaneous credibility with the supported command.

Supported commanders do not assist in the manner, as they already have an idea of what munitions provided by the PSYOP element should be. “I want a handbill saying this...” often echoes within the tactical operations center. This often putting the young officer or sergeant on the spot, and external pressures from various staff elements nearly forces the PSYOP Soldier into conformity.

PSYOP elements can defend against this by saying small phrases such as, “Let me look at this; we might be able to get a quicker turn around if we do this...”, or “Yes Sir, I can do that, but my best weapon is my loudspeakers with a recorded message of you saying...”

Creative weaponeering of a target set by PSYOP elements, in conjunction with the brigade staff allow commanders to benefit from a non-lethal asset that can provide deliverables. Pride is difficult to swallow, and PSYOP Soldiers have to be cunning and quick to answer the commander’s intent and support his unit.

In closing, the proper use of PSYOP forces plays a definitive role in shaping positive outcomes during COIN operations. T.E. Lawrence wrote, “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern guerilla commander.” Being aware of these potential pitfalls arms both the PSYOP elements and the supported brigade staff, which must work in concert to successfully accomplish their missions.

MAJ Patrick McCarthy, Jr. served in Iraq during the “Surge” in southwest Baghdad as a tactical PSYOP detachment commander. He and his team provided tactical PSYOP support to two light infantry brigade combat teams over a period of 14 months. He is currently serving as the commander of Alpha Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, N.C.

ITAS in OEF: *CODE NAME 'FINGER OF GOD'*

CPT JOSH HARRISON

While deployed to Afghanistan from June 2007 until July 2008, my platoon — the heavy weapons platoon for D Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment — discovered a new way of using the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS).

Before the deployment, our ITAS, an organic weapon system for all IBCTs, had never been trained on or even signed out of the arms room because there was no “armor threat” in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In fact, before 2006, our battalion didn’t even have a D Company or heavy weapons platoon. Training for OEF was focused on using our vehicles to close with the enemy and then dismounting and fighting as light infantry. ITAS training was nonexistent, and few Soldiers had training or experience with the system, unless they had received it prior to coming to the unit.

The ITAS system we deployed with was an older version. It had the second generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) for night or “thermal signature” observation that is nearly equal to the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS³), a 12X day sight, and a 10K laser range finder. While deployed to Afghanistan, we received four of the newest version of ITAS. These come with all of the aforementioned capabilities plus a far target locator (FTL) feature. The FTL provides a 10-digit grid of the gunner’s location and the target that is lased. This new feature provides us the eyes of LRAS³, the sting of a TOW missile, the ability to generate precision indirect fire missions, and to provide accurate grids for bombing missions. The system became our most effective precision fire weapon system, since no other organic system offers precise, accurate fires to a range of 4,000 meters. Needless to say, ITAS isn’t just an anti-armor weapon. It is



Figure 1

a tremendous combat multiplier in the light infantry, counterinsurgency fight.

Background

First, let me briefly describe the friendly and enemy situation. The anti-Afghan forces (AAF) are experts at the use of terrain and quickly adapt to blue force tactics. The AAF have been fighting on the same terrain their entire lives, and they make excellent use of cover and concealment, normally rocks and caves, that are difficult if not impossible to spot and attack with air support or indirect fire. The AAF know how long it takes for air support, either helicopters or jets, to arrive, and so they strike and disappear before air support can get to them.

During the deployment we identified the need for accurate long-range fires immediately upon arriving in Afghanistan. We began using our ITAS, relying on the experiences of former 11H MOS Soldiers, who had some familiarization with the ITAS and its capabilities. We quickly developed ITAS training and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for our platoon.

Ultimately, because of our success with the ITAS in more than 200 engagements with the enemy, the entire task force was cross-trained on use of the ITAS.

Midway through the deployment, my platoon — 1st Platoon (Dragons) — was designated the task force quick reaction force (QRF). In this role we sometimes would have as many as five engagements per day. The ITAS and our ability to employ it made us one of the most lethal platoons in TF ROCK. At the end of the deployment, our TTPs had been refined and passed throughout the TF, which greatly improved the lethality of all. My platoon fired 63 of the 108 missiles fired by TF ROCK, and intelligence gathered indicated that the AAF had given our ITAS the code name “Finger of God.” It isn’t a stretch to say that ITAS went from gathering dust in the arms room to being THE key precision fire weapon system in our task force. Our learning curve with ITAS focused on two primary missions for the system, neither of which were in the traditional anti-armor role: convoy operations and force protection.

Convoy Operations

In garrison, our ITAS is mounted on an M1121, a light-skinned high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). When deployed, the up-armored M1151 is used. Though both are HMMWVs, they are very different, and the M1151 has to be dramatically modified in order to mount the ITAS. With the gunner's protective kit, the TOW missile cannot be mounted or fired and, without the gunner's protective kit, the TOW gunner is far too exposed. Also, the turret is only set up for one weapon system, so even if we could mount the ITAS the gunner could not protect himself with a secondary weapon system. We modified the M1151 turret to solve all of these issues. By cutting out part of the front quarter of the right turret plate to allow the gunner access to the ITAS hand controls, we were able to mount the ITAS. We removed all but the bottom two bolts from the back of the turret in order to allow it to drop-down. We fastened the back of the turret in the up position with two pins to give the gunner protection to the rear. When we fired a missile, the gunner removed the pins, dropped the rear panel, and fired. To allow the use of an alternate weapon that doesn't interfere with the operation of the ITAS, a machine gun mount was welded towards the front of the left turret panel. Ammo for the weapon was contained in a discarded linked 40mm (MK-19) ammo can that is bolted to the outside of the left turret panel (See Figure 1).

With the ability to mount the ITAS, it became an integral part in all convoys. When engaged, the front and rear elements returned fire, fixing the enemy and allowing the ITAS truck to move out of the kill zone to a covered and concealed position. With the system's optics and FLIR sensors, we quickly located the enemy and destroyed them with missiles. Nothing ends a fight like a TOW missile taking out an entire enemy machine gun team, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) team, or a command and control section that thinks they have positioned themselves with enough stand off to be safe! With an ITAS in the convoy, the AAF would not conduct a hasty attack on the convoy and no longer viewed convoys as target of opportunities.

Force Protection

Our security was built around the ITAS and was designed to provide 360-degree surveillance and fire. Initially, we achieved large fields of fire for our dismounted ITAS positions, but with limited flank and overhead protection from AAF fire and observation, we again modified our equipment to fit

The ITAS was able to detect the AAF moving into position, which allowed us to fire first and surprise the enemy, even though we were on the defense.

our needs. We improved our positions to keep 360-degree fields of fire/back-blast clearance.

To power the system 24/7, we requested lithium-ion AC chargers (LIACs) from the ITAS project office that would hook-up to our generators. The LIAC allowed us to continuously run the ITAS without relying on a vehicle to charge its battery. We custom-made an ITAS mount by cementing a 4-inch diameter pipe (with holes cut in it for cables) into the ground. With the ITAS system's "dog collar" attaching the ITAS to the pipe and an add-on seat, gunners could either stand or sit for sustained operations (See Figure 2). To avoid the time required for system cool-down, we learned to never shut the system down but switch it to "stand-by" mode.

The ITAS was able to detect the AAF moving into position, which allowed us to fire first and surprise the enemy, even though we were on the defense. We coordinated indirect fires, close air support (CAS), and TOW missile strikes to destroy the enemy before they could initiate their attack or even come within maximum effective range of their weapon systems. ITAS simply owns the night — the enemy never knew what hit them! If the AAF initiated the attack, ITAS was much quicker than the naked eye in finding their positions and was much faster at destroying them, since it was almost always a guaranteed one shot one kill.

Other Lessons Learned for ITAS

The FTL brings a whole new capability to the light infantry. In addition to the ITAS gunner providing or verifying grid locations of targets for indirect fires, FTL can work in reverse to find targets with grid coordinates provided by external sources. During an operation, two intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) teams were able to identify and triangulate where the AAF command

Figure 2



ITAS Far Target Locator

FTL Description

Benefits



- * Precision Attitude Determination Subsystem (PADS)
 - 2 GPSIS receivers, 1 GPSIS processor, and inclinometer
 - Determines self-location and bearing to target
- * The existing ITAS LRF determines range to target
- * PADS aligned to the optical line-of-sight of the ITAS
- * The ITAS computes target location using bearing from PADS and range from LRF
- * Self-position and target location are displayed in gunner's display and commander's view
- * Integrated PEQ-2 mount

- * Provides 10-digit grid coordinate to the gunner
- * Accuracy determination of enemy position (60m CEP)
- * Provides enhancement to the ITAS' responsiveness and situational awareness
 - Transmission of accurate and timely enemy positions
 - Enables responsive fires (either direct or indirect)
- * Self-position and target location displayed in gunner's eyepiece and commander's view



Figure 3

and control section was positioned and provide a grid location back to the ITAS gunner. A map check got us close and after a few attempts "lasing selected targets" and comparing coordinates with the FTL, we identified the exact cave that the AAF were in and destroyed it with a missile. Without the FTL we never would have found the cave because it was nearly indistinguishable from the rest of the terrain and impossible to see by the naked eye.

The ITAS helped to make our cordon and search missions more successful. The ITAS' thermal sights can see people moving in dark openings, behind thin curtains, and in open doorways. Anywhere there is a temperature delta, ITAS can detect it. Even when the daytime heat in the summer made it hard to use the thermals, we still had the 12X day view optics (no thermal).

Battle damage assessments (BDA) could be done with the ITAS. During direct engagements with the enemy, we were able to identify enemy combatants lying on the

ground. Without the thermals, we could not tell if the enemy was dead or just lying still, but with the thermals we were able to see the body cool and know that he was no longer a threat.

With the increased surveillance and FTL capability of the ITAS, proper radio and reporting procedures, in addition to a trained truck commander (TC), are musts. The ITAS will be able to see things no one else can and this information must be disseminated. The TC needs to ensure that the gunner is reporting everything and not getting fixated on one particular area or target.

The Missile

We initially had challenges getting TOW missiles into theater, which made us very conservative in our missile use. Throughout the deployment, our supply of missiles improved. We received and used TOW 2A missiles exclusively.

We developed the following lessons for using missiles:

- The missile will shoot UP into targets. Unlike indirect fire or CAS, which is normally fired DOWN onto the target with little effect, a TOW missile can be fired UP into a cave or rock overhang and destroy the enemy.
- A TOW missile is precise! It can be steered into a window or cave entrance. It can also be fired danger close to friendly units in extreme cases.
- Standoff range is 3,750 meters to fire a missile, but the ability to detect the enemy's movement is far greater, which allows you to prepare a coordinated engagement using indirect fire with the missile to mass the effects and have air assets enroute before the enemy is ever close enough to shoot back at you.
- In light contact, the ITAS gunner should talk other guns onto the enemy, in order to kill the enemy without having to use the TOW missile.
 - If the enemy is fixed and exposed, attempt to kill him with other weapon systems first — indirect or direct fire.
 - If the enemy is in a bunker, cave, fortified

fighting position, or about to get away, then engage and destroy with a TOW missile.

- In heavy contact, have ITAS/TOW located with the platoon leader or platoon sergeant so you can immediately engage if targets are located.

- Train the gunner to look for the most casualty producing weapons first.

- In a heavy engagement, some enemy will always be in a group. The gunner should ignore individuals and scan until he identifies a group.

- If the missile's wire breaks:

- Check the system before firing another missile. If the wire got caught on something metal, it can cause critical errors in the ITAS.

- The gunner must address the critical errors before engaging another target or the next missile will misfire.

- Missile engagement considerations:

- Power lines, concertina wire, body of water, or any type obstacle between you and the target.

- Do not use missiles with a broken seal unless it is all you have; a misfire takes a long time to correct.

- Record the lot number of faulty missile and check against other missiles.

- Due to the potential of wire breaks, don't fire over friendly units or civilians.

New ITAS and TOW Missile Improvements

As previously mentioned, the new FTL system allows for greater situational awareness for the gunner and the commander on the ground. It adds a great capability to an already great weapon system. Additionally, they are looking at the possibility of networking the ITAS enabling target locations to be passed to other shooters.

The TOW missile is going wireless! New missiles will be controlled by radio frequencies without modifications to the launcher. Also, the TOW Bunker Buster is back in production and will be issued to IBCTs (initially, there were just a few produced for the Stryker brigades). With the capability for direct, precision fires and a larger fragmenting warhead, it will be the weapon of choice to attack caves and hidden targets with overhead cover in OEF. Bunker Busters are scheduled to be delivered in 2009.

Summary

ITAS with TOW missiles are the light infantry's direct fire artillery. As a shooter, ITAS is a precision fire system capable of putting a missile with significant explosives in a cave or through a window and then providing BDA with its thermal sights. ITAS is capable of directing other fires onto the target or passing ten-digit grids to other shooters.

CPT Josh Harrison is a graduate of Carson Newman College and received his commission through ROTC. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officers Basic Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Airborne School, Recon Surveillance Leaders Course, and Ranger School. He was a platoon leader for D Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade during OEF VIII. He is currently assigned to the 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Fort Benning, Ga.

A Bridge Too Far? **THE LOST ART OF COMMANDER'S INTENT**

MAJ MICHAEL MULHERIN

“The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end state”

– FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008

We are quickly forgetting we are an intent driven army. At every level of war, commander's intent is becoming an increasingly endangered species through misinterpretation of its purpose, lack of understanding of its composition, and the inability of commanders to communicate their intent. Regardless of any other doctrinal publication, methodology, or technique, we risk losing our greatest strength and attribute — initiative — if we fail to understand commander's intent.

Beginning with our earliest military science classes, leaders are schooled to understand that commander's intent is the bridge between our mission and our concept of the operation. Regardless of how the situation changes, it provides us with what success looks like at the end of a mission. Commander's intent is not parameters or boundaries to work within. They are the pieces of the bridge that must be in place before you can cross over to achieving your purpose, even if the bridge is in a different location, over a much different gap than expected.

The importance with this difference is that understanding commander's intent, as parameters or boundaries, creates an environment where you expect your subordinates to make a decision as if they were you within a given set of circumstances. This is counterintuitive to encouraging your subordinates to exercise initiative. If they make a decision you aren't pleased with, they didn't “understand your intent,” when in reality they just couldn't read your mind. This allows for a significant possibility of error, since few people (if any) have the ability to read minds. Instead, your commander's intent should describe to them, in simple terms, what success looks like at the end of the mission, and allow them to exercise their initiative to figure out how to reach that key task accomplishment, or condition with respect to the enemy, terrain, or civil considerations.

Commander's intent comes in many forms. Our doctrine

states commander's intent can be in bullet or paragraph form, but should not exceed five sentences. Everyone has certainly seen examples where the commander's intent is structured with "Expanded Purpose," "Key Tasks," and "End State." Expanded purpose can lead us into a totally separate discussion, so I will just focus on key tasks and end state. Why do we separate the two? If I gave the key task of "Seize all key terrain in sector," couldn't I also express that as "All key terrain in sector seized?" There is no need to draw a division between key tasks and conditions. Separating these two categories just increases the chance that you will become redundant (by stating key tasks that will set conditions described in your desired end state),

that you will provide key tasks that are course of action specific, and that your commander's intent will become much greater than five sentences or bullets.

We know the Army says commander's intent should not exceed three-to-five sentences (or bullets), because our span of control is three to five elements. If we exceed five elements, our ability to focus, control, or understand begins to rapidly deteriorate. It is not uncommon for commanders' intents in Afghanistan and Iraq to be 10 or 11 (if not more) bullets. If commander's intent is going to be remembered two levels down and serve as a guide during planning and execution when conditions change, how can you reasonably focus on that many key tasks or conditions? There is no reason why, at all levels of planning, we can't have the same structure of "Expanded Purpose" (optional), and three-to-five bullet statements providing key tasks and/or conditions in respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the




Figure 1

desired end state. This doesn't alter our definition, and it facilitates understanding. The challenge is to provide these to our subordinates for EVERY mission.

In a recent episode of "Celebrity Apprentice," Donald Trump told a group of contestants that he liked people who exercised initiative and who didn't wait to be told what to do. At no point during the project, did the project leader ever explain her intent, either formally or informally. If initiative is exercised in this environment, effort is unfocused, resources can be misplaced, and results can be far different than what was expected. In this particular case, half the team contributed little if anything at all to the project completion because they were unsure what to do, tension rose within the team due to perceived lack of effort, and they lost their challenge by providing an inferior product to their customer. Although the personalities on this particular team may have difficulty working together, the only casualty from this

lack of communicating intent is financial loss. In our profession of arms, the risks are much greater.

For 234 years, our greatest strength as an Army has been the ability of our subordinates to take the initiative and make decisions in the absence of their commanders or in the absence of further orders. This is because they understood their purpose, and what success looked like at the end of their mission. Regardless of the complexity of the contemporary operating environment, the role of the commander is to simplify the environment, and explain how to achieve our purpose when our dynamic situation changes. Commander's intent is not a bridge too far; it is our bridge over troubled waters.

At the time this article was written, **MAJ Michael Mulherin** was assigned as a small group leader with the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

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BATTALION MORTAR PLATOON OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

SFC JASON LEVY

In early 2006, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was alerted for deployment in support of the global war on terrorism. The brigade was initially alerted for a deployment to Iraq, but prior to deploying was notified it would instead be deployed to Afghanistan. This change in deployment location directly affected my platoon — the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment's mortar platoon, and the valuable training and preparation we conducted directly resulted in success in combat. The purpose of this article is to share the valuable lessons my platoon learned during 15 months of heavy combat operations.

The valuable lessons learned enabled the battalion's mortarmen to accurately fire more than 5,000 indirect fire missions and over 21,000 mortar rounds in support of roughly 1,100 engagements with enemy forces in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of northeast Afghanistan. The 15 months of combat validated the doctrine, TTPs, and experience learned through numerous mortar training events, live fires, and gained institutional knowledge. The Soldiers' outstanding performance, bravery, valor, and dedication to duty resulted in the battalion's mortarmen being awarded one Distinguished Service Cross, two Silver Stars, three Bronze Stars for Valor, and more than 50 Army Commendation Medals with Valor.

Pre-deployment

In March of 2007, while the battalion was conducting pre-deployment training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), our battalion commander returned from a pre-deployment site survey of northeast Afghanistan. He immediately gathered and briefed all leaders in the battalion on all topics relevant to our future area of operations. During this brief, we were informed that the mortar platoon would be separated into sections, which would be attached to the rifle and heavy weapons companies in the battalion. Platoon operations would not be conducted. Each company would receive two to three mortar systems in addition to the organic 60mm mortars. (Once in theater, we gained additional 120mm theater-provided mortar systems. In addition, halfway through the deployment a New York National Guard mortar section consisting of 10 personnel also augmented our task force with additional mortars.) At a minimum, we would operate five mortar sections from the organic battalion mortar platoon in addition to three company mortar sections. This would give the battalion a total of eight to nine mortar sections to operate across our battlespace.

All leaders in the battalion were given contact information for

Soldiers with 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment launch mortar rounds in northeast Afghanistan 24 October 2007.

SFC Jacob Caldwell



their counterparts who were currently in theater awaiting our relief in place (RIP). This information and subsequent correspondence would be the greatest source of pre-deployment success. I was able to talk to my counterpart on a daily basis through secure e-mail. I cannot stress enough that mortar leaders need to have a clear picture of what their unit will be facing in theater. They must plan accordingly and task organize down to the individual mortar section. If communication was not made with my counterpart downrange, my platoon would have miserably failed in its task organization for the mission.

The battalion mortar platoon is doctrinally organized to run two individual sections of two squads each. If we had been unaware that we would separate mortar sections in theater, we would have faced numerous challenges during our first few months of combat. Due to the excellent communication with the mortar platoon we would be replacing, we had a clear picture of mortar operations in our future area of operations. Every question that our platoon had was answered quickly and accurately. I recommend that all leaders in your unit have an AKO-S account in order to communicate over secure channels with their counterparts. As long as you have a security clearance, your unit S2 shop will aid in the set up of this type of account. Ensure all of your NCOs and those who have the potential to be promoted during the deployment have been processed for a security clearance. From my counterpart, I learned where the sections were emplaced, how many people were manning a section, what theater-provided equipment I would be receiving, where the most volatile bases were, types of indirect fire missions, and a host of other questions that aided my platoon during the planning process. Mailing addresses for individual section locations were also distributed prior to deploying. This enabled the Soldiers to begin mailing personal items they were unable to carry during the initial embarkation.

Our battalion mortar platoon consisted of one officer and 23 enlisted personnel. In order to run five mortar sections from our platoon, it was quickly noted that we were woefully short of personnel and equipment. Through war gaming, planning and training, we determined that we could effectively run five sections with a minimum of six personnel



Photos courtesy of author

Mortarmen with the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment prepare to fire rounds during a mission in Afghanistan in October 2007.

per section. Each section would be responsible for two to three mortar systems at each location. We would man each section with two fire direction center personnel, two gunners, and two ammunition bearers. Since we were short personnel, we developed a course of action to present to our battalion leadership on how to receive additional personnel from other companies in our unit. All of the companies in our battalion were supportive and were able to backfill our platoon with Soldiers who were not indirect fire infantrymen. We relied on a quick training program in country to get these Soldiers up to speed. They all quickly became experts in indirect fire operations and as a result most have desired to reclass into our MOS.

During the pre-deployment phase, units need to cross train as many non-mortar MOS-qualified members of their unit as possible. Units need to focus on mortar assistant gunner and mortar gunnery procedures. Work with your unit chain of command to conduct mortar live fires in order to give an orientation of mortars to your unit. Basic classes on assistant gunnery duties and preparation of mortar ammunition must be conducted. The benefits of training non-11C personnel on the basic skills of a mortarman paid off greatly in combat. There are countless examples of our unit being in contact where the closest cover found during an engagement was the relative safety of the mortar positions. Once in the mortar position and pinned down by enemy

fire, the Soldiers would quickly assume the duties of an ammunition bearer or assistant gunner and augment our crews with great skill and effectiveness.

We began to map out what extra equipment would be needed in order to conduct sustained combat operations. In order to run the mortar sections effectively, we determined how many bore sights, mortar FDC computers, plotting boards, Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP) radios, aiming circles, additional mortar sights, base plates, and Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) radios we would need. We were unable to fill the requirement for extra bore sights, aiming circles, or additional plotting boards until we were in country. Units will need to cross load computers from the company mortar sections in order to maximize fire direction capability. We did a great job of coordinating with our forward support company to build a stockpile of extra baseplates, mortar sights, and repair parts for our weapons systems. If you wait until you are in country, it will be too late. I recommend having a minimum of two extra sights and one extra baseplate per mortar tube.

As a result of such decentralized operations to be conducted in theater, the platoon leadership determined that an intense instruction on fire direction procedures also needed to be conducted. We needed to certify all Soldiers in our platoon to operate a fire direction center.

Our goal was to train every single member of our platoon to use the FDC computer in the event of casualties or absences for leave or other duties that pull personnel away from a patrol base. We were given full support by our company and battalion leadership to conduct this during our JMRC rotation. We had recently been issued three M32 Lightweight Handheld Mortar Ballistic Computers (LHMCs) but were able to retain our old five M23 Mortar Ballistic Computers (MBCs). We focused on ensuring every Soldier in the platoon was able to process calls for fire on the plotting board and M23 and M32 computers. We focused on basic missions to include grid, shift, polar, registration, coordinated illumination, illumination, and immediate suppression missions. Each Soldier became extremely proficient with each system over the course of five days of intense training. This training would pay off huge dividends in future combat operations. We used the course of instruction from the Infantry Mortar Leader's Course as our training guideline.

During the JMRC rotation, we split the platoon into five sections. This enabled the individual section leaders and Soldiers to begin forming relationships with their companies and forward observers. It is critical that once the platoon is split up that they immediately begin to work with their attached company in order to develop standard operating procedures and to ensure that all personalities mesh. This early attachment enables the platoon leadership to rearrange the sections in order to maximize working relationships. This also enables the company commanders to begin integrating heavy and medium mortars into their organizations. As a result of such decentralized operations, company commanders were given clearance of fires authority for all mortar assets in their formations. Company commanders who normally only planned for 60mm mortar fire were now challenged with integrating 120mm and 81mm mortar fires into their operational plans. Section leaders need to be very proactive within their companies and ensure the maneuver commanders are aware of all capabilities and limitations of their sections' weapons systems.

The biggest lesson learned for pre-deployment of the mortar platoon was the shipping of our sensitive items, squad equipment, and expendable supplies. The platoon shipped its equipment in one

shipping container organic to HHC. As a result, this container flowed into country with HHC while the Soldiers shipped with their respective companies. This caused a great deal of problems for the HHC executive officer. Since the mortar platoon sergeant and platoon leader were forward with different mortar sections, it fell onto the company XO to separate the mortar equipment for each location and push it forward to the different sections. Over e-mail and the telephone, we were able to ensure that all required equipment was pushed forward prior to the relief in place. My recommendation is that each section split up and ship its sensitive items, expendable supplies, and all other squad equipment with the company it will be attached to. All of this equipment must be hand-receipted to the section leader prior to out load. This will ensure that all needed equipment is flown into the correct location. It will ensure the relief in place is conducted with all needed equipment, which will allow the platoon leadership and Soldiers to integrate seamlessly into combat operations.

Prior to deployment, one of the section leaders was tasked to build 10 FDC packets (two for each section). Folders with six different pockets were acquired and filled with all needed fire direction center forms. As a result, each section deployed into country with 500 computer records, 100 data sheets, 100 target list worksheets, 100 computer met data sheets, 100 safety diagram forms, and computer cheat sheets for all missions with the M23 and M32 computers. I recommend that each mortar section deploy with a minimum of 500 computer records. This will be enough to sustain each section for the first 90 days in country. After 90 days, the company will have its automation equipment in place and can resupply the mortar section as needed.

If your unit is tasked to deploy to Afghanistan, the unit leadership must also institute a rigorous physical fitness plan in order to prepare for the mountain fight. The stresses of fighting in the mountains, carrying heavy loads, and dealing with extreme weather and difficult terrain will quickly sap the combat power of an ill-prepared unit. Units must focus on building strong lower bodies that can withstand the rigors of carrying heavy loads throughout their areas of operations. As mortarmen, we worked hard to ensure our Soldiers were

ready for Afghanistan by conducting numerous road marches with full equipment and body armor. We stressed the importance of combat physical fitness that increased our Soldiers' ability to carry heavy loads, perform under pressure, and the ability to continue even though extremely fatigued.

Core muscle strength and cardio respiratory endurance must be stressed and increased in order to be successful at the high elevations of Afghanistan. Even if your Soldiers are not going to be moving through the mountains, they must still be extremely strong as the weight of moving mortar rounds around the patrol bases will quickly break down their bodies. Our mortar ammunition resupplies would often consist of hundreds of mortar rounds that needed to be moved long distances in order to be stored securely.

Deployment

Upon arrival to the company forward operating bases and platoon patrol bases, we immediately began conducting indirect fire missions. There was zero time on the ground to conduct a train up or rehearsals. Mortar platoons and sections must arrive in theater ready to immediately execute their duties as indirect fire infantrymen. There will be no time to conduct basic skills refresher as the operational tempo is too high to cease indirect fire coverage. While the rifle and mounted platoons are conducting their left and right seat rides, the mortar sections must be able to provide immediate, responsive indirect fires in support of engagements and operations. The enemy will absolutely exploit the lack of indirect fire coverage. Once the enemy determines the length of time it takes unprepared units to return fire, they will use such terms to their advantage.

We completely integrated our Soldiers and conducted a quick three-to-five day RIP operation. We received all pertinent information from the outgoing unit and shadowed them for approximately five days. All mortar sections in our battalion were emplaced into highly volatile locations that received direct and indirect fire every single day. After the RIP, we assumed control of the battlespace and continued to improve on the work that the outgoing unit started.

When arriving to a new location, the members of the mortar unit must immediately begin to learn the terrain around their patrol base. Basics such as cardinal directions,



target numbers, and prominent terrain features must be memorized. Along with knowing target numbers, Soldiers must memorize the range to all targets in sight of their mortar firing position. This will speed up the engagement of enemy forces during direct lay missions. All companies and mortar sections standardized the naming of prominent terrain features in their AO in order to speed up familiarization with the terrain. It is a great deal easier to remember a terrain feature name such as “Big Rock,” “One Tree Hill,” or “Javelin House” than it is to memorize a target number. Upon making contact, it is much easier to orient all Soldiers to the enemy location if the terrain feature is named. In the heat of battle, it is very easy to confuse target numbers. A technique to quickly memorize terrain

feature names and target numbers is to post large digital photographs of the terrain labeled with target numbers and nicknames in the fire direction center. The Soldiers can study the terrain diagram and photographs while on guard duty. Other units also put digital pictures along with range cards into their guard positions around the patrol base. It is an effective technique that will pay off when in contact.

Mortar Gunnery

One of our biggest challenges during the first month of combat operations was our speed of mortar gunnery. I attribute this to the “range mentality” that we have ingrained into ourselves as mortarmen. I previously

served as live-fire observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La. I taught, coached, and mentored more than 25 mortar platoons during live-fire and force-on-force exercises. While conducting live fires, I never saw a mortar platoon use a referred deflection other than 2800 or 3200. It is just taken for granted that mortar sections set up their weapon systems and

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment launch 81mm mortar rounds during operations in Afghanistan in October 2007.

SFC Jacob Caldwell



lay their aiming stakes in a generally front direction from the mortar tube. The mortar community needs to get out of this habit and start laying their aiming stakes in other directions.

My platoon used these same referred deflections when conducting our pre-deployment training. This is fine during training back at home station, but it will result in failure in combat. We quickly learned that our aiming stakes needed to be emplaced in the areas where we took the least amount of fire. As a result, our mortar gunners were constantly gunning backwards, sideways, and rarely to the front during conventional indirect fire missions. I cannot stress enough that units will fail if they only train using frontal-oriented referred deflections. When conducting training at home station, practice mortar gunnery using referred deflections that cause your gun squads to gun to the rear and to the side. Compute fire missions that cause intentional sight blockages. This will force your squad leaders to quickly transition to an alternate aiming pole. Mortar squads must be able to quickly transition between alternate and primary aiming poles in order to be successful in combat.

All mortar men in your unit must be proficient on all three mortar systems: 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm systems. We trained and certified all mortar men in our battalion to safely operate all three mortar systems. With each rifle and heavy weapons company in our battalion having a mix of all different mortar systems, we were able to seamlessly transition from one weapon system to the next. It also was a big benefit when we cross-loaded personnel to different patrol bases.

Mortar Positions

Our fight in the mountains of Afghanistan was a 360-degree engagement area at all times. The enemy was often very well armed and would often engage from one location with the intent of focusing our mortars onto that position. Once the mortars were engaging the first position, the enemy would open up from their primary fighting positions often located in a complete opposite direction from the first attack. This strategy would attempt to diminish the effects of our mortar fire by delaying the responsiveness of the mortars onto the second and third enemy fighting positions. The enemy was very intelligent in trying to take advantage of the time it took our mortars crew to traverse from one direction to a complete opposite direction of fire. Through practice and crew drills, we were able to greatly diminish the effects of the enemy tactics.

The mortar positions were among the most targeted locations on the patrol bases. The enemy knew that if he took out our mortar systems, he would quickly be able to gain fire superiority and have the tactical advantage. In minutes, we would have multiple rounds impacting onto the enemy. Once all targets were engaged, the squad leader would conduct surveillance to locate the most concentrated enemy forces and then bring more mortar fire onto the enemy. He would continually direct his squad on what targets to engage and with what types of rounds. This technique aided in the destruction of numerous enemy forces.

We quickly learned that the enemy is a creature of habit. They will attempt to use the same fighting positions to engage our Soldiers. An example is during the summer of 2007 in northeast Afghanistan, where the enemy attempted to use the same positions three nights in a row. We quickly identified the enemy moving into position from our location and coordinated a time on target mission with our

mortar and TOW systems. We destroyed the enemy with accurate fires and prevented numerous attacks from taking place.

An easy method to accomplish quick indirect fires is to use direct lay fires and note the firing data for all of the targets that are in sight of your mortar position. Once the rounds were in the desired location or target position, we indexed a 3200 deflection and emplaced an aiming stake in the mortar firing position. We placed a small, wooden sign onto the aiming stake with the corresponding elevation and charge in order to hit the target. If we were unable to use an aiming stake, we would simply paint a black line down the side of the mortar firing position or Hesco. This quick fire method resulted in the destruction of numerous enemy fighters in hundreds of engagements throughout our battlespace. There were often times when we were under such heavy fire that we were unable to move the mortar sight to a 3200 deflection. In these cases, we would just line the mortar cannon up with the target stake or target line and fire the corresponding data. All corrections would be made using the traversing mechanism and range estimation. As a result, our mortar firing positions had numerous aiming stakes, signs, and black lines ringing the perimeter of the position.

When building our mortar firing positions, we learned that it is more advantageous to build your positions above ground than to dig down. With the amount of precipitation in the mountains, rocky terrain and unlevel ground, we would always build up instead of down. Our mortar sections used whatever means possible in order to build their positions. Some sections used rock walls to build large enough positions while others used gigantic, square processed logs to make positions. Units will need to improvise due to the remote locations where mortars will be emplaced. It is often not physically possible to move engineer assets to the side of a mountain.

An effective technique is to build a large square out of eight-foot Hesco baskets. We built numerous positions with Hesco baskets with two entrances and exits. We locally purchased gravel and lined the inside of our mortar firing positions. This helped to keep down the dust when firing and to also prevent flooding during the winter months. The inside of the mortar firing position measured about 15-feet across. This large position was needed in order to ensure that we could have proper mask clearance in all directions. When building your mortar position, you have to ensure that you can use as much of the mortar system's range as possible. In the mountains, you are going to lose a great deal of range due to firing at such high elevations and the need to clear major terrain features. We simply would use a pair of bolt cutters to lower specific areas of the Hesco in order to maximize our range.

It is imperative that you camouflage your mortar firing positions using any and all available materials. At our remote patrol bases, we would send patrols to all of the surrounding high ground in order to take photos of our patrol base from above. We would analyze these photos in order to see what the enemy could observe. We would then camouflage our positions accordingly with camouflage nets, vegetation, spray paint, or any other improvised materials.

We would also build fake mortar positions around the patrol base or emplace dummy mortar systems into old or alternate mortar firing positions. We would take a piece of lumber or pvc pipe and set it up with a covered poncho in order to confuse the enemy on our true mortar firing locations. After major engagements, we would often find numerous bullet holes and projectile fragments in these

fake positions. The enemy has extensive early warning and observation systems. Assume that you are always under observation. Any steps you can take to attempt to confuse or disorient him will give you a tactical advantage. Always emplace your fake mortar positions during hours of limited visibility. This will also prevent the local national workers on your patrol base from seeing your dummy position emplacement.

We did not have the luxury of being able to prepare alternate firing positions for every mortar system. The small size of our patrol bases, inhospitable terrain, and constant firing did not allow us to build multiple positions. We augmented this disadvantage by constantly improving our mortar firing positions with sandbags, additional Hesco baskets, camouflage, and fortifying the entry and exit routes with Hesco walls or sandbags. You should never allow a day to go by that you are not improving your firing positions. The weather, constant engagements, and normal wear and tear will quickly deteriorate your firing positions. Do

not wait for engineer assets to come to your location. If you have to fill Hescos by hand, you must do it. Complacency will get your Soldiers killed. Position improvement must be one of your daily priorities of work.

Units need to ensure that they have alternate entry and exit routes from their mortar positions. When engaged, we would often have to move between numerous mortar firing positions in order to suppress the enemy and gain fire superiority. In our area of operations, the mortar firing positions were the most dangerous places to be located. The enemy would attempt to fix our Soldiers in place and prevent the weapon systems from firing. We stocked extra machine gun and small arms ammunition in our positions. An effective technique was to store light antitank weapons (AT4s) and light antiarmor weapons (LAWs) in our firing positions in order to effectively engage enemy fighters. These weapon systems were absolutely critical in the defense of our positions. We also stocked our mortar firing positions with enough first aid materials to stabilize numerous casualties. Improvised

litters or skedcos were also kept in our ammunition supply points in order to quickly move wounded Soldiers. I recommend that units also keep at least two to three fire extinguishers in each mortar firing position. Unexpended propellant charges must be kept covered during firing. Be disciplined and put them into an empty ammunition box or round container during every fire mission. Do not allow your Soldiers to throw unexpended charges on the ground. Disciplined Soldiers understand the need for keeping your unexpended charges covered.

Ammunition

Ammunition management will be one of the hardest tasks that you will encounter as a mortar platoon or section in a heavy mortar fight. We attempted to keep numerous types of all ammunition on hand at all times. Since all of the mortar units in our brigade were firing high numbers of ammunition, it was a challenge to keep all of our systems supplied at such high quantities.

Our ammunition resupply was conducted by our forward support company based at a forward operating base. Without their constant, outstanding support and ability to independently run resupply patrols to all of our mortar firing locations, we would have failed miserably. All of our ammunition requests were handled using ammunition expenditure reports given to our company fire support officers. At the end of each day, the FSO and company XO would have a maintenance meeting and then relay our expenditures and requests to higher headquarters. Based on our requested needs and our current round counts, the combat logistics patrol would know exactly how much ammunition we needed at each location.

Expect to fire every type of ammunition in the Army inventory. We fired rounds that were from the Vietnam era to the newest ammunition available. Tabular firing tables must be kept on hand for all ammunition. This is due to the fact that not all ammunition firing data is loaded into the M23 or M32 MBC. If your unit does not have all firing tables, they can e-mail Jodie.Ables@us.army.mil. She is the firing table point of contact for mortars and was a great help in sending our unit as many new firing tables as we needed. If you have internet connectivity, you can also download all of the firing tables from AKO. We did not have



A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment fires a mortar round toward an enemy position during operations in Afghanistan.

connectivity at many of our patrol bases for the majority of the deployment so this was not feasible. Also, if the internet is slow, it can take hours to download some of the larger firing tables.

In the mountains of northeast Afghanistan, natural cover and huge rock formations offered excellent protection for enemy fighters. In order to effectively engage the enemy, we would fire a heavy mixture of white phosphorus and high explosive rounds. We would use the proximity fuze setting in order to maximize our effects on target.

In the mountain fight, we had great success using the 81mm M819 red phosphorus round. This excellent munition is well-suited for the mountain fight due to having the capability of changing the time setting of its detonation. This was very important when our crews were attempting to engage enemy that were located in deep ravines, draws, and in heavy rock formations. In conjunction with high explosive rounds, we had excellent suppression and neutralization of enemy targets. During the deployment, it was very difficult to procure this round in great numbers. We would save this round for our larger scale attacks in order to maximize its effects. Ensure that you properly store this round in a cool area where the temperatures will not become extremely hot.

In the beginning of our deployment, we were having difficulties engaging enemy on very steep terrain and inside deep ravines and draws. For these situations, a technique we used with great success was to increase the charge manually. By increasing the charge, we would increase the angle of fall for the mortar round. This technique allowed us to achieve greater effects on target and improve our overall accuracy.

Ensure that your unit properly stores all ammunition. In the first 10,000 rounds fired in support of combat operations, we had only two rounds that ballistically failed and did not land at the desired target. I believe this was due to improper storage of the round. White phosphorus rounds must be stored properly as the contents will easily settle on the side of the round and cause improper flight. Mortar rounds must be stored on a minimum of six inches of dunnage in order to prevent the rounds from getting wet or damaged. We would simply download pallets of bottled water and then use the pallets to store our cases of mortar ammunition.

On our gun line we would keep numerous rounds of all types. There are many techniques you can use to store your ready ammunition but a few are to use pallets with overhead cover, empty two-foot Hescos with sandbags on the bottom can hold up to fifteen 120mm rounds, or shelving built into the sides of your Hesco barriers. You will have to use the terrain to your advantage but ensure that your ready ammunition storage methods have overhead cover to prevent premature detonations from enemy fire.

Do not store all of your mortar ammunition in one location on your patrol base. The enemy is always performing surveillance. He will know where your ammunition storage areas are and will directly target them during engagements. Use multiple ammunition supply points in addition to your ready ammunition located on the gunline in order to mitigate any sustained damage by the enemy. You must use a minimum of three feet of overhead and side cover for all of your ammunition supply points.

At our patrol bases where direct lay was the primary method of engagement, we would have numerous rounds broken down to the minimum charge needed to hit our most likely enemy positions. This effective time-saving technique paid off when we were engaged by enemy forces. Keep these rounds in a separate ready location in

order for quick retrieval by your Soldiers.

Empty mortar ammunition cans soon overwhelm your patrol base if a plan does not exist to get rid of them. During the beginning of the deployment, we would fill all mortar cans with dirt and use them for force protection. When we did not need the cans anymore, we would give them to the Afghan National Army and they would use them for their force protection needs. Once no more cans were needed, we would simply call our FSC, and they would backhaul the empty cans to a main forward operating base for reuse or recycling.

Do not allow your personnel to burn unused charges or increments during the hours of limited visibility. We would only burn our excess charges in the morning. This would prevent the burn pit fire from burning all night and thus exposing our positions. Ensure that a competent person is put in charge of this task. Do not give charges away to the Soldiers on the FOB to burn human waste.

AEPS

Due to high amount of firing on a daily basis, it would be practically impossible to record each round fired using the DA Form 2408-4 after each day's firing. As a result, we developed the following TTP. At the beginning of each month, each mortar squad and section would forward me their rounds fired for each mortar cannon by round type and charge for the previous month. I would then log onto AEPS and update the weapon card, print it off, and digitally send it to each section.

If you are unable to log onto AEPS or find your mortar cannon records, send an e-mail to Joe.Schmidt@us.army.mil. He is the point of contact for mortar cannons and firing records. His assistance and expertise greatly aided my platoon in the mortar fight as he was able to research numerous mortar cannons that we received to replace our worn systems. (Alternate e-mail POCs for mortar gun cards are brian.connelly1@us.army.mil, christopher.urban1@us.army.mil, and joseph.leigh@us.army.mil.)

Maintenance

One of the biggest challenges in such a heavy mortar fight is ensuring your systems are fully mission capable at all times. During 15 months of heavy combat, our platoon had to replace several mortar cannons, mortar bipods, baseplates, and mortar sights. The constant daily firing took its toll on all of our equipment. After every fire mission we vigorously conducted mortar maintenance in order to ensure our cannons were ready at all times for all missions and enemy contacts. We had great success using rifle bore cleaner after every fire mission. Additionally, we would conduct maintenance on all systems at a minimum of twice daily. Units need to conduct daily preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of all equipment to ensure that systems are operational and mission capable. If you follow the technical manual's detailed inspections, you will be able to forecast problems before they become a major issue.

We attempted to borescope and pullover all weapons systems at least once every two months or every 500 rounds. This was often very difficult due to the size of our battlespace, distance between patrol bases, and remote locations of patrol bases. Our armament technician from our forward support company was absolutely outstanding. He was given the support of his company to constantly travel throughout our area of operations with all repair parts, inspection equipment, and other needed supplies. His expertise



Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment identify enemy fighters during operations in Afghanistan.

was absolutely critical in the fixing of our mortar bipods, individual weapons, and other assigned equipment.

I recommend that units deploying to Afghanistan bring a minimum of two baseplates and two sights for each individual mortar system. This will prevent a system from becoming dead lined in case of damage to a sight or baseplate. The sheer distance between patrol bases and the location of your maintenance company may prevent the immediate replacement of a damaged item of equipment until a combat logistics patrol or air resupply is scheduled and executed.

Individual mortarmen must also know how to properly fix their equipment and troubleshoot problems. We fixed numerous bipods on our own by following the maintenance manuals. When the armament technician is inspecting your mortar cannons and bipods, have your Soldiers take notes and learn how to troubleshoot the problems on their own. My Soldiers quickly became experts at fixing their own bipods and other mortar essential equipment.

Our company purchased large tool kits for each of our mortar sections. These kits included everything that was needed in order to fix all weapons systems. The tool kits were absolutely critical in ensuring our mortar systems were fully operational at all times. I recommend that each unit deploying to Afghanistan issue each section or mortar squad a large tool kit that contains enough hand tools to fix all problems and last throughout the deployment. Additionally,

we purchased and issued jig saws, circular saws, drills, and extension cords. These tools were absolutely critical to building ammunition bunkers, increased force protection, and other various tasks.

FDC Procedures

All of the skills learned during previous training events, the Infantry Mortar Leader's Course, and unit live fires were validated throughout our 15 months of deployment to Afghanistan. While we did not use advanced missions to a great extent, the bases for all indirect fire missions were direct lay, immediate suppression, registration, coordinated illumination, adjust fire grid, shift, polar, and shift from a known point.

At our different firing locations, each fight was absolutely different. Some of the mortar sections primarily operated with a fire direction center while others operated predominately with direct lay fires. Some sections fired a heavy mix of both FDC operations and direct lay fires. This was due to the different terrain where each patrol base was located and the engagement distance by enemy forces. Many of the patrol bases had observation of all terrain in their area of operations. Regardless of the employment technique, every mortar section operated with outstanding skill and proficiency.

Direct lay was used at a majority of our firing locations to great effect. It was the quickest way to bring maximum rounds onto the enemy in the shortest amount of time possible. Using direct lay in conjunction with target reference stakes, we were able

to bring more than 20 rounds of mortar ammunition onto the enemy within the first minutes of direct and indirect fire engagements. Direct lay was primarily used at numerous locations due to our being engaged with enemy fire all the time in our mortar firing positions and patrol bases. We did not have time to process a call for fire, compute the data, and then send it to the gunline. At some locations, our mortar squad leader would lead his Soldiers to the mortar firing position, identify enemy targets, and give direct lay instructions to his squad. Often a squad would consist of the mortar squad leader, gunner, and an assistant gunner. The squad leader would spot the impact of the round and give corrections to the mortar gunner. If a forward observer called in a fire mission, we would simply compute it on the gunline and then give the commands to our gun team. Each squad leader whose primary missions were direct lay would have an MBITR radio or ASIP in order to communicate with the forward observers.

Soldiers had the ranges memorized to all terrain features and target numbers in their immediate vicinity. Upon reaching the mortar firing position, the Soldiers would quickly traverse the mortar onto the first visible enemy positions, fire the mortar system, and then quickly shift to all other known targets where enemy fighters were located. We learned the quickest way to suppress the enemy fighters was to engage as many targets as possible and then concentrate our fires onto the largest concentration of enemy fighters. The psychological impact of numerous mortar rounds impacting onto separate enemy fighting positions directly enabled our patrol base to gain fire superiority. Our Soldiers quickly became experts at direct lay fires and destroyed numerous enemy fighters.

We often used our mortars on continuous operations throughout our battlespace. We air assaulted, convoyed, and man-packed our 60mm and 81mm mortars on numerous operations into the mountains of northeast Afghanistan. We would attempt to go in as light as possible as the mountains quickly fatigue the body when carrying heavy loads. Due to having to support numerous missions throughout the area of operations, smaller crews were often the norm when conducting operations outside of our patrol bases. The FDC would consist of one computer while the other two personnel

conducted the manipulation of the mortar system. Since we were in radio contact with the mortar teams back at the patrol bases, they would hear the call for fire and conduct check computer duties. One aspect that the mortar team must plan for is ammunition resupply. We had great success by building pre-positioned speedballs of ammunition. This ammunition would be placed on the patrol base and could be quickly delivered to us by aviation or ground assets.

All of our Soldiers carried graphical firing scales also known as “whiz wheels” in the side pocket of their Improved Outer Tactical Vest or in their rack system. We carried them for every type of ammunition that we had on hand. Upon receiving enemy fire or positive identification of enemy personnel, the mortar gunner would conduct direct lay onto the enemy positions. The whiz wheels were absolutely a time saver in the processing and firing of thousands of fire missions. I recommend that the Army mandate that a graphical firing scale is included in every box of mortar ammunition. It was very difficult to find whiz wheels for infrared illumination for all mortar systems.

Every section in our platoon was able to receive meteorological (MET) data daily for all locations. By accessing the Interactive Grid Analysis and Display System (IGrADS) site, we received MET by inputting the latitude and longitude for each specific valley. During the first six months of the deployment, we received MET data every four hours by using a SIPR-connected computer with access to the IGrADS site. We had mixed results with MET data and eventually stopped using it. With the constant weather changes in our valleys, MET data was not giving us increased accuracy during fire missions. While MET data is extremely effective in other areas of operations, our mission accuracy was effective without it.

For conventional fire missions, we fired mostly adjust fire missions using the grid, shift, and polar methods. In order to process missions with speed, our fire direction centers already had the firing data worked up for most target numbers in our area of responsibility. We placed copies of all target lists in our mortar firing positions with the corresponding firing data. This sped up our processing of fire missions and for laying the weapons systems onto targets during operations and battle tracking. Our FDCs would often consist of two personnel who would receive the fire mission and send it to the gunline via radio. The gunline squad leader or senior man present would read back the firing data, check the mortar sight for correctness, and then prepare the ammunition for firing. Since many of our missions were danger close to friendly troops, we checked the initial azimuth of fire with an M2 compass. This was an additional safety measure that helped to mitigate any firing incidents. Since the mortar fight in our area of operations was a 360-degree engagement area, we ensured that we were always on the correct initial firing azimuth prior to firing the mortar.

When receiving a call for fire, you must receive the elevation of the target. We would not fire mortar missions unless given an altitude to the target or an up or down correction for a polar mission by the forward observer. This prevented short and long rounds from being fired. Vertical interval and altitude correction are critical computations that must always be taken into account. The majority of our patrol bases were located in the low ground due to our desire to be close to the population. As a result, the majority of our mortar fires were uphill. We learned that you must make bold corrections in order to adjust your mortar fires

onto steep terrain. When conducting direct lay fires, you must take into account the vertical interval and altitude corrections or else you will not be able to emplace accurate fires. We purchased Bushnell laser rangefinders, which were excellent because they computed the vertical interval into the final displayed computed range.

At many of our locations, the enemy would engage from multiple positions onto our friendly patrols and fire bases. We would often receive simultaneous missions from the forward observers. Units must practice simultaneous missions and develop standard operating procedures so there is no confusion on the radio or gunline. I recommend that units use separate firing nets for their artillery and mortar fires. This will prevent confusion when the observers begin to call corrections for fire missions. If you are unable to use separate controlling radio nets, ensure that the observer clearly states the target number that the subsequent corrections are for.

Our unit would find the enemy by using all available methods such as UAVs, optics, aviation assets, scout elements, and constant mounted and dismounted patrolling. Upon positive identification of the enemy, we would attempt to fix him in place with effective heavy weapon and mortar fires. Upon contact, our unit would immediately request artillery fires in order to fix and destroy the enemy. The mortar and artillery fire would fire on enemy positions, enemy exfiltration routes, and historic fighting positions. The enemy would often attempt to break contact using rat trails and natural lines of drift. We attempted to prevent him from breaking contact by firing on his exfiltration routes. We would fire onto these positions in order to fix the enemy in place. Simultaneously, our forward observers, platoon leaders, and company commanders would be requesting close combat attack (CCA) or close air support (CAS) assets to destroy the enemy. With the enemy fixed in place, we were able to destroy numerous enemy fighters with combined indirect fires, CAS, and CCA.

The key to our success in providing immediate, accurate indirect fires was that we had the complete confidence of all ground commanders. In our unit, company commanders had clearance of fires authority for all weapons systems up to 120mm mortars. Upon making contact, the section leader would call for clearance of numerous targets. Once given clearance of fires, the section leader was able to engage all targets without delay. If we had to clear our mortar fires at battalion level, we would lose our timeliness and effectiveness due to huge distances between firing elements and battalion headquarters. This effective technique was the key to our success in numerous engagements with enemy forces.

The purpose of this article was to discuss the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the 2nd Battalion, 503rd IN (Airborne) mortar platoon and company mortar sections during its recent deployment to Afghanistan as part of OEF VIII. These valuable lessons learned directly led to success in combat for our battalion’s mortarmen.

SFC Jason Levy served as the mortar platoon sergeant for HHC, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade from May 2006 to November 2008. Previous assignments include JRTC Observer/Controller and mortar section sergeant in the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.



SMARTER PATROLLING:

DISMOUNTED MOVEMENT IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN

CPT AARON W. CHILDERS
SFC DAVID BANKS

Basic movement techniques and platoon-level patrolling may be seen by some as antiquated, but in Afghanistan, these “basics” are valuable building blocks. Conducting urban warfare and moving in armored vehicles with cutting edge technology is often how the Army is depicted. Although this might be the conflict some imagine, it is not the fight in rural Afghanistan. Patrolling, as instructed in Ranger School and FM 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, sounds archaic and simple, but the opposite is true. Terrain, cultural limitations, enemy situation, host nation forces, and a slew of other factors make the contemporary battlefield confusing, but sometimes returning to the basics makes everything simpler.

In the spring of 2007, I served as a platoon leader in Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), and deployed to Ghazni Province in eastern Afghanistan. The

existing obstacles and severely restrictive terrain and enemy situation in this area limited our ability to move mounted and forced my platoon to adapt a traditional way of patrolling.

Andar District, located immediately to the south of Ghazni City, was the most difficult area in A Company’s Rhode Island-sized battlespace. When 26 Korean hostages were kidnapped near there that summer, the district gained international attention. As the security situation in the district worsened, ambushes of local trucks carrying coalition resupply increased. Initially, my platoon occupied a fire base at the district’s government center, and later that year, the company moved to an abandoned Russian base about 10 kilometers away.

The terrain in this area is flat, mostly open, and is only slightly restrictive to dismounted movement. Vehicular movement is severely restricted though by hundreds of irrigation ditches dug by the

Russians in an attempt to revitalize the area's farming. Only two roads in 2nd Platoon's area, which measured over 100 square kilometers, were trafficable by up-armored HMMWVs (UAHs). In the spring of 2007, only one main supply route (MSR) was paved. Ditches belonging to karez systems, which are local irrigation systems, ran several kilometers long and were the most limiting obstacle in the battlespace. They had steep walls and ranged from 10-to-30-foot deep with five-foot berms on each side. Although the ditches prohibited UAH movement, the enemy could move mostly unrestricted on small motorbikes.

There were patches of increased vegetation, usually consisting of aspen trees and fruit orchards, that were just large enough to provide a platoon minus cover and concealment. The fields, which covered a majority of the district, were full of smaller irrigation ditches. The irrigation systems ran between the plots of land and kept the land watered. When plowed, these areas filled with soft dirt, which turned into a slippery mud when irrigated. During growing seasons, they were completely impassable by vehicle.

There were roughly 100 small villages in the area, usually consisting of 20 compounds or roughly 200 people. The buildings were walled mud huts usually one story and never more than three stories high. The walls ranged from 10-foot tall in smaller compounds to 40-foot tall in aging forts. Inside the compound, there were usually two to four buildings used as living quarters. Most families kept livestock inside the home as well as a small garden. Villages usually centered on a mosque and a well, with homes and walled gardens on the outskirts of the town. Each village usually had one main road entering into the village with small alleys and goat paths leading out. Most villages were also centered along an irrigation ditch for farming purposes. These ditches are used by the Taliban as covered and concealed avenues of approach. The walled gardens canalized movement through the villages and provided excellent positions for enemy caches.

The mountains bordering the Andar District were up to 10,000 feet in height with little to no vegetation. The roads into the mountains provided excellent ambush positions, allowing the enemy to overwatch the road. The mountain roads were in poor condition and extremely restrictive to

maneuver. Enemy spotters used the mountains to spot coalition movement. According to the local leaders, these were the same positions used by the Mujahideen against the Russian division that had been in this area.

The enemy knew how to use the terrain to their advantage. They almost always initiated contact at the maximum range of their weapon systems, trading accuracy for standoff. The enemy would place an irrigation ditch between coalition forces and their firing points, using that natural obstacle to deny the coalition forces the ability to maneuver on them. We observed the Taliban retrograding to supplementary positions with cover and concealment. The enemy also used the ditches from the karez system or the walled gardens inside a village as cover during contact and concealment during their exfil.

A Company established several Afghan National Police (ANP) outposts on paved roads, pushing the ANP out into the communities. These outposts enabled the platoon and company to send dismounted patrols across the battlespace. However, the majority of the population was not located along these high speed avenues. Over the last three years, the coalition had focused little aid to this district and no aid outside of the paved road and the district center. U.S. forces had failed to focus a significant effort

off this paved surface.

Four months into the 15-month rotation, 2/A/2-508 had the ability to move mounted, but because of maintenance and battle damage, we began to move dismounted into the battlespace, a decision that would give us an unforeseen advantage.

Dismounted movement had become slightly foreign to my unit, which had returned from Iraq and adopted different tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Moving back into a wedge was difficult for some to adjust to, especially when very open terrain forced larger intervals between men. The large open areas did not give adequate cover for any other type of formation, and rehearsals just outside the fire base were key.

Even with the open terrain, some existing obstacles offered the enemy advantages. The dried river beds in the area had banks the enemy could fire from. These areas were particularly dangerous because of the loose sand which slowed down any element that tried to cross it. Any open area that created clear fields of fire in front of ditches were avoided all together if possible.

While training in garrison, we conducted road marches twice a week. The difference was obvious once we started moving in Afghanistan. Moving tactically over difficult terrain, sometimes at high elevations, was much more demanding than a tactical road



Author's photos

Elements of 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and an Afghan National Army soldier cross an irrigation ditch described above.

march on trails in North Carolina.

What we discovered as the best movement formation by far was bounding overwatch. When the platoon left the firebase, one squad and gun usually remained with the weapons squad leader. Two squads, two gun teams, and the headquarters element usually went on patrol. The guns were attached to squads and would move with them while bounding. This was not just used in times of likely enemy



Dismounted movement was key not only because of the terrain but also to maintain the element of surprise.

contact, but also during summer months where it offered the covering element a break. This was usually adopted when the terrain opened up, and fields of fire 800 meters or more were available.

In training, roads were always treated as linear danger areas, but the idea of terrain as a true linear danger area was slightly foreign. While deployed, the unit treated the irrigation ditches as avenues of approach, especially in areas where we knew that motorbike traffic was uninhibited along the bottom of the ditch.

We modified the use of objective rally points (ORPs) to suit the terrain. Instead of templating our ORPs a few hundred meters from the objective in a traditional environment, we utilized the last covered and concealed position on our route. Due to line of sight, the ORPs could be up to one kilometer from the objective. From this location, we were able to use the terrain to the best of our advantage and conduct the leader recons before we entered the village. Going any closer in this open terrain would have given away our position, which often forced us to use the ORP as the release point. When we carried rucks, we dropped them at the local support by fire.

The cultural constraints often limited us when placing our support-by-fire (SBF) locations. One squad would move in with the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) to search the house. After we searched the house, we would ask the owner for permission to use their house. (This worked out well in two ways with the populace. First of all, the search was random and different houses are selected when we return to the village. Secondly, Pashtu culture welcomed travelers who passed through requesting rest according to their Pashtun Code.) Here, we placed and organized the rucks. The M240s moved on top of the roof and dismounted patrols departed from the compound. One TTP that we adopted later on was using ANA forces to sit on top of the roof. This quelled several complaints about Americans being visible from outside the compound.

Establishing the local support by fire in a compound also gave a secure place to establish a casualty collection point (CCP) or enemy prisoner of war (EPW) collection point if needed. By engaging the homeowner in comfortable surroundings, and keeping them away from crowds, the villagers were more apt to share information with coalition forces. The homeowner usually gave information that he would not have told coalition forces on patrol.

During operations lasting longer than a night or two, the unit learned to adapt patrol bases to the terrain. Observation posts

worked well at night but were extremely hard to hide during the day. Because of the virtually unbroken line of sight during the day and the amount of herders that move around in the early morning, daytime covert positions were almost impossible unless we were located in higher elevations. The patrol bases my platoon established in Afghanistan were often located around gardens and pump houses in orchards. The patrol base was almost always seen at first light, and the entire area was usually aware of their position by the time daily patrols began.

When the platoon went through patrol base activities, one of the most important steps was terrain analysis. The most challenging terrain feature in Andar, the irrigation ditches, provided unobservable avenues of approach. These areas were usually covered with claymores to resolve the issue.

Since the line of sight compromised our security during the daylight, the platoon would mitigate the threat of being seen by moving to a new location after EENT (end evening nautical twilight). As soon as the platoon was sure that they could be observed, they would move to the next patrol base location.

This gave us several advantages. During the spring and fall the ground would usually freeze at night making it much easier to move across than the slush or mud. Probably the best advantage that moving at this time provided was the ability to overwatch previous patrol bases from several kilometers away. On one occasion, the Taliban engaged a previous patrol base giving the platoon a good idea of enemy composition disposition and strength. Moving at night to new positions kept the enemy guessing about our location, greatly increasing security.

When the unit arrived in country, we attempted to use vehicles to cordon off areas. Although the vehicles gave the gunners a better line of sight, the ditches that ran through most villages and the terrain never allowed for complete isolation. Some villages were just not conducive to mounted movement. The greatest disadvantage to using vehicles when they were available was losing the element of surprise. Even at night, vehicular movement was restricted to the few trafficable roads, helping the enemy detect movement.

Dismounted movement was the only way to keep surprise. Moving to a release point and going to blocking positions gave the element of surprise back to U.S. forces and achieved full isolation. Any enemy lookouts or scouts were looking for vehicles, expecting forces to stick to mounted movement.

Breaching, if necessary, was done with shotgun or bolt cutters due to weight. When moving into an area after setting up a vehicle patrol base (VPB), a door ram could be used, but it was impractical for long movements.

Although dismounted movement was the method of choice, there were several instances where, because of distance of terrain between the fire base and objective, part of the movement is completed by vehicle. Many times a vehicle patrol base was established within five kilometers of the objective, and the dismounted element moved in from that position. The problem with this technique is that that half of the manpower in the platoon is left at the VPB and not where it was required on the objective.

Several other successful techniques can be applied. In one instance, another platoon provided the vehicle crews and 2nd Platoon rode in passenger seats. When the mounted element reached the de-trucking point, one of the lead trucks created a diversion.

During a mission to target an improvised

explosive device (IED) cell, another platoon acted as the drivers, truck commander (TC), and gunners. The de-trucking point occurred at a low water crossing point. The mounted element stopped 100 meters before the point. As the trucks went down into the low water crossing, concealing the truck completely, the dismounts moved 100 meters up the ditch. The truck came out of the low water crossing with doors closed and preceded on what seemed like a routine patrol. Although multiple rehearsals were conducted with the entire element inside the fire base, the rehearsal paid off enormously in execution.

Service and support is a challenging issue when moving longer distances dismounted. There is a tough balance between bringing what is needed and overloading Soldiers to the point of ineffectiveness. While we understood the concept of how a light infantry unit should plan for service and support, there were valuable lessons developed through experiences and after action reviews (AARs).

Tailoring the load for the terrain, weather, and temperature is another challenge. For example, M240B tripods were carried only for planned SBFs or for patrol bases. This being said, tripods in contact were very helpful and increase the weapon's maximum effective range. To ease the burden on the weapons squad, each of the three gun teams were assigned to a squad and their basic load of ammo was distributed between that squad, rather than the individual gun team.

Each rifleman carried his basic load, to include the M203 grenadiers. When moving for several days, we packed a two-day supply of food and water. This was tailored down to one full CamelBak plus eight more bottles of water. Resupply is coordinated for 24 hours after movement begins and was delivered via low cost low altitude parachute or contract helicopter if ground resupply was not available.

Evacuation equipment is always important, and there are several ways to carry these supplies dismounted. We always carried a falcon litter (collapsible rigid litter). The falcon litter is well worth the extra weight, as it allowed us to transport casualties with ease, as opposed to the unbalanced, poleless litter which takes much longer to transport casualties with. In the summer time, we also carried one IV and a starter kit per buddy team.

During the winter, patrols were much shorter in distance. As the winter comes, the packing lists became heavier and heavier. The Army provided the Level VII system to the Soldiers. This gear gave leaders the flexibility to cut weight without sacrificing warmth and react to different levels of cold.

A key problem is battery unit basic load (UBL). In the summer, the weight becomes an issue, and in the winter, battery life causes problems. As an SOP, each Soldier in the platoon carried an additional load of batteries, usually extra AAs.

Tailoring communications equipment is also another big challenge, as communications gear required the most space and weighed the most. Communications was a constant problem in Afghanistan because of the terrain. In the mountains, any line-of-sight system had difficulties. The most reliable and battery smart piece of equipment was the PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR). The MBITR performed the same as an ASIP and 117 in most



A Soldier with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, watches village activity from an overwatch position. The Soldier is carrying a falcon litter.

situations, and being only a quarter of the size was much better for dismounted patrolling. On long movements, the RTO connected a tactical satellite (TACSAT) antenna to his ruck sack, and simply faced the antenna in the appropriate direction to make a call. This was especially effective in contact. A majority of our contacts were made outside of FM range and the MBITR was the only mode of communication.

The MBITRs had different battery configurations, which made it especially useful. Using a special battery adapter, 5590s were attached to the MBITR. In patrol bases, the additional 5590s were used to run the MBITR through the night. During the day, another adapter, which used 12x 3v lithium batteries, was used. The lighter 3v batteries also cut down on the amount of weight that had to be carried.

At first the ANSF (Afghan Security Forces) did not respond well to our TTPs, but the ANSF eventually became a valuable asset. The ANSF would develop bonds with the local populace when we were on patrol by visiting mosques, sharing meals, and using local wells.

During missions, each ANA soldier had his own ruck sack and packed some winter clothing. While entering villages, the ANA stayed with the acting weapons squad leader, using their RPKs and RPGs at the local support by fire. However, the ANP were kept on a short leash with the clearing element. Although they were good at movement, ANSF had to be integrated into rifle fire teams during contact. Towards the end of the deployment, their staff showed great improvements in their ability to plan for totally independent resupply missions. During the winter, the Kandak (Afghan battalion) even issued cold weather gear to its troops.

As time progressed, the ANSF even led formations back on approved paths. This put the ANSF up front, making them visible in high traffic areas, such as bazaars. When conducting cordon and searches, the ANSF were an integral part of the search and placed an Afghan face on operations.

Moving dismounted had a large effect on the population. People were shocked to see Americans walk to remote villages that had not been visited before. Even when the coalition forces were just moving through a village, it had a much greater effect on the people than a UAH rolling past them on a road. Dismounted movement had an immense psychological effect, especially at dawn, when locals would find Soldiers moving through their fields. When the coalition forces walked into villages, the people treated them with hospitality, due to the Pashtun code. On several occasions, locals were actually startled when they stumbled upon an ORP established early in the morning. Several local nationals told us that the fact that we walked separated us from the Russians. Our dismounted movement helped us move covertly and retain the element of surprise.



In colder temperatures, Soldiers carried/utilized special equipment such as ice cleats, additional uniform items, and medical items for cold weather injuries.

Coalition forces identified several disadvantages to moving dismounted as well. The enemy was very quick to adapt. We received reports of IEDs designed to target dismounts but fortunately never encountered them. The biggest shift was how the enemy moved away from IEDs and was forced to resort to direct fire engagements.

The enemy also realized that we would not be able to close the distance as quickly. Although we would try to move as fast as possible, it took time to maneuver. U.S. weapons systems helped in this somewhat. The M240B, especially when on tripod, could effectively suppress the enemy far beyond their effective range, allowing U.S. forces to maneuver. The M203 proved to be an excellent weapon while dismounted. The 40mm grenades were used to cut off the enemy exfil routes and reach behind

their covered positions. Another excellent weapon system was the M14, carried by the squad designated marksmen. The M14 with Leopold sights enhanced our ability to not only fire at targets but to observe areas as well.

Eventually the enemy became familiar with our battle drills and TTPs. In one far ambush, the Taliban emplaced a security engagement in order to prevent a bold flanking flank. This required more thoughtful execution when in contact. They also developed the TTP to try and draw U.S. forces out, separating the SBF and maneuver element away from each other with sporadic fire in different directions. This was also attempted on formations in villages. This again requires careful consideration from the leader on the ground and good command and control of all subordinate units, especially ANSF.

Many of the subjects discussed are derived from basic infantry tasks, FM 3-21.8, and Ranger School TTPs. These techniques took time to develop in country and many of them were painful to learn. Infantry tasks have been referred to as “easy to learn, but impossible to master.” This is very true in that the basics are taught, but they must be adapted in every situation. Ultimately, unless U.S. forces continue to hone, develop, train, and execute these basics, they will be re-taught by our enemies.

CPT Aaron W. Childers is currently attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course with a follow-on assignment with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. He has served as a platoon leader and assistant operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C. He deployed to Afghanistan as a platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. CPT Childers has a bachelor's degree in International Studies from the Virginia Military Institute.

SFC David Banks is currently a Ranger instructor with the 5th Ranger Training Battalion in Dahlonaga, Ga. He entered the Army in 1987 and has held positions at every level in light and heavy infantry assignments. He deployed to Afghanistan as a platoon sergeant with the 2nd Battalion, 508th PIR.



Planning Challenging, Realistic Training at the Battalion Level

CPT PAUL BENFIELD

“Success in battle does not happen by accident; it is a direct result of tough, realistic, and challenging training.”

— FM 7-0, Training the Force
October 2002

Many junior officers and NCOs of my generation have served multiple tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. With today’s increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO), multi-echeloned training has never been more critical. Ironically, the same OPTEMPO that demands increased levels of training has led to a loss of competence in garrison-based skills such as training management among junior officers and NCOs. On numerous occasions, I have heard senior Army officers tell groups of young officers that one of the biggest shortcomings among junior officers is a lack of knowledge on training management. Contrary to these perceived deficiencies, I was a part of the planning and execution of an excellent battalion-planned training event; planned in large part by the same junior officers lacking training management experience. With clear guidance and a good working relationship between key staff, battalions can conduct challenging, realistic, and multi-echeloned training.


The 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment returned from a 15-month deployment in March of 2007. Our battalion suffered the same fate as many returning units, namely a large reduction in personnel strength due to separations and permanent changes of station (PCS). Due to the large turnover of experienced personnel, the battalion began a training cycle at the individual Soldier level. The next seven months saw the unit conducting basic individual skills training, working up to squad-level live-fire exercises in November. The plan was to complete squad-level training in order to have the battalion prepared to conduct platoon-level training by December.

The most important element in planning training, and a must before the process can begin, is to receive the commander’s intent. As in any military operation, training must

have a clear and concise purpose on which to base and focus planning. In this case, the battalion commander, LTC Christopher LaNeve, gathered all of the primary staff, along with the battalion executive officer (XO), MAJ Eric Flesch. The staff discussed key tasks to be trained on during the upcoming platoon live-fire exercise. Because the battalion was planning for a possible Afghanistan deployment, the commander stressed key counterinsurgency (COIN) tasks. He also stressed that the training must be as realistic as possible. The newest private and the most cynical team leader must believe that the training was productive and useful.

The meeting was informal, which allowed open discussion from everyone. This facilitated ideas from everyone on the staff, capitalizing on a wide variety of training, combat, and historical experience. This simple brainstorming session around a white board, combined with doctrinal mission essential task list (METL), led to a lengthy list of individual and collective tasks that would be a part of the training event. Some additional specific guidance from the commander was that the training should encompass both mounted and dismounted operations; should cover a period of 24-36 hours of continuous operations; and should focus on key COIN tasks

Figure 1 — Platoon EXEVAL (STX and LFX) Concept



such as cordon and search, local leader engagement, and indigenous security force coordination.

The coordination of three critical elements make up successful planning of platoon-level training. The battalion S3 develops the “what” of the training concept. The “why” is the battalion S2’s development of an intelligence-driven script. The “how” is the support plan developed by the battalion S4. The primary planners for this event were CPT John Baker, the assistant battalion S3, 1LT Nathaniel Tupper, the battalion S2, and myself, the battalion S4. Of the three primary planners, none had yet attended their respective captain’s career courses.

As the AS3, CPT Baker was the lead planner and had two critical and connecting tasks. One was the development of the actual training plan, and the second was obtaining necessary training areas. These two tasks are often mutually dependent. The type and availability of training land has a significant impact on what type of training is actually possible. Many training events fall into the trap of having what geographical areas are available direct the type of training they conduct. It is a difficult balancing act to work both issues simultaneously.

CPT Baker first came up with a general plan. To identify possible training events, he grouped the listed tasks by related concepts. He then developed a simple concept sketch as a visual depiction. It clearly laid out a generic outline from which the staff sections could begin detailed, concurrent planning. On several occasions throughout the two months leading up to the training event, the staff came together through intermediate planning reviews (IPR). These IPRs de-conflicted friction points between the staff, solidified the plan, and slowly began to develop into a detailed scenario.

One of the most difficult aspects of preparing this training event was acquiring necessary training areas. Limited resources, combined with competition for land with other units, made acquiring appropriate training areas extremely difficult. MAJ Flesch brought forward an idea from a previous assignment to create modular walls by building separate sections of wall out of 4 x 8 plywood that were bolted together in




Figure 2 — Platoon EXEVAL (STX and LFX) Concept of Support

any one-room or multi-room configuration. CPT Baker’s scenario required a village to conduct a cordon and search. A “village” could be created almost anywhere by building small shacks out of plywood, negating the need for a complex, and difficult to coordinate, MOUT training area.

LTC LaNeve’s requirement to give the platoons a lengthy mounted movement presented a particular problem due to the limited land and training areas available. Other units were frequently using training areas at the same time our training was scheduled. However, the roads surrounding them or even running through them were usually not part of a unit’s training plan. CPT Baker conducted prior coordination with land-owning units throughout Fort Bragg and obtained permission to use the roads running between and through training areas. Combined with creative use of checkpoints throughout the post, he was able to ensure a lengthy mounted movement with a limited amount of “owned” training area.

Once CPT Baker completed the concept sketch, 1LT Tupper was able to develop an intelligence-driven scenario that would act as the script. Each platoon would begin the mission by conducting a mounted patrol to meet with a local leader. The intelligence from higher would indicate that the local leader was a coalition forces (CF) supporter who had information on anti-coalition forces

(ACF) operating in the area. While at the farmer’s house, observer/controllers (OCs), would evaluate the platoon on establishing a traffic control point while the platoon leader met with the farmer. Depending on the level of rapport built by the platoon leader, the elder would give varying degrees of information. Improper actions of the evaluated platoon could lead to them discovering very little information, such as a mere general area in which ACF were operating or even no information at all. However, successful platoons could gather specific intelligence such as names, descriptions and house locations of individual ACF leaders.

The platoon would then move from the farmhouse compound to the village identified to conduct a cordon and search of the area. Enroute to the village, the patrol would encounter an IED and have to react. The OCs would then give the patrol guidance to self-recover its vehicle to the objective village. Once there, the platoon leader would coordinate with support personnel, conduct a link up and facilitate the evacuation of the damaged vehicle. This had the added benefit of incorporating the forward support company into the training.

Once at the village, the platoon would begin its cordon and search operation. Proper searching and tactical questioning techniques would give the platoon additional intelligence, eventually leading

to the exact location of a terrorist planning cell. The villagers would be generally less than supportive of the platoon's activities in the village, causing additional planning considerations for the platoon leader. The platoon would be tasked with the follow-on mission of conducting patrol base activities in the village overnight and assaulting the terrorist compound the following morning.

The above scenario describes the "what" and the "why" of the training event. The next critical piece was the "how." The "how" identified support requirements the S4 needed to provide to ensure successful conduct of the training. CPT Baker's concept sketch provided a useful tool to plan support requirements. I developed a clear and concise checklist by identifying support requirements at each phase or station using the same format as the training plan.

The goal of the support plan was to give the S2 and S3 the necessary tools to ensure the training was as realistic as possible. The smallest detail can go a long way towards convincing a Soldier that training is relevant and realistic. At the farmhouse site, the "elder" was given a teapot, hot plate, and tea set along with some "easy-to-boil" rice and chicken. With this, he was easily able to recreate the image of a local Afghan giving a guest a meal. To add to the realism of an Afghan farmhouse, we obtained live animals to place in pens. A little research can locate local farmers, petting zoo owners, or ranches

willing to rent livestock. For this particular training event, we had 20 chickens, 12 goats, and a llama.

At the village site, we set up a small village using the previously described modular walls. We furnished those buildings with furniture obtained through the post Defense Reutilization & Marketing Office (DRMO). The DRMO had information on when post facilities were to receive new furniture. With some prior coordination, we obtained a great deal of old furniture from these facilities for use as props inside village buildings. For additional realism, we used a sound system from the battalion S6 to play a recording of the call to prayer throughout the day. All of these small details, combined with livestock, worked to create a realistic Afghanistan village setting.

An important part of any training is to ensure that it is multi-echeloned. This training event is an excellent example of that. While the rifle platoons were the primary training objective, many other training opportunities were incorporated at the battalion staff level as well as at the company level.


The battalion staff had multiple training opportunities throughout the exercise. The training event began with a base operations order created and briefed by the battalion staff to company commanders. This was a chance for the battalion staff to work through the military decision-making process and

orders production. Company commanders then had the opportunity to create company operations orders and brief them to their company key leadership.

The actual execution of the training event provided additional training opportunities for the battalion staff. As the platoons rotated through the scenario, they were closely coordinated and monitored. The battalion tactical operations center (TOC) did this through checkpoints and reports sent in from the platoons. This became an excellent way for the battalion TOC to train on battle tracking multiple platoons conducting patrols in different locations throughout the area of operations, a critical task easily comparable to actual operations in theater.

The above scenario is an actions-based training event that can be reactive to the actions taken by the platoon creating realistic and challenging training. This basic training plan can be a basis for an unlimited variety of scenarios. This outstanding training event was effective and productive at every level. While there was clear and consistent guidance from the battalion XO throughout the process, none of the primary planners for our platoon live-fire exercise were graduates of their respective career courses. All of us had limited exposure to garrison training management because of lengthy deployments. However, that did not stop us from planning and executing challenging and realistic multi-echeloned training. FM 7-0 states that there is "a direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield." This example shows that lack of experience in training management among staff planners is no excuse for failing to provide our Soldiers with the tools to be successful in combat.

Figure 3



At the time this article was written, **CPT Paul Benfield** was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He was commissioned from Officer Candidate School in September 2005. He served as a rifle platoon leader and company executive officer with the 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division and deployed with them to Baghdad for the Surge from January 2007 to March 2008. Upon redeployment, he became the battalion S4. His next assignment is with the 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Ga.



IED DEFEAT GATED TRAINING STRATEGY

A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO PREPARING UNITS AND SOLDIERS FOR COMBAT

COL KENNETH J. CRAWFORD

Warfighters and leaders across the Army often face the same challenge as they create and execute their directed mission essential task list (DMETL) training. Once deployment orders are received, interests quickly adjust to the future operating environment and the threats therein. The most common and lethal threat on today's battlefield is the improvised explosive device (IED). These deadly weapons consist of various types and configurations of explosive, munition, trigger, arming, and firing devices. However, there is one constant — it takes an enemy element to design, finance, manufacture, transport, emplace, arm, and (sometimes) detonate this device.

The general purpose of this article is to provide leaders and resource providers with a holistic and practical approach to prepare and train Soldiers and units for combat. Specifically, provide a methodical approach along the three lines of operation laid out by the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which call for defeating the device, attack the network, and training the force.

The readily available and supporting Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) supports training warfighters by “validating and propagating IED defeat tactics, using techniques and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned from theater,” according to the center's Web site. The primary outlet for this expertise is found in our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), which provide units with a wealth of experience and resources in a hyper-realistic training environment. The

challenge is leveling this quality of training experience across the Army for all deploying active duty and Reserve forces.

Resourcing, Providing Expertise, and Relevant Training

A systematic approach to providing Soldiers and units with the quality of training they deserve is to harness installation resources such as facilities, ranges, and training aids, devices, simulators, simulations (TADSS) and expertise of specific organizations (i.e. JIEDDO, Asymmetric Warfare Group [AWG], Training and Doctrine Command's IEDD Integrated Capabilities Development Team [ICDT], and U.S. Army Forces Command's IEDD Integration Cells [I2C]) in a gated training strategy (GTS) akin to how we conduct Bradley and tank gunnery tables (Figure 1 highlights the interrelated resource providers for home station training). The solution isn't simple; it will require vigilance in maintaining relevance as quickly as our tactical environments and enemy TTPs change. Every unit leader's intent is to develop and resource the most realistic training that will best prepare their Soldiers for what they may experience “downrange.” Rather than complicating resource requirements, the IEDD community must enable the chain of command, which is ultimately responsible for preparing Soldiers and units for deployment (inherent within senior commanders' training and readiness authority). The cascading complexity of efficiently

coordinating the resources for a senior commander requires a dedicated and focused effort on providing support to all units training at home station. Essentially, this is commanders' business, and commanders must have the ability to flex resources to meet their common challenge which is the absence of a standard, relevant, and current approach to training IEDD at the individual through collective levels.

Structuring and Planning the GTS

Structuring "a way" to overcome this challenge through live-virtual-constructive (LVC) training with a "CTC-like" experience at home station enables leaders and units to hone their skills, battle drills, and TTPs prior to certification and deployment. In essence, they will arrive at the CTC or their deployed destination with a heightened level of competency and ability. The GTS is not a catch-all approach for training on all pre-deployment tasks, but it does focus on IEDD and the supporting or interrelated tactical tasks. Given the high probability that IEDs will remain a weapon of choice for our enemy and adversaries in future conflicts, our IEDD training must be adaptive, structured, and holistic.

Soldiers are at risk of encountering IEDs while deployed, and their probability of encountering an IED varies depending on

their unique operational environment. To effectively synchronize our IEDD GTS, we must dovetail the hierarchy of training requirements and prioritize the competing demands for resources with the training tasks to the four categories articulated in FORSCOM's Southwest Asia Training Guidance. The GTS focuses the specific IEDD individual, individual leader, and collective training tasks (outlined in Figure 2) and builds upon each training experience culminating in the unit's ability to systematically defeat the device and attack the network. The construct of the IEDD GTS takes into account the following considerations:

* It must be "scalable" to meet the desired training objectives from platoon to brigade levels. The strategy must have the ability to be tailored to a unit's mission and experience level. Commanders must tailor the concept to fit current unit training levels, especially for a combat-experienced force; the start point for training may not always be the "crawl" stage. As units prepare for the next higher level's training event, they must prepare accordingly. As units prepare for major combat operations (MCO) gunnery, a crew is expected to be able to execute specific tasks before operating as part of a section or platoon; platoons must master specific tasks before executing company-level operations;


companies and battalions must be able to effectively maneuver and mass firepower to support battalion and brigade-level operations, etc. The nesting of IEDD GTS is similar with the underlying objectives of defeating the device and maneuvering on and attacking the network.

* Training, enemy and friendly TTPs, available TADSS, the terrain/environment, and systems employed must be relevant and current. Ideally, we must, whenever possible, train with and on the same systems and platforms that Soldiers will operate to reduce the initial risks associated with learning while being engaged downrange. It is absolutely necessary to prioritize the fielding of our platforms and systems to those "in the fight" first. When training effectively on "like" systems, we have the ability to create surrogates using mock-ups and virtual platforms to achieve the desired effect(s) until we field the actual systems at home stations.

*We must ensure our doctrine and knowledge management remain relevant, current, adaptive, and dynamic to the changing threat abroad. JIEDDO provides outstanding references and resources for LVC training applications through the Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE). The primary purpose of KnIFE "is to exchange information, consolidate best practices, and respond to requests for information (RFIs) related to the asymmetric application of ...TTPs by both enemy and friendly forces," according to the KnIFE Web site. The Web site provides leaders and units with a wealth of information to enable quality training. A significant challenge is keeping our doctrine current. Our existing doctrine is a reference that we must expand into our digital knowledge management databases to allow the Army to maintain currency until the release of the next printed publication revision. The constantly changing conditions and operating environments mandate a requirement to have both a baseline (printed) reference and an individual dynamic online database of information that maintains relevance for the warfighter's training.

* Lastly, we must provide and resource the most hyper-realistic training to increase Soldiers' training experience by immersing them in an environment that closely

Figure 1 — Spheres of IEDD Enablers and Connectivity



Required Tasks by Deployment Category




Figure 2

replicates the environment they'll operate in abroad. The structures, civilians, smells, and sounds experienced by individual Soldiers and units serve as the means to help "inoculate" and prepare them to instinctively respond under any condition while deployed.

IEDD Gunnery — Synthesizing Training and Effects

The IEDD GTS is a holistic approach to training individual Soldiers to brigade-size units how to defeat the device and attack the network. The overarching intent is to ensure units understand and can effectively analyze the complexity of the IEDD fight. The IEDD GTS provides this methodology by creating "gates" where individuals and units must successfully accomplish specific training objectives to standard before moving to the next higher and more complex gate. The structure of the IEDD GTS includes tables similar to Bradley and tank

gunnery tables and is focused on specific unit levels.

Gate 1 establishes a baseline to ensure every individual/crew/squad can successfully execute the common individual and leader training tasks and possesses a common knowledge frame of reference based on FORSCOM training guidance, doctrine, unit SOPs, and current enemy and friendly TTPs. KnIFE's training courses and seminars provide units with a plethora of additional resources, which can enhance the capabilities of Soldiers who attend courses, participate in distance learning, or use training support packages (TSPs), which are available for download. Similar to the Bradley and tank gunnery skills tests, commanders certify that individuals and crews are ready to begin the LVC training tables outlined in the IEDD GTS before allowing crews to move into Table I (crew skills virtual training).

Table I includes Gates 2 and 3, which

build upon previously gained experiences and knowledge. Unit training is applied and refined through virtual training using simulators and simulations to validate the TTPs units will use in their SOPs for tactical operations. The focus of Table I is to ensure crews can effectively perform individual and leader tasks in virtual terrain, provide proper contact reports, and successfully execute crew battle drills (i.e. rollover drills using the high explosive anti-tank rounds).

Gate 2 is executed in generic virtual terrain and includes graduated skill levels. Once the crew successfully meets the standards of performance, they go on to the second half of Table I, which provides a significantly more complex and realistic training experience for the crew and unit. The simulated terrain replicates actual terrain they will encounter in Tables II-V. At this point the scenario provides a comprehensive experience from the individual crew up to the battalion and

brigade commander and staff levels. This takes advantage of how units manage, report, synthesize, and analyze reports and information for future decisions and action. Every report from Table I to VI (collective proficiency) is meaningful and eventually leads to the ultimate objective of successfully “attacking the network” and ensuring a holistic training experience.


Platoons normally serve at the lowest level and are called upon to execute combat patrols in a combat environment; hence Tables II to V build to platoon-level proficiency in live scenarios with a crawl-walk-run approach. Crews, sections, and platoons execute their mission and focus on their ability to defeat the effects of IEDs and submit effective reports as staffs conduct the analysis and build actionable intelligence for direct action. Platoon leaders are given and will execute one or a series of missions similar to what they are

likely to experience while deployed. These missions may include navigation (mounted and dismounted), tactical questioning, react to contact, establishing traffic control points, crowd control, detainee operations, and other missions depending on the training objective(s) selected from the FORSCOM training guidance tasks.

The crews, sections, and platoons encounter a hyper-realistic environment while responding to civilian role players, enemy elements, urban structures, and other battlefield effects (replicating indirect and direct fire, IEDs, munitions and homemade explosives [HME], sounds, wires, etc.). Once platoons meet the training standards of Table V (Gate 4) and the battalion or brigade establishes the IED network hierarchy and probable location(s), they issue orders to the company to prepare to execute kinetic operations. Additional complexities and considerations must be included based on

the theater of operations and established rules of engagement (ROE) or status of forces agreement (SFA), which may affect planning and action as it may be a U.S., combined, or host nation forces-led operation.

Table VI (Gates 5 and 6) focuses on company-level planning, rehearsals, operations, and mission execution. Once all the platoons of a company successfully pass through Gate 4, the company receives its mission and begins troop leading procedures (TLP) on their forward operating base. On order, the company executes a direct action mission to attack to destroy or defeat the network. Depending on the available training terrain, Table VI could potentially culminate in a combined arms live-fire exercise on a multipurpose range complex where battalion and brigades could integrate combat multiplier resources such as



unmanned aerial vehicles, precision fires, and attack aviation.

As units approach their deployment dates, the availability and application of simulations helps units sustain their skill sets and capabilities. Gate 7 focuses on the sustainment of these skills and enables the training of Soldiers who arrive after a CTC rotation and the shipment of equipment. These same Soldiers reap the benefits of the unit's training and quickly learn prior to their deployment "what right looks like" as they learn their unit's TTPs and SOPs first hand.

Figure 3 lays out the IEDD GTS as it is being developed on Fort Hood. The intent is for all units to have access to world-class home station IEDD training facilities, which enable them to successfully accomplish the desired DMETL tasks and deploy with validated TTPs and SOPs. Due to the shortened dwell times and the fact not every type of unit can deploy to a CTC, these resources and training strategy enable units to attain and sustain readiness at a much quicker rate right at their home station. Additionally, this training can be integrated as part of a battalion or BCT's gunnery scheme of maneuver with minimal effort and resource overhead. The commonality of training tasks and threat allows the Army to adopt the IEDD GTS concept and apply it across every installation for active and reserve component training.

The Desired Effect

The IEDD GTS allows units to build upon realistic training scenarios to defeat the device as they execute missions and provide reports to battalion and brigade TOCs in virtual and live environments. Staffs synthesize the information gained from the reports into actionable intelligence, staffs build target decks as well as develop and direct missions, and commanders decide how and when to attack the network as they will during deployment. The outcome, or desired training effect, is a unit that is fully trained to operate, adapt, and decisively act in an extremely lethal environment with positive results. They deploy well trained, able to defeat the device, and able to successfully attack the network!

COL Kenneth J. Crawford is the assistant chief of staff G5 (Plans, Exercises, and Training), III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignments include combat tours during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Continue Hope in Somalia, and two deployments as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, most recently as a battalion commander in central Baghdad. He is a Senior Service College Fellow at the University of Texas Institute of Advanced Technology and has been selected to command the 1st Engineer Brigade.

TOWARDS A LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY

MAJ TEDDY KLEISNER

Army officers lead amidst a constant dichotomy between mission accomplishment and care for Soldiers.

Popular culture and Army banality have reduced thought on this dichotomy to quotes such as "your mission is men," or the even less helpful cliché, "mission first, Soldiers always." Furthermore, though



the Army explicitly prioritizes mission accomplishment over care for Soldiers, the close interpersonal nature of leadership taught and practiced in the American military tradition exacerbates the leader's dilemma. This dichotomy therefore serves as a potential source of tension between leaders and led, and a potential source of compromise between leaders and mission success. Attempts to achieve and sustain balance between these forces prove fleeting. Thus, Army leaders must embrace this dichotomy, and by further understanding it, prepare themselves to optimize the competing needs of the mission and men.

Embracing the mission vs. men dichotomy means understanding that making decisions means accepting tradeoffs. The mission comes first or the men come first, but never both. This sounds simple but in practice becomes quite difficult because it forces leaders to realize that they cannot be the perfect leader the Army describes in manuals and admires in the book *Once An Eagle*. Accepting this is the first step in learning how to manage the trade-offs incurred by a leader's decisions, and though counterintuitive, it makes officers more self aware and in turn, better leaders.

Army officers who develop a genuine awareness of this dichotomy empower themselves to anticipate the negative externalities of his decisions between the **moral imperative** of preserving his Soldiers and the **professional obligation** to accomplish his mission. By anticipating these negative externalities, he can manage the amount of **compromise** that he inevitably invites to mission accomplishment or preservation of men. Negative externalities surface in the relationships that connect the leader, his men, and his mission.

The value of these thoughts is not that they serve as a leadership philosophy in and of themselves, but that they establish the foundation from which a sound leadership philosophy can emerge. Too often leadership philosophies launch into a principled treatise on how to lead individuals and teams. I argue that until a leader has framed his leadership philosophy using the men vs. mission dichotomy, any attempt to establish a firm leadership philosophy, will likely result in a one-sided concept that addresses only the relationship between the leader and followers. Such a philosophy subjects itself to compromise and places its author's integrity at risk.

MAJ Teddy Kleisner is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College. He received his commission in 1997 from the U.S. Military Academy. His previous assignments include serving with the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Ranger Training Brigade; and 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, with operational deployments in the Balkans and Middle East. He earned a Master in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 2008.

RSLC CUTS ADMIN TIME, MAINTAINS COMPETITIVE EDGE

KRISTIN MOLINARO

The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) offered by Fort Benning's 4th Ranger Training Battalion provides training to reconnaissance and surveillance leaders in all branches of the military.

But with current operational tempos high for many units, the RTB needed to find a way to train troops limited by time because of their unit's reset and redeployment processes, said CPT Brian Canny, executive officer for D Company, RTB.

Previously 33 days long, the course introduced a shorter, streamlined course giving troops more hands-on time and a shorter stay at the post by reducing administrative time and eliminating nonessential training.

The move to a 26-day course is in line with achieving a greater competitive edge alongside shorter courses, such as the Army Reconnaissance Course, said SSG Alexander Marotta, an RSLC instructor with D Co., which conducts the course.

Formerly known as the Long Range Surveillance Leaders Course, RSLC was developed in 1986 to teach mission-essential tasks drawn from lessons learned in previous long-range reconnaissance operations conducted in Southeast Asia. In 2002, the course was renamed RSLC and tailored to further develop the combat arms related skills of troops eligible for assignments to units whose primary mission is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, target acquisition, and combat assessment operations. The course expanded from 36 slots available per course to 82 slots, and is open to eligible personnel from all branches of the military.

Today, the course brings in a variety of personnel, including Reconnaissance troops, cavalry scouts, Pathfinders, battlefield surveillance brigade troops, Navy Special Warfare candidates, Marine reconnaissance officers, Special Forces teams and Rangers.

Modifications made to RSLC, which provides expert-level instruction in areas including reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, data transmission and foreign vehicle identification, will not affect training standards, CPT Canny said.

Among the changes, RSLC has cut back retraining time for first-time failures on land navigation as well as condensing classroom time on written land navigation skills.

For potential students, this means they must come prepared, said SFC Brian Baumgartner, primary instructor for land navigation and reconnaissance physical exercises.

Classroom and field instruction was also reduced in the areas of vehicle mobility and close target reconnaissance. The course eliminated survival, evasion, and recovery and digital navigation, which had previously been trimmed back, Baumgartner said.

Additionally, nontactical airborne operations and Special Patrol



Insertion and Extraction and Fast Rope Insertion and Extraction systems courses were combined into one day to reduce administrative time. The course culminates in a five-day field training exercise, which was reduced by one day.

The result of the changes is an increase in practical exercises, which leads to an increase in retention of knowledge, said SSG Marotta, primary instructor for intelligence collection and vehicle identification.

The course will continue to offer specialized training in areas such as vehicle identification, photography, observation techniques, communication, data transmission, battle drills and camouflage.

LTC Daniel Waters, who graduated RSLC June 12, said he signed up for the course to increase his understanding of the capabilities of the recon squadron he would soon command. Waters is the incoming commander for 1st Squadron, 221st Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Nevada National Guard.

"As you move up through the ranks, you turn from direct leadership aspects to indirect. I liked getting back to the troop level, being at the tip of the spear," LTC Waters said.

Waters said the course improved his knowledge of in-depth planning for team-level missions.

"When you send out a six-man team, you must make up for the lack of force protection and firepower. You must plan for contingencies. If there are any shortcomings in a person's planning, I can see that and improve the plan to make it valuable," he said.

By shaving a week off the course, RSLC has increased its attractiveness to units needing a quicker training cycle. However, other options are also available, CPT Canny said.

The executive officer said RSLC offers resident unit training, mobile training teams and the observer-controller/EXEVAL package. For specialized training, Canny recommends units contact D Company six to seven months in advance.

According to information posted at the school's Web site, students must possess a Ranger school physical completed within the last 18 months and be an E-5 or above (waiverable by the first O-5 in the chain of command). Personnel assigned to, have the potential to be assigned to or work alongside Infantry and Field Artillery units or involved in reconnaissance and surveillance operations are eligible to attend the course. RSLC graduates are authorized the 6B additional skill identifier.

For more information about the course, visit the RSLC Web site at https://www.infantry.army.mil/rtb/new_lrsc/default.htm or call RSLC at (706) 544-6039.

Kristin Molinaro writes for Fort Benning's post newspaper, *The Bayonet*.

HISTORY, THE MYTH, AND THE STAFF RIDE:

A New Look at the Development of Subordinate Leaders

MAJ ANDREW M. DEL GAUDIO, USMC

It must be stated that the highest virtue ascribed to a military professional is his character and the cultivation of character of the subordinates that he leads. Indeed, history is replete with examples of units that have adapted the ways and mannerisms of their leaders, right down to the most minor detail. We understand character as that inner strength that is guided by a sense of right and wrong while rooted in solid intellect. The physical manifestation of our character is displayed through our will to accomplish our assigned tasks. The most solemn duty of the senior leader is, in fact, to teach the subordinate. But what is he supposed to teach? In these days, the relevant answer is what they need to learn in order to survive in combat for the next seven or more months. It seems that time is the one thing that we never have enough of. Presently, in our time-competitive environment, we are faced with the task, as leaders, to inculcate in our subordinates a character that will transcend the moral, the mental, and the physical aspects that compromise combat. The most appropriate answer is to examine how others have dealt with this same situation. Enter the study of history. We are going to explore the development of character and how we relate these lessons to our subordinates. The vehicle to explore these phenomena will be the past or what we commonly refer to as history. We will also explore the pitfalls of the study of history in relation to the military professional. Lastly, we will look at a technique for conducting the battlefield tour or “staff ride” for the development of subordinate unit leaders.

Solid Foundations

In order to have an effective unit, whether it is a combat arms unit or a support unit, it is imperative that everyone view these situations in a similar manner. Common values along with traditions are often asserted during entry level training to be maintained and developed throughout their career. At the center of this development, we find character. What aspect of our character are we trying to develop? As stated in U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM)-1, *Warfighting*, character is rooted in intellect and is governed by the will. The development of intellect cannot be overstated. Intellect must not only be developed in subordinates through the course of professional military studies, but also in areas less familiar and certainly less comfortable to the military professional. A German philosopher of the early 20th century named Dr. E. Meumann once wrote, “Man cannot namely and solely attempt to answer the question of whether the will is decided by intelligence, but rather indeed are the willing of intelligence.” A sincere appreciation for philosophy and other art forms will create leaders with a broader horizon who will be more capable of dealing with the wide variety of problems that are associated with operating in the contemporary operating environment of today. We are always looking to develop in our subordinates the initiative to accomplish

an assigned task. But more importantly, we must develop in our subordinates the decision-making skills and judgment which are necessary to take the initiative to address the mission as they see fit. We must afford them this latitude. If we have developed our subordinates correctly, they are going to do what is right. This is not an insubordination to your orders. Rather, it is a result of truly understanding their commander’s intent in addition to what is happening around them. Developed judgment and decision-making skills foster the ability to critically analyze problems and develop detailed courses of action that will allow freedom of action to subordinates.

Developing a strong sense of character will allow for constructive criticism. More so than ever in this day and age, military professionals tend to get their egos bruised by the notion that there may be a more efficient or more correct technique for performing a task. The development of a “thick skin” is not just nice to have, but a necessity for the military professional. If a unit is to become better, then it is necessary for leaders to be honest with themselves in recognizing their personal capabilities and limitations as well as that of the unit before somebody else does. While being a part of that unit, your own opinion of your performance will always be subjective at best. The objective opinion of an individual not assigned to the unit will always provide the best form of evaluation on your performance. As many of us have heard in our personal or professional education, “you will likely see this again.”

The Role of History in the Development of Subordinates

In today’s American military organizations, combat experience abounds. Once upon a time, young officers were told that reading was a way to gain valuable “vicarious experience” about any aspect of combat from human factors (such as the moral, mental, and physical strains due to combat), to easy lessons about leadership in order to learn from the mistakes of others. With young leaders now having valuable firsthand experience from the horrors of war, it would only make sense that teaching lessons that are relative to their professional military development would be made easier right? Wrong! There are age-old problems that still persist.

The origin of these problems exists in the difference between what is the past and what is history. In his article “The Trouble with History,” which appeared in the Summer 2005 issue of *Parameters*, Antulio J. Echevarria stated, “The past, simply put is what happened. History, in contrast, is the historian’s interpretation of what happened.” Leopold von Ranke, who was the father of modern historiography, viewed history as “what really happened,” according to Sir Michael Howard in his article “The Use and Abuse of Military History” (*The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Canadian Defense Force, Summer 2003). Allow us to return to the

notion of being subjective verses being objective, but let's look at the problem through the lens of what Sir Michael Howard referred to as "myth making." First and foremost, it is of the highest importance to remember that the side who typically writes the history of any engagement, whether battle or war, is the side that wins. "Myth making" rears its ugly head for a few prominent reasons. Below are but a few of those reasons.

Believe in the Subculture

It is important for us as military professionals to never forget that our military services are a reflection of the society from which they came. Each military service has a unique subculture from the nation for which it serves. Every Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and every unit also have their own unique story to tell as well. The importance of the subculture to members of a unit is that it allows for its members to identify with each other under the common bond of members that have gone before them. The lore of such tales is the thing that keeps the young Soldiers from falling asleep at their post or officers from surrendering their positions. It is believed that the man on the right or on the left will sustain the subculture and provide the moral backbone in order to continue under tough times. This belief in the subculture is what propels healthy and sometimes unhealthy competition among the armed services. The danger of the subculture is when current members feel that new members must be initiated into the group in order to prove their worthiness and to pay their dues. Enter the fraternity style hazing that has been common in military organizations for generations. By acknowledging the root causes of the desire to belong to something bigger than an individual's identity, the military organizations will only then come up with solutions to their unique problem.

"The Military Way or Militarism"

A method of sustaining the subculture and building or adding to the common "myth" is through memoirs. Whether they are written by the victorious or the defeated is relative to whether or not the object of study was won or lost. Successful as well as unsuccessful military officers write memoirs. What is their purpose? More



PFC Kaimana-Ipulani Kalauli

During a staff ride 19 May, an instructor with the U.S. Army War College explains the bloody battle that took place around the Devil's Den during the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

often than not, it is to recount their version of what happened in a manner that they would like for you to believe. Perhaps it is a need to explain their experiences for the sake of posterity, or to preserve their name and reputation because they simply would prefer for us to remember their interpretation instead. The reasoning lies in the outcome of the event and is governed by the character of the man who wrote it. The self-account of any memoir is far from being an objective version of the story. The untrained eye must proceed with caution when reading memoirs. A student of the past must search far and wide to find an objective history of the event for which they are studying. Memoirs are only for use to explore the reasons that surround why certain decisions were made at particular times. In his all important work *A History Of Militarism*, Alfred Vagts suggested in the title of this segment "The Military Way or Militarism," that the author of the memoir is wishing to contribute good for the "military way," but may unwillingly contribute to militarism and the furtherance of the popular "myth." A tradition that existed during the time of the Prussian Kingdom prior to 1870 was that Prussians were forbidden from writing memoirs. Vagts wrote, "If confession is one test of truthfulness, then there is little of reality in the military memoirs. The Prussian General Constantin von Alvensleben, an upright and conservative man, laid down the rule that 'a Prussian general dies but does not leave any

memoirs.' Prussian tradition long forbade the public appearance of the individual officer in his lifetime or posthumously."

With these two thoughts in mind, how can we train our subordinates using history as a vehicle to learn? The age-old adage of "buyers beware" applies. The leader wishing to educate his subordinates using history must have a full grasp of the subject that he is teaching and recognize the pitfalls of the subject matter. Remembering that we are reflections of the society from which we come, Americans tend to want the "bottom line up front," in order to match our fast-paced lifestyle. In order for you to use military history properly, it is going to require you to do some homework on the topic that you are going to teach. Thorough preparation and an intelligent lesson plan for the topics that you want to teach your subordinates will enhance and leave an indelible memory of the exercise. If done properly this is an excellent opportunity to "train the trainer." Getting subordinates excited to do this sort of work requires truly skilled leadership. You are not going to get the best results if you plan on doing your battle study at 4:30 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, unless of course you are deployed and there is no leave or liberty in sight. Like everything in life, timing and location are everything.

The Crawl, Walk, and Run of Military History and Making it Useful

As with all good military operations, you

must have a clearly defined objective to your training, and you must have a culminating point where it can all come together for your subordinates. For the purpose of this example, the culminating point of our exercise will be to conduct a battlefield tour or staff ride. Depending on where you are physically located in the world will ultimately determine how far you will have to go and what time period you will be studying. Generally, being along the East Coast of the United States or any country in Europe will allow for the study of a battle. A common misconception that exists among trainers is that it needs to be a large battle in the scope and size of Gettysburg, Waterloo, or Iwo Jima in order for a student to gain an understanding of the events. This is false. Locations where belligerents have been enjoined in armed conflict will avail opportunities to learn something. You only need to relate the battle or engagement in terms of the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of war. You also have the obligation to relate the moral, mental, and physical aspects as well. No matter what common rank the group is, the natural tendency is for that group to digress to what is comfortable. This generally refers to things that are tactical. You have to fight that urge and force subordinates to see the bigger picture. Here are some useful thoughts to maintain when building your battle study:

* Have a director for the exercise — one person who knows what points need to be drawn out of the subordinates about the historical fight and somebody who is capable of making subordinates think about how or if they would fight the same fight today using today's weapons and technology.

* Know your target audience. This allows you to reinforce what they should already know and allows you to develop what they need to know for their future development.

* Compare and contrast the art and the science of war. Naturally you are going to spend considerable time on the art of war by discussing the tactics that were used during that time. You will also find that your subordinates will naturally gravitate toward it. Take the time to understand the science of war and the contribution of technology to the fight that you are studying.

* Study the personalities that fought the

A common misconception that exists among trainers is that it needs to be a large battle in the scope and size of Gettysburg, Waterloo, or Iwo Jima in order for a student to gain an understanding of the events. This is false. Locations where belligerents have been enjoined in armed conflict will avail opportunities to learn something.

battle. Avoid assigning your subordinates historical personalities. Give them pieces of the battle and emphasize decisions that were made. Make them explain why certain decisions were made relative to that personality's character. This is the best way to learn from somebody else's mistakes.

* Study the terrain. Recent experience has shown me that young leaders with only combat experience from Iraq tend to view all future combat in terms of a featureless desert or urban terrain. They forget that they might fight somewhere that has vegetation or hills. Get 1:50,000 maps of the area that you are studying. Have subordinates draw overlays that explain the historical fight, but also how they would fight the battle today.

* Gather the proper tools. Have your subordinates bring digital cameras, compasses, global positioning systems (GPS), and note-taking materials along with their maps of the area. They can always use the gathered information for reference in future professional papers that will likely be written for a school.

* Return to core competencies. This is perhaps the most important point. Talk about basic offensive and defensive operations relative to the audience that you are trying to teach. Whether you talk about building a convention defense and the seven steps of engagement area development or a simple movement to contact, you will be able to talk about engineering or the use of preplanned fires. The manner in which subordinates use to communicate instructions to their subordinates in the form of a five-paragraph order still applies.

The Crawl

If you choose to be the director of your

battle study, then you will be doing the crawling. The amount of time that you will spend in preparing the material for the study is the most important piece of the study. You must gather the appropriate level reading material for your audience. It is your responsibility to read the material and detect potential pitfalls for your subordinates. Once you have a good knowledge of the material, begin to pose questions that will allow you to achieve your learning objectives. A simple way to create learning objectives is to use the U. S. Army's battlefield operating systems (BOSs). They are as follows:

- Intelligence
- Maneuver
- Fire Support
- Air Defense
- Mobility and Survivability
- Combat Service Support
- Command and Control

By using these seven simple concepts, you will be able to arrive at questions that pertain to each "area expert" that you assign.

Give your subordinate unit leaders a package with all of the material that they will need to accomplish their assigned tasks. Also provide them with other recommended reading material that you don't provide to them. You will immediately notice who applies the extra time and effort because you will more than likely guess which of your subordinates will do this prior to you stepping off on the tour. This is an excellent way to see which of your subordinates are taking the work seriously. Your subordinates may decide to get together on their own over a beer and work on the project together. Encourage this! You are truly fortunate as a leader if your subordinates will take things that serious.

The Walk

This is the time that you take to walk the battlefield on your staff ride. Take the time to think about parts of the field that will maximize the best learning objectives for the amount of time that you are allotted to do the tour. If you are studying a battle with a traditional offense and defense, then start out in the defensive engagement area and look at the terrain from the perspective of the offense. This will enable you to talk about the terrain in terms of where you could be seen by the defense and what terrain



Dave Melancon

Members of the U.S. Army Garrison Heidelberg staff ride walk along a string of “dragon’s teeth” anti-tank barriers erected by the German army along the border with Belgium during World War II.

features would provide protection from enemy observation and enemy fire. Note terrain that you would call key terrain. Make sure that your subordinates understand if the offense would want a position for a support-by-fire position, then the enemy would probably have an observation post on that piece of terrain. Talk about the offensive reconnaissance effort and the defensive patrolling effort. What assets were available then, and what would you want today? Take the time to talk about the vegetation and the effects it would have on your operations and fires. The whole time that you are having the guided discussion, make your subordinates answer the “why.” Here you will experience your greatest joy when your subordinates can respond to their own questions faster than you were able to ask. You then know that “learning has occurred.” Once you have completed the historical perspective of the area, then talk about it in terms of how you would offensively operate in that particular area today. Take into consideration how you would move to the objective, be it mounted or dismounted. How would you set up a potential support by fire, and finally, how you would bring together your direct and indirect fire support plans to ensure correct geometries of fire to accomplish your mission. Make sure that your subordinates highlight the differences technologically and then relate it to the science of war. As you continue to walk toward the objective, pick an area that was a historical engagement area and ask why did the area achieve or fail to achieve the desired effect. This will enable you to talk about how you would do it today with the assets that you would have available to you. The key to this part of the exercise is to remind your subordinates about their troop to task and the amount of time required to achieve the desired engineer effect. Ensure that you tie this to your defensive fires plan for both direct as well as indirect weapons. Finally, as you reach the objective, talk about the human factors affecting the offense. Would the offense have reached its culminating point at this stage? How would the defense and the offense resupply? Did their communication assets allow them to

talk to one another effectively? For the defense, did the positions that they chose make sense in relation to the terrain that they were on and the effects that they were able to achieve with their weapons? Does the terrain allow for you to employ a reverse slope defense? Could you employ a defense in depth to better accomplish the mission? Was there a better way to array forces based on their capabilities and limitations and how would you do it today?

The Run

This is the unfortunate part that you will likely never see. This is when your subordinates get promoted and reassigned to later lead their own staff rides in the excellent example that you provided to them years before. The immediate short term effects you will


likely see when your subordinates begin to apply the things that they learned in their next training operation. You will also likely see these lessons manifest themselves when your subordinates teach their own subordinates. If you are a company commander, have a conversation with one of your squad leaders and see what he has learned. The answers are sometimes shocking.

Conclusion

History is still the viable tool that it has always been for the military professional to learn from. The question is whether your subordinates are getting the right message from what you have them reading. As long as you understand the pitfalls associated with reading history, then you will be able to read it with a sense of objectivity and get something from it. Unemotional objectivity is often very difficult for anybody to achieve, but the rewards are great if we wish to pursue it. Recognize history for what it is and don’t contribute to the “myth” that isn’t. There is an undeniable link between success on the current battlefield and the time spent by leaders in study of past conflicts. The tangible benefits of developing decision-making skills and good judgment are obvious. The intangible benefit of developing a subordinate’s character will be far reaching and life long. Returning a better American to society is our ultimate goal, whether it takes only four years or 40 years. While the man is in uniform, it is our charter to make him better than when he came into the service.

MAJ Andrew M. Del Gaudio, USMC, is currently serving as the executive officer of the Infantry Training Battalion at the School of Infantry-East in Camp Lejeune, N.C. He earned a bachelor’s degree in History from Villanova University. MAJ Del Gaudio is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Armor Captains Career Course and has been an instructor at The Basic School in Quantico, Va. He has also been a guest lecturer at The Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, on various topics ranging from doctrine, theory, and the employment of small unit leadership in combat.

Book Reviews



***The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich.* By Robert M. Citino. Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005, \$34.95.** Reviewed by Randy R. Talbot, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command historian.

Robert M. Citino's *The German Way of War* is a groundbreaking narrative on Prussian-German military operations from 1656 to 1942. Like his previous volumes leading to this unprecedented work (the award-winning *Quest for Decisive Victory* and *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*), Citino is changing the paradigm of military history narrative and analysis. The emphasis of *The German Way of War* "is on action rather than theory, on operations rather than doctrine." This is not to say that he negates the contributions of Clausewitz, Schlieffen and other contemporary military theorists; in fact, military theorists, contemporary military analysts and scholars all have their place in describing or ridiculing the ability or inability of the German military at operational warfare.

Each chapter follows a similar pattern: a discussion of the particular problem facing the Germany military leadership, a recounting of operations that define or dismiss the German ability to conduct warfare on the operational level, and finally analysis of German operational success and failure. Citino's analysis covers the operational implications for the German army, their missed opportunities, and how historians judged Germany's conduct of war. This is where Citino shines, synthesizing a massive amount of primary and secondary literature to offer a bright, crisp and lively narrative of the operational level of warfare of the Prussian/German army.

Citino's argument, and really the heart of his work, is a consistent pattern of the operational level of warfare throughout German military history. The problem for Prussia/Germany, surrounded by enemies and potential enemies, was to find a way to fight wars that were "*kurz und vives*" (short and lively). As a small country with limited resources, prolonged warfare would develop into a *Stellungskrieg* or positional warfare

as seen in WWI and following Operation Barbarossa. Therefore, the German army developed an operational method of warfare to keep its wars short and decisive, with victory coming with one decisive blow — the annihilation of the enemy. The result is an aggressive attacking army that sought to defeat its enemy through operational maneuver or *Bewegungskrieg*. This is the operational link from the Battle of Warsaw in 1656 to the *Wehrmacht* attack into Russia during in WWII.

Successive German military officers would look to the battles fought by Frederick William in the Thirty Years' War and Frederick the Great as the beginnings of the German way of war. These campaigns combined a similar pattern of forced marches, the operational attack on the enemies flank if available, and the use of terrain to conceal an army or to provide the best location for an attack. Operational plans were made on the fly by the commander, leaving his officers the ability (or inability) to carry out the attack as they saw fit. The battles were innovative in a time of linear armies, providing speed, surprise and shock against the enemy.

But it did not always work out as the German leadership expected. Aggressive infantry halted cavalry charges; aggressive cavalry in turn defeated linear infantry formations. As warfare progressed into the 19th and 20th centuries, armies became larger and the ability to command and control them faltered, leaving artillery to become the prominent arm on the battlefield, and breech-loading rifles and machine guns made traditional battle tactics and formations archaic. Later, tanks, planes, and airborne operations would again establish the war of maneuver to the battlefield. While the Germans paid attention to the materiel to wage war, such areas as intelligence, counterintelligence and logistics would continue to hamper the German army.

Defeated by Napoleon at Jena and Eylau in 1806, the Prussians turned inward to reform the army. Led by Scharnhorst and

Gneisenau, the German army adopted Napoleon's corps structure and developed a military educational system that produced the Chief of Staff to advise the commander. Reform brought to the field a more aggressive army against Napoleon in 1813 at Lützen, Bautzen and Leipzig, tying together "the operational link between the wars of Frederick the Great, the art of war as practiced by Napoleon, and the great nineteenth century campaigns of Helmuth von Moltke."

The rise of technology changed warfare, and no army embraced technology with more precision than Germany. Under Moltke, the German army based their war plans on railroad schedules, and exercised both war plans and technological advancements in rifles and communications during yearly war games (*kriegsspielen*). The result was three "short and lively" campaigns against Denmark, Austria and France with a goal of destroying the enemy in a *kesselschlacht* (cauldron battle). This would not be the only time that the army looked inward. Again, following WWI, Hans von Seeckt followed the tradition of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in reforming the army, again emphasizing aggressive, offensive operations to deal a decisive blow to an enemies flank and rear. The result of these reforms would be called "blitzkrieg" in the West, but were really a rebirth of traditional German operational concepts of maneuver, aggressive attacks, decisive battles and flexible command.

Rarely do history works become "page turners," but Citino blends enough traditional history to satisfy the scholar, crisp battle recounting and analysis to appeal to military historians and military professionals, and as is typical of Citino's works, footnotes that become a lesson in historiography with a bibliography that staggers the mind. Well researched and written, the *German Way of War* not only changes the paradigm of historical work, but is a footprint for successful, entertaining, and scholarly research with an appeal to a wide audience.

Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance — And Why They Fall. By Amy Chua. NY: Doubleday, 544 pages, 2007, \$27.95. Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN.

One debate among those immersed in questions of America's national security is whether the United States is ascendant or descendant? Answering this singular question eventually leads to the discussion and exploration of past superpowers, analyzing what happened and the rate of and the reasons for decline. Yale Law professor Amy Chua has published a new book exploring various societies which she has selected as hyperpowers that combine military and economic dominance of most of the globe. The term hyperpower was coined by French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, in a scathing criticism of the United States. Vedrine was part of the unconstructive aspects of Franco-American relations, which has thankfully abated with the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy. Chua examines the Persian Empire, considered the first global hyperpower, Rome, China's Golden Age, the Dutch World Empire, Medieval Spain, the British Empire, and ends with the United States and a discussion of why Axis powers like World War II Germany and Japan failed?

The book begins with 600-500 BCE, the Empire of Darius the Great of Persia saw a Persian emperor who upheld rulings of Egyptian judges and sanctioned Judaic law as the law of Israel. Darius did not waste resources trying to Persianize his subjects or destroying conquered peoples; instead, his policy focused on harnessing their different skills and talents. When Darius' successors reversed the policies of Darius the Great, they became more oppressive, and this overbearing intrusion began to fragment the Persian Empire. The book also highlights a counter-trend to diversity that explains how as more diverse peoples entered the Persian Empire, they lacked a common language or experience and with this

expansion the forces of disintegration crept upon the Persians. So diversity on its own does not guarantee the preservation of great powers, but must be tempered with a commonality between diverse peoples; this commonality may take the form of a common language or civic values.

Rome would see its ascendancy as a massive free trade zone with at least the opportunity for upward mobility. One story is that of a North African third son of a local Berber farmer who rose through the imperial ranks, becoming Governor of Britain and expanding Roman dominance over Scotland. The boy, Quintus Lollius Urbicus, would die as city prefect of Rome. By the late fourth century, Rome limited its opportunity to German tribes imposing apartheid policies. In Rome's apex they did not fear diversity, by the fourth century Roman leaders did not capitalize on the talents of Germans. Mutiny, invasion and the taking of Rome by force would ensue and by 476 AD, the Western Roman Empire would splinter into warlike kingdoms and the Eastern Byzantine Empire would rule for another 1,000 years. The author highlights how the Christian Byzantine Empire would not allow religious dissent and engaged in fierce infighting over Christian doctrine, they would fall to the Muslims who took advantage of this disunity.

The book continues with discussions about China, Spain, and the United States. The central theme involves empires that are great because of their ability to be inclusive. However, there are anomalies in this trend, where inclusivity without the common bonds of citizenship becomes destructive. The chapter on Axis regimes shows the economic costs of intolerance; scarce resources such as transport, raw materials, and human effort that could have been used in the war effort were diverted to mass genocide. The book is thought provoking for those with a passion to ponder how America can reinvent, reinvigorate, and change to remain a benevolent superpower in the 21st century.

TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE

KOREAN WAR

1. The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when:

- a) Communist Chinese forces shelled the outskirts of Seoul
- b) The North Korean Peoples Army crossed the 38th parallel, invading South Korea
- c) Josef Stalin declared to the United Nations that the government of South Korea was "illegitimate" and was committed to uniting the Korean peninsula under Communist hegemony
- d) Border patrols on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) clashed in a chance encounter

2. The Korean War spanned the years:

- a) 1950 – 54
- b) 1950 – 51
- c) 1950 – 53
- d) 1950 only

3. The amphibious landings of 15 September 1950, often called "MacArthur's masterstroke," took place at:

- a) Pusan
- b) Seoul
- c) Changjin
- d) Inchon

4. The general chosen by President Harry S. Truman to replace MacArthur upon his relief of command was:

- a) Mark Clark
- b) James Van Fleet
- c) Matthew Ridgway
- d) Walton Walker

5. The river separating North Korea from mainland China is the:

- a) Yalu
- b) Taedong
- c) Han
- d) Changchon

6. In terms of total military deaths, rank the wars below from highest killed in action casualties to lowest:

- a) Civil War
- b) WWII
- c) WWI
- d) Vietnam
- e) Korea

7. Place these battles in their proper chronological sequence:

- a) Heartbreak Ridge
- b) Chosin Reservoir
- c) Pusan Perimeter
- d) Inchon

8. The South Korean chief of state who led his country through the Korean War but was later forced to abdicate and flee to Hawaii (where he died in 1960) was:

- a) Syngman Rhee
- b) Kim Seong-su
- c) Han Tae-yeong
- d) Kim Gu

9. The only airborne operation during the Korean War featuring the drop of U.S. Army paratroopers was with the:

- a) 502nd Airborne Infantry Regiment
- b) 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment
- c) 325th Regimental Combat Team
- d) 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment

(Answers on next page)

Quiz courtesy of Chris Timmers



Kim Smith

Soldiers with the 172nd Infantry Brigade prepare to clear a room during a joint training exercise near Bahbahani, Iraq, on 5 June 2009.

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***Infantry Magazine* Contact Information**

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
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ANSWERS TO QUIZ: 1) b) 2) c) 3) d) 4) c) 5) a) 6) a, b, c, d, e) 7) c, d, b, a) 8) a) 9) b)



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