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Infantry

July-August 2007



Dismounted Operations:

Training to Achieve Victory (Page 1)

Infantry Doctrine for Dismounted Patrolling (Page 26)

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI
Commandant, The Infantry School


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FRONT COVER:

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, patrol a neighborhood in Baghdad. (Photo by Sergeant Mike Pryor)



BACK COVER:

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, radio to superiors during a patrol in Baghdad July 24. (Photo by Master Sgt. Jonathan Doti, USAF)

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JULY-AUGUST 2007

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Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS Training to Achieve Victory

Today we are fighting the enemy on his own turf, and in the contemporary operational environment that means we must train intensively for dismounted operations. The dismounted infantry fight demands the utmost of our Soldiers, and in this Commandant's Note I want to discuss the changing missions of non-infantry units and some of the considerations that contribute to the successful execution of dismounted operations.

The dismounted fight is no longer the sole province of the infantryman. Soldiers of other military occupational specialties are patrolling, securing convoys, training local forces and performing what we once saw as purely infantry tasks in the built-up areas and countryside of Iraq. Their peers are carrying out similar missions in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, and other regions of national interest. These are demanding missions, often requiring a paradigm shift in how we train, and the Infantry School and other branch schools are committed to training Soldiers and their leaders in the skills they will need as they fight on unfamiliar terrain.

The global war on terrorism is characterized to a large extent by the complexity of the terrain on which dismounted U.S. and Coalition forces operate, and we must learn how to fight there. Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan face extremes of weather ranging from the blistering heat of the Iraqi deserts and plains to the numbing cold of the Hindu Kush. They fight on terrain as dense as the urban sprawl of Baghdad and in the rarified air of Afghan mountains at elevations ranging up to well over 10,000 feet. At those elevations Soldiers, leaders, and medics have to remain alert to cold weather injuries, but also to the danger of altitude sickness, something we are learning to deal with in terms of both medical and physical conditioning.

Physical conditioning is an imperative to sustain the mental and physical toughness the infantry fight demands. We cannot evaluate physical readiness by APFT scores alone, and leaders must avoid excessive optimism based solely upon these test results. The Ranger-Athlete-Warrior conditioning initiative of the 75th Ranger Regiment highlighted in the May-June issue of *Infantry* is applicable to non-Ranger units as well. Dismounted units well understand the matter of the Soldier's load, and we must train as we will fight. This includes road marching while carrying combat approach march loads and practicing to quickly reduce the fighting load once contact is imminent or underway. FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10), *The Infantry Rifle Company*, offers doctrinal guidance on Soldier's load planning. Common sense tells us that we need to tailor the load to the mission, and planning for link-up with our vehicles will further reduce the burden on Soldiers and save their stamina for when they most need it. Even though combat developers are making every effort

to reduce the weight of the Soldier's combat load, leaders must ensure that the infantryman goes into battle with what he needs, but unencumbered by non-mission essential equipment. Ultimately, the success of a dismounted operation will depend on mobility, stealth, and surprise and we must train to achieve these.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has made available vast amounts of data gathered over the past three decades and particularly during the global war on terrorism. We see that Russian operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya revealed the limitations of their command and control (C2) systems once their fight moved into the complex terrain of mountainous and urban environments. Today, our own infantry leaders conducting dismounted operations rely upon current dedicated C2 systems, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working to field more advanced C2 technology for testing and evaluation under field dismounted conditions. With the materiel assistance of DARPA and other agencies, units hunting down insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are employing the latest in C2 equipment as they deny the enemy the use of terrain he formerly dominated.

The time required to maneuver dismounted Soldiers through complex terrain reinforces the necessity of detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB must include likely enemy courses of action once the attack is initiated or discovered, and we employ both human and electronic intelligence to gather the data we need. Unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite imagery contribute to the effort as well. Units need to realistically consider the time needed to reach the objective for day and night operations, and must include recovery time prior to the action. When planning fires to restrict enemy mobility, we must consider our own courses of action to ensure that we do not restrict our own ability to maneuver.

Our Army's success at dismounted operations is due in large part to Soldiers' and leaders' ability to quickly adapt to changing enemy tactics and incorporate what they have learned into training. Today's many initiatives in the lessons learned program lie at the core of how we train Soldiers and units to fight, and because of this each Soldier deployed in the global war on terrorism is better trained than his predecessors. We have seized the initiative from those who would destroy us and are closing the circle around the terrorists and their sanctuaries.

Follow me!





2007 DOUGHBOY RECIPIENTS NAMED

BRIDGETT SITER

In 1968, Robert Hall left Gaffney, South Carolina, population 12,000, and went looking for “something more.” Something more than cotton.

“I was a country boy raised on a cotton farm. I worked in a cotton mill. All I knew was cotton,” Hall said. “I thought there might be something better out there.”

Thirty-two years later, after an Army career that took him to 48 states and 47 countries and saw him from Drill Sergeant of the Year to Sergeant Major of the Army, Hall went looking for a place to call home again. A place where he “could just be Bob Hall.”

He found it back in Gaffney, population 12,050 plus two since 2000, when Hall returned with his bride of 30 years.

“Gaffney is a place we can just relax and enjoy our good neighbors,” said Hall, who served as the 11th sergeant major of the Army before retiring. These days, Hall champions Soldier issues as a military affairs representative for USAA.

On the other hand, there’s Colonel (Retired) Ralph Puckett, who lives as a legend in his own hometown. The Columbus, Georgia, resident was a first lieutenant in 1950, when he formed and commanded the first Ranger company since World War II, the 8th Army Ranger Company in Korea.

Months after its formation, Puckett was wounded when his company, outnumbered 600 to 71, captured a Chinese stronghold and repelled five counterattacks. On the sixth attack, Puckett was wounded a second and third time. He ordered his men to withdraw, but he stayed behind to fight. Two Rangers returned, fought back the Chinese, and dragged their commander to safety.

As the honorary colonel of the 75th Ranger Regiment and an alumnus of the first class of Ranger Hall of Famers, Puckett uses his platform to preach all things Ranger. But, like Hall, he eschews any personal



Puckett



Hall

accolades. It’s all about the Soldiers today who fight the global war on terrorism.

September 18, it will be “all about” Hall and Puckett. The two will be presented one of the Army’s highest awards, the National Infantry Association’s Doughboy Award at the annual Centennial Dinner

Since 1980, the Doughboy Awards have recognized individuals who contribute greatly to the cause of the Infantry Soldier. Hall and Puckett join the likes of the late Bob Hope, Senator Bob Dole and General (Retired) Colin Powell, previous Doughboy honorees.

The award is “more than amazing,” Hall said.

“I’m flabbergasted. When you look at all the people who are more deserving ... well, I’m floored,” he said. “For me, it was an honor to spend my life working with Soldiers, being a Soldier.”

The Doughboy Awards ceremony is held each year during the Infantry Warfighting Conference.

The term “Doughboy” was popular during World War I, when the American Expeditionary Force was led by Gen. John Pershing, who had commanded an expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916. Then, the Infantry troops were constantly covered in dust while marching through northern Mexico, giving them the appearance of “dough boys.”

(Bridgett Siter is the assistant editor of The Bayonet at Fort Benning, Georgia.)

NEWS BRIEFS

2007 Sniper Competition Set —

The 7th International U.S. Army Sniper Competition will be held at Fort Benning, Georgia, from October 26 to November 3. The competition will be conducted regardless of weather conditions and is designed to physically and mentally challenge sniper teams from all over the world. The winning team will be the one that demonstrates a proficiency in a wide range of sniper-related skills. Unlike most sniper competitions, a high level of physical and mental toughness is needed. This is not only the premier sniper competition in the armed forces, but it is an excellent training opportunity for snipers. Competitors from different units and countries will be able to exchange techniques and tactics during the event.

For more information on the competition go to the Web site <https://www.benning.army.mil/197th/courses/sniper/index.htm> or contact Captain Keith Bell at (706) 545-7507 or Master Sergeant Craig Irwin at (706) 544-6006.

CALL Releases New Leader Handbook on Iraq

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has just released “The First 100 Days” leader’s handbook. The first 100 days are critical to the survival of Soldiers. In this brief initial period, Soldiers and units adjust to the tactical environment, the enemy, and each other. “There’s no doubt that the early part of the deployment is the most dangerous, when people are understanding their environment,” said Colonel Steven Mains, director of CALL. The second in a series of three handbooks is available to Soldiers, Army civilians, and validated contractors on the CALL Web site at <http://call.army.mil>.

LETTERS

Dear *Infantry*,

I wanted to take a few moments and comment on Captain Trenton Conner's article "A Commander's Guide to the Forward Support Company" in the March-April 2007 issue of *Infantry*. First of all, it was a great article and very well researched. It had a good introduction on the doctrinal capabilities and assets of the FSC in the modular force. CPT Conner does a good job of introducing the "how to think" concept of the FSC in respect to counterinsurgency (COIN). FSC operations are no different and should be given no less consideration than any other combat patrol and this is clear in the article. In the combat logistics patrols section, he mentions air/ground and setting the conditions, but another important piece is missing. With intense coordination, the passage of lines piece is sometimes possible. This is where combat logistics patrols can be "passed" from unit to unit as it rolls through different areas of responsibility. This requires coordination and is sometimes possible (or not) due to a variety of reasons. In my experience and opinion, however, it is well worth the effort for high priority logistics patrols. Additionally, CPT Conner does an excellent job of bringing to light the issue of host-nation logistics, which is often overlooked or neglected. I can tell you from personal experience that this is a key issue and failure to address this in combined/joint combat operations is a tactical mistake waiting to happen. The issues of ammunition, food, water, vehicle repair, and fueling are serious concerns that every task force will face during their tour at least once if not more often. Better to train and plan and do as little "discover learning" as possible.

It is a good article that has great points which will remain valid in future conflicts as well as the current conflict. As an introduction to FSC logistics, what they bring to the fight, and how to prep, plan and execute, this is an article that the smart commander will earmark and pass on to his subordinates.

— Major Mark S. Leslie

Chief of Training, Stryker Transition Team,
Fort Benning, Georgia

SHORT BARREL PASSES TEST

MICHELLE L. GORDON

In an ongoing effort to reduce the weight of the M-240B, the Soldier Battle Lab at Fort Benning, Georgia, recently evaluated the new short barrel. The short barrel M-240B is four inches shorter and 1.66 pounds lighter than the standard barrel. It has already passed technical tests conducted by the Army Research, Development and Engineering Center. Now the Soldier Battle Lab is testing it from a user's perspective.

"The testing we do is directly with the Soldiers," said Sam Bass, Soldier Battle Lab project officer. "We get their feedback on whether it is something they will use, and if it enhances their ability to perform."

Soldiers from the 63rd Engineer Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Engineer Battalion, spent July 23-27 comparing and contrasting the two weapons. They found that the shortened M-240B did improve their performance.

"The short barrel was easier to get up the ladder," said Private First Class Dustin Pruett, 11th Eng. Bn. "The long barrel stopped me as I was going up because it got caught on the concrete."

The Soldiers tested both weapons at the McKenna urban operations site for mobility and compatibility. Each Soldier ran two courses, one with each weapon. After each course, they completed a user survey.

The long barrel and the short barrel were also tested at the firing range. The target data from both weapons will be compared in terms of how the weapons performed and how the Soldiers performed with each weapon.

In addition to the target data, subjective data was collected, including Soldiers' comments and opinions, Bass said. They rate both weapons and list strengths and weaknesses of each so researchers can decide if the new technology is better, worse or if there is no appreciable difference.

Army researchers don't know when the new short barrel M-240B will be available, but they do know that any reduction in weapon size and weight can increase Soldier performance without sacrificing accuracy.

"It doesn't sound like a lot," Bass said. "But when you take a pound and a half and you have to pick it up, carry it and move it — that pound and a half makes a difference."

(Michelle L. Gordon writes for the Fort Benning Public Affairs Office.)



Michelle L. Gordon

The reduction in weapon size and weight can increase Soldier performance without sacrificing accuracy.

SOLDIERS TO RECEIVE FIRST STRIKE RATION

SOLDIER SYSTEMS CENTER - NATICK

A new compact, eat-on-the-move assault ration is well on its way to warfighters' hands.

"The First Strike Ration (FSR) is intended for the first-on-the-ground, first-to-fight warfighter," said Barbara Daley, food technologist and FSR project officer, Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD), U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center (NSRDEC).

Usually when warfighters are issued two or more Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) they "field strip" them to lessen the bulk and weight they are carrying.

Personnel at NSRDEC found that not only were warfighters tossing what they considered extra weight, such as the flameless ration heater and Tabasco sauce, but they were also tossing food items. According to the Product Optimization and Evaluation Team at NSRDEC, if a warfighter is given 3,600 calories, he or she will often strip it down to 2,500 calories.

The FSR attempts to reduce this stripping by providing a lighter, smaller package with eat-on-the-go items that also enhance performance. These items are calorically dense and provide appropriate nutritional content and energy to warfighters for short durations of highly mobile, highly intense combat operations.

Items included in the FSR include pocket sandwiches, First Strike energy bars, Zapplesauce™ (a carbohydrate-enhanced applesauce), high-energy drinks, pouches of tuna and chunk chicken, and caffeinated gum.

The FSR is designed to be about half the size of the three MREs it replaces and

it provides, on average, 2,900 calories per day. "It is not intended to sustain the warfighter for long periods of time," Daley emphasized.

Because of its lower caloric content, the FSR is classified by the Office of the Surgeon General as a restricted ration. As such, it can only be used as a sole source of food for 10 days or less in accordance with Army Regulation 40-25.

CFD conducted user evaluations on the FSR in Nevada and Germany in FY 2004, and in Afghanistan and Iraq in FY 2005. When compared with a field-stripped MRE in Iraq in 2005, more than 70 percent of Soldiers said the FSR was more convenient to carry and consume than the MRE.

"The best feedback we have received to date has been from warfighters participating in OIF/OEF in the mountains of Afghanistan and Iraq. They loved it," Daley said.

More than 6,500 FSRs have been used in theater in response to urgent requests by 25th Infantry Division and the Marine Corps, and modifications have been incorporated based on warfighters' feedback.

Lieutenant Colonel David Exton of the 25th Infantry Division told CFD: "You have created something great here. Do not fail in this ration. Need to make these happen for the Soldiers who go outside the wire. Could not get enough of them into theater."



Sarah Underhill

Two Soldiers assess the components of the First Strike Ration during a recent evaluation at Fort Bliss, Texas.

In July 2006, CFD conducted an operational test at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. With more than 100 Soldiers participating from an airborne infantry battalion, one group consumed the FSR for three days while the other group consumed MREs for three days. Then the groups switched. From monitoring what the Soldiers ate and what they threw out, CFD saw less waste and greater consumption with the groups eating the FSR.

Based upon these successful tests, and the introduction of this ration in-theater, the demand for the FSR is immense.


In November 2006, a Joint Services Decision Board consisting of the Army, Marine Corps and Defense Logistics Agency approved the FSR for procurement and fielding.

NSRDEC was able to compress the acquisition process by nearly 30 percent while maintaining support for all other ration platforms in order to maintain the schedule of 3rd quarter FY 2007 procurement by Defense Logistics Agency/ Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, with delivery in 4th quarter FY 2007.



INFANTRY MAGAZINE NEEDS ARTICLES

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POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IMPACTS ALL LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR SAMUEL M. RHODES, SR.

Since I served in the Middle East for approximately 30 months, the thoughts and reminders of my time there come and go so often that I really cannot acknowledge them. It is also tough acknowledging them to peers or superiors without concerns that they may see weakness.

I had the toughest time dealing with these constant thoughts and reminders as I transitioned from a unit that frequently deployed to taking over duties as a brigade command sergeant major of a Basic Combat Training unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. I continued to embody those traits and characteristics that I thought had kept me and my Soldiers alive for 32 months in the Middle East and incorporated them into my everyday work habits. The 192nd Infantry Brigade could not be doing better.

Unfortunately for most of the first nine months, little did anyone realize their brigade CSM was not doing well at all. I was able to perform my military duties on a daily basis without any negative thoughts whatsoever until I attended a Soldier's memorial service in February 2006.

As I walked into the chapel, my body began to tremble, and my mind began flashing back to memories of the 16 Soldiers I had lost during my last deployment with 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The chaplain began to speak and then the roll call was given. My eyes began to water and then tears rolled down my face like a waterfall. How did I get here? What was the root cause of all the issues? What did I see that triggered these constant memories? I had no control; being a Warrior and a member of a team reduced to this was tough to swallow. After the roll call finished and we all stood up I said, "OK, the worst is over." Then, like a knife in my heart the bugler began playing Taps. My knees buckled and I couldn't feel my legs so I grabbed onto the front bench. The brigade commander, Colonel Charles W. Durr, Jr., looked at me and immediately knew this was having a negative effect on me. We talked briefly later that day about it being worse for me than any memorial I attended in Iraq.

After the memorial service, I began to lose control of my eating habits, and nightmares came every night. I began to work longer hours in order to not have any free time. The only problem is that you can only work so much! What triggered this? Are my fellow Soldiers having the same problems?

On May 5, 2006, while attending a course at Fort Jackson, it all came full circle when I found myself crying continuously for about an hour, thinking about those Soldiers who died in Iraq. I



Courtesy photo

Command Sergeant Major Samuel M. Rhodes, Sr., attends a memorial service for a Soldier while serving in Iraq.

had awakened early in the morning from one of the worst dreams I ever had. It wasn't really a dream — I was there. I have seen the aftereffects of losing two great company commanders and seeing their bodies placed in bags. It was then that I began receiving counseling. I had been diagnosed in March of 2006 with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but like many leaders I put it off — too busy. Too busy almost cost me forever! From talking with Yvonne Wilbanks, Fort Benning's Alcohol & Drug Control Officer, I learned that PTSD needs to be treated early to try to avoid other serious problems such as depression and substance abuse. Her office, the Army Substance Abuse Program, had sponsored training on PTSD in conjunction with National Depression Screening Day at my unit.

While I did not develop substance abuse issues, I gained weight and was up to 260 pounds. Even at this weight I was still able to run and do PT without a lot of acknowledgment of my weight. I thank God for the ACUs that covered that up. The weight issue has since been fixed through continued dedication and with the help of the medical staff at Troop Medical Clinic (TMC) 5.

Later that summer, I was not feeling very well so the primary physician assistant sent me to the hospital to have some lab work done. Early the next morning I received a phone call from the TMC; the caller was different than normal and sounded a little anxious.

SYMPTOMS OF PTSD

- Reliving a trauma, intrusive memories
- Staying away from places/people that remind you of the trauma
- Feeling on guard, irritable, or easily startled
- Difficulty sleeping, outbursts of anger

PTSD MAY OCCUR WITH OTHER PROBLEMS

- * Depression
- * Anxiety
- * Substance abuse
- * Fear
- * Social anxiety

She said, “CSM, you need to come to the TMC right now.”

I replied, “I am in a meeting.”

She said, “CSM, don’t make me come get you.”

I went into the physician assistant’s office, and he began to tell me about the lab work and how I was showing signs of heart disease. He said if I didn’t do something about it soon, he couldn’t predict the timeline.

We talked about the findings and about my family history; my father and his brother both passed away at the ages of 64 and 65 from heart disease so the family history was not helping.

Having received this information along with a booming blood pressure, I took a hard look in the mirror and continued receiving counseling from a combat stress doctor from Walter Reed Medical Center via the telephone. I was also counseled by him in Iraq during my last deployment. I started dieting and working out harder and harder. The TMC folks continued to stay on top of me every day about my blood pressure checks and monthly lab work.

I found out during this period that the root causes of all my issues were the anxiety and the emotional instability I was dealing with from my extended stay in the Middle East.

Though we as leaders choose to fight most of our individual battles by ourselves, it’s great to know we have excellent medical personnel who care about Soldiers of all ranks. We definitely don’t appreciate them enough! I remembered Ms. Wilbanks had

SUICIDE WARNING SIGNS

- ✓ Current suicide thoughts/plan
- ✓ Perceived lack of resources
- ✓ Perceived loss of military career
- ✓ Domestic issues
- ✓ Financial issues
- ✓ Relationship problems
- ✓ Prior suicidal behavior
- ✓ Alcohol/drug abuse
- ✓ Sudden purchase of firearms/weapons
- ✓ Legal problems
- ✓ Depression/PTSD
- ✓ Traumatic childhood experiences

also told me leaders can be helpful to their Soldiers by being aware of symptoms of PTSD and making it a priority to get training and assistance for each Soldier. I believe my experiences have made me more sensitive to helping my Soldiers.

After six months, I lost more than 40 pounds and can run like the wind again; I feel terrific! Emotionally, I still have issues whenever someone mentions a Soldier’s death, but all in all I have recovered to a degree.

Who would have thought a Soldier could have a PTSD incident while running down the road in a garrison environment? I was running down Moye Road at about 0545 hours when all of a sudden three loud bursts of gunfire rang out. My heart felt like it stopped on the first burst. Then there was a second burst and then the third. My eyes began to water — I knew instantly what those three volleys were for. It was a firing squad from the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry rehearsing for a funeral support mission. I tried to continue running, but I found myself remembering that time and time again this has happened over the last four years.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in my opinion is not curable and will remain a part of my life forever. I am dealing with it by trying to replace any bad memories

with the great memories of those fallen comrades and what this life is because of their efforts.

We as leaders do not get trained on how to react to losing our Soldiers or even losing our fellow leaders during combat. We continue to learn and grow through the struggles of our current conflict. It’s an instinct to be a Warrior. It’s also an instinct to be saddened by the memories that come and go due to the loss of these great Americans. I am not able to develop the instinct to allow the memories of these events to disappear from my mind. Ms. Wilbanks explained that when these memories interfere with normal functioning or if the thoughts turn to suicide, to get help immediately.

As I sat in the 47th Infantry Regiment’s reunion last year, I talked to some of the heroes who fought in previous wars. I talked to them specifically about what I was feeling and going through on a daily basis.

The best words I heard were, “Never forget, but let it go.” I would add, “Never forget, get help, and let it go.”

Command Sergeant Major Samuel M. Rhodes, Sr., is currently serving as the brigade command sergeant major for the 192nd Infantry Brigade on Fort Benning, Georgia.

WHERE TO GET HELP

- National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder — (800) 296-6300 or <http://www.ncptsd.va.gov>
- Military One Source — (800) 342-9647 (If overseas precede number with U.S. access code)
- Military Mental Health Organization — www.mentalhealthscreening.org
- National Depression Screening Day — www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org (anonymous screening)
- Emergency call 911
- Chaplains, Troop Medical Clinics, Mental Health Providers, Emergency Rooms, and National Depression Screenings

CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

The Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment

MAJOR MARK S. LESLIE

“Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing forces, are of limited importance and are never the total conflict.”

— Roger Trinquier
Author of *Modern Warfare*

Cultural awareness is a term that has grown and morphed in the course of the global war on terrorism, and the actual meaning and the “*how can I implement this in actual combat*” and “*why this is important to me*” has been somewhat lost in the “big picture” in my opinion. Some Soldiers perceive cultural awareness training as another block to check during required pre-deployment training. This assumption is partly correct — it is mandated training. But if this is where the unit, or the Army as a whole, draws the line then we are significantly shortchanging our troops in their preparation for combat in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Cultural awareness training must be embraced by the unit early on in the train-up process and implemented in all echelons of training. Cultural

awareness is a combat multiplier in a COIN environment and its importance is relative to that of our combat skills training. Cultural awareness training should not be the training event that is sacrificed at the expense of time in the training schedule.

When most people think of cultural awareness training, they think of sitting in a classroom learning a litany of cultural do’s and do not’s. This may be a baseline and is the first step in the ladder of our real objective, which is cultural understanding. But, it is not cultural awareness training. Real cultural awareness training takes those do’s and do not’s, as well as history, geography, cultural nuances, and social norms and expands them into training at all echelons of training. For example, the task of conducting a cordon and search operation is given to a platoon. One way to integrate cultural awareness training would be to include role players (as civilians on the battlefield) who would react to the

A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment talks with some young citizens during a search for weapon caches in Iraq February 10, 2007.

Tech Sergeant Molly Dzitko, USAF






Figure 1 — The Cultural Awareness Pyramid

actions of the platoon based on social norms, etc. Then, the outcome and conduct of the exercise are based on the tactical decisions of the leader on the ground, who should incorporate cultural sensitivity and cultural awareness into the planning, preparation and execution of the mission. This cultivates and builds cultural understanding, which is our overall goal. If we place emphasis at all echelons on integrating cultural awareness into our thought process in a COIN environment, then we are successfully building cultural understanding and the impact it has on how we conduct warfare in a COIN environment. The ability to recognize the importance of cultural awareness in training, and therefore cultural understanding on the battlefield, can determine our actions on the battlefield and our success in a COIN fight. Our successes in sector are directly linked to how we conduct ourselves on a daily basis “outside the wire” in regards to the population. It is indisputable that the population is the center of gravity in a COIN fight, and therefore, our understanding of their culture and our attitude and demeanor in respect to that should be a significant factor that is taken into consideration in that fight.

An outstanding publication put out by the Combat Studies Institute, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries* by William D. Wunderle, provides us with some baseline of reference in relation to all things culture related:

Culture: A set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors. Culture is shaped by many factors including history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality. Culture evolves in response to various pressures and influences and is learned through socialization; it is not inherent. In short, a culture provides a lens through which its members see and understand the world.

In a military context, think of culture as simply another element of terrain, parallel to geographic terrain. Just as a hill or saddle affect a Soldier’s ability to maneuver, so can religion, perceptions, and language help military planners find centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, and assist in campaign planning and the proper allocation of resources.

Cultural Awareness: The ability to recognize and understand the effects of culture on people’s values and behaviors.

In the military context, cultural awareness can be defined as the “cognizance of cultural terrain in military operations and the connections between connections and war fighting.” Cultural awareness implies an understanding of the need to consider cultural terrain in military operations, a knowledge of which cultural factors are important for a given situation and why, and a specified level of understanding for a target culture.

At an elementary level, cultural awareness is information, the meaning humans assign to what they know about a culture. A principal task involved in acquiring cultural awareness is to collect cultural information and transform it by adding progressively greater meaning as understanding deepens.

The Primer goes on to explain cultural consideration, cultural knowledge, cultural understanding, and cultural competence, with a corresponding illustration that captures our goal in reference to cultural awareness/understanding training and implementation.

Cultural Consideration: (“how and why”) The incorporation of generic concepts in common military training – knowing how and why to study culture and where to find cultural factors and expertise.

Cultural Knowledge: (specific training) The exposure to the recent history of a target culture. It includes basic cultural issues such as significant groups, actors, leaders, and dynamic, as well as cultural niceties and survival language skills.

Cultural Understanding: (advanced training) This refers to a deeper awareness of the specific culture that allows general insight into thought processes, motivating factors, and other issues that directly support the military decision-making process.

Cultural Competence: (decision making and cultural intelligence) This is the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into military planning and decision making for current and future military operations. Cultural competence implies insight into the intentions of specific actors and groups.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes of the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division provided an excellent

example of cultural understanding and competence. LTC Hughes' actions were detailed in the book *Banking on Baghdad* by Edwin Black. His highly publicized use of cultural competence in Iraq is just one of many situations in our current war where understanding the culture has worked into the military decision-making process and influenced tactical actions in order to resolve a situation. In the case of LTC Hughes, his actions thwarted those of the insurgents, frustrating them and their efforts, and in the end, coerced and influenced local leaders into cooperation.

Many will argue that it is not the job of the Army to be culturally sensitive or aware, that we are an Army that destroys the enemy and moves on with the next mission. This is a false, naïve, and outdated assumption. General David H. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), put it into perspective well in a memo dated May 10, 2007, to all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen serving MNF-I. He wrote, "We are, indeed, warriors. We train to kill our enemies. We are engaged in combat, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly, and we must be violent at times. What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight, however, is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are warriors, we are also human beings."

Fair treatment of detainees is a given, considering all the negative press the actions of a few at Abu Ghraib have brought to our Army as well as the mountain of IO material that was provided to the enemy. What is interesting in this statement is that the treatment of noncombatants is specifically addressed. Once again, think of yourself as a "quasi-policeman." If the customer, the center of gravity, in this case the noncombatant Iraqi citizen, does not

trust us and we have not taken steps to gain his trust and develop a rapport – where does this leave us? The only way to win trust and develop a rapport is through an understanding of the culture and maybe even to embrace it to a certain degree. We are after all in their country. I had a colleague point out to me that it is not necessary for the Iraqis as a whole to like us or even consider us friends; what is important is for them to trust us and understand that their interests, safety, and well-being are our objectives. Counterinsurgency has been and will continue to be with us for a long time, inevitably. No, I am not advocating that major combat operations are a thing of the past; what I am proposing is that I believe that as long as we have major combat operations (MCOs) we will have smaller scale conflicts (SSCs) in the post-MCOs that are dominated by COIN.

Understanding that COIN and cultural awareness are inextricably linked is one of the first steps. In COIN, there is a lot of gray area; there is a lot of room for low-level leaders to make cultural mistakes that could affect the strategic level. This is known as the strategic corporal theory and is very valid throughout Iraq today. Therefore, in order to avoid these subtle mistakes and alienate ourselves from the center of gravity — the populace — we must teach our leaders a new way to think. Think of cultural considerations as a combat multiplier, force multiplier and a valid inject in the military decision making process. When he was developing Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, the late Colonel John Boyd said "Do not write it as a formula. Write it as a way to teach officers to think, to think in new ways about war. War is ever changing and men are fallible. Rigid rules simply won't work. Teach men to think." COIN is a thinking man's game.

Integrating cultural sensitivity considerations into our tactical exercises at all levels and into our operations on the battlefield is doing just that — teaching our leaders and Soldiers to think about a war that is ever changing and varies area of responsibility (AOR) by AOR and tour by tour.

Our use of cultural sensitivity in our daily interactions with Iraqis will be largely unnoticed on a daily basis. There will be no big battles, no great revelations, and therefore, a limited feeling of success. But cultural competence is paramount in a COIN fight. Our character and perseverance is the key to success. Colonel T.E. Lawrence, one of the greatest and most legendary Arab advisors of all time, characterizes the power of influence and the embodiment of cultural understanding in his book *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. He said, "I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to



Sergeant Jeffrey Alexander

A Soldier with the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment talks with an Iraqi man through an interpreter during the opening of a gas station in Baghdad.




Figure 2 — Arab Loyalties Model

think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England in her war. If I could not assume their character, I could at least conceal my own, and pass among them without evident friction, neither a discord nor a critic but an unnoticed influence.” Is that not the ultimate goal in a counterinsurgency — to pass among the populace without friction as an unnoticed influence? The center of the gravity is the populace, and the only way to pass among the population with little as little friction and as nonabrasively as possible is to be not only somewhat tolerant of their culture and social norms but actually embrace certain aspects of their culture to endear yourself to the populace itself.


This is a tall order. As mostly non-Muslims and Arabs as a whole, we are very low on the Arab Loyalties Model (See Figure 2). Although not perfect, this model serves as a good lens into the mind of the population and our adversaries in Iraq.

Is it possible for us to move up higher in this model, even though we do not meet many of the criteria on this model? Yes, it has been done numerous times by many of our leaders at all levels during the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. My fellow advisors and I felt that while we were never considered “Iraqis,” we were considered part of an extended family. How did this happen? Because the Iraqis saw that although we could be violent and were absolutely relentless in our pursuit of the enemy, we were passionate about the welfare of the citizens in our sector, the welfare of the families of our Iraqi soldiers, and were compassionate to the plight of the population. We took risks of not engaging known insurgents in order to prevent harm to the populace. We also took precautions to ensure those that provided us information were protected and cared for. When our Iraqi soldiers were killed, we ensured their benefits were paid to the families and at the advice of our interpreters, bought sheep and presented them to the families of the soldiers. Our area was largely

rural and this was considered an honorable thing to do in that area. I had never been formally instructed on the proper way to buy sheep, nor had the Iraqi local sheep “vendors” ever seen an American drive up and buy sheep and stuff them in a HMMWV for transport. But once the haggling was initiated, the price negotiated, and the word of our deeds spread through the community, our reputation as compassionate warriors who could be trusted grew — therefore our intelligence grew from local sources, and the detention of actual verified insurgents grew. This is just a small example of the how and why of cultural awareness is important and is a combat multiplier.

One of the Iraqi populace’s greatest causes of concern, and the American Soldier’s cause of concern, is the escalation of force. Rarely in a COIN environment will there be an easy call in regards to deadly force. There are

Figure 3



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Crowd Action	Nonlethal Response			
Unarmed Civilians	Command Presence/PSYOP - Ensure that the on-site commander of the TPT directs the broadcast of the dispersal proclamation and/or passes handbills. - Escalate the tone of the dispersal proclamation from information to a warning of force.	Show of Force - Display force along with escalating the dispersal proclamation. - Display force in a graduated manner, such as a helicopter hovering over a crowd or soldiers with charged weapons. - Exploit the psychological effect of a show of force.	Demonstration of Force - Do not demonstrate force toward unarmed civilians.	Riot Control Means (if approved) - Employ RCAs at the point of penetration. - Use PSYOP to exploit the psychological effect. - Move through the crowd using riot control formations and movement techniques.
Armed Civilians (knives, clubs)			- Display force along with escalating the dispersal proclamation. - Highlight the target pointer. - Demonstrate sniper precision strike capabilities.	
Armed Crowds/Military (firearms)				- Do not use RCAs—they may escalate the situation.
Hostile intent/hostile act occurs by armed threat.				
Crowd Action	Lethal Response			
Unarmed Civilians	Sniper Response - Ensure that target leaders or troublemakers are targeted. - Use the minimum response necessary. - Exploit the psychological effect of an attack.	Small Arms Direct Fire - Determine that sniper attack is insufficient. - Consider demonstrating capabilities. - Exploit the psychological effect of a lethal response. - Escalate gradually, starting with a small caliber, single round and work up to a large caliber, automatic.	Aerial Fires - Determine that small arms direct fire is ineffective. - Use the minimum response necessary. - Use a minimal precision strike initially; use subsequent fires based on the situation. - Exploit the psychological impact of each strike.	Indirect Fires - Determine that air assets are unavailable or ineffective. - Use the minimum response necessary. - Ensure that the response is directed by the on-site commander.
Armed Civilians (knives, clubs)			- CAS/indirect fires must be authorized by the MACOM commander. - Consider requesting permission for use when— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All lesser means have been ineffective. • There are physical eyes on target. • Proximity to civilians has been considered. • Risk to friendly forces/evacuees outweighs the risk of collateral damage. 	
Armed Civilians/Military (firearms)				

Figure 4 — Sample GRM Card

many factors that determine the use of force in Iraq, and not just deadly force since any force can cause a rift in the populace. While this article is not about rules of engagement (ROE) or the escalation of force, I think it is paramount and would be negligent not to discuss it in relation to cultural awareness.

In his book, *Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, author Hy S. Rothstein states: “The pursuit of attrition efficiencies against an irregular enemy can only be damaging to one’s own cause ... by producing collateral damage, antagonizing the population, increasing the ranks of the enemy, and eventually

demoralizing one’s own forces as a result of increasingly well-coordinated attacks generated by an increasingly hostile population.”

This passage highlights the importance of precision and controlled fires, and meeting escalation of force is an issue that is ingrained at all levels of leadership in our training. As an Army, we often place great value on firepower and a show of strength. And arguably so, this is an appropriate response to force. But graduated response is a better way and simply having it available to us does not make it the appropriate tool. A visual representation of meeting force with the

appropriate force is sometimes useful in conveying a message to the troops. Meeting force with the appropriate measure of force is critical in a COIN fight in order to not alienate the population even further. Figures 3 and 4 are two examples of escalation of force modules. Figure 3 is a civilian model designed by Jim Wagner, a world renowned law enforcement and military instructor. It is a good model and has applications that, although not designed for military use and are not cookie cutter solutions for Iraq, they could be a base line for Soldiers at the individual level. Figure 4 is a graduated response matrix (GRM) card from FM 3-19.15, *Civil Disturbance Operations*. This GRM is a sample and could be modified at the battalion or brigade levels to fit specific needs. A GRM should be war-gamed, molded and developed to fit each unit’s individual conditions in respect to the nature of enemy attacks, rapport with the local populace, as well as the cultural and social considerations unique to their area. A reevaluation of this matrix based on events and proper measure of effectiveness (MOE) would be recommended at the battalion level. It is important to remember the IO campaign plan when developing this matrix in order to capitalize on our efforts to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. Proper use of force creates a tremendous amount of stress on Soldiers and leaders alike. The proper development of a graduation of force ladder assists in the mitigation of this stress. This makes the populace safer, and in the end – Soldiers safer by gaining the trust and respect of the Iraqi people.

The enemy in Iraq succeeds daily in their goal of engaging us in attrition-based warfare while they slowly strengthen their lines of communication with the center of gravity in a COIN fight — the Iraqi populace. We must do all we can to discard the idea that this war is about simply killing the enemy. Without a doubt, that is a micro part of our objective, but the real mission is gaining the confidence of the Iraqi people in their government and strengthening the lines of communication between them, their government, and us. This cannot be done without some degree of cultural awareness and cultural understanding. Some ways we can achieve this are by integrating cultural sensitivity into

our training and our combat operations.

* **Cultural awareness training:** Soldiers must know, understand, and be able to effectively integrate what is the social norm in theater.

* **Language training:** This is an invaluable skill that serves a unit well throughout the tour. Every unit has its language training challenges. Be innovative. Some Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington, have realized the importance of this skill and have accepted risk in some areas to capitalize on this combat multiplier. Knowing some of the language and body language helps break down social and cultural barriers.

* **Leader training:** Develop scenario-based vignettes and exercises involving escalation of force. Develop and implement negotiation training and arbitration at all levels of training. Our leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan are going to have to do this on a daily basis in some form or another. Why not give them the proper tools to do so? A surprising number of civilian courses have a plethora of information that can be applicable and have utility in Iraq if looked at through the lens of cultural awareness.

* **Rules of engagement and escalation of force training:** ROE and EOF vignettes are culturally sensitive. Soldiers may have to make a life or death decision within moments. Understanding ROE and EOF enhances the Soldier's ability to make the right decision. Rehearse these prior to every mission.

* **Diversify training events:** Integrate ROE, EOF, role-playing, and civilians on the battlefield into all tactical exercises. Ensure there are consequences for cultural blunders and blatantly disregarding cultural social considerations in the planning and execution phase.

* **Draw the line:** Emphasize that cultural sensitivity in no way jeopardizes the lives of Soldiers. Ensure that Soldiers understand that sometimes tactical decisions that are not culturally sensitive must be made, but that is the exception rather than the norm. Care towards civilians and treating them with dignity and respect is "the culture of our organization."

* **Information Operations (IO) training:** IO training at all levels ensures that this powerful tool in a COIN environment is adequately utilized throughout our organization. Know that IO is the name of the game and integrate it into our daily operations. "Knowing your neighborhood" is essential in the IO plan. As an example at the micro level, while I was an advisor, in our AOR there were no local newspapers, etc., and the local populace was hungry for printed material. One of my NCOs was a big NASCAR fan. While looking at some photos one day, we came up with the idea of enlarging sector-specific IO products and pasting them all over our vehicles and our Iraqi vehicles. While the appearance was rather "unmilitary looking" in a traditional sense (they resembled a NASCAR car with the sponsor logos), the response was overwhelming from the locals. They actually read our vehicles while at halts, on security, etc., and subsequently provided us valuable intelligence based off this.

* **Every Soldier is a sensor:** This is almost a cliché now, but a

In our Army today, there is no excuse to deploy culturally ignorant. There are multitudes of tools, models and assets at our disposal as leaders.

true one. Intelligence information in a COIN fight is more often than not garnered through personal relationships. Verbal engagements are more common than kinetic engagements. Debriefings are critical to reaping the rewards.

* **Civil Affairs training:** Pre-deployment training on public works, animal husbandry, waste disposal process, etc., are essential. While no one expects us as infantry Soldiers to be masters of these tasks, general knowledge can and will give

you a point of reference to base ideas, thoughts, and most importantly – solutions – off of. Although Columbus, Georgia, and Clarksville, Tennessee, are not Baghdad, the local cities in the area can provide you with a working model to base "nation builder" duties off of. Attending a local city meeting may seem a far cry from what you will be doing in Iraq, but the same principal as above applies – working model.

* **Embrace the culture:** This is difficult for most but not impossible. Understanding the Iraqi people, the center of gravity in our fight, is a combat multiplier. Knowing the history, cultural norms, and social norms enhances understanding and reinforces the belief that they are not the enemy — the insurgents are the enemy. Assimilate local customs and sensibilities as closely as possible.

In our Army today, there is no excuse to deploy culturally ignorant. There are multitudes of tools, models, and assets at our disposal as leaders. Tools such as Rosetta Stone, Army Continuing education classes on Arabic, and Internet resources such as the 11th Infantry Regiment's Web site dedicated to cultural awareness (<https://www.benning.army.mil/11th/culture/culture.asp>) are just a few examples. Our imagination is all that limits us in our ability to train our Soldiers effectively in preparation for the rigors of combat. Traditional warfighting skills are important as ever and are not meant to be marginalized by cultural awareness. The next step in progression in the level of difficulty is obviously the integration of the cultural factors that so often determine defeat or failure in a COIN fight. To disregard the implications of cultural ignorance or the inability to be culturally savvy is to place not only the mission of victory in Iraq in jeopardy but also our most precious asset – the lives of those in our charge, our Soldiers.

Let there be no misconception that I understand we are engaged in deadly combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet we must temper that necessary violence in a COIN fight with cultural awareness, cultural understanding, and ultimately cultural competence. For as Clausewitz said: "*The people are everything in war.*"

Major Mark S. Leslie is the chief of Training for the Stryker Transformation Team at Fort Benning. Leslie is a veteran of Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. He has served as a Long Range Surveillance team leader, Ranger instructor and commander of A Company and HHC, 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, and as the Senior Iraqi Army Advisor for 2-7 CAV, 1CD.

THE MORTAR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM

DAVID SUPER AND TRAVIS KUNDEL

In 2004, the M95/M96 Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS) was fielded to the 1st Cavalry Division in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. The M95 MFCS is used with the 120mm mortar vehicle and primarily consists of the commander's interface computer, gunner's display, driver's display, and a navigation suite. The M96 MFCS is used in the fire direction center (FDC) and consists primarily of the commander's interface computer. The system gives the battalion's mortar platoon increased overall accuracy, responsiveness, survivability, and lethality. MFCS allows the battalion's heavy mortar platoon to perform technical fire direction via the commander's interface computer. This digitalized system lets MFCS integrate into

the digital fires network through the existing SINCGARS radio suite. MFCS is compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). MFCS uses an accurate pointing device which eliminates the need for aiming posts and sights as the primary method of lay. The driver's display allows the driver to rough lay the mortar carrier. Finally, the gunner's display lets the gunner know where the mortar tube is actually laid. MFCS is currently fielded in the M1064A3 Mortar Carrier (M113) and M1129 Stryker Mortar Carrier.

MFCS can conduct final protective fires (FPF), precision registrations, grid, polar

plot, and shift missions. It conducts fratricide checks, stores meteorological messages and safety fans as well. MFCS allows the FDC to quickly and accurately change sheafs to fit the tactical situation. These sheafs include linear, open, parallel, converged, and special sheafs.

MFCS first saw operational experience in the battles in Najaf and Fallujah in 2004. In all instances, MFCS gave the maneuver commanders confidence in the system. One battalion fire support officer said the 120s (MFCS) were so good, that the Marines requested 120mm mortar support in lieu of using their own organic 81mm mortars.

All interviewees were impressed with the accuracy of MFCS. One company commander reflected upon his unit's conduct of a deliberate attack when they

received more enemy resistance than expected.

The unit, pulled back and called in the battalion's 120mm mortar platoon. He

The Mortar Fire Control System is currently fielded in the M1064A3 Mortar Carrier (M113) and M1129 Stryker Mortar Carrier.

Courtesy photo





Courtesy photo

The Mortar Fire Control System gives the battalion's mortar platoon increased overall accuracy, responsiveness, survivability, and lethality.

was amazed at the accuracy of the MFCS. The mortars destroyed the enemy position within meters of the target location. In Najaf, one maneuver platoon leader commented that within a round or two of adjustment on a target of opportunity, the mortars accurately converged on the targeted building with great success. MFCS significantly reduces the circular error probable (CEP) of the 120mm mortar systems. One of the capabilities of MFCS is the use of meteorological conditions (MET) to account for nonstandard conditions. This allows MFCS to be more accurate. One mortar platoon leader said, "...with a good MET it has been steel on target for us." The same platoon leader said, "We have primarily fired illum missions with it, and the sheafs have been picture perfect." Another Soldier said, "MFCS allows for greater accuracy than we've ever had and that equates to immediately suppressing and destroying the enemy."

MFCS enhances responsiveness for maneuver commanders, especially with the ability of the system to conduct hip shoots in less than a minute. In Fallujah, mortars were extensively used, in part because mortars are the battalion commander's organic fire support system. Additionally, with howitzers located more than 10 kilometers away, communications were difficult, especially when conducting urban operations. Artillery's role was further complicated by its tactical mission of general-support reinforcement, which slowed responsiveness. MFCS allows the maneuver commander to receive fire for effect in a substantially less amount of time than through the previous method of fire control which required use of a plotting board, aiming posts, and sight units.

Survivability is increased by use of MFCS. The ability to conduct hip shoots in less than minute means not only can the mortars emplace in a short amount of time, but they can also displace quickly. If a fire direction center is taken out of action, any gun can easily fulfill the FDC role as required.

Several Soldiers commented that the lethality of the 120mm mortar was excellent, especially in an urban environment. Improved accuracy results in less time taken to adjust rounds provided the observer's target location is accurate. Numerous

Soldiers commented they preferred using 120's in urban operations because of its accuracy compared with 81mm or 60mm mortars. MFCS has enabled the 120mm mortar to become more lethal based on its improved accuracy, responsiveness, and survivability. While MFCS has enabled 120mm mortars to become much more effective and accurate, the system will not make 120mm mortar ammunition precise enough to destroy high value point targets with minimal collateral damage. For these applications against lightly armored vehicles, bunkers, and buildings, where "one shot, one kill" is required, mortar users still need the Precision Guided Mortar Munition.

The Mortar Fire Control System is managed by the office of the Product Manager (PM) for Mortar Systems. In response to the 1995 MFCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD), PM Mortars developed an evolutionary development strategy to field the full required functionality. The MFCS hardware was baselined when the system was type classified standard in April 2003. The full functionality of the MFCS software will be achieved through development and release of 5 Versions of software. Because MFCS is a core system in Army Software Blocking (ASB), releases of MFCS software versions are accomplished concurrently with ASB releases. MFCS Version 4 is slated to be released with Army Software Block 2 in FY 2007. Through Version 4, MFCS software incorporates: all basic mortar firing missions, digital MET, interface with FBCB2, fire support coordination measures, digital communication, the NATO ballistic kernel, and the ballistic kernel for the most recently fielded U.S. mortar rounds. MFCS Version 5, which will be released with ASB 3, will incorporate all of Version 4 plus multiple safety fans, search and traverse, the XM395 Precision Guided Mortar Munition, and the dismantled 120mm MFCS.

The MFCS program is fully funded and will be fully fielded by the end of FY 2008 to all heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams in both the active force and National Guard. PM Mortars is currently qualifying a dismantled variant of MFCS which will be integrated with the M120 120mm towed mortar. This MFCS variant, called the XM150 Dismounted 120mm MFCS, will be used in conjunction with the M1101 trailer and the Quick Stow device which will be mounted on the trailer. The Quick Stow will enable the mortar crew to rapidly emplace and displace the M120 towed mortar. Qualification of the dismantled 120mm MFCS will be completed in early FY 2008. Fielding of this system to infantry brigade combat teams will begin in FY 2009. The XM150 Dismounted MFCS will enhance the IBCTs ability to deliver more accurate, responsive, and lethal 120mm mortar fires.

Honeywell Aerospace Electronic Systems in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is the systems integrator responsible for systems procurement, staging, and fielding. The Life Cycle Software Engineering Center, located at the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, is responsible for software development.

David Super is the Deputy Product Manager for Mortar Systems, at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.

Travis Kundel is employed by Honeywell Aerospace Electronic Systems and works on-site in the Office of the Product Manager for Mortar Systems.

SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN BUHRIZ

CAPTAIN LARRY SHARP

Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specific situation. In choosing a solution to a tactical problem, applicable laws and regulations, the mission, the laws of physics, human behavior, and logistic realities constrain the tactician, not standardized techniques and procedures. The true test of the tactician's solution is not whether it uses the specific techniques or procedures contained in this manual, but whether the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situation.

— FM 3-90, *Tactics*

In January 2006 my company assumed responsibility for the southern half of Baqubah, the largest city in Iraq's Diyala Province (Figure 1). Our battalion was charged with preparing an Iraqi Army brigade to assume the security lead and for setting the conditions for provincial government control in Diyala. My company's mission was to disrupt a Sunni-based insurgency to give the Iraqi Police and Army space and time to develop capabilities and assume the security lead. As I deployed my company, my biggest challenge was in focusing our combat power into tactical operations against an asymmetric opponent in a decentralized fight.

The conventional Army is manned, equipped, and trained to rapidly find, fix, and destroy other conventional forces. When we find ourselves facing an enemy who can readily blend in to an opaque society, we are challenged to affect a decisive outcome. Because we cannot readily discriminate friend from foe in this environment, we look towards indigenous security forces to overcome this limitation. However, until those forces are adequately manned, trained, and equipped to do the job, we must intervene to provide them space and time to mature. It is in this period that discrete application of combat power against the enemy's vulnerabilities is critical.

We have been fighting a number of opposition groups in Iraq. While each has unique agendas and goals, they all appear to have at least one common operational goal, namely the premature exit



Figure 1

of U.S. forces from Iraq. This translates into a common set of tactics against coalition forces and leads to difficulty in modeling and predicting enemy activity in Iraq. However, an accurate accounting and analysis of both enemy and friendly patterns can lead to useful assumptions that allow us to shape operations that decisively attack the enemy's vulnerabilities.

My company consisted of two organic mechanized infantry platoons, the battalion mortar platoon, and one armor platoon with an engineer squad. We had M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks. All platoons were also motorized with M1114 armored trucks and 25 to 30 Soldiers. We supplied two platoons a day to protect the force, and we fielded two platoons a day for offensive operations.

Our area of operation included the boroughs of Tahrir and Katoon and the village of Buhriz. Unlike Tahrir and Katoon, Buhriz is an independent municipality with its own mayor, city council, and police department. It also serves as the administrative seat for the Buhriz Nahia which extends many kilometers south. (The Nahia is an administrative district similar to the county in the U.S.) Buhriz, which is a largely conservative Sunni agriculture community, is generally poor. The people earn their living through the palm groves which produce dates, oranges, and other fruit and from grain raised on irrigated farmlands. There is no industry or service economy aside from small shops in the central market area. Major infrastructure such as roads, power, water, and sewer are poorer than in neighboring Baqubah.

The village is isolated geographically by a dense palm grove

and the Diyala River on the west, and by irrigated farmland on the east (Figure 2). A wide irrigation canal runs north-south and splits the village. East-west traffic is constricted to three bridges large enough to support vehicles and to a handful of pedestrian bridges. Within the village traffic is constricted to narrow, paved and gravel roads. A paved road runs the length of the village on the west side of the canal. Because of profuse irrigation canals, the village is accessible by only a few roads: the primary road in the north and the south, and by three improved gravel roads running to the east. Traffic is controlled by permanent checkpoints at the extreme north and south of the village, but internally is unregulated. Historically, the village had been a zone of support for various Sunni insurgent groups and the site of numerous firefights, engagements, and uprisings. Most notably was the downing of an American helicopter in 2004.

The Buhriz police were understrength and poorly trained. Barely capable of defending their station, they rarely patrolled the village. The checkpoints at the north and south of town were manned by officers from Baqubah traffic department and their guard mount constituted the only regular non-coalition patrols through town. The original police station had been attacked and completely destroyed in 2004, and the southernmost checkpoint was frequently attacked and on several occasions completely destroyed.

We were challenged to paint a coherent picture of the enemy in Buhriz. Solid intelligence on enemy activity there proved difficult to obtain. External reporting was at best vague and often wildly inaccurate and unverifiable. We inherited a robust human intelligence program from the previous unit; however, their vetting system was largely intuitive. While they were extremely proactive and detained many low-level terrorists and criminals, they had not accurately tied activity in Buhriz with a larger insurgency. Recurring reports from sources and contacts indicated that large groups of armed men massed after curfew to attack the Iraqi Police positions. Finally,

Marginalizing him (the enemy) from the society he hides amongst is the surest route to victory. This entails building and protecting a number of complementary effects within that society.

the enemy routinely employed roadside bombs in Buhriz, but they were not as effective as in other areas in the province.

Several assumptions drove my tactical analysis. First, the enemy can afford a stalemate because time is on his side. He is here for the rest of his life, but we can't stay indefinitely. Our operational reach in Iraq is virtually equivalent to the amount of time our Nation will keep us there. No other factor limits us to the extent of this great unknown. History, however, guarantees that two things will shorten this reach: unacceptable U.S. casualties and abuse of U.S. firepower. Because of this, effective attacks are more valuable for the enemy than us and ineffective or inaccurate attacks are more prejudicial to us than the enemy. The details of every American casualty and every botched operation are published in every major American newspaper, whereas most enemy die anonymously and enemy attacks with no effects are underreported even by us. The result significantly limits the amount of risk

we are willing to take, and it limits the available kinetic options at our disposal while the enemy is relatively unfettered.

Marginalizing him from the society he hides amongst is the surest route to victory. This entails building and protecting a number of complementary effects within that society. In this sense fighting the enemy is only necessary when he threatens our effects. We do not necessarily have to destroy him when it will suffice to merely disrupt him. This is a much easier tactical task.

My METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians) analysis resulted in four effects objectives that served as the framework for all company operations:

- Ø Fix and destroy the enemy when and where he exposes himself;
- Ø Develop Iraqi security forces (ISF) to assume basic security and law enforcement operations;
- Ø Foster local popular confidence in the ISF; and
- Ø Capture or kill enemy leadership and resources with combined operations.

I wanted to relate all company operations back to one or more of these objectives. Because of its independent nature and because of its reputation as a Sunni stronghold, I chose to focus my company's effort in Buhriz. While we continued to comprehend the enemy structure and target his leadership and support element, we nonetheless had to

confront the real danger posed by the reports of forces massing in Buhriz. To confirm or deny these reports we reconnoitered at night. The restrictive terrain favored our truck mobile platoons. During the day we trained the IPs and canvassed the neighborhoods to acquire solid intelligence.

Our first two direct fire engagements were in Buhriz (Figure 2). The first was from elevated positions near the central market area. There the enemy attacked with machine guns as the platoon crossed a bridge. The platoon immediately returned fire, and the platoon leader pushed across the bridge and south to escape. From there he was unable to flank the enemy with his trucks,



Figure 2

and by the time he led his squad afoot to maneuver on the enemy they broke contact and evaded capture.

Less than a month later, another platoon was moving north through the village when the enemy engaged it with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and machine-gun fire. The platoon attempted to maneuver on the enemy, but could not precisely locate the foe. Then the enemy detonated a roadside bomb near one of the trucks and engaged the platoon with a machine gun. The platoon leader attempted to fix the enemy and maneuver on it with his squads, but again the enemy was able to break contact.

Neither engagement proved decisive for us because the enemy combined an early warning system, with a disciplined engagement criteria and a calculated withdrawal plan that set the conditions in his favor. In both instances the enemy attacked four armored gun trucks at night. The enemy surprised the patrol with a direct fire attack, the platoon reacted aggressively and attempted to maneuver on the foe, but they evaded the platoon in the restrictive terrain and suffered no apparent damage.

To change the dynamics, the company before us had experimented with infiltrating snipers into key terrain, but they were unable to do so clandestinely. Because they couldn't gain surprise, the enemy refused to commit while the snipers were in place. While this suppressed enemy activity, the company could not sustain them for more than a few days and so achieved no long term effects. They also tried committing more firepower by

employing Bradley fighting vehicle sections. The Bradley's firepower advantage was offset by its lack of mobility in the narrow streets and along the irrigation canal. This neither decreased attacks nor netted decisive engagements because the enemy retained the initiative and decided when and how to engage.

I intended to decisively and consistently defeat the enemy at night on his own turf. This would neutralize the Sunni resistance threat, provide operating room for the beleaguered Iraqi police, and provide us with a positive IO message which we could leverage during the day. The challenge then was: how to circumvent his early warning and engagement criteria to get him to commit when we could decisively maneuver on and destroy him.

We began to model and track the enemy's intent and engagement criteria. Our assumptions from his patterns indicated:

Ø His intent was to set the conditions for attacks that he could leverage in a prolonged IO campaign. Complete success for him was a catastrophic kill that destroyed a coalition vehicle, killed Soldiers, or elicited a gross overreaction on our part. Direct participation with small arms was critical to his ethos and his IO campaign. Partial success was to periodically engage us without sustaining any losses. Failure for him was no attacks.

Ø The enemy concealed sentries in houses near all mounted approaches to Buhriz, and these sentries used cell phones to communicate with the ambush position.

Ø Because of its symbolic importance the enemy was more



Staff Sergeant Stacy L. Pearsall, USAF

Soldiers react to a situation while on foot patrol in Buhriz in February 2007.

likely to attack Thursday or Friday night. (I never determined if the so called "Fight Nights" on Thursday and Friday were factual or anecdotal. A previous S2 suggested that over the course of a year no night or nights incur more attacks than others.)

Ø The enemy was more likely to attempt to attack us after a successful non-kinetic operation.

Ø He would use the same engagement areas consistently.

Ø The enemy would not engage patrols larger than a certain number of trucks.

As a result we implemented the following control measures:

Ø Our platoon's mission in Buhriz after curfew was: Destroy enemy forces massing in Buhriz to neutralize their influence and provide ISF freedom of maneuver.

Ø Frequent daytime reconnaissance of likely enemy engagement areas both mounted and on foot to familiarize the platoons with the area.

Ø From Sunday to Wednesday night we deployed another platoon to a nearby neighborhood, either to the north or to the south. While both patrols had separate missions, they stood ready to maneuver to and reinforce each other.

Ø Platoons deployed their rifle squads to clear through likely engagement areas on foot.

Ø Patrols would only engage confirmed enemy locations and observe suspected and likely locations. (The intent was to minimize collateral damage and avoid gross overreactions.)

Ø No platoon operations on Thursday and Friday nights or after non-kinetic operations. On these nights we coordinated one or two platoons and the company headquarters.

My concept for the company operations was to leverage our organic Raven small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) in conjunction with two platoons maneuvering in Buhriz. The company headquarters with three trucks usually set in position first and we launched the Raven from the edge of town. Another platoon with four trucks would move to a blocking position. Then, as the third platoon of four trucks entered town, we would attempt to locate enemy ambush positions and maneuver our forces on them. After several

iterations we became proficient with our Raven SUAV, but we were unable to make contact with the enemy.

We concluded that either the enemy had relocated to another area or that the enemy's early warning was sophisticated enough to detect our intent. Occasional night attacks against the southernmost police checkpoint convinced us that he was still there, but the police could never convey where they came from or where they went after the attack. To defeat the early warning, we scaled down the operation to a single platoon with four trucks, and the headquarters with three trucks ready to maneuver and support. With each operation we pushed our Raven launch site further from town, and still we netted no significant contact. On the last night we ran this operation, our platoon in town found a roadside bomb, but no fighters. In retrospect I believe that it was virtually impossible to hide our signature from his sentries. Shortly after this patrol, we handed Buhriz over to another company, and the IA took the security lead in Baqubah. The battalion assumed operational overwatch and we focused on QRF support to the IA, select combined raids, and daytime non-kinetic operations.

While we never achieved my intent of decisively beating the enemy on his own turf at night, we nonetheless forced the enemy to failure through a careful analysis of his patterns and by leveraging his triggers against him. Never once did the enemy engage us when we were implementing this plan.

This allowed us to do several things. First and foremost it gave us immeasurable clout with the Buhriz police. As the weeks progressed, we worked closely together first teaching them marksmanship and then more complex tactical skills. As we proved the enemy was unwilling to challenge us, the police grew bolder. Soon they accompanied us on daytime patrols and a few select raids. At the same time, we promoted them with the people of Buhriz. By linking our success to them it increased the number of citizen contacts coming to the police with intelligence. This provided both a positive measure of popular confidence in the institution and a source of intelligence to drive future operations.

The other benefit was directly with the

people of Buhriz. Immediately they noticed our subtle approach and appreciated both our controlled operations and the general decrease in violence. This lent us credibility with the civil authorities, and allowed us to restart some sidetracked projects. Finally, our success gave the battalion commander leverage with the local Sheiks. In this sense he was able to negotiate several deals between the tribes to further our cause. In the end we managed to effectively transition the gap between coalition and Iraqi security lead in Buhriz through our discrete application of combat power and by carefully setting the conditions for decisive engagements.

Focusing your available combat power and setting the conditions for successful tactical operations takes a great deal of analysis and consideration. Remember to define the effects you want to generate in your area. Get all your assets into the fight, and fight for the esoteric ones. Some assets that I could have used included: signal detection equipment to confirm or deny the capability of his early warning capability, tactical UAVs to reinforce my limited reconnaissance stealth UAV, and an Iraqi army close target reconnaissance team to report clandestinely from inside town.

Your METT-TC analysis has to consider the enemy's intent and scheme of maneuver. Don't just look at what he might or can do. Consider what he needs to win, and look at how he loses. Assess his tactical triggers, and update your model with every engagement. Then you are ready to develop a scheme of maneuver to defeat him. As FM 3-90 reminds us:

Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelligent, and decisive use of combat power in an environment of uncertainty, disorder, violence, and danger. A commander wins by being on the offense, initiating combat on his own terms — at a time and place of his choosing.

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OPERATION AL HASN

Planning and Executing a Full-Spectrum Operation in the Afghan Theater Today

MAJOR SCOTT T. MCGLEISH
MAJOR DARIN J. BLATT
CAPTAIN PETER G. FISCHER

OVERVIEW

In 2005, members of a Special Operations task force conducted an offensive operation in the Tagab Valley located in the southeastern corner of the Kapisa Province in central Afghanistan. This assault sent insurgent fighters into nearby Pakistan to escape the coalition offensive. Once the coalition troops stabilized the security situation in the Tagab Valley, they shifted to other parts of the theater leaving the valley undefended. By the fall of 2006, insurgent Taliban fighters had returned to the Tagab Valley from Pakistan and had firmly regained control. The Tagab Valley was as deadly in September 2006 as it was before the 2005 offensive. Local leaders reported to coalition forces that there were almost 500 Taliban fighters living in the area, some of whom had trained at one of the three nearby suicide bomber training facilities. Tagab Valley residents symbolically burned humanitarian assistance (HA) drops of blankets and winter clothing in the southern portion of the valley only weeks before the cold winter months. Taliban fighters littered the Kohi Safi Mountains which separate the Tagab Valley from Bagram Airfield with weapons caches and fighting positions to fire on coalition forces (CF). Up until this past November, coalition ground convoys could not pass through the valley without receiving small arms fire as part of a series of pre-planned ambushes. The Tagab Valley, running 40 kilometers north to south only 60 miles northeast of Kabul, was an ideal safe haven from which Taliban commanders could project suicide bombers and other insurgent activity into nearby Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, and Kapisa (See Figure 1). Clearly, a stable and peaceful Tagab would have significant effects on the security of central Afghanistan.

Special Operations Task Force 33 (SOTF-33) from the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), worked hand-in-hand with the Kapisa Provincial Governor and soldiers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Special Operations Task Force 8 (TF-8) to bring long-term stability to the Tagab Valley. On October 31, 2006, these partners began Operation Al Hasn (Arabic for “fortress” or “castle”) as a joint, multinational, multi-agency operation designed to clear, hold, and build the Tagab Valley against the insurgency. The operation featured more than 1,000 Soldiers and policeman from the Afghan National Security Forces Afghanistan National Police (ANP)/Afghanistan Border Patrol (ABP), TF-8, four Operational Detachments -Alpha (ODAs), Other Government Agencies (OGAs), and Afghanistan National Army




Figure 1

(ANA) personnel, which operated under the command and control of SOTF-33.

PLANNING AS A PARTNERSHIP

“This is the first time that the government of Afghanistan has been involved in all phases of the operation. This is the way that operation(s) should be conducted.”

— **Kapisa Province Governor Satar Murad,**
November 8, 2006

SOTF-33, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ashley, rotated into Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom IX. SOTF-33 established a strong partnership with TF-8 whose leader, Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Al Ottabi, was eager to apply his country’s significant assets where they could be most effective in stabilizing Afghanistan. Immediately after SOTF-33 transitioned into Afghanistan, SOTF-33 and TF-8 planners recognized the strategic importance of denying the Taliban Tagab Valley as a safe haven. With this in mind, SOTF-33 and TF-8 began to create a friendly network to degrade the Taliban network

Successful counterinsurgency operations separate the insurgent from the populace. Today, special operations forces in Afghanistan must empower Afghan governmental agencies to separate the civilians from the insurgents and minimize the impact of those insurgents on the legitimate government organizations.

in the valley. This required the identification of key friendly personalities with whom SOTF-33 and TF-8 could build their alliance. SOTF-33 and TF-8 understood that the key to success for long-term stability in the Kapisa Province was empowering the Afghan officials in the province. With similar Islamic cultural norms and streamlined financial support procedures, TF-8 had the unique ability to build almost instant rapport with local Afghan leaders. LTC Nasser had developed a relationship with the Kapisa Governor Satar Murad and recommended he personally participate in the planning operations to deny Taliban use of the Tagab Valley. In September 2006, LTC Ashley, LTC Nasser, and Governor Murad met at the UAE compound to discuss the future security of the Tagab Valley.

From the first planning sessions, Governor Murad and officials from SOTF-33 and TF-8 agreed that bringing stability to Tagab was not exclusively a military matter. Instead, this was a battle that must be won by the local legitimate government. Long-term success in the Tagab Valley requires tangible demonstrations of the Afghan government's commitment to security and stability in the region. The government of Afghanistan (GOA) would do more than provide symbolic ownership; it would bear the leadership mantle for this operation.

SOTF-33, TF-8, and the regional Afghan leaders began to plan an operation to clear the insurgents from the valley, hold a lasting security posture, and build legitimate government structures capable of combating an insurgent threat over the long-term. SOTF-33 conducted the U.S. military decision-making process (MDMP) to include both Afghan partners and TF-8. This challenged U.S. planners accustomed to tightly structured MDMP. Elements of the planning that might take minutes for a U.S. staff to accomplish, took significantly

longer when working in a combined/interagency environment with partners not accustomed to MDMP. Moreover, the GOA leaders were forced to divide their attentions between operational planning and their governing duties. Despite these challenges, SOTF-33 gave their Afghan partners ownership of the process by pushing the plan forward according to their priorities. The operational principle of having "Afghan ownership" was recently derived from lessons learned in conducting effective operations from the tactical to strategic levels.

When planning Operation Al Hasn, the coalition evaluated the historical operations and looked to three lessons learned in previous Tagab Valley operations. First and foremost, Operation Al Hasn was designed as a true partnership between the U.S., UAE, and the government of Afghanistan. Throughout Operation Al Hasn, SOTF-33 and TF-8 included Governor Murad in the planning, coordination, and execution as an equal partner. Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations separate the insurgent from the populace. Today, special operations forces in Afghanistan must empower Afghan governmental agencies to separate the civilians from the insurgents and minimize the impact of those insurgents on the legitimate government organizations. While kinetic operations may be a necessary catalyst for change, it is just as important for non-kinetic operations to be imbedded in these operations to have the lasting effects necessary to win in Afghanistan. SOTF-33 and TF-8 designed the partnership between coalition forces and the government of Afghanistan during Operation Al Hasn to set the conditions for the Kapisa government to separate the local populace from the insurgent fighters.

Second, this mission marked the beginning of a long-term Afghan and coalition government presence in the Tagab

Valley. Temporary displays of military might do not lead to effective growth and transformation in Afghanistan. Long before the kinetic operations have ended, the battle to win the support of the local populace must begin. The Afghan government must provide security and stability through non-kinetic and kinetic operations that have a long term strategic effect. COIN operations require a multitude of aggressive non-kinetic operations that draw on assets provided by Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Civil Affairs (CA), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). To bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the minds of the Afghan people, the local officials must be seen leading actions that are both relevant to their lives and effective at meeting their needs. Tactical success in the short term holds little value if it does not lead to operational success in the long-term.

Finally, the partnership and the long-term presence must be supported by a responsive and flexible logistics system that are sustainable through an Afghanistan-owned system. Stockpiling all classes of humanitarian assistance and civil-military resources is essential to ensure a seamless transition from kinetic to non-kinetic operations within the valley. CA teams, humanitarian assistance (HA) drops, medical civil affairs programs (MEDCAP), and PSYOPS resources must be pre-positioned for movement prior to the start of the operation. This allows the leaders to move non-kinetic assets throughout the area of operations where and when they were needed, not when they became available.

SHAPING

"If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient — at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve."

— Karl Von Clausewitz

Initial shaping efforts began over six weeks prior to the execution of Operation Al Hasn through extensive and thorough meetings between SOTF-33, TF-8 and the

governor of Kapisa. During these meetings SOTF-33 planners determined that the key location for the forward command and control element should be north of Tagab Valley because it was the most secure location from which to direct Operation Al Hasn and receive accurate intelligence. At the onset of the operation, an ODA from SOTF-33 and a company of the Afghan National Army's 201st Corps would secure a small foothold in the north of Tagab Valley that would later become the permanent firebase for that ODA. SOTF-33 and TF-8 gathered intelligence through the Afghan security organizations in the Tagab Valley region. This location has since become the regional government center in the valley.

Members of the SOTF-33 PSYOPS section prepared products for each stage of the operation. These products included leaflet drops to provide instructions to the local population and military deception plans. Also, radio messages were utilized to provide important information to the local populace during the operation. All of these products helped to support an effective information operations plan that circumvented any attempts by the Taliban to undermine the efforts of the operation. Several days before the operation, Governor Murad recorded messages of assurance, guidance, and leadership for play on local radio stations during the operation to encourage his people to identify the insurgents who have brought instability, poverty and violence to their otherwise peaceful valley. The Voice of Kapisa radio station agreed to play Governor Murad's messages and work with SOTF-33 PSYOPS personnel to ensure the messages were spread throughout its broadcast region. To support the information operations, SOTF-33 PSYOPS distributed several thousand radios to enable the population to listen to Governor Murad's radio messages. The radio transmissions allowed Governor Murad to personally update the people of Tagab with critical and accurate news and information.

Executing these radio programs required the distribution of CMO assets at the right times in the right places. Prepositioned logistics allowed the coalition to provide support to the Afghan leaders when and where they were required, rather than

binding them to a coalition supply timeline. Operation Al-Hasn's logistics, HA, and MEDCAP movements were event driven to provide the command the ability to react to events on the ground. More than 30 days before the operation began, SOTF-33 ordered and requisitioned blankets, sundry kits, radios, food stuffs, and clothing. All classes of logistics were requisitioned, drawn and prepared for movement weeks before the mission began. Days before the operation began, SOTF-33 and TF-8 loaded prepackaged medical and HA supplies on Afghan trucks. SOTF-33 packaged, prepared, stocked, and assembled logistical packages to respond to operational needs in the valley.

By pre-positioning supplies weeks in advance, coalition forces have the ability to support operations without delay. The large MEDCAP package that consisted of more than 30 medical personnel deployed to the Tagab Valley region on the first day of Operation Al Hasn. The SOTF-33 surgeon spent more than a month assembling a robust medical team consisting of personnel from the United States, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Romania, and Korea. SOTF-33 medical personnel provided refresher training for Romanian, Korean, and UAE medical personnel in trauma training in preparation for the medical mission. The SOTF-33 surgeon assembled the MEDCAP to include expanded capabilities for treating women,

children, and a veterinary package for treating pets and livestock. CA planners worked with the ANA to provide both internal and external security and a patient management system that would maximize the number of people who could receive care. As the MEDCAP plan came together, TF Tiger and the Bagram PRT contributed medical supplies and equipment to the already robust package. Medical personnel prepared this package, like the logistical package, to move days in advance, and actually entered the valley only hours after the initial phases of kinetic operations.

Establishing the initial foothold in the valley was made easier by using the "firebase in a box" concept developed by the CJSOTF-A engineer. The SOTF-33 support center delivered relocatable buildings and ready-made defensive resources at the onset of the operation. This along, with CJSOTF-A pre-coordinated contracting with host nation workers, ensured that this firebase was in place within days after the initial assault.

While SOTF-33 and TF-8 assembled the logistics, Governor Murad and his intelligence chiefs identified key enemy locations, key players, and discussing unique environmental and political challenges in the Tagab with the SOTF-33 and TF-8 planners. The local Afghan leadership drove the targeting process with their unique knowledge of the environment. Their unparalleled insight into the region



Courtesy photos

Governor Satar Murad, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ashley and Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Al Otabbi discuss aspects of Operation Al Hasn.

gave Operation Al Hasn precise targeting information that would reduce the risk of collateral damage and allow the coalition to maximize the effectiveness of its reconstruction efforts.

In October, SOTF-33 published the warning order and TF-8, ODAs and their partnered Afghan forces began mission-focused training in preparation for the operation. SOTF-33 tasked TF-8 and their partnered ODA to execute an air assault mission to capture key leaders of the Tagab Taliban network. To prepare for this mission, TF-8 and their partnered ODA began a crawl, walk, run training program to execute an air assault against a static target to capture key individuals in the northern part of the valley. They first rehearsed helicopter loading and off-loading procedures and practiced each of their contingency plans. Two nights before the operation, the training culminated in a full fly-away task force rehearsal where the entire assault element loaded onto their helicopters, and flew away to a mock target which they assaulted and secured at full speed.

Other ODAs, tasked by SOTF-33 to create blocking or clearing positions during Al Hasn rehearsed military operations in urban terrain with their Afghan partners. Contingency procedures and movement techniques were polished so that by the 30th of October each element of the kinetic operation had planned and rehearsed key phases of its operations for over three solid weeks.

EXECUTION

“The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.”

— Sun Tzu

During the initial phase of the operation, ANSF, SOTF-33, and TF-8 planned to isolate and deliberately clear the valley. The first phase would separate the insurgents from the populace. The coalition expected 250 ANP from surrounding provinces to link-up with ODAs to conduct the clearing operations. To SOTF-33’s surprise, the night before the operation, almost 900 ANP responded to Governor Murad’s call by reporting for duty at the governor’s headquarters while others went to the northern part of the valley to collocate next to the ANA/ODA’s location. With this good news and a favorable weather forecast, Governor Murad, LTC Ashley, and LTC Nasser met in the SOTF-33 operations center to monitor and direct the beginning of Operation Al Hasn. With Governor Murad co-located with the military commanders, real-time intelligence from the Kapisa intelligence officers flowed to the ODAs and ANP on the ground almost instantly.

On the first evening of Operation Al Hasn, ANP, ANA, TF-8, ODAs from SOTF-33, and AH-64 Apaches from Task Force Centaur cleared Taliban insurgents from their positions and established a security presence in the valley. The operation coordinated three different key efforts throughout the valley. TF-8 and their ODA partners conducted a successful air assault raid as the main effort against a known Taliban leader in the north of the valley while ANSF and two ODAs sealed the south of the valley (Figure 2).

An ODA, TF-8, FBI, and a dog team commenced the air assault raid just after midnight on October 31, signaling the beginning of the operation. This was the UAE military’s first air assault into a




Figure 2

combat situation. Once on target, the element cleared the objective, captured a key Taliban leader, and established strong points. Within 30 minutes of arriving on target, squad-sized elements of Taliban engaged the TF-8 positions. TF-8 suppressed the enemy while the ODA called in AH-64s and AC-130 gunships for close air support (CAS).

As the air assault began, the SOTF-33 support center commander delivered his convoy brief to the massive logistical convoy as it prepared to move from Bagram Airfield towards the Tagab Valley under the cover of darkness. This convoy included not only the HA, MEDCAP and logistics necessary for sustained operations, but also the armored vehicles to be delivered to the air assault element once they had secured their initial objective. A company of ANA and an ODA met the logistical convoy when it arrived at the new Tagab firebase. The ANA, the ODA, and a portion of the logistical convoy moved from the firebase by ground convoy to link-up with the TF-8 air assault element.

On the first morning of the operation, as the Afghan, U.S., and UAE forces began clearing the Taliban insurgents from the valley, LTC Ashley, LTC Nasser, and Governor Murad moved into the northern part of the Tagab Valley and established a forward combined command post. To ensure the operation’s success, Governor Murad stayed at this forward headquarters to plan and direct operations for the entire 11 days of the operation. The governor, co-located with the military commanders, was an essential link with the people of the valley and the Afghan media. When the Taliban insurgents published false information in the press about civilian casualties during kinetic operations, the governor immediately contacted the Afghan Minister of Information, the Minister of Interior, and President Karzai to expose the misinformation. During the operation, Governor Murad



During the operation, Governor Murad presented factual information to the Afghan national media that they published on the same day, which resulted in stopping the Taliban's misinformation campaign.

sent factual information to the Afghan national media that they published on the same day. As a result, the Taliban's misinformation campaign stopped within the first few days of the operation.

Meanwhile, the ABP and two ODAs in the southern part of the valley began fighting their way northward towards the center of the valley and Tagab Village. A-10 Warthogs, B-1 Bombers, AC-130 Gunships, and AH-64 Apaches provided essential close air support as the enemy force increased the intensity of its counterattacks the further the north element moved in the valley. Simultaneously, two ODAs, TF-8 and their partnered ANP pushed south toward Tagab Village.

By the fifth day of operations, on November 4, all of the elements involved in Operation Al Hasn turned east to attack the fiercely defended Bedrab Valley on the eastern wall of the Tagab. TF-8 and their partnered ODA established a blocking position along known Taliban egress and ingress routes in the Bedrab Valley. By dusk, the ANSF and their ODA partners sealed the southern and northern egress routes out of the valley while another ODA established a blocking position on the approach route out of Bedrab Valley in the west.

The coalition partners coordinated the kinetic operation against the Taliban stronghold in the central portion with both Governor Murad's information operations and a comprehensive MEDCAP in the north. More importantly, Governor Murad brought together key mullahs in the valley to encourage them to identify Taliban criminals. After constructive discussion about the future of the valley, the governor sent these mullahs to the center

of Tagab to help the ANP and the ODAs to separate the insurgents from the civilians. The governor then hosted a meeting with Kapisa's parliament members from Kabul to keep them informed on the progress of the battle in the area and received their unbridled support for the operation. Governor Murad followed up this meeting with a local Shura with the local leaders to spread the message of support and encouragement that he had just received from Kabul. Meanwhile, the first of seven MEDCAPs began. Throughout the valley, U.S. medical personnel saw almost 4,200 patients in the first two weeks of the operation. The stacking of HA and medical assets enabled the MEDCAPs to be employed when and where the local population needed them according to the local sentiment. The first MEDCAP in Tagab Village only saw 400 patients. That night the governor decided to plan a second MEDCAP for the following day and announced the new time and place over the new Voice of Kapisa radio station, at local mosques and through the governor's personal contacts. The next day, the

MEDCAP attendance doubled to more than 800. The operational and logistical flexibility given by pre-positioned assets and wide breadth of local influence gained from the Afghan leadership provided the coalition forces the ability to tailor their operations based on the local conditions.

As operations continued, supplying maneuver units became increasingly important. The intensity of the fighting required continuous resupply by either rotary wing or containerized delivery system (CDS). On the second day of the operation, clearing elements participated in decisive direct fire engagements throughout the valley for more than 10 straight hours. As the clearing elements moved closer to the center of the Tagab Valley insurgent resistance intensified. Essential



Governor Murad brought together key mullahs in the valley and encouraged them to identify Taliban criminals.



U.S. and coalition medical personnel saw nearly 4,200 patients during the first two weeks of the operation during medical civil affairs program missions throughout the Tagab Valley.

ground resupply and aerial resupply drops reached the troops in contact when and where needed. Every night of the first week of operations, Air Force aircraft conducted CDS drops for the maneuver units. In addition, TF Centaur conducted five immediate resupplies of ammunition and water by rotary wing assets.

Throughout the maneuver phase of operations, TF-8 was an invaluable partner in fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with SOTF-33 ODAs. TF-8 soldiers were essential to the main clearing element and in facilitating ground resupply for troops in contact. TF-8's tactics and weapons systems increased fire superiority during the long decisive direct fire engagements. TF-8's soldiers' valiant combat action earned them the right to wear the US Army's revered combat infantryman's badge.

As Coalition forces cleared each area, the kinetic operations flowed seamlessly into stability operations. Local radio stations played prerecorded messages from Governor Murad, encouraging the locals to reject the violent ways of the Taliban criminals and support the coalition forces who have brought security and prosperity to the Tagab. Governor Murad was instrumental in placing the right asset in

the right place at the right time. Every night, Governor Murad conducted a two-hour operations meeting with his key leaders. This meeting followed a format similar to an AAR in which the governor's key leaders discussed what went well, areas to improve, and the essential goals for the next day's operations.

By the seventh day, coalition forces nearly completed the clearing operations in the major population centers, allowing the ANSF, TF-8, and their partnered ODAs to clear secondary portions of the valley and solidify the security posture. The coalition now focused on supporting the local population and bolstering the legitimacy of the local officials. All of the coalition and Afghan elements received actionable intelligence from the local population. Some local residents contacted ODAs to disclose the location of large caches. ANP units received constant reports on the locations of stalwart insurgent commanders who remained in the valley. Sensing a key turning point in the Tagab, Governor Murad took the opportunity to publicly address the local people at the Tagab bazaar. He made an extemporaneous speech that was broadcast by the Voice of Kapisa Radio discussing the evils of the Taliban. The villagers appeared eager to

see a secure and prosperous Tagab with a confident and competent leader.

One week after the kinetic operations began, the homes in the Tagab Valley lit up again as life in the valley began to return to normal. SOTF-33 provided messages to the Voice of Kapisa radio station to be broadcast for 10 minutes every hour of every evening during the operation describing the future of Tagab. No longer anxious about the coalition presence, the people of Tagab became curious about whether this operation was the same as many of the operations in the past; "Are the Americans here to stay?" As the residents asked these questions at MEDCAPs and CA events throughout the valley, SOTF-33 logistics trains built a permanent firebase in the northern part of the Tagab Valley. This firebase serves as the new home for an ODA and a company of ANA soldiers. As coalition forces conducted MEDCAPs throughout the valley, non-kinetic planners made preparations for monthly Tagab Medical Humanitarian Aid Programs. Combined Joint Task Force -76 (CJTF-76) committed millions of dollars in Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funding specifically to rebuild the Tagab infrastructure. Representatives of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a strategy with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), the Kapisa government and the coalition to establish long-term infrastructure development projects. To maintain the relationship, SOTF-33 held weekly coordination meetings between Governor Murad, his key leaders, and the Tagab ODA. The people of Tagab now have close allies and security support for the foreseeable future.

EFFECTS ACHIEVED

"I am Taliban, I have been Taliban, but I am not a stupid Taliban. I have seen what the government of Afghanistan is doing for the people and their ways are much better for the people than the Taliban ways are."

**— Local elder Afghanya Shura
November 6, 2006**

During Governor Murad's final day in the Tagab Valley, he held a press conference with all of the national Afghan TV and

radio stations to emphasize the progress in the Tagab Valley. In his statement, he emphasized partnership with the coalition in both security and development. SOTF-33 ODAs are taking the lead in developing the local law enforcement capabilities in the Tagab. A permanent structure is under construction at the new Tagab firebase to facilitate meetings between the coalition and the ANSF. An ANP and National Defense Services (NDS) liaison will be permanently stationed at the firebase to maintain the constant partnership between the Kapisa government and coalition forces. Meanwhile, Tagab officials are encouraging locals to build stores outside of the firebase in which vendors from the local area will be able to sell goods in order to stimulate local economic development and progress.

Less than eight weeks after Operation Al Hasn began, the Tagab Valley is a different place. Counting the number of dead insurgents does not tell the story of the Tagab's transition. The story is best told by the Afghan men, women, and children who returned to the valley and flooded the streets in celebration. Shopkeepers in the main bazaar are replacing doors, repairing walls, and hanging new signs. The local ANP, trained by SOTF-33 ODAs conduct constant patrols to instill a sense of security and stability. Parents dress their children with coalition distributed backpacks and drive around in vehicles openly

displaying pro-Afghanistan stickers throughout the valley. Governor Murad sees an improvement at his level as well. With increased security, a \$3 million CERP-funded road project through the Tagab Valley is expected to be completed on-time. What was a four-hour drive from Bagram Airfield to Tagab now takes little more than 90 minutes.

SOTF-33 and TF-8 now turn their focus towards the development of Tagab's infrastructure and civil society to maintain the momentum and long term strategic effects that SOTF-33 designed Operation Al Hasn to deliver. The primary objective in the Tagab Valley remains the maintenance of stability and strengthening the rapport amongst the local populace to discourage insurgent elements returning in force. Since Operation Al Hasn ended on November 11, there has been little enemy activity in the Tagab Valley and the insurgent related violence in nearby Kabul has been significantly reduced. Operation Al Hasn has become a template for COIN operations in Afghanistan.

During the first night of operations in the SOTF-33 operations center, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, Combined Forces Commander-Afghanistan, said, "This is the best example of full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. This should be the model for COIN operations in Afghanistan."

Success against an insurgency demands that the time, place, and conditions are set in order to establish long-term stability for the legitimate government.



During one of the medical civil affairs program missions in the Tagab Valley, a Soldier meets a few local children.

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Captain Peter G. Fischer is the Judge Advocate for the 3d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne). He previously served as a trial counsel and operational law attorney with the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. He has earned degrees from Emory Law School, Emory University, and the London School of Economics.



INFANTRY DOCTRINE FOR DISMOUNTED PATROLLING

ARTHUR A. DURANTE, JR.

Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan, infantrymen are going out on foot more and more often to patrol the streets and countryside to find the enemy and determine the situation, to report on conditions, provide security, and to defeat the insurgent while reassuring the populace that he will not return.

This increase in dismounted patrolling is part of a new effort to improve the security situation and counter the insurgency, but dismounted patrolling is not new to the Infantry. It is a continuation of a long history of small-unit combat that stretches back to the origin of our Army.

The American Infantry has a long and distinguished history of patrolling on foot. The unique conditions the English colonists faced on the new continent created a new type of military



Soldiers with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division patrol the streets of Al Haymer, Iraq, during a recent mission.

Senior Airman Steve Czyz, USAF

force, one with unconventional skills and a reliance on the initiative of the individual not often practiced by the armies of Europe.

The origins of one of our premier Infantry units, today's 75th Ranger Regiment, can be traced back to small groups of battle-hardened men "ranging the woods" over vast distances, relying on their skill at arms and their intimate knowledge of the forests and fields for their security and mission success. Their story came to be the story of the American infantryman, one of small groups of hardy, well-trained and disciplined warriors moving on foot, able to generate combat power far out of proportion to their actual numbers.

The early colonists had to adapt to the Atlantic seaboard's vast woodlands, with its rugged terrain and variable climate. They faced the fierce resistance of the native tribes head-on for more than a century, and in the process they created and matured their new tactics of small-unit warfare.

These new tactics emphasized being able to operate independently, and to move quickly and undetected across the countryside in day or night, unencumbered by plodding baggage trains, mass formations or heavy weapons.

The early American forces formed small lightly armed units that could remain undetected while seeking out the enemy. They could then either report back or make a sudden, decisive surprise attack.

As the years went by and the Army grew, these Soldiers passed the tactics and techniques of patrolling down from generation to generation. Eventually, they were written down and the writings became codified and orderly, transforming them from "tribal knowledge" into what we know today as doctrine.

The U.S. Army Infantry School is responsible for keeping our doctrine for dismounted patrolling up-to-date. It does this by reviewing what was written in the past, looking at what is being done by units in the field today, and developing what should be done as we face enemies yet unknown, on the battlefields of the future.

The newest Infantry School doctrine on dismounted patrolling can be found in FM 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*. This manual, dated 28 March 2007, supersedes the 1992 version of FM 7-8 with the same title. Until it comes out in paper copy later this summer, you can find it at this Web site: <http://www.army.mil/usapa/>

doctrine / 7_Series_Collection_1.html.

This is how the new FM 3-21.8 describes a patrol:

"A patrol is a detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific mission. Patrols operate semi-independently and return to the main body upon completion of their mission. Patrolling fulfills the Infantry's primary function of finding the enemy to either engage him or report his disposition, location, and actions. Patrols act as both the eyes and ears of the larger unit and as a fist to deliver a sharp devastating jab and then withdraw before the enemy can recover."

The discussion of patrols and patrolling in the new manual is not totally new. It expands and builds on the doctrine that we have had in place for years and that has served us well in previous wars. However, there are some new terms and new definitions that infantry leaders should know about. These terms and definitions can be found in the new version of FM 3-21.8.

There are some issues concerning patrolling doctrine that always generate discussion and which are sometimes not understood clearly. The new version of the manual addresses these in more detail than the version it supersedes.

One of the issues that always comes up in discussions about patrolling is the need for commanders to be specific when they give a unit the mission to send out a patrol.

Units should not be sent out simply to "patrol." A commander must provide a specific combat, reconnaissance, or security task, with an associated tactical purpose. Upon completion of that task, the patrol leader returns to the main body, reports on his actions and describes the events that



The American Infantry has a long and distinguished history of patrolling on foot.

took place, the status of the patrol's members and equipment, and any observations the patrol may have made.

There is no standard size for a patrol. A fire team can be used for a patrol, but squad- and platoon-sized patrols are also appropriate at times. Sometimes, for combat tasks such as a large raid or an area ambush, a patrol may consist of most of the combat elements of a rifle company.

Unlike operations in which the infantry platoon or squad is integrated into the maneuver of a larger organization, a patrol is semi-independent and relies on its own resources and actions for security although it may have indirect fire and aerial support.

Patrols are never administrative, never conducted casually, even if the situation on the ground may seem almost nonthreatening. The leader of every patrol, regardless of the type or the mission, has an inherent responsibility to prepare and plan for possible enemy contact. During operations within the United States, in support of civil authority, there may not be an actual "enemy" force, but leaders must always consider the possibility of violence



Soldiers with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division patrol an area of Baghdad June 3.

Staff Sergeant Bronco Suzuki

and lawlessness. There are several specific purposes for dismounted patrols:

- Gathering information on the enemy, the terrain, or the populace;
- Gaining or regaining contact with the enemy;
- Making contact with adjacent friendly forces;
- Engaging the enemy in combat to destroy him or inflict losses;
- Reassuring or gaining the trust of a local population;
- Preventing and controlling public disorder;
- Deterring and disrupting insurgent or criminal activity;
- Providing unit security; and
- Protecting key infrastructure or bases.

The two major categories of patrols are combat and reconnaissance. Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make direct contact with the enemy are called combat patrols. The three types of combat patrols are raid patrols, ambush patrols, both of which conduct special purpose attacks, and security patrols.

Patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoiding direct combat with the enemy while seeking out new information or confirming the accuracy of previously-gathered information are called reconnaissance patrols.

The traditional types of reconnaissance patrols are area, route, and zone. The new FM 3-21.8 introduces and describes a fourth type, the point reconnaissance patrol.

Point reconnaissance patrols are tasked to move to a very specific location, such as a power station, a mosque, or a school, and gather detailed information on the conditions there, often by interviewing members of the local populace or the workforce.

Point reconnaissance patrols are often used during stability operations or during operations in support of civil authority when the general situation is confusing and normal reporting systems

are not functional. They provide the commander with a trusted set of eyes on the scene to provide him with “ground truth”.

Leaders can also dispatch reconnaissance patrols to track the enemy, or to establish contact with other friendly forces. Tracking patrols follow the trail and movements of a specific enemy unit, often for long distances. Contact patrols move to and make physical contact with adjacent units and exchange information on their location, status, and intentions.

In the Army today, electronic position reporting and information transfer systems have reduced the need for contact patrols between U.S. units, but they are still vital when working with allies and coalition partners who may not have fielded such high-tech systems.


There is another type of patrol that has been very controversial since the fighting in Iraq began — the presence patrol.

Presence patrols are not new. They have been a part of Infantry doctrine since the publication of FM 3-21.21, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion*, in April 2003. In fact, under a different name, the same sort of patrol was described in the 1967 version of FM 21-75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*.

The presence patrol is not a new concept, but because of confusion about the execution of a presence patrol, FM 3-21.8 discusses it in much more detail than has been done in any previous publication.

Some leaders have not understood the doctrinal principles behind the planning and execution of presence patrols. Some units have misunderstood the term and even disagree with its utility. To better explain the concept, the new manual goes into significant detail describing and explaining the operational environment and the set of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians) conditions under which presence patrols are appropriate.

A presence patrol, like all other types of reconnaissance patrols,



has a specific task and purpose. It gathers information the commander needs to support his decision-making process. However, because of the conditions under which the patrol operates, its actions are carefully calculated not only to gather specific information but also to convey a message to those with whom the patrol comes into contact.

The uniqueness of a presence patrol originates with the fundamental idea that all other reconnaissance patrols start out with the intent to accomplish their mission while remaining undetected. Even combat patrols intend to remain undetected until they reveal themselves in a sudden and deadly attack.

The presence patrol is different in that from the very beginning it intends to both see (conduct reconnaissance) and to be seen (demonstrate presence).

A presence patrol is normally used most often in stability or civil support operations. It has many purposes, but should always be seen in a specific manner, one predetermined by the commander after careful analysis of the existing situation.

The primary task of a presence patrol is to gather information about the conditions in the unit's area of operations. To do this, the patrol gathers critical (as determined by the commander) information, both specific and general.

The patrol seeks out this information, observes and reports. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting a particular image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander's intent.

In addition to the reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols can demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of the U.S. forces. Presence patrols are used to clearly demonstrate the intent, determination, competency, confidence, concern, and when appropriate, the overwhelming power of the force to all who observe it, including local and national media.

In Iraq, some units send out patrols made up of combined U.S. and Iraqi security forces. These are examples of presence patrols being used to demonstrate a national will, unity of effort, a growing Iraqi competence and responsibility, and a partnership in the counterinsurgency effort.

In some situations, presence patrols may be used to demonstrate that calm prevails and the situation is returning to normality. In such cases, the patrol members may deliberately adopt a friendly, nonthreatening, benign demeanor. An example of this was the presence patrols sent out by the 82nd Airborne Division in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

The Soldiers were armed and ready to meet violence with force if necessary, but they did not wear body armor or Kevlar helmets. Instead, they wore the distinctive maroon berets of the airborne, and conducted themselves in such a way as to show the populace that the preceding days of anarchy and disorder were over, and that calm and normalcy were returning. Their presence did much

to restore that calm, and they were soon able to transition large areas of the city back to civil control.

The commander always plans for the possibility that a presence patrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent. Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol in a situation where significant enemy contact is expected or likely.

Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operations such as peace operations, humanitarian and civil assistance, noncombatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending out a presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader.

To accomplish the "to be seen" part of its purpose, a presence patrol reconnoiters overtly. It takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are all part of that impression.

When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it not only for hard information, but also for the patrol leader's impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to see to modify the actions of subsequent patrols.

Another type of patrol that the new FM 3-21.8 discusses is really an old type that had fallen out of Infantry doctrine after the Vietnam War but has now been reintroduced. It is the security patrol.

A security patrol is a small combat patrol sent out from a unit location, when the unit is stationary or temporarily halted, to search the local area, detect any enemy forces near the main body, and to engage and destroy the enemy within the capability of the patrol. This type of is normally sent out by units operating in close terrain with limited fields of observation and fire. It is a common type of patrol to be sent out during operations in the jungle or dense forests, or in some urban areas.

A security patrol detects and disrupts enemy forces that are conducting reconnaissance of the main body or that are massing to conduct an attack. Although this type of combat patrol seeks to make direct enemy contact and to destroy enemy forces within its capability, it should always attempt to avoid decisive engagement.

Security patrols are normally away from the main body of the unit for limited periods, returning frequently to coordinate and rest. They do not operate beyond the range of communications and supporting fires from the main body, especially mortar fires.

The mission of the Infantry, to close with and engage the enemy, requires many skills. Among the most important of them is the ability to patrol, to disperse across the countryside, to seek out the enemy and engage him at the time and place of our choosing.

For infantrymen to gain those skills, to truly master them, takes long hard training, dedication, physical fitness, initiative, and an intense will to win. All this has to begin with a well defined doctrine that clearly lays out the principles, tactics, techniques and procedures associated with patrolling. The newly published FM 3-21.8 provides the infantry rifle squad and platoon with that doctrine.

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THE EVOLUTION OF IRANIAN WARFIGHTING DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR


When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference

SERGEANT BEN WILSON

After the Islamic revolution in 1979, two different perspectives on warfighting influenced the tactics of Iranian ground forces. There was a traditional military perspective, based on Iran's military history, which relied on modern equipment and European and American officer training. Then there was the revolutionary perspective that often placed Shiite religious values of perseverance and martyrdom ahead of some military practices. These two perspectives contradicted each other at times, and the troops on the ground were the ones most harmed by this. However, it was the synthesis of elements of these two that would eventually become Iran's most effective means of fighting by the end of the war.

By the 1970's, Iran had become one of the most dominant military powers in the region, and the fifth largest armed force in the world. The armed forces had established contingency plans and training and relied on the west for equipment and support. They trained for conventional war, but had little combat experience. The Shah wanted to become the dominant military power in the region, and, by some measures, he had achieved this. The vestiges of this military development in Iran, in the form of military technique and leaders that had not been purged, provided the ability to pursue the war with conventional military tactics.

The clerics purged a large part of the conventional military structure after the 1979 revolution leaving the military broken and barely able to defend Iran from the initial Iraqi ground invasion in 1980. There were only two Iranian armored divisions with tanks in bad need of maintenance, and several infantry units in the main theater of Khuzestan at the time of the invasion, and it would be weeks before they could mobilize. While suffering from poor maintenance and lack of spare parts, the Iranian Air Force was able to launch a surprising counterattack just days after Iraqi preemptive strikes on Iranian air fields. They also launched a major airlift using Boeing 747, 707, and C-130 aircraft to move conventional forces to the front.



The Iranian Air Force, equipped with Maverick missiles, proved critical during the initial defense by attacking Iraqi ground forces. On the ground, most of the initial defense of Khuzestan was left to the Iranian Republican Guards Corps (IRGC). The Iranian regime created the IRGC in 1979 as a counterweight to the military, and as a defender of the new regime and upholder of revolutionary values in Iran.

This group represented Shiite revolutionary values and initially disdained military professionalism and training. The IRGC was composed of two arms: the cadre Guards (Pasdaran) and the part-time Basij militia. The Basij were a large group of volunteers, said to have numbered in the millions when fully mobilized. The Pasdaran were a better trained and equipped group of religious loyalists that commanded the Basij.

The IRGC in Khuzestan was hardly able to defend itself against the Iraqi armor and artillery, especially in the vast open areas of Khuzestan. Possessing only small arms, they retreated to urban areas and set up defenses. The slow advance of the Iraqi Army, often due to Iranian air power, gave them plenty of time to establish defenses and to bring in reinforcements. The Iranians set up very stout defenses in the cities that were able to withstand Iraqi armored and air attacks. Saddam's wish to minimize casualties resulted in Iraqi armor being sent into cities without infantry support. The IRGC was able to destroy many Iraqi tanks using only rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and Molotov cocktails. The Iraqis

only captured one major city in Khuzestan: Korramshahr. Here, Iran initially repelled Iraqi armored attack as they were canalized into narrow avenues of approach through the marshy areas outside of the city. Finally a large force of Iraqi infantry took the city in house-to-house fighting. Even then, casualties were tremendous. The badly supplied Iranians made a controlled withdrawal street by street through the city. It took Iraq over a month to take the city while sustaining around 15,000 casualties and losing more than 100 armored vehicles

The IRGC (Iranian Republican Guard Corps) in Khuzestan was hardly able to defend itself against the Iraqi armor and artillery, especially in the vast open areas of Khuzestan. Possessing only small arms, they retreated to urban areas and set up defenses.

to disorganized light infantry.

By October 1980, the first stage of the war had ended and Saddam declared that Iraq's army had accomplished its goals and he was ready to negotiate peace. Up to this point, Iraq had experienced sporadic resistance. While the resistance was not enough to stop Iraq from taking the vast open areas of Khuzestan, the now-reinforced cities convinced Saddam not to overextend his supply lines and to declare an end to operations. The Paskaran lacked a defined chain of command and effective direction from above, possessed only small arms, and had no support. It was only their dedication to the revolutionary cause, which was strengthened by the Iraqi invasion, that enabled them to stand up and fight the Iraqis. In spite of inferior technology and failure to deter the Iraqis in open ground, their concentrations in urban areas made them a formidable foe. The Iraqis conducted ineffective sieges around the other cities which gave the Iranians plenty of time to reinforce.

In January 1981, Iran launched its first counterattack (Map 1). By this time, the army had reorganized sufficiently to begin operations. They attacked on the plains south of Dezful near Susangerd in what would be one of the largest armored battles of the war. The Iranians broke through Iraqi lines but were then trapped in a double envelopment. Iran lost more than half of its tanks in the battle.

They were caught in a low-lying marshy area. When they attempted to maneuver, many vehicles became stuck in the mud and were disabled. Unable to recover their vehicles due to intense Iraqi fire, they abandoned much of their armor. More problems surfaced which would plague the Iranians for the duration of the war: lack of coordinated air and artillery support, poor logistics, and lack of coordination

between IRGC and regular military forces. The IRGC and the conventional military would often refuse to work together, ignoring one another's orders. In fact, this split, and the poor state of the IRGC in the early stage of the war was in part due to then President Bani Sadr's and moderate military leaders' distaste of the IRGC. This distaste worked both ways. This battle became one of the critical events that

Map 1



(The Iranians) began to rely on intelligence and scouting to find the weak spots in the Iraqi lines where they would launch their human wave attacks.

convinced the regime to shift its support to the IRGC as a conventional fighting force and not just a guardian of the regime. It is ironic that while Khomeini fully supported purging the regular military before the war, he had pressured Bani Sadr, the commander of regular military forces, to initiate the first counteroffensive. After this failure, the Mullahs continued to gain support for their revolutionary method of fighting, while the moderate secular voices were swept aside.


The IRGC gained favor and support from the regime and employed simple tactics of its own. Initially, the IRGC attacked with revolutionary fervor and huge numbers, hoping that this would overcome Iraqi advanced technology. They employed the human wave attack reminiscent of World War I. They sent in Basij volunteers as the lead element. These forces often consisted of old men and young children. The primary purpose of this initial wave was to clear mines, breach obstacles (often by laying on top of concertina wire), and to absorb enemy fire. Many of the Basij were found with plastic keys to heaven in their hands, or a note from the Ayatollah giving them permission to enter heaven. Separated perhaps by a few hundred meters, waves and waves of under-trained conscripts would storm Iraqi defenses. Eventually the more experienced, better trained and equipped IRGC Pasdaran would attack in an attempt to break through the lines and dislodge the Iraqis from their positions. This was not always the case however as Basij and Pasdaran would often be intermingled as IRGC tactics became more adaptive and complex. Sometimes, through superb infiltration, the IRGC would attack a unit's command center, thus breaking the integrity of the Iraqi lines and then defeating the Iraqi positions in detail. This tactic was possible due to the Iraqi's lack of defensive depth throughout the war. Iraqi units were often placed in isolated strong points. The areas between strong points were wide, and loosely patrolled, but heavily covered by artillery. The Iraqis often failed to garrison the urban areas that they had overrun, allowing Iran to mass troops in Iraqi rear areas. The armored and other heavy equipment units, which were organic to independent army units or integrated within the IRGC, were the last to join the battle. In the case of the IRGC, armor and heavy weapons would not be deployed below battalion strength until later in the war, and at the beginning of the war the IRGC did not even have any armor. This led to poor combined arms coordination and execution, particularly when supporting the infantry, according to *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis* by Efraim Karsh. In many cases, the armor would not move up to support the initial infantry push. This was probably done to curb tank losses, but lack of integration inevitably led to heavy Iranian casualties.

Iranian tactics improved throughout their initial campaign to expel the Iraqis from Khuzestan. One of their major improvements was at the small unit level. Faced with a vastly superior Iraqi Army, the Iranians learned the value of fire and maneuver, especially with their own armor. While not discontinuing the human wave attack, the infantry and IRGC improved their patrolling and infiltration techniques. They began to rely on intelligence and scouting to find the weak spots in the Iraqi lines where they would launch their human wave attacks. They would follow an infiltration with surprise attacks at multiple points along the Iraqi lines. Iranian attacks created confusion in the Iraqi forces causing premature or incorrect commitment of reserves and

shifting of forces. The Iranians demonstrated initiative and surprise in other areas during the early stages of the war. In operation Tariq Al Quds, they used heavy equipment to build a 14-kilometer road through an area of undefended sand dunes to attack Iraqi rear areas. They used the same approach later in the war to assail Iraqi mountain outposts. They also used electronic warfare to send false messages through the Iraqi's communications networks. The marshes that proved fatal to the Iranians at Susangerd provided great advantages to the Iranians in later battles. They intentionally flooded marsh areas to canalize Iraqi forces during their urban attacks. This also provided help to their infiltration tactics. The Iraqis were road bound so the marsh areas often fell under Iranian control and proved to be excellent avenues of approach for Iranian light infantry.

Iranians increasingly relied on night and poor weather attacks. They regarded the Iraqis as poor night fighters and attempted to take advantage of this. The Iranians never received night observation devices during the war, but relied on superior light infantry tactics. The use of the night and poor weather was also to counter U.S. intelligence efforts, including satellite imagery which supplied Iraq with intelligence on Iranian movements. Though they suffered various setbacks throughout the war, Iranian tactics gradually improved. The first human wave attacks were often carried out in broad daylight against fully-defended positions with no real mind given to terrain or proper planning. Eventually, they were able to launch limited attacks using infiltration, low visibility, and the static Iraqi defenses. However political differences among high level officials would often lead to the Iranian forces suffering from poor planning as conventional war fighting gained and lost favor with the regime.

After the initial Iraqi expulsion from Khuzestan, the Iranians decided to launch an invasion of Iraq. Their first target was the city of Basra in the south. Using more primitive planning than was often used in Khuzestan, Iran launched large human wave assaults on the prepared Iraqi defenses at Basra. These attacks did not yield the large victory that Iran was seeking. In 1984, the regime conducted reforms to correct the failures in capturing Basra. Unplanned, unsupported human wave attacks were not working. They began to improve leader training and procedures, coordination between the IRGC and conventional military, planning and logistics. The poor coordination between the IRGC and the conventional military may have been one of the largest contributors in the initial failures in Iraq. The regime's desire to invade Iraq had been opposed by the IRGC and conventional military leaders. The operations, which were imposed by the regime, put the IRGC and conventional military in an awkward and eventually disastrous position which again led the IRGC to operate on its own. These fundamental reforms gave the armed forces the successful foundation for integrated planning that would serve them well throughout the war and afterwards. However, these reforms were not enough, as better integration of Iranian forces would take years. While Iran could



Map 2

often achieve an initial breakthrough of Iraqi defenses, their lack of effective logistics and combined arms support prevented the Iranians from penetrating in depth and achieving "final" victory. The Mullahs supported achieving large operational goals, with tactics that could only achieve limited gains.

The shift from an idea of "final" victory was needed as this often proved to be overambitious and led to massing on the immediate objective becoming vulnerable to Iraqi counterattacks and artillery. The leadership's idea was to launch sudden huge swarming attacks overwhelming the enemy on as many points as possible. They intended for the IRGC to advance from position to position not allowing themselves to lose momentum, become pinned down, and lose morale. There was a lack of military understanding within the IRGC supporters in the regime. While leadership

(The Iranians) honed their skills in infiltration, patrolling, night fighting, and marsh and mountain warfare.

and planning improved, the Iranian forces could only move as far as they could be resupplied and supported. More often than not, this was not very far and this proved to be one of the fatal flaws in the revolutionary style of fighting. These problems proved even more severe as heavy Iraqi fire, and chemical weapons, were used to strike Iranian supply centers.

The Iranian infantry tactics eventually were superior to that of the Iraqis. While the Iraqis relied on static positions and concentrations of armor, the Iranians found ways to cope with this. They honed their skills in infiltration, patrolling, night

fighting, and marsh and mountain warfare. They seemed to have had the most success in the marshy areas around the Majnoon Islands and the mountains of the North. This was the ideal area for them to use light infantry tactics using the mobility offered by helicopters and boats to give them an advantage over mechanized forces.

After pushing Iraq back to the international border, the Iranians eventually occupied the marsh areas around Howeiza. This gave them opportunities to attack Basra and launch attacks towards the Tigris in an attempt to cut off the Baghdad-Basra highway. The Iranians experienced continual failure in their attempts to break out of the marshes and occupy Basra and the outlying areas. Their forces and their tactics could not survive against a concerted defensive effort once they left the protection of the marshes. While they made limited gains, they lacked the support and

organization to move further into Iraq.

The combat in the marsh areas was another story. The marshes provided a great area for the Iranians to employ and hone their small unit tactics. The marshes' wet ground and tall, dense reeds provided concealment for the Iranian forces, impeded Iraqi armor, and absorbed artillery shells in its soft ground. Iran thoroughly scouted the marsh areas with patrols and numerous water craft. Iran used the lessons learned in this area to launch one of the most successful attacks of the war farther south (Map 2). While launching a diversionary attack north of Basra, Iran launched a commando raid using Basij frogmen, boats and pontoon bridges to cross the Shatt Al Arab and take the Al Faw peninsula. Their attack took advantage of darkness and rain and totally surprised the Iraqi defenders, many of whom fled their posts. The Iranians quickly established a bridge head and reinforced the peninsula. They dispersed their defenses and dug in quickly. They made all troop and supply movements at night to prevent the Iraqis from acquiring artillery targets. This attack provided one of the greatest demonstrations of the Iranians' potential in light infantry attacks in difficult terrain. Indeed, it seemed that Iran preferred, and found the most success, in light infantry warfare. Their ability in infiltration, use of the night, and lightning attacks gave them the advantage over Iraq's cumbersome forces.

The Iranian war began in a defense and counterattack to expel the Iraqi invaders, but once the Iranian forces were successful, they continued their conventional operations to invade Iraq. However, from the beginning, and throughout the war, Iran employed unconventional tactics to project its power. This often included supporting international terrorist operations like the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait in 1986, and the coup attempt in Bahrain. Iran began its support for Kurdish uprisings in Iraq years before the war. However, this had little effect until Iran was able to control the Kurdish insurgency in its own country. In fact, they had hoped for a quick end to the war in Iraq with the revolt of the Iraqi Shiites in the south. At the time, Iran continued its attempts to export revolution. This includes Iran's support of Shiites in the war in Lebanon where they sent several hundred IRGC members to the Bekaa valley in 1982 as well as Iran's support for the Mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. The hit and run insurgency tactics and support of terrorists may have yielded the most lessons learned for the Iranians.

The northern area of Iraq was perhaps the most fertile area for Iran's insurgent aspirations. Iran's presence in the north dated to before the war where the Shah fomented rebellion amongst the Iraqi Kurds to pressure the Iraqi regime. In part, this eventually led to Saddam grudgingly accepting the Algiers Accord. Once the war began, the IRGC once again exploited differences between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime. This campaign was aided by the mountainous terrain of the north, and the fact that Iraq's main forces were tied down in the South. The Kurds often acted as scouts and guides for the Iranian forces in conventional attacks. Much more common, however,

They gained a definite tactical advantage over the technologically superior Iraqi forces when they employed light infantry tactics in difficult terrain.

was the presence of Iranian agents who organized and directed small groups of Kurdish Peshmerga raiding parties. These were organized into small groups of about 12 Peshmerga. They were capable of operating semi-independently, relying on natural water sources and stashed arms and food. They also received extensive support from the local population and

infrastructure. They would carry out insurgent activities such as assassinations of government officials, car bombings of government buildings, and attacks on Iraqi Army troop formations and vehicles. One of their prime targets was the oil and population center of Kirkuk. They launched numerous raids on oil facilities and military posts in the area with some success. They even developed a rocket known as the "Karad" with a range of 20 kilometers in order to strike the city of Kirkuk.

In the final stages of the war, the Iranian regime had reached its highest tactical evolution. However, friction between the IRGC and conventional military continued until the end of the war. This evolution led to the capture of the Al Faw peninsula and the Majnoon islands in the Howeiza marsh areas. However, there remained several obstacles to Iran's success on the battlefield which eventually led to the failure of their invasion of Iraq. This was mostly due the Iran's inability to emerge from areas of difficult terrain and engage in combined arms warfare on open ground as occurred in Iran's various offensive operations which attempted to break out from the marshes.

Through eight years of war, the Iranian regime learned how to properly employ and integrate foreign guerilla forces, IRGC, and conventional military forces to defeat a more technologically advanced foe given the right circumstances. From a U.S. standpoint, it is difficult to say that their combined arms capabilities were ever performed satisfactorily. Command and control, logistical, and support problems, as well as failure to implement sound military doctrine prevented the Iranians from taking to open ground and hampered the Iranians' potential to make a large breakthrough in the war. They gained a definite tactical advantage over the technologically superior Iraqi forces when they employed light infantry tactics in difficult terrain. They learned to attain small gains with their coordination of these light infantry tactics, religiously-motivated conscripts, and guerilla tactics. While these were not enough to initiate an all out invasion of Iraq, they did prove effective in repelling the Iraqi invasion and creating havoc in Iraqi territory, especially in difficult terrain areas.

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The references for this article are on file and available through *Infantry Magazine*.

OPERATION CAESAR RETURNS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DISMOUNTED INFANTRY

CAPTAIN ERIC G. EVANS

I was the platoon leader of 3rd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), when my unit deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. We were stationed at a forward operating base (FOB) in the vicinity of Hawija, Iraq, and operated there for 12 months.

Once we arrived at the FOB, we drew new equipment from the unit we replaced. My platoon drew up-armored HMMWWs (M1114), M-2 .50 caliber machine guns, Mk-19 40mm grenade launchers, and 240B machine guns. This greatly increased the mobility and firepower of my platoon. It also introduced new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) which we would continue to develop throughout our deployment. We task organized into two sections. Alpha section — led by me when we split sections — consisted of three trucks. Alpha section had an Mk-19, M-2, and M240B for mounted weapons. Bravo section, under my platoon sergeant, consisted of three trucks. Another significant change to our task organization was the addition of the duty of section sergeant. The section sergeants would remain mounted at all times and control the fires of their sections. The dismounts of each section were led by the dismounted squad leaders. My platoon could dismount 12 infantrymen, one medic, and one interpreter. I led the dismounts and my platoon sergeant took control of the mounted elements when we dismounted.

The enemy in our area of operation was adept at the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which he employed frequently along the one route into and out of our FOB, as well as other routes. The enemy also employed snipers concentrated in complex urban terrain. Enemy forces also had a substantial number of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), PKC machine guns, and hand grenades. The enemy could mass his forces for squad plus sized ambushes usually consisting of eight to 12 men. These men would be armed with PKC machine guns and RPGs and operated mostly in the rural areas at night.

A common enemy tactic was the emplacing of IEDs along the routes, especially in culverts that

ran underneath the road. In town the enemy would use hand grenades as convoys passed by targeting the trail vehicle of the convoy. We could not move through town with our gunners up because of the amount of sniper fire we encountered. It was common to receive small arms fire exiting town due to the inability of my platoon to react quickly enough to kill or capture the insurgents. The shooters would simply blend back into the populace. The enemy had roving patrols consisting of one sedan style car with two to three individuals inside. They would be armed with an RPG and Dragunov sniper rifle. If an American platoon halted, these patrols would attempt to maneuver on that platoon and engage with whichever weapon was most appropriate for their target.

The city of Hawija itself was about three kilometers square. A canal divided the city into eastern and western halves. The eastern half of the city was the industrial district and contained the market area. Residences on this half of the city were on the extreme northern and southern ends. The Joint Command Center (JCC) and Iraqi Police (IP) station as well as the gas station were also located on this side. The western side of the city was primarily the residential side. The high school and two mosques were located on that side of the city. The roads were generally more narrow



Journalist 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, USN

Captain Eric G. Evans (right) and another Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment examine a small-caliber revolver during a mission on the outskirts of Hawija, Iraq.

here except for Market Street which became broad as you left town. A concrete factory and grainery were located at the southern end of the city. Hawija had traffic control points (TCPs) located on the four routes leading into and out of the city. The eastern half of the village was from the Obeide tribe while the western half was from the Jabori tribe. Both of these tribes were of the Sunni sect. The city was 99-percent Sunni with very few Shias and Kurds.

American forces were repeatedly attacked at checkpoints and even inside the JCC. The police never reported finding any weapons at the traffic control points and very seldom conducted patrols. Anytime the police with American help would try to establish some legitimacy they would be targeted heavily. Our battalion's concept for operating within our battlespace was saturation. We would launch every platoon in the battalion for at least six to eight hours a day conducting presence patrols, gathering information, and conducting raids when intelligence would support it. We continued to be targeted by IEDs and sniper fire during the day and ambushes at night. My platoon was ambushed on October 29. The enemy ambush consisted of three to four RPG launchers and three PKC machine guns. The ambush was actually the type of contact most conducive to success for us. It allowed us to attempt to fix and maneuver on the enemy in the relatively simple rural terrain. The enemy's effective use of terrain made fixing and closing with him very difficult. My platoon was again ambushed on February 20. This ambush consisted of three to four RPG teams as well as four PKC machine guns. My platoon was traveling overwatch along the route, conducting a movement to contact to engage such ambush cells. The enemy initiated the ambush on Alpha section with RPGs. Then PKCs opened up on the entire patrol as Bravo section closed. I attempted to flank the enemy position with Bravo section, which was not yet decisively engaged. Seeing a section of my trucks moving on their eastern flank, the enemy broke contact over the inter-visibility line they were using as cover and escaped. Although no vehicles were destroyed, we could not pin the enemy down. The fact that he was achieving effective direct fire at night at a distance of 400 meters leads me to believe they were night vision capable.



Tech Sergeant Andy Dunaway, USAF

Soldiers with A Company, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, question local Iraqi men during a traffic control point mission October 31, 2005.

The vast majority of the contact we made, however, was not conducive to success. Mostly, we were engaged by IEDs along the routes in the rural environment. They would be remotely detonated making it nearly impossible to catch the triggerman. Inside town we were engaged with sniper fire, hand grenades, and RPGs. Effective sniper fire restricted our ability to move with our gunners up in the turrets to engage the grenadiers. Dismounting or halting in the city for any length of time was especially dangerous. The roving teams maneuvered on and attacked the halted patrol from behind some form of obstacle and escaped by vehicle before the patrol could react effectively.

The responses to the threat in Hawija were Operation Spartacus and Operation Caesar Returns. Operation Spartacus consisted of obstacle emplacement within the city of Hawija to attempt to limit the mobility of the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF). We emplaced many fixing obstacles as well as blocking obstacles consisting of Jersey barriers throughout the city. The obstacles could not all be over-watched by American forces so responsibility for the obstacles fell to the Iraqis. The culmination of Operation Spartacus was the emplacement of two concrete towers; one tower was located at the south bridge intersection and one was located at the north bridge intersection. The obstacles we emplaced were removed completely within a week. Operation Caesar Returns was launched in response

to this action.

Operation Caesar Returns started with the occupation of Battle Position 1 (BP1) and the co-location of the Military Police and Mortar Platoons within the JCC. The purpose of Operation Caesar Returns was to provide constant presence in Hawija. This operation would last the remaining four months of our deployment. Operation Caesar Returns embedded us with our Iraqi Army (IA) and IP brethren and forced cooperation and mutual support. The IA's fate was now intertwined with our own as we manned the same battle positions, and it was impossible to tell who was who. Throughout the operation we would construct three more battle positions and move an Iraqi Army battalion from the 5th Iraqi Army Brigade into Hawija. The influx of personnel created a surge at a level we were able to maintain. The introduction of an IA battalion from outside the immediate area also paid significant dividends as it forced the local Iraqi Army to improve their own performance. No outside Iraqi Police were brought in, however, the constant oversight by American forces combined with training and support paid its own dividends as well.

BP1 was located on the southern axis of the city. It was a large house that was still under construction, but about 90 percent complete. The house originally belonged to an AIF financier. We occupied this house on May 17 and immediately started improving our defensive positions. BP 1

was two stories with a large porch on the second floor. Each of the side rooms looked down a route. The eastern room looked down the eastern bypass and the western room looked down the southern bypass. We positioned M240Bs in each of these rooms and built platforms with tripods away from the windows. Each of these rooms also had a platform for an M249 in bipod mode covering an alternate avenue of approach. One room also had a loophole for the M24 sniper rifle which our qualified, school trained, and very experienced sniper carried.

The enemy began to attack us daily once we established BP1, repeatedly engaging us from the same areas. We developed his pattern and established target reference points (TRPs) at these locations. TRP1 was at the corner of the concrete factory approximately 200 meters from BP1. The enemy primarily engaged us with RPGs from there, then fled north along a route back into the city. One truck was responsible for this TRP as well as the shooters on the rooftop. TRP2 was approximately 500 meters away from the eastern room. The enemy engaged the eastern room as well as this truck with small arms and sniper fire from this TRP. The position in the eastern room as well as the truck was again responsible for this TRP. TRP 3 was approximately 400 meters to the north of the western room. The enemy attempted to engage us with small arms fire and, occasionally, with an RPG from this TRP. The western room and another truck with its weapons were responsible for this TRP. TRP4 was exactly 680 meters from the western room. The enemy engaged us from there often due to its standoff range. The enemy would engage us from a car with a sniper rifle as well as with RPGs. TRP5 was in the field to the east of BP 1. This is where we believe the 57mm fire came from that destroyed the truck earlier. The truck with the Mk-19 was responsible for this TRP because that weapon was best suited to engaging targets in the open terrain. Two other trucks were responsible for the rear security and provided the immediate CASEVAC platform. The gun on one truck was dismantled and brought inside and that weapon replaced with a machine gun. When contact was made, I took a preselected group of Soldiers and attempted to maneuver on the enemy. One dismantled squad leader supervised the

When contact was made, I took a preselected group of Soldiers and attempted to maneuver on the enemy. One dismantled squad leader supervised the dismantles left inside the BP while the other squad leader and four dismantles came with me.

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Contact persisted at BP1. It was still very difficult to maneuver against the enemy. The enemy soon gave up his attempts to engage us at close range. The lack of knockdown power of the 5.56mm cartridge was quickly apparent. Twice the rooftop position engaged an RPG shooter at 200 meters, and twice the enemy misfired his RPG but was able to escape. The enemy quit sending his wounded to the local hospital where we would find them. The enemy had an excellent casualty evacuation plan and it was rare to find bodies. The enemy shifted to TRP4 and TRP2. This is when we noticed the scouting element. In the morning we would notice a black pickup truck come by every 15 minutes. After we didn't see the truck

for about an hour, we would be engaged from TRP 4. The fire at TRP 4 would come from a car in the form of a Dragunov sniper rifle. It was difficult to gain positive identification of a target at that range with the optics we had, so the positive identification would have to come from our sniper and his M-24 sniper rifle. We used the report from the sniper rifle to engage with the M240B. The enemy quickly adapted and would pull the vehicle forward so that we could not engage the driver or the engine of the vehicle. With a 700 meter head start, it was difficult to catch the vehicle. The enemy also used common vehicles to prevent identification by air. The enemy would also use our rules of engagement against us. They would drive up and stop briefly in the same location but not present a weapon or engage and then drive off. The effectiveness of our rooftop sniper position garnered attention from the enemy. On June 10, BP1 was engaged by a salvo of mortar fire. Approximately eight rounds of 82mm mortars were fired with no effect. This forced us to provide overhead cover on the rooftop, but did not force us to displace the position.



BP2 was our response to the persistent engagement of BP1 from the extended range. BP2 was a few hundred meters north east of BP1. BP1 was not able to mutually support BP2 with direct fire, but BP2 had enfilading fires against TRP4 and TRP1. We fortified BP2 much the same way as BP1. The only place in BP2 that had good observation and fields of fire was the rooftop. The rooftop of BP2 was especially dangerous due to its position deeper in the city and the ability to engage it from built up urban areas. Having myself been wounded there by a sniper, I was leery of establishing a position there. The benefit of having another position and creating an engagement area seemed to outweigh the danger at the time. BP2 would be manned by a squad, which left BP 1 short handed. Now when we attempted to maneuver against the enemy, I would only have three other dismounts and lacked a dismounted squad leader so I had to play both squad leader and platoon leader. BP2 could support the JCC from the south side and overwatch patrols entering the JCC. The truck in the courtyard mounted an M-60D and protected the only gate into the compound. The IA also dispatched a squad to assist in force protection at BP2. The IA would inspect people coming into and out of the grainery. The grainery was still operational at the time so the inside of the BP was continually dusted out. I always wondered and thankfully never found out if BP2 would explode like a grain silo if it were hit with an RPG. First Platoon suffered a casualty during the operation. The Soldier was hit in the upper left side of his chest with a single round from a sniper rifle. He was evacuated to the FOB and then to a field hospital where he recovered.

The problem with BP2's location was while it supported BP1 no other position was able to support BP2. Alpha Company lacked the manpower to occupy positions all over the city and could not support every position. BP2 actually did more harm than good. It forced the enemy out of our established engagement areas and allowed him to regain some of the initiative based off his ability to attack BP2. It also made for two undermanned battle positions rather than one strong one. My ability to maneuver with anything resembling an effective force was drastically reduced based on man power requirements of the two BPs. BP 2 proved to be more of a liability than an asset.

Battle Positions 3 and 4 were manned completely by the Iraqi Army. BP3 was located across the canal on the south western side of the city. This battle position could observe a bridge which had been blown nearly in half by repeated IED detonations. Battle Position 3 later became the CP for the 5th IA battalion assigned to the city. BP3 had a tower on that was about 50 meters from south bridge, the bridge crossing the canal. For force protection at these BPs we provided the sandbags, plywood, netting, and wire for the Iraqi Army to use to fortify them but left it up to the Iraqis to do the actual fortification. A bare minimum of fortification was done and most of the material was either stolen or used for things other than force protection. A lack of leadership pushed forward by the Iraqi Army was the most significant factor. It was rare to ever find an officer on patrol with his unit. Due to the Iraqis' different style of command, the officer is the only one with any real power. Most of the time you would get a squad of nine "Jundi" (soldier in Arabic) instead of another maneuver element.

BPs 3 and 4 were often engaged at night. We would see tracer fire going up at these BPs, but would not see any return fire nor

would the IA element in contact report. Very rarely they would report minor casualties. I determined after launching my strike element several times in support of our Iraqi counterparts that we were being set up for a baited ambush. After we stopped launching every time BP3 or BP4 came in contact, the instances of the BPs being fired on dropped dramatically.

The two towers put up to help secure the IA battle positions were also a subject of contention. The towers themselves were very sturdy. They were made of sections of reinforced concrete and had a heavy roof. The towers had a machine gun mount for the Iraqi's PKC machine gun, and we showed them how to make range cards. The tower near BP3 was the first to be destroyed. The Iraqi who was crewing the tower was simply told to leave by the insurgent forces while a large IED was placed inside the tower and detonated. The Iraqi soldier said he had been attacked by 40 insurgents but never fired his weapon. A week later the tower by BP4 was destroyed in much the same manner. The two Iraqis manning the tower this time were reported kidnapped and the tower destroyed by a large IED. The Iraqis who were kidnapped were found later unharmed. The towers had become icons of American occupation in Hawija and were attacked accordingly. The towers themselves had not hampered the insurgent's ability to conduct operations; it was merely a symbolic gesture.

The JCC was an integral part of Operation Caesar Returns. The JCC provided the communications nucleus between American and Iraqi forces. An MP NCO and his platoon alternated occupying the JCC with the battalion mortar platoon. We were in constant radio contact with the American forces at the JCC. At first we had to coordinate logistics support for our Iraqi Army counter parts through the American forces at the JCC but the IA quickly developed a process of their own. The JCC also helped the IA and IP track their patrols. The MP NCO led many integrated patrols in the city. This helped the IP develop sound tactics as well as establish some type of battle rhythm. The IP got used to going on patrol everyday and it became less difficult to goad them into action. The IP also began launching their own quick reaction forces. The IP would send units to support patrols who were having difficulty, especially around the gas station where civil unrest was the norm. The IP could also radio the JCC who was in direct radio contact with the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) and could request support from our explosives ordinance disposal (EOD) teams or illumination rounds from the battalion mortars.

All the platoons from the company rotated to the BPs. This rotation allowed our forces to take advantage of the battalion's maintenance facilities and the chow hall. Soldiers' morale remained high because they could still call home when we were back on the FOB. This rotation limited the exposure of logistics packages because we would carry all the food water and ammunition we needed on our way out. The company had its own emergency resupply package assembled in case the BPs needed immediate resupply but this package would be carried forward by our own quick reaction force. The platoon that was going to occupy the BPs next would be at REDCON 2 (able to launch in less than 15 minutes) to be used as a QRF or for time sensitive targets. BP1's position in town also provided the company commander with more flexibility in his operations. For company- sized operations we could surge the entire company into town and have

the BP to act as a company command post, casualty collection point, detainee collection point, and forward resupply.

The BP concept effectively took the initiative away from the enemy. The attacker usually maintains the initiative in linear operations but the BP concept forced him to play to our strengths. By forcing the enemy to come to us we negated his ability to blend into the populace, and forced him into our own prepared engagement areas. The positioning of BP1 provided standoff which took away his most effective weapons the RKG-3 and the IED. The enemy could not engage us from any closer than 200 meters and in doing so had to present himself as a target. He could no longer target us with impunity by using remote IEDs. Having dismounts in a position to engage from a prepared defense maximized the useable firepower of the platoon while minimizing the risk to Soldiers.

The concept of BP's manned by dismounted infantry also gave flexibility to the platoon leader and diminished the enemy's ability to pattern us. I was able to launch patrols at times of my own choosing and for specific purposes. This allowed me to patrol at times when it was most effective and patrol only for specific purposes. The most dangerous types of patrols are the long presence patrols in a certain sector. When conducting these types of patrols, it is difficult not to pattern yourself. Patrols of shorter duration increased the Soldiers' vigilance and reduced the amount of time we were exposed to the enemy's most effective weapons. Presence inside town also made our raids more effective. The enemy no longer received reports that we were in town so his early warning system became less effective. At night we could slip out of the BP leaving only the vehicles in place and conduct dismounted patrols which at the time were inherently safer and more effective.

Operation Caesar Returns completely unbalanced the enemy. Denied the ability to target our mounted patrols in terrain that made them vulnerable, he was forced to attack us on more even terms. The attacks against BP1 were not only more resource intensive to the enemy but also more costly in personnel. It was less resource intensive to us because we were not constantly repairing our vehicles after IED strikes. Soldiers preferred the BP to presence

The concept of BP's manned by dismounted infantry also gave flexibility to the platoon leader and diminished the enemy's ability to pattern us. I was able to launch patrols at times of my own choosing and for specific purposes.

patrols because they felt like it put them in a better position to engage the enemy without being vulnerable to weapons they could do little about such as the IED. My Soldiers became adept at recognizing the signs of a coming enemy attack and we were able to interdict these attacks. The BP provided the opportunity for Soldiers to identify a target and shoot first rather than being completely reactive. Two Soldiers, a sergeant and a specialist, were able to spot an RPG team moving into position to attack the BP from TRP 5. The machine gunner noticed the man through the PAS-13 sight on the M240 and brought it to the sergeant's attention. He spotted the same group through his light PAS-13 and identified the RPG as well. The gunner engaged at a range of 500 meters and forced the enemy to withdraw. We are unsure if he killed the RPG gunner because the strike element was supporting IA in contact vicinity of BP 4 and we could not maneuver, but it is encouraging that we were able to shoot first rather than react to enemy action. Our sniper repeatedly spotted threats with his M-24 and engaged before the enemy could fire. In an environment that makes positive identification of a target so difficult the ability to shoot first is a large step towards success. The enemy became more desperate in their attempts to destroy BP1. The most original attack was in the form of an ice cream cart rigged with 57mm rockets that would fire by remote. The first rocket that fired missed wide and capsized the cart causing the rest of the rockets to miss also.

Contact at BP1 dropped to almost nothing during the month of August. This could be due to a myriad of reasons, but I believe that it was due to the enemy's inability to effectively target BP1, and because the mounting cost of his previous operations forced him into a refit cycle. No casualties were suffered inside BP1 and only one at BP2. In comparison to our previous operations, this fact is remarkable especially because of the amount of combat power the enemy dedicated to destroying it. After nearly daily contact for two

months, BP1 was still standing; the enemy was frustrated for the first time. It seemed like a doctrinal oxymoron that going static could in fact turn you into the hunter, but it worked. The IA also benefitted from our example at the BPs and the JCC. They learned how to make range cards, control direct fires, and establish effective rest and refit plans. The IA at BPs 1 and 2 became units that you could count on and use as another maneuver element rather than bystanders. IP forces and IA forces learned to cooperate and launch patrols in support of one another.

Battle positions proved to be very effective in dealing with hostile areas. At BP1 we had the best of both worlds. We had the support of a battalion-sized FOB in close proximity as well as the autonomy of a smaller outpost. What allowed our BP to be so effective was the support structure behind it. One temptation that should be avoided by commanders is to dedicate so much of their force to decentralized battle positions that they are unable to support each other or they lose all flexibility of maneuver because all of their forces are committed. To effectively man BPs in the north side of town would have required an entire other company. The temptation to stretch your forces too thin results in battle positions that are targetable and you set yourself up more for tragedy than for success. There is no such thing as an economy of force when you cannot template the enemy. Battle positions that are supportable and most importantly sustainable are an incredible combat multiplier for larger units operating in that sector.

At the time this article was written, **Captain Eric G. Evans** was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is currently serving as the S-4 for the 2-70 Combined Arms Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas. He was commissioned in May 2004. After completing the Infantry Officers Basic Course and Ranger School he was assigned to A Company, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, as a platoon leader and then company executive officer.

Training Notes

A photograph of a military Humvee driving on a paved road. The vehicle is viewed from the rear, showing a spare tire mounted on the back. In the background, a military helicopter is flying in the sky. The scene is set in a rural or semi-rural area with some vegetation and a hazy sky.

DEFENSIVE AND EVASIVE DRIVER TRAINING

MAJOR RICH R. ROULEAU

Current Army operations in Iraq, primarily those in the larger cities such as Baghdad and Mosul require that our wheeled vehicle drivers be well versed in congested traffic driving techniques. Although we employ measures to keep local traffic away from our vehicles and convoys such as distance warning signs and hand and arm signals, the local population does not always obey. Unless Soldiers are from a large city or have experience driving in heavy urban traffic, they are learning on the fly. Even the most experienced driver will need training to overcome the dangers of driving in a hostile environment. The Army needs to develop a “train-the-trainer” course in evasive and defensive driving techniques, to include practical exercises, for our unit master drivers to follow when conducting training for the inexperienced younger Soldiers prior to their deployment.

Both AR 600-55, *the Army Driver and Operator-Standardization Program (Selection, Training, Testing, and Licensing)*, and FM 21-305, *the Manual for the Wheeled Vehicle Driver*, are deficient in addressing evasive driver training.

The only training resource available to unit commanders for evasive/defensive driving techniques can be found on the U.S.

Army Combat Readiness Training Center Web site in the “Driver’s Training Tool Box ([https://crc.army.mil/drivertraining toolbox/evoTrainingManual.aspx](https://crc.army.mil/drivertraining%20toolbox/evoTrainingManual.aspx)). The site has a copy of the Emergency Vehicle Operators Training Manual, a training manual developed by civilian law enforcement activities, and there are examples of courses taught to Military Police (MP) students. MP driving courses are taught in accordance with AR 600-55 as indicated by the following excerpt:

“Emergency vehicle operators must complete an emergency vehicle training program prior to assuming operator duties, and every 3 years thereafter. This training will include instruction in the subjects outlined in appendix H and will be annotated on DA Form 348, section III, upon completion.”

— AR 600-55 • December 31, 1993

Appendix H of AR 600-55 addresses the Emergency Vehicle Driver Training Course and highlights the requirement but provides nothing that a unit can use. The tasks outlined on the next page may or may not support evasive driving techniques, but currently there is no sample course of instruction that units can follow at home station.

Appendix H of AR 600-55 Emergency Vehicle Driver Training Course

H-2. Program of instruction

- a. Unit A — Introduction, organization of course, and material review.
- b. Unit B — State, local, host nation, and post traffic regulations and laws.
- c. Unit C — Selection of routes and building identification.
- d. Unit D — Use of radios and communications procedures.
- e. Unit E — Emergency vehicle driving.
 - (1) Lights and sirens.
 - (2) Parking and backing.
 - (3) Negotiating traffic.
 - (4) Intersections.
 - (5) Turns.
 - (6) Following distance.
 - (7) Road conditions.
 - (8) Yield right of way.
 - (9) Negotiating curves.
- f. Unit F — Handling unusual situations.
 - (1) Adverse weather.
 - (2) Collisions.
 - (3) Skids.
 - (4) Vehicle malfunctions.
 - (5) Placement of warning devices.
- g. Unit G — Specialized instruction.
 - (1) Section I—Ambulances.
 - (a) Responsibilities.
 - (b) Route planning.
 - (c) Inspection and maintenance of medical supplies and life support equipment authorized for the type of ambulance the individual is being tested for.
 - (d) Driving to the scene.
 - (e) At the scene.
 - (f) Directing traffic.
 - (g) Driving with a patient aboard.
- (2) Section II — Police vehicles.
 - (a) Responsibilities.
 - (b) Emergency communications.
 - (c) Pursuit driving.
 - (d) Making a traffic stop.
 - (e) Emergency escort of another vehicle.
 - (f) Directing traffic.
- (3) Section III — Fire apparatus.
 - (a) Responsibilities.
 - (b) Inspection and maintenance of specialized equipment.
 - (c) Vehicle characteristics.
 - (d) Selecting routes.
 - (e) Operating systems.
 - (f) Special considerations.
- (4) Vehicle dynamics.
- (5) Size and weight.
- (6) Speed.
- (7) Basic control tasks.
 - (a) Steering.
 - (b) Braking.
 - (c) Shifting.
 - (d) Backing.
 - (e) Parking.
 - (f) Intersections.
- h. Unit H — Introduction to driving range and safety briefing.
- i. Unit I — Driving range.
- j. Unit J — Operator's performance evaluation.

FM 21-305: Manual for the Wheeled Vehicle Driver

This manual covers the general principles of non-tactical wheeled vehicle operation. It also describes special instructions for tactical vehicle operation. Military and civilian drivers of government-owned vehicles will use this manual as a guide for safe and efficient operation of a vehicle. Instructions in this manual will help the wheeled vehicle driver maintain a high degree of driving efficiency. This manual does not restrict its contents to any particular vehicle. It is a guide to normal everyday operations and to driving under difficult conditions. When more information is needed for a specific vehicle, check the technical manual written for that vehicle.

Chapter 8, Operating Practices and Maneuvers, should address evasive driving techniques only focuses on driving practices, starting, steering, turning, braking, and stopping, ground guide safety procedures, backing, turning around, parking and the elements of safe driving.

Typically, unit driver's training standard operating procedures (SOPs) will include reviews of the above information with additional training that is unit specific or condition specific such as winter driving. Here is an excerpt from one unit's SOP.

OBJECTIVES: To establish a training program at the squadron and troop level for motor vehicle drivers and equipment operators that promotes the highest

standards of technical proficiency, equipment safety, and driver knowledge.

a. To insure that, at a minimum, the troop master drivers license all the Soldiers that are not in a command position on a high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) within 60 days of arrival under the supervision of the squadron master driver.

b. To teach and/or sustain basic operator skills on motor vehicles and equipment.

c. To instill in vehicle operators and supervisors a safety attitude and a greater sense of pride in his/her assigned equipment.

d. To ensure that Soldiers are aware of all state and post environmental protection and traffic laws.

e. To ensure that Soldiers' motor vehicles and equipment are in proper operational status by complying with proper preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).

f. To promote safety.

Evading Contact

Although some unit's have convoy leader's handbooks and other driving-related unit level products, many focus on breaking contact not evading it.

Several federal agencies and private contractors have programs which emphasize evading contact. One of these programs offered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the Tactical Emergency Vehicle Operators Course (TEVOC).

The TEVOC program instructs new agents and other law enforcement personnel in the basics of defensive driving and emergency vehicle operation techniques. It is used to improve the driving skills and confidence of personnel and reduce the possibility of accidents; students receive classroom instruction in vehicle dynamics, defensive driving principles, and legal and liability issues. Students also are given skill development exercises in skid control, performance driving, and evasive driving techniques. Sending master drivers to the TEVOC or other federally sanctioned courses would assist the Army in building a training base to prepare units for combat driving in the big cities of Iraq.




Figure 1 — Concept Brief for Combat Drivers Assault Course

Combat Drivers Assault Course

Figure 1 is a concept and example of a scaled down/modified version of training a Soldier received while attending a course prior to his unit deploying to Iraq.

The unit named its training course the Combat Drivers Assault Course (CDAC). The following is an example concept brief used by the unit to brief the participants.

The purpose of the course was to improve drivers' survivability in a combat environment. The course consisted of limited classroom training and a series of driving exercises designed to teach drivers new techniques and to instill in them confidence in their abilities.

The training objectives for CDAC were:

- Free a Trapped Vehicle
- Precision Steering
- Precision Backing
- Ramming Techniques*
- React to Contact
- React to Media
- React to Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs)

*This training was trained only in a classroom environment, but not put into practice.

The unit used its post military operations on urban terrain (MOU) site as its training site, and it provided a great setting for the training. The personnel at the site were able to acquire every training aid requested. These included junked cars, telephone poles, tires, 55-gallon drums, and barriers, all of which made the training more realistic. Sound effects (call to prayer, weapons fire, and screams) were used to add realism. The MOU site's theater also proved to be the ideal place to conduct classroom training and after action reviews (AARs).

Old tires were used to provide protection to the vehicles used in training to protect them from unnecessary damage. Tying used

tires to the four corners of the vehicles with parachute cord took about five minutes per vehicle and were very effective in reducing damage suffered during training. Additionally, the vehicles never collided with anything while moving more than 10 miles per hour (mph), and the tires prevented damage to vehicle lights and body. The low-speed collisions included contact with other HMMWVs, junked cars, and 55-gallon drums.

The student-to-instructor ratio is very important in order to provide proper instruction. One instructor for approximately every five students is the desired level. This allowed for smooth rotation of the students and vehicles for each exercise, and it allowed for some instructors to do administrative work for the course (set-up, etc) while the others ran the exercises. The number of instructors also allowed the students to be split into small groups to better use all of the training sites in the limited time available.

Instructors with experience driving HMMWVs are key to the success of this course. Without experienced instructors, the leader certification would have easily taken several days. With the experienced NCOs, the leader certification focused more on the specifics of each exercise. Classroom instruction followed by practical exercises and a written exam completed the certification.

Leader Certification

Unit leaders and trainers are certified in providing this type of instruction. The course instructor teaches unit master drivers the techniques to be trained and certifies them to teach these techniques.

Driver's Training Program

The target audience for this course is drivers of wheeled vehicles (i.e. supply specialist, NBC specialist, and command group drivers). A small group was chosen to ensure the student to instructor ratio was low. Additionally, other units from post sent

Leader Certification

CDAC, Phase I

0900-0945	Overview/Read-ahead Review* (MOUT Clrm)
0945-1030	Media / CA overview
1030-1200	MOUT Site walk / obstacle set-up
1200-1300	Lunch
1300-1310	Motor Pool orientation
1310-1400	Drive Motor Pool exercises (all instructors)
1400-1600	Drive MOUT Site exercises (all instructors)
1600-1700	Revise/Refine/Drive (as required) obstacles and exercises
1700	Return vehicles to Motor Pool

*Instructors are responsible for reading instructor packet before Leader Certification IOT expedite leader training

personnel through the course to develop their own training course. Initially, students were given classroom instruction (the crawl phase) followed by controlled execution in the motor pool with traffic cones (the walk phase), and then advanced execution (the run phase) with an instructor in the vehicle in the urban sprawl of the MOUT site.

The morning of Day 1 included classroom instruction for afternoon execution. Soldiers were trained by on the fundamentals of evasive driving, a serpentine course (as depicted in Figure 2) under controlled conditions and then given a practical exercise (PE) in the afternoon in the MOUT site with typical urban sprawl. Each vehicle used consisted of the driver, the vehicle commander/instructor and two additional students. After each student executed the course, they were immediately AAR'd by the instructor and their peers on the application of the techniques being trained. Soldiers executed numerous iterations of the course and due to the immediate feedback and low student-to-instructor ratio were able to retraining effectively. A sample Day 1 schedule is listed below.

Day 1

CDAC, Phase I

0900-1030	Fundamentals of Evasive Driving/4WD applications (MOUT Classroom)
1030-1200	Media / CA Considerations (MOUT Classroom)
1200-1300	Lunch
1300-1330	Prep Vehicles for Operations (Motor Pool)
1330-1430	Drive Serpentine Course (Motor Pool)
1430-1600	Drive Basic Urban Steering Course (MOUT Site)
1600-1630	Review (MOUT Site)
1630-1700	Return Vehicles to Motor Pool

The morning of Day 2 included the fundamentals of precision backing (Figure 2), lane change (Figure 3), and precision driving courses (Figure 4) under controlled conditions with traffic cones and then given a PE in the afternoon in the MOUT site with typical urban sprawl. Each vehicle used consisted of the driver, the vehicle commander/instructor and two additional students. After each student executed the course, they were immediately AAR'd by the

instructor and their peers on the application of the techniques being trained. Soldiers executed numerous iteration of the course and due to the immediate feedback and low student-to-instructor ratio were able to retraining effectively. A sample Day 2 schedule is listed below.

Day 2,

CDAC, Phase I

0900-0930	Prep Vehicles for Operations
0930-1030	Drive Precision Backing Course (Motor Pool)
1030-1130	Lane Change Exercise (Motor Pool)
1130-1300	Lunch / Course Set-up
1300-1330	Walk Precision Steering Course (Motor Pool)
1330-1500	Drive Precision Steering Course (Motor Pool)
1500-1530	Walk Advanced Urban Steering Course (MOUT Site)
1530-1600	Drive Advanced Urban Steering Course (slow, MOUT Site)
1600-1630	Return Vehicles to Motor Pool

The morning of Day 3 included a review and execution of advanced urban steering, free a trapped vehicle and classroom instruction of evasive driving techniques followed by a PE. Again initial introduction to training was first executed under controlled conditions with traffic cones and then given a PE in the afternoon in the MOUT site with typical urban sprawl. For advance techniques, each vehicle used consisted of the driver and the vehicle commander/instructor. After each student executed the course, they were immediately AAR'd by the instructor and their peers on the application of the techniques being trained. Soldiers executed numerous iterations of the course, and due to the immediate feedback and low student-to-instructor ratio were able to complete retraining effectively. A sample Day 3 schedule is listed below.

Day 3

CDAC, Phase I

0700-0730	Prep Vehicles for Operations (Motor Pool)
0730-0900	Drive Advanced Urban Steering Course (fast, MOUT Site)
0900-0930	Free Trapped Vehicle (MOUT Site)
0930-1000	Evasive Driving Overview
1000-1200	Drive Evasive Driving Exercise (MOUT Site)
1200-1300	Lunch
1300-1600	Drive Evasive Driving Exercise (MOUT Site)
1600-1630	AARs
1630-1700	Move Vehicles to Motor Pool

The purpose of the course was to improve drivers' survivability in a combat environment and with a small student-to-instructor ratio of the first execution CDAC, which was completed in four days. Day 4 was left for retraining, vehicle maintenance, and site clean-up.

Day 4

CDAC, Phase I

0900-1200	Convoy Driving Overview (MOUT Classroom)
1300-1430	AAR (MOUT Classroom)
1430-1700	Clean-up (MOUT Site) / Post-ops PMCS (Motor Pool)




Figure 2 — Serpentine Course




Figure 3 — Precision Backing Course




Figure 4 — Lane Change Exercise




Figure 5 — Precision Steering Course

Again, this training was adaptive to meet the goals of a unit commander based on available resources and knowledge. The following were some of the resources required to execute the training:

Personnel

Instructors: 5x NCO (troop master drivers)
 Set-up/tear down detail: Instructors + 5 Soldiers
 Minimum student-to-teacher ration: 5:1

Land

Classroom: MOUT site classroom
 Urban obstacle course: MOUT site
 Skills area: Motor Pool

Vehicles

1x dedicated medic HMMWV
 5x training HMMWVs

Other

Urban obstacle course:
 20 55-gal. drums (empty) or equivalent
 10 plastic Jersey barriers (empty)
 10 junk vehicles (kept at MOUT site permanently)
 Skills area: 100 road cones/pylons, 18-36" height
 Targets (simulate COBs)

Conclusion

The days of conducting simple operator/driver's training in a sterile environment are gone. Convoy live fires are now a way of life for units preparing to go to combat in Iraq. Even in the third world, urban sprawl and modernization has made defensive or tactical driving in a congested urban environment a fact of military life. Doing so requires the careful application of creative training by unit leaders. This brief article showed how one unit maintains its combat edge by using all the available tools at hand.

Leaders must continue to draw on the experience of its combat veterans, seasoned in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Finally, a unit never stops refining its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in combat drills that improve the unit's ability to meet the challenges of urban operations. This is an example of how one unit made up for inadequacies in Army training as it prepared for combat in Iraq.

Major Rich R. Rouleau is currently assigned to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, as the Light Task Force XO Trainer. He enlisted in the Army National Guard in 1982 and transferred to active duty in 1984 as an M60A1 armor crewman. He has served as a tank platoon leader, company executive officer, and battalion maintenance officer for the 2nd Battalion, 37th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division, and assistant S3, S4 and troop commander of A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division. He also served as an armor/mechanized observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and as S3 and XO for the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Iraq.

A CONCEPT FOR ALL SEASONS

The COE and its Relation to Real-World Events

MAJOR GEORGE STROUMPOS

The contemporary operational environment (COE), introduced in February 2000, has proven surprisingly adept at maintaining its training relevance to the present day. The number of changes and seemingly “new” occurrences in current conflicts are staggering; yet those who understood the COE would have been prepared for just such occurrences. Essentially, those with a thorough grounding in the COE would be able to replicate any real world environment for any preparatory, pre-deployment, training or experimentation purpose. Armed with a thorough understanding of the COE and opposing force (OPFOR) operations and tactics, today’s trainers can prepare the Army for any conflict — both today and tomorrow.

Describing the Environment: A Look at the Revised COE

The contemporary operational environment is the synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations today and in the future. An operational environment (OE) consists of all the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect military operations, to include the application of other instruments of national power within a specific area. An OE is a subset of the COE and is defined as here and to the foreseeable future (determined to be 15 years), according to Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. COE environments described more than 15 years into the future are considered to be the future operational environment (FOE).

The COE is the holistic view of the environment of the conditions that exist within the operational environment that best and most realistically challenge Army units, leaders and Soldiers in the execution of Army and joint tasks (FM 7-100.4, *Opposing Force Organization Guide*). Variables of the COE are used to describe distinct operational environments whether real or contrived for training. The strength of the COE is that it is flexible and scalable, capable of replicating any environment U.S. forces might encounter along the full spectrum of conflict, from a peacetime military engagement to major combat operations. A simple look at the conditions as they exist in the world today will give an observer a series of considerations to prepare and train our Army for successful engagements, regardless of contingency.

The COE was based on a few key assumptions. First, we will not be able to predict what and where, with any degree of confidence, the threats are we must train for in the near- to mid-term. Second, the missions of the Army are widespread and disparate, covering the range of operations including disaster relief, nation building, full spectrum conflict, or a conglomeration of all three occurring simultaneously.

When introduced, the COE initially used 11 variables to describe the operational environment. Due to how Joint doctrine describes the respective parts of an OE, these 11 variables were changed, adopting the Joint OE framework of PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. In an effort to ensure a complete capture of the environmental conditions that the Army would face, the Army adds +PT (physical environment and time) to the framework of analysis. As a memory aid to ensure consideration of all the variables in describing an OE, one uses the acronym PMESII+PT to fully describe a COE environment.

Revised, though fundamentally unchanged, the new COE variables still maintain all of the original variable considerations, albeit packaged in a more ubiquitously accepted context. To understand the power of the COE, we must first understand the interacting variables — what they mean and their effects. Included is a brief overview of the OE and COE variables for reference. Each description captures the gist of the variable as it is currently defined. A more in-depth look at the variables and their effects can be found in FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the soon to be published FM 3-0.2.

The Variables of the COE: PMESII+PT

Political (P): This variable provides an overview of the political system and political power within an OE. In essence, the nature of political authority within the state refers to all actors within an OE with political authority and the degree of legitimacy. The political variable includes the analysis of all relevant political, economic, military, religious or cultural mergers and/or partnerships of the key entities of a given OE. Another aspect this variable deals with is the idea of “national will” in the political sense.

Military (M): This variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given OE. This includes conventional forces, police forces and special forces and these capabilities typically include equipment, manpower, training levels, resource constraints and leadership issues. The variable focuses on an actor’s ability to field forces and leverage them for use domestically, regionally or globally. Moreover, the variable also analyzes the flexibility, innovation, and adaptability of an actor.

Economic (E): The economic variable provides an overview of the economic conditions/indicators within an OE. A study of this variable establishes the boundaries between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Control of and access to natural or strategic resources are also considered as this can cause conflict. Being able to affect another actor, positively or negatively, through economic not military means, may become the key to regional

hegemonic status or dominance. Economic deprivation is also a major cause of conflict. One actor may have economic superiority over another for many reasons, including access to natural resources or power.

Social (S): A social system is the people, groups, and social institutions of a society, with shared characteristic values and beliefs, which are organized, integrated and networked by relationships, interacting within their environment. A subset of this variable, culture, is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one another. This variable includes the cultural, religious and ethnic makeup of a given OE. Analysis is conducted on the network of social institutions, statuses, and roles that support, acculturate, and enable individuals.

Information (I): The information variable discusses the nature, scope, and characteristics of the information environment of a given OE. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information technology systems, both civilian and military, by an entity (state or non-state). Understanding whatever communication infrastructure exists is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the threat. Moreover, communication availability acts as a leveling function with regards to mitigating our technical advantages to a surprising extent.

Infrastructure (I): The infrastructure system is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. The degradation or destruction of infrastructure will impact the entire OE, especially the political, military, economic, social, and information variables. This variable also reflects the technological sophistication of a given OE. Technology encompasses the ability of an actor to conduct research and development (R&D) and capitalize on such research for both civil and military purposes. The variable reflects the technological level of the OE in terms of sectors of technological success or

advancement, scientific and research institutions, technology acquisition policies and the education and training facilities that support the acquisition of technology.

Physical Environment (P): The physical environment defines the physical circumstances and conditions surrounding and influencing the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea and space. The defining factors are complex terrain and urban settings (super-surface, surface and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology and environmental conditions.

Time (T): The variable of time influences military operations within an OE in terms of the decision cycle, tempo of operations and overall planning; it may also influence popular support for operations, success of operations and final victory. How much time is available and how long events might take will affect every aspect of military planning, to include force package development, force flow rate, quality of intelligence preparation of the area of operations, and the need for forward-deployed forces and logistics. Time is the one variable that is invariably unfavorable to us.

A deeper look at "M" — the threat: the capabilities-based, thinking enemy

Gone are the "space invader" armies of yesterday: predictable, mechanized and well understood formations. Today's threat is extremely lethal, adaptive and capable of reaching niche parity or superiority with our own force capabilities. Moreover, this threat is innovative, leveraging adaptive tactics in an effort to negate our military superiorities and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The thinking, capabilities-based and adaptive threat is, and will likely be, the threat norm for our nation's military forces — today and in the foreseeable future. A merely cursory study of our most elusive and stubborn threats demonstrates this reality. COE accommodates this new reality.

For example, no one on September 10, 2001, would have easily foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan and the speedy

defeat of the Taliban three months later. Moreover, five years on, few could truly have foreseen a resurgent Taliban, successfully employing guerilla tactics, either. Our inability to predict future conflict enhances the value of the COE. Also, the COE conceptual framework reflects much of the "new" tactics that have been employed recently, in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq with an astonishing degree of accuracy.

Originally proposed in the February 2000 white paper "Capturing the Operational Environment," adversaries will opt to avoid conventional maneuver battles with U.S. forces, seeking to draw U.S. forces piecemeal into urban fights — which constrain precision guided munitions (PGM) employment and truncates our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), limiting our standoff capabilities. Additionally, the threat will employ effective asymmetric countermeasures to increasingly nullify our technological prowess.

Adversaries understand the power of adaptation and, as a result, will continuously change their tactics to try to gain advantage over U.S. forces. Perhaps the threat's greatest success today is the threat's adroit use of mass media to attack the U.S. national will. Ironically, though not specifically predicted, much of recent years' activity and asymmetric threats have been presciently foretold by COE: from unique environmental conditions and influences, operational restrictions and challenges, to threat tactics and niche capabilities.

The Operational Environment Assessment

To help trainers analyze, then incorporate the different variables of an OE into conditions for training, including relevant threat capabilities, Training and Doctrine Command - Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (TRADOC DCSINT) publishes a series of operational environmental assessments (OEA) to help the training base accurately and correctly replicate the appropriate training environment.

OEAs are assessments of OEs in specific geographic areas. They help trainers replicate conditions of a specific OE in a training environment for mission rehearsal or deployment. They are an encyclopedic look at an environment, providing a full view of all variables present in an environment, their interactions, and the possible manifestations of those variables. OEAs also provide another helpful feature: predictive events based upon analysis of conditions three, six and 12 months into the future based on analyzed trends in the specific OEs variables.

While intended to support mission rehearsal or contingency training, these OEAs have in some cases provided significant insights that help deployed units understand their particular OE. OEAs also serve as examples of how to use an analysis of the PMESII+PT variables to gain a holistic understanding of any specific OE. Using the OEA, trainers can not only replicate today's conditions, but tomorrow's as well — all without using today's news as a training aid (still a disappointingly common practice). Instead, using the future trends analysis of the OEA, we can anticipate and train for tomorrow's challenges while not being tied to the present day threat tactics and techniques.

Presently, DCSINT has produced OEAs for OIF, OEF, North Korea, and Azerbaijan. Other OEAs are currently under development for other locations.

A Matter of Description: the Range of Environments Possible Using the PMESII+PT Framework

Although OEAs are instrumental in helping trainers replicate an environment, today and in the future, it is not necessary to have an OEA to create a training environment. A solid knowledge of the COE framework empowers trainers to design their own training environments. To do this, trainers must simply define the PMESII+PT variables to create a relevant environment for the specific training conditions desired.

The environments capable of description are widespread and limitless. From a

potential future environment to the environments of today's conflicts and events, the OE framework enables any environment, whether real or imagined, to be replicated or created. The most demonstrative examples of this capability can be seen in COE framework's ability to accurately describe disparate, though recent, world events. Events such as the tsunami rescue missions in Indonesia, Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts, and the Israeli/Hizbollah conflict can all be described using the PMESII+PT variables. To do this, a trainer needs to capture descriptions of the individual variables. Using the COE framework, all of these real-world conditions could also be combined to create an excruciatingly challenging training environment.

To demonstrate the resilience of our COE, a dissection of a real world event using the PMESII+PT variables is in order: specifically the Israeli/Hizbollah conflict (See figure 1). Although this conflict was unique (state vs. paramilitary or non-state actor), the tactics and techniques used against the Israeli Defense Forces by Hizbollah are not new. Indeed, the majority of the Hizbollah militia strategy and tactics are more than adequately described by the FM 7-100 series on COE OPFOR (FM 7-100.1, .2, .3), respectively. The uniqueness of the Lebanese conflict arises from the confluence of events and the Israeli reaction to those events, not the threat's (Hizbollah's) courses of action or tactics. A look at how the variables are described illustrates this point and the power of our COE framework of analysis.

Once an environment is described, whether real or artificial, the environment described can and should be modified to fit the unit commander's specific training objectives. This is a key capability of the COE framework: the ability to create any training environment imaginable, governed solely by a unit's training objectives.

This flexibility is embedded in the COE framework. Within COE, training objectives play the dominant role in the creation of the training environment. For instance, if a commander desired more non-

lethal effects to be trained, a trainer could augment existing OEA variables or create their own social, political, economic and possibly infrastructure variables to accommodate the training scenario. Such an artificial combined environment could challenge both a unit's lethal and non-lethal capabilities in a realistic and synergistic manner. Although this is a simplistic example, the possibilities for adoption or creation of a training environment are truly limitless.

The recent revisions to the OE chapter of FM 3-0 (the adoption of the PMESII+PT framework) have only increased the capability of the COE framework to describe accurate, realistic training conditions for the Army and other services in a joint context. It is a powerful framework, able to create challenging, realistic training environment for any Army contingency. Incorporation of appropriate manifestations of the OE variables, including a flexible, adaptive OPFOR, capable of countering or negating US military and technical prowess, is a realistic and necessary facet in our training exercises. Future threats, though not yet fully described or comprehended, are both lethal and capable. Understanding the current OE framework and COE OPFOR operations and tactics will enable Army units and their commanders to cope with myriad threats and challenges that we face today and in the future. The COE framework's importance and relevance in our training methodologies cannot be overstated.

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Figure 1 — COE Description of the Israeli/Hizbollah Conflict, 2006

Political (P): Hizbollah is a non-state actor that has integrated itself in to the legitimate Lebanese government. The militia maintains political control of 21 percent of the Lebanese municipalities and holds 11 percent of the Lebanese parliament seats, and two cabinet positions. The organization is a state within a state — meaning that Hizbollah can initiate any sort of unilateral action outside of the Lebanese government influence. Conversely, however, the Lebanese government cannot act without Hizbollah's consent and influence. As such, the Lebanese government will be reluctant to interfere with Hizbollah activities and, at times, actively seek to leverage its international standing in support of the Hizbollah. National will is held exclusively by the Hizbollah organization. As an organization, the militia will fight with a "kill or be killed" mentality, using every resource at its disposal to thwart Israel. Moreover, its regional relationship with Iran provides the organization maximum flexibility in maintaining its independence from Lebanon or any other state.

Military (M): The militia is essentially a stateless army, possessing a wide variety of military arms and capabilities. Their typical weapons are ATGMs and small arms. Additionally, Hizbollah has built a strong fire support capability with large quantities of rockets and launchers. They possess robust ISR capability, to include UAV and a redundant C2 capability. Internal weapons production capability and extra regional assistance in the form of weapons and training has enabled the militia to assess, design and build a defense in depth: a series of mutually supporting positions and redundant C2. Hizbollah fields a force of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 active fighters in Southern Lebanon with a large reserve/auxiliary pool of supporters who provide intelligence, logistics support and a fighting augmentation capability for the main force.

Economic (E): Southern Lebanon is still a very fragile economy due to its recent occupation by Israel and its ongoing reconstruction efforts. Hizbollah has inserted itself into Southern Lebanon by providing relief services and reconstruction assistance. The total lock on municipality control in the Southern part of the country prevents any economic activity except Hizbollah sanctioned works and activities. Providing the primary source of economic support in the region, Hizbollah enjoys widespread popular support. The organization itself does not internally possess the resources for such activity and is heavily subsidized by both the Iranian and Syrian governments.

Social (S): Lebanese society is fractious and extremely diverse. Active religions in the Southern part of the country include Christianity, Sunni and Shi'a Islam. Shi'a Muslims

comprise the majority religious concentration followed by Sunni and Christian Druse populations. Among groups there is a tenuous relationship and mutual suspicion. A large degree of nationalist sentiment has reduced these tensions, but they are present during periods of heavy stress and difficulty.

Information (I): Hizbollah maintains a large information operations establishment in Southern Lebanon. They possess active television, radio, newspapers and, since they control the municipalities in the South, the militia also controls the official sources of news, information and propaganda. Their unique relationship with the Lebanese government provides the militia with an international information operations capability as well. Domestically, the political arm of Hizbollah has engaged in direct humanitarian support for decades, ensuring an enduring relationship with the populace. Those that are not swayed are targeted or pressured through non-lethal means to support the militia. Domestically and internationally, the Hizbollah militia possesses ample capability to shape information operations against any regional or extra-regional adversary with a high degree of prowess and skill. Their media apparatus is well-suited to manipulating information to achieve their strategic aims.

Infrastructure (I): Though urbanized, much of Southern Lebanon's geography can be characterized by urban blight, congestion and poor infrastructure.

Physical Environment (P): The terrain is that of rolling hills with numerous urban built up areas and towns. These towns are within mutual supporting distance of each other and are densely populated. The Litani River separates the southern part of the country from northern Lebanon and provides the only true physical obstacle separating the two regions.

Time (T): Hizbollah has spent more than six years planning and preparing for a defense in-depth of Southern Lebanon. The majority of their efforts have been invested into this endeavor with the primary purpose of complicating and stifling any sort of high-tech, combined arms operations. The goal of these efforts is to create a never-ending "quagmire" effect, causing the Israeli army to become locked into an extended, protracted conflict — costly in terms of both money and time. Internationally, the pressure of time forces Israeli forces to seek a quick, succinct victory, since the international community, the press and Israeli citizens will not tolerate a long drawn out conflict in the region. All aspects of the Hizbollah planning have taken these vulnerabilities into account to create a prolonged conflict with little definitive resolution.

ROGERS' RANGERS STANDING ORDERS REVISITED

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RETIRED) MICHAEL E. REICHARD

Major Robert Rogers' Standing Orders are viewed as questionable in origin, colorful, but obsolete lessons from an era when the fastest message moved at the speed of a horse and rider, and when the bow and arrow (a weapon from the dawn of man) was superior in many respects to the matchlock, musket, and rifle. (The bow and arrow was silent, still operated in the rain or when wet, fired faster, and ammo and parts were only as far as the nearest hardwood tree).

Upon closer examination, these 19 orders, which were forged in frontier combat around Fort Carillon/Ticonderoga, still provide relevant guidance for the platoon or squad leader taking a patrol through the back alleys of Baghdad.

Translation follows:

1. Don't forget nothing. A military mission has many component tasks. So we don't forget something we use the eight-step Troop Leading Procedures, the five-paragraph operations order (OPORD), standard operating procedures, and battle drills.

2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, tomahawk scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning. The self discipline of each Soldier maintaining his weapon, equipment, supplies, and being physically fit to march at a minute's warning are a big part of unit readiness. His leader's duty is still to inspect but the Soldier will be ready and no time is lost on remedial action. "...at a minute's warning." refers to a good intelligence and communication network.

3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first. Camouflage, situational awareness, and noise and light discipline are key in stealthy movement. By stealth you will be able to "see the enemy first." You then have the advantage and option to attack or evade and bypass.

4. Tell the truth about what you see



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and what you do. There is an Army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the RANGERS, but never lie to a RANGER or an officer. This is the collection of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and accurate SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment) reports. Report only what is actually seen, heard, smelled, or touched — no more, no less.

5. Don't take a chance you don't have to. Know yourself and your unit's capabilities and limitations, and employ them accordingly.

6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men. This order refers to formation and order of movement on foot and in vehicles. Keep your interval, don't bunch up, watch your sector, and communicate (hand/arm signals and radio).

7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it is hard to

track us. No beeline movements (even in the air). Try to deceive the enemy as to your real destination and intention(s).

8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us. Time is a precious resource, don't waste it. Time, when measured as daylight/darkness, the tides, or an approaching storm, has a profound effect on one's ability to fight and navigate. Keep time on your side.

9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps. Security first, always. Part of your squad or platoon should always be ready to fight 24/7.

10. If we take prisoners, we keep'em separate till we have time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em. Remember the five S's: Secure, Search, Silence, Segregate, and Safeguard.

11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed. Don't be predictable. Your routines, patterns, and habits can be used against you. A convoy of four up-armored HMMWVs leave FOB Able every two days traveling northeast at 50 mph with an interval of 150 meters between vehicles. Each vehicle has a mounted .50 cal with shield and a gunner, driver, and front-seat passenger. The destination is Log Base Easy, which is 110 miles away. They spend an hour at LB Easy then make a return trip. Sooner or later, what do you think will happen? Returning from the objective your Soldiers will be also fatigued, and as they get closer to friendly lines there is a tendency to think they're safe and they will lessen vigilance. DON'T let them get complacent!

12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out. Three hundred and sixty-degree security is essential during all movements and halts as well as while in assembly areas and in patrol bases. Get in that combat

frame of mind and be ready to fight at all times. Scouts to the front and flanks, advance guard, main body, and rear guard. The main body never makes unexpected contact.

13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force. Always make a contingency/five-point plan and designate rally points.

14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries. Establish priorities of work; number one should be security. Then, post observation posts/listening posts (OP/LPs), assign team/squad sectors, position crew served weapons, and send out patrols.

15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack. Know your enemy, learn their tactics and their habits.

16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford. Use OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach), METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians), map and aerial recons to spot danger areas. Don't let terrain force you into a position of disadvantage in respect to the enemy. Properly utilize your intelligence assets.

17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you. You take your tactics and adapt them from what you have learned about the enemy and strike them when and where they least expect it.

18. Don't stand up when the enemy is coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, or hide behind a tree. Fight smart use cover and concealment, individual, buddy, and team fire and maneuver techniques, and marksmanship to defeat your enemy.

19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your tomahawk (hatchet?). Use your weapons and weapon systems in depth like they were designed to be used and include courage and discipline. Don't falter, break, or run. Train realistically and often with your equipment and unit. It builds skill and confidence. With the will and the skill you will WIN!

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Michael E. Reichard completed 28 years of Regular Army and Reserve service. As a civilian, he spent 18 years in various assignments within Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. As part of the Retired Reserve, he is attached to the University of Florida Army ROTC Cadre.

Book Reviews



Avenging Eagles: Forbidden Tales of the 101st Airborne Division in World War 2.

By Mark Bando. Detroit: Mark Bando Publishing, 183 pages, \$33, hardcover. Reviewed by Randy Talbot, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command historian.

Mark Bando's sixth book, *Avenging Eagles: Forbidden Tales of the 101st Airborne Division in World War 2*, is an engrossing, gripping, fast-paced rendering of one of the most celebrated units in the U.S. Army. Bando is a historian worthy of praise, as *Avenging Eagles* shows the value of oral history interviewing and recording. The use of official historical reports and documents combined with vignettes by actual participants in a narrative style make this book a great read. For Bando, this is the culmination of almost 40 years work as an interviewer of nearly 1,000 "Screaming Eagles," as recorder, reporter, chronicler, and author for the 101st Airborne.

World War II still holds a fascination in the American psyche; maybe this is because life and warfare seemed less complicated then than it does now. With our nation once again engaged in a long war with an uncertain conclusion, is there anything new to learn from those who went to war more than 60 years ago? What made the Airborne troopers of World War II suffer such horrendous losses in combat, yet continue to fight and accomplish their missions? Bando's work offers insight into these questions as *Avenging Eagles* takes the reader through the uncertain and chaotic beginnings of the division, its training, and eventual first exposure to combat operations: Normandy.

Avenging Eagles is more than another history of this unit; it is a tribute to the tenacity, courage, and leadership abilities of the Airborne veterans, those who volunteered for a new and untested concept in American military history. Central to this work is the "unsanitized version of the unusual, offbeat and unfortunate events of the 101st." It is through these vignettes that Bando reaches the heartbeat of his work, the "Soldier's Story" — the incidents and experiences that combat veterans talk about amongst themselves,

not to outsiders. Second, the use of oral history interviews confirm many of the stories in this work, some that are hard to read, others teaming with "gallows humor" from those who faced death the moment they jumped into a hail of bullets and enemy fire. Finally, an underlying theme throughout *Avenging Eagles* centers on the impact of leadership on raw troopers about to face the ordeals of combat for the first time. There is a commonality in the selection of stories and characters that military members and veterans can identify with from their own service.

Calling training for the 101st tough is an understatement; it was at times cruel and sadistic, but there was also a sense of fear instilled in the 18 to 20 year olds. Failure to complete all phases of training — especially qualifying jumps — led to the embarrassment of dropping out and reassigned to the "leg" infantry. Leaders believed that self-sacrifice in training would carry over to the battlefield. They trained their men to believe they were gods, better than anyone else in the Army. Of course, this swagger led to many incidents of Soldiers proving themselves against the other services, often with disastrous and near riotous consequences.

Training hoped to instill a sense of discipline in what was a "pick-up" team. All were volunteers and though many "washed-out," still many more were sent packing due to prejudice, something one troop recalled cost the division a lot of killers needed for combat.

Training increases physical abilities and endurance. It also teaches combat skills for battlefield survivability. However, one officer chastised training since there were no operational plans or regimental exercises, and "what we knew about tactics wouldn't fit on a postage stamp." This officer believed that success and finally victory on the battlefield is attributed to the individual Soldier, not to leadership and their inability to teach them survival skills — skills that would cost men's lives in Normandy.

From the time that the paratroopers approached their drop zones, things

started to go awry. Transport pilots missed the drop zones; some due to evasive action that threw them off course, others in a hurry to get rid of their load and head back to base. Troopers were shot out of the sky, others were stuck in trees or butchered where they landed, many with their own weapons. Ordered not to fire their weapons in the drop zone areas and not to take prisoners for the first two days, many troopers found themselves in both a moral and ethical dilemma.

Every Soldier's experience in combat is a highly personalized recollection of events; actions and reactions are unpredictable in the chaos of battle. Many can be in an area where something happens but only a few actually see it happen. This is very indicative of the airborne trooper who may have fought alone for days, evading and escaping the enemy while trying to find his way back to the lines. Many would not leave their buddies while others who were evacuated found a way back to continue the fight. There was a bond of brotherhood amongst the Normandy survivors — a bond that exists to this day. Their bond has become more than a legacy for generations of warfighters following in their footsteps. It is the essential key element that kept them together, that saw them not only survive, but overcome some of the most intense combat battles of World War II.

Avenging Eagles adds to that legacy by providing past and present combat commanders and leaders a primer on leadership, ethical conduct in wartime, and the importance of the impact of their orders. Through their actions and reactions, their behavior, "boys will be boys" antics, and moral courage and character, these stories by the veterans of the "Screaming Eagles" do not paint them as angels, far from it. However, it is the willingness of World War II veterans over the years to share their mistakes and fears that adds to the "toolbox" of the current combat leader to lead his troops through the most difficult times in combat operations.

***War, Terror and Peace in the Qur'an and in Islam: Insights for Military and Government Leaders.* By T.P. Schwartz-Barcott. Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2004, 401 pages,**

\$26.95. Reviewed by Brigadier General (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

In the preface to the book, former Central Command Commander in Chief Marine Corps General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni points out the weakness in our national and military decision making in not being sufficiently aware of the history and culture of possible opponents. We need to be more aware of what motivates them so as not to be caught by surprise or expect them to share the same values.

Americans have not been void of exposure to Islam. We learned about the Crusades and the infidels in Sir Walter Scott's *Waverly Novels*. In high school, students learn about the wars with the Barbary pirates. In World War II, we landed on the shores of Algeria and Morocco. Our return to the Islamic world at that time started a tide of engagement that has hit a present peak.

There is a need now more than ever to realize that we have an enemy who doesn't play by the same rules. Why? The influence of the Koran is a partial answer. The author dissects that holy book in an attempt to show its applicability to current actions. There is perhaps an embarrassment of riches here as well as a minimizing of the other factors that shape culture and consequent conduct. The direction of individual and group behavior starts with the environment — the shape of the terrain and its resources and the climate. From these come ethnicity and social and economic institutions, which take such forms as nationalism and imperialism.

The book analyzes Muslim warfare through the ages to better understand behaviors in combat. This is intended to make our leaders better informed and realistic in dealing with matters of war, terror, and peace.

This is useful, but does not stand alone. There is a wealth of information on the subject, of which the bibliography only taps the surface. There are several special values to this effort. It gives a good summary of Muslim conflicts including naval actions. There could have been more maps, but those provided are helpful. There also also 10 tables and figures which clarify the text.

Overall, this is a book to be read selectively. There is much material not essential to the usual reader. I would

supplement it with more material on sociological motivation, but that's a matter of individual need.

***Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.* By Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006, 603 pages, \$27.95.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

There have been few recent books that have caused the early stir and release anticipation that *Cobra II* did. This anticipation also brought a great deal of high expectations for the book. I believe all this pre-release "hype" stemmed from two factors. First, there is simply a large amount of interest on any book involving operations in Iraq. This interest is peaked even more, when a book claims to have the inside story on the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Second, was the superb reputation of authors Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor. In particular, their collaboration on the first Gulf War (*The General's War*) was highly regarded by both readers and critics alike. Thus, when you combine current, emotional subject matter with authors who have an established pattern of excellence, you have a book that will greatly intrigue potential readers.

I, too, shared the anticipation and had the same high expectations as many others. After reading the initial chapters, I quickly found the volume was certainly worth the wait. More importantly, as I turned each page, I discovered the book was meeting most of my expectations. There was no doubt that Gordon and Trainor had crafted yet another excellent history.

In *Cobra II*, the authors seek to detail the planning, preparation, and execution of the invasion and initial occupation of Iraq. They state their objective (in the book's forward) as, "Our mission was not to offer up a slice of the war, to cover the action of a single unit, or to concentrate exclusively on the decision-making in Washington. Instead, we sought to prepare a contemporary history of the entire conflict with all of its complexity, to relate the planning behind closed doors, the bloodletting on the battlefield, and the

parallels among disparate battles, and to provide a comprehensive account and rationale of the foreign policy strategy, generalship, and fighting.” Truly, this is an ambitious goal, especially considering how recent these events took place. However, I believe the authors succeeded in most of their lofty aspirations.

Cobra II is organized into three sections. In section one, the authors go into succinct detail into the planning and foreign policy jockeying that led to the invasion. They provide readers with a solid background of the recent history between the United States and Iraq and then delve into the decisions and personalities that led to the attack. The second portion of the book focuses on the combat operations of the attack. The final section of the volume touches on the initial occupation of Iraq and Phase IV operations.

Trainor and Gordon have written a book that contains numerous strengths. Perhaps, the first that will immediately become apparent to readers is the exhaustive research the authors conducted in writing the book. This research includes dozens of personal interviews they conducted with leaders and Soldiers at all levels and the use of various unpublished military planning documents to add detail. This research is reflected in a substantial notes section and an appendix section that holds dozens of planning documents previously unreleased. Most readers will agree that *Cobra II* is one of the best researched books they have read.

The second strength of the book is the ability of the authors to discuss many controversial decisions and topics and provide analysis. These include the reasons to invade Iraq, troop levels to initiate and conduct the invasion, and the amount and detail of planning to conduct Phase IV operations. Additionally, Gordon and Trainor focus on the civilian and military leaders and provide accolades and criticism as appropriate.

Another key strength of the book is the skill in which the authors are able to move throughout the levels of war during their discussion of combat operations in Iraq. Gordon and Trainor translate decisions made at the strategic level and how they were then fought at the operational and tactical levels. The authors’ treatment of actions on the ground is particularly effective as they continue to shift from actions between the Army and the Marines

as they raced to Baghdad. I must admit that the focus at the “foxhole” level was something I wasn’t expecting and was an excellent bonus.

I believe the biggest strength of the book (related to the authors’ ability to provide analysis) is the volume’s epilogue. In it, the authors address areas (both in the military and political realm) that they feel hindered operations on the ground and the subsequent Phase IV operations. You may agree or disagree with the authors’ views, but they are without a doubt, thought-provoking.

Despite these and many additional strengths not covered in this review, there was one area that could have been improved in my opinion, and that was the scope of the book itself. As highlighted in the book’s title, the volume promises to address the occupation of Iraq. It is not the fault of the authors, but due to the publication date of the book, the occupation was in its opening period. Thus, the authors merely whet the appetite of their readers in this discussion. I contend that Gordon and Trainor should have postponed this treatment for possibly a future book. I simply felt this was taking on a little too much.

In summary, *Cobra II* is a superb book. There is no question that it has set the current standard for books of this genre. This is especially true for books focusing on the planning and invasion of Iraq. As is the case with many earlier histories, over time many more sources will become available and consequently, more definitive histories will be published. However, until that time, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor have provided the reading public with a superb service. It is a book that will inform, bring about emotions, and simply make people think “what if?” For me, there is nothing more I can ask for in a book.

***All American All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II.* By Phil Nordyke. St. Park, MN: Zenith Press, 2005, 868 pages, \$35.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Albert N. Garland and Patricia A. Weekley.

There is little question as to the author’s primary objective: “This is the story of the 82nd Airborne Division during World War

II, told in the words of those courageous men who fought in some of history’s most critical battles.” Along the way to completing this massive book, the author, a retired high-tech industry official, pulls together more than 900 oral and written statements to give us a readable history of the division’s training and 171 combat days. In order to be able to do that pulling together, Nordyke had to do a tremendous amount of research in mounds of material and by visits to the division’s battlegrounds in Europe. This effort is amply documented in his chapter notes and bibliography.

Unfortunately, while plugging away at this task, Nordyke apparently became enamored with his subject; this shows throughout the book, from the beginnings at Fort Benning to the end of the war in Europe and the occupation of Germany and confrontations with the Russians. Thus, at the beginning, Nordyke believes Colonel Jim Gaven, commander of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, proved himself to be head and shoulders above any other commander in the division, including Colonel Reuben Tucker, commander of the 504th PIR. Tucker protested vigorously when the 505th was chosen to make the first drop in Sicily in July 1943. From this time on, Gavin could do no wrong.

Then, Nordyke believes the fighting qualities of the 82nd troopers were such as to be held “in awe” by any U.S. unit that served in combat with or near them, and even by some German units that opposed the division.

I am terribly sorry to say that, as a member of the 84th Infantry Division, I did not hold “in awe” any of the airborne divisions in Europe except maybe their extra pay. My troops felt the same, but if we held anything in awe it was the Corcoran boots — the leather boots issued only to airborne Soldiers — while we had to wear the worst boots any combat Soldier ever had to wear.

These are but a few examples of what I mean to imply about Nordyke’s approach. So, if you like to read a lot of war stories while learning only a little history (i.e., Operations Giant I and II), this book is for you. One final point: To the day — I am not airborne — I do not believe Colonel Tucker and his 504th Soldiers ever received the recognition they deserved.



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IN THE NEXT ISSUE:

*** The Two Sides of the COIN: Applying FM 3-24 to the Brigade and Below Counterinsurgency Fight**



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