

PB 7-06-4

Infantry

July-August 2006

A photograph of an infantry unit in a field. In the center, a large military vehicle, possibly an M113, is parked on a dirt road. Two soldiers in full combat gear are walking towards the camera on either side of the vehicle. The background shows a flat, open landscape under a clear sky.

**Infantry
in Battle:**

**Soldiers Training and Fighting to Win
the Global War on Terrorism**

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI
Commandant, The Infantry School


RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor

MICHELLE J. ROWAN
Deputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRD
Editorial Assistant

FRONT COVER:

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment guide a Stryker through rough terrain during a mission in Baghdad Aug. 10. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Martin A. Edgil, USN)



BACK COVER:

A group of 101st Airborne Division Soldiers pause at the end of patrol near Wyoat, Iraq, Sept. 8. (U.S. Army photo)

This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Peter J. Schoomaker
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0623301

Distribution: Special

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Infantry

JULY-AUGUST 2006

Volume 95, Number 4

FEATURES

- 26 IMPROVING ARMY MARKSMANSHIP: REGAINING THE INITIATIVE IN THE INFANTRYMAN'S HALF KILOMETER**
Lieutenant Colonel David Liwanag
- 33 GUARD PLATOON ASSISTS WITH HURRICANE RELIEF EFFORTS**
First Lieutenant Paola Sica

DEPARTMENTS

- 1 COMMANDANT'S NOTE**
- 2 INFANTRY NEWS**
- 8 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER**
- 11 PROFESSIONAL FORUM**
 - 11 THE PLATINUM 10: 2ND BCT, 101ST AIRBORNE IMPROVES MEDICAL TRAINING TO SAVE LIVES**
Major Craig W. Bukowski
 - 16 MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS**
Captain Ren Angeles
 - 18 WARRIOR, PROPHET, PRIEST: THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF CHAPLAINS TO THE WAR EFFORT AND COMMUNITY**
Stephen Muse, PhD
Chaplain (Colonel) Glen L. Bloomstrom
 - 23 SPYMASTER: FORMER EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF DISCUSSES WAR OF IDEAS OF 1950-70'S.**
Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN
- 42 TRAINING NOTES**
 - 42 ESTABLISHING A TRAINING CENTER FOR DIYALA BORDER ENFORCEMENT**
Captain Joseph Wise
 - 46 WEAPONS CORNER: SNIPER RIFLES**
 - 48 THE LOGIC OF FAILURE**
G. Gabriel Serbu
- 51 BOOK REVIEWS**
- 53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION**

• **INFANTRY** (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail rowanm@benning.army.mil. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. • **POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.** • USPS Publication No. 370630.

Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

SHARING INFORMATION TO WIN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The contemporary operational environment (COE) is as uncertain as it is violent, and every bit as complex as any we have faced before. Our Soldiers and leaders have learned to operate and win in it, and they are sharing their lessons learned with us every day. Closing with and destroying an enemy who uses asymmetric means to fight is far from simple, but our adaptability is making a difference. Adaptability has been part of the American character since the earliest days of the Republic, and today it is an integral part of the training our warriors receive at the Infantry School. Adaptability and innovation go hand in hand, and Soldiers in combat quickly learn what works and what does not, just as they learn to recognize the patterns of the enemy and anticipate his next move. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed and refined in theater today are passed to our doctrine writers, system developers, and trainers and will positively affect how we prepare for future battles.

The professional education of Soldiers and leaders was already ingrained in our Army when Axis armies and their allies were still focused on fielding obedient masses directed by a cadre of leaders. When Lieutenant Colonel George Catlett Marshal was Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School in 1927-1932, American Army leaders were taught *how* to think, rather than *what* to think; that continues to this day. Professional education relies heavily upon reading, thinking, and reflecting, and we are systematically review and revise our list of recommended readings to ensure it provides the right menu for that education. The list includes books on counterinsurgency, cultural awareness, infantry operations, and leadership. The complete list will be published in *Infantry Magazine*, posted on our Web site, and the books made available in the Infantry School library and bookstore.

Another crucial skill required by the COE that requires a comprehensive, realistic training strategy is marksmanship. A Soldier and his weapon must be inseparable; it is his means of mission accomplishment and his survival. Today's Soldier is as well-trained in the use of his assigned weapon as at any time in our history. Marksmanship training is evolving to reflect the realities of the COE: fleeting targets, close-range engagements, ambushes, situations requiring split-second decisions, and a host of dilemmas that demand Soldiers' complete attention under all conditions. Today's Soldier learns reflexive firing techniques and battle drills that enable him to place accurate, killing fire from a battle-proven machine gun, rifle, pistol, or shotgun on an enemy.

Training will assume broader and more complex dimensions as the Maneuver Center of Excellence takes shape in the coming months and years. Our ties to the Armor Branch began in 1919 when Major

Dwight D. Eisenhower transferred tanks from Camp Colt, Pa., to Fort Benning. The Tank School came to Benning from Fort Meade, Md., in 1932 and remained here until it moved to Fort Knox, Ky., in 1940. Colonel George S. Patton Jr., arrived at Fort Benning in 1940, was promoted to Brigadier General, and later commanded the 2nd Armored Division here in 1941 prior to his deployment to command in North Africa. The Armor and the Infantry have stood shoulder to shoulder fighting in defense of our homeland, and they will soon be better able to train together as they prepare to meet future threats to our nation.

The Maneuver Center of Excellence will be one topic of discussion at this year's Infantry Warfighting Conference, a gathering of the foremost trainers, tacticians, and leaders of the United States Army. This unique exchange of information will bring together the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the Commanders of Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and the Combined Arms Center; and the Chief of Armor to update conference attendees on their respective functional areas. Separate presentations will highlight the Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Infantry Brigade Combat Team, warfighting lessons learned, and combined arms leader development. Today, such gatherings of Army senior leadership are at best infrequent due to mission requirements and the costs involved, but the ideas shared and decisions made pay dividends for the future in terms of their enormous training and doctrinal benefits.

We are an Army at war, and winning it demands our total commitment to training and to making the most efficient use of all our assets in a time of constrained resources. Our deployed warriors are grappling with the enemy wherever he is found, and the military and civilian workforce at the Infantry Center and School share their commitment to winning the Global War on Terrorism. America and our fellow citizens deserve no less.

Follow me!





SOLDIERS SHOULD REGISTER NOW FOR SDM, CQM CLASSES

PAULA J. RANDALL PAGÁN

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) Service Rifle Team conducts the Squad Designated Marksman Train the Trainer and the USAMU Service Pistol Team conducts the Close Quarter Marksman Train the Trainers for Soldiers throughout the Army.

The following is the schedule for Squad Designated Marksman (SDM) and Close Quarter Marksman (CQM) Train the Trainers for the next fiscal year.

The SDM classes will be conducted on the following dates:

SDM #1-07, Sept. 25-29;
SDM #2-07, Oct. 16-20;
SDM #3-07, Nov. 27 to Dec. 1;
SDM #4-07, Dec. 11-15;
SDM #5-07, Jan. 22-26; and
SDM #6-07, Feb. 5-9.

The CQM classes will be held:

CQM #1-07, Oct. 2-4;
CQM #2-07, Oct. 23-25;
CQM #3-07, Dec. 4-6;
CQM #4-07, Dec. 18-20;
CQM #5-07, Jan. 29-31; and
CQM #6-07, Feb. 12-14.

To request a slot, unit training and operations sections must send an e-mail request to USAMU Training and Operations NCOIC Sergeant First Class Edward Hocking at edward.hocking@usaac.army.mil; the request must include the Soldier's full name, rank, social security number, military occupational specialty, specific unit, unit point of contact and telephone number.

To be eligible, Soldiers must be a corporal or above; deploying units get priority. Soldiers' units are responsible for lodging, per diem and personal transportation. Transportation to and from the range with government weapons will be provided by USAMU.

The USAMU supplies the SDM rifles,



ammunition and Advanced Combat Optical Gunsights for the SDM classes. Soldiers attending the CQM classes must provide their own rifles, six magazines and 800 rounds of ammunition. For the additional day of pistol training, Soldiers will need to bring pistols, four magazines, and 300 rounds of ammunition.

Soldiers who do not have weapons or ammunition should call Hocking to see if alternate arrangements can be made. The recommended items of clothing for the SDM and CQM classes are: Sufficient battle dress uniforms for one week of range firing, four rifle magazines, wet and cold weather gear, prescription glasses and/or contact lenses, identification card, M-16 cleaning kit, personnel hygiene items for one week and civilian clothes; for CQM, add Kevlar, IBA, pistol holster and four pistol magazines, optics and night vision accessories.

Any unit requesting a SDM course to be conducted at its own installation must have a known distance range up to 500 yards, a classroom large enough for the amount of Soldiers in the class and travel funding for four to six USAMU instructors. Units should also provide their own rifles, ACOGs, and ammunition (600 rounds per student).

Units requesting a CQM course at their installations must have a 25-meter zero range minimum with the ability to fire 9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm and shotgun, and a classroom large enough for the amount of Soldiers in the class and will provide all equipment and ammunition (800 rounds per student). For additional pistol training, units must provide the pistols, magazines and ammunition (300 rounds per student), and funding for up to six instructors.

For more information, call (706) 545-7174/1410 or visit the unit's Web site at www.usarec.army.mil/hq/amu.

Doctrine Corner

FM 3-90.60, *The Brigade Combat Team*, is approved and can now be found on the Reimer Digital Library. (This FM supersedes FM 7-30, FM 3-21.31, FM 3-90.3)



For more information, contact the **U.S. Army Infantry School's Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate** at: DSN: 835-7114, COMM: (706) 545-7114, or e-mail: doctrine@benning.army.mil.

COMBATIVES TOURNAMENT SET

Fort Benning, Ga., will host an all-Army combatives tournament Nov. 3-6.

Modern Combatives is a functional mixed martial art form combining Brazilian jiu-jitsu, boxing, clinch hitting, takedowns and groundfighting techniques. Combatives also employs techniques borrowed from judo, kick boxing and Greco-Roman wrestling.

All matches will be conducted at the Lawson Army Airfield passenger terminal. Preliminary matches will start at 8 a.m. Nov. 4; final matches will be conducted the afternoon of Nov. 5.

The competition will be followed by a Combatives Symposium on Nov. 6 in Infantry Hall from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Topics will include safety, trends, and training. The symposium is directed to level 4 and installation combatives instructors.

For more information, visit the Combatives School Web site at www.benning.army.mil/combatives/ or call (706) 545-3512.

SWAP SHOP

PORTABLE PHOTO PRINTERS CAN AID MISSION

CAPTAIN THOMAS ANDERSON

It is not uncommon for U.S. Army Soldiers to take pictures with local national civilians for nostalgic or mission-related purposes. The Soldiers depart with the digital pictures stored in their cameras, but unfortunately the civilians are typically left with nothing except the memory of the photo shared with the Soldier from the LCD screen. On a recent service project trip to Slovakia as a leader with the post Chapel youth program, I discovered a possible solution to this problem.

Throughout the week-long service trip, our students took many pictures with the Slovakian children as they built a playground together and participated in various sports activities. The Slovakian children always wanted to see the results of their pictures with the Americans on the digital camera's LCD screen. At the end of the week, I used a compact photo printer I brought on the trip to print many of the pictures. Each of our American students personally gave the pictures to each of the Slovakian children in the photographs. The children beamed incredible smiles as their eyes bounced back and forth between the photographs and the real-life American heroes who had built them a playground and shared time with them. The photographs will undoubtedly remain prized possessions in the children's humble day-to-day lives, and the American children were able to keep the digital copies to download on their return from the service project.

COMPACT PHOTO PRINTERS

Over the last several years, technology and camera companies have developed portable, lightweight, and inexpensive printers that can produce high-quality postcard-size pictures for less than 30 cents per photo. The commander who includes a compact photo printer on his fact-finding and humanitarian missions can potentially reap several benefits.

Solidify lasting relationships. Oftentimes, our ability as an Army to touch individual lives of foreign national civilians can be limited. Leaving a photographic memory of their positive encounter with American forces would act as a constant reminder of the difference in attitude and actions of our Army's Soldiers and the terrorists. Payoff would be particularly high in the poorer, remote regions of Afghanistan and Iraq where frequent contact with Americans is limited and many of the civilians might not even own a picture of themselves, much less a photo with American forces.

Facilitate friendly forces identification. A particularly uncomfortable situation can occur in the process of taking photographs of local national leaders for Coalition identification purposes. Promising them a printed copy can help ease the possible suspicion that their photograph might be taken for other than benevolent purposes. Posing with them in the photograph can again result in long-term benefits as they remember the engagement an American

leader conducted with them. It is quite likely that they will eagerly show the pictures in initial conversation with the next American with whom they interact.

Develop civic pride. The portable photo printer can serve an especially important function when included on local government leader escort missions. Leaving the civilians a picture of them with their elected officials can help reinforce the reality of their representative democracy. When local national soldiers accompany missions, the photo printer could also serve to capture their status as real hometown heroes, volunteers risking their lives (and their families' lives) to defend their country. Asserting the local and national government's authority must always be a priority for U.S. forces.

Printing pictures will not win the Global War on Terrorism. However, it is another tool that commanders can use to influence individuals within the battlespace. Compact photo printers are available in a range of prices and capabilities. Medium-quality compact photo printers range in price from about \$150-200 and weigh around 2 to 2 1/2 pounds. In addition to price and weight, other things to consider when looking for a printer include the print speed and battery/power requirements, ink cartridges and photo paper. Compatibility requirements should also be checked before purchase as some compact photo printers work better with or work only with particular digital cameras. A few examples of printers on the market include the Canon Selphy CP710 Compact Photo Printer, HP Photosmart 325 Compact Photo Printer and the Kodak Easyshare Printer Dock Plus Series 3.



Courtesy photo

The author, Captain Thomas Anderson, takes a photo of an American student with several Slovakian children during a service project trip to Slovakia. The photo was then printed on a portable printer, and copies were given to the children.

FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR PASSES MAJOR MILESTONE

The Army's Future Force Warrior (FFW) system is one step closer to being fielded as the Ground Soldier System following a successful demonstration in August of its electronic networking capability.

Developed and managed by the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center (NSC) with General Dynamics C4 Systems as the lead integrator, FFW is the Army's flagship science and technology program, aimed at integrating "best in class" technologies from the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) enterprise, other government agencies, and industry to enhance the combat effectiveness of the Soldier and Small Combat Unit.

Carol Fitzgerald, program manager for the FFW Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD), said that last month's success marked a major milestone for the program.

"This was the first of two incremental design phases, in which we have successfully demonstrated network interoperability of the Soldier/Small Combat Unit (SCU) with the future force network," she said. "This achievement satisfied the program's top level goal for its first incremental design and was completed three months ahead of schedule."

According to Fitzgerald, the FFW Technology Program Office delivered early prototypes of the "Increment 2" design, enabling risk reduction of the system that will continue to be enhanced throughout the remainder of the program, which is scheduled to conclude in late 2007.

To achieve this success, NSC has worked with a number of their sister centers, including the Communications and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC).


"Natick participated in CERDEC's Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) On-the-Move (OTM) program," said Fitzgerald. "This allowed us to leverage an important Army field experimentation venue to assess multiple developmental technologies addressing future force network integration, including FFW."

The FFW Increment 1 capabilities demonstrated at the OTM included: SCU integration into the future force network via the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW); demonstration of the Soldier Protective Individual Equipment System (SPIES), an advanced body armor and load carriage system; demonstration of cooperative engagement/networked fires using digital target handoff and Non Line of Sight (NLOS) fire; demonstration of headgear thermal and Image-Intensification (I2) sensor fusion; demonstration of system voice control; and simulation of physiological status monitoring.

In addition, the FFW early Increment 2 capabilities demonstrated at OTM included: demonstration of Leader level Command and Control (C2) via FalconView (leveraged from the U.S. Air Force), system voice control, integrated Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) imagery, look-down display integrated into combat goggles, and advanced power management devices to extend mission duration; demonstration of Soldier level Situational Awareness (SA) leveraged from CERDEC's Command and Control Mobile Intelligent Net-Centric Computing System (C2MINCS) program; Warrior Physiological Status Monitoring (WPSM); and deeper integration of electronics into the FFW combat ensemble.

Fitzgerald said that the FFW is spiraling mature components to enhance the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier's Land Warrior system, designed for Stryker and current force interoperability.

"FFW will transition to the PEO Soldier in fiscal year 2008 to support the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)-approved Ground Soldier System — the next version of Land Warrior, which supports Future Combat Systems (FCS) and future force interoperability," she said.



NG COMPANY TAKES FIGHT TO ENEMY IN INSURGENT STRONGHOLD

SECOND LIEUTENANT AARON FLINT

For nearly a year, National Guard soldiers with Alpha Company, Task Force Saber, controlled a sector in the place *Time* magazine cited as the worst place in Iraq — Ramadi.

The Marines operated in the heart of Ramadi on one side of the river, while Alpha Company operated in the urban area on the other side of the river. The urban portion of Alpha's battlespace alone contained upwards of 40,000 people. Faced with the daily threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms fire, sniper and rocket attacks, Alpha's commander, Major Jason Pelletier of Milton, Vt., put together an unorthodox team of tankers, infantrymen, field artillerymen, and Long Range Surveillance snipers from different units across Vermont, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania to stay on the offense in the counterinsurgency fight.

During their time in Ramadi, Alpha, whose parent unit is 3-172nd Infantry Battalion (Mountain) headquartered in Jericho, Vt., successfully held the line in a battalion-sized battlespace for close to a year while serving under Task Force Saber and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 28th Infantry Division. More than holding the line, Alpha took the fight to the enemy, increasing the foothold of coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.

"We took the Iraqi Army from conducting squad-level patrols to owning their own urban battalion battlespace in under a year," said Pelletier of the increased presence of Iraqi Army forces in Ramadi. "We've done it by creating an unconventional combat set that is combined arms in nature."

To hinder the IED threat and provide security for the main routes into and out of the city, Alpha manned observation posts (OPs) with tanks, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and Bradley fighting vehicles from the main combined arms platoons

referred to as "vigilant hunters." From these OPs, the men were able to successfully engage IED emplacement teams on the main routes and overwatch the sector. With a combined arms team of tankers and infantrymen, Alpha was able to combine the optics and the firepower of the tanks and Bradleys with the ground assets in the HMMWV crews.

While manning OPs, the platoon charged with securing the sector at any given time then used their HMMWV crews to patrol the heart of the city. These crews became the eyes, ears, and representatives of the unit on the ground. In addition to regular combat patrol missions, these crews roamed the city and gathered atmospherics on the neighborhoods, checking in with

shop owners and local families on services and any unusual activity in the area.

"It was pretty wild," said Sergeant Brandon Allmond, a 21-year-old tanker from Philadelphia, Pa., who ended up serving as a truck commander with Alpha Company. "When you're roving, it's just your two trucks and the guys in those trucks. You are your own security, you are your own overwatch, and you are your own assault team."

While it was mainly the truck crews roving the guts of the city, they knew they had the Bradley and tank crews watching their backs at all times.

Although a smaller unit, Alpha was able to organize into a highly lethal team. Crucial to Alpha's success were the enablers



Courtesy photos

The view from a scope on a Bradley fighting vehicle in Ramadi where Alpha Company is conducting operations.

who contributed their resources to the mission. Several teams composed the enablers offering resources to the mission, including the Task Force Saber intelligence shop, as well as tactical human intelligence teams, Naval Special Warfare teams through their work with the Iraqi soldiers, Marine Corps K9 teams, Civil Affairs groups, counter-IED engineer units, and others.

Part of that enabler team included Marine Corps Major David Berke from Miramar, Calif. Berke and his Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team started operating with Alpha Company when Berke first came to Ramadi.

“I never thought in my career I’d be on the ground in a firefight with my M-4 (rifle),” said Berke, an F-18 fighter pilot who spent the last three years as a Top Gun flight instructor.

As a piece of the full spectrum combined arms fight, Berke’s ANGLICO teams coordinated air support for the Soldiers when they came under enemy contact or were conducting raids, creating a link between the Army ground units and the Marine aviation units in sector. Berke is used to seeing the fight from 20,000 feet in the air, traveling at 500 miles per hour. Now, Berke is on the ground in the middle of firefights, getting shot at by rocket propelled grenades and going on high-speed car chases.

“The only way to be effective as a direct supporting unit is if I know the battlespace as well as you do,” said Berke. “I need to know the mosques, the soccer fields, and the alleyways. The more familiar I am with the battlespace — the less time it’s going to take me to get the air support you need.”

Besides coordinating air support, he and his team could be counted on as skilled riflemen on the ground. In another sector, Berke was pinned down in enemy crossfire. Fortunately, he was already in radio contact with the F-18 pilot overhead.

“We’re in major contact down here,” yelled Berke.

The pilot, an old friend of his from Top Gun school, immediately fired on the enemy from the air.

“I’m reminded of why I joined the Marine Corps in the first place,” he said. “We are fulfilling the motto that every Marine is a rifleman.”

For the Soldier on the ground, the battlefield is complex with few standard operating procedures on how to respond to a myriad of situations.

Vigilance is key, said Sergeant Brett Clairmont of Richmond, Vt. “I find myself feeling like I don’t have enough sets of eyes — I’m scanning rooftops, windows, scanning the ground for IEDs, and looking long distances for RPGs.”

“Going out there day after day knowing that in a split second it can go from people smiling and waving to the streets clearing and being in the middle of a full blown firefight,” adds Allmond as to what the hardest part of the job at hand. “It’s the anxiety of knowing that it will happen, but just not knowing when.”

No matter what the rank of the Soldier, Captain Gregory Knight of Huntington, Vt., said you’ve got to listen to the Soldier on the ground — the Soldier referred to is the on-scene commander.



Major Jason Pelletier talks to the Soldiers of Alpha Company in Ramadi, Iraq, during their last week in the theater of operations.

“That guy knows exactly what situation he is in,” said Knight, battle captain for Task Force Saber. “We do it as a matter of course now, but the complexity and the speed at which things happen is mind-boggling. You can write SOPs all day long, but you’ll never crack the book. For the higher headquarters, it all comes back to providing support to the guy on the ground (who’s) taking the fight to the enemy.”

It’s that “taking the fight to the enemy” that Knight said has made Alpha and Task Force Saber successful.

“You’ve simply got to be aggressive,” said Knight.

Staying aggressive is what guided Clairmont and his fellow Soldiers when they roved the city.

“That’s our preventive measure (roving), that’s why we go back out there,” said Clairmont. “That’s how we prevent the enemy from putting more IEDs in. We know that at some point we’re going to have to go back in, so we need to keep a constant presence in the area. Plus, we feel confident in our ability to detect IEDs.” Just as much as staying aggressive, the soldiers had to be creative.

“If you can dream it, you can do it,” said Staff Sergeant Ed Robinson, a financial analyst for GE Financial in Virginia. Robinson led one of the sniper teams from the 104th Long Range Surveillance Detachment that watched the backs of the vigilant hunter platoons and conducted missions of their own. Robinson said Ramadi was more than just a testing ground for the combined arms team.

“It was simply what is necessary to be effective in this environment,” he said. “Conventional sniper and LRS tactics are not the norm here. We have to combine sniper, ambush, and recon roles into one operation. Because of the nature of the fight, because of the mystery of who the enemy is, you can put different tactics to use and see what works.”

By manning OPs and staying on the offense, Alpha was able to minimize the IED threat.

“IEDs have plagued every unit before us,” said Pelletier. “We’ve been able to sustain single-digit IEDs during our final five months, and we found and disabled 80-90 percent of those.”

Besides stopping and removing emplaced IEDs, Alpha Company had an aggressive focus on locating and detaining the terrorist and insurgent networks responsible for carrying out the

attacks, and then forwarding the criminals to the Iraqi court system for prosecution.

“Critical to our success was our ability to develop and employ a stand alone detainee processing system, at the company level, with the highest court conviction rate in the entire Marine Expeditionary Force,” said Pelletier.

Manning, an infantryman, organized the detainee operations for Alpha Company. He says units need to be aware of what the Iraqi courts need to see from the detaining unit.

“... The Soldiers were bogged down in paperwork and weren’t able to discern contraband as well,” he said. “Out of all the detainees we brought in, our conviction rate was about 30 percent. Once we started our detainee ops program from mid-November on, our conviction rate doubled up to over 60 percent. The bottom line isn’t how many guys you’re sending to (prison). The bottom line is that you’re saving your fellow Soldiers’ lives out there with each terrorist you bring in.”

But all the success did not come without significant heartache. Alpha suffered most of their losses early on. Sergeant Joshua Johnson, who died in January during a support mission for the Iraqi soldiers,

fought in one of the toughest battles in Afghanistan with the 10th Mountain Division before deploying to Ramadi. Second Lieutenant Mark Procopio, assigned to another company, died while rushing to the aid of a downed helicopter. Specialist Will Fernandez, Sergeant Mike Egan, and First Lieutenant Mark Dooley were killed last September while on their way to assist their fellow Soldiers. Dooley cruised straight through the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School before deploying with Alpha Company.

On Memorial Day, President Bush quoted Dooley’s letter home during an address at Arlington National Cemetery. In the letter, Dooley said, “Remember that my leaving was in the service of something that we loved, and be proud. The best way to pay respect is to value why a sacrifice was made.”

That was the moral compass that guided Alpha Company.

“No matter how hard it is, you can’t come out here, lose someone close to you and then say kill ‘em all,” said Pelletier. “You have to be able to bounce back from that and still have the ability to hand out teddy bears to kids — to demonstrate compassion even after tremendous loss.

The bottom line is that you honor their sacrifice by continuing to do what is right.”

Pelletier said the quote, “War will always be a human endeavor” sums up the counterinsurgency fight.

“We focus so much on all the gear, the F-18s, the up-armor,” he said. “In the end, when you strip it down, this is a person-to-person commitment won by individual Soldiers at the lowest tactical level — the team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders.”

As the Soldiers of Alpha Company made their way back home, they left Ramadi behind — knowing of the hardship they endured, the fine Soldiers they lost, and the success they accrued. They also left knowing that a much larger force would be replacing them in their area of operation, but that the struggle against terror will continue for those still in the fight.

“You can’t duplicate this; training cannot duplicate this,” said Allmond of his tour in Ramadi. “Yeah, I hate it here. But if I had the choice, I’d do it all over again.”

Second Lieutenant Aaron Flint, from Fort Harrison, Mont., served as a platoon leader with Alpha Company, Task Force Saber.



SALUTE

An Iraqi soldier from the 4th Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, salutes his commanding officer during a ceremony at Forward Operating Base O’Ryan July 13. The ceremony marked the passing of authority from a 4th Infantry Division unit to the Iraqi Army.

Petty Officer 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, USN



TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

NBCRV

Latest Stryker Variant To Be Fielded

MAJOR TY STARK

The Stryker Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) is the last of the configurations of the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) to be fielded. For those unfamiliar with the Stryker family of vehicles, there are two basic variants — the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). The ICV has eight different configurations, each fitted with different Mission Equipment Packages (MEPs) to match and enable its role in the brigade. In addition to the NBCRV, the other fielded configurations of the ICV are the Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Mortar Carrier (MC), Command Vehicle (CV), Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), and Anti-tank Guided Missile Vehicle (ATGM). The NBCRV is a new and very different reconnaissance vehicle in a very new organization. Essentially, it's an armored, rolling laboratory in an infantry brigade capable of detecting and identifying a range of hazardous materials and then providing automated alerts with the purpose of providing improved situational awareness and preserving combat power.

What does it do for me?

The NBCRV will contribute to a sensor network that will provide real-time digitized data through radio frequency and/or satellite links to the brigade headquarters to provide operational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) situational awareness and understanding and detailed hazard analysis. It does this



U.S. Army photo

The Stryker Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle

by providing a Detect-to-Warn detection and identification capability for chemical and radiological hazards and Detect-to-Treat identification and identification capabilities for biological agents. In addition to detecting hazards, it can collect, store and transfer samples of biological and chemical vapor and liquid hazards, using strict chain of custody protocols for evidence of use. The system can identify a range of chemical liquid and vapor hazards ranging from toxic industrial materials to weaponized chemical agents. It can also identify biological agents for use in determining treatment protocols. These capabilities will increase the combat power of the deployed force and minimize degradation of force effectiveness under CBRN conditions.

How does it do it?

The NBCRV has similar survivability, mobility, communication, lethality, and transportability characteristics as the base ICV (including an RWS with M2). It incorporates existing and developmental CBRN sensors which enable it to perform CBRN reconnaissance missions and conduct mounted Sensitive Site Exploitation. It does this with a suite of sensors which are integrated into the platform and the Sensor Processing Group (SPG). The individual sensors provide data to the SPG (which is a pair of hardened laptop computers), which interprets and displays the data for the crew. Simultaneously, it uses the data to populate NBC reports and passes them to the FBCB2 for dissemination. This

enables the system to conduct:

- Rapid, on-the-move, standoff chemical vapor agent detection (yes, standoff means you don't have to be in it to detect it);

- On-the-move point (at location of vehicle system) vapor chemical agent detection;

- On-the-move point liquid chemical agent detection and identification;

- Stationary point biological agent detection and identification;

- Nuclear/radiological detection;

- Hazard warning and marking; and

- Solid, liquid and vapor sample collection.

The core of the NBCRV will be its on-board integrated CBRN sensor suite. The sensor suite is composed of 10 integrated, internetted sensors which provide input to the system:

- **Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD)** — JSLSCAD provides stationary and on-the-move detection and identification of nerve, blister, and blood agent vapors using a passive infrared detector.

- **Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)** — JBPDS provides point detection of biological aerosols. The system will continuously monitor the environmental background for changes consistent with a biological attack and detects, collects, and preserves a sample for confirmatory laboratory analysis, and identifies which agent is present.

- **Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer Block II (CBMS II)** — CBMS II provides detection of persistent chemical agents (nerve and blister) and TICs on the ground. The chemical agent is picked up by a sampler arm/wheel and presented to the CBMS heated probe head.

- **M88 Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Assembly (ACADA)** — ACADA provides point detection and identification capability for chemical vapors. The ACADA uses ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) technology to concurrently detect and identify nerve and

blister agents under all environmental conditions, while mobile or stationary. The ACADA has a standard communication interface to support integration with the central data processing system within the NBCRV. It can also be operated as a stand-alone unit using built-in controls and displays. It is common to Strykers in the brigade.

- **AN/VDR-2 Radiac** — AN/VDR-2 provides point radiological detection capability of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. It can be used as a hand-held, battery-operated device, or be mounted in the vehicle and controlled and monitored by the SPG. It is currently in service with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

- **AN/UDR-13 Radiac** — AN/UDR-13 provides point radiological detection capability of alpha, beta, gamma, or neutron radiation and can be used as a hand-held, battery-operated device, or be mounted in the vehicle and controlled and monitored by the SPG. It is currently in service with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

- **Double Wheel Sampler System (DWSS)** — The DWSS provides physical transfer of chemical agents from the ground to the chemical probe. It consists of two arms and wheels that are extended from the vehicle to obtain ground samples of chemical agents for analysis by the CBMS II. The system is capable of operating over primary, secondary, and cross country routes at speeds determined by terrain and surface conditions. The system can be operated manually or automatically.

- **Chemical Vapor Sampling System (CVSS)** — The CVSS provides the means to collect and store Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) and TIC vapor samples for confirmatory analysis by a theater lab at a later date.

- **METSMAN** — The METSMAN meteorological sensor provides air and ground temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, and atmospheric pressure for use in populating NBC reports.

- **Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM)** — The NBCRV is equipped with the ICAM for conducting dismounted detection and identification of nerve and blister agents.

In addition to the internetted sensors listed above, the system has these integrated, stand-alone capabilities:

- **Sample Collection and Retention** — The sample collection and retention system consists of 24 sealed vials that are filled by the operator using a glove-port in the rear deck of the vehicle. Using the vials, a 50cc sample can be collected and stored in a rack on the rear of the vehicle for post mission laboratory analysis. No egress from the vehicle is required.

- **Area Marking** — The area marking function provides markers which conform to the guidelines defined in Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) 2002 for marking areas contaminated with radiological, biological, or chemical hazards. The markers are weighted flags that are deployed from a port in the rear of the vehicle while stationary or moving.

Where is it in my brigade and who operates it?

The NBCRV systems are low density, mission specific, specialized platforms manned by specially trained crews located in the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Troop of the RSTA squadron. There are three systems in the platoon, which are manned by four-man crews. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant and squad leader are the vehicle systems commanders for the three systems. Each system has a chemical operations NCO and two chemical operations specialists (one of whom is the driver). The crew operates the system from inside an over-pressure crew compartment which provides collective protection from environmental hazards. The platoon will conduct CBRN operations as part of reconnaissance (route and area/zone reconnaissance on primary and secondary roads and cross-country), NBC surveys (to determine limits of contamination), and chemical and/or biological surveillance. To review, according to FM 3-11.19, a search mission is the initial screening of a portion of the battlefield for chemical hazards (primarily persistent) that can

affect the commander's scheme of maneuver and are usually made in areas that are currently (or usually) unoccupied by friendly forces. They include searches of routes, zones, and areas. Surveys are conducted to identify the extent (limits) of contamination and are time-consuming operations. A survey normally results in marking the contaminated area and generation of an NBC-4 report. The CBMS is the only instrument on the NBCRV that can conduct a chemical survey. An AN/VDR-2 must be used to conduct a radiological survey. Surveillance is the "systematic observation of surface areas to detect CBRN attacks and hazards. Examples of CBRN surveillance include monitoring an area with an automatic chemical agent alarm or scanning with the JSLSCAD

remote sensing chemical agent alarm or simply maintaining visual observation for unexplained artillery or spray missions" (FM 3-101-2). The goal of surveillance is to detect a chemical event without becoming contaminated or decisively engaged. This implies the primary sensor, the mass spectrometer (which requires direct contact with the contamination), will not be used. Surveillance missions, directed by the organization's intelligence officer (S-2/G-2), are to overwatch key pieces of terrain for a limited period of time in support of the overall R&S plan and the commander's scheme of maneuver. Surveillance is conducted when the NBCRV locates at a given position for an extended period of time (hours) and uses its standoff or biological detection capabilities. Sampling is an independent mission which gathers a small amount of contamination (chemical, biological or nuclear) for evacuation and detailed follow-on analysis at a theater Army medical laboratory or other specialized facility.

What do we know so far? And when will I see one?

The first unit to be equipped with NBCRVs is 2-1 Cavalry, the RSTA squadron for 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Wash. The platoon received its systems in early March and has completed its 13 weeks of initial training and an additional eight weeks of unit training at home station and Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. The Initial Operational Test and Evaluation begins Sept. 26 and will consist of two 9-day exercises in which the platoon will operate in a realistic environment conducting operations in an SBCT AO. The platoon will conduct the full range of its mission set against an active OPFOR enhanced with chemical and biological simulants.

Based on the initial training, we know that the system is



U.S. Army photo

The Stryker NBCRV brings a capability not previously available to the infantry brigade commander: mounted, ground CBRN reconnaissance with a specialized vehicle developed to develop and confirm information requirements in support of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process.

complex but robust. It brings a capability not previously available to the infantry brigade commander: mounted, ground CBRN reconnaissance with a specialized vehicle developed to develop and confirm information requirements in support of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. In the past, CBRN reconnaissance was the purview of the division commander. The organization itself is new. It is composed of three systems; other Fox-based platoons are composed of six systems. It integrates chemical and biological capabilities. Previously, these very different capabilities were in separate units operated by chemical Soldiers with different additional skill identifiers (ASIs). Speaking of which, these Soldiers receive a new ASI, L6, at the successful completion of their training. The system is as survivable as the remainder of the brigade, reducing the security burden on the brigade and is as lethal as the balance of the systems with an RWS-mounted M2 heavy machine gun and AT-4s. All in all, this system will considerably increase the situational awareness and sustainment capabilities in the brigade. Another unique aspect of the NBCRV is its probable proliferation. There is much interest throughout the Army for different configurations of Strykers, notably the CV, MC and MEV, to go to other units. The NBCRV is likely to be the first to be fielded in substantial numbers outside the SBCT. NBCRVs will begin replacing M93 Fox's in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) in the near future.

Major Ty Stark currently serves as the assistant TRADOC System Manager Stryker Bradley (NBCRV) at Fort Benning, Ga. Stark is a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has previously served as a mortar platoon leader and company commander at Fort Campbell, Ky., in addition to other various acquisition assignments.



THE PLATINUM 10

2ND BCT, 101ST AIRBORNE IMPROVES MEDICAL TRAINING TO HELP SAVE LIVES

MAJOR CRAIG W. BUKOWSKI

With the passing of conventional warfare in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I during the spring of 2003, the fight in Iraq changed dramatically. As we continue the war on terrorism, we now face an asymmetrical battlefield with a new and transformed Army. This new war generates many different challenges to both the warfighter and the medic who must save his life. Up to 90 percent of combat deaths occur on the battlefield before a casualty ever reaches a medical treatment facility (MTF). The first 10 minutes are a key determining factor in whether or not the wounded warrior will live or die. Soldiers and medics who have the proper training,

Specialist Clint Radcliffe, a medic with the 101st Airborne Division, and two Iraqi army medics apply tourniquets and field dressings to an injured Iraqi soldier.

Petty Officer 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, USN

equipment and mind-set will vastly improve the chances for saving his life.

Medical success starts with pre-deployment medical training and the brigade surgeon section should take the lead with support from the brigade combat team (BCT) operations officer (S-3). Pre-deployment training should include a robust medical focus for every Soldier, not just the medics. Brigade should emphasize through the orders process the medical training required or ensure at a minimum that training is conducted in accordance with all training guidance. Prior to any combat deployment, it is easy for the warfighter to focus more on live-fire ranges and weapons training that require medical coverage. The benefit to medics during this coverage is often limited due to a lack of casualty play. The brigade surgeon section should offer the battalions separate medical training opportunities as well as integrating medical training with the





Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY © 2006, AUSA

brigade's overall train up for deployment with focus on the brigade quarterly training guidance. Time spent on medic training will build confidence in the Soldiers and save lives.

The BCT concept and transformation results in a major medical change at the BCT headquarters. The transformed BCT headquarters includes a brigade surgeon section consisting of the surgeon, medical plans and operations officer, and an NCOIC. The surgeon was previously assigned to the brigade support battalion (BSB). His placement at brigade is critical in moving the overall medical emphasis to the brigade level. Assigning the surgeon as a brigade special staff member has placed proper emphasis on the medical mission and allows the surgeon to advise the brigade commander on specific issues. The brigade medical plans officer should be involved with all brigade-level planning to ensure medical training is properly represented.

The concept of the "Golden Hour" was invented by R. Adams Cowley, an Army surgeon and father of shock trauma medicine. The Golden Hour emphasized the importance of moving an injured person to medical care as quickly as possible to an established medical facility. Recently, the Army medical community rediscovered that even more important than the Golden Hour was the first 10 minutes after a traumatic injury. The first 10 minutes is now being

called the "Platinum 10" by some and is the basis for innovative new combat medic training. The Platinum 10 asserts that a critically injured Soldier stabilized in the first 10 minutes has an excellent chance of survival provided the Soldier makes it to definitive care soon thereafter – the Golden Hour. The Golden Hour focused on getting the patient to definitive surgical care within one hour but didn't properly focus on the care given in the first 10 minutes enroute to the hospital. So what does this mean to commanders on the ground? The first 10 minutes are far more critical than getting the Soldier to the combat support hospital (CSH) first. If the bleeding is not stopped, breathing established and airway properly cleared in the first 10 minutes, it doesn't matter how quickly the Soldier gets to the CSH. This is where advanced buddy aid, combat lifesavers (CLS) and medics have the opportunity to save lives.

Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TC3) Course

The primary focus of the Platinum 10 is to stop the bleeding in the first 10 minutes. The temporary use of a tourniquet to manage life-threatening extremity bleeding is recommended. This principle is supported by the wealth of Vietnam conflict combat casualty data indicating injuries from blood loss due to extremity injuries represented the number one etiology of preventable battlefield deaths. Therefore, in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), all medics must go through the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TC3) course. This innovative program changes the traditional focus of Airway, Breathing, and Circulation (A-B-C) to Circulation, Breathing, and Airway (C-B-A). Use of the Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT) is heavily emphasized along with the use of blood loss replacement fluids like Hextend and specialized clotting agents such as Quick Clot and Hemcon dressings that clot bleeding in areas where tourniquets won't work, i.e. groin, neck, etc. The course is designed to address the primary causes of preventable deaths. It also focuses on treatment under fire in hostile areas. The training is conducted both in a classroom and under hands-on, high stress, realistic environments that involve high fidelity mannequins and pyrotechnics. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) adopted the TC3 concept as the standard for combat medic training and fielded it as Combat Medic Advanced Skills Training, (CMAST). In addition to TC3, we sent



Photo by Dennis Steele, ARMY © 2006, AUSA

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry treat a wounded squad member while on a patrol south of Baghdad.

several medics on a partnership program we created with the local Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The Strike Medic Ambulance Ride-along Training (SMART) program allowed medics to spend 10 or 12-hour days with the local Montgomery County EMS. This allowed our medics to gain invaluable real-life medical experience under the supervision of seasoned paramedics.

The 101st Airborne also revamped its CLS program. Its replacement, Eagle First Responder (EFR), teaches advanced first aid using the same concepts as TC3 focusing on C-B-A, using the CAT and updated triage techniques. The emphasis is to treat immediate life-threatening injuries up front and quickly. A TC3-trained medic or CLS will know that a Soldier with a traumatic amputation needs a properly placed CAT first, then an IV before being evacuated. Untreated, the casualty would have bled to death in about 5 to 10 minutes but will survive because of the emphasis on treating the life-threatening injury up front. The importance of having properly trained medics and CLS combined with an individual first aid kit (IFAK) on every Soldier has never been more important. Remember, the IFAK is only as useful as the individual using it. If all Soldiers are not properly trained on using the CAT and other items in the IFAK, the kits are useless. Proper pre-deployment and in-country medical training that focuses on the first 10 minutes will pay huge dividends and save lives.

The transformed BCT tactics today in both Iraq and Afghanistan are more similar to the Vietnam era or Special Operations Forces (SOF) tactics than to the linear battlefield we trained for over the past 30 years. Long gone are the mass assaults using multiple divisions, brigades, and battalions. Today, most operations are

company size or smaller. Currently in the 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division, we average around 100 daily patrols in what is considered one of the most dangerous parts of Iraq. The area south of Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers not only contains the notorious “Triangle of Death,” an area between the towns of Mahmudiya, Yusafiyah, and Iskandaria that has long been known as a Sunni and Shiite hotbed, but also hundreds of miles of canals that create a web of roads and obstructions across a sprawling farming basin. These canals are paralleled by dirt and paved roads that are littered with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and old IED craters that make any ground medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) mission an extremely hazardous operation.

Historically, this area was home to Saddam’s weapons and munitions factories. Although these factories pose little threat today, the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) have easily recruited people from this region who have a great deal of experience working with explosives. Directional charge IEDs are becoming more frequent and recent tactics indicate the ability to adapt. With the effectiveness of the IEDs, some estimated as large as 500 pounds of explosives, we realized there were a few medical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) we needed to address and master.

Our brigade’s casualty count represented well over 50 percent of the casualties for the entire 4th Infantry Division during their

A casualty is evacuated from a forward operating base in Iraq.

Captain Dennison Segui



first eight and a half months in country. It could have been far worse. Fortunately, excellent pre-deployment training, development of in-country TTPs and world class air MEDEVAC and treatment at the CSH greatly reduced the number of fatalities during a costly second tour for the STRIKE BCT.

Medical planning centers on small units versus an overall brigade-level operation. Instead of splitting the battalion aid station (BAS) into a forward aid station (FAS) and main aid station (MAS) and leapfrogging them, smaller treatment teams are usually sent forward to support relatively static areas. These teams usually consist of the physician assistant (PA) and a few experienced medics with limited medical supplies. For larger operations, the medical platoon leader will usually accompany the battalion surgeon and co-locate with the tactical command post (TAC) or cover a section left without adequate medical coverage due to the size and nature of the operation. The BCT surgeon and medical plans officer focus on coordinating and providing resources to support battalion and below missions rather than planning for brigade-level missions.

In Iraq, air MEDEVAC has reached a level of near perfection. The process and frequencies have been standardized in theater leading to an average wheels up time of around 10 minutes. Depending upon location in theater, the aircraft is usually on scene in anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes. In our area of operations (AO), air MEDEVAC is green approximately 95 percent of the time. Air MEDEVAC does however, have some limitations — the biggest being the weather. Sandstorms are the most common cause for grounding aircraft with thunderstorms being the next most common reason. Weather conditions vary by region and season in Iraq. Our AO requires gun ship support and will occasionally launch with two MEDEVAC aircraft if gunship support is not readily available. Hasty landing zones (LZs) must be quickly and properly established. Once again, terrain constraints usually play a key role in site selection. Improperly established LZs may either delay the aircraft's arrival or jeopardize the safety of the crew or Soldiers on the ground.

Ground evacuation is challenging for



Photo courtesy of Force Protection, Inc., www.forceprotection.net

An alternative for ground evacuations may be the Cougar 4x4, which is made by Force Protection, Incorporated.

many reasons. Depending upon the area, the roads can be heavily IED laden and/or covered with craters from old IEDs, making them impassable or too narrow for tracked vehicles. The biggest challenge, however, is the lack of an adequate up-armored front line ambulance (FLA). M113s are slower than M1114s, have higher maintenance needs and are fairly ineffective against many IEDs. In most cases, units usually stabilize the casualties the best they can and place them in an M1114 and drive to the nearest appropriate medical facility. Twice in the STRIKE Brigade, we began evacuation by ground in an M1114. When air evacuation was approved, we halted the vehicle en route. They quickly established a hasty LZ, and we directed the aircraft to their grid, quickly getting the casualties to the CSH. This is important to remember because time is always critical. A final alternative we are still researching is the use of the Cougar which is made by Force Protection, Incorporated. They are the same company that makes the Buffalo vehicle series which is used for IED route clearance. It will hold up to two litter patients without major modifications and is a very survivable and quick up-armored vehicle. Furthermore, Force Protection Inc. makes an armored ambulance version but has not been used in Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B) to date.

Battle tracking during a MEDEVAC is simple when an effective and practiced

battle drill is established. The first critical step to success is having the unit on the ground call directly to the air ambulance company for “Urgent” casualties if possible. In cases where communication with the air ambulance company isn’t possible, the fewest number of people required to get the 9-line to them is crucial. Units should not be required to call 9-lines through their chain of command — this only slows down the process. Several modes of communication have simplified situational understanding greatly. WAVE Desktop Communicator allows several FM channels to be monitored simultaneously. We generally monitor our brigade command net and the MEDEVAC net. We also use an Internet Relay Chat program called mIRC which allows us to essentially instant message anyone monitoring the program. Units have individual chat rooms and each air ambulance company has a room for each location. There is also one main MEDEVAC room for the entire theater where information, updates, and 9-lines are relayed. We are also able to see aircraft launch and arrival times at LZs and the CSH.

Once the aircraft arrives at the CSH, we wait approximately 15 minutes and call for an update on patient status to the liaison officers (LNOs) provided by division. The brigade surgeon section takes the lead on this to prevent multiple phone calls asking the same questions. The brigade aviation

element (BAE) monitors the aviation frequency and helps relay communication between the unit on the ground, attack aviation and MEDEVAC aircraft as needed. Finally, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage provides real time eyes on the scene if available and helps to paint a complete picture.

All these assets assist in the battle drill, but if not orchestrated correctly they can lead to confusion and information overload. This battle drill should be exercised in the tactical operations center (TOC) and tailored to fit the unit's individual needs.

Patient tracking is a critical and often overlooked process until the unit arrives in theater and takes its first casualty. The BCT surgeon section should take the lead in this area as the surgeon understands technical medical matters and the staff understands hospital organization. Establishing good relationships with the LNOs at nearby medical treatment facilities like the International Zone CSH, Balad Air Force Expeditionary Medical Group (EMED-G), and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in Germany is critical. Patient tracking may not sound critical to the average warfighter until you realize how much time you will spend trying to find out how the injured Soldiers are doing and where they are. Prior to transformation, the medical company assumed the role of patient tracking. Our brigade surgeon section took on this responsibility for several reasons. The brigade surgeon has a direct link to the BCT commander, we have better communications, and we are resourced with more experienced and knowledgeable individuals. Some of our commanders think this is the most important function of the surgeon section. The ability to get a current status on their wounded warriors helps keep emotions in check and provides feedback to Soldiers that their teammate is OK. The BCT surgeon section should have a solid patient tracking spreadsheet that encompasses Soldiers from the last 24 hours all the way back to the U.S., including the medical hold company at

home station. Finally, someone should be responsible at the rear detachment for tracking Soldiers in medical hold and assisting with return to duty (RTD) Soldiers. Getting RTD Soldiers back in the fight requires a lot of effort at home station. It is easy for Soldiers to get lost in the medical and personnel systems if they are not tracked daily. The quicker RTD Soldiers are processed back into the fight, the better unit strength is maintained.

From pre-deployment to present day, we took measures to ensure everyone from the Soldier on the ground to the doctor at the medical company has the proper equipment and training to save our warfighters. We took the initiative to design our own Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) pouch because the ones issued Armywide were not available prior to our deployment. Our pouch costs less money and is smaller than the issued IFAK but still contains all the critical Class VIII required. We also created our own CLS bag. At the time the one available in the Class VIII system was ineffective and more than 30 years old. We implemented standards for every vehicle to carry litters with straps, vehicle lifesaving kits and human remains bags. We often deal with deceased local nationals and enemy killed in action (KIA) as well as our own. Regardless, units need to identify special equipment and standards that are proven effective prior to deployment and continue to train on, modify and adapt them as necessary during deployment. The medical challenges in today's asymmetrical war on terror are different than in the past but can be overcome with prior planning and the proper mind-set. Combat medicine has changed — medics and combat lifesavers must be trained and equipped with the latest knowledge and tools prior to deployment. The BCT surgeon section must take the lead and educate not just medics and combat lifesavers but every Soldier and leader on TC3, air MEDEVAC procedures, and current in-country standards. Soldiers and leaders alike must also understand what the Platinum 10 means for their medical personnel, Soldiers, and mission.

Our medical system from point of injury to the hospital back in the U.S. is the best in the world. The Platinum 10 is the first event in a chain that saves Soldiers' lives. If that chain is broken, the Soldier may die. Taking the necessary steps to ensure the training and equipment to get casualties stabilized in that first 10 minutes will ensure every warfighter has the confidence to accomplish the mission and know the best battlefield medical system in the world is ready to care for them.

Major Craig W. Bukowski is currently the medical plans and operations officer for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The brigade has been deployed to Iraq since September 2005, serving with the Multi-National Division - Baghdad. MAJ Bukowski is a Medical Service Corps officer and will be attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in January 2007.



Staff Sergeant Jacob N. Bailey, USAF

Soldiers unload an injured Iraqi Army soldier at the 47th Combat Support Hospital in Mosul.



MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

CAPTAIN REN ANGELES

The need to measure the effectiveness of a campaign plan against an enemy is important on all levels of war but primarily at the operational and tactical level where tactical operations and close combat against the enemy are conducted. It is important to validate and measure the effectiveness of the courses of actions being employed against the enemy to find out what is working and what is lacking in order to defeat the enemy decisively. The primary goal or objective for a measure of effectiveness is to illustrate and validate the effects of a current course of action being employed to try to provide a picture of what works by asking questions such as:

- How is it working?
- How effective is it?
- What are the desired effects?
- What does not work?
- What is the local population's perception?


The military decision-making process (MDMP) is a good tool to employ in creating courses of actions against the enemy. It may provide a glimpse of the effects of the plan of action, but it will not fully lay out the result to provide a panoramic view of what is working on the ground and how it is being perceived by the local population. For this you would have to come up with a measure of effectiveness chart or scale that lays out and measure the courses of action, plan of actions or focus areas and their effects.

A key and effective tool in measuring the current progress or success of a campaign plan against an enemy is to have a measure of effectiveness (MOE) scale or chart that outlines courses of action and

or focus areas measuring or validating their effects. It is hard to quantify or validate in a measurable form the accuracy of the data using scientific methodology, but it is a good tool to employ as an azimuth check or measure of the effects of current operations against the enemy. The use and employment of such a chart may not be scientifically based due to the constraints and limitations on the battlefield. It is not feasible or achievable to quantify or validate the data scientifically, although site survey and local survey can be employed to validate some of the information, but the intent here is to gauge the local population's perception and the effects of operations and plan against the enemy. Given this data, units at the operational and tactical level can make the necessary changes and implement plans that will work against the enemy.

A gauge or an azimuth checks to see how effective the current plan is working or not, and will allow for making changes or improvement on current plans. It is really hard to quantify progress and success in the contemporary operational environment in Iraq. Those who have been there can attest to the fluidity of the situation, but there are measurable gains that can be quantified. Progress is being made on many fronts, but the obvious inability to put an end to the violent attacks is keeping the coalition forces and Iraqi government from creating a momentum of measurable progress. It is difficult for sustainable progress to take hold when the key ingredient for its growth — namely security — is not present.

Currently, the COE in Iraq has coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces fighting an insurgency whose primary goal is to prevent the creation of a stable and unified government. The enemy's methodology is simply to terrorize and incite sectarian violence in order to prevent the organization of a unified government that is hoped to bring about change, freedom, and democracy in a land long bereft of hope. It would also serve as a beacon for the greater Middle East of what is possible in a free and



CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Desired effect:

MOE:

Focus Areas:

Job Programs (S5):

Current Projects (S5):

Local Leaders engagement (S5):

Medical Outreach Programs (MEDO):

Future Projects (S5):

democratic society. So far the enemy has been effective in its goal of hindering measurable sustained progress by inciting violence, inflicting heavy casualties, and creating fear. The enemy has been effective in implementing its plan of projecting instability and uncertainty. It is not hard to quantify the enemy's effectiveness; the enemy has been successful in creating a perception of capability that is probably less effective or unsustainable in the long run, but because of its violent effects, he is able to mask his true capability, to be perceived as more effective than it may otherwise be. The enemy has a monopoly on the perception category due to his relentless violence.

Fighting against this type of enemy is very difficult to say the least, but it is not impossible to win. The employment of both lethal and nonlethal targets in the targeting process proves to be effective in fighting this type of warfare. The lethal targets are effective in neutralizing the enemy's capability to do harm against coalition and ISF forces, but they do not fully eliminate the threat as other individuals in the organization will move up to assume the mantle of leadership and continue with the fight. They can be effective in delaying enemy activity, but ultimately the enemy will reorganize and fight another day. The key is focusing on the nonlethal targets as well, engaging the Mukhtars, Imams, Sheiks, community leaders, business owners and local government officials. Establishing a relationship and fostering good will with local leaders and the populace at large goes a long way towards winning hearts and minds. The simple meet and greet while conducting daily combat patrols and cordon and knock operations with ISF forces goes a long way in building relationships and the perception of security. These operations not only help build the process of legitimization for ISF forces, but they can allow coalition forces to engage the population and find out firsthand the issues and concerns of citizens. Future Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operation (IO) campaigns can be derived out of these engagements. The value of local leaders, particularly the secular ones, cannot be underestimated in the Iraqi society or Muslim society in general. Knowing what the Imams are preaching in their mosques can provide good indications of the current threats or situations in a particular neighborhood. Knowing the key players in the area of operations is helpful in providing answers to questions that have bearing on the daily life of the local population.

Issues such as electricity, fuel, and food shortage are problems that might need to be addressed. The impact of fixing these issues and concerns has a direct bearing on the overall success of the campaign. There is more than just one aspect to winning the fight against an insurgency. The tactical aspect and lethal targets help in the security aspect, but to win the war you have to succeed in winning the hearts and minds by providing hope for a better future.

IO and CMO are on equal footing with the tactical aspect. Success depends on these operations as much as any other aspect or phase, more so at times than the tactical aspect. Information Operations directed at countering the enemy's propaganda bear a lot of weight in the overall scheme of things. IO products such as hand bills, posters, billboards, banners, radio talk shows, TV and radio spots, and TV shows can be employed. The ability to shape and change the perceptions of the local populace is very important; putting out messages and themes to the public proves crucial, especially in the Iraqi culture where perception is almost everything. CMO projects that have immediate impact on the daily life of the local population have a measure of effectiveness that can be easily seen. Fuel, electricity, water and food distribution, job/work programs, key infrastructure reconstruction/upgrade, school supplies, heater distribution, medical outreach and neighborhood clean up are some projects that can be implemented that will bring desirable effects that can be easily verified. The combination of all has direct bearing in the overall success. Success on these aspects is critical towards achieving lasting success. Post-combat operations of IO/CMO are critical in the success of all operations directly influencing the fight.

Measuring or validating the effectiveness of a campaign plan provides an azimuth check on what is working and effective, facilitates change in the course of action and provides focus to changing conditions on the ground; without this it is hard to measure and sustain progress being made to defeat the enemy decisively.

SECURITY OPS

Desired effect:

MOE:

Focus Areas:

Iraqi Army (ISF cell):

Iraqi Police (PMO):

AIF attacks against IP stations (S2):

AIF attacks against TCP's (S2):

Intimidation against Government Officials (S5/S2):

Captain Ren Angeles is currently attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He previously served as a battle captain for Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), during the unit's deployment to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom III.

Warrior, Prophet, Priest:

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF CHAPLAINS TO THE WAR EFFORT AND COMMUNITY

STEPHEN MUSE, PHD
CHAPLAIN (COLONEL) GLEN L. BLOOMSTROM

Don't confuse proximity to the target with importance to the mission.

— Unknown

The true warrior is one who is fit both for life and for war, succeeding in battle *and* after returning home from war. This is a dual mission often overlooked in terms of its strategic value to sustaining the war effort over the long haul and underestimated in its difficulty in terms of learning and managing the very different skill sets necessary to succeed in the two very different arenas, each of which is a force multiplier and protector for the other.

For example, research indicates “marriage to a stable partner” as one of the significant contributors to creating resilience in the face of adversity. This is particularly significant in light of data which shows that over the last 40 years the Army has evolved from a conscript force of primarily male Soldiers to a volunteer force in which 51 percent are married. These military couples are at a greater risk than civilians for domestic violence and that risk increases for those who are deployed, with longer deployments related to greater risk of violence. Exposure to combat further intensifies risk factors adding greater marital distress and threat of dissolution to the mix of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other combat-exacerbated vulnerabilities. Significantly, while the number of Soldiers over the past five years has remained fairly constant, a *USA Today* article dated June 7, 2005, by G. Zoroya stated, “divorce rates among officers is up 78 percent from 2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, and more than 3.5 times the number in 2000 before the Afghan operation.” What does this mean for the combat theater and support both logistically and at home in terms of morale?

It is our thesis that those men and women most likely to serve well in battle and survive it to live well in life are those who practice the way of the warrior striving to make themselves fit for both life and for war. The U.S. Army Chaplain’s task is strategic in supporting this effort. U.S. Army Chaplains and Family Life Chaplains in particular (who are trained to integrate both theological, pastoral, and clinical skills) have a vocation to support warriors in such a way that they successfully serve both God and



country. It is a task which places them squarely in the bull’s eye between two missions which involve different skill sets that are not easily mastered and can even seem contradictory:

- 1) Get the Soldier back to soldiering ASAP, and
- 2) Help the Soldier move back into family life as quickly and easily as possible after deployment.

Because the chaplain’s task is to serve on these two fronts simultaneously, when fully and authentically embraced in the depths, it is also one of the most difficult assignments in the armed forces, because the chaplain works at the very heart of the tension inherent to these very different tasks of being fit for life and fit for war. The chaplain and the Chaplain corps in general are not only force multipliers who help Soldiers get back to soldiering, but more importantly, they serve as healers, counselors and educators, to help raw recruits and battle-scarred and hardened veterans return to life at home, and once again become capable of effective interpersonal communication, vulnerability, intimacy, playfulness and joy among their loved ones and community. Many interwoven tasks are needed for effective deployment and transition as well as a depth understanding of the existential and psychological moorings for these activities, all of which the chaplain serves as both grunt and officer in charge.

A 1999 review of Army active duty psychological autopsies indicated 75 percent of all completed suicides in the Army involved the loss or dissolution of a significant relationship. Commanders and chaplains have hypothesized for years that the underlying reason for Soldiers leaving the Army is due to the loss of a marriage or significant relationship. Concerns in this area were confirmed by a recent survey of more than 1,500 respondents conducted by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, which paralleled the findings of other agencies on overall indicators of morale that the primary fear of operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and multiple lengthy deployments was not the fear of death or serious injury, but the fear of losing a significant relationship.

Given the fact that the Army loses an average of 14.8 percent of all enlistees between the sixth and 36th months and up to 36.8 percent for each annual enlistment cohort, stabilizing marriages becomes a critical factor in both retention and as a force multiplier of those who serve. The readiness of the Army is inseparable from

the well-being of its people and the consistency and depth of civilian support. Army well-being is defined as the “personal, physical, material, mental and spiritual state of Soldiers (Active, Guard and Reserve), retirees, veterans, civilians, and their families that contributes to their preparedness to perform and support the Army’s mission.” Providing for the well-being of Soldiers’ families is a fundamental leadership imperative that requires adequate support and resources.

The importance of addressing these issues recently gained national attention during June and July 2002, when there was an unusual clustering of four homicides of spouses of active duty Soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C. Eventually all four cases were determined to have been committed by Soldier husbands. Two of these took their own lives immediately after murdering their spouses while a third committed suicide some months later while incarcerated. A fifth homicide, perpetrated by the wife of a mobilized reservist assigned to Fort Bragg, also occurred during the same six-week period. These tragic events unfolding in the midst of a protracted Global War on

Terrorism (GWOT) became a great concern to the entire Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of the Army leadership at all levels and generated a media firestorm at the national and international levels.

Prominent among the causal factors raised by the press was the impact of separation due to deployment (since three out of the four Soldiers had been deployed to Afghanistan) and the lingering effects of traumatic stress related to combat experiences. In response, the U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) established a charter for an epidemiological consultation (EPICON) team composed of Army and Centers for Disease Control subject matter experts (including chaplains) to consult with the local medical and line leadership at Fort Bragg. A central finding to the EPICON team was that severe marital discord was a major factor in all of the active duty Bragg cases including recent or threatened separation.

Contributions of the Chaplaincy

Historically Army chaplains have been and remain the critical link in assisting with

Soldiers’ morale and helping with the transition between war and civilian life. Chaplains have consistently been catalysts and innovators in addressing Soldier and family needs and initiating programs, which later became independent Army programs. Chaplains established lending closets and provided “Helping Hand” funds using offerings taken up at chapels which were the precursors to today’s Army Community Service and Army Emergency Relief. After World War II, chaplains were at the forefront of initiatives to racially integrate the force. During the Vietnam period and following, chaplains initiated and were integral to drug and alcohol treatment and “Human Relations” programs.

The chaplain remains the primary frontline professional person in whom Soldiers are likely to confide in or seek out in distress. While the stigma of the label of “mental illness” still prevents Soldiers from talking with psychiatrists and medical personnel, the American Association of Pastoral Counselors found that when “...confronted with a personal problem needing counseling, 66 percent of persons would prefer a counselor who represented spiritual values and beliefs.



Eighty-one percent prefer someone who enables them to integrate their values and belief system into the counseling process.” Results of the Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP) indicate that next to a friend or close relative, Soldiers rank chaplains as the one “most likely for Army personnel to turn to for advice about confidential personal or family problems.”

Prior to the events unveiled at Fort Bragg by the EPICON team, the U.S. Army Chaplaincy had already begun piloting a proactive, unit-based prevention training program to strengthen marriages with what is known nationally as marriage education. Though not a new function, the approach is the only systemic and standardized approach in DoD.

Marriage Education Strategies to Strengthen Marriages

Marriage education focuses on empirically based strategies designed to help individuals reduce the risk factors and contributors to marital distress and increase the protective factors, skills, attitudes and confidence required to strengthen commitment and the achievement of mutual goals in marriage.

Developed in the 25th Infantry Division in 1999, the Building Strong and Ready Families (BSRF) program has become an example of how marriage education can work in the U.S. Army, how agencies can collaborate and has birthed related programs in support of GWOT. Outcome research was conducted with positive feedback from participants. These metrics supported further funding.

The intended target population for BSRF is first term or newly married couples. BSRF is intended to be offered at least three times per year to accommodate newly arrived or newly married couples in brigades. The marriage education component of the training is taught by members of the brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMT), community health nursing, or health promotion staff members and others. BSRF is a three-level training event consisting of two daylong workshops and culminating with an overnight retreat.

Due to the success of several Chief of Chaplains-sponsored Reserve Component BSRF pilot programs and the legislative changes beginning in fiscal year 2003 which allowed the use of appropriated funds for “chaplain led programs to strengthen the family structure,” the U.S. Army Reserve Command proposed a weekend event for couples. Beginning in late 2003, the 81st Regional Readiness Command sponsored the first of many couples and single Soldier post-deployment weekends. These weekend readiness events have multiplied significantly in the USARC and State Joint Force (National Guard) Units.

The costs of marriage education are small compared to the costs of not providing it. For example, the average outlay for recruiting (\$15,000) and training a Soldier in One Station Unit Training (\$28,000 average) is estimated to be somewhere between

The conclusions are clear: commanders who take the time and make the investments up front by preventing relationship problems before they escalate, will ultimately spend less time and funds than they would if the problem evolves to the point that it requires intervention from successively higher leaders and support agencies.

\$43,000-50,000 per Soldier. Attrition rates for Soldier cohorts who leave the Army before completing their first term average 36.8 percent for 0-36 months and 14.8 percent from months 6-36. If marriage education reduces the attrition a mere one or two percent after month six, savings would be \$43-86 million in recruitment and training costs alone, and double that if an additional \$50,000 is included for having to train another Soldier as a replacement, along with the 6-7 month time lag before he or she is ready for deployment. This more than covers the costs associated with systematic marriage

education conducted by chaplains for all the components.

The Army Family Advocacy program spent \$17 million to treat approximately 3,000 substantiated cases of spouse abuse in FY 04 at an estimated cost of \$5,500 per intervention. In contrast, the active component chaplaincy spent roughly \$1.5 million for approximately 4,000 couples on marriage education for approximately \$375 per couple. The active component chaplaincy could train all newly accessioned junior enlisted Soldiers and their spouses, reducing potential spouse abuse cases, for significantly less than the FY 04 cost of spouse abuse intervention and treatment, an important consideration in light of the fact that the causes of domestic violence are deeper than the substance abuse that often accompanies it.

The conclusions are clear: commanders who take the time and make the investments up front by preventing relationship problems before they escalate, will ultimately spend less time and funds than they would if the problem evolves to the point that it requires intervention from successively higher leaders and support agencies. Multiply this by thousands of Army couples and the impact on readiness, sustainment, and later, healthy reintegration to society, is evident and especially significant, since multiple deployments appear to be the immediate future, requiring stabilization and harmony for couples in the interims between combat rotations.

Equipping Warriors for Life and for War

In Stephen Pressfield’s historical novel *Gates of Fire*, King Leonidas, who narrates the events of the Spartan defense of Thermopylae against the Persian army, describes a ritual event that holds in it a key to the dual skill sets and orientations of the warrior, who must be one way in battle and another at home. The warrior moves between these two worlds most easily when there is 1) conscious intention and 2) the necessary communal acceptance, forgiveness, permission and empowerment that are part and parcel of such drastically different arenas as marriage, family and community life and the arena of battle.

“When a man sets before his eyes the bronze face of his helmet and steps off from the line of departure, he divides himself, as he divides his ‘ticket,’ in two parts. One part he leaves behind. That part which takes delight in his children, which lifts his voice in the chorus, which clasps his wife to him in the sweet darkness of their bed.

“That half of him, the best part, a man sets aside and leaves behind. He banishes from his heart all feelings of tenderness and mercy, all compassion and kindness, all thought or concept of the enemy as a man, a human being like himself. He marches into battle bearing only the second portion of himself, the baser measure, that half which knows slaughter and butchery and turns a blind eye to quarter. He could not fight if he did not do this.”

The men listened, silent and solemn. Leonidas at that time was fifty-five years old. He had fought in more than two score battles, since he was twenty; wounds as ancient as thirty years stood forth, lurid upon his shoulders and calves, on his neck and across his steel colored beard.

“Then this man returns, alive, out of the slaughter. He hears his name called and comes forward to take his ticket. He reclaims that part of himself which he had earlier set aside.

“This is a holy moment. A sacramental moment. A moment in which a man feels the gods as close as his own breath.”

“What unknowable mercy has spared us this day? What clemency of the divine has turned the enemy’s spear one handbreadth from our throat and driven it fatally into the breast of the beloved comrade at our side? Why are we still here above the earth, we who are no better, no braver, who revered heaven no more than these, our brothers whom the gods have dispatched to hell?”

“When a man joins the two pieces of his ticket and sees them weld in union together, he feels that part of him, the part that knows love and mercy and compassion, come flooding back over him. This is what unstrings his knees.”

The intent of this passage reminds us that it is not enough to be committed to “leaving no Soldier behind” on the battlefield dead or alive. A different war is waged upon return home unless “the ticket” symbolizing the inner being of each warrior is “reconnected.” Along with the

recognition that “war is hell” comes the understanding that no one goes to hell and comes back unscathed. It is a community betrayal to send men and women to war without a plan for on-going and follow-up pastoral care and counseling to support the soul-searching confrontations of heart and grief work that are necessary to sustain the effort and work through the effects of combat upon their return. The U.S. Army chaplaincy exists precisely because of the recognition that spiritual logistics and support are strategically important for the on-going war effort and morale in theater, as well as critical for combat veterans transitioning back home psychologically, emotionally and socially after they have arrived home physically. Miscalculation of the cost to families and communities from ignoring this essential link results in unhealed moral, spiritual, emotional and psychological damage, and decline occurring to combat veterans that wreaks interpersonal havoc for one and two generations or more after they return which serves to weaken the morale of the people who indirectly sustain the army by honoring its purpose, thus undercutting the war at its root. Both senior Army civilian and military leadership agree that “People are the heart and soul of the Army — Soldiers, civilians, family members and retirees. Our readiness is inextricably linked to the well-being of our people. The Army Family, both the Active and Reserve Component, is a force multiplier and provides the foundation to sustain our warrior culture.”

What must be clearly understood is that the Soldier has a mission in war as well as in peace. This is why the warrior’s way cannot be divorced from commitment to both God and Country, (*Pro Deo et Patri*, as the motto of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy states). Different skill sets and emphases are needed to be able to intentionally shift between protecting the Sacred Origins (battle) and enjoying them (marriage, family and community life.) Not all combat veterans achieve this; perhaps not even the majority. Family Life Chaplains, due to their special education and training, as well as the fact that they

are the persons most likely chosen as confidants by Soldiers both in theatre and at home, are strategically positioned and trained to support Soldiers in learning and living this difference. Of course, this means that the Family Life Chaplains themselves must be familiar with both worlds and able to move fluidly between them.




Existential and Spiritual context for FLC’s special mission

The chaplain who has walked among the troops on the field of battle earns the Soldier’s trust and it is easier for veterans to open up to them after they return as well. While the chaplain may not carry a gun, it must be remembered that neither did Christ fight with a sword, while some of his disciples or “chaplain’s assistants” on his Unit Ministry Team, certainly did as Peter demonstrated when he pulled out his sword to attack the guard seeking to arrest Jesus.

The chaplain then, represents in his/her person the type of the warrior-king — a leader who stands with his or her people sharing their struggles, knowing their pain and the realities of war in all its dimensions. Most of all the chaplain knows that the final battle is won or lost in the heart itself where meaning, worth and value are discovered and lost.

The chaplain also embodies and carries out the role of prophet — helping Soldiers wrestle with the moral decisions involved in fighting the war, and those arising among family and community in its aftermath. The chaplain is the one who is most capable of being direct and honest with command about the morale of the troops and those chaplains are most respected by command who have the courage and forthrightness to speak directly and boldly about the issues and persons for which they stand, something others in the rank and file may not feel they are able to do when outranked by their superiors.

Thirdly, there is the dimension of priest, which the chaplain incarnates — the shaman, or healer and representative of the presence of God in the midst of the conflict who is vowed to pay the price of being messenger at the intersection of the worlds of war, community and the Divine summons, embracing the tensions inherent





A Soldier talks with Landstuhl Regional Medical Center Chaplain Lieutenant Colonel Paul Williams at the hospital.

in the seemingly irreconcilable worlds of life and death, heaven and hell, war and family. One ex-Marine captured this tension in the title of his article, *Gulag and Kyrie*, which relates his experience of the chaplain walking among dead bodies intoning, “the Body of Christ... the Body of Christ...” as he handed out Holy Communion during the Vietnam conflict. That chaplain was both a symbol of unutterable grace amidst unspeakable horror, sustaining the hearts of Soldiers for continuing the battle at the time, and also offering hope to the souls of vulnerable human beings who would hopefully one day reenter the world of love and joyful community once the conflict was ended. Indeed, upon his return home, Marine Timothy Calhoun Sims went to Seminary and later became a Lutheran pastor who served as a chaplain in the U.S. Navy as a result of his experiences.

In order to fulfill these various dimensions of leadership, the chaplain must undergo extensive soul-searching and work on him or herself, integrating clinical skills, theological training and capacity for a special kind of integrative awareness and ability to remain present to pain and loss without abandoning persons and/or trying to “fix” them with easy superficial solutions. The chaplain has the special task of bearing the wisdom and the wounds incurred from moving back and forth between the two worlds of war and life, evil and good, grief and celebration, and use his/her

experiences to help others having difficulty with the transition, for as Henri Nouwen in his classic little volume, *The Wounded Healer*, has rightly observed, “You cannot expect someone to lead you out of the desert who has never been there.”

For this reason, the U.S. Army Family Life Training program offers a 15-month “spiritual ranger training” which tests the heart and soul of those who complete it in ways that changes their lives and relationships. As the wife of one chaplain volunteered at a recent graduation dinner, “This training hasn’t just made him a better chaplain; he has become a better husband and a better man.” Another nearing the end of his experience in the Family Life Training Program agreed, “This has been a life changing event for me.” It is music to the ears of those of us who serve as trainers in the program, for we know and share with the chaplains, that what they do is not a job, but a vocation, and not the work of a brief moment in time, but a lifelong campaign in the same direction. Those who understand and commit to this service deserve the highest respect.

On a societal level, the psychological, emotional and spiritual effects of war are present in some respect for all persons touched by it directly and indirectly, just as much as for those who suffer from medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder, and each and every person represents a communal responsibility for justice and healing. We haven’t brought our Soldiers home after they have come home physically, until they are home spiritually, psychologically and emotionally. Family life chaplains are leaders in the United States Army in helping bring awareness to this issue. They are front line Soldiers when it comes to addressing it in preparation for deployment as well as one of the most important members of the team involved in sustainment in theatre and after the men and women return from combat. In light of the intent of this article, it is our hope that chaplains in general, and family life chaplains in particular, are committed to being warriors, priests and prophets so that they may serve the rest who honorably seek to serve both God and Country, and to help sensitize and translate for the civilian sector the moral obligations we incur and the full price we must be ready to pay over generations for our nation to go to war and return not only safely, but wholly in body, mind, and spirit.

Stephen Muse, Ph.D., directs the Counselor Training Program and clinical services for the D.A. & Elizabeth Turner Ministry Resource Center of the Pastoral Institute, Inc. in Columbus, Georgia, and teaches and supervises with the U.S. Army Family Life Chaplain Training program at Fort Benning. Dr. Muse has taught and led workshops throughout the U.S. and internationally in the civilian sector and for U.S. Army Chaplains in areas such as treatment of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and marriage and intimacy issues. Dr. Muse earned a B.S. in philosophy from Davidson College, an M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary and M.S. and Ph.D. from Loyola College of Maryland in the field of Pastoral Counseling.

Chaplain (Colonel) Glen L. Bloomstrom is currently the Command Chaplain for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Prior to his current assignment he served as the Director of Ministry Initiatives, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Washington, D.C. Chaplain Bloomstrom previous assignments include: 1st Battalion, 325th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division; U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Europe; 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and the 25th Infantry Division. Chaplain Bloomstrom is a Fellow with the American Association of Pastoral Counselors and is a Clinical Member of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy.

A complete list of references for this article is on file and available with *Infantry Magazine*.

SPYMASTER

FORMER EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF DISCUSSES PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

The issue of public diplomacy remains one of the weaker aspects of American policy in the Middle East. There have been admirable tries at reaching the so-called “Arab Street,” yet these attempts have not been successful because they focus primarily on popular cultural icons, sports, and other superficial issues to bring the news from an American perspective. While these can influence opinion, it would be more effective for the U.S. to give voice to Arab intellectuals, thinkers, and security experts who oppose Islamist extremists and their tactics. Al-Jazeera offers the kind of shock TV that, although extremely biased, defies Arab taboos. The United States also needs to offer such programming highlighting Arab opinions that favor democracy, representative governance, and a fresh debate about the future of Islam in the 21st century. A discussion by Arabs on Prophet Muhammad’s interaction with Christians in early Islam (late sixth century AD), or the Christian emperor of Abyssinia’s offer of asylum to Muslims escaping Meccan persecution can begin to stem the tide of hate preached by extremists and radical clerics. Even debates on the origins of the Caliphate, a pre-Islamic notion, would serve to punch holes in the argument of Islamic militants wanting to reestablish this institution.

Public diplomacy as an instrument of war has historically played a significant role in the Middle East. One example is Salah Nasr, a controversial figure in Egyptian modern politics who headed Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate from the late 1950s until 1967, when he was arrested and tried after the Six-Day War. His reputation as a womanizer came back to haunt him when, shortly after his death, his mistress published her memoirs revealing intimate details of how he exerted significant control on Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser by throwing in his path real and imagined coups, assassination and terrorist plots — all of which he was responsible for foiling. He also used many tactics in violation of human rights to purge and liquidate opponents of Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council that toppled the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. Among his chief adversaries was the Muslim Brotherhood. His purging of this illegal faction in Egyptian politics was so thorough that many leaders sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These Arab monarchs were more than willing to provide the Muslim Brotherhood refuge as a proxy army to throw back at Nasser to undermine his pan-Arab agenda that vowed to sweep away traditional monarchies in the region.

Salah Nasr published an autobiography and also a two volume work in Arabic entitled “*Al-Harb Al-Nafsiyah: Maraka Al-Kalimah wal Moutaqad*,” (Psychological Warfare — the Battle of Words and Perceptions) the subject of this review essay. It is perhaps the finest work on psychological warfare in the Arabic language combining not only Arab, but German, Russian, British and American sources.

Salah Nasr was also a prolific writer while incarcerated in Nasser’s prisons when he fell out of favor. He published an autobiography and also a two-volume work in Arabic entitled “*Al-Harb Al-Nafsiyah: Maraka Al-Kalimah wal Moutaqad*,” (Psychological Warfare — the Battle of Words and Perceptions) the subject of this review essay. It is perhaps the finest work on psychological warfare in the Arabic language combining not only Arab, but German, Russian, British, and American sources.

Nasr is a man who combined a vicious and violent passion of subduing enemies of the Egyptian revolution with an intellect in the tradecraft of his dark arts. The two volumes are a survey of psychological warfare techniques in mankind’s history. This review will look at Salah Nasr’s discussions on the inter-Arab techniques used to undermine Nasser’s regime and the tools used by clandestine services in the western world that he viewed as playing a direct role in subduing Nasser’s power and message of Arab unity. It is vital for American military planners and academics in our war colleges to dust off works by Arab authors on warfare, terrorism and military-political affairs, particularly as the United States becomes committed to long-term reform and reconstruction in the Middle East.

Nasr’s Arabic book demonstrates the importance of media wars in many modern Middle East conflicts. Employing this skill in warfare is more complex today because of the Internet and satellite channels, which exponentially increase the average Arab’s exposure to varying opinions. Yet on the whole, the Arab education system does not provide for the synthesis of information or the challenging of ideas from clerics and teachers. There has been a marked decrease in the quality of education in the Arab world brought on by numerous factors, one of which includes an

economic downturn and explosive demographics that magnifies this problem.

Nasr's Comments on Nasser's Priorities

When the Egyptian revolution succeeded in July 1952, one of the six principles of the revolution was to acquire modern weaponry to equip a national army. Nasser never forgot that the slogans creating the revolutionary environment geared toward defeating Israel one had to go through Cairo, meaning that the regime of King Farouk had to be toppled and an army equipped with proper weapons in order to take it beyond being a ceremonial or internal guard force. Another principle was to declare war on imperialism and colonialism and create the same conditions for a successful revolt in African and Asian colonies. For Egypt, this particular policy found its ultimate expression in March 1955 with the convening of the Bandung Non-Allied Nations Conference in Indonesia. Amidst speeches, Nasser popularized the revolutionary slogans about national independence, political freedom, and social justice. However, within Egypt, Nasser and his Revolutionary Command Council ran the nation like a police state. Nasr discusses that after President Nasser returned from Indonesia, he was even more determined to acquire modern weapons. This triggered the 1955 Czechoslovakian Arms Deal, where Nasser in the end quietly accepted Eastern Block weapons to effectively wage war and deter Israel. The apex of Nasser's power was after the 1956 Suez War, when President Eisenhower realizing the wider Cold War implications of the French, Israeli and British attack on Egypt and possible involvement by the Soviets ordered the three attackers to cease their assault against the Sinai. Although a military blunder for the Egyptians, it would be overall a political success for Nasser, who turned the withdrawal into political capital in the Arab streets, leaving him the undisputed leader who defied the western powers and Israel.

Salah Nasr Discusses the Radio Media Wars

Aside from suppressing internal dissent and waging an internal war against Islamist extremists, Nasr was also intimately involved in the media wars that were prevalent under Nasser. He writes that Egypt's enemies used the radiowaves as early as 1955 to undermine the Egyptian Republic. Radio Free Egypt and Radio Monarchs were designed by Arab monarchs to undermine Nasser's influence with the masses. By 1958, 11 anti-Nasserist stations were broadcast into Egypt as a result of its union with Syria to create the short-lived United Arab Republic. One such station, Sawt Al-Haq (Voice of the Truth) was broadcast from the home of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun used the Voice of Lebanon to undermine the United Arab Republic and Nasser and compete with the highly successful and widely listened Egyptian radio programming, Voice of the Arabs, which in its day shook the Arab masses like Al-Jazeera does today. Iraqi Colonel Adem-Kareem Qassim (who toppled the Iraqi monarchy of King Feisal II in 1958) established Radio Free Damascus in 1959 to undermine the Syrian part of the union with Egypt. Radio Free Damascus was broadcast from the infamous Abu Ghraib Prison, a site of much pain under Saddam Hussein and a place renowned as the backdrop for the shocking



www.wikipedia.org

Gamal Abdel-Nasser (middle), shown with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, served as Egyptian President from 1956 until 1970. Under Nasser, Salah Nasr headed Egypt's General Intelligence Directorate from the late 1950s until 1967.

abuses of a handful of irresponsible U.S. Army leaders. The Iraqi Baathists, who shared power with Communists, socialists and Arab nationalists, created Voice of the Masses that widened attacks not only on Syria, but also Egypt.

The French, opposed to Nasser's support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) assisted dissident Arabs and Egyptians with establishing the radio broadcasts Voice of the Free and Voice of Free Egypt. According to Nasr's book, Jacques Sostel, who fought in the Algerian insurgency, was the first to listen to Egypt's Voice of the Arabs and attempted to copy its programming for Radio Kleber (known by its announcement name this is the Algerian Renaissance Movement). This radio station was clever counter-insurgency propaganda, even broadcasting occasional jamming to make listeners think they were tuned to Egypt's Voice of the Arabs. The British angry at Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and harassment of British Forces in the Canal Zone, created Voice of the Near East before the start of the 1956 Suez War.

The Battle of Ideas and Propaganda

The purpose behind these radio stations was to attack Nasser's governance and legitimacy as leader of the Egyptian people. It highlighted arrests, tortures, terrorism by Nasser's internal security forces, and the futility of his economic and social policies. It also spread rumors in Syria of Egyptian dominance in the union

between the two nations; this was not helped by Nasser's War Minister Field Marshal Amer who ran Syria as his personal fiefdom. Undermining the United Arab Republic (UAR) was a top priority after Nasser had successfully undermined such plans by Britain to create CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) which set Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan as bulwarks against Communist expansion.

It would be simplistic to think that Iraq, Jordan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia all channeled their propaganda efforts against Nasser that would simplify the tangled political intrigues of the Middle East. Jordan's late King Hussein created Voice of Iraq in July 1958 to counter the military leaders who murdered his cousin, King Feisal II. According to Egyptians (President Nasser and his inner-intelligence circle), the U.S. presence at the Dhahran Airbase in Saudi Arabia coupled with the British presence in the Yemeni port of Aden lent support (material and technical) in the creation of a few of these radio stations.

Secret Broadsheets, Pamphlet, and Printing Presses

For Americans, the use of leaflets and broadsheets is reminiscent of the American Revolutionary War with such classics as Thomas Paine's writings (*Common Sense* and *The Crisis*) or even World War II. But this lost art of the 18-20th centuries deserves close examination, for today the medium of such publications that undermine a regime can be found on the Internet and faxes. Egyptians found anti-Nasserist leaflets and pamphlets in their mailboxes and under their apartment doors. These pamphlets came by ship, air, and diplomatic pouches and deducing their origins consumed Egyptian intelligence officials. For those who were illiterate, caricatures and cartoons were drawn and altered photos of Nasser and Israeli leader Moshe Dayan were circulated. Some rumors that were circulated in print and radio included:

- Egypt was depleting its gold reserves;
- Egypt was importing wheat because it was unable to feed the masses;
- Assassination attempts against South



African leaders and the 1959 Cuban Revolution were conducted from Cairo.

Purchase of Newspapers, Journalists and Writers

In the 1960's, Beirut was the scene of a new creation, Dar Al-Sahafa (House of Journalism), which produced one English and two Arabic dailies financed by Britain. That same year, pro-nationalist and pro-Nasserist newspapers were bombed. Iraqi strongman Abdel-Karim Qasem partly financed the Lebanese paper Al-Hayat in the late 1950's, according to Nasr's book. In Sudan, jamming stations targeting Egyptian broadcasts were discovered in 1958. Nasr notes that in 1959, the U.S. Congress voted \$40 million to bolster the Voice of America broadcasts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Saudi Arabia's King Saud looked for religious ways to undermine Nasser since the Saudis were fighting a proxy war against Egypt in Yemen from 1962 to 1967. According to Nasr, King Saud prodded his clerics to propagate religious reasons why Egypt's union with Syria was abhorrent. Saudi King Faisal also searched for religious legitimacy to bolster the Eisenhower Doctrine according to Nasr, and found it in fighting godless Communism. There was even an idea passed around among the Saudi rulers for an Islamic union to counter Nasser's UAR. In 1963, the World Muslim League was created and the Saudi religious doctrine of

Wahabism stiffened resistance to pan-Arab nationalism and further radicalized Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Conclusion

Salah Nasr's chapter chronicling his perspectives on Arab propaganda efforts of the late '50s to the early '70s clearly shows the importance of media relations in the conflict-ridden Middle East. An estimated 40 million Arabs tune into Al-Jazeera, a mere 20 miles from Central Command, and its lack of objectivity can only be countered by other Arabs who feel that moderate voices have been drowned out by two polarized extremes. Thus, countering Al-Jazeera must be done

through Arabic programming that provides a forum for those Arabs who crave reform. Only they can effectively engage the Arab masses into answering the central question of why the Islamic world was great in the ninth and tenth centuries and the circumstances that put the region on a downsloping trajectory. Those who claim that US assistance of media capabilities to Arab reformers hinder their credibility miss the point, which is to introduce a line of reasoning to the cacophony of noise Arabs see on satellite TV and from such anti-American satellite channels like Hizballah's Al-Manar TV.

Salah Nasr's book also shows that any conflict, be it political, military or economic, must be supported by a media campaign. In the end, only a campaign geared toward changing "hearts and minds" will undermine Islamist extremist ideology. This ideology, blending pan-Arabism and even Communist revolutionary rhetoric, have brought the Islamic world a new and counterproductive interpretation of Islamic history, precedent and laws.

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Medical Service Corps and Middle East Foreign Area Officer who is Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has written prolifically in U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force journals and speaks annually on Islamic militant ideology at the U.S. Army War College. He wishes to thank his colleague at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ms. Mara Karlin, for her valuable advice, research and editing of this essay.



IMPROVI

R


NG ARMY MARKSMANSHIP

REGAINING THE INITIATIVE IN THE INFANTRYMAN'S HALF KILOMETER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID LIWANAG

"The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy, but to kill with accurate, aimed fire."

— General J. Lawton Collins



Combat experience in the mountains of Afghanistan, two wars in the Iraqi desert, and current fighting in cities reinforces the need for effective rifle and carbine training to shoot and kill enemy soldiers at all ranges. We have no doctrinal training courses for close combat (7 to 200 meters) nor for extended range (300 to 500 meters) M16/M4 precision shooting. Division-level schools like the 10th Mountain Division's Infantry Mountain Leader Advance Rifle Marksmanship course (briefed at the 2003 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning) provide 21-day programs of instruction to provide training in close-combat marksmanship, known-distance (KD) training for extended-range engagements, and the use of optics and night-fighting devices.

The U.S. Army infantryman is supported by incredibly sophisticated all-weather weapons and arms notable for their precision, effectiveness, and lethality at extended ranges — yet he must close to within 300-200 meters to engage enemy soldiers with a rifle effective to 500-550 meters. This fight is in the "the infantryman's half-kilometer," the difference between the 200-300 meter range of the average infantryman's training and the 500-550 meter maximum point-effective range of an expert rifleman armed with an M16/M4.

Today's accepted musketry standards are far lower than during WWI, when 600 meters and under were regarded as "close" range for a rifle.

Our current marksmanship training programs do not give Soldiers the confidence to control the infantryman's half-kilometer. Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier interviews with Soldiers in Iraq found, "In the desert, there were times when Soldiers needed to assault a building that might be 500-plus meters distance across open terrain. They did not feel the M4 provided effective fire at that range. The 82nd Airborne Soldiers wished they had deployed with M14s at the squad level as the 101st did." Even had they done so, do the Soldiers know how to effectively use them at that

range?

WWII observations made by Colonel (later Brigadier General) S.L.A. Marshall, as he documented U.S. infantry fighting experience in *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, led the Army to change its training methods to get more infantrymen to fire their weapons during engagements. His analysis led him to several conclusions:

- "What we need is more and better fire."
- "What we need to seek in training are any and all means by which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we go to war."
- "...weapons when correctly handled in battle seldom fail to gain victory."
- "... a highly proper doctrine which seeks to ingrain in the infantry soldier a confidence that superior use of superior weapons is his surest protection."
- "The rarest thing in battle is fire in good volume, accurately delivered and steadily maintained."
- The secret of mobility: "They moved faster because they could place their trust in the superior hitting power of relatively small forces."
- "The soldier who learns and applies correct principles of fire will always move."
- "The man who has the fire habit is looking always for forward ground from which to give his fire increased effectiveness."

The Infantry School at Fort Benning converted these observations into the Trainfire marksmanship program. The Known Distance (KD) marksmanship training system to teach recruits was abandoned for Trainfire instruction on reactive pop-up/knock-down targets to 300 meters.

General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General of the Continental Army Command (predecessor of FORSCOM and TRADOC), wrote an eight-page article in the July-September 1958 *Infantry Magazine* titled "Army Marksmanship Today," to answer questions and assuage institutional doubts about the new system.

Traditionalists protested that Trainfire was a "short cut" to marksmanship proficiency. Advocates championed Trainfire's

strengths — instead of learning to shoot at round bull’s-eyes, recruits would shoot a combat-style course of fire. Soldiers would gain confidence in quickly detecting indistinct or fleeting targets, rapidly assuming steady firing positions, and hitting detected targets. An unintended benefit discovered nearly 40 years later was the mental training and immediate feedback conditioning derived from rapidly shooting humanoid-shaped silhouettes, analyzed by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman in his book, *On Killing*.

Extensive training center tests at Fort Jackson and Fort Carson showed that on the 112-shot/112-target qualification course then in place, over 12,000 Trainfire Soldiers hit 5 more targets, on average, than did KD-trained counterparts. The bottom line: KD produced fewer first-time qualified Soldiers but more experts; Trainfire produced more first-time “Go” riflemen faster and cheaper, but fewer expert shots.

General Wyman pointed out, however, that there would always be a need for extended-range precision rifle fire and a cadre of expert riflemen to give quality marksmanship instruction. The objectives of the Army marksmanship system, he explained, were to quickly and cheaply train

large numbers of basic, effective combat marksmen, with units developing precision riflemen for combat and competition. Unit and Soldier mobility and dispersion dictated there would always be a need to cover gaps and terrain using designated squad riflemen (distinct from snipers) who could effectively shoot and kill targets at extended distances to 500 meters.

Infantry Soldiers were to receive Trainfire I in basic combat training. In infantry advanced individual training (AIT), they were to learn to fire as members of squads. Selected riflemen were to take a two-week Infantry School or Advanced Marksmanship Unit KD precision-shooting course, and all Soldiers were to be allowed the opportunity to compete in Army marksmanship events. The most advanced Soldiers would be selected for sniper training.

According to General Wyman, advanced KD and competition shooting were to remain an important part of marksmanship development and sustainment. The order implementing Trainfire I for CONARC units required that a minimum of 50 KD firing points (to 1,000 yards) per division, or equivalent, be maintained at each major installation.

Army marksmanship doctrine shifted to

formally emphasize short-range volume fire over precision fire. Soldiers were taught to shoot at terrain and suspected enemy hiding places and firing positions — experience had proven it was easier to get ammo resupplied than trained replacements. The Army transitioned from the 8-shot semi-automatic M1 to the 20-shot semi-automatic M14, then to the full-automatic-capable M16.

Vietnam experience seemed to validate assumptions that most infantry engagements would be intense, short-range fights against indistinct targets. Theory suggested survival and success were linked to pure volume of fire. “Quickfire” point-shooting techniques without the use of sights appeared in the M16 marksmanship manuals, and were trained at Vietnam-specific training centers like Fort Polk using B-B rifles. Army marksmanship doctrine earned the nickname “spray and pray.”

Vietnam manpower requirements demanded large numbers of riflemen from the institutional training base and the Army needed to train thousands of draftees quickly. KD and competition shooting were viewed as expensive and irrelevant for enhancing combat skills and survivability at jungle-engagement distances. FORSCOM and Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) deactivated their marksmanship training units (MTUs).

The current Trainfire rifle qualification course requires a recruit to hit 23 of 40 targets to meet Initial Entry Training standards (before 1980 this was 17 of 40). The expected norm is 27 to 31 hits. Fort Benning recently reported Initial Entry Training Soldiers averaged 27 hits of 40. The qualification score card in FM 3-22.9, *Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 Carbine*, shows that to qualify a recruit does not have to hit all 200-meter targets, and can qualify while hitting no targets beyond 200 meters. Recruits are formally evaluated using only two shooting positions (prone and foxhole, supported and unsupported). Soldiers are not trained in sustained fire (being conditioned that a “hit” immediately eliminates a threat when the target goes down).

The Army has trained several generations of Soldiers since 1958 using Trainfire, transitioning from .30 caliber M1 and 7.62mm M14 rifles through the M16A1 and M16A2 to the current M16A4. Nearly



During record firing (unsupported phase), the scorer follows the firer. Targets were generally obscure — note the circled area.

Trainfire is also a throw-back to the active defense strategy of the 1960s and 70s, in that it is a defensive course of fire (where the shooters in static prone or foxhole shoot at targets that appear at varying distances downrange of the Soldier). It conditions a Soldier to shoot as a defensive measure, vice closing with the enemy to destroy him.

all serving Army senior leadership personnel (generals and command sergeants major) have been trained to shoot to a maximum range of only 300 meters.

Trainfire gave Soldiers immediate feedback whether or not they hit a target, but it could not give qualitative feedback (a hit to a fringe area on a 700 square-inch E-type silhouette is as good as a center-of-mass hit to the central nervous system). Trainfire “was never intended to be, nor is it suitable for providing the feedback necessary for diagnosing problems, correcting a faulty zero, or gradually refining or sharpening a beginner’s shooting ability,” according to a U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences report.

Trainfire’s lack of precision downrange feedback, declining numbers of advance-trained shooters and coaches, and the collective inability of our NCO corps to analyze and correct shooting errors began to have a cumulative detrimental effect. By the end of the 1980s, most KD-trained NCOs and officers had attrited from service and Army-wide marksmanship competition was dying. We lost our experienced unit and institutional Army marksmanship training base.

Trainfire is also a throw-back to the active defense strategy of the 1960s and 70s, in that it is a defensive course of fire (where the shooters in static prone or foxhole shoot at targets that appear at varying distances downrange of the Soldier). It conditions a Soldier to shoot as a defensive measure, vice closing with the enemy to destroy him.

Post-Vietnam frustration with the general level of marksmanship proficiency led Army Vice Chief of Staff General John Vessey to publish a Marksmanship Memorandum dated Dec. 11, 1980. The lead sentence reads: “Many current Army regulations and policies place insufficient emphasis on individual, crew, and unit marksmanship. If the fighting Army does nothing else, we must be able to hit our targets. Conversely, if we do all other things right, but fail to hit and kill targets, we shall lose.”

Eventually, Clinton administration guidelines to simplify government resulted in many government and Army regulations being declared obsolete and discarded. In 1996 the Army’s Director of Competition Marksmanship (DCM), directing the Army Competition Marksmanship Program (CMP), became the civilian Director of Civilian Marksmanship overseeing the *Civilian* Marksmanship Program (a congressionally-mandated corporation). Formal active-Army marksmanship competition ended in 1994, the Army Championships having moved from Fort Benning, Ga., to Camp Robinson, Ark. The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) at Fort Benning was slated for deactivation in 1998.

The problems identified by the Army Research Institute (ARI)

in Basic Rifle Marksmanship Training in 1977 have remained:

- Too few competent instructors,
- Limited basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) knowledge . Limited diagnostic skills, and
- Inability to conduct effective remediation.

A 1980 ARI report found that “there has been a demonstrated loss of institutional knowledge over the years in fundamental marksmanship training skills. Observations of drill sergeants who were unable to correctly diagnose trainee errors or more simply to recognize improper firing positions were not at all uncommon during the test. To assist in correcting trainee errors, the drill sergeants themselves must be adequately trained. The U.S. Marine Corps uses highly qualified instructors in a ratio of one to two students at critical fundamental skill acquisition times. There is evidence that this has much to do with the excellence of their marksmanship training program. It remains to be seen what gains would occur for the Army as the ratio of student to qualified instructor drops from as much as 20 to 1, as now exists, to a smaller ratio permitting greater individual attention per student.”

Steps to correct the loss of marksmanship instruction proficiency led to some Army self-examination. The ARI noted major problems in 1980: “poor quality of instructors (often having to work with high ratios of trainees to instructor, when individual attention is needed), little opportunity for practice of necessary skills, and insufficient feedback of where bullets were landing so that correction of problems was difficult.”

In 2005 very, very few (if any) staff NCOs can train precision marksmanship to 600 yards from experience. Our Army is not trained to shoot to the doctrinal maximum effective range of our service rifle (M16A2 - 550 meters, M16A1- 460 meters) and carbine (M4 - 500 meters). Army assumptions that combined arms, crew-served weapons, and the infantry battalion’s six organic snipers would dominate the *infantryman’s half kilometer* have not proven true in recent mobile expeditionary warfare.

To improve marksmanship scores and training, and to provide some sort of timely, quality precision feedback for marksmanship trainers, the Army has invested in five different shooting simulators: the Accudart, Weaponeer, Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator, Engagement Skills Trainer, and Beamhit Laser Marksmanship Training System. Despite this investment in research and simulators, the quality of marksmanship instruction remains stagnant. Only 31 Regular Army, 15 Army Reserve, and 20 Army National Guard riflemen representing the entire United States Army fired in the National Rifle Championship Matches in 2003. There are no STRAC ammunition allocations for rifle and pistol competition training, and Army Subject Schedules for advanced marksmanship training and competition are obsolete.

Infantrymen maneuvering in urban battlefields need realistic close-range shooting training. Special Forces units met close-quarters marksmanship skill requirements in the 1970s and ’80s by forming unit-level schools, notably Special Operations Training (SOT) and other specialized courses. Major General William G. Boykin, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, instituted Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat training at group level in the late ’90s.

Close-quarters combat rifle courses of fire can be conducted on existing 25-meter zero rifle ranges that are universal on Army posts.



Specialist Andrew Meisner

Staff Sergeant Aaron Hamptom, an instructor and shooter with the USAMU Service Pistol Team, helps a student with his shot placement during marksmanship training in Baghdad.

The Soldier's perceived limited effectiveness with his rifle has spawned the requirement for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon to compensate. The proposed adoption of the XM8 carbine (with a 12 1/2-inch barrel) to replace the M16 rifle and M4 carbine will further decrease a Soldier's ability to hit extended-range targets. The XM8 will no longer exploit the relatively flat trajectory of the 5.56mm cartridge to 300 meters. Additional problems arise from the future requirement for training on the 25mm explosive launcher of the Objective Infantry Combat Weapon (OICW). Simulation is already seen as the answer to high ammunition costs and the inability to maneuver on explosive-contaminated ranges. The Army must address the need for precision fire to avoid collateral damage caused by a proximity-fused area weapon and the inherent limitations of a short-barreled XM8. In the interim period between retirement of the M16 and fielding of the OICW, we will be vulnerable to enemy small arms fires from 200-500 meters.

Advance Combat, Known-Distance Marksmanship, and Competition as a Proposed Training Fix

The Army can build a trained cadre of competent NCO rifle marksmanship trainers using both known-distance and close-combat competition as the vehicle. Shooting competitions are held at ranges

from 25 to 600 yards. The USAMU can give advanced marksmanship training at Fort Benning, at requesting-unit home station, and in-theater by mobile training teams. USAMU established and began conducting exportable designated marksman courses in October 2004.

Divisions and posts can run competitions covering known-distance shooting, firing from advanced and alternate firing positions (kneeling, standing, and sitting), conducting sustained fire with magazine changes, and adjusting sights to compensate for the effects of environmental and meteorological conditions. Combat matches emphasize rapid target engagements, magazine changes, and offensive action toward banks of enemy targets. Fire-team level events exercise squad leaders and individual shooters in selecting targets and using sustained fire.

Combat KD rifle firing and competition can help build a trained instructor base. KD shooting and techniques provide invaluable precision training feedback. KD teaches Soldiers to compensate for the effects of range and wind (correcting by hold off or sight correction for elevation and windage), atmospheric, and lighting. Designated courses of fire reinforce sustained individual and squad rapid aimed fire and magazine reloads, and train squad and fire-team leaders in fire distribution and control. Soldiers are already familiar with E- and F-type silhouette targets. Soldiers shoot

offensive courses of fire in full field gear to include helmet and body armor from 600 yards to 25 yards (KD ranges are set up in 100-yard increments from 100 to up to 1,000 yards).

Combat KD courses of fire are *offensive* in nature. Soldiers and squads advance toward the target line, closing the distance to the "enemy."

The Known Distance Alternate Qualification Course fired at 300, 200, and 100 yards (see in FM 3-22.9) is an offensive rifle qualification course. Soldiers fire six zero-confirmation rounds from 300 yards in the prone-supported position. They then fire 10 rounds for record in 60 seconds from the prone-supported firing position. Bullet holes are marked on the E-type silhouette to show the Soldier where his groups are impacting, helping to determine whether he is applying the basics of marksmanship. Soldiers repeat with 10 rounds in the prone-unsupported position, then move to the 200-yard line where the exercises are repeated. Soldiers then advance to the 100-yard line where they fire on the F-type silhouette. This qualification course gives excellent feedback and forces the Soldier to employ his marksmanship basics in rapid, sustained fire, and psychologically preps for the offense, to close distance with an enemy from 300 to 100 yards.

The Infantry Team Match is a squad-level KD course of fire. The historic U.S. eight-man infantry squad was issued 384 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition for their M1 rifles (six 8-round clips per soldier. The traditional round count remains at 384 for today's M16 or M4 match). Six riflemen engage eight E-type silhouettes at 600, 500, and 300 yards with the squad leader and fire team leader controlling fire and ammo distribution. Targets are exposed for 50 seconds at each yard line. Scoring is by simple hit or miss; hits at longer ranges can earn extra points. Soldiers and teams get feedback from group plots on KD target boards.

Commanders put four squads on a 50-point KD range to shoot the Infantry Team Match. Twenty-four Soldiers, on line, shooting 40 rounds each in rapid aimed fire is inspiring to experience — the cadence and noise of the fire gives the match its nickname, "Rattle Battle." Four USAMU riflemen demonstrated to Lieutenant General Dennis D. Cavin (then commanding general of U.S. Army Accessions Command) that a four-man fire

team armed with M16A2s can deliver 40 shots per Soldier in 50 seconds, scoring 35 to 36 hits per E-type silhouette (against four targets) at 600 yards.

Combat Match 321 and the Combat Excellence-in-Competition (EIC) rifle match start individual Soldiers at 300 yards to rapidly engage timed and multiple target exposures, advancing to repeat at 200 and 100 yards. Soldiers then advance toward the target berm to engage multiple “snap” targets (exposed for 3 to 5 seconds) at ranges of 75, 50, and 25 yards. Soldiers must use prone, sitting, kneeling, and standing positions.

Division and post matches are also venues for Excellence-in-Competition matches, which formally recognize shooters who place in the top 10 percent of competitors. The division and post match format mirrors the Army Rifle and Pistol Championships and helps commanders train NCO marksmanship trainers. Successful teams represent the Army in interservice and national championships.

KD shooting instruction cannot be given at some posts, as the TRADOC Army Training Support Center has declared KD ranges obsolete and dropped them from 2004 edition of TC 25-8, *Training Ranges*. Many infantry and armor division posts no longer have serviceable KD ranges.

KD combat marksmanship training and competition can produce competent instructors and advanced-skills riflemen relatively quickly. Resources are precious but available.

Marksmanship training experience in the U.S. Marine Corps is centralized at brigade level. A warrant officer “gunner” is responsible for marksmanship-sustainment instruction, competition, and ranges, and his duties are akin to armor and Bradley master gunners. In the 1st Special Forces Group, a designated experienced master gunner and instructor group teaches close-quarters battle (CQB) marksmanship, advanced urban combat marksmanship, and group-level sniper training. The U.S. Army should consider assigning a small arms “gunner” to each infantry brigade headquarters.

“Shoot, move, and communicate” are core Soldier battlefield

competencies. Our doctrinal infantry marksmanship yardstick once stated, “If you can see it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can kill it.” Trainfire trains large numbers of Soldiers quickly and cheaply. KD and competition produces precision riflemen. The Army’s leadership identified the benefits and need for both systems in 1958. The 2006 Army must invest in precision marksmanship training and competition to re-establish the experience base of our NCO corps and make our riflemen effective in the *infantryman’s half kilometer*. Training-the-trainer experience has proven we can develop confident and competent NCO and Soldier shooters who can decisively engage and kill enemy targets from seven to 600 yards with our service rifles and carbines.

Technical advances in aiming and sighting devices derived from the USSOCOM SOPMOD (now the Army Modular Weapon System) allow the Soldier to acquire, identify, and engage targets faster, farther, and in the dark or with thermal sights. We are the world’s premier night-fighting force, and we should dominate the battlefield to the maximum effective ranges of our weapons and enabling technology.

Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker emphasized the absolute need for marksmanship competency and Warrior focus in his speech at the 2003 Association of the United States Army Convention in Washington, D.C. We must build on that direction to make the U.S. Soldier the most lethal and effective man on the battlefield.

For more information on KD and combat shooting competition, contact the United States Army Marksmanship Unit, 7031 Bill Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905, (706) 545-1272; or the National Guard Marksmanship Training Center, Camp J. T. Robinson, North Little Rock, AR 72199-9600, (501) 212-4504.

Formal Army Recognition of Individual Marksmanship Achievement

In 2003 the Army republished AR 350-66, *Army-wide Small Arms Competitive Marksmanship*, which dictates procedures and



Joe Burlas

Staff Sergeant Charles Blackwell of the Texas National Guard tackles a 500-yard target during the All-Army Small Arms Championships in March 2004. Blackwell was named the 2004 individual champion.

guidelines for service and interservice marksmanship competition and training.

Distinctive badges and awards already exist to recognize competitive marksmanship expertise and achievement. Bronze and silver EIC marksmanship badges are of higher precedence than standard marksman, sharpshooter, and expert badges, with gold Distinguished Rifleman and Distinguished Pistol Shot highest in precedence. Badges and points are awarded for finishing in the top 10 percent of all competitors in announced EIC matches. No sighter or zero shots are fired in EIC matches.

The President's Hundred tab is awarded to the top 100 shooters in the President's Rifle and President's Pistol Matches at the annual National Matches held at Camp Perry, Ohio. The respective champions receive a commendation letter signed by the President of the United States.

Regulations governing the permanent wear of Excellence-in-Competition badges and the President's Hundred Tab are outlined in AR 670-1.

The USAMU resumed hosting the Army Small Arms Championships at Fort Benning in March 2004. The All-Army Championships help the USAMU, Army Reserve, and National Guard (combined Army and Air Guard) Rifle and Pistol Teams identify talented Soldiers who may be asked to shoot the summer-season TDY. Soldiers represent their components at Interservice and National Championships.

The National Guard Marksmanship Training Unit (NGMTU) at Camp Robinson sponsors the Winston P. Wilson matches, international Armed Forces Skill-at-Arms Meeting, and international Interservice Small Arms Championships. These competitions include combat rifle and pistol matches, machine gun matches, sniper matches, and rifle and EIC matches. They are excellent opportunities to develop advanced combat marksmanship skills.

The USAMU and NGMTC can provide assistance to establish and run brigade-level and above marksmanship competition programs. USAMU recently helped establish an EIC match program for Special Operations Forces and MACOM combat rifle and pistol matches for the Joint Special Operations Command.

Squad Designated Marksman

Army marksmanship doctrine and the new Stryker concept both identify Squad Designated Marksmen (DMs) as Soldiers armed with the standard rifle or carbine, with or without an optical sight, who engage and kill targets to 500 meters (training is specified in FM 3-22.9). A DM equipped with a modified M16 and optical sight may be exceptionally effective at covering ground from 200 to 500 meters. The Soviets historically filled similar requirements with squad and platoon marksmen armed with the 7.62 x 54mm SVD semiautomatic rifle, and the U.S. Marine Corps is studying using accurized M14s and M16s as DM and Squad Advanced Marksman (SAM) rifles. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions (equipped exclusively with M4 carbines), the 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), and the 1st Cavalry Division recently pulled 7.62mm M14 rifles from Army stocks to serve as DM weapons.

The M16 can be modified to provide exceptional accuracy with combat reliability. Since 1993, most Interservice and National records set with either the M1 or M14 have been broken by shooters using the M16. One of the most successful individual weapons to



U.S. Army photo

During a Squad Designated Marksman Course, instructors from the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit assist students with advanced marksmanship techniques.

emerge since 9/11 is the modernized M16A1 rifle (designated Mark 12 SOF Precision Rifle, or SPR by the United States Special Operations Command). The Army G3 approved a Designated Marksman-modified M16A4 for the 3rd Infantry Division for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2005.

The USAMU-designed SPR and the 3rd ID Designated Marksman Rifle are built using the same techniques as for precision competition M16s. Armorers install a high-quality free-floating stainless steel match barrel (the hand guard tube and Special Operations Peculiar Modification, or SOPMOD, accessory rails do not touch or affect the barrel) on a flat-top upper receiver and tune or replace the trigger. Ammunition designed for KD competition shooting has proven exceptionally effective in combat in the SPR and M4 carbine to 600 yards. Lethality is increased as hits on target increase. Match-grade ammunition (5.56mm Long Range Special Ball, Mark 262 Mod 0, DODIC AA53 loaded with 77-grain target bullets) is now type-standardized but in limited production for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command. The U.S. Marine Corps has designed and deployed their prototype SAM-R, a very similar system, and use the same type of ammo.

Another rifle that may fill the requirement for an infantry DM is the 7.62mm AR-10T. For all intents and purposes a scaled M16 or M4, it can be configured with SOPMOD accessory rails and use either 7.62mm M118 Long Range or standard ammunition used in the M240 machine gun. Soldiers are already familiar with AR-10 design and operation.

Lieutenant Colonel David Liwanag commanded the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, Ga., from June 2003 until June 2006. He is currently assigned to the J3, Special Operations Command - Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Va. Other previous assignments include commanding the U.S. Army Parachute Team and serving with the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.

GUARD PLATOON ASSISTS WITH HURRICANE RELIEF EFFORTS

FIRST LIEUTENANT PAOLO SICA

My intent is to provide a narrative and analysis of my platoon's operations in Louisiana in support of Hurricane Katrina and Rita relief activities during September 2005. At the time, I was serving as the platoon leader for the Reconnaissance Platoon, HHC, 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Pennsylvania Army National Guard.

Background

Expediency and some similarities encourage the equivocation of reservist and full-time Soldiers. However, guardsmen, both officer and enlisted, join and remain at their home stations for reasons readily distinguishable from the typical Regular Army (RA) enlistee or academy graduate. Phrases and concepts such as a "standing army" and "(Constitutional) militia" don't frequently enter into Army banter, but are germane to the comparison. To mistake guardsmen for being RA Soldiers of a different tempo or caliber would be a grave error. For example, until recently, we held the reasonable and popular expectation of accomplishing far different tasks than the RA; peace-enforcement and brief disaster relief come to mind, missions at which reservists are naturally proficient and best-suited.

For 36 nonconsecutive days out of an average year, I am directly responsible for the training and welfare of the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team's Reconnaissance Platoon (Pennsylvania Army National

Guard). There's a milk crate packed with loose-leafed FMs and a duffel bag stenciled "DRILL" in my trunk for the "one weekend a month" I get to go train. It's an ideal arrangement since I relish life as an American civilian, yet admire our country's military tradition and am proud of my forebears' service.

Task organization

My platoon sergeant, Sergeant 1st Class Randall Diehl, is a Vietnam veteran and retired police officer. He was the Recon platoon sergeant when it was the Scout platoon and before it moved from Tyrone, Pa., to the Lewistown armory, which makes him at once the senior NCO and platoon historian. Our muster includes a plumber, a photographer/meteorologist, corrections officers, and assorted wage-workers; most were born and raised within 50 miles of the armory. This diversity of skill


constitutes a transparent attachment to the platoon in that almost every Soldier has a civilian skill.

In September 2005, the platoon was missing six of its best men, all of whom volunteered to accompany the 55th Brigade to OIF when the opportunity arose in February. This left us with 18 scouts, our individual equipment, and sufficient crew-served weapons to mount on however many turtleback HMMWVs are available for training in a given month.

Timeline

On Thursday morning, Sept. 1, 2005, I was four days into law school at Widener University, when 1st Sergeant Michael Carper called me and told me to be at the armory the following morning. I explained things to Dean of Students Elizabeth G. Simcox, who promised I would be welcome back next year, and my academic

Figure 1 — Deployment Timeline



scholarship would carry over. (It is very important that guardsmen select a university that is military-friendly.) At home, my wife, Sue, was ready to assist with a quick pre-combat inspection (PCI) of my rucksack and duffel bag as I double-checked the lock on the gun cabinet, the locks on the windows, and backed up my laptop to DVD+R, much the same routine as leaving for vacation. The following morning at 0700, the armory at Lewistown was alive with excitement; a series of Emergency Management Assistance Contracts (EMACs) had been triggered by Hurricane Katrina's Aug. 29 landfall, and we were to send troops and equipment south to the area of relief operations (ARO). All junior officers were expected to deploy, although there was no stoploss in effect, and Soldiers enrolled in academic programs could be exempted on a case-by-case basis.

Situational awareness

Having completed 16.5 continuing education credits of distance learning through the Emergency Management Institute, I was able to explain to my peers and subordinates what was occurring, in terms of how the ARNG fit into the National Response Plan and emergency management protocols. As per the brigade warning order, Task Force Paxton (2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry) of Task Force Griffin (56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team), would conduct relief operations of an unknown nature in the vicinity of New Orleans.

First Lieutenant Luke Shinskie, our S2 and an aspiring minister, began the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and used various commercial computerized mapping services to generate maps for the trip. Forecast threats to the force included roving hooligans and the more realistic threat of disease and spilled industrial toxins. First Lieutenant Cara Walters provided me with a summary of chemical and biological threats likely to be encountered, which I relayed to 1LT Shinskie, aiding in the IPB. The medics scrounged for as many vaccination doses as were available to catch everyone up before entering New Orleans, which they eventually succeeded in doing. We were fortunate to have Sergeant Edward Corcelius, an ordained minister in the "real world," as the chaplain's assistant. Absent a permanently assigned chaplain, he provided consistent and effective support to our Soldiers, as two substitute chaplains did consecutive stints with us.

Packing list/PCIs

We packed as we would for annual training (AT), that being the point of reference for extended operations. In addition to battalion SOP "battle rattle," shrewd additions included folding cots, rechargeable batteries, power inverters, cell phones, laptops, FRS radios, and ample quantities of tobacco, paperbacks, and cash to sustain us no matter the conditions. I bought hip waders, although they were never called to action and were later returned for refund.

Preparation

In the last days of August's AT, Captain Shick had tasked my platoon to make over the motor pool and dispose of accumulated decades' worth of detritus and that summer's wasps' nests. Mortar Platoon pitched in with gusto, and the treasure we unearthed (c.1966 ring mounts, brand-new slave cables, M2 .50 flash hiders, and barrel gloves) was appropriately allocated before pitching the

rest of it into a closely monitored bonfire. Within a few days, we'd managed to match mystery keys to locks, logbooks to vehicles, and we PMCS'ed everything that moved (or refused to). CPT Shick tasked the remainder of HHC to clear out common areas; organize and stencil individual lockers and platoon cages; unpack, clean, and label tents of all sizes and eras; and conduct individual showdown inspections before calling annual training a wrap. Less than a month later, our commander's tenacity and exertion was paying off in spades. This prescience alone could be credited with our successful execution.

Of course, there were briefings to endure; personnel files to review; state active duty forms to fill out (until Federal funds kicked in and we became Title 10); heat casualties and nonswimmers to segregate; and HMMWVs (from HHC, 3-103rd AR in neighboring Lewisburg) to borrow, inventory and assign, so it was not until Sunday morning that half of the company was hurtling south, buckled up and wearing patrol caps at a jaunty cant. The rest of HHC would ride down on chartered buses because there wasn't any room remaining for them in the tactical vehicles.

Deployment

As convoy commander, I had three M1025s, 15 M998s, seven M35A2 Vietnam-era 2 1/2 tons, five M923s 5 tons, and assorted trailers, in addition to the Combat Repair Team's (CRT's) organic vehicles to account for. The trucks were without SINCGARS, so we sandwiched them between HMMWVs. I led from near the front, while the medics and CRT trailed, to service any breakdowns or accidents. Within 10 minutes of departure, CPT Shick's HMMWV made the ultimate sacrifice and gracefully coasted to the side of Route 322S, crackling out of SINCGARS range. He caught up with us later that day. This would not be the last vehicular casualty of the 1,200-mile convoy, but owing to a thorough convoy briefing and rehearsal of vehicle breakdown procedures, the convoy made its hard times, and we kept accountability.

Fueling

An SOP for best managing fueling stops was developed on the fly: SFC Diehl and Sergeant 1st Class Robert Megahan, Mortar platoon sergeant, traveled 10-15 minutes ahead of the company convoy and assessed the brigade's planned fuel stops. Often,



Photos by 1st Lt. Paolo Sica

Nearing the hurricane-affected region, telecommunications failures made our Voyager cards useless. Once in New Orleans, we had our own fuelers.



During the convoy down to New Orleans, the brigade had its first bivouac at a truckstop in Marion, Va.

brigade elements would jam up the planned location, and our lead element would, instead, guide us into an alternate truck stop that would accept our Voyager card. Sergeant 1st Class Russell Hunt, HHC's senior medic and a civilian truck driver, gave us a useful primer on truck stop culture, and a small group of NCOs, led by Staff Sergeant Joseph Rogal, assumed responsibility for directing traffic into fueling lanes, maintaining convoy integrity, and safely moving tactical vehicles among anxious civilian POVs and 18-wheelers.

Maintenance

Vehicle safety, security, and sensitive items accountability were leaders' intuitive concerns, and for four days, we traveled, dominating the interstates, staying over in Marion, Va.; Hurricane, Tenn.; and Pearl, Miss. Brigade HQ led the way and contracted for hot meals on the local economies so that we were always well-fed and in high spirits as dusk fell, and we cordoned off our vehicles with folding cots.

The battalion CRT, recently reduced in size from a mechanized organization to a more spartan SBCT table of organization and equipment (TO&E), worked tirelessly into the night, arranging for the evacuation of what was irreparable and had been left behind. Inarguably, CRT set the mark for motivation from day 1. Despite a drought of Class IX (repair parts), which would persist throughout the entire deployment, the wheels kept turning.

Simultaneously, there arose a zeal for PMCS unlike ever before. CPT Shick had taken the Boy Scout motto to heart in his review of load plans, so that his Soldiers could encamp, become self-sufficient anywhere, and be a net asset to any relief effort. This level of preparation involved a lot of equipment, including concertina wire, pickets, cots, kitchen equipment and tents. This was equipment that had to be cross-loaded whenever a truck broke down, so PMCS was fastidiously performed.

Comms

Our communication was primarily commercial cell phone, from H-hour to mission complete. This was for a number of reasons, none owing to improper maintenance or lack of equipment. While the 2 1/2 tons had no radios, I soon learned that they needed to be kept between vehicles that did, or would travel on, independent of the convoy, long after the rest of us had taken an exit. The road noise, compounded by temporary hearing loss resulting from the truck's routing of exhaust directly into the passenger's right ear, was such that I had to keep my cellphone's "vibrate+ring" flush against my beltline, to notice an incoming call. I wore foam earplugs and encouraged all Soldiers to do the same, explaining the irreversible effects of dangerous decibel levels.

When my phone rang, I had to activate the speakerphone and hold it flush against my ear to hold an intelligible conversation with the caller. To keep my phone charged,

I permanently married a 12V car charger and a set of alligator clips to one of the two 12V batteries under my seat. This worked well for three weeks, until one day the entire arrangement ignited, and I had to henceforth rely on intermittent AC power in the rear. Regardless, cell phones were our lifeline, and at the earliest opportunity, CPT Shick ordered a phone directory by bumper number (driver & assistant driver), noting commercial carrier; same-carrier calling was usually free, and the financial impact of the deployment on Soldiers needed to be minimized. From H-hour to H+18, I received 31 separate calls, averaging two minutes each.

In urban terrain, the SINCGARS' limited range was further diminished, until eventually, it was used only to report departure and return from the FOB. Certain cellphone networks were operational on our arrival, and their coverage improved daily. Toward the end of our relief operations, phones were issued briefly before being collected up again, and HQ's phone provider changed. This introduced minor confusion and emphasized the need for detailed handovers and daily meetings. Needless to say, without the use of civilian communication networks and, particularly, personal cellphones, operations would have been greatly hampered.

Alexandria ISB

We threw down chock blocks Wednesday evening, Sept. 7, at Alexandria Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), 190 miles northwest of New Orleans. The next four days were fraught with anticipation, as higher HQ labored to find out who was in charge and how to get us out of the open-air hangers and to work as soon as possible. The other half of the company, along with the acting battalion commander, Major Eric Zimmerman, caught up with us later that night, after having been deposited at the northern edge of the Slidell Airport runway. It was obvious that the operation here was amply-funded. While at Alexandria, we were fed well by contractors, the dining hall was outfitted with air conditioning, and a kiosk with washers and dryers was constructed across the street from the barracks.

CPT Shick seized this opportunity to fit in company-wide training that wouldn't ordinarily squeeze into the mission essential task list (METL); we qualified

every last man on the HMMWV and 2 1/2-ton and 5-ton trucks and delivered refresher classes on SINCGARS operation, rollover drills, and other germane topics.

Meanwhile, familiar with the crippling malaise that accompanies indeterminate lengths of “dead time,” I kick-started Recon PLT’s PT program. The program persisted throughout the deployment and may be at least partially credited with pushing every scout to pass November’s APFT. The rejuvenating effects of PT cannot be overemphasized, and it is a valuable regrouping activity when conducting decentralized, squad-sized operations in addition to numerous garrison duties.

Alexandria à New Orleans

Our brigade was eventually understood to be organized under Joint Task Force Pelican, a collection of Guard units peaking at 50,000-plus Soldiers. We got the word to move Sunday morning, Sept. 11, and were back on the road just after noon. Nearing the city, a military checkpoint had been established at Luling, and the convoy slowed to a halt. My HMMWV was third from the trail element when we heard screeching tires rapidly approach from our rear — I told my crew to brace themselves. We heard metal crumple once, twice, and then our own vehicle was struck. We were all OK, and I raced to the rear of the convoy to find Staff Sergeant Joshua Thompson’s vehicle crushed at the right rear passenger side. SSG Thompson had made it out through the front passenger-side window, and as soon as we had Specialist Jeremy Hyatt’s door off, SFC Hunt was on the scene with his medics.

The driver and left passenger were OK, but SPC Hyatt had taken the brunt of the impact and was bleeding from the head, moaning semi-coherently. The HMMWV’s plastic fuel tank ruptured, diesel making the roadway slippery wet, while the drunk driver’s vehicle, a white Ford F-150, was situated a few feet away at a right angle. Smoke was curling up from under the dash, and the elderly man held up a limp, broken wrist when I demanded he unlock his door. A pickup truck with four Hispanic men neared the scene, and I gestured for them to assist. With little hesitation, they took to prying his door open, and were soon joined by our

medics, who extracted, stabilized, and treated the man.

Major Christopher Reed, S3, had calmly assessed the situation and made several phone calls. An ambulance arrived within 20 minutes, along with firefighters and Louisiana state police.

The convoy pressed on past refineries and offshore rigs, across the antediluvian Huey P. Long bridge. After a few right-hand turns, we were happy to find a mountain of unattended box lunches at our FOB, the Riverside Middle School in Jefferson Parish, situated at the western fringe of metro New Orleans, adjacent to the northern bank of the Mississippi River. SPC Hyatt was stitched up and back among friends before we laid down cots that night, and nobody wanted to go to sleep.

FOB Occupation

While exploring our surroundings the next morning, we found the city bore a strong resemblance to a MOUT training facility over drill weekend; an assortment of uniformed personnel and vehicles were present, wielding a variety of weapons and claiming all manners of authority, but no civilians in need of rescue could be found. A slight disappointment did set it in, similar to that of well-intentioned blood donors in the days after 9/11, in the realization that we would probably not be saving anyone’s life.

The Superdome had long since been evacuated, and streets were abandoned, with the exception of a festival-like media cluster at the riverfront edge of the French Quarter. The maroon-bereted 82nd Airborne Division had taken ownership of New Orleans’ most recognizably stricken areas and inhabited a sophisticated Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in the Hyatt hotel. We were free to roam the barren city and its outskirts. Vehicles sat parked helter-skelter on medians and front yards in a futile effort to obtain refuge from now-receded waters.

Despite the grounded pleasure boats and toppled infrastructure less than a mile to our east, the school campus had sustained only minor damage in the hurricane, and most of the work that lay ahead was removing debris and fallen trees and mitigating water damage. CPT Shick was designated the mayor of our living area and established his own priorities of work, absent higher orders. After obtaining permission from a visiting school official, we moved into the air-conditioned elementary building, careful to move desks into the hallway and displace furniture in such a way that it could be precisely repositioned.

First Lieutenant Josh Herr, S6, and his assistant, Specialist Ronald Mack, persuaded the school’s computer network to come alive, and those of us with wi-fi laptops made them available for common use. Previously, I had been using my cellphone and a USB cable to connect to a wireless internet network with limited success.

Our NCOs enthusiastically set to work with chain saws and squad-sized elements, clearing the school of fallen trees, while the CRT began renovating the on-campus cottage of a hearing-impaired woman. A Montana-based tractor-trailer outfit called Big Sky Catering had established a superb dining facility at the southern edge of the football field, and with it came showers and associated laundry services, but we still lacked a bona fide mission.



In Luling, La., the trail vehicle of the convoy was struck by a drunk driver.



As the unit approached the Superdome, a hearse bears evidence of the high-water mark.

Relief Distribution: Gretna 1 POD

We didn't wait long — on Sept. 14, battalion issued the operations order (OPORD) for Operation Independence Relief, and Recon Platoon went to work at Gretna 1 Point of Distribution (POD), north of I-90 and off Rt. 23 (AKA the Bingo Palace parking lot). Gretna 1 was one of 18 PODs operated by the brigade. A drive-through POD is most similar to an Army "service station" resupply point. At first, we alternated workdays with the Mortar Platoon, until 1st Lieutenant Joseph Reffner, the Mortar platoon leader, was put in charge of Gretna 2 a mile south. The "palace" was a WWII-era Quonset hut, housing the presumed bingo king's collection of motorboats and soggy, displaced insulation. The front windows had been blown in, but at least the parking lot had a thin layer of macadam. With the new mission of relief distribution came a lexicon of improbable acronyms and phrases, not to be found in FM 1-02 or any all-encompassing dictionary. Every government agency and non-governmental organization (NGO) had its own terminology, so I made it a point to politely ask for a definition of anything I didn't understand fully.

Texas LSSIM & POD equipment

The POD came equipped with two 10K propane-powered forklifts, one diesel-

powered skid-loader, nine portable toilets, two gasoline-powered lightsets, two pallet jacks and various traffic-control devices. It had been operated by the Lone Star State Incident Management Team for the previous two weeks, and I was given a briefing on operating hours and procedures by a representative of that organization, "Jeff," who would check back every couple of days to see what we needed. Jeff was the first personality to fit into our daily operations, and by his ability to conjure critical tangibles (propane fuel, FEMA newsletters, spraypaint, EZ-UP sunshades) and services (trash pickup, portable toilet maintenance), he came to embody the fast action and frank manner of his agency, the Texas Forest Service. Of equal utility was Don Royal, a retired NBA player, local celebrity and liaison to Gretna's mayor. As an infantry unit, we lacked military-licensed forklift operators. However, as a National Guard unit, we had more than one professional forklift operator among us and many willing amateurs.

Supply

Our resupply was by semi-truckload from the regional staging area (RSA) located northwest in Harrahan, operated by the men of B Company; they in turn received supplies from a receiving and distribution (R&D) site farther north.

Truck-driverland

Almost everything was transported by commercial truck-drivers. These drivers were single-minded in their intent: to "get (their) paper signed!" By my signing their paper, I attested that they had arrived with quantity *X* of item *Z* and had remained on-site until their payload was depleted. This created some interesting arrangements. As I learned in a series of conversations, the truck-drivers made their livelihood by contracting with "brokers" to carry trailers from point to point. The brokers kept up to 50 percent of the contract for themselves and would occasionally cheat the drivers altogether.

Still, the money to be made in this time of crisis was astounding. Some drivers at my POD, remaining there for as long as five days, were earning as much as \$800/day, regardless of mileage. So for those drivers being paid daily, there was a powerful incentive to remain static as long as possible. To that end, drivers being paid by mileage sought to swap full trailers for empty with those paid by the day and "get their paper signed" more or less immediately, so they could grab another trailer, sometimes on a "trip to nowhere." The per-mile drivers would also pressure me to cross-level their trailer with the daily drivers, provided they were hauling the same commodity.

Accountability

Nobody was sure who was paying for what — while a local fuel company arrived infrequently to fuel our mobile light sets, they weren't allowed to provide fuel to the "reefers" (refrigerated trailers). However, since the reefer trailers were often blocked in by other trailers, and the \$5,000 worth of ice in each reefer would soon melt if the belly tanks weren't kept full, I made allowances. I also advised the drivers as to the location of our FOB, where it appeared absolutely anyone ambulatory could be well-fed and showered. I didn't have to sign for anything on the site, so we secured the pallet jacks by locking them in the reefers overnight and the forklifts by taking the keys at the end of the day. As a result of this refreshing disinterest in paper shuffling, there were minimal distractions from the mission, which we interpreted to mean "Distribute As Much Stuff As Possible."

Need for speed

At first, the Mortar and Recon platoons, reinforced with the fire support element (FSE) and sniper section respectively, alternated days at Gretna 1. This fostered a good-natured competition: who could run through more vehicles in a day? We experimented with four to five ‘stations,’ one to two lanes of oncoming traffic, and various opening statements, doubling and eventually tripling our volume of customers. The criteria for distribution was based on FEMA planning factors and refined according to Soldiers’ good judgment.

Guidance on how to distribute supplies wasn’t emphasized, so whereas another company’s POD took to distributing “one each” food, water, ice, tarp to every vehicle, regardless of claimed need, my NCOs took an active role in ensuring a more equitable distribution of supplies. If a beat-up Chevy truck from Plaquemines asked for enough food and water for a family of seven, no problem. If a brand-new BMW 740il came through with a mumbled request for MREs only, he might bear some scrutiny. The lack of established TTPs for this type of noncombat operation was much less confounding than it was stimulating. Undoubtedly, doctrinal publications governing the assumption of civilian relief operations could be published, illustrated in detail and disseminated. But on “one weekend a month,” there exists time only to train on the barest essentials of your unit’s wartime mission. Anything else would be another distraction and dead weight in the rucksack. All we needed to bring to this “fight” was our Army Values and the ability to adapt.

Unannounced arrivals

Numerous NGOs, generally Christian faith-based, were attracted by the buzz and would send their leader to seek me out, to see what they could do for the locals and for themselves. Depending on what they came bearing, we could achieve synergy; one church-group, without any coordination, began distributing baloney and cheese sandwiches in the incoming traffic lane, at great danger to themselves and to the impediment of our operations. I moved them to a safer location and gave them instructions on when and how to distribute their sandwiches, and all was well. One organization brought with them an assortment of baby-care products. I situated them to the right of our exit lane. Two nonaligned female physician assistants arrived, offering free vaccinations and a useful prescription-writing service, since a pharmacy was open down the block. I emplaced them to the front of the baby-care station. A men’s Christian group came BBQ’ing, and I put them right on the corner, to attract wary pedestrians. I tried to maintain a clear separation between my own operations and those of NGOs to avoid the appearance of endorsement, but this was challenging due to our close confines.


On occasion, we would be the ones receiving aid; in an awe-inspiring sleight-of-hand, one drive-through customer had to “clear out some room in (his) trunk” by setting two ice-cold cases of beer on the curb and driving away with a thumbs-up before we understood what had happened. Accustomed to General Order #1’s damnable abjuration, I gave it to the truck-drivers. Future gifts included cases of indigenous Zatarain’s rice, bushels of malodorous beads, and very sweet little old ladies bringing us baked goods and ice cream. The Bingo King made a brief appearance, and rewarded us with still more beads, the peculiar

currency of the region. Back at FOB Riverdale, a lucky few sampled illicit, authentic gumbo before higher HQ found out and declared it (rightly) unsanitary.

POD TTP


In determining what each vehicle would receive, we adopted a “tell, don’t ask” approach. After having waited in line for 5-10 minutes, drivers tended to slow as they rotated through the line, eyeing up everything we had, careful to not miss out on anything. And if you made the mistake of asking “Whaddaya need?” a truly thought-out response could ensue, with follow-up questions like “What do you have?” or “What can I get?” or “Oh, can I get some of those too?”

After a few days of enduring window-shoppers, I took steps to abbreviate the relief transaction, starting with a prominent spray-painted sign at the entrance, duct-taped to the traffic barrier, declaring:



The theme was consistent, as SFC Diehl, Staff Sergeant George Webb, Sergeant Philip Schratweiser and Sergeant David Plummer ensured that our Soldiers declared “Food, water, ice, tarp. Whaddaya need?” at every vehicle’s halt. The customer might reply “Well, I need MREs for my family of five, we’re good on water, and some ice in the cooler please.” The Soldier would confirm “OK you’re getting food for five, ice in the back, and no water, no tarp,” at which point the customer would vacillate and say “Yeah, I better get two of them tarps” as he/she saw bright blue imported tarps flying into other customers’ SUVs. At once, doors and tailgates flew open, and a couple of Soldiers would rush to fill the order, instilling shock and awe in the gracious customer. Noting the success of the improvised signage, I added more signs to the service lane, including:





The smileys were not in jest; I made them uniform throughout our signage and encouraged friendly demeanors among the Soldiers to defuse short tempers in the sultry weather. The end result was that customers commented on how much more pleasant we were to visit than some other PODs.

When asked to capture the TTP for the Paxton Relief Lessons Learned (AAR), 1LT Reffner and I made separate submissions, combined and edited by CPT Shick:

POD Operations

(1) Discussion. There is little to no doctrine on how to establish and operate a food or supply distribution point. The platoon operated the distribution point similar to a traffic control point. The only difference was that there was no searching of vehicles. As our POD operations became more efficient or we were able to send more Soldiers to operate the PODs, we were surprised to find out that the length of the lines of cars waiting at the PODs did not change very much. After several days of operations, we discovered that people that were truly in need were willing to wait no matter how long it took us to serve them. People who were not so much in need, but merely wanted additional supplies or support would be less likely to wait in a long line. Therefore, in the early days our lines were mainly made up a very needy people. Later in the operation or on days that we had more Soldiers working the PODs to speed up the process, we found the lines to be just as long, but made up of people who were less needy or those who were simply stockpiling relief supplies at their homes. Therefore, “sustainability” must be the watchword for continuous POD

ops. Focus on the reliability of your supply lines and the workload management of your Soldiers as the keys to supporting extended operations, (emph. added) and not so much on the average length of the lines at the PODs. Many days there were different NGOs arriving at our PODs desiring to distribute different relief supplies then we offered. These NGOs could be easy to integrate or difficult, largely depending on their organization and the amount of space available at the POD.

(2) Recommendations. The first Soldier a civilian seeking aid will meet is a road guard. Road guards were used to control the flow of traffic coming in and out of the POD and to ensure vehicles do not attempt to enter into unauthorized areas. The number of road guards depends on personnel and traffic considerations. The next person the civilian meets is the “greeter”. This Soldier is placed about 50 meters before distribution stations. He ensures traffic does not “rush” a distribution station. The greeter can also be used to engage personnel in vehicles with IO topics, identify personnel with special needs, provide a calming effect on already stressed civilians, and give directions to civilians if they do not understand the process. The greeter directs civilians to move forward as distribution stations become available. The number of stations depends on personnel available and facility constraints. Each station consisted of a four-man team and distributed food, water, ice, and tarps. PODs also need to have Soldiers identified as forklift operators and load supervisors. The load supervisor (E-6) ensured trucks were unloaded and supplies were distributed to stations. The load supervisor also communicated with civilian truck drivers on when to stage their trucks and unload trucks. The platoon sergeant ensured enough supplies were on location to continue operations. The PSG also placed orders for supplies to RSA or BN TOC, ensured rest plan was implemented, and ensured distribution points were distributing proper amount of supplies to each vehicle. The platoon leader ensured the distribution point was established and operational, ensured enough supplies were on location to continue operations, communicated with local governments or Federal agencies for any needs or resources, ensured POD wait line did not interfere with local community

traffic flow. Soldiers should be polite but firm in dispensing relief supplies. Don’t ask civilians what they want, tell civilians what they have to choose from; i.e. “Food, water, ice and tarps, sir. What do you need?” If you *ask* them what they want, they’ll start to really consider that and will window-shop all the way down the line for things they feel they could have gotten or missed out on, real or imagined. Use your best judgment; contractors coming through our POD were getting 30x40’ tarps for free, while Home Depot was charging \$116.97 for one 40x50’ tarp. Many out-of-state opportunists were charging the very people we sought to relieve exorbitant amounts for temporary roof repair, using the tarps we gave them. Avoid waste and abuse; identify repeat visitors for the day and inform them they are limited to a certain number of visits daily. If NGOs wish to operate at your POD location or there were NGOs already operating the POD before your arrival, try to stay on good working terms with them. The NGOs and the Army are all working for the same cause. Therefore, identify a liaison person within their organization that you can go to with questions or issues.

The bad & the ugly

If one had to capture a still portrait of our relief operations, it would include two late-model SUVs accompanied by a decrepit sedan and a pickup truck in the traffic lane, and perhaps one pedestrian from the surrounding neighborhood, dragging along a grocery cart. While many motorists were eager to take all they could, the modest and cordial people of Gretna came on foot and asked only for what they truly needed, sometimes a single bag of ice for a feeble grandmother. We wished for a better way to deliver aid directly to these earnest people, as the irony of relief operations became apparent; those in need are least aware of the efforts being made to assist them.

Unfortunately, profiteers abounded. One frequent flier, nicknamed “Snaggle-Tooth,” was number one on our black list. He would arrive alone in an aged Mercedes, claim to be distributing aid to up to seven families in another county or state, and request only high pay-off items such as MREs (no ‘Jimmy Dean’ refrigerated meals) and tarps (the big ones). Just as contemptible were the private contractors, eager to be confused with charity workers. Absent any

accrediting authority, we had only our good judgment to rely on, when distinguishing good Samaritans from vultures. The latter came two or three to a pickup, always with out-of-state tags, dolefully eyeing up cases of MREs and tarps, which they assured were destined for some stricken family somewhere. Such was the preponderance of opportunists that we eventually began playing a guessing game called “Family or Contractor.”

There were two to three-man teams with ladders and pickups using our PODs to obtain free tarps, while charging elderly and otherwise disabled residents usurious amounts to staple that tarp to their roof. Reports from Gretna residents confirmed this bastardry. We had little patience for these types and gave them only the minimum when they came through the line, indifferent to their overtures. A less common spectacle was a box truck filled with more than a dozen workers. Rather than pay for their workers’ subsistence, white contractors and foremen drove the laborers through our POD, where they received a day’s ration for every man.

ROE: nothing worth killing anybody over

All Soldiers were in possession of the Louisiana Rules on Use of Force (RUF) card; however, there also existed a separate card for officers, one that didn’t make its way down to me. The officer’s card delegated peace officer’s duties to any National Guard officer. While I was unaware of this delegation of authority, I would have assumed most of it, had the occasion arisen.

Martial law?

Classifying fellow Americans as “civilians” wasn’t a great mental leap; given boots, a rifle and a bit of mental conditioning, one easily assumes a confident, take-charge attitude, and we experienced negligible friction with the locals. When you’re in the business of giving away stuff as fast as humanly possible, there tends to be few dissatisfied customers. Our ARO was utterly docile,

so I consolidated the platoon’s weapons and ammunition in the medic’s vehicle, within his reach and my sight. The exit gate guard retained his weapon and ammunition. On my first day at the job, an African-American motorist beckoned me to the curb to ask, “where can I buy a gun?” He explained that his neighborhood was being looted, and he was powerless to resist. I offered him some provisions and urged him to stay clear of hostile areas, unable to provide any information of where to obtain an affordable firearm. At that time, we were unaware that the city of New Orleans was confiscating firearms en masse.

Integrating local support

Along with the POD came Clebert Bourgeois, a disabled, wiry volunteer firefighter, whose steadfast work ethic and infectious grin were well-known to the community. He was there every morning, and we gave him a ride up the block at the end of the day, sad to see him go. I incorporated him into the line (not that he gave me much of a choice), to give the operation a ‘Cajun face,’ and he never let us down.

Ultimately, CPT Shick, 1LT Reffner and I realized that we had chosen a false measure of effectiveness for our relief operations, inasmuch as they were truly ours, or we were being judged against any standard. We came to this realization almost by accident, making the observation that no matter how rapidly the vehicle line was moving, it would never be backed up past a certain point. Our conclusion was that the truly needy would patronize our POD regardless of the wait time, and moving the line quickly only encouraged passersby to stock up.

Forays outside of the limelight

On only one occasion did I venture outside of the New Orleans metropolitan area and as far south as Lafitte, La. CPT Shick had dispatched me in that direction to scout out areas that would benefit more from our presence. A Missouri ARNG unit was periodically overseeing the POD operation at the Lafitte City Hall, which served a very different demographic than Gretna 1. What I found was that, by mid-September, the MREs and bottled water were ubiquitous, but what troubled residents most was an uncertain future. Shrimp-boating was the signal enterprise in this region, and fears of contamination from sewage overflow could cause an industry collapse. I was unqualified and unable to answer the questions of national policy that were posed to me, but gave the mayor and chief of police my cellphone number in case they ran out of rations. On the way out of town, I detoured to examine out the storm-damaged middle school. Adjacent to the school sat an open-air garage, covering at least 100 pallets of MREs. I never got a call from Lafitte.

Land of plenty, redeployment

Back at the FOB, life was good. Because we’d availed ourselves of a vacant public building, rather than pitch tents and wait for



Clebert Bourgeois, a Gretna firefighter and de facto civil-military liaison, keeps the line moving at the Gretna point of distribution (POD).

POD	Unit	Vehicles	Walk-ups
Gretna 1	HHC	14323	522
Gretna 2	HHC	4879	120
Alerio	A	11648	0
Sam's Club	B	2814	68
Bus Station	B	9015	138
Kineer	A	10785	0
TOTAL		53464	848
Escort Missions		TF Paxton conducted more than 500 mission from Sept. 12 - Oct. 2 including:	
Trucks Water	28	■ Public assistance; tree cutting, debris removal	
Trucks Ice	32	■ Food distribution	
Trucks MRE	15	■ Security missions	
Trucks Tarps	3	■ Convoy escort missions	
Total	50	■ Recon missions	

Figure 2 — TF Paxton Distribution Roll-up

Hurricane Rita, we had operable plumbing and window A/C units. When teachers returned in late September, we moved into giant, 500-man FEMA tents on the football field for the concluding week of our deployment. The tents had electricity and air-conditioning, powered by diesel generators outside. FEMA operated a “general store” at the southeastern end of the track, where we could pick up cots, sunscreen, buckets, chainsaws and straw hats. Everything was free and nearly everything was made in China. The last few days were a time of good feelings. We PT’ed on the banks of the Mississippi and packed our duffle bags into 53-foot trailers. Commercial busses drove us home, and the tactical vehicles were convoyed back by stay-behind volunteers — Soldiers who could use the extra money. Everything went according to plan, and although our cellphone bills for September weren’t reimbursed, 1SG Carper got Family Separation Allowance (FSA) for those us with dependants, so it was a wash.

Afterword

Not a single scout, or HHC Soldier for that matter, sought to avoid duty on account of his collegiate studies. While this speaks to a profound sense of duty and well-developed unit cohesion, it is unfortunate that much-touted and perishable military education benefits were recouped as a result of it; Federal Tuition Assistance, Education Assistance Program (EAP) disbursements, and GI Bill checks are often what Soldier-students rely on to pay both rent and tuition, and when we came off Title 10 orders on Oct. 10,

students were at a loss and off track.

In my case, law school would wait another year, and I was doubly fortunate to be offered an Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) job by MAJ Timothy Gwinn, at the Pennsylvania Joint Emergency Operation Center, and subsequently a course reservation in ICCC, lobbied for by my battalion XO, Major Eric Zimmerman.

Take-away

If Hurricane Katrina relief was an instant and unqualified “success,” we would not have had to endure a springtime renaissance of exploitive news coverage. Some commentators even questioned the value of the relief efforts as a whole, given the seemingly plodding and problematic progress toward an unclear endstate. However, I have no doubts as to the value of this operation.

Since the very first PowerPoint briefing introduced the “Stryker” vehicle to the Men of Iron in 2003, and while our sister brigade (the 55th) braved the “Sunni Triangle,” we’ve been planning and training for our piece of the GWOT. The prospect of our nation “calling up the Reserves” is now far from abstract, and weekend drill is in all ways a more sober occasion than in decades past. Owing to the duration of this disaster relief operation, SFC Diehl and I were able to make forward-looking determinations concerning future leadership; we came to judgments about our Soldiers’ character that would have otherwise come out late in a train-up for a combat tour.

Moreover, Guard tenure is measured in ATs, and it is not uncommon for a Soldier to spend a 20-year career at the same armory; being a guardsman has always been considered a mark of civic merit among PA’s close-knit rural communities. Not until I made first lieutenant, and had accrued five years in the battalion, could I begin to count on my relationships with the “full-timers,” those NCOs and few officers who execute the day-to-day business of the armories. These men have a tremendous personal investment in a single armory (duty station), making the RA’s schedule of perpetual and unpredictable reassignment seem frenetic by comparison. Shrimp gumbo and gritty truck drivers aside, what I carried home from Louisiana can only be measured in handshakes and nods: the product of an assiduous, incremental development of trust among career-long colleagues. Someday, this alone will culminate in the decisions made and promises kept that will bring my Soldiers back alive, from wherever our governor sees fit to send us.

“Strike Hard!”

At the time this article was written, **First Lieutenant Paolo Sica** was a student in the Infantry Captains Career Course and assigned as a recon platoon leader in Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Pennsylvania Army National Guard. Sica previously served as an anti-armor platoon leader while a cadet at Pennsylvania State University Army ROTC and as a rifle platoon leader in Kosovo.

Training Notes



ESTABLISHING A TRAINING CENTER FOR DIYALA BORDER ENFORCEMENT

CAPTAIN JOSEPH WISE

The plan for reduction of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq is for the Iraqi people to have enough trained personnel to maintain their own security and the security of their borders. The Iraqi government has established three major organizations to accomplish this: police, army, and border enforcement. These organizations had to be completely rebuilt from the ground up. The border enforcement along the Iranian border had no standardized training program since the fall of the last government. The 3rd Squadron, 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) selected a group of 16 Soldiers and an interpreter to set up a standardized training program for 1,500 men in two and a half months. This group included three NCOs and me.

Since arriving in northeastern Iraq in December 2004, 3rd Squadron had been tasked to train the Iraqi police and army. It

was also given the task of evaluating and monitoring the Diyala Border Enforcement (DBE), which is charged with securing Iraq's borders. This organization's members, sometimes referred to as border police, must secure the border against all threats short of an invasion and provide early warning if there is an invasion. This means that the organization must use military techniques and tactics to secure the border. However, the rules of engagement are a mix of the regular army and police rules. The DBE is located south of Kurdistan, along the Iranian border, and in the Diyala Province. The border is 193 kilometers long in their sector.

Regiment required reports on all the security forces at least twice a month from the squadron. The reports tracked competence of leadership, logistics shortcomings, and how many people were trained in different areas. I was responsible for making sure that squadron received the reports on the army and

فیرگه ی جهنگی به ریوه به رایه تی یاره وانی سنوری دیاله
مدرسه قتال مدیریتة حرس حدود دیالی

DIYALA BORDER POLICE BATTLE SCHOOL

police from I Troop. I submitted reports to regiment from November 2004 until March 2004. In March 2004, a training team for the Iraqi Army was organized out of our squadron, and Major Keith Scott assumed responsibility for the reports about the army to send to regiment. Sergeant First Class Boswell assumed responsibility for the police reports for I Troop. The problems identified from the reports were addressed or fixed.

The squadron initially began working on training the local police. There was not a lot of guidance to the training wanted, and this guidance seemed to change regularly. Coalition forces were working with the government to establish academies throughout the country for their training. However, there was no continued training after the academy instruction.

Small groups of soldiers from each troop were initially selected to work with the local police organizations located in each troop's area of operations. These groups had some guidance, but the type and amount of training given by each troop varied greatly. Some troops documented this training well, and others did not. As time in country progressed, the focus was to send all of the police to the academies. Of course, that meant that coalition forces were tasked with escorting them out of sector to the academies. The academies were set up so that Iraqi instructors taught at the academy with advisors from the coalition. The instructors were not all policemen. The transition to training the police at the academies took some time. The transitions started before the regiment entered into the country, and we had finished the majority of the transition by the time that we redeployed in October 2005. The academies trained all the basic skills and rules that the police needed and was a good source for basic training. However, there was not much thought given to continue training after the police went to the academies. Sustaining training was primarily done at the department where the police worked and marksmanship was done on the range at the FOB.

There was a different approach taken to train the Iraqi Army. Due to the Iraqi Army's reorganization, the 3rd Squadron went from training two companies to training a battalion of soldiers. The 3rd Squadron assigned a platoon from each troop to train each Iraqi company and elements of the staff to train the Iraqi staff on a daily basis. The companies had some training from the previous unit in the area and from U.S. Special Forces before the 278th RCT entered the country. However, the battalion headquarters unit was brand new. The training for the battalion was very structured, requiring at least eight hours of training a day for approximately three months. The emphasis was on the Iraqi Army battalion staff, which had almost one-on-one training. FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, was used as the primary reference (Major Keith Scott). The Iraqi Army was taught an operations order format that "was adopted as the standard across Theater" (MAJ Keith Scott). The major emphasis of Iraqi Army training was for them to be a self-sustaining organization. The training and results were tracked through reports on a daily basis and the training was considered successful. Even though the mission was a success, again, the issue of continued training was



Courtesy photos

Diyala Border Enforcement students receive instruction.

not really addressed.

Towards the end of April, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Holmes, the squadron commander, and Major Barry Roberson, the S-3, decided that the DBE needed some attention. There were not enough training academies to train the border enforcement personnel in a timely manner, and it would take years for some of them to be able to attend a training academy. Everyone who signed up for the DBE had to go through a basic training course in Muntheria. Their basic training was only 14 days long and included teaching them how to march, issuing uniforms to them, and giving a limited amount of instruction on basic rules of what was expected of them. Basic training did not cover any small arms training or any other operational training. There was very little customs or legal training. After completing the 14-day basic training, the personnel were then assigned to work at a border castle along the border. The commander of each border castle was tasked with training them once they arrived, so there was no standard for this continuous training, and the commanders trained the personnel on what they considered was important with some guidance from their chain of command.

The guidance from 3rd Squadron was to focus on the key areas of training and logistics and to identify any other problems the DBE had so they could be addressed. This guidance was divided into two missions. The first mission was set up standardized training within the DBE so the DBE personnel could secure the Iraqi border more effectively. The second, and simultaneous, mission was to identify the logistics situation and address any problems that the DBE might have. Sixteen people were selected from I Troop to accomplish these multiple missions. I was put in charge of this group. I had three sharp NCOs — Staff Sergeants Robert Ditmore, Charles Newcomb, and Bruce Bailey — who figured out how to make all this happen. This group had just over two months to accomplish this mission, from May 1, 2004, to July 12, 2004.

How to accomplish these two missions was left up to me. I met with the NCOs, and we came up with a strategy. After looking at the other ways regiment had trained the other ISF (Iraqi Security

Forces) and because of the constraints of time, personnel, and equipment that was available, we decided that the best way to accomplish this mission was to set up a program to train the trainer. The plan was to train some sharp men within the DBE who could then begin teaching the rest of the border enforcement personnel. LTC Holmes agreed with the plan and gave his verbal approval. However, he said for that for this to be successful, the DBE commander, Brigadier General Nazim, would have to believe that this was his idea. The reasoning was that he would support it better and continue the training when the squadron's rotation was up. LTC Holmes also identified certain areas and tasks to train the DBE. Some of the areas identified to train the DBE on were basic rifle marksmanship, fixed site security, presence patrols, establish a hasty checkpoint, establish deliberate checkpoints, customs and courtesies, traffic control points, and vehicle searches (LTC Holmes and MNSTC). We refined our plan to include these areas and tasks. The refined training plan would be divided into four areas: marksmanship, common skills, security, and patrol and recon. The squadron commander was presented this refined plan, and he gave his approval. The group started researching the tasks during the first week of May. This research included either adopting other training plans that were be found or by developing new ones in English, Arabic, and Kurdish. During this first week, several people, including LTC Holmes, SSG Newcomb, SSG Bailey, and me, talked to BG Nazim

about a way to train his soldiers. BG Nazim jumped at the idea of a training school. BG Nazim and I identified a couple of possible training sites and he chose COL Mohommed to be in charge of this plan.

COL Mohommed, his staff, and the three NCOs from our group began working on a training schedule. In addition to what those tasks which the squadron wanted the Army trained, COL Mohommed wanted to teach customs, professionalism, and law in the course. The training schedule would incorporate both 3rd Squadron and COL Mohommed's subjects.

By May 8, 2004, COL Mohommed had identified more than 20 soldiers who were smart, had combat experience, and had some sort of professional training. These soldiers were then interviewed and screened so the best could be picked to teach. COL Mohommed, the NCOs, and I decided on the best candidates to be instructors. We needed two instructors per class, a primary and alternate. The instructors were of mixed religion and race. There was a mix of Sunni, Shia, and a couple of Christians. The instructors were also Arabs and Kurds. Some of them could speak English, Arabic, and Kurdish. All of them could read in Arabic, but not all of them could speak the same language.

Through the rest of May, we developed the course curriculum, identified a training site, and planned the schedule for the course. Members of the group worked with COL Mohommed, staff, and instructors to gather information and books to teach the classes. Course material from previous military schools, material collected by the

group, and information from other ISF (Iraqi Security Force) schools were used to develop the curriculum. The different areas of expertise in the military and civilian careers of the 16 soldiers proved invaluable in putting the course together. The members of the group were medics, teachers, computer technicians, and policemen before being mobilized.

One of the concerns, while putting all this material into a teachable format, was the education level of the students. The material and testing had to be able to teach the lowest educated students. Some of them could not write or read. In addition to giving the instruction and tests in writing, they would also have to be given orally.

The only training sites that were available were border castles. There were eleven castles occupied along the border in the Diyala Province. Several castles were not occupied and in much need of repair. There was a contract in progress to renovate several castles and build six other new ones. BG Nazim and I tentatively identified a training site; the problem of developing and supplying it arose. However, before the problem of developing and supplying it was addressed, we realized that this site might not work. There was an Iranian border castle less than 1,200 meters away from the tentative training site, and minefields in the area would limit the ability to conduct practical exercises.

BG Nazim suggested a different training site. I evaluated the training site and agreed with BG Nazim. No landmines were near the castle and it was more secure because it was not directly on the border. Both BG Nazim and the squadron agreed to use this as the new training site. The training site was a border castle still under construction that was supposed to be completed by the end of June. There was a contract to construct several new border castles and renovate other castles.

At the end of May and the beginning of June, the focus and energy on the missions began to wane. The NCOs were rotating on leave, and the squadron was tasking the group to do other things. The squadron commander went on leave during this time also. The engineers could not build the range or vehicle search areas at the time due to other missions. The overall focus on the training was faltering.

In mid-June, the majority of the people



Diyala Border Enforcement instructors pose for a photo with members of the DBE Assessment Team from the 3rd Squadron, 278th Regimental Combat Team.



Representatives from local television stations were present for the ceremony marking the opening of the DBE school.

who were on leave returned, including LTC Holmes. I met with SSG Ditmore, SSG Bailey, and SSG Newcomb to discuss the situation. Reviewing all of the documentation and reports identified the accomplishments and needs. Mission success could still be attained if the group was not tasked to do any other things, and we needed an additional week. I drafted a memo to request this (MEMO to CPT Reed). Upon receipt of the memo, LTC Holmes told me to proceed with my plan and the new target date was July 19. Also, during this time, BG Nazim had gone to a meeting where he had briefed his boss in person about the plans for the school and had received his approval.

I coordinated with the engineers again to find that they had no other missions at the time and could support the group. The group escorted the engineers to the new training location site to build a small arms range, a vehicle search area, and a small berm around the castle. It took the engineers two days to accomplish this.

The supplies and equipment problem still needed to be solved. The DBE was able to come up with desks, signs, a computer, and a printer. Pens, pencils, and paper came from U.S. family members from the states. Silhouettes were constructed for the range from available wood. I found a large tent for the soldiers to live in while they were in class.

Even though the plan had to be adjusted, everything seemed to be progressing well. The projected completion of the castle was the end of June. By the end of June, it was still not completed. This meant that the DBE could not move in or bring any of the supplies and equipment into the castle. I had been working with the contractor and subcontractor throughout this whole time. The time of completion was going to come down to the last day. The

contractor allowed the DBE to move the supplies and equipment into the castle on July 17.

On July 18, one of the interpreters realized that the sign for the school had misspellings and had to be fixed. The subcontractor was complaining that he would have to work late and may not get done. The contractor and Corps of Engineers representative were not sure if the castle would be complete. Squadron wanted to know if everything was ready for the next day. The regimental commander, Colonel Dennis Adams, and many local VIPs were planning on coming to the castle on July 19.

The castle was completed early in the morning on July 19. There was a ceremony for the opening of the school, and the first of many castles that were to be constructed was complete. During the ceremony, BG Nazim was given full credit for all that the DBE had accomplished during the previous two and a half months. This was the first DBE school to be established in the Diyala Province that is run totally by the DBE. The regimental commander, Iraqi Army battalion commander, the mayor of Khanaqin, many other VIPs, and representatives from five newspapers and two local television stations were present at the ceremony in which I was the master of the ceremony.

By the end of the rotation, the DBE had graduated three classes, averaging 50 students per class. A fourth class was beginning. The classes last three weeks. Since the opening of the training school, COL Mohommed built an obstacle course for physical training. The students get weekends and holidays off during training. The schedule has a flexible schedule to accommodate for weather. The students rotate through the different courses during the three weeks. BG Nazim and COL Mohommed made sure that the school could accomplish everything that was wanted and give the students a little bit of a break from the border.

Part of the plan was to be able to expand the class up to one hundred students as soon as more permanent living accommodations for the students could be erected. BG Nazim's boss was so pleased that he expressed the desire to send border enforcement soldiers from other provinces to the school for training.

Because of the time constraints, the training mission did not allow for training down to the lowest level. Feedback from the soldiers did not come until after the first class. This school allows for standardized training throughout the province. Even if there became enough academies to train at, the training site could still be used to continue training. The training model can be duplicated in other provinces. The DBE soldiers will receive the same type of instruction and will be able to work collectively with more efficiency. Their survivability rate will go up. The ability to secure the borders from insurgents and enemies will increase due to training. The instructors can continually refine the classes for better instruction. Because the DBE was convinced that this was their idea, it is more likely that the training will continue for years after the 278th RCT has demobilized.

Captain Joseph Wise recently graduated from the Infantry Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga., and is currently serving as the assistant S3 for the 3/278th Heavy Brigade Combat Team. Since graduating from Officer Candidate School in 1997, Wise has served with the 278th in a variety of positions including tank platoon leader, executive officer, and fire support officer.

WEAPONS CORNER

SNIPER RIFLES THEN AND NOW



Soviet Mosin-Nagant M91/30

1. A standard Russian infantry rifle since the 1st World War, the M91/30 Mosin-Nagant fires a rimmed cartridge—the 7.62x54R—whose external ballistics approximated those of our own service cartridge, the .30/06. Fitted with a 3.5 power telescopic sight which worked well out to around 500 yards, this was the standard Russian sniper rifle of World War II and saw service in the Korean War and Vietnam as well. This is a reliable, accurate rifle which some German snipers in Russia preferred to their own Mauser sniper rifle, because the looser tolerances of the Mosin-Nagant enabled it to function better than the Mauser in extreme cold. (Photo courtesy National Infantry Museum)

2. The Model 1903A4 Springfield was adopted as the U.S. Army and Marine Corps sniper rifle in 1943. While the 2.5 power scope limited its effective range to around 500 yards, it continued to be used through the Korean War and into the early years of the war in Vietnam.

Due to some of the low scope mounts, the 1903A4 would not eject spent cartridges as designed, and was often used as a single shot rifle. It is nevertheless a highly accurate and powerful rifle. (Photo courtesy National Infantry Museum)



U.S. Model 1903A4 Springfield



Garand M1C

3. The Garand M1C .30/06 sniper rifle became the standard issue sniper rifle in June of 1944, and served well and reliably in World War II, in Korea, and in the early days of Vietnam. Although its 2.5 power scope limited its range to around 500 yards, it is nevertheless a powerful, rugged, and thoroughly reliable rifle. (Photo courtesy National Infantry Museum)

4. The U.S. Army M21 sniper system is based on the M14 National Match Rifle and fires the powerful 7.62x51mm NATO (.308 Winchester) round. A standard 3-9X variable scope extends its effective range to well beyond 700 yards, and match-grade ammunition ensures consistent hits even at extended ranges. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit)



U.S. M21 Sniper System



Soviet Dragunov/SVD

5. The Dragunov fires the same 7.62x54R cartridge as the M91/30 sniper rifle of World War II, but its 4-power scope extends its effective range to well beyond that of its predecessor. The rifle was introduced in 1963 and was issued down to platoon level. Originally made in Russia, they have since been manufactured in China, Romania, and other former Soviet Union surrogates. U.S. forces first encountered the Dragunov in the Vietnam War. (Photo Courtesy National Infantry Museum.)

6. The U.S. Army's M24 sniper system is based on the proven Remington 700 bolt action rifle action and is fielded in two calibers, the 7.62x51mm NATO and the .300 Winchester Magnum. The former fires a 175-grain match bullet at a muzzle velocity close to 2,700 feet per second (fps), and the latter a 195-grain projectile at 2,900 fps. (Photo courtesy U.S. Army Sniper School)



U.S. M24 Sniper Rifle



U.S. Model M107 Barrett .50 caliber

7. The Barrett M107 is chambered for the powerful .50 caliber Browning Machine Gun (BMG) cartridge. It fires a 700-grain bullet at over 2,900 fps and has an effective range of over 1900 yards against materiel targets. The semiautomatic weapon fires from a 10-round magazine and also uses standard ball ammunition for the Browning M2 machine gun. (Photo courtesy U. S. Army Sniper School)

SNIPER WEAPONS AND THEIR EFFECTIVE RANGES

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>	<u>RANGE</u>
MOSIN NAGANT	7.62x54R	5 rounds	500 yards
M1903A4	.30/06	5 rounds	500 yards
Garand M1C	.30/06	8 rounds	500 yards
M21 System	7.62x51mm NATO	20 rounds	>700 yards
Dragunov/SVD	7.62x54R	10 rounds	650 yards
M24 System	7.62x51mm NATO	20 rounds	>800 yards
M107 Barrett	.50 BMG	10 rounds	>1900 yards

Note: Effective ranges are approximate, and the increased range of weapons having similar external ballistic characteristics (.30/06, 7.62x51mm, 7.62x54R) with newer weapons is a function of improved optical sights and ammunition.

THE LOGIC OF FAILURE

G. GABRIEL SERBU

“In war, as in art, there are no general rules. In neither can talent be replaced by precept.”

— von Moltke the Elder

Von Clausewitz wrote in his famed *On War* that “There is only one decisive victory: the last.” Victory, in other words, is only achieved once the enemy is **completely** defeated, once he has no longer the ability to launch a successful offensive or to organize a coherent defence. But, concealed behind von Clausewitz’s obvious point, rests another one: **initial** success has also some serious side effects, significant psychological costs, which can affect future performance in the conduct of warfare.

One of the most dangerous by-products of a military victory that does not lead to the complete defeat of the enemy is undeniably the successive use of the same successful method to fairly similar challenges, against the same enemy or against a different opponent at a later time. Underestimating the ability of the opponent to adapt, to learn from his or someone else’s failures and mistakes is a grave and common error.

In an attempt to overcome the nightmare of static trench warfare, the Germans used, during World War I, Stormtroopers, elite shock infantry units designed to infiltrate enemy positions by using the momentum of surprise and speed. They ultimately failed because their tactics, although highly successful, lacked support, which could only be provided by a mechanized, mobile army. In the interwar period, military visionaries such as Basil Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller or Heinz Guderian recognized the tremendous potential of tanks if used “enmasse,” while exploiting their mobility. Concentrations of armor could rapidly smash through enemy lines

and into his rear, provoking havoc, destroying the communications and lines of communication, wiping out soft echelons and generally bringing mayhem to a zone that was traditionally for the troops on the front line the psychological comfort zone. The result would be disorganization, panic, loss of morale, and confusion. What’s more, mechanized infantry would exploit the breaches in the enemy’s line, thus giving the opponent a “coup de grace.” No military analyst or historian would challenge the brilliance of the Blitzkrieg. The doctrine gave the classical German canon of encircling the enemy through a strategic offensive, but then fighting a tactical


defensive battle on favourable terms to prevent the enemy breaking out of the trap, a final masterstroke.

The Blitzkrieg with its practice of using the armor’s momentum of surprise and speed proved enormously successful in France and in the first months of Operation Barbarossa. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Soviets demonstrated to be more than the “crash test dummies” portrayed by Nazi propaganda. They learned from their blunders and from the opponent’s successful strategy, a process greatly helped by other factors such as the enormous and difficult territory that the Germans had to cover. The enemy will eventually adapt: therein lies the danger of military success through the *ad nauseam* application of the same unbeaten strategy.

Today’s successful innovation is tomorrow’s dogma. And all dogmas, especially military doctrines, are bound to fail the test of history. Moreover, the struggle for imposing a brilliant innovation — strategic or technical — is directly proportional with the effort put into getting the military establishment to abandon the very same idea. Paradoxically, a tactical or strategic approach should be abandoned not only when it fails, but also when it works. Otherwise, one becomes predictable; and predictability breeds defeat.

But the staleness of successful methods is not the only costly side effect of victory: rigidity, complacency and an inevitable tendency towards indolence are other vicious consequences of military triumphs. Why bother to think, improvise and innovate, when a sound military doctrine offers ready-made, already chewed and digested ideas. “In war as in art there are no general rules. In neither can talent be replaced by precept.” Von Moltke expressed what all great military commanders knew: the conduct of warfare is an intellectual exercise, a free creative activity requiring intelligence, flexibility and imagination. A true soldier, regardless of rank, is not an automaton, but someone able to take care of him and others in the most unpredictable situations.

During World War II, *Operation Citadel* (pinching off in 1943 the Soviet held salient centered around Kursk) failed because the Germans relied on the principles of the Blitzkrieg: speed was hampered by boobytraps, minefields, anti-tank ditches, scarps and counter-scarps, hedgehogs, road blocks, barbed-wire entanglements and a myriad of other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Surprise failed to be achieved,



since Soviet intelligence was aware of the exact date and time of the attack.

The Russians learned from German achievements, but never from German mistakes. They, too, blindly and mechanically, without consideration, applied the lessons of a Blitzkrieg ferociously unleashed upon them with initially devastating results. The Germans simply lured them forward and then struck them hard on the flanks after the impetus of their armor attack had been lost. What ultimately saved them (apart from the lend-lease program, *Operations Husky* and *Overlord*, Bletchley Park, etc.) was Hitler's obsession with clinging to every inch of the "Lebensraum."

In the book *Lost Victories*, Erich Von Manstein later observed: "His way of thinking conformed more to a mental picture of masses of the enemy bleeding to death before our lines, than to the concept of a subtle fencer who knows how to make an occasional step backwards in order to lunge for the decisive thrust."

It's a clear symptom of psychological rigidity conditioned by previous military successful approaches: Hitler's own experience of the Western front during World War I.

Obsessed with mass and quantity, the Soviets also elaborated the concept of "artillery offensive," implemented by "artillery breakthrough" divisions (by the end of the war they were massing 670 guns per kilometre). The idea behind this artillery juggernaut was the pulverization of just about anything above the ground, especially anti-tank guns. The Soviets were extremely proud of their innovative approach, which became, after numerous successes, a doctrine. What they didn't know was the fact that, after being blown to smithereens a few times, the Germans were, through aggressive intelligence, aware of the exact time of the artillery barrage. They just retreated to a safe location, behind the initial position, waited for the end of the artillery barrage and re-occupied their original line of defence.

The Blitzkrieg validated, after *Case White* and *Case Yellow*, the extensive use of the air force and long-range artillery to soften the opponent's positions, just before the offensive. Extremely successful in Poland and France, the very same strategy

... the struggle for imposing a brilliant innovation — strategic or technical — is directly proportional with the effort put into getting the military establishment to abandon the very same idea. Paradoxically, a tactical or strategic approach should be abandoned not only when it fails, but also when it works. Otherwise, one becomes predictable; and predictability breeds defeat.

failed at Cassino and Stalingrad. The obliterated buildings offered great cover for the defenders fighting in the rubble.

It is puzzling how general staffs still applied at the beginning of the 1970's, principles stated in the 1920's and 30's, innovative at that time, but mere dogmatic ghosts in the 70's. Ignoring what happened at Kursk in July 1943, Cassino and in Normandy in 1944, in Korea (between 1950 and 1953), the Israelis used armored spearheads in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The anti-tank Egyptian teams took a heavy toll on the tanks, especially in Port Suez, where the Israeli armour engaged on urban terrain. History proved that tanks are as vulnerable to anti-tank weapons, just as much as the infantry is to machine guns. It is futile to throw armor against a well-prepared foe expecting the attack and determined to repulse it. Rommel knew better than anyone that applying without discernment what has been so far an undefeated strategy would eventually end up in disaster. Unleashing his panzers against a braced foe would have been a misapprehension. Rommel and his staff became conscious of the fact that tank versus tank was a useless recipe. Far better was to destroy your opponents' tanks by luring them into the open, where he could be decimated by anti-tank guns, a job greatly facilitated by the superb 88mm FLAK. Moreover, he used dummies so as to bait the enemy. By tactical audacity and ruse, he assertively manned the PAK in the forefront of the battlefield, often alongside the panzers. It is an illustration of astonishing flexibility. The same man that had so successfully used the armour as a

spearhead force in France, dramatically change his tactical approach when dealing with a new enemy in a new environment. Surprise can only be achieved by incessantly innovating.

Even more astonishing is the fixation on the importance of high ground. The control of high ground for the purpose of observation and prevention of efficient cavalry charges dates back to Napoleonic wars. High ground also offers the advantage of great fields of fire and increased range for weapons. Unfortunately, troops amassed on such positions are exposed and vulnerable to artillery attacks. As John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson observed in *On Infantry*, it is far better to:

"Erecting defenses on a rear slope had the effect of placing an impenetrable barrier (i.e., the crest of the hill) to much of the enemy's artillery fire and most of his artillery observation. This made the small forts that made up the intermediate zone difficult for enemy artillery observers to locate and almost impossible for the big guns to knock out."

The control of high ground is just another successful innovation turned into a dogmatic tactical approach, which reverberates like an echo throughout the ages.

Another psychological spin-off of victory is the disregard for an organized retreat as a viable strategy or in case of a military hindrance. After a long streak of triumphs, the military commander will increasingly ignore the plans for a retreat in case things go wrong. He will also be less likely to use it as bait. There are innumerable books written by various military analysts and historians on offensive, defensive battles and approaches to battle, but very few on the art of retreat. Retreat is perceived as somehow shameful, the admission of a setback or at least of the inability to deal with a present threat. Retreat, if used elegantly, can be a decisive weapon against an impulsive foe. Manstein called this particular approach the "backhand stroke," a smashing counter-blow against the extended flanks of an opponent's offensive. In war it is vital to maintain the momentum. But that doesn't necessarily mean a forward momentum. Feigned retreat has also been used by Muslim warriors since the seventh century.

The Seljuk Turks and the armies of Salahaldin were particularly good at it. What can be more rewarding for a military commander than to successfully lure the enemy into a trap?

For Hitler, who always thought of warfare in terms of the Western front of the First World War, retreat was anathema. The excuse for his rigid approach was twofold: first, that by surrendering ground, one might surrender critical military or economical centres; second, that the retreat wrecks the morale of an army. Although his observations are in some way legitimate, it is always “healthier” to lose the morale of an army, than the actual army, always better to lose a few important military and economical hubs, than the war. Hitler was more interesting in last heroic stands, than in flexible retreats. So much for Manstein’s “operational elasticity”.

A classic example of a retreat, smoothly and efficiently conducted, occurred in March 1943, when Hitler was persuaded to evacuate the dangerous salient of Vyaz’ma Rzhev on the front of Army Group Center. This operation was known by the code name *Buffalo* and was described in great detail by von Mellenthin in *Panzer Battles, A Study on the Employment of Armour in the Second World War*.

Another emotional offshoot of victory, and one of the most dangerous, is over-confidence. This is how Ronald Lewin describes the catastrophic effect of superciliousness in military affairs in his book *The Life and Death of Afrika Korps*:

“In May/June 1942, with a strong Luftwaffe and a feeble Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, it was not beyond the bounds of possibility for long-suffering Malta to have been captured by the Axis, and it is certainly difficult to assess the full range of benefits that the availability of the island, as a base for the U-boats and bombers, might have produced. Still less, it is easy to imagine how, without Malta, the British could have re-established a significant interdiction of the Panzerarmee’s supply lines. At the end of May, therefore, when Rommel attacked at Gazala, the Axis had committed itself to battle in the wrong place –and when the Afrika Korps went on to take Tobruk, the psychological effect of success was such, as will be seen, that Hitler and Mussolini dropped *Herkules* with hardly a pang. This was self-mutilation.”

Ironically, instead of unmanageable euphoria, any military victory should trigger, in the camp of the victor, a cheerless, stern celebration, because the narcotic elation of martial triumph bears the seeds of future defeats. It is paramount for the military commander never to give in to an uncontrollable enthusiasm that could encourage him to see himself as an invincible warrior. The gods of war favour only those they can’t seduce.

G. Gabriel Serbu received a master’s degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. In January, he will begin Serial Basic Infantry Officer Training at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School in Saint Jean, Quebec.

WANT TO GET PUBLISHED IN *INFANTRY* MAGAZINE?

We are now accepting articles for publication in *Infantry* Magazine. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. We can also use relevant historical articles, with the emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. If you’re unsure a topic is suitable, please feel free to contact our office and run your ideas by us. We’ll let you know whether we would be interested in the article, and we can also give any further guidance you may need.


Our fully developed feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 3,500 words, but these are not rigid guidelines. Most of our articles are much shorter, and we use those articles in the Professional Forum and Training Notes sections. If you have only a short comment, suggestion, or training idea, it may fit best in the Letters to the Editor section or as a Swap Shop item.

Sketches, photographs, maps, or line drawings that support your article are recommended. If you use graphics in your manuscript, please include either a high quality print or the electronic file. Graphics already imported into Microsoft Word or Powerpoint don’t reproduce well; we usually need the original electronic file (jpeg, gif, tiff, bmp, etc.). Also, please remember to include where the graphic originated (author’s photo, Web site address, etc.) so we can ensure proper credit is given to the photographer/illustrator and prevent the violation of any copyrights.

E-mail — Inf.MagazineDep@benning.army.mil

Telephone — (706) 545-2350/6951 DSN 835-2350/6951

Web site — www.infantry.army.mil/magazine (will need AKO login and password)



Book Reviews



***No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah.* By Bing West. New York: Bantam Books, 2005, 380 pages, \$25 (cloth).** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines classic as “serving as a standard of excellence.” In utilizing this definition, several recent books come to my mind as true classics. These include General Hal Moore and Joe Galloway’s *We Were Soldiers Once and Young* and Mark Bowden’s *Black Hawk Down*. Each of these books superbly captured the true psychological and physical essence of battle in a way that totally grips its readers. After reading Bing West’s *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*, I have no doubt this book will receive the same acclaim and recognition by readers and critics alike. By definition, it must be categorized as a classic.

Many readers may be familiar with West’s last work, *The March Up: Taking Baghdad With the 1st Marine Division*. In it, he collaborated with Major General (Retired) Ray L. Smith to detail the 1st Marine’s offensive operation into Baghdad from March 20–April 10, 2003. This book received well-deserved praise and garnered several awards. I agreed and felt *The March Up* was a superb book and possessed numerous strengths. West carries these strengths over in his latest effort and in fact takes them to another level.

The best way to give a concise description of *No True Glory* is to utilize the author’s own words. In his introduction West states, “THE OBSCURE, HARDSCRABBLE INDUSTRIAL city of Fallujah erupted into the major battle of the Iraqi insurgency, involving fifteen thousand combatants and claiming 153 American and thousands of Iraqi lives. Fallujah provides a cautionary tale about mixing the combustible ingredients of battle and politics. This book describes how it came to do so and why.”

In detailing how it came to be and to answer the why, *No True Glory* focuses on

the period from April 2003 through December 2004 in the embattled city of Fallujah.

Throughout the pages, West expertly weaves the political climate with operational and tactical decision making. The constant with these two elements is West’s outstanding ability to capture the fighting on the ground at the individual Marine and Soldier level. The author’s ability to seamlessly combine these three places this book a cut above of anything I’ve presently read regarding Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

In my opinion, one of the critical things missing from books of this genre is the inability of authors to set the stage for the reader. To better understand the fighting at the small unit level, a reader should know the political and operational context and how these shaped events on the ground.

Truly, West paints this picture for the reader. Throughout *No True Glory*, readers have an understanding of how the political environment totally affected military decisions during the Fallujah campaign. As West discusses the political context, he pulls no punches. His frustration is evident when he opines how political indecision translated to casualties on the ground. The author’s treatment of the political landscape is complete and to be truthful was an added bonus for myself. Before reading the book, I had the misconception that it entirely focused on operations on the ground.

Certainly, West’s ability to describe the combat on the ground is the major strength of the book. His ability to do this was supported by two actions. First, he spent countless days with the Marines and Soldiers on the ground during operations in Fallujah (as well as Ramadi). There is nothing like being there and West was truly there. Second, the author has conducted hundreds of interviews to fill in any of the missing pieces to tell the story. Combined, these actions enable West to capture the human dimension of war unlike any book I’ve read in many years. It will leave a lasting impact on all readers.

Besides the above strengths, I found

several other items that made this book even better. First, he utilizes the inside flaps of the book to place maps and some graphics of the cancelled April 2004 offensive (Operation Vigilant Resolve) and the actual November 2004 offensive (Operation Phantom Fury). Second, West begins the book by writing paragraph-size biographies of the major political and military leaders involved in the Fallujah campaign. He follows this by adding a “Where Are They Now?” section at the end of the book telling readers what these and others discussed in the book are currently doing today. Third, West provides a large section of color pictures (most taken by West himself) that add power to his words. Finally, he crafts a superb conclusion which offers tremendous insight on various subjects such as defeating the insurgency and the performance of the world press.

In summary, *No True Glory* is a superb book. I believe in years to come it will rightfully be recognized as the book to read not only on the operations in Fallujah, but on the opening months of the insurgency in Iraq. As you can surmise, I give West’s volume my highest recommendation. I am confident future readers will share my sentiments.

***Ambush Alley, The Most Extraordinary Battle of the Iraq War.* By Tim Pritchard. New York: Presidio Press, 281 pages, \$25.95.** Reviewed by Major Keith Everett.

The only thing extraordinary about this engagement was the number of casualties. Eighteen Marines were killed and more than 55 were wounded in the battle at Nasiriyah on March 23, 2003. Tim Pritchard captured the fear, the confusion, and the mistakes after interviewing about 55 of the Marines who fought there. The thoughts and deeds of these Marines forced success out of the mistakes made leading up to the battle.

Pritchard, a London-based war journalist who also films documentaries, is not shy in documenting the mistakes made in planning and executing this battle. Some

of the participants even stated the high cost of the battle would be offset somewhat if Marines could learn from it. The battalion commander's decision to not wait for his tanks cost him dearly in time and men. The decision was made apparently in a desire to take the two bridges and secure the route through Nasiriyah quickly. The author is not judging the commander from his armchair, just pointing out what the Marines of the battalion felt occurred that day. It was not supposed to be a difficult mission. A determined enemy made the missing tanks a critical factor.

Pritchard brings the war to eye level as the Marines charge in with their characteristic speed but with a poor plan. After a series of blunders, the Marines emerged severely bloodied, wiser with the terrifying experience of close quarter battle slammed into their knowledge base.

Nasiriyah, a medium-sized Iraqi city of about 500,000 has two bridges of strategic importance. A bridge over the Euphrates River on the southeastern edge of the city and about four and a half kilometers away another bridge over the Saddam canal. Both bridges allowed easy access across the major water obstacles between the Marines and Baghdad. The 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Grabowski, had the mission to capture these two bridges. During the encounter, the streets were compared to those of Mogadishu in the minds of many Marines. LTC Grabowski's concept included a "series of rapid, violent and unexpected maneuvers." The maneuvers ended up predictable after getting bogged down in the city. The tanks may have even prevented this battle from getting started by destroying any initial enemy success.

The battle of Nasiriyah should be studied by any Soldier at the brigade level down for emphasizing the importance of adapting in positive ways to the changes demanded by enemy contact. Speed is gained not just by forging ahead, but by using assets wisely to take care of obstacles. Nasiriyah and the Marines who fought here gave many valuable lessons. We need to heed them.

The Boys' Crusade: The American Infantry In Northwestern Europe, 1944-

1945. By Paul Fussell. New York: The Modern Library, 2003. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Boden.

Paul Fussell's book, *The Boys' Crusade: The American Infantry In Northwestern Europe, 1944-1945*, is not a typical historical examination of World War II. It is something deeper, more thought-provoking, and above all, more rewarding. The author is a distinguished American professor of English as well as a former rifle platoon leader, who was seriously wounded fighting in Germany in 1945. Fussell produces an account of the conflict that is poignant and fascinating, providing a window into the life of the war's participants that is seldom encountered, and even more rarely addressed in such a comprehensive manner.

The Boys' Crusade is a collection of essays centered around the experiences of the Soldiers who fought in the war, the young men who were suddenly and violently exposed to the broader world beyond the borders of the United States. Fussell tells their story chronologically, through episodic glimpses from the participants' perspectives of the events during the last year of the war in Europe, from the invasion preparations in England, through the fall and winter fighting, to the final defeat of Germany in the spring.

Throughout the book, Fussell constantly reminds the reader of the suffering and sorrow of war. As a constant companion to this focus, however, is the author's constant stress of the sacredness of life, regardless of an individual's role in the conflict. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the penultimate chapter, "The Camps," where Fussell writes a moving essay about the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps. Here, in places like Dachau and Buchenwald, young U.S. Soldiers finally understood, after all of the tragedies they had endured the previous year, why they fought. And they realized that sometimes great hardships are necessary and must be borne to end even greater suffering.

World War II was neither pretty nor fair, and many of the actions taken by young American Soldiers were ethically questionable at best, and Fussell does not shy away from the less-than-respectable aspects of U.S. involvement in the war. He

deftly places these events in context with the wider war and world, forcing the reader to think about morals and ethics in war beyond simplistic "means and ends" comparisons. This is a powerful book, and should be considered among the best books published on World War II in recent years. The momentous events are well-known, but Fussell's essays of far lesser-known happenings invite reflection and consideration from a different perspective.

Civil War Medicine: Challenges and Triumphs. By Dr. Alfred Jay Bollet. Tucson, AZ: Galen Press, LTD, 2002, 489 pages, \$44.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Albert N. Garland and Patricia Weekley.

I found this a fascinating book to read and a solid historical work. It is not a gruesome narrative, although there are a few sections — embalming; chronic diarrhea, "it takes good guts to be a good soldier" prison camps; and "laudable pus" — that may bother some readers. This is not in any sense the author's intent.

Doctor Bollet has long served as a medical doctor in various academic institutions, including the Medical College of Georgia. At present, he is a clinical professor of medicine at Yale University.

He has long been interested in all aspects of our Civil War. During his reading and study, he began to devote more and more time to the medical history of the war and he finds "the preponderance of the existing data refers to the Union Army, since the bulk of the Confederate records were destroyed in the fire that consumed much of Richmond on April 2, 1865." But in the Confederate records he did locate, "their data are similar to the Union as far as can be determined."

What I particularly liked about this book was the author's "attack" on so many Civil War histories in which the authors don't bother to include any discussion of the medical side of the war. And their histories invariably contain nothing but "lasting negative evaluations" of the medical services.

Bollet admits both the Union and Confederate departments did perform "dismally" when the war began, but he is quick to point out "the Medical Services responded remarkably well to the immense

demands” placed on them “by achieving survival rates for disease and wounds not known in previous wars by developing innovations that later became standard components of battlefield and disaster medicine.”

He also wants his readers to know — and rightly so — how poorly our society had done in recognizing the valiant service of our medical personnel in not only the Civil War but in all of our wars. Our nurses in Vietnam did finally get a statue, which was added to the war’s memorial, but can you name another such memorial?

(As an Infantry rifle company commander in Northwest Europe during World War II, I can remember the frequent cries of “aid man!” from my squads and platoons. No once did any of these aid men let us down. Looking back, I regret I did not give them more recognition and the kind they truly deserved, and I can’t forget the work carried out by our regimental detail responsible for collecting our dead.)

During the Civil War, 51 surgeons died either in battle or of wounds suffered in battle, while in Bollet’s words, “A total of 335 surgeons died while in service, most from disease.” And after the war, Bollet suggests that “as emotions cooled, it was easier to see what a fine job Civil War physicians had done.”

He uses his 27 chapters and seven appendices to support his arguments. Along the way, he brings to the forefront the most important service rendered by such individuals as Jonathan Letterman (the father of both the Modern Military and the Emergency Medical Systems); Charles S. Tripler, who proposed a proper ambulance system and also suggested improvements in the nursing care in hospitals; and William Hammond, “one of the founders of the specialty of neurology in the United States.”

I cannot recommend this book too highly. I would have liked more space and details devoted to the important role played by those men (company aid men) who treated and evacuated the wounded and the dead on and from the war’s slaughter houses, i.e., Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and the rest. But I am more than willing to forgive this one subject I happen to be quite interested in. So, if you are a student of our Civil War, you must become familiar with this book.



Tech Sergeant Jeremy Lock, USAF

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, simulate breaching a house during training in Ramadi, Iraq. The Soldiers were training Iraqi Army soldiers from the 7th Iraqi Army Division on patrolling and breaching techniques.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

INFANTRY Magazine is available to subscribers at a cost of \$15 for one year (six issues) or \$28 for two years (12 issues). Effective Oct. 1, subscriptions for foreign (non-APO) addresses cost \$50 for one-year or \$98 for two-year subscriptions. Payments must be in U.S. currency, by money order, or by check. Checks and money orders should be made payable to INFANTRY Magazine.

To begin a subscription, send your name and address along with payment to:

INFANTRY Magazine
P.O. Box 52005
Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005

Unit Distribution — Free copies of the magazine are available to infantry and infantry-related units including active duty, Reserve, and National Guard units. Units may request up to five copies per company-size unit.

Currently, some magazines are being returned due to incorrect mailing addresses or unit designations. If you would like to add your unit or change its address or unit designation, please let us know via mail, e-mail, or telephone.

Please contact us with any questions or concerns.

E-mail — Inf.MagazineDep@benning.army.mil

Telephone — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951

Web site — www.infantry.army.mil/magazine (will need to enter AKO login and password)