PB 7-08-6

Infantry

November-December 2008



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Infantry

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008 **Volume 97, Number 6**

FRONT COVER:

U.S. Army Soldiers with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division provide security for Iraqi Army forces after completing a humanitarian aid mission in Baloor, Iraq, February 4, 2008. (Photo by SPC LaRayne Hurd)



BACK COVER:

Soldiers with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division are silhouetted in the early morning sun as they search a small village during Operation Syme October 28, 2008. (Photo by SFC Kevin Doheny)

This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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FEATURES

DEPARTMENTS

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Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL BARBERO

Meeting the Challenges of the Operational Environment

This is an exciting time in our nation's history to be a Soldier, and I am honored to assume my duties as the 48th Commanding General of Fort Benning and as the Chief of Infantry. The Home of the Infantry remains the centerpiece of Army modernization and training and continues to meet every challenge as its military and civilian work force executes our missions to the highest standard. Today's operational realities demand our closest attention as we provide doctrinal, training, and materiel support to Soldiers preparing for deployment, to those already carrying the fight to our enemies, or those who are returning to home station. In this Commandant's Note I want to highlight the challenges of today's operational environment and outline Fort Benning's support of the operating force.

Today's Soldiers and leaders find themselves dealing with a full spectrum threat on widely differing terrain against a resourceful enemy. They interact with noncombatants and government agencies in areas ranging from urban settings to remote mountainous regions in which both the enemy and the terrain present their own uncompromising challenges. Amidst all of this, our Soldiers draw upon their own and their predecessors' experience to anticipate and deal effectively with the challenges of the environment and the enemy.

The war on terrorism demands a high degree of understanding and application of the lines of operations in counterinsurgency. Ubiquitous media and an increasingly media-savvy enemy also mean that we must continue to retain the initiative in our own information operations as we publicize facts quickly, clearly, and accurately. The water/fish analogy which Mao Zedong first described during China's war against the Japanese in World War II has never been more relevant than it is in the war on terrorism, in which the support of the population for either combatant can be a decisive factor. We address this human dimension through cultural awareness training, foreign language instruction, military transition team training and deployment, and initiatives to reduce collateral damage. Information operations are key to the conflict and are not limited to press within the Islamic world; we must continue to present our case accurately both at home and abroad, among our own citizens and to coalition partners and non-aligned groups.

Fort Benning's support of the operating force has expanded dramatically over the past three years. Mobile training teams export professional military education in the Advanced Leaders and Warrior Leaders courses and at least 16 functional courses, training well over 3,200 Soldiers in FY 2008. Stryker BCT, Heavy BCT, and Infantry BCT Warfighting Forums offer a collaborative process for analysis of BCT tasks, conditions, and standards and have enhanced integration and change within DOTLMPF. Our CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) trains and conducts soldier readiness programs for individual replacements and augmentees as they prepare for movement into theater and receives and out-processes them as they return; and processed 32,500 Soldiers last year. Support to the operating force also includes listening to the field and assessing feedback on subjects as diverse as sustainment of initial military training and initial entry training, better mounted movement protection, better night vision and body armor, BCT organizations, reductions to the Soldier's load, and improvements to the M4 carbine.

The Soldiers we train to standard are ready to fight and to lead when they join their units. The lethality of today's Soldier is a direct result of the full-court emphasis on basic rifle marksmanship, target engagement, and weapons qualification by our Noncommissioned Officer Academy and the training brigades. The urban fight demands skills in short-range marksmanship, engagement of moving targets, use of non-standard firing positions, and total familiarization with all the weapons available to the infantryman. We hard-wire these Soldier skills through extensive live-fire training on the weapons and the state-of-the-art optics that allow us to leverage these weapons' full potential. Improvements to the Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (IBOLC) include training and working out of a forward operating base, cultural awareness training, updates on the operating environment in theater, convoy live-fire exercises, and a foundation in warrior battle tasks and drills.

Over the next three years, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) will become reality as we train infantry and armor Soldiers in a collaborative environment reminiscent of General George Patton's efforts in training the 2nd Armored Division here in the 1940's. The present Maneuver Captains Career Course, the Maneuver Senior Leaders Course, and the Advanced Leaders Course underway at Fort Benning and Fort Knox include combined arms instruction that will facilitate a smooth transition to the MCOE. Fort Benning is a great place to be as our Army and the Infantry undergo this transformation, and this month's *Infantry* offers articles on the global war on terrorism, presents historical perspectives on the evolution of combined arms and the infantryman, and presents thoughts on combat leadership. We invite your comments on our magazine and welcome articles that will further contribute to the professional development of our leaders and Soldiers.

Follow me!

National Infantry Museum, Soldier Center to Honor US Infantry Legacy

The new National Infantry Museum and Soldier Center at Patriot Park will honor the legacy of the United States Infantry on a 200-acre site that links Columbus, Ga., with Fort Benning, the Home of the Infantry. The National Infantry Foundation, a 501 (c) (3) private foundation, was created to act as the sponsoring organization for the project.

The museum's galleries will trace infantry history from colonial times to the present and will feature interactive and immersive exhibits to enhance the visitor's experience. It will be designed to attract and educate all segments of the population with interactive learning opportunities, high-tech classrooms, theaters, and dramatic venues for sacred ceremonies. An active education program will make the venue a must-see attraction for school groups and students of all ages. The foundation has an education coordinator on its staff to work with school groups and assist teachers in the preparation of lesson plans and field trips. The focus of the educational effort will be to teach history, as the history of the U.S. Army Infantry parallels the history of our country.

Additional instruction will focus on leadership skills and the Army Values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity and personal courage. Research done by an internationally known museum planning firm estimates annual visitation at 480,000 to 520,000.

In addition to the 190,000-square-foot museum, there will be a five-acre parade field for infantry and basic training graduations and change of command ceremonies. A Walk of Honor flanked by gardens and memorials will lead visitors to the museum. A recreated World War II era Company Street, featuring the headquarters and sleeping quarters used by General George S. Patton in 1941, will take visitors back to the scenes of our country's largest wartime build-up. The facility will also include a 3-D IMAX theater, restaurant and museum store.

National Infantry Foundation

The new National Infantry Museum and Soldier Center at Patriot Park will trace infantry history from colonial times to the present and feature interactive and immersive exhibits.

The project is a cooperative endeavor with funding being sought from both public and private sectors. To date more than $90 million has been raised in cash and pledges toward a campaign goal of about $100 million.

The National Infantry Museum is fortunate to have one of the world's greatest collections of military artifacts; however, the foundation is dedicated to building a museum of people, not things.

Visitors will meet the infantryman face to face, and join him on his journey. They will come to understand why an infantryman does what he does, why he puts himself in harm's way in defense of an idea, and they will leave transformed, just as the infantry transforms the man into the Soldier.

A graduation and dedication ceremony will take place March 19. Graduates, family members, guests and members of the public will then be invited to visit the Soldier Center, the portion of the new museum comprising an IMAX theater, restaurant, gift shop, lobby, 2nd Regiment gallery, classrooms and Ranger and Officer Candidate School Halls of Honor. The official opening of the remaining galleries will be in June.

For more information on the National Infantry Museum, visit www.nationalinfantrymuseum.com or call (706) 653-9234.

Lightweight .50-Cal:
Lethality at Half the Weight

DEBI DAWSON

As Soldiers training for combat look to lighten their load, they can look forward to the lightweight .50-caliber (LW50) machine gun.

The LW50, an addition to the Army's arsenal of machine guns at one-half the weight of the M2 .50-caliber machine gun and with 60-percent less recoil, does not require the setting of headspace and timing. The LW50 provides Soldiers with the punch of a .50-caliber machine gun in the footprint of a 7.62mm weapon system, allowing them to bring .50-caliber lethality to the fight in situations where using a light to medium machine gun is the only available option.

The LW50 is still in the early stages of system design and development, and officials at the Program Executive Office Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Va., said they expect the weapon to be fielded in 2011. They said a limited two-part Early User Assessment for the weapon was conducted with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) personnel in March and May.

The LW50, a technological spinout from the 25mm XM307 Advanced Crew Served Weapon program, is capable of firing all current .50-caliber ammunition in the inventory, including the standard M33 ball; the M8 armor-piercing incendiary; the M903 saboted light armor penetrator; and the MK211 multipurpose round that combines armor-piercing, explosive, and incendiary effects.

"A major benefit of the LW50 is the weight and recoil savings and no requirement to adjust the headspace and timing," said Shailesh Parmar, a product director for Product Manager Crew Served Weapons in the office of Project Manager Soldier Weapons. "The LW50 is expected to weigh less than 65 pounds, including tripod and traversing and elevation mechanism, compared with the M2 system's weight of 128 pounds, a savings of 63 pounds or more," said Parmar. He also noted that the LW50 can be set up faster than an M2 because it does not need ballast to weigh down the tripod due to less recoil.

The LW50's greatly reduced recoil enables Soldiers to use weapon-magnified optics and maintain sight picture of the target, which was unthinkable and potentially painful with the M2.

"Lower recoil also means less dispersion of rounds and better accuracy," Parmar said. "That, in turn, makes it easier to qualify with the LW50, allows Soldiers to use rounds more economically, and reduces the logistical burden."

The LW50's weight savings, reduced recoil, and increased accuracy allow for its use in places that were not feasible for an M2, such as in light infantry operations.

Once the LW50 is deployed, all vehicles that mount the M2 will be able to mount the new system. Tests have been successfully conducted mounting the system to the Stryker Combat Vehicle and the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station.

Other benefits of the LW50 include safety and training applications. The LW50 eliminates the need for the operator to adjust the headspace and timing and for any special maintenance tools, reducing the amount of training required. The current LW50 has 131 parts, compared with 244 for the M2.

According to the current program cycle, the LW50 could be fielded at the end of FY11. Light units, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, and SOCOM forces, are expected to benefit most from the new weapon.

Seeing what PEO Soldier is bringing to bear in the Global War on Terrorism "inspires and sustains our young Soldiers" as they prepare to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, said CSM Neil Ciotola of III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. "Many of our first-term troopers and even our veterans who have one tour can look at that and go: 'That's what's waiting for me.'"

(Debi Dawson serves as the PEO Soldier Strategic Communications Officer.)

PEO Soldier

A Soldier at Fort Hood, Texas, test fires the LW50 lightweight .50-caliber machine gun.

Army Unveils New Stability Operations FM

JOHN HARLOW

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, GEN William S. Wallace, unveiled the new *Stability Operations* field manual October 6.

FM 3-07 puts stability operations into doctrine after it was recently introduced in FM 3-0, *Operations*, where its importance was elevated to the same level as offensive and defensive operations.

"We recognize that in a contemporary operational environment in the 21st century, conventional military operations, offensive and defensive, will be conducted simultaneously with stability operations," GEN Wallace said. "Our hope is that FM 3-07 becomes a source document not just for the military and agencies within our government, but also non-governmental agencies with whom we routinely work."

LTG William B. Caldwell IV, commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., said, "America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering."

"Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate 'soft' power to promote participation in government, spur economic development and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world, LTG Caldwell said. "At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector."

Given the complexities of the future operating environment, the Army must look at the different ways the elements of national power (military, economic, diplomatic and information) are employed, according to the new manual. It states that military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail during a time of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors fueled by expanding religious extremism, competition for energy, globalization outcomes, climate and demographic changes, and the increased use of violence to achieve political and ideological ends.

"Our objective when we go into a foreign country is to leave, but to leave with that country safe and secure," said LTG Caldwell.

During stability operations, doctrine states U.S. military forces will partner with different U.S. government agencies, non-governmental agencies and coalition partners to bring help and return the quality of life to the people. This doctrine will make stability operations a more conscious portion of that which a Soldier prepares for and executes in the future by institutionalizing the recognition that stability operations are part of operations, TRADOC officials said.

"Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, represents a milestone in Army doctrine," said LTG Caldwell. "It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope and opportunity to the people of the world."

(John Harlow works for the TRADOC Public Affairs Office.)

News Briefs

War College Announces Strategic Landpower Essay Contest — The U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army War College Foundation announce the annual Strategic Landpower Essay Contest. The topic of the essay must relate to "Perspectives on Stability Operations and their Role in U.S. Landpower." Essays should be postmarked by February 17, 2009.

Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of $3,000 for the first place winner, $1,500 to the second place winner, and $500 for third.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact Dr. Michael R. Matheny of the U.S. Army War College Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations at (717) 245-3459 (DSN 242-3459) or e-mail michael.matheny@us.army.mil.

USAMU Hosts Small Arms Championships — The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit will host the 2009 U.S. Army Small Arms Championships in conjunction with the U.S. Army Infantry Center February 21-28 at Fort Benning, Ga.

The Army Rifle and Pistol Championships are open to all Soldiers of all Army components, of any rank, with of any military occupational specialty, including West Point and college ROTC cadets.

All Soldiers will fire both the M-16 rifle and M-9 pistol in helmet and load-bearing equipment from 25 to 500 yards with the M-16 and 7 to 25 yards with the M-9. Teams from battalion-level compete for unit recognition and team awards. All Soldiers will receive advanced marksmanship instruction and training materials to conduct train-the-trainer clinics on return to their home station. The U.S. Army Long Range Championships will provide M-24 long-range shooting training from 600 to 1,000 yards.

To register, contact Clarence Fedrick at (706) 545-5279 or Clarence.Fedrick@usaac.army.mil. A copy of the program/schedule will be available on the USAMU Web site at www.USAMU.com.

40mm Non-dud Producing Training Ammo Now Available

KATE ROA

PEO Soldier's Project Manager Soldier Weapons in Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., has three 40mm product standouts in the Green Ammunition category.

Yes, that's "Green Ammunition." These training cartridges enable 24/7 day/night combat training on the high velocity MK19, MK47 grenade machine guns and low velocity M203, MK13, M79 and XM320 grenade launchers. The MK281 MOD 0 and MOD 1 are for high velocity, and the XM1110 is for low velocity.

Commanders and warfighters who have used the cartridges value the realistic fire and maneuver training they deliver, the good "hit signatures," and the convenience of unrestricted training in dry conditions with no "cease fires" associated with pyrotechnic cartridges.

Warfighters will have access to this ammunition. That's because Project Manager Soldier Weapons leveraged the DoD's Foreign Comparative Test (FCT) program to fast track qualification of a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) product used in a NATO country.

Established in the early 1990s, the FCT program consolidates testing and evaluation of foreign nondevelopmental items to satisfy user requirements across the armed forces. The Department of Defense established the FTC program with a mission to improve warfighting capability, accelerate fielding, and save taxpayer funds.

MK281: The two versions of the MK281 40mm training cartridges began as a Marine request in 1997, a couple of years after the DoD sent the Defense Science Board (DSB) on a mission to evaluate the armed forces' unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems. The DSB's 1996 report stated clean-up numbers were in the billions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved funding, and in 1999 the Marines' request became a joint program between the Army Research Development and Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal and the USMC in Quantico, Va.

Despite combined efforts, when the top product made its way through the final stages of testing the Army dropped the program. Regardless of the Army's reasons for exiting the program, USMC's Mike Miller took the reins and brought the program to completion with the technical support of the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dalhgren in Virginia, hence the Navy MK nomenclature. They classified the day training cartridge in 2003 and had enough successes to secure additional funding. The Mod 1 day/night training, visible in IR spectrum and to the naked eye, was classified in 2006.

Throughout the program's transition, Army warfighters' interest in the 40mm non-dud producing training cartridges remained high. In 2004 PEO Soldier, BG James R. Moran, acknowledged this. Subsequently, PEO authorized Project Manager Soldier Weapons to formalize the adoption of the MK281 MOD 0 into the Army system. This move enabled access to the cartridges by adopting the Marine's requirements.

To date, the Army has procured limited quantities of MK281 on an as-needed-basis through the USMC's five-year Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract, a 2006 award that went to Rheinmetall and American teaming partner Cyalume, located in Massachusetts. Aligned to the DoD policy of stateside production for contract awards, Rheinmetall established a production facility to manufacture MK281 cartridges.

XM1110: The XM1110 training cartridge began in 2003 when the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) identified a need for night training ammunition for the MK13 grenade launcher. Recognizing Project Manager Soldier Weapons' expertise with the MK281 cartridges, SOCOM issued a Program Specific Memo of Agreement (PSMOA), tasking PEO Soldier's Project Manager Soldier Weapons to manage the XM1110 FCT program for them with SOCOM executive oversight.

A market survey was conducted, and a training cartridge manufactured by Rheinmetall/Cyalume was viewed as a candidate likely to satisfy SOCOM's need. This cartridge had the same propulsion system as the DoD's Standard M781 daytime-only training cartridge. The cartridge needed nighttime capability as well, so Cyalume's glow-stick component was added to the orange powder payload. In 2005 SOCOM awarded Rheinmetall a contract to produce test quantities of its cartridge for testing and evaluation.

The XM1110 is progressing well. Compliance with Key Performance Parameters was demonstrated in April of 2007 in Germany, followed by a successful Initial Operator Test (IOT) in April of 2008 in Avon Park, Fla. Final Qualification Testing is planned for December 2008 with initial fielding expected in early 2010.

To date, commanders of the National Guard have taken notice and recognized the convenience of being able to train on ranges in their respective states, instead of sending warfighters on long convoys to active duty installations. Installation commanders have also taken notice of the convenience of being able to redirect limited operations and maintenance funds for needed projects. And, the DoD has recognized the convenience of enabling oversees commanders to train on makeshift ranges without the international concerns of civilians picking up unexploded training duds.

(Kate Roa is a former media specialist for PEO Soldier, who transitioned to full-time writing.)

The HHC Commander as the JSS/Forward TAC OIC

CPT RYAN ROBERTS

With the changing nature of the light infantry battalion's headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander's role in a modular brigade combat team, this paper addresses a course of action for the tactical employment of the HHC commander in combat, particularly the role he can play in establishing and running a joint security station (JSS).

While fully immersed in the residency approach in Baghdad, our task force — the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment "Black Lions" — had an area of operations (AO) 6 kilometers away from the forward operating base (FOB); our FOB was 4 kilometers south of our southern boundary and 15 kilometers from the northwest corner of our AO. The distance in an urban environment such as Baghdad was too great for every operation and every emergency situation that occurred. It was necessary for certain battalion assets such as the battalion quick reaction force (QRF), maintenance/recovery team, small aid station, and a battalion forward tactical command post (TAC) to be located forward in order to synchronize all the battalion assets. With the focus on sustainable security and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces, every task force will need to establish a JSS. In a modular brigade combat team (BCT), a light infantry HHC commander is one option to take charge of the JSS and TAC of the task force.

New Role of the HHC Commander on the Battlefield Still in Question

The HHC commander in a light infantry battalion in a modular BCT has fewer logistical personnel than HHC commanders of the past. The battalion support platoon within the HHC no longer exists. The forward support company (FSC) now has all the logistical personnel that directly support the infantry battalion. Within the HHC the company commander has three specialty platoons to train and lead into combat: the scout platoon, the mortar platoon, and the medical platoon. A robust fire support cell is also present within the company, with a field artillery captain as the fires and effects coordination officer who is directly responsible for the cell's training and mentoring. And, as always, the staff falls under the umbrella of the HHC.

In garrison, during reset and training, the HHC commander's sole focus should be the training of the scout, mortar, and medical platoons. Those platoons need company-level support to plan and resource their training. The battalion commander and S3 focus on supporting the line companies, and the battalion executive officer (XO) focuses on the staff. The HHC commander, with each platoon leader, plans the training of the specialty platoons and proposes the plan to the S3 and command group. The mortar platoon training

Vehicles line the outside of Joint Security Station Black Lion in Iraq.

PFC Nathaniel Smith

will involve mortar sections from the infantry companies, as well as forward observers (FOs) from the infantry companies in coordination with the fires and effects cell, just as medical training will involve all the line medics from across the battalion.

Once the battalion is deployed and under task force organization, the majority of the fire supporters and medics are attached to the infantry companies. The scout platoon and the mortar platoon may be used in a number of ways. The Black Lions chose to use the mortar platoon to secure Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assets, based on the BCT requirement that each task force provide a security escort for EOD in their AO (not all BCTs and task forces will be faced with this tasking). Using the same platoon, like the mortar platoon, for the task enabled EOD and the platoon to develop their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and hone their skills as a team over time.

The 1-28 IN used the battalion scout platoon and sniper section for sniper team locations and high value targeted raids across the AO. When a particular target the intelligence community was tracking made himself available, the scout platoon would bring the intelligence experts to the company AO for action as soon as possible. The scout platoon would be attached to the company that owned the battlespace and would incorporate their own platoon in the cordon and sensitive site exploitation.

We considered keeping the HHC commander in the rear to assist with planning all scout platoon operations in conjunction with the S3 and the S2. The S3 provides battalion-level planning, and the S2 provides experts from the Military Intelligence (MI) company as well as all intelligence available, but the scout platoon is forced to take all this information and break it down to platoon-level operations. What the HHC commander could provide is company-level detail, terrain analysis, and risk management. With the fast pace of high value target (HVT) raids and since the S3 and S2 were coordinating a plan for the scout platoon which was then attached to the battlespace-owning infantry company, we chose not to go with this course of action for the HHC commander.

We have seen other uses for the HHC commander. We have seen the HHC commander given the combat power to own battlespace himself. We did not have the combat power to do that in this environment. We have also seen the HHC commander as a projects officer or community contracting officer. If you keep your HHC commander in the rear for contracting, you still have a JSS and forward tactical command post to operate, and you have to find the right person for that job.

A task force may have an extra lieutenant available for the JSS and TAC, and for 24-hour operations a task force would need two lieutenants. Then you have to look at the NCOs and personnel you will place at the JSS as well. You may have an additional assistant S3 who is appropriate for the job. The decision is usually personality driven in order to find the right person for the job. With an HHC commander, you have an infantry officer whose career path has enabled him to assume command, he has some tactical proficiency, and he can read the battalion commander's intent, support the infantry company commanders to achieve their goals, and can be responsible for a robust signature, on a coalition outpost (COP), away from higher levels of supervision.

The Structure of the JSS/TAC

On our JSS we had the HHC commander and medical platoon leader run the TAC and supervise the JSS. Security and logistical support for the compound fell on the battlespace-owning company that owned the COP where the JSS was located. We had three NCOs (staff sergeants or sergeants first class), two communications specialists (one NCO and one Soldier), two medics who ran the forward aid station (one NCO and one Soldier), four Soldiers on rotations at the JSS for two-week periods, a recovery team that operated a M984 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) wrecker and an XM1120 HEMTT Load Handling System (LHS), and at times, other elements that assisted with welding or carpentry across the compound.

With only those personnel, we then had to split into two separate command posts (CPs): the TAC and the joint operations center (JOC). The TAC would maintain radio communications with all operations, battle track the fight, coordinate battalion assets forward, track six military and national police transition teams (MiTT/NPTTs) and two police transition teams (PTTs), and communicate to the tactical operations center (TOC) on the FOB regarding any resources needed for the infantry companies or transition teams. The JOC would have a liaison with each Iraqi Security Force: local police, army, national police, highway police, fire department, and emergency medical services; train the Iraqi Army unit in charge at the JSS how to battle track and run a CP; coordinate with emergency medical services and the fire department; take walk-in tips, concerns, and claims; and field any issues/needs the Iraqi Security Forces had that required U.S. help.

With the JOC located within or adjacent to the Iraqi Army compound, we were concerned with whom we had at the JOC and what kind of security/force protection we could provide them. At any given time, there is a threat of militia or terrorists attempting to capture U.S. Soldiers. The entire JSS — the compound itself — was divided to ensure the force protection of U.S. Soldiers.

The NCOs (sergeant first class or staff sergeant) filled the role as the JOC NCO in charge (NCOIC). We had one staff sergeant (cook) provided by the FSC; one sergeant first class who had been removed from a platoon sergeant position; and one sergeant first class, artilleryman, the effects cell NCOIC. Later in the deployment, the effects cell NCOIC moved to a task force internal MiTT and a squad leader, infantryman, who had stepped down from his squad, became a JOC NCOIC as well. Two NCOICs provided day and night coverage on 12-hour shifts. Having a third allowed the NCOs to rotate back to the FOB for refit, if needed, or to assist in the TAC. The communications specialists (one NCO and one Soldier) also assisted the NCOIC in the JOC, keeping the buddy-system in tact 24 hours a day in the JOC and ensuring communication was always available at the JOC.

In the TAC, the HHC commander ran the TAC during the day, and the medical platoon leader ran the TAC at night. The four Soldiers on a two-week tasking at the JSS were Soldiers from the FSC from various Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs)

whose primary task was to provide a female search team. Located at the TAC, they were forward positioned any time the infantry companies needed them. The battlespace owning company at the TAC needed the female search teams almost every day as female informants or claimants came to the front gate requesting assistance. When the female search teams were not conducting personal searches — which did not take up most of their time — they were radio telephone operators (RTOs) for the TAC. Two working together at all times, managed the battalion command net, brigade command net, battalion operations and intelligence (O/I) net, and battalion administrative and logistics (A/L) nets, the blue force tracker, logs, and phones.

The medics ran the aid station, assisted with injured personnel who came to the U.S. or Iraqi gates, assisted with detainee screening for the battlespace-owning company, and covered down on all medical emergencies in the area if needed. The recovery team covered down on all maintenance needs for all U.S. elements in the vicinity and also assisted the Iraqi Security Forces with their maintenance needs. Whenever a recovery asset was needed in the task force AO, they would drop the maintenance they were doing, meet up with the QRF, and move to wherever they were needed. If a female search team was needed, the medics or mechanics could often cover down on the radios.

PFC Nathaniel Smith

LTC Patrick Frank, commander of the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, briefs GEN David Petraeus at Joint Security Station Black Lion June 30.

HHC Concerns/Recommendations to Alleviate Concerns

With digital framework in place, and the first sergeant (1SG) and XO at the FOB and the HHC commander at the TAC, all administrative issues could still be accomplished. The scout platoon and mortar platoon conducted their operations in the task force AO and found their missions leading them to the JSS numerous times. Any Soldier or the platoon leader, if face-to-face time was needed, had the opportunity. Any paperwork that needed to be signed was e-mailed, signed, scanned, and e-mailed back. The digital framework was supported by an AN-50 (a point-to-point and multi-point fixed broadband wireless system).

One of the biggest drawbacks to this method for the HHC commander is the lack of face time he has with each Soldier in his company. Most of the daily interaction is done over the phone. Lack of face time is a significant drawback; leadership is not something you can do over e-mail. However, you have to overcome the nature of the decentralized fight; you cannot look every Soldier in the eye before he makes a decision that could have mission impacting effects. We made scheduled phone calls a weekly event between me and my XO and platoon leaders. Guidance and a shared, known end-state must be communicated so everyone is moving in the same direction. We had to make the most of any face-to-face time we had. If a platoon came out to the JSS, I would visit with everyone. If I was back at the FOB (which I had to do four times during the 13 months the JSS was operational), I visited every leader, completed UCMJ, and inspected the arms room and supply rooms.

Another drawback is the extra level of risk management, terrain analysis, and planning that the HHC commander could provide to the scout platoon and mortar platoon that he cannot oversee from a different location. In addition, any issues, conflicts in timing, limitations or constraints that the two specialty platoons may have could be overlooked, and the commander needs to be there to fight for the platoons to ensure their safety or recovery. Fortunately, the scout and mortar platoon leaders were in their second or third positions within the battalion, and their maturity to weigh mission accomplishment with sustainability of the platoon was respected by the battalion commander, S3, and XO. Also, the HHC XO and FSC worked hard to ensure these two platoons, which often had very high operational pace, were taken care of immediately for services, maintenance, and battle-damage replacements.

There were times where a safety review and company-level planning would have helped, but we took risk in this area, knowing the mature personalities of each platoon leader, the XO, and the 1SG. And the benefits of a well run JSS and a battalion TAC, which supported the entire task force mission (including the transition teams' mission), outweighed the risks taken.

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Force Protection and Coalition Outposts

CPT GEORGE A. CHIGI

Force protection measures are critical to maintaining combat power at coalition outposts (COPs) and greatly contribute to mission success in Iraq. A little over a year ago, most Soldiers had probably never heard of a coalition outpost. With our current operating environment (OE) in Iraq, we could not do without them. Now, nearly every Soldier in a maneuver battalion has served time on one of these small, company-sized bases. COPs are vital to our mission of securing the local populace and training and operating with Iraqi Security Forces. An effective COP must be embedded into the community in which it serves. Being so close to the populace has obvious advantages, but it also makes COPs very susceptible to enemy attack. Effective, protected COPs require commanders to deliberately plan, prepare, and execute for this mission.

In the fall of 2007, while deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I found myself as an HHC company commander based out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rustamiyah. My unit — the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment — was responsible for the Karada Peninsula OE and several neighboring sectors in Baghdad. A few months into the deployment, my battalion commander asked me to begin conducting force protection assessments of our multiple coalition outposts and joint security stations (JSS). As an infantry officer, conducting an external look at a location for security reasons is common practice. In my quest to help the battalion with its COP security measures, I witnessed the security challenges first hand.

In order to be certified as our battalion's antiterrorism officer (ATO), I had to first go to the Antiterrorism Level II course. The level II course is a 40-hour course not regularly conducted in combat. Due to the overwhelming demand to have ATOs certified in theater, a mobile class was created and taught by the Multi-National Force-Iraq Strategic Operations Command (MNF-I STRATOPS) Protection. This same MNF-I STRATOPS protection element also traveled throughout Iraq and evaluated the force protection plans and procedures at forward operating bases.

Forward operating bases are a means of pulling Soldiers away from the cities and urban areas where enemy insurgents can easily inflict casualties. One of the negative aspects of all of the standoff that provided security to U.S. Soldiers was that the U.S. forces were now tens of kilometers from the Iraqi people they had come to secure. From these distances, employing combat power in the company operating environments could take as long as 30 minutes to an hour.

In early 2007, as part of the "surge," our priorities shifted, and brigades had to find a way to more effectively employ their combat power in their OEs. As a result, the Army created the "coalition outpost," and GEN David Petraeus (then commanding general of Multi-National Force – Iraq) and LTG Raymond Odierno (then commanding general of III Corps) made implementation of COPs a priority. The COP provided company commanders with the ability to maintain nearly a company's worth of combat power in his OE.

In my class of over 50 Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Marines, and contractors, I was surprised to find that I was the only Soldier whose sole purpose of receiving the training was to assess more forward, smaller locations (COPs). My class, interesting as it was, was designed around teaching ATOs about FOB-level force protection. Early in the instruction, knowing that COPs were essential to mission success and of high importance, I asked when we would progress to the lessons where we would discuss building, manning, and securing COPs. A silence fell over the class. I quickly realized that the COP concept was so new (even though we had been executing it in theater) that the model had not caught up with the curriculum.

Often you will hear company-level outposts referred to as patrol bases. Because a COP is a near permanent fixture to the muhallah (neighborhood) it resides in, it does not fit the description of a "patrol base" by existing for less than 24 hours.

SPC Creighton Holub

Army engineers build a barrier wall at a forward operating base in southeastern Iraq in August 2007.

FM 3-90, *Tactics*, makes reference to an obscure term: "combat outpost." A combat outpost is, "a reinforced OP (observation post) capable of conducting limited combat operations …in restrictive terrain." A combat outpost would allow a platoon leader or commander to operate for extended periods of time from a defendable position. While the field manual leads the reader to believe that "restrictive terrain" is a mountainous or heavily forested area, a heavily populated and urbanized area could be just as restrictive. It is likely that the term "combat outpost" was changed to "coalition outpost" to reflect the multitude of nations that are aiding the United States in the war on terrorism.

In a city of more than seven million inhabitants like Baghdad, real estate is a highly sought after commodity. It's hard enough for a civilian to find an empty house or apartment so finding enough room to secure a mechanized or motorized company can be a daunting task.

Once the company commander has secured his site, the construction begins. In agricultural areas, building a COP is challenging, but commanders generally have the freedom to design the dimensions of their COPs and create standoff from assault. In urban areas, commanders often are restricted by what structures are available.

FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,* states: "The challenge to the defender is to retain the initiative, that is, to keep the enemy reacting and unable to execute his own plan." Once on the ground, the commander must find ways of securing his unconventional outpost. The security measures must be strong enough to halt attack, or appear so untouchable that its sight alone will deter the enemy, while at the same time encourage the local nationals to approach the COP with tips and enemy information.

According to FM 7-8, the first priority with any military operation is security. In regards to security, priorities of work for a COP are no different than a patrol base or combat outpost. Security is an enduring operation that will never reach completion: establishing security positions, clearing and identifying dead space, placing obstacles in avenues of approach, creating target reference points and final protective fires, and requesting indirect fire targets never end.

Creating these fortresses that keep the enemy out may make the COP so ominous that the very people we are seeking to help are too afraid to approach the COP. Commanders must conduct combat patrols with the purpose of getting to know the people. Local people will provide the greatest intelligence about the enemy and aid in the restoration efforts to return the area into a secure location.

Maximizing combat power in a sustained combat operation is integral to defeating the enemy. Sustaining combat power is precisely what the theory of the COP suggests. Unfortunately, manpower is not without its limits. When an entire infantry or armor company is pushed to a COP, it goes without saying that it must also secure itself. At any given time, one third of that company is committed to the force protection of that COP. That same platoon that was guarding the entrance gate or roving the COP perimeter for eight hours will finish its day by conducting a combat patrol in the company sector.

Rapid fielding initiatives have brought some of the greatest technologies the world has seen to our fingertips. If these technologies are implemented properly, commanders can preserve some of that combat power for patrols. The contracting company Raytheon has developed Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) systems specifically for U.S. military and law enforcement surveillance needs. At the FOB level, large aerial blimps (RAID Aerostat) with surveillance equipment are being used. The COPs can be outfitted with similar tower surveillance systems (RAID towers) that can also monitor vast amounts of battlespace. The company command post can have one Soldier who monitors radios and traverses several cameras to watch the dead space that guard positions cannot see and potentially make several guard positions unnecessary. Both the tower and the blimp can be equipped with infrared video, a laser range finder, laser range designator, and laser illuminator. These tools can give units real time data and current locations on enemy targets, route status, cover dead space, and even make corrections on indirect fire targets.

The Army's Rapid Equipping Force, in cooperation with Exponent, Inc., has been fielding Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS) to COPs and FOBs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The RDISS comes in a complete package that is fully mission capable in a short period of time, and takes very little time for the Soldiers to master its capabilities. The RDISS offers a command post the ability to simultaneously monitor several cameras with pan and zoom features, and several fixed cameras. The first RDISS system that 2-69 AR received was at one of our joint security stations. Manned by our attached airborne company, JSS Muthana, like many of our outposts, was surrounded by apartment buildings and homes and was attached to an Iraqi Police station. The cameras were a definite home run. With just one Soldier, the sergeant of the guard could monitor his guard positions and the dead space his guards could not see, zoom in on enemy avenues of approach, and check in on his Iraqi Police counterparts to ensure they were properly executing their duties.

While the paratroopers were the first to receive the RDISS, I have to give credit to the ingenuity of our Cobra Company (C Company, 2-69 AR, 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID). Long before the first RDISS had arrived, Cobra's leaders had heard of the system, but it seemed the cameras were just being fielded and were not likely to get to the COP soon enough. With so much air traffic near the Karada Peninsula, the company's Raven unmanned aerial vehicle was rendered useless. With no surveillance package available, Cobra mounted its Raven in a window that overlooked some dead space of the COP, and the "Raven on a Stick" concept was born. Just like that, Cobra had an ad hoc RDISS.

Technologies like this and others can reduce the numbers required to secure the COPs and FOBs, and in turn, free up combat power for the COPs. This technique will preserve combat power for the COP's true purpose of providing a forward position for Soldiers to operate from.

With the proper resources, a COP can be as secure as a FOB. Regrettably, with so many forces on the FOB, that is where the main focus is for assets. Even when the main concern is the COP, battalions and brigades are hindered by time or changing

MAJ Robert Lenz

A Soldier installs an RDISS system on Camp Victory in Baghdad. The system allows the monitoring of several locations using fixed cameras.

priorities. In the early stages of building COPs, the logistic pushes of huge trucks and trailers seem never ending. Reducing or minimizing big logistical packages can eliminate unnecessary combat patrols, and lower the risk of encountering improvised explosive devices. As the COP matures, it can sustain itself with smaller packages that are moved with only what an infantry or armor platoon can move in its organic vehicles.

With the unpredictable nature of building a COP in an urban area, designing a COP package that will work everywhere in Baghdad is simply not feasible. There is not a formula based on COP size that will fix all or likely more than one COP. That being said, many company commanders do request similar equipment: RAID towers, RDISS camera packages, Command Post Node (CPN) for data transfer, Kevlar boards and blankets, Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR), mobile barriers and lift arm gates for entry control points, and high intensity spotlights.

Although a fix-all COP package will never work, a smaller universal COP package could be devised. Each time a brigade is given the mission to employ a new COP, the division-level support networks could push a universal COP package (or multiple packages based on predicted COP numbers) to the commander on the ground.

When I first began assessing 2-69 AR's COPs, it seemed only battalions and brigade-level ATOs inspected COPs and that is where the information flow seemed to stop. When we were assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, the ATO inspections stopped at the brigade level. Each maneuver battalion may have one to six COPs or COP-like locations. The battalion ATO is a good start, but a battalion can do only so much with its resources and ATO. I felt that I was well trained by the ATO class and my experience as an infantryman. While the current status of all COPs is tracked, COPs do not get the visibility that FOBs do. I believed that what was needed was a division or theater-level COP assessment team that could aid the ATO with assessments similar to those done on FOBs. The group that taught my ATO class, MNF-I STRATOPS Protection, also travels the Iraq OE inspecting FOBs. They have the personnel, resources, and capabilities to bring concepts to fruition and help units with force protection short falls. This group should have a team that inspects COPs.

In March of 2008, I returned from my mid-tour leave to find that the 4th Infantry Division had arrived and brought some changes with them. A division-level team of four Soldiers and one civilian, each trained in a specific area relevant to COP force protection and safety, was dispatched into our brigade's OE. I was pleasantly surprised to see the assessment they had completed at JSS Muthana. The level of detail that each inspector brought to the fight was outstanding. Not only had they done a very detailed analysis of my battalion's JSS, but what I had learned from their level of detail was invaluable. Our battalion is currently making numerous force protection upgrades based on their assessment.

The idea of the coalition outpost is still in its infancy. None the less, it is budding very quickly. The *Joint Forward Operations Base Force Protection Handbook* issued at the AT level II course was a good starting point for my COP education, but I have learned much more from working with the Soldiers, NCOs, and commanders as I made my assessments.

Maintaining a rapport with the people and training and operating with Iraqi Security Forces are essential for an independent and self-sufficient Iraq. To successfully accomplish these goals, the coalition forces must be in close proximity to the Iraqi people. The coalition outpost is the most effective means of establishing and maintaining this rapport. The COPs must have a force protection plan, robust force protection measures, and the resources to implement the plan. Additionally, this plan must be wholeheartedly backed by the entire chain of command, from theater level down to the company level. To aid the leaders, the Army has equipped its Soldiers with some of the newest ideas, technologies, and changes to doctrine to support COPs and COP force protection. Yet, in over 200 years of service and evolution, the Soldier remains our greatest resource.

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SNAPSHOT OF A JOINT SECURITY STATION

CPT JEFFREY M. SHELNUTT

The joint security station (JSS) is a program in Iraq that works off the idea that one of the ways to get the Iraqi governmental institution to take ownership over their security forces is to embed coalition forces (CF) with Iraqi police (IP), Iraqi Army (IA) elements, and the "Sons of Iraq" (SoI), formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens (CLC). The purpose of this article is to look at a snapshot view, and highlight a few examples of issues faced at one particular JSS, specifically the district JSS (DJSS) located in the Adhamiyah section of Baghdad (Figure 1).

Figure 1 — 3-7 Cavalry AO

DJSS Adhamiyah

DJSS Adhamiyah is located in what has historically been one of the most violent and uncontrolled Sunni enclaves of Baghdad. When Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment took over the DJSS in September of 2007, the various acts of violence against CF and our partners throughout the AO was high. Through interactions with the IA, IP, and with the standing up of the SoI in Adhamiyah, attacks against CF and civilians decreased dramatically over the months, with a rise seen during increased fighting in Sadr City in April/May 2008 (See Figure 2).

The mission for HHT, 3-7 CAV at the DJSS was to provide security for the site, provide tactical and technical oversight, coordinate and track patrols between CF and IP, monitor day-to-day operations, and, along with the Military Police (MP) and civilian law enforcement professionals (LEP), advise and train the IP to increase their efficiency at the sight and their effectiveness throughout their sector of Adhamiyah. This was accomplished by stationing a permanent force made up of the HHT headquarters command element and attachments from the other troops in the squadron, and a separate element of MPs and LEP. This force was approximately 40 personnel from HHT, three to four MPs, and at least one LEP who came periodically for training.

The joint operations cell (JOC) is the nerve center of any JSS. The JOC at JSS Adhamiyah consisted of a JOC supervisor from HHT, the MP element, and liaison officers (LNOs) from the IP, IA, and SoI. Each of these LNOs were equipped with radios and were able to provide the JOC direct communications with the separate elements outside of the JSS on the streets of Adhamiyah. The JOC also ensured that all patrols were monitored, organized, resourced, and tracked. Until a boundary realignment in March 2008, two troops conducted at least two to four patrols per troop in a 24-hour period with IP personnel integrated into the patrols. These patrols were conducted throughout many of the muhallas, or neighborhoods, in Adhamiyah. Personnel from the DJSS also conducted dismounted patrols around the DJSS in the neighborhoods directly surrounding the compound. These patrols were made up of a combination of CF and IP, and were primarily used to show the populace that their IPs were out and about, to meet the owners and workers of the rapidly expanding base of shops opening up all around the DJSS, to get atmospheric reads, and to pass out tip cards with cell phone numbers of the JOC.

The dynamics of a JSS are necessarily very different from operating from a forward operating base (FOB) or a combat outpost (COP). HHT occupied the DJSS on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week basis. We did not rotate elements or personnel in and out. This is one of the most important aspects of occupying and conducting a mission at a JSS. It is important to create a working relationship between the CF and the IP. That can only come with the day-to-day familiarity that living at a site on a permanent basis provides. That familiarity does not guarantee an intimate relationship with the IPs at that station, but it does give the parties a common ground upon which to build an effective working relationship.

Along the same lines, one of the lessons that should be quickly learned for incoming units, regardless of the number of deployments their personnel have had, is that at this point in time we — the CF — cannot and should not solve the problems of the IPs.

Just one of many examples: In February, shortly after I had taken command of HHT and the JSS, the IP leadership brought up the issue of having trouble acquiring fuel for vehicles. They could not roll out of the DJSS to crime scenes or go on patrols due to their limited fuel situation. The main reason for this problem was the lack of any kind of steady or reliable logistical support system. Their system, or lack of one, is a bureaucratic morass that still relies heavily on payoffs, nepotism, and favoritism. Culturally, this has been an accepted way of doing business for years and will continue for the foreseeable future.

In our situation at the DJSS, of course, the IPs were testing the waters to see what, if anything, the new command was going to give them. In the past the solution to this might have been to simply supply them with CF *benzin*. However, we (both HHT and the MPs) approached the issue from an angle of encouraging and really pushing for an *Iraqi solution* to the issues they faced. That is not to say that we would not engage the IP's higher headquarters, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and assist in working out a solution.



Figure 2

In fact, that is exactly what took place. The 3rd Brigade, 4th ID, to which 3-7 CAV was attached, brought the problem to the attention of the MoI. On the other side, the IP district commander took it through his channels to the MoI. Eventually a solution was brought about, but, most importantly, we did not supply the fuel that they needed or force a solution on them. In extreme cases, I must admit that assistance from higher to solve an issue is a must, but the days of the IP's overreliance on CF is over, and this should only be undertaken when all courses of action are exhausted.

Sons of Iraq (SoI)

During our deployment in Adhamiyah, the Sons of Iraq program was initiated. This has been one of the most important steps taken in the Iraqi theater of operations to reduce the amount of violence directed against CF, our partners, and civilians. Without getting into too much detail, the SoI serves as a "neighborhood watch" for their communities, albeit an armed one. In Adhamiyah they have become a force for peace and stability. The complexities of working with SoI, who are effectively conducting static checkpoint operations throughout Adhamiyah, are many. And there are naturally times when they and the IP have had their differences. There are, in fact, times when power struggles arise between SoI leaders as they seek to consolidate local power in a secure environment. But CF have recognized the benefit of the SoI and have begun the process of bringing them into the fold of the MoI as IPs and IA. Granted, the process has not been an easy one. The historic religious, sectarian differences and prejudices are still strong and will remain so for the foreseeable future. However, there seems to be some real action on reconciliation at the ministry level. But it will be a slow, cautious process.

The benefits of the process of recognizing and legitimizing the SoI by accepting them into the IP are twofold. First, it legitimizes and recognizes the service that has been provided by the SoI. That the amount of violence has dropped significantly due to the SoI cannot be refuted. There is, of course, a train of thought that says we are simply paying terrorists who were trying to kill us before to not kill us, and that we're creating "consurgents" (concerned insurgents). One answer to that argument is the enemy you know is better than one you do not. Another answer might be that is why it is so important to reconcile the factions and bring the SoI into the fold as part of the solution rather than have them on the outside as an armed militia.

The second benefit of recognition and legitimization is that by accepting and sending SoI to the IP academy it increases the numbers of the IP and could, if they are assigned to their home neighborhoods, provide familiar faces that have a proven track record of providing security for their muhallas, have been engaging with the citizenry, and providing protection to the property and livelihoods of not just the private citizen, but also the important economic livelihood of the burgeoning "shopkeeper" class that provide services and employment in the various neighborhoods.

This plan, at the time of the writing of this article, is in its nascent stage and has yet to reach complete fruition. Handled correctly this program will provide a real and lasting impact on the security issues facing Iraq.

The Shia/Sunni Dichotomy

One very real problem faced at the DJSS was the fact that a majority of the IPs working at the station were Shia, many with homes and families in Sadr City. Adhamiyah, however, is an overwhelmingly Sunni area. The Shia IPs would not conduct independent patrols without either CF or IA support. Their fear, a valid one, was that they would be attacked, kidnapped, and/or killed by the Sunni in Adhamiyah, and there are numerous examples of both the SoI and IP (usually off duty) engaging in periodic harassment of each other. This was never a

TSGT Adrian Cadiz, USAF

A Sons of Iraq member provides security as residents line up to exchange empty propane tanks for filled ones at the marketplace in the Adhamiyah district of Baghdad March 19.

major problem, but there was always the possibility for escalation.

An example of the problems faced can be found in the patrols. The MPs consistently reported that when they accompanied an IP patrol of Shia makeup that the members of the patrol were distrustful of the citizenry, refused to engage with the people, and when prodded to "take the lead" did so unenthusiastically. The same was seen in the HHT foot patrols. Conversely, when the patrol was made up of Sunni personnel, their actions were the polar opposite. They talked to the population, passed out IO messages and tip cards, and generally took more of the lead than their Shia counterparts.

One solution to this problem is a joint operations program between the IP and SoI. This would involve the IP and SoI patrolling together, manning checkpoints, and serving warrants together.

Another solution for the IP in Adhamiyah to be effective at the street level is for the local police element to be made up of majority Sunni personnel; the Shia officers can then be reassigned to stations in predominantly Shia neighborhoods where they, in turn, can be more effective. As it stands now, hundreds of SoI members have been admitted to the police training academy. After graduating, it is hoped they will return to work in their own neighborhoods, relieving the SoI and offering a governmental, as opposed to extra-governmental, solution to the security problems.

As this article is written, we are preparing for redeployment after more than a year in theater as part of the surge. The outcome of the JSS and SoI experiment remains to be seen, but that there has been a significant drop in violence over the period of the surge deployment of 3-7 CAV is inarguable. Many things need to happen to ensure this trend remains steady. There must be continued oversight at a small unit level to ensure a more intimate and personal relationship between CF and IP is cultivated. The SoI must accept a gradual drawdown of their numbers and release local power that has been consolidated during the SoI program. The MoI must accept and legitimize the SoI and bring them into the government through programs such as recruiting them for positions within the IP. And, there are still a hundred more things that must go right for final success. We are on the right road. The new catch phrase of the day is "defeat the FOB mentality." This is a truism, and the JSS is one of the ways to defeat an isolating mentality. The JSS is succeeding and will continue to succeed as long as we maintain the focus of encouraging Iraqi solutions to their myriad of problems.

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

HHT Soldiers, along with members of the Iraqi Police, conduct a patrol in Adhamiyah.

Courtesy photo

Combined Arms and the Evolution of War

1LT JOSEPH P. MORSELLO

We cannot allow casualty aversion to rule military tactics and erase decades of military evidence illustrating the effectiveness of the combined arms (CA) methodology. In the RAND Corporation report "Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat," author Olga Oliker stated, "The guiding concept seemed to be that firepower could limit the exposure of soldiers to close combat and thus save military lives, albeit at the cost of infrastructure and noncombatants."

Unlike the Russians in Chechnya, Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan are balancing organizational and tactical skill with firepower, illustrating an evolution in the CA methodology.

CA operations at battalion/company level and above employ infantry, tanks, artillery and aircraft in combination, using each arm's strengths to engage the enemy while protecting each others' weaknesses from enemy action. Similarly, at company/platoon level and below, combined weapon (CW) methodology — a varied weapons mix of automatic weapons, rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, hand grenades, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles, demolition charges, and man and vehicle portable crew served weapon systems — affords the infantry platoon, squad, or team the ability to engage and defeat a wider variety of targets and accomplish more missions then if they were armed with standard small arms alone.

The evolution of CA began in late WWI, was fully developed in WWII by the Germans and was further refined during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Afghan Wars, and in Chechnya. These post-WWII conflicts illustrate the CA evolution, including the CW concept as infantry forces are greatly empowered by advances in small arm technology and battle group organization. The essence of CA methodology is indisputable in combat; however, some types of conflicts require more of one arm over others, dictated by terrain and conflict intensity. The uniqueness of the infantry embracing the CA evolution of CW becomes the essential ingredient in our current period of guerrilla warfare.

World War I

The overwhelming firepower of the machine gun forced stalemate on the Western Front during WWI. The Allies possessing superior material and industrial capacity sought a technological solution, and the Germans suffering from deficiencies of these assets turned to tactical innovation. The Germans solved the problems of moving across "no-man's" land and breaching the enemy's trench system through the application of organizational, small arms, and tactical movement innovations that set the foundation of modern CA warfare.

First, hand grenades and flamethrowers were used to attack and breach the enemy trenches by "rolling-them up," a technique where German infantrymen would attack at one end of the trench and systematically work their way up to the other end or next trench in the system. Other infantry weapons such as the light machine gun, developed later through detailed tactical testing and evaluation, would also prove very effective in this capacity.

Second, crossing "no-man's" land under heavy machine gun and artillery fire was accomplished by using smaller formations, innovative movement techniques and suppressive fire from organic weapons. Infantry formations began to break up into platoons and squads moving independently utilizing available cover and concealment. Infiltration techniques were developed to protect advancing infantry through stealth.

Finally, the Germans recognized that accurate and timely supporting fire was more effective than volume or duration of fire, according to Bruce I. Gudmundsson in his book *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-18*. Supporting arms such

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German machine gunners in a trench prepare to fire. Through numerous organizational and tactical innovations, the Germans set the foundation of modern CA warfare.

as machine guns, artillery and mortars were an integral part of the infantry formation and made lighter and more manageable so the infantry could move and employ them without the help of animals or machines. This combination made supporting fire from a variety of weapons available and more responsive to the unit's support requirements.

Weapons development was based on tactical innovations, and Gudmundsson noted that the personal equipment of the men was modified to meet the requirements of their new methods of fighting. Assault detachments of Stormtroops, whose composition was made up of variously armed units, employed these new tactics. "Instead of being composed entirely of riflemen, [the platoon] was now composed of three types of squads — light machine gun squad, rifle squad and storm troop," Gudmundsson wrote. Infantry platoons were conducting fire and maneuver at squad level and in some instances within the squad.

Late in WWI aircraft also served in a limited ground attack role. Len Deighton pointed out in his book *Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk* that the Germans produced the first "battle groups" integrating "mixed teams working in very close cooperation" when they combined light artillery and aircraft during WWI battles.

The organizational modifications allowing independent movement of smaller units, the formation of assault detachments armed with a variety of new weapons, and new movement techniques began a tactical revolution creating the CA methodology.

World War II

In the time between the wars, the Germans and Allies studied their experiences during WWI, and CA began to gain wider acceptance in the armies of the major powers. In the book *A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff*, author Trevor N. Dupuy stated that CA was the central tactical principle of the Reichswehr. General Heinz Guderian studied the tank's performance in WWI and knew that no one arm could achieve every battlefield mission. "In this requirement the tanks differ in no respect from the other arms, and inter-arm cooperation is therefore a matter of fundamental importance," Guderian wrote in his book *Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare*. Institutionalizing the CA methodology through the creation of the panzer division, he also insured the complete mechanization of all arms enabling speed, surprise, and mass in the offense.

"The Germans maneuvered and fought so that all arms — guns, tanks, and motorized infantry — could render each other effective support," Dupuy wrote. Additionally, newly created anti-aircraft and reconnaissance elements became organic to the panzer division. Dupuy also pointed out, "The panzer division was effective precisely because it was a combined arms force that used all of its weapons, not just tanks with maximum effectiveness."

The peacetime panzer division evolved as the demands of war required the further evolution of organizational structure. Dupuy and Gundmundsson both noted the application of CA battle groups or detachments in combat as the preferred task-organized formation whose size and composition was mission dependent. The Germans integrated aircraft into the CA team including air force liaison personnel with units involved at the offensive's main effort. "Aircraft worked to telling effect as long ago as 1918, and the attacker can hardly dispense with their cooperation nowadays," Guderian wrote. The Germans created modern CA methodology institutionalizing many of its elements through formal organizational changes also creating the necessary training and command and control atmosphere to make it work.

WWII saw incredible innovations in tactics, ordnance, and weapons. These innovations became the catalyst for the evolution in CA methodology that began with the WWI Stormtroops. Toward the end of WWII the infantry gained a variety of powerful weapons that could be employed by a single Soldier or two-man teams, greatly expanding their operational capabilities.

Guderian, Deighton and Frank Kurowski (author of *Infantry Aces*) all pointed toward the primacy of the infantry in defending and holding ground on the battlefield. Guderian stated that "it was clear that armored attacks could gain lasting success only when they were followed up without delay by the infantry."

Deighton pointed to a successful local French counterattack during the defense at Sedan to illustrate the same point. "Just as the French tanks at Wastia had withdrawn rather than remain after dark without infantry support, so did the French pillboxes at Sedan require the 'interval troops' to protect them. Winkling action at close range by infantry with explosives, hand grenades and flamethrowers can knock out even the strongest emplacement," he wrote.

The assault on the Belgian fort of Eben Emael is an excellent example of the vulnerability of fixed emplacements to a CW infantry force. German airborne troops protected themselves from fire through skillful movement and surprise to place the casement-busting shaped charges — a task that would have been prevented had the assigned Belgian supporting infantry been in position. Additionally, Guderian noted that infantry are "perfectly capable of holding a great variety of locations against armored attack, conversely unsupported armor cannot always be guaranteed to wipe out defending infantry."

In *Infantry Aces*, Kurowski supported this argument illustrating the ability of Panzerfaust armed infantry units bringing "massed armored attacks to a halt by themselves." Oliker collaborating the devastating effect of infantry against unsupported armor, stated "loyalist Chechen tank formations were surrounded and destroyed by RPG-armed rebels." Weapon developments enabled the evolution in CA methodology into CW, what Mike Vickers called a weapons mix in *Charlie Wilson's War*, adding another dimension to modern warfare.

Post World War II

During WWII the development of the CA/CW methodology proved itself in battle and would continue to be valid throughout the wars of the 20th century and into the 21st. The Israelis stumbled over the hard learned lessons of WWI and WWII during the 1973 war. In the opening phases of the war, Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked through the Sinai and Golan Heights. Egyptian infantry was well armed with RPGs and Sagger anti-tank missiles exposing the "errors in Israeli tactics [who] committed large tank formations to battle without artillery, infantry or air support," according to Peter Allen in his book *The Yom Kippur*

War: The Politics, Tactics, and Individual Actions By Which Israel Repelled the Arab Invasions of 1973. Allen described how after the spectacular success of Israeli armored units in 1967 the tank concept so dominated Israeli thinking that supporting arms became an afterthought. Egyptian infantry anti-tank weapons were able to take on Israeli armored forces committed to battle alone and stop them in repeated engagements.

It was only after the Israelis integrated CA formations into the battle that they recovered from earlier setbacks. Allen stated, "Infantry mounted in M-113 armored personnel carriers and integrated self propelled artillery working in close cooperation with the tanks offered the best counter to the otherwise lethal Egyptian Sagger tank-killer teams. Similarly, machine guns and mortars mounted in the M-113s gave the essential close support against Egyptian infantry when they left their own BRDM carriers."

One lesson the Israelis did not forget, however, was that the ability to attack the Arab armored columns from the air was critical to repelling the invasion. Allen stated, "Britain's painful experience [in WWII] of what could happen to armor in the desert when air supremacy was lost was well known to Israel's commanders." When Israeli aircraft were committed to battle, they were met by strong CA/CW Arab forces. The Egyptians incorporated SA-6 and man portable SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles into their formations. "Both these weapons suddenly provided mobile cover for the vulnerable armored formations," wrote Allen.

The Israelis met a similar fate along the Golan Heights. "As the vaunted Israeli Air Force roared in to destroy the Syrian armor … it encountered the Syrian SAMs with disastrous results," according to Allen. High aircraft losses and the diminished ability of the Israeli Air Force to provide effective ground support gave renewed importance to skilled ground maneuver and tactics in destroying the Arab anti-aircraft defenses.

The Israelis again denied their forces proper infantry support during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. "One of the major difficulties that the IDF encountered in Lebanon was a chronic shortage of infantry to support the other combined arms," wrote Richard A. Gabriel in his book *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon.* Deploying light infantry teams the Israelis were able to turn the Syrian tank-hunter teams into the hunted. Well armed with a diversity of weapons, the infantry was indispensable for anti-tank warfare, both for attacking and defending, and was the only arm that could guarantee the decisive defeat of enemy infantry.

Organizing for and employing CA/CW methodology to the lowest levels of platoons and squads allowed considerable battlefield flexibility in the creation of mission-specific battle groups.

During the 1994 and 1999 street fighting for Grozny in Chechnya, the Chechen forces incorporated task organized CA/CW battle groups. Oliker stated that Chechen rebels were well armed with a variety of weapons making them a formidable force.

"In addition to small arms, the rebel arsenal included truck-mounted multibarrel Grad rocket launchers, a handful of T-72 and T-62 tanks, BTR-70s, some self propelled assault guns, as well as anti-tank cannons, and some number of portable SA-7 and SA-14 anti-aircraft missiles," wrote Oliker.

They incorporated these weapons into variably armed teams of about three to five men of which multiple teams formed cells and larger units including support personnel such as medics, more snipers, mortar crews, etc. The CA/CW methodology enabled the Chechen rebels to inflict stunning defeats upon Russian forces in many engagements. The Russians recovered from their initial setbacks and were finally reminded of their hard learned lessons in Stalingrad.

Oliker also wrote, "They began to task organize forces into small mobile assault groups, made better use of snipers and heavy artillery, and made sure that units talked to each other and to air assets, so that mutual support was possible."

The typical Soviet-era mechanized units of tanks and APC-borne infantry were augmented with mortars, flamethrowers, anti-aircraft machine guns and other infantry-portable weapons carried by sappers to drive Chechen fighters from Grozny.

Dr. Stephen Biddle presented an analysis of the fighting in Afghanistan in his book *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. In the book he illustrated the essential and continued need to apply CA/CW methods and pointed out the dangers of the infantry losing its core capabilities. "The key to success in Afghanistan, as in traditional joint warfare, was the close interaction of fire and maneuver, neither of which was sufficient alone," Biddle wrote. He also discussed how American overreliance on firepower and standoff fire attacks were insufficient to completely destroy enemy Soldiers and that they were still capable of resisting ground assaults. It was not until these fire attacks were used in coordination with skilled infantry maneuvering to seize enemy positions that supporting arms proved decisive.

Uniqueness of Terrain and Infantry

Certain types of conflicts and specific terrain dictate that specific arms should be more predominate than others in the CA/CW task force. For example, conflicts on open terrain or high intensity state-versus-state wars will favor armor, artillery, and aircraft with mechanized infantry. More restricted terrain and lower intensity conflicts such as those involving urban areas and mountains will favor infantry.

In his book Gabriel wrote that "Perhaps a basic lesson of this war is simply that tanks and APCs deployed together in mountain terrain without a forward infantry screen simply do not work very well." Whereas highly restricted terrain such as jungle and alpine areas or insurgencies and other conflicts favor light infantry and paramilitary operations, counterinsurgency operations are mainly a light infantry battle.

The foundation of CW methodology is the ability of the infantry to operate as a combined weapons force — employing machine guns, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles, grenade launchers and explosive charges — as the panzer division operated as a combined arms force. Organizing for and employing CA/CW methodology to the lowest levels of platoons and squads allowed considerable battlefield flexibility in the creation of mission-specific battle groups. It also greatly facilitated maneuver as all formations large and small could gain positional advantage on the enemy through maneuver employing their mixed arms and affording each arm or weapon its maximum effectiveness. The infantry's ability to close

with elusive teams of enemy infantry is its strongest asset. It has been said that the best anti-tank weapon is another tank. The same is true for infantry forces, especially when the opponent is small teams of enemy infantry operating among civilians and other friendly forces armed with modern weapons.

The CA methodology is as relevant today as it was in WWII and 1973, and recognizing its evolution to include the CW methodology is the key to success today.

Combined Weapons

Traditional Western tactics call for indirect fire to suppress an enemy before assaulting or maneuvering. Since the Boer War and WWI, growing fire power has continuously dispersed combat formations into the modern small group battles of Afghanistan and Iraq. While useful in suppressing an enemy, indirect fire and air strikes have had little effect in actually forcing an enemy to surrender or give up the ground he holds.

Biddle wrote that "In Operation Anaconda, well-prepared al Qaeda positions survived repeated aerial attack by U.S. precision guided munitions. Yet in spite of over a week of sustained heavy bombing, al Qaeda positions on (OBJ) Ginger survived to fire upon U.S. infantry when they finally reached the objective."

Insurgents have also sought shelter in underground complexes and frequently use civilians as shields, making the need for low caliber and low blast radius precision more acute. Additionally, the reality remains that even though we can drop a smart bomb right into the lap of a terrorist leader it still contains over 100 to 2,000 pounds of explosives detonating in an attempt to target a handful of individuals in an urban area. American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan immediately turn to supporting arms when they come under fire. Infantry forces must perfect their core competency at closing with the enemy through maneuver using organic weapons for direct fire support. Increasing force distribution and smaller functional units operating on the battlefield demand CA/CW light infantry forces. Guiding these units with reconnaissance-pull techniques driven from a detailed human intelligence network will equalize the corresponding decrease in supporting arms employed thus limiting collateral damage.

Light infantry units form the backbone of asymmetric warfare, making it imperative that they maintain their core skills in maneuvering under fire in teams of varying size and the time-honored basics of sound techniques and procedures such as marksmanship, tracking, and flexible battle drills.

In his book *Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods*, John H. Poole wrote, "Light infantry is a surprise and terrain dependant force. These protect it from tanks and artillery, compartmentalize its opponents and mask its movements. The characteristic of light infantry tactics everywhere is infiltration in the attack and ambush and counter stroke in the defense."

The combination of machine guns, assault rifles, grenades and other man-portable systems within an infantry squad mirror the infantry, tank, artillery, and aircraft team. Operating independently from other friendly forces, reconsider the traditional infantry platoon for a mission dependent task or battle group configuration of multiple, variably armed fire teams. Using a core infantry fire team of one light machine gun, one grenade launcher, one designated marksman and one rifleman or scout supplemented as mission requirements dictates with any combination of the following teams forming the CW infantry battle unit.

Anti-Aircraft Team

- Surface-to-air missile (SAM) team of two Soldiers armed with a Stinger SAM launcher

Heavy or Medium Machine Gun Team

- Vehicle-borne M2 or two Soldiers with an M240B

Anti-Tank Team

- Anti-tank team of two Soldiers armed with four to eight AT-4 launchers or Javelin systems or vehicle-mounted TOW system

Scout/Sniper Team

- Sniper team of two Soldiers armed with an M24 or M110 rifle

Demolition Team

- Demo team of two Soldiers appropriately armed with demolition materials

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team

- Two EOD technicians

Intelligence Team

- Intel team of two Human Intelligence specialists

Employing the battle unit of variably armed fire teams yields a mission specific force that can be commanded by a staff sergeant through captain depending on its size and tasks. These teams can also be augmented with vehicles to carry heavier weapons such as the TOW or Vulcan Systems and include armor, artillery, etc. Sections of two to three tanks and/or self-propelled artillery and dedicated aircraft should be incorporated when missions require. The CA/CW infantry battle unit can operate in difficult terrain widely distributed from other friendly forces and employ precision strikes against equally distributed teams of terrorists and insurgents, greatly limiting the use of collateral damage caused by indirect fire or direct air assets.

Conclusion

Modern combat requires a mix of arms and weapons that through maneuver exploits the capabilities of each while avoiding their weaknesses. CA, which is also inclusive of CW, is essential to winning battles, evolving to include machine guns, rifles, shoulder fired rockets and demolition charges — not only tanks, infantry, aircraft and artillery. CA is universally applicable to all conflicts and field conditions. As our enemies are unable to offer any meaningful resistance through conventional means, they have turned to the unconventional. Any hope of successfully tracking and engaging terrorists, guerrilla fighters and suicide attackers without creating more animosity through collateral damage and a new generation of fighters seeking revenge can only be accomplished with CA teams of highly trained infantry battle units.

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Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course

Platoon Leader Decision Making for the 21st Century

CPT MICHAEL FORTENBERRY

In the Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (IBOLC), lieutenants train to lead infantry platoons in modern warfare. While much time is spent teaching the students to embrace the Warrior Ethos, infantry culture and small unit tactics, critical thinking and decision-making skills are the most important leader traits developed during the course. Students are trained and assessed in three critical areas: *Intelligence, Character and Tactical Skills,* and *Competencies Development.* These individual and leader tasks and skills are essential in leading Soldiers on today's battlefields.

The typical methods of teaching infantry leadership do not permit lieutenants to fully recognize the intricacies of modern warfare. Thus, IBOLC is an outcomes-based leader development program designed to build the foundation of infantry leadership and prepare lieutenants for the complexities of the operational environment. Using its long-established framework of embedding the basics of infantry tactics and doctrine, the curriculum has become more relevant with emphasis on teaching lieutenants how to think.



In the contemporary environment small unit leaders must not only possess a firm grounding in infantry tactics, but also understand cause and effect and be acute to the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). Leaders, especially at the squad and platoon levels, often find themselves in unique and even abnormal situations. Through situational awareness and understanding of the environment, these leaders are making smart decisions to solve problems while completing their missions.

The most important tenet in small unit leadership is versatility. This is due to two existing characteristics that dominate today's battlefield — ambiguity and irregular or random violence. Small unit leaders who are equipped with the basics of infantry tactics and possess the maturity to make sound decisions will operate more effectively in the conflicts of the 21st century. Civilians, culture, complex terrain, economy, religion and politics all make up the peripheral conditions that weigh on a leader's ability to achieve objectivity and decisiveness in both planning and decision making.

BOLC III Outcomes

- **Values and Ethics**
  - * Junior officer who embodies, lives and defends the Army Values;
- **Leadership**
  - * Possesses attributes and competencies to assess, train, and lead at first unit of assignment;
- **Officership**
  - * Applies roles and responsibilities at first unit of assignment;
- **Personal Development**
  - * Demonstrates self-development and an understanding of the lifelong learning process for himself and future subordinates;
  - * Advances personal and professional development as the future of the Army;
- **Technical Competence**
  - * Demonstrates technical skills proficiency for individual branch integration as a member of the combined arms team;
  - * As a leader applies Army management systems and sustainment functions;
- **Tactical Competence**
  - * Makes appropriate decisions based on doctrine (includes troop leading procedures), assessment, critical thinking and judgment to provide a solution to a tactical problem;
  - * Functions as a leader in employing warrior task and battle drills and branch-defined technical and tactical skills;
  - * Adapts TLPs and problem-solving skills to branch specific mission support requirements;
  - * Executes branch defined missions in support of full spectrum operations.

Tactical decision making is an amalgamated thought process using critical thinking skills and Army doctrine to develop solutions and evaluate outcomes. In IBOLC, leader intelligence development is defined in two aspects of decision making — analytical and intuition.

Lieutenants are taught to understand that not every problem has a textbook remedy and not every situation should be

approached with a lockstep mentality. We emphasize that leaders will need to use both analytical and intuitive thinking to develop rational courses of action. While analytical thinking combines sequential, procedural and comparative methods in a scientific approach to problem solving, leaders are often required to fall back on their intuition. Where uncertainty and ambiguity often prevail, leaders who possess cognitive skills in understanding the environment and how and when it changes will be able to identify the outcomes derived by their unit's actions.

Intuitive thinking enables individuals who are constrained by time to rely on personal experience, judgment, and understanding of the environment. These elements serve as an aggregate to enable quick decision making. Leaders learn to weigh their actions against desired outcomes in order to avoid negative consequences.

Students are challenged intellectually through multiple learning exercises designed to improve their ability to think, lead, and plan. Lieutenants receive a full week of training on troop leading procedures and stability operations. In addition, they are required to complete a book report from the Chief of Infantry Reading List and a tactical decision exercise. These assignments are contemporary operating environment based and help to develop analytical and intuitive decision making. An example of a tactical decision exercise is illustrated in Figure 1.

This simple exercise helps to develop intuitive decision making while building on the sequential process defined in the troop leading procedures. It requires the student to conduct a hasty mission analysis. The student analyzes terrain, time, and relative combat power. He faces constraints and limitations on resources and personnel. By forcing the student to consider these constraints and the civilian dynamic, we improve the student's intangible ability to form creative solutions.

Lieutenants leave IBOLC understanding that the operational environment changes frequently. Once students deploy, the need to adjust behavior, tactics and techniques as well as perception of the enemy and civilians on the battlefield will be necessary. Often units transition battlespace and move from one area to another. A threat in one area may not be the same in another, and the cultural and political dynamics sometimes differ by region.

On today's battlefield the need for leaders who can develop tactically sound courses of action while making ethically grounded decisions is critical. We offer this question to our students: "Is the tactical victory worth operational or even strategic setbacks?"

As stated in Chapter 1 of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*: "Any use of force generates a series of actions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents."

According to Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*, the factors which make up leader character are the Army Values, empathy, and the Warrior Ethos. Students are required to complete an ethical vignette involving a real-world leader dilemma or leadership character flaw in relation to the Army Values. The student must demonstrate a clear understanding of the dilemma or character flaw that pertains to the decisions and actions taken by all individuals involved. The assignment is either written or briefed in front of the student's peers.

Hasty TCP in Mosul, Iraq

Situation:

You are the support platoon leader of 3-327th Infantry (Air Assault) and are currently in the brigade support area (BSA), adjacent to the main highway leading north into Mosul. It is now 1400 hrs. The battalion has operated in the AO for two months and has been effective in transitioning to stability and support operations.

While updating the HHC commander on the last 24/next 24-hour operations, you receive a message over the radio from the battalion commander. He is 10 kilometers south of the BSA heading north toward Mosul, and he has just spotted a "suspicious" individual in a white four-door SUV also heading north at a high rate of speed. The BN CDR orders you to detail all personnel in the SUV.

Several of your vehicles and personnel are conducting LOGPAC operations in the city, and a couple of vehicles are deadlined. However, you have 2 x M998s with mounted .50 caliber machine guns, 1 x M1083 LMTV and your command HMMWV available in the BSA. You have 15 x Pax in the BSA. Also available are 5 x strands of concertina wire and 2 x TCP signs in Kurdish and Arabic.

The HHC CDR reminds you of the rules of engagement which state that deadly force is authorized in case of a perceived deadly threat and always in self-defense. You also know that it takes approximately two minutes to get from the BSA to Hwy 1.

Requirement:

Develop your plan for detaining the suspects. Include your concept sketch and timeline. Then provide a brief explanation.



Figure 1 — Example Tactical Decision Exercise

As outlined in our graduation requirements under **Character and Tactical Skills** and **Competency Development**, we continue to maintain a stern focus on physical fitness and infantry platoon tactics. Students will demonstrate the ability to work as a team and

encompass "will" and "heart." They must complete seven of eight "stress events" designed to test their physical fitness and intestinal fortitude. These events include advanced land navigation, the obstacle course, a six-mile run, and combatives level I certification.

We also place a premium on a student's ability to work with his peers. Feedback is provided to the senior platoon cadre through two peer evaluations conducted in weeks six and 12. Each student completes foot marches ranging from four to 12 miles and the five-mile run at the Ranger Training Brigade. We emphasize to the students that the rigors of the operational environment demand that Soldiers be in top physical condition. In fact, it is paramount to ensure the success of rifle platoons whether they are operating in the high mountains in Afghanistan or the intense summer heat of Mesopotamia.

Lieutenants want to be taught primarily what is needed to succeed in the contemporary environment. We show the lieutenants that the applicability of the fundamentals is no different now than it was in years and wars past. The basics are the same whether a platoon is conducting a dismounted patrol through the jungles of Vietnam or a mounted patrol through the streets of Baghdad. The five principles of patrolling — security, planning, reconnaissance, communication and common sense — are just as important to the small unit leader as ever before.

As a testament to our efforts, we have received favorable comments from a variety of observers over the past year or so, the most prominent coming from students in the Maneuver Captain's Career Course. These junior captains often observe and participate in our training. Most have deployed to the operational environment serving as platoon leaders, company executive officers, and staff officers. These captains provide additional mentorship and serve as an outstanding example of the type of company commanders that lieutenants can expect to see once they arrive at their units.

By the time we bring in these captains, the lieutenants have had 10 weeks of training under their platoon trainers. The career course students help give a fresh perspective on the learning objectives and assist in making clear many of the lessons we want the students to comprehend.

Collectively these captains agree that our training is more realistic and relevant to the COE than when they attended the course several years ago. After having served as the acting company commander for a company cordon and search mission during the final field exercise, one captain stated that the old Infantry Officer Basic Course served mostly as a Pre-Ranger Course with emphasis on the basics, improving a lieutenant's will and heart, and his ability to "just suck it up."

Intellectual and tactical competencies development continues as the class progresses to its collective training phase at week seven. In this phase we assess the student's analytical and intuitive decision making through multiple situational field and live-fire exercises. The five critical areas — tempo, synchronization, setting conditions, tactical patience and transition points — are at the heart of Infantry leadership during maneuver. Each student is required to show understanding in the application of these tasks.



Figure 2 — Platoon Live-Fire Exercise AAR

During the after actions review (AAR) for the platoon live-fire exercise, students in leadership roles are required to lead their squad or platoon through the AAR process. It is used for all collective training events to include the squad live-fire exercise, platoon support-by-fire and attack live-fire exercises, platoon situational training exercises, and the company cordon and search and company attack.

The cadre supervises the AAR process while the student in charge of the event assesses the performance of his unit. He begins by first identifying the key leader decision points. Discussion is then open for all students to provide their own perspective on the decisions made by the leader, his actions or lack thereof. This allows for shared learning. Students listen while their peers offer their own ideas at the time the unit arrived at the decision point.

Students learn by watching their peers make decisions and then discuss the actions to identify and understand the leader critical task. For example, during the platoon attack, the platoon leader decided to wait to employ his mortars on the objective until the support-by-fire position was completely established in order to fix the enemy on the objective for the assault element. Another student serving in the support by fire as the M249 automatic rifleman felt that it would have been best to employ the mortars earlier in order to allow the support-by-fire element to move into position unhindered.

Neither student is wrong in his assessment. The decision point, "How do I get my mortars into the fight?" will generate a significant amount of discussion which will lead the students to resolve the issues for themselves. What we are looking for is not so much whether the decision that was made was a good one, but whether or not the leader did the appropriate level of analysis at each of the decision points. The questions a leader should ask are:

- "What effects do I need to achieve on the objective in order to allow my assault element to close in and destroy the enemy?"

- "How many rounds should it take to achieve this effect?" and
- "What is the best place and time to safely employ these mortars in order to reduce fratricide?"

The students demonstrate their understanding in surface danger zones, minimum safe distances, and the risk of overhead fires.

All of these questions a leader ponders while under distress will cause a lull in his unit's momentum. This lull is not frowned upon. Instead, it becomes an opportunity to generate further discussion in the relationship between cause and effect and the five critical leader tasks. In the end, the point intended is for the students, and particularly the leader, to understand that all five leader critical tasks were affected, and leadership decisions during the execution of an operation are almost always intuitive.

Of course, the platoon attack battle drill is nothing new. The concepts and principles are taught the same today as they were before. What is novel is getting the students to understand how these principles are relevant in the contemporary environment. At the end of the AAR, the cadre will ask, "OK gentlemen, you approached the objective and learned that there are civilians present. Upon approach your unit receives small arms fire from the area where civilians are located. How does this variable affect your decision making?"

As expected, the usual reaction to this question varies. The circumstances are similar; however, the conditions have changed. Now the students have to reassess their options to prevent civilian casualties. Mortars may no longer be an option. The unit will have to better control its direct fire weapons systems.

We explain to the lieutenants that not every course of action or technique is universal. An excerpt from FM 3-21.8, Chapter 1, explains:

"The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit leader…Understanding the operational environment is perhaps the most difficult aspect of making decisions and conducting operations. The TTP for accomplishing tasks are fairly straightforward…Choosing and applying the appropriate TTP based on the specific conditions of a given operational environment, however, is never straightforward and always carries with it second and third order effects."

In the COE, whether negative or positive, every decision has an impact on the outcome of an operation. Leaders are required to manage the counteractions or consequences during all phases of an operation. An approach to resolve a problem or achieve a goal in Afghanistan may not carry over to Iraq and vice versa. A good example to this is the use of small rewards, or micro-rewards, as a tool for small unit leaders to persuade local nationals to provide information on insurgent activity. While Afghans are more likely persuaded by monetary incentives, Iraqi civilians living in the affluent districts of western Baghdad may not. This means that leaders have to be versatile. They must be able to adjust and identify what works and, more importantly, consider the consequences of their actions.

Example Scenario

During the company cordon and search, conditions on the objective are set to create a contemporary environment. The student leadership encounters multiple variables throughout the exercise designed to keep the lieutenants off balance. A student from the MCCC serves as the company commander. He arrives to the field the evening before the mission and issues an operations order to the student leadership. The company has 12 hours to conduct troop leading procedures, rehearse, and prepare to conduct an air movement to a landing zone near the objective.

While the company prepares for the operation, the cadre positions a detail of 30 or so lieutenants from the battalion's Lieutenant Transition Detachment on the objective to serve as civilians on the battlefield (COB). Role players on the objective are played by international students. These role players are volunteers who speak Arabic.

In a fictitious scenario, the McKenna MOUT site is turned into the provincial capitol of the Paknov Province. The province is one of four in a war torn country known as Krosnochistan. The country has been in civil unrest for over a year. A pro-democratic movement removed a totalitarian regime prior to the arrival of coalition forces. The U.S formed a coalition and deployed troops to the country nine months ago to aid the newly formed democratic government in establishing stability.

A group known as the "People's Loyal Resistance," or PLR, is attempting to influence the population and take control of the government. Many of its leaders were members of the former regime and are responsible for much of the violence throughout the country. These people belong to the Tiki tribe and have a strong support base within its villages and towns.

The city of Al McKenna is decisive to the coalition forces and Krosnochistani government because it sits on a fault line between two warring tribes — the Tiki and Mansuck tribes. Most of the city's inhabitants are from the Mansuck tribe; however, a significant number of the Tiki tribespeople live in the area. Recent kidnappings



Figure 3 — Step 1 of example company cordon and search operation

Figure 4 — Step 2



Figure 5— Step 3

Figure 6 — Step 4

of government officials and other acts of intimidation have caused many Mansuck tribespeople to leave the area. Within the past 24 hours, the police station has been attacked with mortars and one policeman was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED).

The company is ordered to conduct a cordon and search of the city to confirm or deny the presence of anti-coalition forces. After planning, rehearsals and cold load training, the students air mobile to a landing zone about 800 meters west of the city and conduct a tactical dismounted approach. Usually the company commander arranges his forces on the objective with one or two platoons establishing an overwatch position to the west and/or east of the city, while the other platoons search the buildings. In almost every instance, the commander determines that an essential part of setting the conditions on the objective shortly after entering the city is to meet with the police chief and request his assistance during the company's operation.

Variables are introduced throughout the exercise to force a modification and adjustment in behavior and require that the student leadership make quick decisions. The actions of the COBs and role players are choreographed prior to the exercise, and the variables are usually not considered by the students during the planning phase.

The MCCC student serving as the company commander is briefed prior to the exercise. He is aware of the variables and learning objectives set forth and plays along with the scenario in order to allow the cadre to maximize the impacts of the script.

We modify the intensity of the training to prevent information overload. During the exercise we will reduce the impact of the variables on the student's decision making if we begin to see that the student leadership is overwhelmed. The cadre determines what actions role players and COBs take as the situation develops.

In a recent class we directed that the police chief and one of his policemen move and meet with the platoon that had established an overwatch position to the west of the city. The role players were told to approach the position and, in Arabic, vocally welcome the platoon. All platoons use their international Arab speaking students to serve as the platoon's interpreter.

Initially, the platoon in overwatch acted suspicious toward the police chief as he and the policeman approached the platoon's position. Both men were dressed in Arab garb, and the policeman carried an M4 rifle slung over his shoulder. The student platoon sergeant halted the two role players and ordered them to be searched. Once the police chief identified himself and both were determined to be policemen, the platoon sergeant began an engagement with the two men. The traditional handshake was offered by the police chief, and the platoon sergeant accepted. However, to assess how the platoon sergeant would react to cultural sensibilities, we told the police chief ahead of time to attempt to kiss his guest on both cheeks. This is customary of many cultures throughout the

Middle East and Mediterranean. The platoon sergeant hesitated and almost pushed the police chief away before realizing that he could potentially cause insult or humiliation.

For the most part, the platoon sergeant did well. He invited the police chief into his secure position and began a thorough engagement. The company commander and his other platoons had not moved out of the woods to the south of the city. The commander wanted to meet with the police chief prior to beginning his search. He received word from the platoon leader in the overwatch position that the police chief had arrived at their position and welcomed the company to search the city.

As the platoon sergeant and platoon leader continued their engagement with the police chief, an incident occurred that set the tone for the rest of the exercise. The cadre directed that a COB dressed in Arab garb walk down the main street of the city carrying a log on his shoulder. The log, approximately six feet in length and eight to 10 inches in thickness, could be mistaken by a distant observer as a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

The main street of the city lies perpendicular to the position of the platoon, and observation is good. As the COB entered the street and walked facing to the west toward the platoon in overwatch, a team leader ordered a M249 automatic rifleman to fire on the civilian. The automatic rifleman fired two 6-9 round bursts killing the civilian pedestrian.

The commander and his other two platoons to the south had begun moving out of the woods and were 75 meters from the city when they heard the firing. Not knowing what happened, the platoons dropped and sought cover. This incident caused confusion, and the company began to lose its momentum. Shortly afterwards, many civilians within the city became hostile toward the company. This mood would remain throughout the operation.

While the company commander assessed the situation and prepared to calm a rowdy crowd approaching his unit, a loud explosion occurred from the center of the town. No one knew what caused the explosion. A civilian from the city ran toward the platoon in overwatch yelling for the police chief to return to the center of town.

The principles that make up infantry doctrine are the foundation of the lieutenant's new profession. These basic parameters will remain true for generations of combat leaders to come. However, decision-making development for the next century needs to challenge leaders to think in the abstract and expand intuitive decision making rather than depend solely on the sequential processes.

At that time, what the students do not know is that an IED has prematurely exploded on a civilian pedestrian injuring him severely. The cadre use moulage kits to simulate the wounds suffered by the IED. The COB sustained partial amputation of his right leg below the knee.

To prevent the company from becoming overwhelmed at this point, we delayed initiating further variables. Time was given to the company to assess casualties and ease tensions. The police chief and his policemen assisted in calming the civilian demonstrators.

As the environment became less hostile, the company received a mortar attack of eight to 10 rounds. During this variable the cadre assessed two to three U.S casualties while the COBs frantically scattered to their homes to avoid becoming injured. The company was forced to treat friendly as well as local casualties.

With the exception of two to three sporadic mortar attacks, the company continued to search the town mostly unopposed throughout the remainder of the exercise. These attacks caused no casualties or significant damage. One platoon found a weapons cache in a town house building.

As the company completed its search of the city, a two-man opposing force (OPFOR) element hidden in the woods to the east, fired on one of the platoons with semi and automatic small arms. One was killed immediately, and the other escaped unharmed.

Once the insurgent team is repelled, the company consolidated and reorganized, established a landing zone for air medical evacuation of both friendly and civilian casualties, and began a painful effort to reestablish legitimacy and trust among the civilian populace.

In this exercise, one of the key components is getting the lieutenants to understand that the operational environment is a constant battle over lessons learned. The threat here, as in most insurgencies, has the initial advantage — knowledge of terrain, the cultural and political environment, and the ability to wage a protracted battle through sporadic engagements with absent regard for collateral damage.

In order to lessen these advantages, leaders must maintain objectivity throughout the operational process. Simplifying facts and assumptions based off personal experience, judgment and ethics allows leaders to achieve the desired end state.

The company had ample time to develop its plan using the analytical decision-making process of the troop leading procedures. While purpose and intent were defined during this more deliberate planning process, the student leadership was forced to exercise its intuitive thinking as the conditions changed.

The principles that make up infantry doctrine are the foundation of the lieutenant's new profession. These basic parameters will remain true for generations of combat leaders to come. However, decision-making development for the next century needs to challenge leaders to think in the abstract and expand intuitive decision making rather than depend solely on the sequential processes. Small unit infantry leaders must consider the "unknowns" and "what ifs" at leader critical decision points.

With conflicts like Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, the second half of the 20th century taught us that rarely will an enemy of the United States project conventional violence against the American military. As technology, urban growth and globalization affect the scope and mannerisms of 21st century conflict, the need to grow small unit leader decision making at the initial entry phase of training young officers is crucial.

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COMBAT LEADERSHIP

CPT HUGH JONES

SSGT Jason T. Bailey, USAF

"*To rectify past blunders is impossible, but we might profit by the experience of them.*"

— George Washington

Comparable units with near identical assets, resources, and enemy situation templates (SITTEMPs) frequently enjoy widely disparate results on the ground in combat. Many times the cause for these disparate results is the one inconsistency — combat leadership.

The purpose of this article is to document the leadership and tactical lessons that I learned in combat both through personal experience and through observing others. I made these observations as a company commander on two combat deployments to Iraq — one as part of a joint task force (JTF) and the second in a conventional role in Baghdad during the surge. My deployment with the JTF afforded me the unique opportunity to observe many units in differing circumstances and their operations.

My goal is to draw attention to the importance of these lessons in hopes that future generations of combat leaders will not make the same mistakes. This article will not review or comment on current Army leadership principles, but rather focus on those aspects of leadership commonly violated in combat that seriously impede mission success or can lead to unnecessary friendly casualties. The article is organized into two sections: tactical mission execution and general combat leadership. While many of these lessons seem simple or are bedrock tenants of Army leadership, I have seen them all violated at all levels of responsibility.

TACTICAL MISSION EXECUTION

Execute Aggressively

1. Get inside the enemy's decision cycle, and do not give him a chance to target you.
2. Seize the decisive point.
3. Prioritize objectives.
4. Employ all assets necessary to destroy the enemy. (Do not pull punches.)

Rapid and aggressive maneuver arrayed in depth throughout the battlespace at both company and battalion levels is essential. Avoid anchoring a unit to a confined inert terrain-oriented objective or maneuvering in an easily predictable scheme. Focus on prioritized assault objectives, most likely enemy locations, and developing the situation through tactical questioning (TQ), sensitive site exploitation (SSE), observation, and atmospherics. Proactively target the enemy. Treat every contact as an opportunity to destroy the enemy. Do not "pull punches" and employ whatever asset is necessary to ensure destruction of the enemy within higher command's intent.

Tactical Application: Rapid and aggressive maneuver arrayed in depth throughout the battlespace forces the enemy to react to friendly forces and does not allow him to effectively target friendly forces. Additionally, it allows friendly forces to dominate the battlespace. For example, on some of our initial missions, our operations focused on a large, single fixed objective. Our forces were not arrayed in depth, and therefore did not disrupt the enemy or limit his ability to target us. It also concentrated our forces, presenting a better indirect fires target for the enemy. On subsequent operations, the battalion operated in greater depth across the battlefield. Additionally, maneuver was typically aggressive, rapid, and dynamic. This allowed us to dominate the battlespace and forced the enemy to react to our actions as opposed to targeting us at his leisure.

Application at the Company Level: In application, this type of fluid, aggressive maneuver consists of seizing the most likely enemy locations (assault objectives) at H-hour and containing the objective through movement as opposed to blocking positions. Once initial assault objectives have been seized, expand the search driven by TQ, SSE, atmospherics and most likely enemy locations. Non-linear clearance of the objective allows quicker, more efficient clearance while not creating a pattern for the enemy to exploit.

Execution: Aggressive execution of the mission saves lives and best completes the mission. Through executing our missions and observing various units and their mentality in conducting operations, it seems apparent that excessive concern for force protection or lack of aggression creates an environment in which the enemy is at liberty to target friendly forces at his convenience. Through planning and experience the enemy's ability to target friendly forces improves and eventually he will start to effectively target friendly forces. We have to understand and adapt faster. Energetic and aggressive execution of the mission keeps the enemy in a reactive mode, constantly running, unable to reconnoiter, unable to plan, and unable to reorganize. Additionally, through aggressive, energetic execution the chances of killing/capturing the enemy increase.

For example, if you are engaged by a sniper, you can break contact, seek cover

and remain in position, or target and attack the sniper. By attacking the sniper with direct or indirect fires, at a minimum you drive him away and at best you kill him. If you break contact or remain where you are and do nothing, you only invite another attack. You may not kill the sniper the first, second, or third time, but eventually you will. If you do nothing or break contact, you never will and only embolden him. Additionally, you must understand the methodology of the sniper and take measures to kill him. Active scanning with optics and counter-sniper patrols disrupt his ability to target you and increase your chance of killing him. This same line of thinking can easily be applied to IED strikes as well. If friendly forces do not attempt to maneuver on or engage IED cells, there is little risk for the enemy and little reason for them not to continue employing IEDs. Terrorists will selectively target "soft" targets for this very reason.

Employ the Full Spectrum of Available Assets to Locate the Enemy

The U.S. armed forces possess a tremendous array of intelligence and situational awareness gathering assets. Many units do not fully exploit the advantages that these assets provide. Additionally, as new assets, information, and resources become available, we must learn how to employ and exploit these resources as quickly and fluidly as possible, from planning through execution. Acting on real-time intelligence gathered on the objective allows us to act prior to the enemy being able to adjust or within his decision cycle. As an example, after killing an IED emplacement team, my company gained significant intelligence simply by moving immediately to exploit their houses.

While we have made great strides in using all available information and resources to target the enemy, we can improve on using these assets more fluidly and on fully disseminating intelligence. Examples include pulling all available intelligence from all sources and providing it to leaders as soon as possible in the orders process; using technological assets to positively identify (PID) the enemy on the objective, not at the detention facility; generating tactical intelligence reports (TIRs) on the objective through TQ, not after exfil. All of the assets and methods listed in this discussion can be used on the objective to more effectively find the enemy.

There are many assets and methods by which we can target the enemy, specifically:

- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB): TIRs, DIIRs, special intelligence, patrol debriefs, etc.; combine these various sources to generate the most accurate SITTEMP, prioritize the targets and maneuver accordingly.
- TQ: immediately actionable intelligence generated by TQ on the objective. TQ cannot be delegated to the battlefield interrogation team (BIT) or tactical human intelligence team (THT). The BIT/THT team's competence varies, and proper TQ is a leader responsibility. Train/rehearse with your interpreters on TQ.
- SSE: Technical exploitation to PID and/or generate immediately actionable intelligence; other evidence that PIDs enemy combatants, requires further exploitation, or generates immediately actionable intelligence.
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): ISR can observe enemy activity and drive friendly maneuver or CAS strikes.
- Friendly Ground Observation: Units on the ground can observe enemy activity through active, constant observation with thermals, night observation devices (NODs), spotting scopes, sniper optics. This observation must occur both on the move and at static positions. Every Soldier is a Sensor (ESS).
- Emerging Intelligence: During an operation new intelligence will develop that we may have the ability to act on during the mission, such as indirect attack points of origin (POOs), new intel reports, etc.

Throughout my deployments we improved at using all available assets to target the enemy, with increasingly positive results. Combining all pertinent, available Be On Look Out (BOLO) lists and TIRs with SI, and SIGINT generates a much more complete picture of the enemy presence on the objective.

Avoid Extreme Risk Aversion

1. Build an organization not afraid to take risks.
2. Risks can be worth the reward.
3. Do not be afraid to employ unconventional solutions.

Leaders must mitigate tactical risks, but some risk must be accepted as an inherent characteristic of combat. Units that take smart risks are the units that win wars and battles. We must build units and leaders not afraid to take risks.

A company commander with the 2nd Battalion, 505th Pa

The training mentality of mitigating away all possible risks seems to have permeated into combat operations and at its extreme, becomes cowardice. A Soldier's death in training is unacceptable, but combat is an inherently dangerous and life-threatening event. Extreme risk aversion in some units serves as an enormous constraint on operations. I spoke with one former battalion commander who, when conducting a relief in

SPC Joshua R. Ford

rachute Infantry Regiment and his troops conduct a joint patrol in Samarra, Iraq, October 21, 2006.

place (RIP) with the outgoing battalion, was told that they did not conduct operations in a certain town because Al Qaida "owns" it. As we are the most powerful Army in the world, how can a terrorist organization own a town? As soon as possible, the new battalion conducted a major offensive on the town. While the battalion sustained casualties, they are credited with breaking the back of Al Qaida in that province and making a strategic impact on the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It is through the efforts of units like these that we win wars.

Risks can and must be taken in order to win the tactical fight. Furthermore, risks can be worth the reward. During the surge my company inherited one of the most heavily IEDed stretches of road in Iraq. In order to occupy ambush/small kill team (SKT) positions undetected, SKTs were as small as possible. The SKTs were overwhelmingly successful, reducing the number of IEDs per week and destroying several IED emplacement teams. We mitigated the risk of the SKT with a forward mounted quick reaction force (QRF); however, there was certainly a possibility of the SKT being overwhelmed due to its small size. Other units failed in conducting similar SKTs because of compromise due to the size of their force. In this case, the risk was worth the reward: the countless lives of convoy personnel that were saved.

Avoid Absolute Constraints, Use Intent and Decentralized Decision Rights

1. Give intent/operate within the intent.
2. Build a flexible plan, not a perfect plan.

Leaders must provide guidance and intent, avoiding absolute constraints. Risk averse and micromanaging leaders quickly emplace constraints and centralize decision

rights. In subordinate units and leaders, centralized decision rights destroy initiative, creativity, responsibility, and accountability; and place the decision in the hands of those unfamiliar with the reality on the ground and the specific situation. While decentralized decision rights increase the possibility of actions inconsistent with the higher commander's vision, constraints impact a unit's ability to effectively and quickly adjust to conditions on the ground and cause the secondary effects listed above. Centralized decision rights destroy the small unit initiative and tactical flexibility that make our Army great.

General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, the 32nd Army Chief of Staff, explained it best when he said, "*The paradox of war in the Information Age is one of managing massive amounts of information and resisting the temptation to over-control it. The competitive advantage is nullified when you try to run decisions up and down the chain of command. All platoons and tank crews have real-time information on what is going on around them, the location of the enemy, and the nature and targeting of the enemy's weapons system.* ***Once the commander's intent is understood, decisions must be devolved to the lowest possible level to allow these frontline Soldiers to exploit the opportunities that develop.***"

During a prolonged firefight in Baghdad, a company employed AH-64s, in addition to organic weapons, to engage enemy fighters. Several civilian vehicles were destroyed and numerous buildings were damaged. The following day CNN covered the story, providing images of the damage. What CNN did not report was that upwards of 25 enemy fighters were confirmed killed. Within a week, Muqtada Al Sadr entered a truce with coalition forces, an event of strategic importance. Within that same week, MND-B implemented numerous additional restrictions on AH-64 employment. The resulting constraints added additional steps and precious time to the close combat air (CCA) attack process, hindering the ability of tactical units to quickly respond to conditions on the ground and win the fight. What was initially considered unnecessary or excessive force, may have contributed to a strategic victory.

Rather than establishing constraints, leaders must focus on clear intent. Soldiers and subordinate units, if they clearly understand their higher commander's intent, can then make the appropriate decision. For example, in the aforementioned situation, the intent could be, "Use CCA strikes only when absolutely necessary, and avoid any use of CCA that could appear excessive." Again, operating with intent versus restrictions does increase the chance of an error in judgment, but it allows for the leader on the ground to make appropriate decisions free of absolute constraints.

Carrying the concept of operating under intent and not constraints, leaders should not focus on building the perfect plan, planned down to minutiae, but rather a flexible plan, clearly communicating the intent and providing a logical framework for execution. In conducting more than 75 company-level raids, the target was only in the pre-planned building ONCE. What proved important in planning was creating a framework that allowed for flexible maneuvering.

Trust Your Intuition

In many tactical situations, I "felt" a certain way about a situation. For example, I knew that contact was imminent or that a certain individual was an enemy combatant. In many of these situations, there was no specific, observable evidence to corroborate my feeling. However, in hindsight, my intuition was never wrong and I learned to trust it.

During one particular nighttime raid, following contact enroute to the objective, AH-64s spotted figures moving on a nearby roof. The AH-64s reported potential weapons with the figures. As the gunships marked the appropriate building and a squad moved on the building, I observed a figure in civilian clothes walk out of a nearby house with an AK-47 rifle and start to look in our direction. Immediately, I placed my aiming laser on his chest and flicked off my safety. As I was about to pull the trigger, my intuition told me not to shoot. Despite all logic to the contrary, I did not shoot. I started walking towards the figure, keeping my laser on his chest. As I moved closer, another figure walked out. Something was odd, the other figure was very small, and the two seemed to be talking. As I got closer, I realized that the first figure with the AK-47 was an adolescent, and the other figure was a little girl. I yelled, and the adolescent saw me, dropped the weapon and ran inside. I then moved a squad to lockdown the house. Once we were done at the target house, I returned to the adolescent's house where, much to my chagrin, the parents denied the whole incident. I confiscated the weapon and told the father how foolish they had been, and that he was lucky his son was still alive. I still do not know if the father realized how close his son (and possibly his daughter) had been to death or that a gut feeling saved his son's life.

Choose the Harder Right

Leaders must have the discipline and toughness to select the harder right tactical solution over the easier wrong. Generally, the right tactical solution is not the easiest. For example, an adjacent unit conducted counter-IED ambushes by parking a section of tanks on the main supply route (MSR). Logically, the enemy never operated near the tanks, and simply waited until the tanks had left to put out their IEDs. While the adjacent unit must have been comfortable, the enemy continued to attack the unit with IEDs and they continued to suffer casualties. Regardless of Soldier preference or comfort, tactical short cuts lead to casualties or sub-optimal mission execution.

COMBAT LEADERSHIP

Lead By Example

Leading by example is a bedrock value of Army leadership, but countless leaders violate this value or fail to appreciate and use its power. Simply put, Soldiers will look to their leaders for the appropriate values, attitudes, actions, and behavior. Meaning, whatever you expect your subordinates to do, you must do yourself. This concept applies to every aspect of a leader's behavior, and in my experience is the most powerful leadership tool available.

To illustrate this principle I will contrast two leaders. One leader (A) typically did not patrol with his unit. When he did patrol he would command and control (C2) maneuver but was otherwise uninvolved. In fact, at times he would even read novels if he perceived that everything was going according to plan. Contrast this with another leader (B) in the same unit fighting the same enemy in the same situation, who pushed his Soldiers and served as an example, assisting with TQ, SSE, searches, etc. Leader B made every effort to show his Soldiers how important the mission was and how it should be conducted with 100-percent effort. It

should come as little surprise that the latter unit (B) was extremely successful, while the former unit contributed very little.

Communication in a Crisis

Listening to some leaders speak during a crisis or contact frequently gives the impression that they have watched too many war movies. In a crisis where the situation is truly critical, the worst thing a leader can do is add stress. In fact, in a crisis a leader must reduce stress. Coherent communication exuding confidence and control is how a leader must communicate. In an intense firefight, the worst feeling is to have the impression that a leader has lost control of himself or the situation.

Everyone Makes Mistakes, But Mitigate the Incompetents

Leaders must remember that everyone makes mistakes — everyone. Unfortunately, in combat mistakes can cost lives, friendly or civilian. However, the severe consequences of a mistake in combat does not immunize Soldiers from committing them. Risk averse leaders will attempt to overcome the extreme costs of mistakes by consolidating power and decision rights, and sometimes by harshly punishing those who make mistakes. However, before taking any of these actions, leaders must remember that mistakes are inevitable and judge the mistake in light of the individual and the circumstances. The best course of action is to learn as much as possible from the mistake; and very carefully consider corrective action or punishment and the resultant message you will communicate.

One of my Soldiers once severely wounded an Iraqi with a warning shot. His team leader ordered him to take a warning shot at a moving vehicle because the Iraqi was driving suspiciously and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) were an Al Qaida weapon of choice in the area. Clearly, the Soldier made a mistake and poorly aimed his warning shot. The chain of command could have proceeded on a number of different courses of action: we could have prosecuted the Soldier, relieved the team leader, prohibited warning shots, or reserved the decision to take a warning shot for a certain level of rank. However, the Soldier was a fantastic Soldier with an outstanding record of conduct. Additionally, when the choices were to either take a warning shot, shoot to kill or risk a VBIED, warning shots were essential to force protection. Rather than prosecute the Soldier or add new constraints, we chose to learn as a unit from the mistake and develop more detailed intent (not constraints) for warning shots. We discussed the mechanics of a warning shot on a moving vehicle. We discussed the circumstances under which a warning shot is warranted. We discussed who ideally should take the warning shot and with what weapon system. We never again had an issue with warning shots and the Soldier went on to serve with distinction. This vignette also illustrates the importance of protecting your subordinates from unnecessary punishment, demonstrating your loyalty to your unit, and communicating the right message to your unit in both words and actions. It would have been much easier for the chain of command to hang this Soldier out to dry.

While keeping in mind that everyone makes mistakes, there are those that make them repeatedly or excessively, "the incompetents." Depending on the organizational culture, it is not always possible to remove these incompetents, and they must be mitigated. I had one such person in my company. This person habitually folded under pressure, lacked common sense, and was a tactical liability. No one in the battalion wanted this person, and I had insufficient cause to relieve him. As a result, I had to mitigate him. I ensured that he was never in a position to directly lead Soldiers while in combat, or in a position to get himself or others killed. Some units seem to consider combat units like a YMCA children's soccer team, "everyone plays." I disagree with this approach. Because combat is a life and death endeavor, we have a responsibility to field the best team possible and mitigate the incompetents.

Courtesy photo

The author completed two tours in Iraq while serving as commander of a reconnaissance troop with the 82nd Airborne Division.

People Are Emotional; Manage Emotions

There is a tendency in the combat arms to think that we and our subordinates are immune to counterproductive emotions. This is simply naïve. A leader who fails to manage his subordinates' emotions, is failing. As humans, Soldiers can and will experience the full spectrum of emotions, from jealousy to depression to elation. Furthermore, the extreme emotional demands of combat can intensify these feelings, increasing the need to address them. Part of being an effective leader is harnessing these emotions, managing or mitigating them, and using them as much as possible towards a constructive end.

For example, two units in the same organization were assigned less desirable, less important missions. Regardless of the original intent, the message from higher was that these units were not on par with the others. One leader (A) carried himself with obvious dejection and essentially shutdown, feeling as though he had been dismissed, all was lost, and his assigned mission was unimportant. The other leader (B) motivated his Soldiers to "show them how good we are." He created a sense of outrage in his unit and focused their anger towards improvement and becoming the best. He inculcated a competitive spirit to be the best. Leader A left six months later. His unit was in shambles and had to chapter over 15 Soldiers for various disciplinary issues. It took many months of hard work to repair the damage. Within a few months, leader B's unit was generally considered the best in the organization and was assigned the most high-priority mission, which they executed with great success.

As a teamwork-oriented organization, Army leaders sometimes avoid competition. Leaders constrain competition in an effort to avoid equity issues, or an overly competitive, self-serving culture.

However, healthy competition can be a fantastic motivator. When units compete, they can push each other to new levels of excellence. I always fostered healthy competition between my platoons, and I enjoyed seeing them push each other. If the competition ever escalated to an unhealthy level, I reined it in, but I am convinced they achieved more by trying to be the best.

Loyalty and Trust Are Paramount

1. Avoid second-guessing the leader on the ground both during and after.

A unit cannot function in combat without loyalty and trust; the two go hand-in-hand. To fight effectively a Soldier has to trust his buddy and his leaders. A Soldier must also know that his leader cares about and is loyal to him and the unit.

Trust, or lack thereof, extends into tactical operations when ranking leaders question the decisions of the leader on the ground. This questioning is particularly counterproductive. Questioning decisions delays action, creates a culture of mistrust, and has all of the negative secondary effects of centralized decision rights. While most leaders who second-guess are doing so in an effort to assist, they must remember: it is extremely difficult to determine if the leader on the ground is making a bad decision when you are not there. If possible, wait until the after action review (AAR) to coach this leader into other possible courses of action, or refine the intent. While there may be circumstances where additional guidance is required, whenever possible, support the decisions of the leader on the ground.

One of the most frustrating tactical situations in all of my combat experience occurred due to second-guessing over the net. Two platoons of my company were conducting a raid to kill/capture a high value individual (a battalion main effort mission). My third platoon was conducting overt denial of IED emplacement and SKTs on an MSR 1,500 meters away. As we were conducting our mission, I heard a firefight erupt in the vicinity of my separate platoon. I could hear rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), PKMs, M240, and .50-cal fire. It was clearly a significant contact. I contacted my separate platoon leader immediately to determine if he had the situation under control. Over the sound of his M240, he reported that he did, but could use some help when we were able. The company (-) continued on our raid until the objective had been fully prosecuted and declared a "dry-hole," which was approximately 45 minutes to an hour from the initiation of the distant firefight. During this time, I had been periodically getting situation reports (SITREPs) from the third platoon, monitoring the traffic from the third platoon to battalion, and listening to their forward observer coordinate CCA support. During that time the third platoon leader reported to me that he was "amber" (running low) on ammunition and needed resupply. As soon as our objective had been declared a dry-hole, I immediately reported my intent to reinforce the third platoon. Battalion headquarters ordered me not to reinforce. I was extremely frustrated. I was not going to leave my platoon low on ammunition and in contact, but I did not want to disobey a direct order. It was one of the few times in my Army career where I was planning to blatantly disobey. I spent several wasted minutes arguing on the radio until battalion realized that my third platoon was in serious contact and needed reinforcement. Immediately, I reinforced, and the situation was resolved with no friendly casualties and without issue. Later, when I discussed the mission with battalion, I realized that they had not been able to monitor all of the radio traffic and did not understand the situation. However, the lesson I learned was that you should avoid second-guessing the leader on the ground. Train your subordinates so you can trust them working under your clearly communicated intent.

Other examples of trust-eroding leader behavior are: not considering subordinates' recommendations, blaming subordinates or superiors for failures, taking all of the credit for successes, failing to support your subordinates or superiors, and sacrificing others for personal gain. These selfish actions destroy trust and prevent units from fighting effectively.

Continuous Improvement

1. Always be thinking and working to improve.

2. If you aren't improving, you're getting worse.

3. Don't be afraid of unconventional solutions.

Successful organizations never stop improving through constant effort and deliberate thought. This quality applies to all organizations, including military organizations. Through complacency, ineptitude, laziness or arrogance, some units will stop improving, stop adjusting, and stop learning. While they set a routine and carry-out daily operations laissez-faire, the enemy plans, attacks, learns, and improves. If we fail to improve (relative to the enemy), we become worse. We must always be learning, leveraging new capabilities, technologies, and experiences. This also ties into risk aversion in terms of building units not afraid to try new techniques, unconventional solutions, or "thinking outside the box." True evolution in our tactics can only occur when we push the envelope. As an institution, we must never be afraid to try new techniques.

Many unconventional solutions examples exist in the GWOT today. The "Sons of Iraq" Sunni militia is a perfect example. A more personal example is a tactic my unit adopted when conducting air assaults into Al Qaida strongholds. Because we conducted light air assault operations, we lacked vehicles. This limited our ability to exploit real-time intelligence gathered on the ground, and slowed our casualty evacuation and resupply capabilities. We eventually started using local Iraqi "bongo trucks" to accomplish these tasks. These trucks were acquired on the objective and returned to their compensated owners when we were done using the truck(s). On one particular mission, through TQ, we learned that the brother of a strategic level high-value individual (HVI) was in a house two kilometers away. We did not know how long he would be there and had only a few hours until the battalion exfil. Rather than cancel or delay the battalion's air exfil, or risk this HVI leaving the area, we used two bongo trucks to transport an element to the target house. The element subsequently detained the HVI and returned without incident. Without the use of these bongo trucks, this mission would not have been possible. Many other unconventional solutions to tactical problems involve taking non-military specific technology and applying it to tactical problems.

Leadership Styles and Situations

1. Different people and situations require different leadership/management.

2. Different leadership styles are effective; there is no one correct style.

Different people require different leadership. Every person is unique and requires an appropriately tailored leadership technique. For example, some subordinates need to be coached, mentored, and led

through a process; other subordinates thrive on autonomy and prefer to find a way to get the job done. All types of subordinates can be successful, but they require different leadership. A leader must try to identify what sort of leadership a subordinate requires and deliver as necessary to get the best performance possible.

At one point I had two very different PLs, X and Y. PL Y had a graduate degree from a prestigious university and had a track record of success. The other, PL X, had a track record of failure. Both PLs were effective, but they both required very different leadership. PL Y required minimal coaching, supervision, and mentoring. However, whenever I corrected PL Y, I was sure to explain the reasons behind the correction or decision, which his personality required. PL X did not respond to this type of leadership. PL X required pressure and constant external motivation. When I did not pressure PL X, he did not perform to standard and accepted less than acceptable results. In the end, both PLs were successful, but required different leadership.

Different situations require different leadership. As different individuals require tailored leadership styles, different situations require different leadership styles. There are times when leaders have to go to extraordinary lengths to get the mission accomplished, essentially doing whatever is required to motivate their subordinates. Often, the more critical a situation, the more extraordinary the lengths to which a leader must go.

In one particular running engagement, I was maneuvering my company from east to west towards an enemy position. As we were moving, we were receiving sporadic fire from the north and concentrated fire from the west. I was moving just behind the lead platoon dismounted, supported by our trucks to the rear. A section of Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) from another unit to our south was also supporting us. The BFVs were suppressing the enemy position in front of us. For some reason, I could not talk to the BFVs on my handheld radio, but my joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) could speak with them on another net. I was coordinating with the BFVs through my JTAC to walk us across the objective, while simultaneously trying to raise them on the company and battalion net. However, the lead PL only heard my transmissions on the company net. He did not know I was coordinating with the BFVs on another net. Movement kept slowing down in the lead platoon despite my efforts to get the platoon moving. I realized that they had essentially stopped, leaving us exposed at a major intersection and losing the initiative. As I moved up, I realized that the PL was concerned about blue-on-blue fire (that the BFVs did not see us). I assured the PL that I was talking to the BFVs and that they saw us, but the platoon was still slow to move. Apparently, the platoon was not convinced. Finally, I moved up to the front and starting walking with the lead team, showing them that the situation was under control. A company commander cannot best maneuver his company while walking point, but at the time, I could think of no other way to get them moving.

Different leadership styles are effective; there is no one correct style. There are many different types of leaders in the Army and each has a personality and leadership style of his own. All of these leaders can be successful if they remain true to their personality (do not come across as insincere) and maturely address and mitigate their weaknesses. I have had and have observed many different leaders and they all had weaknesses; the successful leaders were the leaders who appreciated these weaknesses and had a trusted agent fill the need. For example, if you are a very intelligent leader, but not much of a motivator, then ensure you have someone who can motivate to fill that role.

Accountability

Do your job, make and allow others to do theirs.

Good Army leaders focus on getting the job done, getting it done quickly, and getting it done right. Additionally, Army leaders are unique in that they have typically performed almost all of the duties of those who work under them. This leads to a tendency at some levels to "just do it myself and get it done right." While this approach may suffice for the short term, there are numerous long-term costs. The principal cost is that any effort or time that you spend on other's duties and responsibilities is time away from your primary duty responsibilities. This means that either someone else will have to cover down on your duties, or that your duties are not being accomplished to the best of your abilities. Additionally, by performing your subordinates' duties you are not forcing, or allowing, your subordinates to develop. Even if it takes much longer and is more difficult, when time permits, it is better to force the subordinate to accomplish his duties. If a subordinate is struggling, then he may require additional guidance, supervision, or assistance, but in the end, this will result in a better-developed subordinate, a more smoothly running organization, and more time for you to focus on performing your primary duties.

At one point, my executive officer was really struggling with keeping our vehicles maintained. Without going into details, the entire process had failed. After discussing it with him, I realized that the problem was a lack of internal systems, a lack of understanding, and a lack of communication with me and the battalion. When I had been an executive officer, I had developed many systems for tracking maintenance. I knew that I could quickly develop and implement the systems necessary to fix our vehicle fleet. However, if I fixed the situation for my executive officer he would not learn how to do it himself, nor would I have held him accountable for fixing the mess. Additionally, we were conducting combat operations on a continuous basis, and running the company maintenance would take my attention away from operations. Instead of solving the problem for him, I explained the systems I had developed as an executive officer, gave him examples, and explained how he could implement these same systems in our current situation. Once he came back to me with his solutions, I helped him implement them, both within the company and the battalion. The fleet quickly rose to an acceptable fully mission capable rate. However, over the next few weeks my spot checks consistently discovered that he was struggling with maintaining the systems and an accurate status. Again, I resisted the urge to take over the system myself, but rather assigned my weapons PL as the company BMO. This PL was slated to be an executive officer next, so it would be a good way to get him trained up. Additionally, by not taking over our company maintenance I was able to focus on planning and executing our operations and supervising the company as a whole.

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GOLIATH'S TRANSFIGURATION:
Preparing the Infantry for Netwars

LT G. GABRIEL SERBU, CANADIAN ARMY

"In the period that Einstein was active as a professor, one of his students came to him and said: 'The questions of this year's exam are the same as last year's!' 'True,' Einstein replied, 'but this year all answers are different.'"

(http://www.twilightbridge.com/humor/einstein.htm)

In his May-June 2007 *Military Review* article "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," USMC Colonel (Retired) T.X. Hammes, one of the most prominent contemporary military commentators, wrote, "…most military thinkers, for a variety of reasons, continued to dismiss the 4GW [fourth generation warfare] concept. In fact, about the only place 4GW was carefully discussed was on an al-Qaeda website. In January 2002, one 'Ubed al-Qurashi quoted extensively from two *Marine Corps Gazette* articles about 4GW. He then stated, 'The fourth generation of wars [has] already taken place and revealed the superiority of the theoretically weak side. In many instances, these wars have resulted in the defeat of the ethnic states [duwal qawmiyah] at the hands of ethnic groups with no states.'"

The quotation reveals facts that are hardly ever mentioned by scores of counterinsurgency analysts. Even if al-Qaeda is an organization barbaric in its means, callous and inflexible in the pursuit of its irrational political goals, its strategists are far from being blind fanatics. The clarity of their analysis of contemporary warfare and their receptiveness to novel concepts is proof to the contrary. Western journalists and analysts alike have difficulties dissociating the planners from those implementing their designs. Documentaries, books and reports on suicide bombers, the Taliban and low-level terrorists abound. However, we know very little about the men recruiting and training them. We know even less about how the recruiters and the strategists are trained and recruited. Where do they come from? What motivates them? Do they have the same motivations as common suicide bombers?

In a conversation I had with a NATO officer who recently returned from Afghanistan, he summarized his tour by saying: "We're fighting simpletons with rusty Kalashnikovs." Sadly, the reality is slightly different: we're fighting articulate, inventive, intelligent men, using simpletons with corroded assault rifles to achieve their objectives. Our inability to inflict severe, debilitating defeats on what appears to be a rudimentary enemy makes the public opinion in the West impatient and in the Middle East angry, politicians everywhere nervous, and al-Qaeda strategists jubilant. This is precisely what they seek: not military successes, but the destruction of our political will to fight, according to Hammes in his book *The Sling and the Stone.*

In a videotape posted on the web, Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaeda's number 2, intimately associates military defeat with intense pressure from public opinion to withdraw. He stated, "The American forces [in Iraq] are defeated and looking for a way out. Their government is faced with an incredible popular demand to withdraw."

That is, in a nutshell, the definition of 4GW. Their way of waging war enhances the few strengths they have, while at the same time exploiting our weaknesses. And because they have the initiative, we have no choice but to deal with this new kind of conflict.

"Insurgents are living proof of why man is at the top of the food chain. We are the most creative, treacherous, loyal, aggressive, and determined life form to yet evolve. Any nation that assumes it is inherently superior to another is setting itself up for disaster," wrote Hammes in *The Sling and the Stone.*

Their strengths? Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership have something the West does not have: extensive manpower resources in the scores of disenchanted and unemployed youth in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, they have the will to use them coldheartedly, as suicide bombers, for example. Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban headship prove to be highly flexible groups with truly post-modern organizations (this point will be further developed in the article). The overwhelming force of their enemies before and particularly after September 11, 2001, forced change upon them. They adapted in order to survive.

Our weaknesses? If there is something worse than ineffectiveness in the conduct of warfare, that is the tendency to underestimate one's enemy, his actions, and his plans. Deriding the

enemy's appearance and parts of his equipment with little or no impact on his tactics is self-mutilation. It has happened before, such as during the Boer War.

In his book *On the Philosophy of Military Incompetence,* Norman Dixon wrote, "Of all the factors which contributed to the succession of disasters which marked the war, this underestimation of the enemy was perhaps the most important. Largely because they eschewed any form of sartorial elegance and preferred the wearing of civilian attire, dark cloaks and floppy hats to the sorts of uniforms affected by the British, the Boers were dubbed a rabble of illiterate peasants and their army utterly ludicrous. In reality, as events were to prove, it was the British, not the Boers, who despite their smart appearance showed up in a far from satisfactory light."

Moreover, the enemy's apparent weakness makes the threat he poses to Western societies less perceptible and discourages genuine military innovation in training, equipment, and the general way in which Western military establishments perceive warfare. Western armies are in a period of long and painful transition; they seek to adapt to the new challenges they are faced with in countries like Afghanistan while desperately trying not to radically change. One question arises: do they need a radical change in order to defeat insurgents? And if they do, will a sweeping change affect their ability to wage a high intensity conflict (HIC), the kind of war they were meant to wage in the first place? Other questions can be inferred from my original one, such as: on the short to medium term, will Western nations engage in HIC? Do we need at all to be prepared for such a type of conflict or is HIC a thing of the past?

In Afghanistan, the infantry is at the forefront of our struggle against the Taliban and al Qaeda. But, how prepared is the infantry to deal with such an inventive, resourceful, adaptable and ideologically driven enemy?

This article will identify the changes that the infantry, a factual Goliath, will have to go through in order to better adapt to 4GW. Given my limited experience and exposure, the essay is far from being an exhaustive study. It is merely the result of my personal concerns caused by a conflict that has claimed far too many lives.

The Invisible Enemy

One of the most important questions we need to ask ourselves is: does war evolve, or does it simply change as one of belligerents, usually the weaker side, tries to find ways to cope with the real or perceived superiority of his adversary?

If there is something worse than ineffectiveness in the conduct of warfare, that is the tendency to underestimate one's enemy, his actions, and his plans.

Hammes preferred labeling the insurgents' way of waging war "fourth generation warfare," a term that implies much more than change — it involves a gradual progression. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in the two breathtaking books they edited — *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* and *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* — preferred a different term: netwars.

There are, however, inherent dangers in labeling the challenges we are facing today in Afghanistan as fourth generation warfare. One of them resides in the close association between military technological innovation and the transformation of warfare. The so-called RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) with its emphasis on technological advancement hinders if applied to asymmetrical threats. One of the victims of technology in times of conflict is leadership, particularly the warfighting ethos of "Follow Me," the trademark of inspirational and charismatic leadership. As John Keegan wrote in *The Mask of Command*, "The first and greatest imperative of command is to be present in person. Those who impose risk must be seen to share it…"

Unfortunately, during the summer 2006 Lebanon War, "after-action probes found egregious cases where commanders relied on situational awareness provided by the sensor-fused data streaming into command centers instead of moving forward to assess critical points in the evolving battle," wrote Barbara Opall-Rome in her article "Does Technology Undercut War Leadership?" which appeared in the November 20, 2006, issue of *Defense News*. On August 12, 2006, a column of Merkava tanks was ambushed in a narrow gorge by Hizballah fighters armed with state-of-the-art Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed and four wounded in the Saluki Wadi ambush due to command and control issues: the commanders of the two brigades were managing their respective battles from a digitized post in southern Lebanon. Operation Desert Storm, a HIC, convinced many analysts that "electronic operations will be decisive in their own right, and aerospace systems incorporating electronic and information technologies will take warfare into a third dimension," wrote Opall-Rome. The technological edge is a great advantage in HIC; there is no doubt about that. But in netwars, it hinders instead of providing decisive benefits, a point which will be developed later on in the article. In recent guerrilla wars, many of the military fiascos can be attributed to the brass' fixation on technology as a universal panacea. Really worrisome is the fact that Western military establishments have constantly and relentlessly silenced the critics to such an approach to netwars.

One of the critics is former LTG James Helmy who quietly stepped down in May 2006 after completing a four-year tenure as chief of the U.S. Army Reserve. In an interview with Stephen Trimble for the June 21, 2006, issue of *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Helmy confessed: "I say 'transformation' has become a cheap moniker around the Pentagon. (…) I want a new piece of equipment that doesn't really change anything. It's just new, so I'll call it transformational. That's unfair to our leadership, so I said: No, I like the word change. Deep, profound change, and not just pieces of equipment but how we do business, how we train, how we organize our force."

Warfare does not evolve; it is not a life form that can be subjected to Darwinian principles. It simply changes, as the belligerent with the most flexible organization adapts to/or shapes the reality of the battlefield. Unfortunately for us, al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership have the upper hand, since they control organizations which are ideally suited for the conduct of guerilla wars. These organizations are networks, not hierarchies. They are founded on strong social or personal ties, which can often be family ties.

As defined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, networks come in three major typologies: chain, hub and all-channel, although there are other complex combinations and hybrids, such as spider webs. The structures themselves are self-adjusting constantly due to attrition and other

imperatives. The organizational structure of our enemies resembles an array of dispersed, independent, but interconnected nodes. Its main strength resides on information-sharing and free-flowing of discussion. The leadership at all levels exhibits the characteristics of primus inter pares, which encourages and facilitates flexibility through mission command-type tactics. The network system greatly facilitates insurgents by granting them almost absolute freedom of action. The only doctrine they have is not a sum of templates or procedures, but an oral tradition disseminated through the Internet that constantly stressed the importance of "the deed." The Pashtun tribal system in Afghanistan exhibits many of the characteristics of a network-based organization. For the Taliban leadership adapting such a system to a network-based organization was not difficult, a task greatly facilitated by the information revolution. In stark contrast, NATO armies display rigid hierarchical organizations, predictable tactics and a doctrine which is far from being adapted to netwars. Dixon called network-based organizations "all-channel communication nets," while hierarchies were dubbed "wheel nets." This is what he wrote about the latter: "…the flow of essential information is to and fro between the leader and his subordinates rather than between all members of the group. Not very surprisingly, the wheel net, though no doubt gratifying to autocratic leaders, produces more errors, slower solutions to problems, and reduced gratification to the group than does the more democratic all-channel net."

Arguably, one of the biggest missteps that NATO infantry is making in Afghanistan is that it is reacting, instead of acting. But, there is a good reason for that: human intelligence (HUMINT) or, to be more precise, the lack thereof. Confronted with overwhelming firepower, the Taliban adapted by operating discreetly, although very effectively. In order to maintain their authority and influence, they have to interact with the local populace; and that requires presence. At the same time, they have to be invisible, inconspicuous to NATO forces and its electronic eyes. Often lacking intelligence, in order to find and neutralize insurgents, the infantry has to provoke them, usually through presence patrols and reconnaissance in force operations. The great disadvantage of such an approach is that the enemy retains the initiative, it imposes his own tempo, as he will fight at his convenience. The insurgent approach resembles motti tactics, a way of waging war introduced by the Finns in the 1939-1940 Soviet-Finnish War. In their book *On Infantry*, John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson said, "The idea behind motti tactics was to strike so rapidly and at so many places that the enemy was deprived of his ability to effectively react. The means of doing this were small teams of infantrymen, often on skis and sometimes even using reindeer sleighs to carry heavy weapons. The chief techniques were the ambush, the hit-and-run raid, and maneuvers that make use of the peculiarities of the environment."

Unlike regular Finnish soldiers, the insurgents do not have to defeat us conventionally. Their attacks do not have to be simultaneous and coordinated. It is no longer about military success, but public relations coups. Netwars have become strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations, according to Hammes in his *Military Review* article. The ultimate goal of the Taliban is not to attrite our own forces, but to erode public support in the West through isolated attacks. Presence patrols turning into hasty attacks in case of an ambush and reconnaissance-in-force operations are not an effective way of defeating the terrorists. Hasty attacks require time (although very little time) to prepare, which is more than enough that the enemy needs to fade away in an environment very often hostile to NATO forces. Moreover, the attacker always retains the momentum and the initiative. No matter how well-prepared, well-equipped and well-led we are, we will invariably be caught off balance.

NATO doctrine, as it is taught in infantry schools in the West, stresses the importance of reaction: "react to enemy fire," "win the firefight" once attacked, etc. These drills are very useful when one is dealing with static or quasi-static forces. But when you're fighting an enemy whose main characteristic is mobility, they are ineffective. To paraphrase Einstein: yes, the question is always the same: how can I defeat the enemy? The answer is different depending on the nature of the enemy. Netwars will be won not by those seeking battle, but by those avoiding it until a crushing blow can be delivered to the enemy when he is vulnerable and exposed. Even forces involved in HIC, such as the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS applied this principle.

In his book *Panzergrenadier Divisions*,

CPL Jason T. Guiliano, USMC

Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment take cover after being fired upon during a mounted patrol in the Farah province of Afghanistan August 2, 2008.

1939-45, Chris Bishop wrote, "As late as 1942, the U.S. Army analysis of German offensive doctrine was that its primary aim was to encircle the enemy and destroy him. 'The objective of the combined arms in attack,' a staff paper concluded, 'is to bring the armoured forces and the infantry into decisive action against the enemy with sufficient firepower and shock. Superiority in force and firepower, the employment of armoured forces, as well as the surprise element play a great part in the offensive.' The truth was very different. German tactics did everything they could to avoid a decisive engagement, relying on speed and flexibility to wreak havoc in enemy rear areas. …The Germans substituted mobility for power…"

Just like the Taliban, in order to defeat them, we need to be invisible but still present: invisible when they need to find and strike us; present when we need to destroy them.

Applying such a tenet is not feasible as long as we do not know the location of enemy lines of communications and his rear areas. Therefore, the responsibility for defeating the Taliban cannot be placed entirely on infantrymen's shoulders; it also rests with the Intelligence branch. Furthermore, before implementing a strategy, one has to be clearly defined. And that is beyond the control of the "lowly" infantryman.

At this point, a few key concepts (guerilla warfare, netwars, 4GW) and the affiliation they share need to be clarified. Guerilla warfare is always the strategy adopted by the weaker side, in quantifiable advantages such as equipment, technology, and training. The ultimate goal of the weaker side is to convince its adversary that it cannot win. It usually achieves this through attrition, both human and material. Severely attrited, the strong side eventually realizes that victory has become too expensive (financially and politically), as it concedes defeat. The problem with such an approach is that the perception of attrition is relative: some generals and/or politicians are willing to accept higher costs than others. But the guerillas know that public opinion has a lower tolerance for casualties than many politicians or generals; so instead of letting them concede defeat, the weaker side simply short circuits the (strategic chess) board by manipulating public opinion. And this is where 4GW comes into play. 4GW uses the information revolution (media, the Internet) to win wars. Guerilla warfare encompasses the tactics leading to military victory. 4GW is about politically exploiting it in an efficient way. Netwars focus primarily on organizational aspects. Guerilla warfare, netwars, and 4GW are far from being synonyms, but they are complementary concepts. Therefore, the technology involved in 4GW through the information revolution should not prevent us from carefully studying the organizational aspects of the Taliban and al Qaeda and from adapting to their tactics. Personally, I prefer the terminology "netwars," since "guerilla warfare" is too broad of a term, while "4GW" focuses too much on the political facets of military conflicts and can be confusing.

Since the end of the World War I, scores of historians and military analysts agree on the fact that the monumental wastage of human resources during that particular conflict could have being avoided by technological innovation, namely the mass production of tanks. Ever since, technology is perceived as a militarily universal panacea.

The Missing Story

The term fourth generation warfare can be misleading for another reason: it implies that netwars are something new, unique, something with which Western armies have never dealt before (that is true only to the extent to which we overlay 4GW and the information revolution). The consequence of such an assumption is the neglect of past military experiences, dating back to the colonial wars of the 19th century. Military history is a priceless source of inspiration, such as the 1830 French invasion of Algeria. This is just one of the best examples.

CPL Randall A. Clinton, USMC

A U.S. Marine convoy travels through the Helmand province of Afghanistan in May 2008.

Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat at Waterloo and his subsequent exile on Saint Helena prompted Louis XVIII's second restoration to the throne of France. The new monarch proved to be almost as unpopular as had been his brother, Louis XVI, who was beheaded during the French Revolution. Upon his death, Charles X became king of France. He was faced with the daunting task of reestablishing the prestige of the monarchy. The French monarch sought to do that by invading Algeria.

The Regency of Algiers was a relatively autonomous political entity within the Ottoman Empire. In 1830, France took advantage of its military weakness and successfully invaded the country. The attack and ensuing occupation made Algeria a French colony governed by high-ranking army officers.

Many Algerians were not happy with their new political status and, under the guidance of various leaders, (Ahmad ibn Muhammad, Muhyi ad Din, etc.) violently resisted the occupation. Arguably, the most successful of all the rebels was Muhyi ad Din's son, Abd al-Qadir.

Abd al-Qadir asserted himself as Amir al-Muminin, commander of the faithful, and declared jihad against the French. His rebellion

proved catastrophic for the colonial administration. The Algerian marauder used guerilla war, a type of conflict with which the French should have been familiar, seeing as in Spain between 1808 and 1814 and again during the Spanish Civil War of 1820-23, they were confronted with roughly the same tactics. But the French army had learned nothing from the past.

During the initial stages of the occupation, the French tried to militarily control Algeria by placing a multitude of garrisons, forts and outposts all over the country. The only way to supply them was by sending slow moving, highly visible, and therefore vulnerable convoys.

Geographically, Algeria is extremely diverse: the southern part is desertic with immense areas of sand dunes, while the northern part is dissected into mountains, plains, and basins. Numerous gorges, cliffs, defiles and sharp turns also created natural barriers or ambush points. Consequently, with the French lines of communication being so exposed, the resupply "soft units" were easy targets for al-Qadir's raiders. Thus, the garrisons scattered all over the country lacked most amenities and munitions. Morale was extremely low. Al-Qadir even went as far as besieging and destroying isolated outposts. Virtual impunity to his ambush and hit-and-run actions encouraged him. As for the French soldiers, when they were not killed by the insurgents, they wasted away in outposts "torn by human conflict brought on by boredom — fighting, insanity, even suicides and self-mutilation," according to Douglas Porch in his book *The French Foreign Legion, A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force*.

The French fought back by sending troops to deal with al-Qadir's insurgents. Long, slow-moving columns were hampered in their advance by heavy artillery and sluggish wagons carrying ammunition and food, senselessly tried to find an enemy that did not want to be found. Since the movement of wagons required good roads and because there were only a few in Algeria, the itinerary of the French was predictable. The raiders were ambushing the columns since they knew where to find them. The heavily armed columns were too slow to effectively fight a highly mobile army of insurgents.

The high-ranking French army officers were confronted with a military problem that is all too familiar to NATO commanders in Afghanistan: how does an army burdened by modern equipment designed for continental warfare efficiently fight a war in a country with limited, if any, infrastructure, against a highly mobile, almost invisible enemy using hit-and-run tactics?

Marshal Bugeaud had the answer. Bugeaud's appointment as governor general and commander in chief of all French armed forces in Algeria came as a surprise for many of his contemporaries. He was vehemently opposed to the occupation of Algeria. Regardless, as soon as he stepped on Algerian soil, he started to work feverishly on an effectual counterinsurgency strategy.

Thomas Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie realized that the main advantage of his enemy was mobility. This was the decisive feature that made the insurgents ghostlike, allowing them to melt into the environment. Hence, the only way to defeat al-Qadir was to make the French troops at least as mobile. One of Bugeaud's first decisions was to get rid of all heavy artillery. The decision met opposition from fellow senior officers.

In his book, Porch wrote, "…the general called the officers in his tent and lectured them on their mistakes: 'You drag thousands of wagons and heavy artillery with you which slows your movements,' he told them. 'Rather than surprise the Arabs with rapid, offensive marches, you stay on the defensive, marching slowly. Your enemies follow you and attack at their convenience. All this is going to change!' (…) 'To begin with, no more heavy artillery, no more of these heavy wagons, no more of these enormous forage trains…The convoys will be on mule back and the only cannons permitted will be light ones.' (…) The overwhelming opinion among the officers was that, by abandoning his heavy artillery, Bugeaud had just set out a recipe for collective suicide."

The brass' opposition to Bugeaud's measures was understandable though. After all, during Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, heavy artillery proved to be a decisive factor in the defeat of the Mamluks. And since Al-Qadir's forces were not much different in their organization, skills and equipment from the Mamluk's, getting rid of all heavy artillery seemed irrational. What those resisting Bugeaud's measures ignored was the fact that unlike the Mamluks, Arab and Arabized Berber tribesmen were not on the battlefield long enough to allow the French the deployment of their heavy artillery.

Western armies fighting colonial wars usually had the blind belief that mere technological superiority will give them an edge in battle, and that serious operational and tactical considerations can be replaced by technological innovations. This proved to be a sound mentality only when their opponents fought conventionally.

Bugeaud replaced all heavy artillery with light artillery carried by mules. He removed the burdensome backpacks of the infantrymen and placed most of the equipment on mule or camel backs. He also discarded all wagons, closed down some of outposts, forts and garrisons, multiplied the number of patrols while reducing their numbers. With an unrelenting pace of march, freed from previous physical burdens, the new French columns became more mobile then the Arab and Arabized Berber insurgents. The strategy made it impossible for al-Qadir's insurgents to move or to recruit tribesmen, as the French "flying columns," as they were called, were nearly everywhere, almost omnipresent. It also stopped the ambushes (there was nothing to ambush anymore), especially since Bugeaud's light and swift troops were no longer road-bound. It was this strategy that led to al-Qadir's complete defeat.

In Conclusion

In order to adapt to the challenges it faces in Afghanistan, the infantry has to reassess its tactics, organization and equipment. Tactics-wise, there are numerous lessons to be learned from the flawed 1830 French invasion of Algeria and from the successful implementation of innovative measures by Marshal Bugeaud. Trying to control a hostile territory by placing outposts, bases and garrisons at various strategic positions is a mistake. The inherent problem with any structure lies in its immobility.

Immobile should be defined as visible (vulnerable), likely to be the target of observation, of analysis and the subsequent and inevitable (if confronted with a resolute enemy) attack. The temptation of staying on the defensive is understandable; however, there are reasons for which Western armies fighting guerrilla wars prefer this particular approach. Defense is easier than attack, since it needs less organization, less movement, fewer communications channels and smaller numbers. Moreover, in an unsafe environment where the locals

have shifting loyalties, units on the defensive can create a relatively safe haven, being able, among other things, to take advantage of any natural protection the terrain has to offer. Furthermore, a force staying on the defensive is less casualty-prone. But it should be remembered, however, that no army won a battle by staying on the defensive. At some point a successful offensive has to be organized, at a strategic level.

Outposts and isolated bases should be built for two reasons: for supplying counterinsurgency units and as traps for insurgents, to force battle upon a ghostlike enemy using hit-and-run tactics. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly risky and it can backfire, as it did at Dien Bien Phu. It should also be noted that, when used as a resupplying post, an outpost could succumb to enemy attacks if the counterinsurgency forces using it do not operate with sufficient aggressiveness in the adjacent area.

When confronting guerrilla forces, particularly in countries with limited infrastructure, roads are to be avoided at all costs. In a way, infrastructure is very similar to an outpost. It is static, exposed and used by conventional troops. It is also more vulnerable than any structure, lacking any protection against insurgents using it for ambushes.

When invading a country, reliable HUMINT is of paramount importance. Crushing technological preeminence, along with superior conventional training and equipment, is no panacea, and it is certainly not a surrogate for good human intelligence. It is also insufficient in confrontations with warlike and unorganized peoples living in a state of perpetual anarchy.

Bugeaud's use of light infantry when dealing with insurgents was at the core of his success. Arguably, special operations forces were the most successful units in Afghanistan. Many attributed their success to training, resilience, and fierceness. This is only partially true. Special operations forces were not only efficient because they were tough, but because they used the right approach (in terms of tactics and organization). Only units shaped in the likeness of guerrilla forces can defeat an enemy fighting unconventionally.

The key to victory in Afghanistan lies not only in the firm control of the ground. It also depends on the ability of all sides involved (government forces, NATO troops, non-governmental organizations, etc.) to present a unified political will and a unified military command. A comprehensible strategy with clearly defined objectives is also necessary. On the security side, round-the-clock saturation patrols carried out by light troops making use of reliable HUMINT will allow us to gain and retain control of the more problematic countryside. This approach is not new; it has been successfully implemented by U.S. Marines in Somalia before the situation deteriorated after U.N. forces took over.

"…saturation patrolling allowed us to gain control of Mogadishu. These tactics made use of the strengths of our Marines. They did well as 'beat cops' getting to know the neighborhoods they patrolled. They learned who should and should not be there. Their constant presence allowed a semblance of normalcy to return to the streets of Mogadishu and the outlying cities," wrote Hammes in *The Sling and the Stone*.

Aggressive saturation patrols would be an ideal deterrent against insurgents. This type of patrol has been more often than not associated with law enforcement. In the Afghani context, saturation patrols should be conducted exclusively by infantry units (preferably at section level). Such units should "hover" around villages, discreetly observing local routines and patterns of behavior. Contact with the residents is to be made only after extensive knowledge is gained on the local activities. Inquiries should be conducted by the patrols not for the purpose of collecting information, but for the purpose of ascertaining the credibility of the locals. That is why prior information unnoticeably collected is of vital importance. If it is concluded that the inhabitants of a certain village are hiding something from NATO troops, the reason has to be known: is it fear, willing collaboration with the Taliban, transactions involving drugs? If it is confirmed that a village provides any kind of support to the insurgents, immediate action is to be taken against it. This is how we can get to the enemy's lines of communications. Movement and combat have to be carried out at night with observation during the day.

To be successful, NATO infantry forces have to become tactically more mobile and significantly more independent from centralized command. Its lines of communications will have to be considerably shortened. Burdensome equipment will have to be discarded, as some of it hampers freedom of movement. The utility of helmets, ballistic plates, vests, heavy communication devices and considerable quantities of ammunition will have to be reassessed. The practice of invariably conducting small-unit offensive operations by using the routine of fire and movement (a part of the unit provides a "base of fire" which compels the enemy to keep his head down, while a separate fraction maneuvers to take advantage of a guarded line of approach) has to be revised. Mobility and marksmanship will have to be privileged over firepower. Instead of engagement, avoidance is to be used. Hovering around the enemy and harassing him are practices that should be encouraged, instead of direct confrontation.

During saturation and recce patrols, raids and ambushes, creativity should be favored over drills, finesse over overwhelming firepower. The abusive utilization of vehicles is to be avoided as much as possible, especially infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), as they are conspicuous and out-of-place in the Afghan countryside. Achieving mobility while being dismounted is no easy task, and caution is key. Light armored vehicles (such as the LAV III) should only be used in reconnaissance roles. By circulating along certain routes, they could also be used to simulate lines of communications, where insurgents placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) could later be ambushed. This way a known weakness could be transformed into a major strength.

Netwars have wide strategic-operational consequences. Planning, preparation, concentration and deployment are no longer major concerns. Logistics has become a key issue. The new kind of conflict also changed the basic requirements for the infantryman. Service in the infantry is not unskilled labor. Recruitment centers should enlist the brightest minds in the infantry. In Afghanistan the job requires a person for whom not only is combat like a second nature, but who is at the same time a PR consultant, a social assistant, and an intelligence officer.

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

GUNFIGHTING 101

The USAMU's Close Quarters Marksmanship Course

MAJ TYSON ANDREW JOHNSON

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) at Fort Benning, Ga., is changing the way we think about close quarters marksmanship (CQM) with a course that I've described as "Gunfighting 101."

The Close Quarters Marksmanship Course is a "train-the-trainer" course, and is the Army's **High Performance Shooting** school. Here, they don't teach you to shoot a gun, they teach you to *drive* a gun! The focus is on marksmanship. No tactics are covered, as they feel this is better reserved for the Infantry School.

Some of the topics covered in the course include basic shooting positions; engaging targets after 90-degree and 180-degree turns; recoil management; rapid and accurate follow-up shots; engaging multiple targets at varying ranges; transitioning from rifle to pistol; and dealing with malfunctions.

The goal of this course is to help Soldiers "put steel on target" faster than the enemy can. It's action shooting at its best! If you've been keeping up with the Warrior Tasks/Battle Drills on the Commander's Training Tool, this training feeds directly into the "shoot" and "urban" tasks.

About the Tools in My Toolbox

You may notice that in the accompanying photos there were all kinds of shooters and all kinds of weapons used during the course. While at the range, I scanned the range racks where other shooters stored their rifles; I saw Colt, FN, Noveske, and Bushmaster in one rack. Mine was an ArmaLite. This rifle has a tactical chamber and tactical trigger, and I was eager to try both aspects of the gun under some punishing conditions.

Each shooter is likely to run more than 1,500 rounds through his weapon by the end of the course, and the weapons can endure some pretty austere conditions, with high heat and sand being the prevailing environment at Fort Benning in August when I attended.

Shooters can also try out different gear to see what works and what doesn't. I like the large "Tac Latch" on the charging handle. A fellow Soldier at Benning commented that to him it feels like it is a big coat hanger, snagging everything on his gear. I move my MOLLE gear to the side so I can get low in the prone, so the Tac Latch works for me. The large latch helps me with *"weak hand press check."* If you don't know what that is, you need this course!

We arrived at 0700 and entered the USAMU classroom where we met our lead instructors and support staff. The instructors are "President's Hundred" and know the science of putting rounds on target. The first hour or so began with instruction covering the fundamentals of shooting (much needed for some) and safety (always needed by all).

This is a "big boy's course" meaning there's no rodding on and off the range. Each shooter is expected to bring a high degree of competency with his assigned weapon and to be safety conscious. I have to stop here and say just how nice that is. I enlisted more than 20 years ago, and I cut my teeth on "no brass, no ammo drill sergeant!" — and being rodded on and off the range. In those days, sometimes we felt like robots. At the USAMU's school, you

have to think on your feet and be your own critic. The "Rules of Firearms Handling" have been around a while — sometimes I hear them referred to as COL Jeff Cooper's Rules. No matter who came up with them, the staff here live by them since the range is run as a "hot range" where students are locked/loaded/safe most of the time. Here are the rules:

1. All guns are always loaded!

2. Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy!

3. Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are on the target!

4. Always be sure of your target, and what is behind it!

After the briefings, all shooters drew weapons from the USAMU arms room and then got on the bus to go to the range. We began with a range in-brief. The students consisted of Regular Army, National Guard and Reserves, as well as multinational Special Forces personnel from allied nations and other personnel**.** My CQM class was not full — there were unfilled seats which are available to Soldiers/Sailors/Marines in leadership positions, E-5 and above. An important note: this course is designed to be a "train-the-trainer" course. After you come here as a student, you are expected to be able to return to your home unit and relay what you learned. You've probably heard of viral marketing. The USAMU's Close Quarters Marksmanship Course is **viral training**! Send your leaders here — and when they return to your unit, the knowledge they've gained spreads like a virus.

Training Priorities

So who gets to go to this course? If you are in a leadership position and you have to ask that question, then you don't get it... Everyone needs Gunfighting 101. Outside the forward operating base, everyone is a trigger puller.

While students should be either E-5 or above OR in a leadership position, you'll see quite a few E-7s, junior officers, and some field grade officers and command sergeants major (CSMs). Remember, when the shooting starts, lieutenant colonels and CSMs don't hunker down in the back of a HMMWV and wait for the shooting to stop ... they are expected to engage with their primary or secondary weapon and win the gunfight.

The CQM Course is not some specialty school that the sergeant major can hand out as a reward for being Soldier of the year. CQM training is not "specialty" training, and therefore must have the widest dissemination possible. Here is where resources normally come up ... How much does it cost? Would [fill in the blank] have been better served if we had sent [insert your rank here] to the course instead of "higher ups?" I was accompanied by three CSMs, and two master sergeants from my unit to the course, all of whom (including myself) are in a primary training role and have the ability to facilitate training in other units. Leaders won't support training if they don't understand it. There must be a "buy in" by middle management or the folks who sign the school orders/ travel vouchers.

For those that have to look at costs and resources — you have to ask, how much does your life cost? This is one week that may make the difference in getting Mr. and Mrs. Jones' son back alive. How much is *that* worth? If I were speaking with the folks who controlled the money, I'd say think of it this way — you know that new piece of Rapid Fielding Initiative Equipment (RFI) we may/may not get/squabble over? Keep it. Instead, send all Soldiers E-5 and above to the CQM Course to learn how to survive a gunfight. The most dangerous weapon an American Soldier has is his mind.

This course teaches you how to teach someone how to drive a gun ... like a Formula 1 race car! You'll hear over and over, "Slow is smooth, smooth is fast, fast is deadly..."

A few words about "kit" — what we used to call gear or equipment. For the course, each shooter has quite a bit of leeway to set up his placement of magazines, water, and mission essential gear. Most of the troops in my class were either about to deploy or were going to be direct trainers for those that are deploying. Today, there is considerable freedom to choose your kit and set it up the way it works for you. I saw a lot of different pieces of gear being tried out, and tactical training is an abusive environment to see if it will break, tear, fail, or just not work. It's better that it breaks in training than while deployed. But it hasn't always been that way...

When I first enlisted, the rule was "Dress Right Dress;" meaning everyone had to look the same, as if we were all going to march in a parade at any given moment. Now, the general rule is shooter's preference. The only exceptions are that medical gear and mission-essential equipment should be carried according to the unit's SOP.

The CQM Course is a five-day class, with each day building on the skills learned the day before. Non-military types may say this looks similar to some high-speed civilian courses that have been taught for years. For "Big Army" this concept of bringing gunfight survival training to the troops is new. This is the first time we have succeeded in bringing modern-day gunfighting

Author's photos

The author and his team practice "Ready, UP!" drills during the CQM course.

marksmanship to regular troops.

Shooters are invited to bring their own assigned rifles and pistols with them, but the school issues weapons to those who do not. Magazines for both pistol and rifle are always in short supply, so students should bring a basic load of rifle and pistol magazines. They also have a limited amount of holsters and tactical slings for students to try out. This is not the place to have magazine-induced malfunctions, so bring quality gear!

Students practice engaging targets after completing 180-degree turns.

Having a Rifle in Your Hands Doesn't Mean You Can Operate It

We too often make the assumption that if you give a Soldier a Basic Combat Training education — and a rifle — he can accomplish any combat mission. The part of the equation we miss is that no Soldier was born to be a shooter the same way that no Soldier was born to be a paper-pusher. We make ourselves into one or the other. This is why everyone needs immersion training on modern-day gunfighting. So few of us can naturally shoot well without this kind of training, and even fewer of us can teach what we know. I've said before and still believe that shooting is a science not an art. And science can be taught. Revamping your unit's gunfighting ability should start with this train-the-trainer course.

We've known for years that it's counter-intuitive to engage the vital zone of a human being with a rifle. LTC Dave Grossman explains in his book *On Killing*, that when the critical instant comes to fire, most men hesitate. An example cited is that Civil War muskets have been recovered having over a dozen projectiles recklessly stuffed down the barrel. This course helps make engaging the enemy intuitive.

Our challenge now is that we labor under an artifact of the "precision aimed fire" doctrine emphasized in the late 19th century. Tough realistic training for combat shooting needs to be rapid semiautomatic fire or automatic (burst) fire within 25 meters.

Somewhere, in the name of expediency, the Army traded real marksmanship for a pop-up range where we are defensively reacting to pop-up enemies that have a vital zone 20 inches wide and 40 inches high. An enemy pops up, you shoot, it falls ... you wait. An enemy pops up, you shoot again … and the target falls.

How in the world did we get here? Our defensive ranges were created for the ease of construction and management, and the safety of the range officer's career. A close quarters shooting range is tougher to run but much more productive and realistic. It also better meets the needs of a modern force.

We need shooters that seek out targets… shooters that effectively engage targets in a realistic vital zone, then move by covered/concealed routes to dominant terrain, then reload, engage again ... and repeat. The "defensive range" was always out of place in modern combat training; it's just that we now can see how it has left us unprepared. A defensive strategy has never been fully adequate; according to Sun Tzu, "You can prevent your opponent from defeating you through defense, but you cannot defeat him without taking the offensive."

Some Fundamental Lessons Learned

1. **About reloading** — always reload "in the pocket." The pocket is the area that fills up an imaginary beach ball held under your chin. Empties should drop free and clear. (if they don't drop free from the weapon, remove that magazine from circulation — there's a special tool on the heel of your boot that works fairly well at removing defective aluminum magazines from circulation ...)

Never take your strong hand off the pistol grip. Your non-firing hand (left hand for most shooters) should pull a fresh magazine out of your load carrying gear *from your weak side*. Look at the magazine well while inserting the magazine, then eyes back on target. After the engagement when you are reloading/cross-leveling, all other magazines stored in other locations are topped off, and rotated over to your weak-side pouches so that your weak hand always has access to a full magazine for a quick reload. Magazines should be stored so that they don't have to be turned or flipped to be inserted into the weapon.

2. **Types of reloads** … There are two general kinds of reloads — those you *want* to do and those you *have* to do. These can be broken down into administrative reloads, tactical reloads, and combat reloads. Administrative is what it sounds like; tactical is one round prior to bolt lock; and combat is after the magazine runs dry and the bold locks to the rear.

3. **Weapon Presentation** must be fluid, accomplished from any position or angle, and must be aggressive and still provide maximum control of the weapon and shots. When engaging multiple targets, DRIVE the gun from target to target ... most shooters "float" the gun up or over, costing time. Also discussed were "bowling" and "fishing." Bowling is bringing the gun up to the target like bowling a ball, and fishing is when the shooter brings the gun from a higher position down to the target as in casting a fishing line.

4. **Why a controlled pair?** *Because anything worth shooting … is worth shooting TWICE!* The "double tap" (also called "the hammer") may have its place, but in most engagements at the ranges we are seeing (more than 7 yards), double taps end up costing accuracy. Instead, place a controlled pair of rounds into the vital zone of the target. Both are aimed shots. (*A brief word about aiming:* An important part of this training is that you aim every shot. The techniques, which are easier shown than written about, encourage rapid aiming

naturally… not target-shooting aiming, but no shots fired without eyes behind the sights. There is an intriguing body of analysis and research on rapid semiautomatic fire that is deserving of discussion in a later article.)

The recoil control techniques they teach at the USAMU's Close Quarters Marksmanship Course enable the second shot to be rock solid; so if you chose to hammer two rounds instead, you could.

5. If you're not shooting, you're moving to cover. If you're not moving, you're reloading. When moving the body three steps or less, keep the weapon mounted; if it's more than three steps, break weak hand hold and run to cover or dominant terrain.

6. **The "Groucho Walk."** Have you ever seen Groucho Marx walk? If so, you need no further explanation of the Groucho Walk. This is moving while keeping a stable shooting platform, nothing more. Shooters visualize holding a full cup of water out in front while walking down range. The picture at right shows my "Groucho Walk."

7. **The "sympathetic finger."** If you curl your weak-hand index finger as in picking up a heavy object, your trigger finger might struggle to do the same thing! Couple this with a failure to keep your trigger finger off the trigger, and this might result in negligent discharge incidents that could have been prevented. An additional benefit of keeping the non-firing hand index finger pointed is it aids in driving the gun to the target.

8. **Gross motor skills**. While certain actions require fine motor skills, such as *smoothing* the trigger and ejecting the magazine, you should train with as many gross motor skills as you can in all of your drills. For example, when pressing the bolt release lever, use (for example) the heel of your palm, not your finger or thumb; the rationale is in a firefight you lose fine motor skills and resort to gross motor skills.

9. **The weak hand/strong hand**. Your shooting or "strong hand" always stays on the pistol grip, weapon on safe, finger off the trigger unless you have a sight picture. The weak hand, which is normally the left hand, inserts the magazine into the rifle; then that same weak hand drops the bolt and then retracts the charging handle slightly to reveal the presence of a live round in the chamber. This is called a **Pres. Check.** (Checking for the "presence" of a round in the chamber.) The weak hand reaches over the top of the gun, slaps the forward assist, closes dust cover and the weapon goes on safe. It takes practice to use your non-firing hand for all of this! *(The risk with the Pres. Check is that too much force ejects a round, and failing to tap forward assist may leave the weapon out of battery.)*

10. **Slow is smooth ... smooth is fast ... fast is deadly**. The USAMU's focus is not the number of hits or the number of rounds fired downrange per minute, but the number of rapid semiautomatic hits per minute. This is not a measure of accuracy alone, or speed alone, but represents a point in the curve where the two overlap.

Here's what I mean ... On "ready up" drills with six-shot strings, those students who delivered a high rate of fire that produced excessive "misses" were told to slow down. Those students that simply took too long but had nice tight groups were told to speed up. The key is to coach students to find their prime rate of semiautomatic fire that maximizes the number of hits per minute.

So what we're not doing is taking your time to make every shot count, which is a remnant of the days of heavy-recoiling or even single shot rifles; rather, you are using a rate of fire that maximizes hits and minimizes overall time. Most shooters at the course erred on the side of shooting too fast and missing the vital zone. As a consequence, most were told to slow down and find that "sweet spot" of hits per minute.

The author demonstrates the Groucho Walk.

11. Slings and holsters. Effective use of the sling is as important as trigger control and cheek-to-stock weld. The most effective sling for weapon stability while also allowing transitions to the pistol was clearly the two-point sling. There are many commercial offerings, including the two most popular among shooters at the course — "Vickers" by Blue Force Gear or V Tac. (No one carried the single point slings, which are great for standing around guarding something, but not very effective for stable shooting platforms or transitions to pistol.) I'm not particularly partial to the V Tac brand, so I made my own from tubular nylon and the slip link from a ruck sack shoulder strap. The name brand slings are around $30 up to $45, so a lot of our guys are making their own, for just a few bucks in parts and materials, and using old rucksack shoulder strap slip-links. If I had to buy one, I probably would have gone with a two-point Vickers based on what I saw.

I had a chance to try out the Vickers "Blue Force" brand — the material is more substantial, doesn't wrinkle/crinkle/deform under high heat and sweat. The Vickers also seemed to adjust quicker once I got the hang of it.

The prevailing holsters were the Serpa and the Safariland. Whatever brand you choose, the type of holster that failed was the soft-sided holster that proved unable to hold the weapon in the

same place. The best holsters had a hard curved drop leg panel that held the weapon in the same place for a consistent draw time after time.

12. Malfunctions. The instruction covered malfunctions drills, clearing all types of malfunctions and getting back into the fight. My problem is that I didn't have any malfunctions … My ArmaLite was new and just didn't give me the opportunity to practice any remedial actions. In all the events, the students' time does not stop — students are expected to react to the malfunction appropriately and bring the gun back into battery quickly.

13. The close quarters pyramid. Perhaps the most important intangible a student will take away from the USAMU's CQM Course is the close quarters pyramid. It has three cornerstones: mind-set, gun handling, and marksmanship.

A. **Operational mind-set** — this is the real key, since without it, all you have is a gun and some rounds. Plan your shoot and shoot your plan. This is where the concept of "shooter immersion" comes into play. On the final day of the course, shooters are given a live-fire shooting scenario where they have to think about each move, plan their shooting, moving and reloading, and execute that plan with time pressure.

B. **Gun handling** — This is the ability to employ the gun, present it, transition from it, reduce the possibility of malfunctions and correct those malfunctions that occur, and to direct your immediate environment, all while operating safely.

C. **Marksmanship** — Essentially, this is the ability to place rounds in the vital zone faster than your opponent can. The key is mastering rapid semiautomatic fire**.**

How the Course Is Organized

Day one is mostly "static" shooting, getting acclimated to shooting while standing, using a sling, and there is a lot of correction by the staff regarding correct posture, weapon presentation, and handling.

Basic shooting positions. The instructors showed a shooting stance that allows the shooter rapid follow-up shots, providing incredible recoil management, with the feet shoulder width or wider, one a little farther back, leaning into the gun, with the non-firing hand far forward on the rifle.

We also practiced doing a 180-degree turn and then engaging with a controlled pair.

Day two covers shooting while moving. Much of what you will see is "Groucho walking" or shooting on the move.

The "changing gears" drill requires the shooter to engage with a controlled pair at 50 meters, 20 meters, then 30 meters. Students then move downrange to see who shot the best groups.

Day three deals with shooting behind cover. Instructors teach students how to lean forward, which helps absorb recoil and allows the shooter to deliver controlled pairs to the vital zone.

Day four covers pistol presentation and transitions from primary to secondary weapon, in our case the Beretta M-9. We also covered "fishing" and "bowling."

Students practiced rapid reloading and worked on recoil management, a necessary skill for controlled pairs.

Part of this day's training included a steel plate match, a competition to the last man standing.

Day five is the Steel Challenge! The course culminates with shooting tactical scenarios on a very engaging course. Students are given limited ammunition, must use a given number of magazines, engage reactive targets from behind cover, and move from cover to cover.

Also covered on Day 5 is combat shotgun operations for those troops who have the shotgun as their primary or secondary weapon.

The facility and the personnel who run this school are able to support high intensity, realistic training that is on the cutting edge of what intense immersion training is to firearms. The only fault I found in the course is that it needs to run week to week all year long.

Supporting close quarters marksmanship training at the USAMU should be a top priority for the Army and will go hand-in-hand with the tactics taught by the Infantry School.

"Of every 100 men, 10 shouldn't even be there, 80 are nothing but targets, nine are real fighters... We are lucky to have them... They make the battle. Ah, but the One, One of them is a Warrior... and He will bring the others back."

— Heraclitus
Greek philosopher

How to Attend the CQM Course

For more information on the USAMU's Close Quarters Marksmanship Course, visit www.usaac.army.mil/amu and click on "Schedule Training." SFC Michael Buss, USAMU S3 Future Operations Planner, can also be contacted at (706) 545-7174/1410.

All the course materials are available online through AKO. Log into AKO; click on the "Groups" box at the top, type in USAMU in the box and click "Find."

CSM Ralph Dorner fires his weapon from behind the barricade.

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The American Hoplite

Evolution of the Infantryman

CPT MICHAEL T. WARNOCK, JR

Much debate has been generated by Victor Davis Hanson's thesis promulgating a continuous Western way of war that can be traced back 2,500 years to the ancient Greek hoplite — which is detailed extensively in his book *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. In his thesis, Hanson described commonalities associated with the hoplite that persist through each succeeding incarnation of the Western warrior that includes today's fighting man. Although the subject of this work draws some inspiration from his argument, the goal is to neither validate nor criticize these claims. Instead, the purpose of this discourse is to examine, with specificity, those similarities that exist between the hoplite of ancient Greece and the modern U.S. Infantry Soldier.

To be sure, there are a many differences between them — perhaps more than any actual similarities. However, one must keep in mind that these two warriors lived and fought, literally, worlds apart. Geography, culture and more than 2,000 years of history separate the Greek hoplite and U.S. Infantry Soldier. These warriors represent the alpha and omega of the Western warfighter, and it is remarkable that any similarities, as such, are present. An analysis of the two groups reveals that, despite their diametric positions in military history, such congruity does exist — both subtle and profound.

Analogous to the hoplite is the American infantryman's relationship to his non-Western counterparts, for the "Greeks lived in political freedom, while barbarians, under their kings, lived in political servitude," wrote Harry Sidebottom in his book *Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction*. Moreover, like American Soldiers, hoplites were citizens of their polis (Greek city-state) and literally fought to maintain their freedom. Of significant importance is the fact that, with some exceptions, the Soldiers of ancient Greece and the United States share the status of *citizen* with a voice in their respective governments. This produces a similar motivation in both fighting men. John Lynn, in *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture,* described the hoplite as neither coerced into battle nor driven by material gain, but rather impelled, largely, by his own civic values and concern for community and family — does this not also apply to the American warrior of today?

Similarities in Warfare

Discipline and unit cohesion are hallmarks of the Western way of war and native to both the hoplite and U.S. infantryman. The phalanx, with its close lines and locked shields, is often touted as the epitome of Western military discipline. While this battle formation has faded to history, its legacy leaves an enduring mark on the drill and ceremony evinced by the modern Soldier. According to the Roman military writer, Onasander, the hoplites "…had fought best with brother 'in rank beside brother, friend beside friend…'" (*World History of Warfare* by Christon I. Archer, John R. Ferris, Holger H. Herwig and Timothy H.E. Travers). Consequently, hoplites forged close-knit bonds that vastly increased their combat effectiveness. Geoffrey Parker, in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, noted that the modern military experiences can produce similar results: "Repeated group activities, whether directly related to combat (firing practice) or not (drill), all have the effect of creating artificial kinship groups…[which are] further



reinforced by the creation of small fellowships within the unit in order to increase cohesion and therefore combat efficiency even further."

Nonetheless, the presence of unit cohesion is for naught without the addition of another crucial Western military staple: superior equipment and tactics. The hoplite proved so effective in battle that several other peoples, from the Greeks to Etruscans and then from Etruscans to the Romans, emulated the hoplite's method and means of war, according to A. M. Snodgrass in his article "The Hoplite Reform and History," which appeared in Volume 85 of *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*. Such imitation exists today as Hanson rhetorically asked, " ... why [does] an AK-47 and M-16 appear almost identical?" Furthermore, private security companies, such as Blackwater Worldwide actively recruit U.S. trained warfighters. Today, as it was in Ancient Greece, it is American tools and methods of warfare that are most prized. For example, a primary function of the U.S. Special Forces Soldier is to train and advise foreign allied military and paramilitary forces.

One of the most striking similarities between the hoplite and U.S. infantryman is the weight of the implements of war each brings to the fight. The hoplite donned a heavy panoply of arms and armor that is estimated to weigh from 40 to 70 pounds, according to Lynn. This greatly impacted the hoplite, as he could not traverse great distances so encumbered. Thus, hoplites did not suit up until just before battle and often relied on horses to transport them to and from the battlefield. Today, the U.S. Army also wrestles with the problem of overburdening the infantryman with similar or even heavier combat loads. This has become such an issue that the U.S. Army Chief of Staff has directed that by 2010 a Soldier's combat load is not to exceed 50 pounds.

These cumbersome loads include superior armor, whether interceptor body armor currently worn in Iraq or a breastplate worn in ancient Greece, as well as superior arms — such as an M-16 with an M203 grenade launcher or spear and short sword. Today's infantryman wields an assortment of weaponry developed and employed to kill the enemy with deadly efficiency. Lynn noted that likewise, "…hoplites opted for weapons that inflicted the kind of fatal blows that won battles rather than those that were more likely to wound and wear down the enemy."

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The Western pursuit of superior arms and equipment has been reinforced by a history of engaging a numerically superior enemy. Whereas the hoplite fought against a Persian army vastly larger than his own, the U.S. infantryman is stretched across the world engaging enemies, which also outnumber him, in two major theaters. It is here that another similarity can be traced between the two. Edmund M. Burke noted, in "The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to the Primitivist Model" from *Transactions of the American Philological Association*: "Significant change occurred in the character of Greek warfare in the Classical era…The demands imposed by foreign initiatives and experience gained over time effected innovation in strategy and tactics. Thus, we find that increasingly campaigns are conducted far afield ... sometimes for extended periods, strategic positions are occupied and held ... The mercenary also begins to be used with greater frequency, and the non-hoplite specialist makes his appearance."

Consequently, the world has seen the integration of both the hoplite and U.S. Soldier with other armed services. For both warriors, there came a time when the army could no longer defend the state's strategic interests without assistance. Both the Greeks and Americans required force projection. Thus, for the hoplite, Burke observed, "…it was the [naval] fleet that had become the city's principal weapon of foreign policy." Meanwhile, the U.S. infantryman of today relies on both air and sea power, not only to deliver him to the fight, but also to support him on the battlefield. Whereas the ancient Greeks maintained and deployed a fleet of naval forces to protect their interests abroad, the United States utilizes a fleet of naval and air forces to similar effect.

Both in terms of manpower and financing, projecting and sustaining forces across great distances dramatically increases the costs associated with war. Consequently, the ancient Greeks relied upon mercenaries to meet their wartime needs. Likewise, the U.S. today finds itself employing contracted security forces in Iraq to meet mission requirements. Furthermore, although references are often made that the hoplite was first and foremost a citizen-warrior, this was not always the case. The Greeks also utilized non-citizen metics to fill their hoplite ranks, according to A.W. Gomme in his article "The Athenian Hoplite Force in 431 B.C." which appeared in the June-October 1927 issue of *The Classical Quarterly*. Similarly, citizenship is not a requirement for enlistment in the U.S. Army. In fact, a benefit of military service is accelerated U.S. citizenship.

Similar Sociopolitical Aspects

The hoplite and U.S. infantryman also hold comparable political power within each of their societies. At the heart of American democracy lies the middle class — which the U.S. military comprises. Likewise, as a citizen-soldier, the hoplite's valued place in society caused "… political power [to be] shifted to the middle class, with…a middle-class democracy as the political consequence," according to Mary E. White in her article "Greek Colonization," which appeared in a 1961 issue of *The Journal of Economic History*. Thus, although the hoplite contributed to the formation of a middle class in ancient Greece, while the U.S. Soldier is largely a product of the middle class — both are of similar socioeconomic backgrounds with comparable political power. The hoplite, as well as the Soldier of today is recognized as an essential contributor to the common defense of his people and survival of the state.

One of the major parallels between the hoplite and U.S. infantryman is their inevitable collaboration with other branches of the military. Although alluded to earlier, this also produced similar political controversies in both the Greek city-state and American governments. Charles W. Fornara described the Greek experience in his article "The Hoplite Achievement at

Psyttaleia," which was published in a 1966 issue of *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*. He wrote, "The social and political implications of a hoplite army and a sailor's navy entailed for liberals and conservatives the keenest opposition in their evaluation of either arm. By and large ... conservatives viewed the growth of the Athenian navy with a distrust that was matched by the hostility of the liberal to the hoplite army. Each group will have asserted, indeed, overstated, achievements present and past."

This is not unlike the political battles fought between the various armed services of the United States. Similar to the Athenian example, strategic necessity, as well as budgetary constraints requires greater cooperation among the various branches of the U.S. military. In recent years, the ever-increasing push towards joint operations has been impeded by, and in fact contributed to, interservice rivalries. Each component fights to maintain its own distinct culture and identity as it vies for dollars and competes for relevancy. To an extent, this is also reflected in the service member. Asking a U.S. Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine to opine on any one of his or her counterparts is likely to yield a mixed bag of obstinate comments. One can only guess at the remarks a hoplite might utter regarding the oarsmen who propelled the triremes of the Greek navy.

Nevertheless, during combat such rivalries are typically marginalized and usually set aside. When a U.S. service member is killed in action, great lengths are undertaken to recover the body. This is exemplified during a firefight in Afghanistan when Soldiers risk their own lives to retrieve a fallen comrade, or, alternately, demonstrated years after a battle as searchers scour the jungles of Vietnam for the remains of a lost combat veteran. Yet, American society demands more than just the physical recovery of its fallen Soldiers, they must also be *identified*. For example, some 58,000 names are carved into the black granite of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial — and when a warfighter cannot be identified, the Tomb of the Unknowns fills the nameless void. American television frequently updates the public with the latest numbers of combat fatalities, reverently displaying the rank, name and picture of each.

The hoplite killed in action could also expect treatment equitable to that of a U.S. Soldier, as noted by W. G. Runciman in "Greek Hoplites, Warrior Culture, and Indirect Bias" from *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*: "…the Greek poleis went to altogether exceptional lengths to recover, identify and bury their dead in battle and commemorate them individually by name. At Athens, an empty bier was garlanded and carried in the funeral procession for any whose bodies were missing ..."

Both warriors are venerated by their respective societies, in part, because they are, for the most part, citizens of a consensual government. Although, each bears civic duties and responsibilities, the governments that send them to war ultimately do so with the people's blessing. Nevertheless, even a free society must maintain warriors to provide for its security. A common, though controversial, notion among military historians posits that Soldiers produced from free societies, like the hoplite and U.S. infantryman, share certain intangible qualities not demonstrated elsewhere. The created result is that which Hanson calls *civic militarism*. It is a term he described as "…the idea that a citizen has particular rights as an individual that transfer into battle."

Hanson attributed the products of civic militarism — a sense of duty, equality and fighting to protect one's freedom — as contributors to Western success on the battlefield. He argued that these ideals uniquely inspire Soldiers in combat, but that civic militarism can only thrive in free societies with consensual governments. Although the continuity of this phenomenon throughout Western military history is debatable, the prerequisite conditions noted by Hanson are present for both the hoplite and U.S. infantry Soldier fighting today.

The fruits of civic militarism can also be discerned through a negative contrast such as the mercenary, who fights purely for material gain. As previously discussed, mercenaries were utilized in hoplite warfare and are currently employed by the U.S. government in support of its existing wartime mission. The introduction of hired soldiers, whether 2,500 years ago or today, alters the dynamics of war, but also significantly impacts society. Again, Runciman commented: "Mercenaries thus became important ... because of their effect on the norms, values and beliefs which had sustained the role of the citizen-hoplite as such."

Mercenaries do not fight out of a sense of duty or allegiance to the state. Although they may be professionals, there are inherent differences in their motivations and this frequently translates to codes of conduct that conflict with the citizen-soldier. Furthermore, as they fall outside the realm of serving the government for which they fight, mercenaries often do not emulate, nor are they subject to, the same standards as their state-sponsored counterparts. Today in Iraq, for example, reports of misconduct by Blackwater employees have strained relations between the Iraqi and U.S. governments and is further compounded by the complexities of holding contractors accountable. Nevertheless, similar to Athens, the U.S. finds itself in the precarious position of requiring the use of contracted security with close coordination of its military forces. One could argue that the addition of mercenaries dilutes the homogeneity of its military, both in terms of cohesion amongst soldiers and civic militarism. The diminishment of both poses significant problems for any military, but also potentially impacts society as a whole, whether modern American or ancient Greek.

If this is indeed the case for the U.S. infantry Soldier, Runciman, also noted that the hoplite was no stranger to this scenario. He wrote, "The change was that willingness to risk death in battle on behalf of the *polis* of which he was a citizen could no longer be seen by the young Greek male as the supreme manifestation of virtue. He might still be brought up to admire the exploits of his forebears ... But the norms, values and beliefs which had motivated the citizen-warriors ... were increasingly unlikely to be replicated in an environment where military prowess was no longer a matter of courage and endurance so much as of the acquisition of the maximum booty with the minimum of risk."

Thus, the fundamental distinction between the mercenary and soldier comes down to money. This seems an obvious, if not simple difference — yet potentially yields far-reaching societal consequences. Furthermore, the utilization of mercenaries, hoplite or otherwise, introduces pertinent economic considerations, which will be discussed hereafter.

Similar Economic Aspects

Despite the significant military and social ramifications of

employing mercenaries, arguably, the most direct effects are economic. Again, it is here that both the Grecian hoplite and American Soldier walk similar paths. The U.S. spends roughly a quarter of its budget on defense every year. Furthermore, costs of the war in Iraq are exacerbated by reliance on private security companies, i.e. mercenaries. For example, in the October 2, 2007, CNN article "Blackwater Chief disputes 'baseless and negative allegations,'" author Suzanne Simons stated that the government pays Blackwater Worldwide "…$1,200 a day for each contractor on the job in Iraq — between six and nine times the pay and allowances of an Army sergeant." Likewise, hiring mercenaries proved exorbitantly expensive for the ancient Greeks. The authors of *The World History of Warfare* noted a similar situation in 5th century Athens: "Money was needed to maintain fleets and mercenaries and to keep citizen armies in the field for more than a few weeks ... Its enemies could not do so, and their fleets soon wasted away. In the last decade of the war, however, the balance of financial and maritime power turned. With its population declining, Athens could maintain the quality and quantity of its navy only by hiring more mercenary oarsmen, which it could no longer afford to do. Its reserves had declined to fifteen hundred talents [from sixty-five hundred talents] and its income decreased by half [from six hundred talents annually]."

When considering either the ancient Greek or the modern-day American economy, employment of mercenaries and the maintenance of fleets constitute a major portion of the debts incurred. Also, both the hoplite and U.S. infantryman have found themselves, to varying degrees, supplanted by mercenary warriors paid by the state, though not citizen-soldiers of the state.

Predominant Similarities

Perhaps the most significant similarity between the hoplite and modern U.S. infantryman stems from their status as a middle class member of a free society. It is from here one may speak in general terms without reference to one or the other. Not coincidentally, it is also from here that their other shared attributes seem to spring.

Whether one ascribes merit to such abstractions as civic militarism is largely irrelevant, for it is difficult to refute the bonds forged by those who have bled and sacrificed on behalf of the state — which in the case of the hoplite and U.S. Soldier *is the people*. The result of fighting for one's people, as opposed to money, fear or enslavement, manifests in far more than superior discipline. It is a formula for producing warriors with heart, who fight with genuine motivation and determination to win — not merely survival. Although history has demonstrated that this does not always occur, it is only in the free society, through consensual government, that the conditions are created in which this becomes a possibility. The next crucial step is taken by the individual accepting responsibility for the security of his fellow citizens.

SGT Richard Rzepka

A Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment takes up a fighting position during a mission along the banks of the Tigris River in October 2008.

This, in turn, gives rise to a society or "grateful nation" that remains aware that it owes its way of life to those same warriors. It is to those Soldiers that monuments are dedicated and names are read aloud in order to honor their sacrifices as can best be done. Free societies not only strive to furnish the best material support for its war fighters, such as superior arms and equipment, but also provide crucial intangible support that can only be given freely and without coercion. In an effort to best prepare their warriors for battle, they are often inadvertently weighted down with the tools of war intended to garner success and maximize their safety.

In return, these Soldiers are sent to far away lands in an effort to better secure the freedoms and way of life enjoyed by their people. At times, this can prove too great a task for the citizen-soldier alone. Consequently, these warriors discover a dependence on fleets to not only carry them to war, but to help wage it. They may also find themselves in the necessary company of mercenaries. Nevertheless, such societies, regardless of their distaste for war or the costs associated with it, love their Soldiers and revere them in life and in death.

It is perhaps for this reason that students and historians of military history search for common traits, linking the soldiers of old to the warriors of today. It can be through this ardent search that one may find meaning within the violence, in an effort to pay homage to the sacrifices endured by those who have fought and died in battle. This also, in part, describes the appeal of attempting to define a Western way of war that spans 2,500 years.

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Field Sanitation Teams, Preventive Medicine Measures Key During Deployments

CPT BRADLEY W. HUDSON

There are few veteran commanders who can relate their combat experiences without at the same time vividly describing the overwhelming influence that the physical environment, climate, and disease had on their decision making and on their mission execution. In combat, disease has always taken a greater toll on manpower than has battle injury. This is true even in the 20th century when man has allegedly conquered his age-old microscopic enemies.

In Vietnam, over two-thirds of U.S. Army hospital admissions were due to disease. In 1968 alone, there were 943,809 man-days lost due to disease, which in theory translates into a bit more than two division-months. There are few indications that this grim health picture will be any different in future wars, but the incidences of disease can be materially reduced through cooperation between combat commanders and their supporting medics.

History

The forerunner of the field sanitation team (FST) was established during WWII when it became apparent that the control of malaria and other arthropod-borne diseases was beyond the capabilities of engineer and medical units. Commanders of company-size units were then required to appoint malaria control details. In 1956, animal pests were added to the duties of the malaria control details. In 1958, health problems encountered in the field by the American task force in Lebanon focused on the need for a team with broader training and knowledge of the relationship of effective preventive medicine measures (PMM) to individual Soldier health and unit mission accomplishment.

Later, the malaria control detail became the field sanitation team. Training was expanded to include field water supply, food service sanitation, waste disposal, and personal hygiene. The effectiveness of the FST in reducing disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs) is firmly established in military history. DNBI describes a person who is not a battle casualty, but who is lost to his organization by reason of disease or injury. This includes those dying from disease or injury, or by reason of being missing where the absence does not appear to be voluntary, due to enemy action, or to being interned.

Impact

Communicable diseases are illnesses that can be transmitted from person to person or from animal to person. These diseases are caused by: direct contact with infected person(s); exposure to bodily discharges; bites of animals, insects and rodents; or found in the air, food, water and milk products. Communicable diseases can be broken down into five different categories: respiratory diseases (common cold and pneumonia), intestinal diseases (dysentery, cholera, typhoid, paratyphoid fevers), insect borne diseases (malaria, typhus, yellow fever, dengue), sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, AIDS), and miscellaneous diseases (tetanus, rabies, dermatophytosis, tuberculosis). It is the inherent responsibility of the FST to individually assess the risk and minimize the impact of the aforementioned communicable diseases on combat operations. Above all, personal hygiene is the most important factor in the prevention of communicable diseases.

Diarrheal disease is contracted from contaminated water and food, and can have a catastrophic impact on the fighting force. Not one of Rommel's highly successful generals was available to help him when he needed them most for his desert campaign in North Africa at El Alamein. They had all been medically evacuated due to illness. Rommel himself was not even available because he was in Germany recovering from hepatitis. His chief of staff, intelligence officer, and operations officer were all evacuated prior to or during the battle with Patton's 3rd Army due to amoebic dysentery. In today's force, the impacts of contracting a lifelong disease such as hepatitis have second and third order effects that include non-deployability of the service member, an elevated level of lifelong healthcare, and decreased quality of life. The FST helps provide safe water for drinking and bathing by monitoring the unit water supply for

U.S. Army photo

A malaria control unit receives training in drainage construction at Camp Plauche, Louisiana.

chlorine and disinfecting as required. Water is essential to the army in the field, both for drinking and bathing. Routine inspection of water containers and the unit's water supply helps eliminate such waterborne diseases as hepatitis, typhoid, and amoebic dysentery and preserve combat power vital to the mission.

The conditions under which food is transported, stored, prepared, and served can have a direct bearing on the success of a mission. Monitoring a unit's field food operations is vital to Soldiers' health as well as the overall morale of the unit. The FST monitors the preparation, distribution, and serving of all food to their organic units.

The proper disposal of all wastes is essential in preventing the spread of disease. This duty is perhaps second only to ensuring safe drinking and bathing water for the unit. Camps with improper waste disposal facilities soon became breeding grounds for a multitude of pests such as flies and rats.

Arthropod-borne illnesses can adversely affect military operations. Only 100,000 of Napoleon's 600,000-man army returned to France from Russia in 1812. They were destroyed by guerrillas, disease, and cold injury, which forced their retreat. There were 70,000 combat losses, but 430,000 DNBI losses. It's estimated that more than 100,000 soldiers of Le Grand Armeè were lost due to louse-borne typhus. During the campaign for the Solomon Islands, malaria infection resulted in eight times more casualties than were caused by the Japanese. The Department of Defense Arthropod Repellant System consists of a properly worn (sleeves down with pants tucked into boots) uniform treated with permethrin and DEET lotion applied to all exposed skin and is 100-percent effective against arthropod-borne disease. It is also necessary to bathe regularly and sleep under a bednet. The FST is responsible for ensuring uniform standards and the distribution and education pertaining to the use of arthropod repellants.

Heat is the most lethal of all the factors working against field forces. Heat can be a tactical weapon as was proven in the 1967 Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The Egyptians suffered 20,000 deaths due to heat when the Israelis severed the Egyptians' water supply lines. In the 1982 U.S. Sinai Peacekeeping action, 35 Soldiers from an airborne company were so badly dehydrated that they required intravenous fluids to recover. Cold is also incapacitating on the battlefield. More than 90,000 U.S. Soldiers were admitted to hospitals with cold injuries during WWII. The FST conducts daily monitoring of the heat index in order to properly advise their respective commands of the heat category and subsequent work-rest cycles.

The FST is an invaluable asset as it is responsible for those PMM that affect units as a whole or are beyond the resources of the individual Soldier. This is key, as unit effectiveness is dependent on the health of its Soldiers. When PMM breakdowns occur and units are unable to carry out their missions due to sick Soldiers, the success of an army, the outcome of a war, and the fate of a nation may be seriously impaired. The success of operations is directly related to how well DNBI is prevented through effective PMM in the units. As a tactical measure, the units with sound PMM can maintain and exploit fighting strength, particularly when the enemy may expect weakness due to DNBI in light of historical data.



Figure 1 — DoD Insect Repellent System

Composition

A field sanitation team must consist of at least two personnel, one of which must be an NCO. For units with organic medical personnel, they will be made a part of the FST due to their established medical knowledge. The important thing to remember is that the team should have enough members to accomplish its mission throughout the unit's area of operations. To successfully execute its mission, FST members must be selected from personnel whose normal field duties will allow ample time for their duties as an FST member. Every FST member will be trained and certified in Field Sanitation by supporting Preventive Medicine assets and have no less than six months time remaining with the unit. Units that consist of teams that operate individually (as is often the case in COIN), FST members should be placed in each team to provide support for the Soldiers. In Operation Iraqi Freedom V, the security had to be "won" before progress can be established, and it was necessary to put coalition forces in a position to replicate, for lack of a better term, police forces. This is referred to as the combat outpost (COP) model. Unfortunately, in many instances, Soldiers previously chosen to perform FST functions were separated from their company/teams. This left the company/team command without that resource and dependent on the brigade PM asset.

When a commander encounters a problem beyond the best efforts of the FST, assistance is requested from supporting preventive medicine assets. This support is located in the brigade support medical company of each brigade combat team (BCT) and consists of one Environmental Science Officer (72D/E) and one Preventive Medicine Specialist (68S). They comprise the Level II preventive medicine capability and work with unit-level FSTs to ensure the health of the command is protected.

Duties

The commander is ultimately responsible for ensuring the health of the troops. Therefore, the commander must have a clear understanding of the direct relationship between a Soldier's health and the success of a mission, and emphasize this at all levels. The commander appoints a functional FST to assist in ensuring preventive medicine measures are practiced at all levels. Command emphasis cannot be overstated at this point; units where PMMs are not stressed suffer significantly higher DNBI rates.

To properly assist the commander in assessing the medical threat, FST members must be able to perform several tasks. FST members participate in the Operational Risk Management (ORM) process in

identifying Occupational and Environmental Health/Endemic Diseases (OEH/ED) hazards and assessing the threat associated with these hazards. Commanders will therefore be able to make better-informed decisions and risk assessments based upon valuable input from the FST.

To perform its function, the FST must be equipped properly. Commanders must make it a priority to ensure all equipment items are on hand, serviceable, and repaired/replaced as necessary. A common misconception is that a FST "kit" exists. The equipment necessary to perform FST duties is actually better explained as an assemblage of items, most of which can be obtained through normal supply channels. Enough items should be acquired to support the entire unit, and these supplies should be placed where they can be used by the FST members or issued to Soldiers as needed (See Figure 2 for minimum recommended list per Soldier). One central location may not accomplish this.

Counterinsurgency and the "Surge"

In the multi-phased approach to conducting COIN operations, phase one concentrates enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents to prepare the area for the rest of the counterinsurgency processes. As a surge brigade, we began this process on or about May 2007. In phase two, the counterinsurgent switches targets from the armed insurgents to the population. Counterinsurgent forces are assigned to sectors, subsectors, and other divisions with the principal mission of protecting the population and civic action teams. The troops are deployed to locations where the people are, not to locations deemed to possess military value. This is how Soldiers lived during OIF V from our brigade — on remote outposts where either you brought what you needed or you went without at least for several weeks. Phase three consists of maintaining contact with and control of the population. These objectives included reestablishing authority over the population, physically isolating the population from the guerrillas, and gathering intelligence that leads to the next step. Phase four consists of eradicating insurgent secret political organizations which requires time and patience.

Our Soldiers performing these multi-faceted missions need to focus on the mission — not on preventable health problems ... We as leaders cannot afford to lose any Soldiers due to preventable illness.

The most important military assets in COIN are disciplined Soldiers and with adaptive, intelligent, and self-aware leaders — one important aspect of self-awareness is PMM and field sanitation. So the fact that command emphasis on an imperative such as preventive medicine is a no-brainer; what commanders care about, their troops care about. FSTs can even be stood up during a deployment and equipment acquired.

During pre-deployment training and preparation, all our 2nd BCT units practiced tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that had been gleaned from lessons learned in previous combat rotations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Everything was rehearsed and well planned by leaders with previous combat experience with the 3rd Infantry Division. Everything that is except being split-up and dispersed over hundreds of miles and operating out of patrol bases, combat outposts, and joint security stations. The current mind-set in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan is that contractors will augment and, in some cases, perform FST duties. However, during the surge when forward operating bases were at maximum capacity, these tasks proved to be challenging at best. In addition, with the establishment of combat outposts and joint security stations wherein Soldiers "live with" the population, small unit commanders quickly found themselves without adequate support and were forced to rely on brigade-level Preventive Medicine assets which were unable to perform the needed tasks with the required frequency. COIN (as defined by FM 3-24) has changed the face of battle from that of a linear environment to adapting to an asymmetric/nonlinear fight without the necessary doctrinal adaptations. For example, contractors were challenged to provide hot meals during this time of rapid expansion. Also, many Soldiers bartered on the local economy for food due to repeated consumption of MREs (Meals, Ready to Eat). While locations with 150 personnel or greater were authorized hot meals, others had to provide their own meals via field kitchens (mobile kitchen trailer [MKT], containerized kitchen trailer [CKT], etc.). This was an issue as personnel that performed those functions were tasked to support gun truck escort details and were therefore unavailable for operation of the MKTs. It's not that PMMs are more or less important during COIN versus other types of military operations; on the contrary – PMMs are essential to successful mission accomplishment no matter what the battlefield "looks" like. However, operations like those we executed during OIF V required small, self sufficient decentralized units that operated independently.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army has taken remarkable strides to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq in a process it calls the "Modular Army." Stepping away from the 15,000-Soldier division as the center of gravity of the Army, this program creates more nimble 4,000-Soldier units of action able to operate independently over a wide area. The Army is also taking steps to increase the numbers of Soldiers with much-needed special skills including counterintelligence and civil affairs Soldiers. These special skills should also include training on individual preventive medicine measures, which are just as necessary as combat lifesaver skills.

Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all elements of national power — diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial, and military — to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable national government that can secure itself against internal and external threats. Our Soldiers performing these multi-faceted missions need to focus on the mission — not on preventable health problems. Integration and emphasis are the keys to successful long-term power projection in COIN. We as leaders cannot afford to lose any Soldiers due to preventable illness.

It will pay dividends to train all Soldiers in individual PMMs, and pre-deployment preparation is the key. Every Soldier should complete Diseases of Military Importance

Figure 2 — Supply Items for Individual Preventive Medicine Measures

ITEM	NSN	UI	AUTH QTY	CL	COST (EA)	REMARKS
Water Purification Tablet Chlorine (720 tablets)	6850-01-352-6129	PG	1/10 indiv	2	$102.15	May substitute with Iodine Tablets (6850-00-985-7166) below
or						
Water Purification Tablet Iodine, 8 mg (50 tablets)	6850-00-985-7166	BT	2/indiv	2	$1.55	May substitute with Chlorine Tablets Tablets (6850-01-352-6129) above
Sunscreen, SPF 15, 4 oz	6505-01-121-2336	EA	2/indiv	8	$1.39	
Lipstick, Anti-chap, SPF 15 (144 tubes/PG)	6508-01-436-0607	PG	2/indiv	8	$107.69	
Hand Sanitizer	8520-01-490-7358	BX	2/indiv	NA	$40.08	
Insect Repellent, Personal Application, 2 oz tube (12 tubes/BX)	6840-01-284-3982	BX	4 tubes/ indiv	3	$30.33	Special handling requirements (MSDS required)
Insect Repellent, Clothing Application IDA Kit (12 kits/BX)	6840-01-345-0237	BX	4 kits/indiv	3	$36.02	Special handling requirements (MSDS required)
Insect Repellent, Clothing and Bednet Treatment, Aerosol, 6 oz (12 cans)	6840-01-278-1336	BX	1 can/indiv	3	$38.35	
Insect Net Protector, Field Type (Bednet)	7210-00-266-9736	EA	1/indiv	2	$28.40	Bednet mesh size not suitable for protection against sandflies; may substitute with Pop-Up Bednet (3740-01-518-7310) below
Pole, Folding Cot, Insect Net Protector	7210-00-267-5641	SE	1/indiv	2	$5.60	For use with Insect Net Protector /Bednet (7210-00-266-9736) above
or						
Bed Net, Pop-Up, Self-Supporting Low Profile Bed Net (SSLPB), Treated with Permethrin Repellent	3740-01-518-7310	EA	1/indiv	NA	$76.80	May substitute with Insect Net Protector/Bednet (7210-00-266-9736) & Poles (7210-00-267-5641) above
Plug, Ear, Noise Protection, Universal Size, Vinyl Foam, Cylindrical (400 earplugs/box)	6515-00-137-6345	BX	1/100 indiv	8	$29.58	

(MD0152) at https://atiam.train.army.mil, and every staff sergeant (E6) and above should complete the Field Sanitation Team Certification Course. Caring leaders will equip their Soldiers with these skills, which are every bit as important as individual weapons qualification and combatives. In fact, they are listed under "Fight" in the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills.

Our continuous missions within other countries that potentially expose us to hazards increase the importance of the FST mission. Today, more than ever, commanders must be aware of the hazards their Soldiers face and enforce PMMs. The expeditionary nature of today's U.S. Army requires all assigned to be fit to fight and ready to win. Preventive medicine conducted through field sanitation teams helps ensure that vital combat power is preserved so that it may be brought to bear on the enemy.

It was truly an honor and an inspiration to serve in Iraq with a few of the finest Soldiers our country has ever produced. Their spirit of selfless service, professionalism, and determination to fight so that others can live in freedom should humble all of us.

CPT Bradley W. Hudson is the commander of the 26th Brigade Support Medical Company and Preventive Medicine Officer for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.

Book Reviews

General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War. **By Kevin C. Holzimmer. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007, 329 pages, $39.95.** Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

In World War I, there were three field armies in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) with a total of four commanding generals. Few remember any except Pershing and only because he was concurrently theater commander. In World War II, we had 12 field armies scattered around the world with a total of 25 commanding generals, some obviously better known than others.

GEN Walter Krueger may be unsung in the sense of not having much written about him, but he was hardly unknown. He was overshadowed by MacArthur, but his Sixth Army headquarters was the only one in action in the Pacific for a considerable time. Those in action in Europe, such as the Seventh under Patton and Fifth under Clark, may have received more publicity at that time, but military scholars pay attention to the special character of Krueger's campaigns. He conducted 21 operations, 13 of which were in his first eight months. Eight operations were conducted simultaneously with other operations, and most involved overlapping future planning with oversight of ongoing battles.

Krueger was an extraordinary Soldier, a key figure in the war against Japan, and certainly warrants being sung about now. The author is on the faculty of the Air Command and Staff College, and this work is the result of his dissertation. Because of academic folderol, such works often do not translate into easy reading, but this is an exception. There are only a few places where readers might appreciate clarification or amplification. In light of the fact that there were only three divisions, and a corps headquarters was already on hand, the role of a field army needs to be understood. While the corps is strictly a tactical organization, the field army is a very large administrative and logistical entity. The table of organization and equipment for the headquarters called for a strength of 779. More than half of the troops in the army provided support services such as mail, graves registrations, laundry, shoe repair, and 13 different sized hospitals with anywhere from 25 to 2,000 beds. There was a need for an infrastructure such as this to backup the units on the scattered frontlines and keep them fighting.

Because of the Europe First War Policy, the number of those units was small, and it appeared the overall organization was top-heavy. Normally an army would have at least two corps under its command, but the small scale nature of the campaigns didn't require a second such headquarters for some time. It wasn't until Leyte that Sixth Army had two corps ashore at the same time and place. For various reasons, each had only two divisions initially. On Leyte, and then Luzon, the organization and deployment of the army more approximated what had been going on in the Atlantic theaters, except there was never the need for an Army group over two or more armies.

The subterfuge of calling Sixth Army "Alamo Force" is touched on lightly. There is no detail about the organization and functioning of the Sixth Army and how it operated in forward and rear CPs. An impressive list of Chiefs of Staff is named — Eisenhower, Gruenther, Honnen, Patrick and Decker, who certainly contributed to the excellence of the Sixth Army.

One of the most interesting parts of the book is the background on Krueger's corps, division and task force commanders and his relations with them.

Another strong feature is tracing his development to the command level that he reached. Above all, he remained a Soldier's Soldier, not a media creation such as Bradley, but one who knew from his time in the ranks the importance of mail, dry socks, beer, toilet paper, and condoms (for rifle barrels). I recommend this book for not only those interested in the Sixth Army in the Pacific but for anyone who wants to know more about the intangibles of leadership.

Patrolling Baghdad, A Military Police Company and the War in Iraq. **By Mark R. DePue. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 291 pages, Hardback $34.95.** Reviewed by LTC Keith Everett, USAR.

The 233rd Military Police Company is like many other companies, but the hazards and situations faced by this unit's Soldiers in the volatile streets of Baghdad, Iraq, between April 2003 and April 2004 make an interesting story. Every MP should read this story as a primer for deploying and to get an idea of the vast scope of their required duties. Mark DePue, a retired lieutenant colonel, weaves the fresh memories of the 233rd Soldiers from more than 80 interviews into a mosaic of military police daily activity in one of the most active areas of the combat zone.

Currently the director of oral history at the Lincoln Presidential Library in Springfield, Illinois, DePue is fully aware of the weaknesses of oral histories. He partially overcomes the subjective nature of the interviews by matching the memories of the Soldiers with official documents, newspaper articles, and magazine articles written at the time. The resulting story gives a good introduction to military policing in Iraq, especially for the many units required to perform MP functions without the background of civilian police experience or years of progressive MP training many of the Soldiers in the 233rd MP Company had in the years before deploying.

CPT Jeff Royer was both a K-9 officer with the Springfield Police Department and the 233rd's company commander. CPT Royer and his top NCOs viewed the pre-deployment training received at Fort McCoy as mostly inadequate with no ties to the realities of the Iraqi battlefield. One of Royer's platoons used the culturally inappropriate nickname of Crusaders, and this was one of the few mistakes not corrected by the chain of command before it caused misunderstandings with the local populace.

One of the biggest obstacles to mission accomplishment identified was the lack of a

clear outline of the overall mission and a lack of Arabic language capability. No interpreters were provided initially for the unit, making it doubly difficult to deal with the public. CPT Royer kept the basic Soldier skills emphasized, requiring every MP to keep their Kevlar helmet and body armor on at all times while on patrol. The highest priority was not comfort, but staying alive. The 233rd MP Company was able to swap 22 of its unarmored HMMWVs for armored HMMWVs partially through its tour of duty. Armored vehicles were welcome in the increasingly violent environment. Patrols took the armored vehicles daily, and the company mechanics scrambled to keep them operational. SGT Rich Carroll is a believer in the virtues of armored HMMWVs, as the bulletproof glass barely stopped a jagged piece of shrapnel from ending his life. The MPs also swapped out their MK-19s for the M-249 squad automatic weapon because of the range required to arm the MK-19 and the versatility of the M-249.

DePue contends the decision by Ambassador Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi Army was a mistake as it left no organic Iraqi institution in place to restore and keep order after the major combat operations were complete. He points to prewar studies supporting retaining a smaller, carefully screened Iraqi Army rather than the decision to disband all of the soldiers into an economy in shambles. The MPs took up the security vacuum created by this decision. The 233rd MP Company's daily routine consisted of patrols, setting up traffic control points at road intersections to stop all traffic to search for weapons, excessive cash or anything else out of the ordinary. The dreaded improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were encountered frequently after the early morning prayers, rarely in the neighborhoods, and often on highway entrance ramps and other high traffic areas. 1LT Stephen Rice was seriously wounded by such an IED as he was leading a patrol to assist another injured Soldier. The 233rd MP Company was fortunate not to experience many more such incidents in light of the amount of time spent mixing with the local populace.

The company leadership kept in touch with the local media with updated reports and ended up with an embedded local reporter as a result. The articles on the unit appeared as a series in the hometown papers garnering large support for the unit's efforts and portraying a much more positive picture than just IED stories with a body count. These efforts were highly popular with the families back home.

The stories of patrolling and leadership are a good primer for MP companies preparing to deploy and should be required reading for field artillery or any other units required to pick up military policing during their tours of duty.

Military Justice in Vietnam: The Rule of Law in an American War. **By William Thomas Allison. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007, 230 pages, $34.95.** Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Albert N. Garland.

The author, William Thomas Allison, is an associate professor of History at Weber State University. With a number of other books to his credit, in this book his aim is to demonstrate to his readers that "military justice in Vietnam was much more than My Lai and war crimes," and while "the U.S. military suffered a nearly complete breakdown in Vietnam for a variety of reasons" it was "military justice ... (that) helped keep the machine running through these difficult periods."

Accordingly, the author organizes his book in a topical fashion, which is laid out quite clearly in his chapter titles. One of the most interesting subjects is command responsibility doctrine and how it was carried out in Vietnam. He ends his comments on this subject by writing "command responsibility continues to be a very sticky problem." (How right he is!)

This book is well-done in all areas. It is well-researched, well-written and well-arranged, as the author makes a strong presentation of the "operational law" concept that involved military lawyers in the planning for and execution of military operations.

He also presents problems for today and for the future. "Civilization" is a growing problem for the U.S. democratic nation-building concept that is often presented by our forces.

Finally, the author calls for our legal system to be in the forefront of all our future military operations because he believes "the use of force and subsequent nation-building cannot succeed without these components prominently and effectively implemented ... by military lawyers and the system they serve and represent."

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SGT Richard Rzepka

A Soldier with the 101st Airborne Division pulls security near a UH-60 Black Hawk during an air assault mission near Bayji, Iraq, October 14.

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