Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

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Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

November-December 1986 Volume 76, Number 6

ARTICLES

FORUM AND FEATURES

TRAINING NOTES

DEPARTMENTS

FRONT COVER

One continues to learn about war by practicing war. *(General George S. Patton, Jr.)*

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USAIS

Commandant's NOTE

Major General Edwin H. Burba, Jr.
Chief of Infantry

NTC ASSAULT TECHNIQUES

One of the most disheartening trends being reported from the National Training Center at Fort Irwin is the tendency of units to lose battles in the final stages of the attack—in the last 400 meters. Since the close-in defeat of the enemy is traditionally an infantry mission, this problem is naturally generating considerable interest and discussion at the Infantry School. It is a problem that is still being examined and studied.

My remarks here are not the final answer, but rather an interim report—some thoughts about what causes the problem and what can be, and is being, done to overcome it.

Realizing that most of you are generally familiar with the NTC training environment, here is my assessment of what attacking units face at the NTC. Simply stated, they face an OPFOR defense organized to defeat a tank/mechanized infantry attacker in general, and the tank in particular. Patterned on Soviet defensive techniques, OPFOR defense tactics at the NTC are sophisticated techniques developed from World War II battle experience on the open steppes of Russia, where the main offensive threat was the tank. It is a defense built around major antiarmor systems, with dismounted infantry and obstacles positioned to protect the antiarmor weapons or to push the attacker into "fire sacks." The antiarmor weapons themselves are dispersed and positioned in depth to allow for flank shots and for rapid displacement to supplementary positions. "Keyhole," "valley floor," reverse slope, and other practical positioning techniques are used to promote survivability and effectiveness.

Several conclusions can be drawn from unsuccessful attacks against this defense:

- Crew-served antiarmor systems (BMPs and, in particular, tanks) represent the greatest danger. Handheld antiarmor weapons do little killing.
- Few defending antiarmor systems are destroyed by the attacking unit. Failure to suppress, fix, and destroy with supporting fire, and to maneuver attacking elements so that they can acquire and engage OPFOR systems makes the attacker a moving but passive target.
- Units are assaulting their objectives piecemeal. This is especially true when the attacker is exposed to converging fires from multiple directions, and from reverse slope or second echelon positions.
- Most of the attacker's tank and infantry carrier losses occur within 500 meters of his assigned objectives. A high percentage of these losses come from flanking fires.
- Encountering an unexpected close-in obstacle during a mounted attack is normally fatal. Such obstacles usually push the attacker into fire sacks where he is exposed to massed fires from multiple directions.
- Target fixation on the assigned terrain objective and orientation in the direction of movement often prevent acquisition of enemy to the flanks. Again, a high percentage of the losses are inflicted by flanking OPFOR fires, and from fires covering the objective but not on it.

Successful attacks, on the other hand, almost always have seven common denominators: good reconnaissance, mass, killing fires by the attacker, relentless all-round security, effective use of dismounted infantry, neutralization of obstacles before the attack, and rehearsals of key tasks. In addition, it is critical to have effective indirect supporting fires fix and/or suppress enemy forces and to use smoke to obscure his direct fire weapons. An analysis of these factors leads to some conceptual conclusions.

First, reconnaissance is vital. The attacker must find the enemy's antiarmor systems and especially his obstacles in time to react. This reconnaissance must include aggressive patrolling and probing before the attack. It must also include all-round security, target acquisition by all members of the team, including Army aviation, use of OPs and overwatch, and other actions to find the enemy and provide securi-

ty during the attack.

Units should concentrate on defeating antiarmor weapons, because these are the keys to the enemy's defense. At present, there is a tendency to orient on dismounted infantry positions. Such statements as "The assault is the culmination of the attack," if they refer to an assault against defending dismounted infantry, probably put the emphasis on the wrong part of the enemy's defensive system. Indeed, the assault of exposed terrain objectives without the defeat, or at least the neutralization, of the defender's antiarmor systems is probably the primary reason an assault fails.

Most attacks at battalion level should be oriented on the enemy rather than on the terrain. We cannot seize terrain unless we first defeat the enemy's antiarmor weapons; once we defeat those weapons the seizure of terrain is relatively simple. This does not mean that a battalion's plan should exclude attacking a defended position. Often, because defending infantry is used to "shield" enemy weaknesses, the rapid seizure of such a position can produce potential advantages. It does mean, however, that the seizure of that position must be part of an overall concept in which the defeat of the enemy is the ultimate objective.

It follows then that a primary concern for the attacker is the destruction of the enemy's antiarmor weapons. Even if it is temporarily neutralized, an antiarmor weapon left undestroyed can be maneuvered against the flank or rear of the attacker or can hit the elements that follow. This destruction does not necessarily require an assault—it is frequently possible to maneuver one's own antiarmor systems into position to destroy OPFOR antiarmor systems by fire without physically assaulting them. An important aspect of destroying enemy antiarmor systems is the contribution of artillery. Against stationary, located systems, DP/ICM fires can destroy as well as accomplish lesser levels of suppression.

The discussion in Field Manual 100-5 of "haste" versus "speed" is valid, but it is not universally understood. If a unit moves into an assault before it has made an effective reconnaissance to locate obstacles and enemy antiarmor weapons, and before its supporting fires are arranged for and coordinated, its attack will be slow and the unit will probably be defeated even if the enemy's defense has been hastily prepared.

Another aspect of speed is the tempo of the attack. Trying to attack at a greater speed than supporting indirect fires and overwatch/support-by-fire elements can shift forward, or faster than the mutual support within the assaulting force can be maintained, leads to a piecemeal attack. This does not argue for a "creeping" attack, which gives the enemy a chance to reposition and adjust, but it does show that the need for speed must always be balanced against the need for synchronization and mass.

No defense can defeat all threats. Although antiarmor weapons can be dispersed laterally and in depth to make the most of their ability to defeat an armored attacker, the very positioning of those weapons makes it difficult to defend them against dismounted attack and to block a dismounted attacker. In other words, the nature of an antiarmor defense opens opportunities for dismounted maneuver.

The acceptance of these concepts sparks a reconsideration of the contributions of infantry to the attack. Clearly, infantry contributes within the framework of a combined arms effort. Its roles and functions must be viewed in terms of a broad concept; that these contributions are critical has been proven by experience in what could be mistakenly defined as "tank terrain" at the NTC.

Translating the lessons learned from the NTC is simple. Infantry, in conjunction with scouts, can provide the eyes to find and target the enemy. In a tank/mechanized infantry task force the firepower contributions of dismounted infantry units may be small in terms of volume, but these units have a tremendous capacity to direct the fire of artillery, mortars, attack helicopters, tanks, TOWs, and, in Bradley units, 25mm fires onto the enemy. This may compensate for any difficulty in acquiring camouflaged, well-sited enemy systems. The circumstances in which dismounted infantry can provide this support are numerous.

Initially, infantry patrols can penetrate to find the enemy and identify his strengths and weaknesses. They can find and secure approaches and key terrain so that heavier elements can maneuver into positions from which they can fire on the enemy. Infantry and engineers can neutralize enemy obstacles by breaching them or by finding tactically viable bypass routes around them. Infantry can also target enemy for indirect fires.

During movement, infantry observation posts can monitor the reactions of the enemy and direct supporting fires against him. Infantry units following tanks in mounted formations, or from overwatch positions, can provide target acquisition capabilities, and security as well. During the assault and seizure of key terrain, dismounted infantry can lead, finding and pointing out the enemy and directing fires against him. During halts and reorganizations, infantry can establish security for the force.

Infantrymen can also act as hunters and flushers. Infiltrating through gaps in the enemy's defense that only dismounted infantry can find and use, foot soldiers can bypass enemy infantry and, using Dragons and LAWs, stalk and destroy antiarmor systems that are positioned to defeat a mounted attack. When attacking infantry is covered by friendly antiarmor systems, enemy antiarmor systems will face a dilemma—they can stay and be destroyed by the friendly infantry or they can withdraw and be destroyed by the overwatching fires from tanks, TOWs, or attack helicopters. Most frequently, they choose to withdraw. For this reason, most enemy armor kills at the NTC are attributed to tanks and TOWs. These kills would not have occurred, however, without the kills that were achieved by manportable antitank systems that forced the enemy to move. That's why the Dragon replacement is the Infantry School's number one combat developments priority.

Infantry can thus seize key terrain, eliminate obstacles, and find and secure indirect approaches to allow a battalion to move forward. It seems ironic that the most tactically mobile element at the NTC is often dismounted infantry.

An item that I have not discussed here is the mechanics of assaulting—not because that aspect is unimportant but because of space limitatons and because the conditions that must be created to allow an assault are fundamental issues that needed to be addressed at length. There is, however, one key aspect that I would like to bring out in this regard. The assault must be a combined arms operation. Tanks, Bradleys, mortars, and artillery provide the volume of firepower needed for an assault. Dismounted infantry, normally leading, provides security and eyes for these systems. This does not mean that all tanks should be tied to this role, but it does mean that infantry, tanks, and artillery must work closely together. A common mistake is to allow too great a separation between tanks and infantry, which leads to a loss of synchronization.

Although some of these ideas may seem to be shifts from "conventional" thought on the subject, they actually represent no change from our well established doctrinal principles. Instead, they result from an application of those principles to the terrain, to the enemy and to the organization for combat. I believe they have broad application in the mid- to high-intensity battlefield. They are the ones we intend to continue examining.

INFANTRY LETTERS



MARKSMANSHIP

In response to Edward Pascucci's letter on marksmanship (INFANTRY, July-August 1986, page 4), the Marines have a good marksmanship program, and so does the Army. No one should ever try to compare the two programs. Marines fire only at known distance targets, and the Army's soldiers fire at known distance targets plus timed pop-up targets. The advantage of the known distance range is that it provides the soldier with an immediate round-for-round feedback. A distinct disadvantage is that it also gives the soldier an unrealistic time lag in which to fire his weapon.

I agree that the fundamentals of marksmanship are the same whether you fire at known distance or pop-up targets. But in each of these categories, training to a standard will result in a skill.

Presently, the initial entry soldier receives 20 hours of instruction in dry fire techniques and rifle marksmanship fundamentals before he goes to a live fire range. If you add the reinforcement done at the unit level, these figures could increase from 30 to 35 hours. And this is only the beginning of a soldier's basic rifle marksmanship instruction, which he receives during a period of 10 days. This instruction fully prepares him to successfully negotiate combat record fire. Record fire tests the soldier's ability to detect and engage timed single and multiple target exposures at ranges from 50 to 300 meters.

On the other hand, the ROTC advanced camp is not equivalent to basic training. It is conducted at the end of four years of ROTC training or the equivalent. The writer of the letter should not judge the Army's marksmanship solely on the basis of his ROTC experience at Fort Bragg.

An infantry soldier improves his marksmanship by attending four days of advanced rifle marksmanship instruction. This instruction consists of known distance training, moving targets, quick fire techniques, automatic fire, and night fire.

WALTER A. ALEMANY
CPT, Infantry
Fort Benning, Georgia

AGREES ON SYMBOLS

I am in total agreement with Lieutenant Van R. Dodd concerning the need for symbols to reflect the uniqueness of the light infantry (see letter, July-August 1986, page 5). As a member of the newly formed 29th Infantry Division (Light), I have been fortunate enough to complete the Light Leader Course and serve this year as an instructor in the light leader program. As a result of this involvement, I can attest to the need for a symbol, or symbols, to establish the light infantry divisions as elite.

The change from straight infantry to light infantry has presented a remarkable challenge to the soldier. Could he adapt to the small-unit concept that places the responsibility on the squad to perform critical missions? Could the squad leaders and team leaders develop their combat skills to an even finer point? Could the soldier forget the "old" days of digging into a defensive position and staying there for days at a time? Could that same soldier be motivated enough by this new concept of "light infantry" to toughen himself even more physically and mentally? Clearly times have changed for the footsoldier, and that change needs to be recognized and symbolized.

Our soldiers need accoutrements on their uniforms that say, "We are Light Infantry." With pride in one's self comes pride in one's unit. A soldier could not help poking his chest out a little farther if he were wearing the tab of a light infantryman and the beret to symbolize his division.

A tab would be simple to design. A beret is already designed; we just need the color. Brown or tan would be excellent choices, but infantry blue could even be considered. Whatever the choice, I urge the Army to recognize us for what we are—the new and elite "Light Infantry."

LARRY W. STEGALL
SSG, Infantry
Radford, Virginia

ESPRIT-BUILDING

In response to Lieutenant Van R. Dodd's letter in your July-August 1986 issue (page 5), I would like to offer the following comments concerning esprit-building uniform items for light infantry units.

First, while the increased attention and emphasis now being placed on light infantry is a welcome change, the fact of the matter is that light infantry is now being challenged and required to do what it should have been doing all along. The "commitment, desire and willingness to fight and win" that Lieutenant Dodd describes is encouraging but validated so far only by training exercises and the loud remonstrations of light infantry enthusiasts who now feel that they, too, should be recognized as an elite force. Perhaps so, but if that's true, then fully one-third of our active force (Special Operations, Airborne, Air Assault, and Light Infan-

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try units) is elite—a preposterous notion.

In the bad, post-Vietnam days of the 1970s, almost every kind of unit had its own distinctive headgear, belt buckle, footwear, and so on. Apart from looking like so many marching bands, the only tangible result was the devaluation of the genuine esprit and morale of traditionally "special" units such as the Special Forces. In fact, the elimination of this widespread abuse was welcomed by many airborne soldiers who felt that any boost engendered by wearing the maroon beret was overwhelmed by the bewildering array of multicolored hats that characterized the force at that time.

Today's light infantry forces are undeniably better, and we would all do well to remember that it is the nameless, faceless grunt who wins wars, not the high-speed headline-gathering "elite forces" who now wear the berets and tabs that signify special status.

But there is a distinction between the soldier who volunteers and is selected for duty in airborne units and the soldier who is ordered to the "regular" combat units in the force. Romanticism should not cause us to overlook the fact that light infantry units do not have a forced entry capability, or that units such as the 101st and the 82d Airborne can be every bit as light as the 7th Infantry Division (Light) with the simple expedient of leaving behind heavy vehicles and equipment—as happened during Operation Urgent Fury.

In short, there is no evidence at all that the creation of light infantry divisions has in any way given us a capability that did not already exist. These units are simply being required to train and fight tougher and leaner than before.

So let us be content with what we are, without necessarily looking to external symbols to bolster what should be inner confidence and fighting spirit. Symbols are important, but much less so than the traditional values of hard work, teamwork, and motivation. It is the leader's job to develop these—not the quartermaster's.

R.D. HOOKER, JR.
CPT, Infantry
Fort Rucker, Alabama

ABSURD

In the July-August 1986 issue of INFANTRY (page 5), there is a letter on the need for symbols. Frankly, the idea that a light division should receive some sort of distinctive clothing such as a beret or a tab is absolutely absurd. A light division is merely an infantry unit—no more, no less. Its soldiers do not jump out of planes or practice the true art of counterinsurgency warfare. Out light units "hump" more and get to train in a few more challenging environments. The light divisions can send soldiers to Airborne and Ranger school. They also get all that wonderful highspeed gear at CIF.

I would like to express my view on some soldiers who really deserve to wear some type of distinctive badge.

As a Bradley platoon leader in the 1st Cavalry Division and a former enlisted soldier in the 82d Airborne Division, I have trained in various courses—Airborne, Ranger, Jungle, Mortar Platoon, and Bradley. I have experience in the desert, the jungle, and the mountains. It has all been great training. But when the M2 lowers its ramp, my dismounted soldiers fight like 11Bs. In fact, many were 11Bs before new equipment training and the Bradley transition.

The Bradley is a lethal piece of machinery. We train the basic infantrymen how to maneuver, operate, and fight a sophisticated weapon system. We also demand that he take the EIB test, maintain high levels of proficiency with the M16, M203, M60, Dragon, LAW, and the rest. Our soldiers practice individual movement techniques and every other "light" drill. Now add to that the Bradley Gunner's Skill Test, gunnery, company-team live fires, air assaults, and any other infantry tactic you can think of, and the life of an 11M is easier to understand.

Doctrine demands that the 11M fight as efficiently as any other infantryman. A review of any skill manual for 11M shows not just Bradley skills but basic and advanced infantry skills as well. If the "balloon went up" tomorrow, the 11M could fight like any 11B, but could the light division soldier crawl into the turret of an M2 and kill the enemy?

Training a COHORT unit cannot be that difficult. At least the men have a basic foundation upon which to work. My idea of a tough job is guiding a brand new Division 86 task force, recently equipped with Bradleys, through new equipment training in January, a company-team test (with M1 tank companies) in April, ARTEPs in May and June, gunnery, then the National Training Center in July of the same year. We had to train soldiers of all ranks from private through lieutenant colonel. Our unit spent so much time in the field, we simply created motor pools at designated assembly areas and returned to garrison for breaks of three or four days. Then we headed back out to train again. That was a trying period for all the soldiers and their families, but we prevailed.

My compliments to our brothers in arms in the 7th, 25th, and 10th Divisions. I wish you all great success. But if you want to recognize any soldier with a badge of distinction for his efforts and all-round guts, then tip your hat to the 11M.

ROBERT S. BOBINSKI
LT, Infantry
Fort Hood, Texas

UPGRADE M113 UNITS

Bravo for Sergeant Foley! In his article in the July-August 1986 issue of INFANTRY, he made some astute observations on the capabilities and limitations of M113-equipped mechanized infantry. (See "Observations on Mechanized Infantry," by Sergeant First Class John E. Foley, pages 29-34.) I completely agree with his common-sense, low-cost improvements especially for upgraded carrier weapons and the dismounted platoon.

I spent three years as a brigade S-4 in Europe; during my tour our brigade converted to the J-series MTOE and transitioned to the M1 and the M2/M3. The Bradley is a fine fighting vehicle, but not all mechanized battalions will receive Bradleys. It is time, in light of reduced budgets, for the infantry community to give serious thought to cheap and readily attainable improvements, especially in firepower, for M113 units. The technology is either here or being worked on.

I agree with Sergeant Foley's idea for a platoon mortar. A carrier-mounted

60mm mortar, fired by direct lay or direct alignment, is ideal for reconnaissance by fire, immediate suppression, and smoke, as well as for illumination.

Branching out a bit—is anybody at Fort Benning looking at the *operational* employment of M113 units as "regular" infantry along the lines suggested by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege in "Three Kinds of Infantry"? (See July-August 1985, page 11.) Neither Bradley battalions nor those in the new light infantry divisions are really suitable for the hard slugging required to attack well-entrenched enemy or defend a battle position in depth. Bradley battalions, although long on firepower, are short on dismounted infantrymen; light battalions don't have the firepower or the sustainability needed. I fully realize that light infantry prefers to attack the enemy's weak spots, but sometimes you can't find a weak spot to attack.

Finally, I haven't read anything recently about the concepts and equipment being tested by the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis. The motorized concept, previously so full of promise, seems to have died on the vine. A motorized division appears to be an excellent compromise between transportability and firepower. I also see no reason why it could not be tailored for use in a low-intensity war.

PAUL L. CONWAY
MAJ, Infantry
Durant, Oklahoma

REORGANIZING

I would like to make two comments on General Wayne Downing's excellent and thought provoking article "Reorganizing" (INFANTRY, March-April 1986, page 22).

First, in Table 2 it appears that the numbers for the light infantry platoon headquarters with a field strength of 22 or more and the lesser strengths are incorrect. To be consistent with the text and the structure of the argument, instead of four in each case, the number should be seven. As the argument goes, a viable platoon needs a maneuver group and a base of fire. The light infantry base of fire would be two 2-man machinegun teams located in a light infantry platoon's headquarters along with the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, and a radiotelephone operator, a total of seven men. This would be consistent with the platoon total in the table's final column.

In general, the article does not deal with the problem of reorganizing on the basis of the soldiers' capabilities. Not all of the soldiers available can or should be moved into certain positions that become vacant. A platoon leader will have to know which men can serve in which capacities, not just what jobs have to be filled first.

Also, the heavy platoon leader will have to think in advance about redistributing soldiers, and about their unique talents, after the loss of a vehicle. A platoon's capabilities will be greatly affected by a vehicle loss.

Overall, the article was very informative, and I hope my comments will be taken not as criticism but as an addition to it.

STEVEN MINNIEAR
Washington, D.C.

INFANTRY IMAGES

Let's talk for a moment about the sacred image of the Infantry. You know the one: You wouldn't introduce either your sister or your daughter to an Infantryman. He prefers field duty when the weather is (at the very least) uncooperative. He wallows in the mud—and loves it. He lends atmosphere to what otherwise might be a stuffy affair.

That image isn't really a problem. After all, the Infantryman is the guy on the ground with the gun. And the Infantry is the first in and last out. Not only that, but the Infantry is proud of that sacred image. Infantrymen everywhere climb proudly on that bandwagon—and just as proudly reduce it to splinters.

There's a serious side to that image. Some people say we Infantrymen can survive with so little for so long that we can do anything with nothing. Those people point to Sherman's march to the sea, the Third Army's race across Europe, and any number of other instances to show that Infantrymen are masters of the "make do"—all the time. To our credit, we have proved them right over and over again—effectively, efficiently, and constantly.

But it's time for a change. It's all well and good to be pigs in the mud, but we must learn to leave the field in the field. When we come back to civilization, we need to come all the way back—to baths, clothes and, yes, even deodorant. There's another side to that, too. The Infantry, as a branch, needs to try hard to *stop* doing everything with nothing. The Infantry needs to demand its fair share and the same respect the other branches seem to get.

In the field it's fine to make do with what we've got and to take a certain pride in doing without. But not in garrison. Not on the installation.

The Infantry must demonstrate that it is no longer willing to get by with less than the best in terms of facilities and posts, camps and stations. We must look at ourselves and our sacred image and demand the best. After all, we *are* the best.

DOUGLAS A. MARTZ
MAJ, Infantry
Fort Sheridan, Illinois

ALOC, ALC, ALCC?

Lieutenant Colonel Joel D. Williamson's interesting article "Command and Control" (INFANTRY, May-June 1986, pp. 25-29) contains a minor discrepancy. He uses the acronym ALOC for the term "administrative logistics operations center," and this is incorrect.

The glossaries of FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, and FM 63-2-2, Combat Service Support: Armored, Mechanized, and Motorized Divisions, both list ALOC as "air line of communication." Unfortunately, the glossary of FC 17-1J, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (coordinating draft), does list ALOC as "administrative logistics operations center." But then, drafts are for the purpose of eliminating such little problems. The correct acronym is ALC, for "administrative/logistics center."

Acronyms are supposed to make communication easier. Considering the num-

ber existing and our penchant for coining new ones, it is clear why many of our brightest second lieutenants are often confused. Now let them beware the ALCC!

WILLIAM G. KEYES
LTC, USA, Retired
Fort McClellan, Alabama

ONLY A GRUNT?

I once had a soldier complain to me that he was tired of being "only a grunt" and that he wanted a more important job. He was somewhat surprised when I explained to him why there could never be a more important job than that of the infantryman.

If it is true that the noncommissioned officer corps is the backbone of the Army, then it certainly follows that the rifleman is the Army's lifeblood. After all, it is the rifleman to whom falls the ultimate challenge: Defeat the enemy on a man-to-man basis and secure victory by bullet and bayonet.

In the heat of the jungle the infantryman often forgets that his job is considered so important that millions of dollars worth of men and equipment are kept standing by to support him in his mission. It is the grunt who leads the way for armor, artillery, and others to follow.

When the rifleman is crawling through the mud or standing guard in the rain, all efforts are directed toward his success. From the aircraft crews that provide him with supplies or close air support to the rear echelon troops funneling food, clothing, and ammunition to his jungle outpost, countless people recognize that his mission has the priority.

No, there is no more important job than that of the grunt. There is also no greater feeling of pride than to hear yourself called "Infantryman."

CHUCK GRIST
SSG, Infantry
Casselberry, Florida

VIETNAM BOOK

With the great help of the hundreds of veterans I've interviewed, I've sold three books on the Vietnam War. I'm now starting a fourth proposed book involving the following: The actions from 29 March to 1 April 1970 when the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry was attacked in its LZ, the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry was overrun at LZ Illingworth, and the CG, 199th Infantry Brigade was killed; and the 1 May to 30 June 1970 incursion into Cambodia by elements of the 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 199th Infantry Brigade.

Veterans, please call me or write any time to arrange interviews: 220 Kingsville Court, Webster Groves, MO 63119; telephone (314) 961-7577.

KEITH WILLIAM NOLAN

HISTORICAL SCROLL

Last year the Devonshire and Dorset Regiment celebrated its 300th Anniversay and, in connection with this celebration, produced several items. One of these items is a handsome horizontal format wall poster (43 inches by 18 inches) which we call our Historical Scroll. It depicts in color the uniforms the regiment has worn from the time of our founding in 1685 up to now.

It occurs to us that there may well be other people with general military or army historical interests who might like a chance to buy this unique item. The price is four pounds sterling (remittance in sterling please), which includes a protective tube and surface mail.

PETER BURDICK
LTC, British Army
Tercentenary Project Officer
The Devonshire and Dorset Regiment
Wyvern Barracks, Exeter
ENGLAND

LOOKING FOR SEABEES

An all-out search is under way for about 400 men who served their country well in the 46th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabee) during World War II. About 600 of the 1,012 members who were stationed in Guadalcanal, New Caledonia, and New Guinea have been located.

Anyone with information concerning the whereabouts of a member of this battalion is urged to contact Mary Holliway at 1833 NW 11, Oklahoma City, OK 73106.

GAIL PECK
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

INFANTRY NEWS



A MOBILE TRAINING UNIT has been organized at Fort Benning to help battalions all over the world maintain their equipment. The Maintenance Field Training Team, organized by the Maintenance Management Division of the 29th Infantry Regiment, can go just about anywhere to provide infantry commanders and other leaders with the latest maintenance concepts and trends as set by Army standards.

The team is made up of six maintenance experts who are skilled in preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on vehicles and weapons, in the maintenance of Bradley fighting vehicles and weapons, and in maintenance management at battalion, brigade, and division level.

The team's primary focus is on squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders, because they are directly responsible for training soldiers. The five-day period of instruction for this group covers how to do PMCS properly, how to establish a training program for a unit, and how to put a sustained PMCS program in the unit. Pre-tests are conducted before the instruction so that it can be tailored to fit the level of expertise in the battalion.

The team is also qualified to teach maintenance leadership to battalion and company commanders and battalion maintenance officers. This instruction includes the function of the Army of Excellence program, how it should work, and how to manage it.

Either or both groups may receive training during a visit, depending upon a battalion's needs.

The Infantry School has provided limited funding for this project. Once these funds have been depleted, the visits will be made at the expense of the requesting unit.

Battalion commanders may request the team's services by writing Maintenance Management Division, 29th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5910, or by calling AUTOVON 784-7214/7363/6366, or commercial (404) 544-7214/7363/6366.

THE 75TH RANGER REGIMENT, with headquarters at Fort Benning, now carries the lineage and honors of the Ranger battalions of World War II and the Ranger companies of the Korean War.

The U.S. Army had six Ranger battalions during World War II. William O. Darby organized and led the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions, which served in North Africa and Italy and were known as the Ranger Force. The 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions saw action in five major campaigns in Europe after landing in Normandy on D-Day. The 6th Ranger Battalion fought in the Pacific.

During the Korean War, elements of the former Ranger battalions were reorganized as 15 separate Ranger companies, six of which served in Korea.

The Combat Arms Regimental System, implemented in the 1950s, did not include plans for reactivating any Ranger units. As a result, in order to perpetuate the outstanding history of the World War II and Korean War Rangers, they were consolidated in 1960 with the 1st Special Service Force of World War II, a joint Canadian-American organization that fought in the Aleutians, Italy, and France. Together they formed the 1st Special Forces, the parent regiment for all Special Forces Groups.

When Ranger units were activated again in 1969, the 75th Infantry became their parent regiment. It perpetuated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), the famous Merrill's Marauders who operated along the Ledo Road in Burma during World War II. Thirteen companies of the 75th Infantry fought in Vietnam, and two battalions saw action in Grenada in 1983. A regimental headquarters and a third battalion were organized in 1984.

Today's Rangers consider themselves the legitimate heirs not only of Merrill's Marauders and the Vietnam era Rangers but also of the Rangers from World War II and the Korean War. The 1st Special Operations Command therefore requested that the lineage and honors of the former Ranger units be transferred from the 1st Special Forces to the 75th Infantry.

Effective 3 February 1986, the Secretary of the Army approved that request and, at the same time, redesignated the 75th Infantry the 75th Ranger Regiment.

A REVISED Army Regulation 600-9, Army Weight Control Program, was published in October 1986. The following major changes have been incorporated into this revision:

- Measurement of body fat will be determined with a tape measure instead of with calipers. This will be performed at unit level. Before, medical personnel conducted the caliper test at medical facilities. The correlation factors are nearly identical in accuracy between these two methods.
- All measurements will be taken in PT uniform and stocking feet. The previous method of obtaining a soldier's weight was to weigh him in his duty uniform and deduct the weight of the clothing.
- There is an increased screening weight for female soldiers. The table increased by five percent for females. The table for males has not changed.
- Soldiers will be able to select a desired weight below their screening table weight to use as a guideline to keep from exceeding the weight ceiling.

A HOTLINE has been established at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama to help soldiers and units with maintenance problems on combat vehicles, small arms, and

INFANTRY HOTLINE

To get answers to Infantry-related questions or to pass on information of an immediate nature, call AUTOVON 835-7693, commercial 404/545-7693.

For lengthy questions or comments, send in writing to Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ES, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

missile guidance and control systems.

The 24-hour hotline is answered by a person on duty between 0700 and 1530 Central Standard Time. During other hours, an answering device records messages. The hotline is available seven days a week.

The depot's equipment specialists will analyze and research maintenance and repair problems and provide speedy solutions. Among the missile guidance and control system problems the depot deals with are land combat support systems, ground TOW, TOW Cobra, TOW 2, Dragon, LANCE, and Shillelagh.

The hotline should be used only after all local resources such as logistic assistance offices have been contacted.

Anyone calling the hotline should provide name, AUTOVON number, unit identification and location, and a complete description of the maintenance or operational problem.

The number is AUTOVON 694-6582 or commercial (205) 235-6582.

SOLDIERS GOING to the 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, may call a toll-free number for any information on their new assignments. The number is 1-800-826-0857. (There is a six-hour time difference between Hawaii and the East Coast.)

The 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry is scheduled to be redesignated the 4th Battalion, 22d Infantry (COHORT), in November.

A FEMALE MEMBER of an Afghani commando brigade is pictured here in a photo from *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the official newspaper of the Soviet military establishment.

Lieutenant Nadzhiba is the medical officer for an undisclosed commando brigade. She wears the crimson beret of all Afghani special forces along with the 1st Class airborne wings bestowed upon the most proficient of Afghani paratroopers.

She asked to serve in the commando brigade and participated alongside other members of the brigade during the assault on the Zhavara citadel. The assault—a predominantly Afghani Army operation that occurred during the last week of May 1986—inflicted a serious blow on the *mujahiddin*.

Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghani Ground Forces included three airborne brigades and a commando brigade, the 444th, all of which were Soviet trained. After the invasion, these forces disappeared from view, and it has been only within the past year that Afghani commandos have made their way into the Soviet press. They have been reported fighting alongside Soviet airborne and *Spetsnaz* units. Additionally, they regularly provide support to Soviet combined arms reinforced battalions—core units for small unit military operations in Afghanistan.

While the number of women serving in special forces units in Afghanistan is not known, it is not believed to be significant at this time and will probably not increase much in the near future.

(Translated and contributed by Captain Gilberto Villahermosa, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.)

THE NATIONAL INFANTRY Museum is preparing a special exhibit titled "This We Will Defend" to commemorate the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Three signers of the constitution who were also military men are featured—James McHenry, Pierce Butler, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. Portraits of these three will be shown along with documents they signed. Eighteenth century style furnishings and military trophies of the period will be included in the exhibit.

Many interesting donations have been made to the Museum recently:

- A Kevlar helmet belonging to Lieutenant General Robert L. Wetzel, a former Fort Benning commanding general.
- A censored edition of an Ecumenical Commission prayer book that was distributed to prisoners of war by the YMCA during World War II.
- Several articles relating to Japan in World War II—a Japanese beer bottle recovered by the donor in 1982 from the Japanese ship *Shoei Maru*, which was sunk by the U.S. Navy on 19 December 1943 at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands; a waterproof rice bag taken from a Japanese soldier on Corregidor; maps used by the 503d Regimental Combat Team at Corregidor and the Noemfoor Islands; and an "I Cease Resistance" leaflet that, ironically, was taken from a dead Japanese soldier on Mindoro. (This and similar leaflets were dropped by U.S. forces on Japanese positions in an effort to get the Japanese soldiers to surrender.)
- World War I infantry mementos including a first aid packet, a punishment card prescribing 14 days of bread and water, a 3d Infantry Day program, and several military documents, as well as a Montana peak hat that belonged to the donor's grandfather.
- A Venezuelan parachutist badge, which will be included in the large collection from many countries that is on display in the airborne section.
- Several other pieces of unit insignia as well as books, photographs, and other printed matter.
- A large bronze sculpture of Adolf Hitler's head, which had been turned upside down and converted into a trash receptacle by the donor's brother.

Other small pieces were purchased recently including a large tin Civil War coffee pot, a pair of wooden crutches bearing the Medical Department stamp, a Civil War bayonet and scabbard, a leather flag carrier, and a brass bullet mold.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who would like to join. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership or $10.00 for a lifetime membership. With these funds the Museum is able to pur-

chase specific items that are needed for planned exhibits or to build or round out its collection in certain areas as these items become available.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5273, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial (404) 545-2958.

THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY Board has submitted the following news items:

SAW Modifications II. Following the fielding of the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) in 1984, some using units reported problems with the weapon. After a series of high level meetings, SAW production was halted in the summer of 1985. A Joint Working Group met at Fort Benning in September 1985 and proposed a series of SAW modifications. These modifications fell into two categories—those that could be implemented within six months and those that would take longer. The modifications that could be implemented within six months were tested by the Infantry Board in December 1985. (See INFANTRY, May-June 1986, page 9.)

On the basis of the test results and other investigations, a Test Integration Working Group, chaired by the SAW Project Manager's office, agreed on a number of additional modifications designed and selected by the materiel developer, the combat developer, and the manufacturer to address the remaining problems. A technical evaluation (development testing) was conducted by the manufacturer in Belgium under the supervision of the Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC), and the user testing of the SAW modifications was conducted by the Infantry Board at Fort Benning. Two designs of each of the following modified SAW components were evaluated: buttstock, buffer assembly, gas system, barrel change handle, and a heat shield.

Twenty-four SAW gunners participated in the user test from 21 July through 28 August 1986. By the time the testing program was completed, each SAW gunner had used each configuration of modified SAW in a series of exercises involving zeroing, movement and reaction to opposing forces (blank firing), negotiation of an obstacle course, and live-fire engagement of hit-sensitive target arrays at ranges out to 800 meters.

Data concerning night sight compatibility and zero retention and repeatability were collected during side tests along with data on signature effects. Reliability, maintainability, human factors, general compatibility, and safety were assessed concurrently with all of the testing.

The test results will be used by the Infantry School and ARDEC to ensure that the selected modifications correct the identified deficiencies and to determine the preferred combination of modifications.

Multipurpose Bayonet System. The Infantry School, in conjunction with the Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC), has been aggressively pursuing the acquisition of a multipurpose bayonet system (MPBS) to replace the present M7 bayonet. (See INFANTRY, January-February 1986, page 9.)

In December 1985, the letter requirement for the bayonet system, which proposed the acquisition of the bayonet under the non-developmental item (NDI) process, was approved. ARDEC fielded the MPBS Request for Proposal and Purchase Description in March 1986 and solicited candidate bayonet systems. Each was expected to function as bayonet, combat knife, field knife, and wire cutter. Six candidates were selected and furnished to the Infantry Board for testing.

Each candidate system consisted of a scabbard, a quick-release attaching and detaching device, and a bayonet. The bayonets varied in weight from .63 to 1.06 pounds and in blade length from 6.02 to 7.0 inches. Each was designed with a modified spear point and V-ground edge. The rear portion of the top edge of five of the candidates had serrations for cutting or sawing while the sixth included a saw blade in the scabbard. All systems incorporated a wire cutter of some kind in their design.

Comparative testing of the MPBS candidates was conducted in an Operational Test II at Fort Benning during the period 16 June through 16 July 1986. Twenty-eight Infantrymen from the 197th Infantry Brigade used each candidate system during a series of exercises that were designed to obtain data on the operational performance capabilities of the MPBS when used as a bayonet, field knife, and wire cutter. The combat knife function was assessed by six instructors from the Infantry School's Ranger Department.

Operational performance data were collected from questionnaires, rating scales, interviews, and timed exercises. Comparative data on compatibility, durability, human factors, and safety were collected throughout testing.

The Infantry School will use the test results to assist in making a decision concerning the Infantry's recommended choice of an MPBS candidate for consideration by a source selection advisory committee.

Lightweight Desert Clothing and Equipment. In an effort to improve upon the clothing and equipment available for use in a desert environment, user representatives attending a Test Integration Working Group meeting held in July 1985 at Fort Bragg selected a number of commercially available items for testing by the Infantry Board under the concept evaluation program (CEP). Particular emphasis was placed on the selection of items used by Special Forces personnel.

Items selected for testing included three designs of one-man tents/individual shelters, three designs of two-man tents, five varieties of individual camouflage covers, two varieties of boots, two types of tactical load bearing vests, three types of hats, four designs of uniforms, two designs of water containers, and one type of scarf. Standard items of clothing and equipment were worn or used to establish a basis of comparison for all the test items except the tents and water containers, which had no control systems.

From 9 July to 24 August 1986, two Special Forces A detachments wore and used the various items during a series of exercises in a desert environment at Fort Bliss, Texas. The detachments participated in tactical ARTEP-type tasks, missions, and team training; traversed obstacles; and made parachute jumps. The uniforms and equipment were alternated so that test and control items could accumulate near-equal wear and use time.

Functional performance, compatibility, human factors, soldier preference,

durability, maintainability, and safety data were collected throughout the test. Questionnaires were administered to determine troop preference and desired or undesired features of each type of test item.

The Infantry School will use the test results to determine the need for furth. testing or consideration of the various te items.

SWAP SHOP



Using azimuth and pace count to navigate is necessary, but it cannot be totally depended upon. Following an azimuth can lead a unit through danger areas and terrain that will impede its movement.

The use of a navigation sheet for planning and traversing a route will allow an infantry leader to navigate using a general azimuth along with terrain features. It will also force the user to make a thorough route analysis.

A simple format for such a sheet is shown here as an example, but more elaborate formats could include even greater detail, tailored to the general terrain.

Each leg should be numbered and should begin and end at a recognizable terrain feature. Leg One begins at the LZ and ends at a stream. The "Landmarks" column includes any intermediate landmarks and the end point of the leg. The column labeled "Slope' indicates the general slope of the ground as shown on the map. If the ground always slopes up to the left or right keeping on the azimuth will be much more difficult. But if a leader finds his right foot is higher than his left when it should be the other way around, he will know that he's off course.

The "Remarks" column should include not only the location of any danger areas but also that of any control measures such as the LZ or the ORP.



LEG	AZ	DIS	LANDMARKS	SLOPE	REMARKS/DANGER AREAS
1	125°	1000	Hill 569 to right at 600m stream at 1000m GL135814	Down Up right Down	From LZ at GL 127821 to stream Christopher Rd DA at 450m +
2	101°	2400	Up a draw, hill to left 700m draw to right 800m & 1100m, 1900m, hilltop at GL159809	Up 600m, Up & down 600m Up left 1200m	DAs: vic 141812 Box Springs Rd, 1600m
3	123°	800	Hollis Creek 500m Hilltop at GL166805	Down 500m Up 300m	DA: Hollis Creek
4	94°	2300	Draw to left 200m, draw to right at 900m & 1800m stream junction GL188803	General slope Up left, Down 200m, up 500m Up left 1600m	DA: Cyclone Rd at 750m
5	30°	1100	Up a ridge 800m down stream bed/draw 300m ORP GL194813	Up 800m Down 300m	DA: Red Diamond Rd 800m ORP at GL 194813

(Submitted by Captain Karl A. Miller of Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, at Fort Benning.)



"In Front of Them All"

MAJOR KARL W. EIKENBERRY

The United Nations Command Security Force (UNCSF), the only military unit with a continuous presence inside the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ), is an elite infantry force whose missions are vital to the upkeep of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Early in 1952, in anticipation of the end of the Korean War, the United Nations Command gave the Eighth United States Army certain responsibilities in connection with the establishment of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). To comply with the overall directive, the Eighth Army commander had to establish a unit to provide security and logistical support for the MAC and other agencies engaged in executing the Armistice Agreement.

On 5 May 1952, the UNCSF — then named the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission Support Group (Provisional) — was organized; it had an authorized strength of five officers and ten enlisted men. The signing of the armistice in July 1953 led to a series of large-scale prisoner-of-war and refugee exchanges between the combatants. The UNCSF was expanded to 1,900 men to support these exchanges (known as Operations Big Switch, Comeback, and Rainbow), which involved the movement of more than 100,000 personnel across the military demarcation line (MDL) in the vicinity of the tiny hamlet of Panmunjom. In 1954 the Security Force was awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation for its outstanding performance during these politically sensitive operations.

By late 1954 the UNCSF's mission had changed to approximately its present one. Some of the details of the armistice negotiations and the eventual agreement will help explain this mission and the UNCSF's operational requirements.

A security corridor had been established in 1951 to provide some degree of safety to officials traveling to and from the armistice negotiations then being conducted next to Panmunjom. Under the terms of the armistice agreement, this corridor, now referred to as the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Area (MACHA), was kept intact. The corridor's purpose was to provide safe access to personnel traveling to and from the Joint Security Area, which is now located about 600 meters from the original negotiation site. This area, about 800 meters in diameter and bisected by the Military Demarcation Line, was established as the site of the headquarters offices of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The Joint Security Area, often referred to today simply as Panmunjom, is the site of meetings between the United Nations component and the North Korean People's Army and Chi-



nese People's Volunteers Military componets of the Armistice Commission as well as official talks between the two Koreas.

The NNSC is divided into the Swiss and Swedish delegations, supported by the United Nations Command, and the Czechoslovakian and Polish delegations, supported by North Korea. The United Nations Command and North Korea have established camps for these delegations within the MACHA on their respective sides of the MDL.

Not far from the Joint Security Area is Taesong Dong, or Freedom Village. Under the provisions of the armistice agreement, the residents of the Panmun Valley (in which the village of Panmunjom is located) were allowed to remain there after the cessation of hostilities, although the area is inside the DMZ. The Republic of Korea decided to move all of the families on its side of the MDL to one location, which became known as Taesong Dong. Today, the village of about 217 residents is the only inhabited locale within the DMZ. The North Korean DMZ "village," Guijong Dong, which is impressive looking but largely unoccupied, is referred to appropriately as "Propaganda Village."

The UNCSF is an Eighth United States Army unit under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. Its command and staff structure parallels that of an infantry battalion. The unit's assigned strength is 350 military personnel, 40 percent of whom are Republic of Korea soldiers. The UNCSF has two companies, the Headquarters and Service (H&S) Company and the Joint Security Force (JSF) Company.

The H&S Company performs most of the unit's support missions. In addition to the usual elements found in an infantry battalion's headquarters company, H&S Company is augmented by a number of sections that perform functions unique to the armistice agreement, such as the escort section, which provides drivers and security guards for the NNSC delegations; the Taesong Dong security platoon, which protects the residents of Freedom Village against possible North Korean incursions; and tour guide section, which briefs and escorts United Nations Command and Republic of Korea guests during their trips to Panmunjom.

The JSF Company is organized and equipped like a light infantry company, except that is has four platoons rather than three, and is fully motorized. It is responsible for securing the Joint Security Area, patrolling the UNCSF's operational area, and reacting to North Korean acts of aggression against the MAC headquarters area.

In addition to fulfilling the administrative and support requirements common to any infantry battalion, the UNCSF also provides logistical support to the Swiss and Swedish NNSC delegations, briefing and escorting the 90,000 or so people who visit Panmunjom each year, and supervising the administration of Taesong Dong.

The soldiers of the UNCSF are among the best in the armies of the United States and the Republic of Korea. The U.S. soldiers are screened and nominated to serve in the unit by a unit liaison NCO who reviews the records of all personnel arriving for assignment to the Eighth United States Army. To be chosen, an infantryman generally must be at least six feet tall, be in excellent physical condition, and have a spotless military record. A Korean soldier must have a working knowledge of English and a black belt in one of the martial arts. Before being permanently assigned to the unit, each prospective UNCSF soldier must successfully complete an eight-day orientation. An American soldier serves a one-year tour of duty, while his Republic of Korea counterpart serves for two and one-half years.

The infantry training conducted by the UNCSF reflects the decentralized nature of the unit's operations. Since the squad and platoons conduct "real world" operations most of the time, tactical proficiency at the small unit level within the UNCSF is exceedingly high. In addition, all soldiers receive extensive training with the .45-caliber pistol (the weapon carried inside the Joint Security Area) and the M16 rifle, and in combatives and Tae Kwon Do (a Korean mar-

UNCSF guards (left) stand their posts inside the JSA. In back is the North Korean building of Panmungak. At right, UNCSF soldiers patrol the UNCSF's operational area.

tial art). The unit's consistently superb performance on the Expert Infantryman Badge test speaks for the skill of the infantrymen assigned to it.

The U.S. soldiers study the Korean language throughout their assignment with the UNCSF, while the Korean soldiers continuously work to improve their English skills.

Based at Camp Bonifas, only 400 meters south of the DMZ, the UNCSF has been involved in many engagements with North Korean forces since the end of the Korean War. The most significant of these include a North Korean attack against Camp Bonifas (then Camp Kitty Hawk) in 1967, which resulted in heavy casualties; a North Korean ambush of a United Nations Command truck in the MACHA in 1968 during which four Security Force soldiers were killed and two wounded; and the axe murder of two Security Force officers at Panmunjom in 1976. As recently as 23 November 1984, the UNCSF countered North Korean aggression when a Soviet citizen defected at Panmunjom.

The recent North-South Korean talks and exchanges at Panmunjom and in Taesong Dong, which have been unprecedented in scope and nature, have placed unusual demands upon the UNCSF. And for its support of the historical North and South Korean Red Cross exchange of relief goods, which occurred in the wake of severe flooding in September 1984, the unit was awarded the humanitarian service medal.

In short, the UNCSF, as the unit deployed farthest forward in the Republic of Korea, performs missions that are essential to the maintenance of peace. The United Nations Command has therefore given the unit its motto — "In Front of Them All."

Major Karl W. Eikenberry, an Infantry officer and a 1973 graduate of the United States Military Academy, recently completed an assignment as deputy commander of the UNCSF. He has served in the 2d Infantry Division; the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and the 24th Infantry Division. He is now assigned as the Assistant Army Attache to the Peoples Republic of China.

Leaders Reaction Course

MAJOR ROBERT L. MAGINNIS

Inside the high grey walls of the prisoner-of-war camp the sultry weather hangs around the soldiers' necks like iron weights. They have been told that two of them are to be executed later today, soon after they have completed digging the newest graves. Their only route of escape is across a wide moat circling the prison's interior and then over the high walls.

They have watched the guards for months, and know their routine. They also know that the slightest movement of the stagnant water in the moat will sound an alarm. The concertina wire along the inside of the prison walls is electrically charged, and the guard's catwalk is too dangerous to be used to aid an escape.

Nearby, the soldiers see a ladder and two ropes of different lengths. Five of them begin to formulate a plan while large brown rats scurry around the prison's recreation area.

The soldiers realize that loud talking and unusual movements will call attention to their plan. They also know that at any moment friendly aircraft will conduct a scheduled bombing of the enemy's nearby garrison area and have decided to take advantage of the inevitable confusion caused by the bombing. Once the alarm sounds announcing the air raid, they plan to run through the moat and get over the wall as quickly as possible.

The friendly bombers can now be heard in the distance. One soldier signals a comrade. Cautiously, the two of them lift the ladder while one keeps the guards in view out of the corner of his eye. One of the soldiers quickly crosses the moat, as the air raid alarm sounds, the bombs burst in the garrison area and the air defense guns muffle the moat's now triggered alarm system. In a moment the soldier is perched on the ladder's top rung.

He finds a handhold dangerously near the wire, which is humming with its deadly electrical charge, but without a moment's hesitation he shifts his weight to that hand and then locates a hold for the other. With a burst of energy he vaults and pulls himself to a position atop the wall. On the other side he finds a piece of pipe. Cautiously moving this over the wire, he is able to help his comrades over the wall. They all escape without being detected.

This group of soldiers has just successfully completed one of the 17 challenging tasks that make up a Leaders Reaction Course (LRC), which is designed to act as a sensitive barometer of leadership skills. (See list of LRC tasks.)

An LRC has five primary functions:

- To improve soldiers' leadership abilities by giving them an opportunity to apply the lessons they learned in their formal leadership instruction.
- To help soldiers assess the degree to which they possess certain leadership traits.
- To provide soldiers with a means of evaluating their own leadership ability more accurately.
- To give soldiers an opportunity to observe the way strengths and weakness-

es of others affect a team operation.

• To develop individuals as leaders by testing their competence in handling a small team that has been charged with accomplishing a mission under conditions of stress.

In addition, the course can develop unit cohesion, strengthen the chain of command, and measure squad effectiveness under competitive conditions.

The first permanent American facility for an LRC was built at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, in 1951. Labeled Project X, it was used to train students in the Squadron Officers' Course. The concept was soon adopted at Fort Benning, Georgia; Lackland AFB, Texas; the Air Force and Military Academies; Army NCO academies; ROTC summer camp sites; and elsewhere.

The Fort Benning course, built in 1952 by Engineer soldiers, is the oldest and busiest course of its type in the Army. (The first class to use the course officially was the first Officer Candidate School class of 1954.) It was rebuilt in 1963 by the 577th Engineer Battalion, which added a 75,000-gallon pool of water for use in 10 of the 17 tasks. The course itself is arranged to permit the evaluators to exercise maximum control and to reduce the time required for the participants to move from one task to another.

The operation of all LRCs is similar. Typically, the emphasis is on giving each soldier an opportunity to be the leader for at least one of the tasks.

A participating unit is usually divided into equal squads of 10 to 12 soldiers, who are issued rubberized M16 rifles and then told to report to the evaluator at their first task location. Each squad is subsequently divided into two equal teams—the working team is responsible for completing the mission, while the observing team provides safety personnel, overwatch and support elements, and harassers.

An evaluator designates one of the working team members to be the leader for a particular task. This soldier and the observing team are briefed on the mission, and the leader is given two minutes to conduct a reconnaissance of the area and to formulate his plan. After his reconnaissance, the working team leader is given 12 minutes to complete the task.

Stress plays an important role in the evaluation, because it is through stress that a leader's true problem-solving processes and leadership skills become apparent. A stressful environment is created for each task by introducing numerous limitations, one of which is time. The working team members are also restricted as to what they may touch, and they can use only the equipment at each site. Finally, the members of the observing team stand nearby verbally harassing the working team.

EVALUATION

At the conclusion of the allotted time, "Cease work" is announced. The working team then returns the equipment to its proper place, and the evaluator conducts a brief critique of the working team's performance. Subsequently, the teams switch responsibilities and move on to the next task. (Later that same day the evaluator should provide a more detailed assessment of each leader's performance.)

Each LRC task is a small engineering problem that is designed to be solved simply and efficiently. But none of the problems can be solved successfully without teamwork on the part of the soldiers in the group. The skill of the leader, therefore, determines the success or failure of his group.

Interest in evaluating the skill of potential leaders has long been the focus of LRCs. The Germans, who were reportedly the first to employ the concepts that support the course, initially used these concepts to select officer candidates. They reasoned that "when an entire people is drafted, the most various abilities and special aptitudes become available, and each single man must be placed where he can best serve his country."

Germany's pre-World War II senior military psychologist, Max Simoneit, looked for specific characteristics in officer candidates. He and nearly 200 other German psychologists examined officer candidates for aptitudes, temperament, personality, likes and dislikes, attitudes and ambitions. The German Army considered desirable officers to be those who had the qualities of imagination, rapid learning ability, capacity for swift adjustment, initiative and willpower in thought and action, emotional stability, and security of conduct, and whose attention was directed outward rather than inward.

LRC TASKS

1. **Escape from a POW compound.**
2. **Scale a heavily mined cliff and cross a water obstacle to deliver urgently needed ammunition.**
3. **Cross a river to deliver a box of Dextran (blood expander).**
4. **Cross a rapidly flowing river by means of a partially destroyed bridge to deliver ammunition boxes.**
5. **Cross a stream with a drum of gasoline.**
6. **Climb through a culvert with ammunition boxes, and then cross concrete abutments that once supported a bridge.**
7. **Deliver a box of ammunition to the far side of a stream.**
8. **Cross two large electrically charged pipes and a river to deliver a special round of ammunition.**
9. **Cross a blown-out bridge over a deep gorge, and deliver two captured ammunition boxes.**
10. **Cross a blown-out bridge with a cartload of supplies.**
11. **Cross a minefield.**
12. **Breach a minefield carrying sensitive items.**
13. **Destroy an ammunition dump.**
14. **Cross a minefield enroute to reinforcing a squad pinned down by fire.**
15. **Cross a gorge with a critical resupply of ammunition.**
16. **Set up a forward observation post on the far side of a minefield and tank trap.**
17. **Recover a small load of ammunition from the far side of a minefield.**

The methods of selection employed by Simoneit and his team eventually gave rise to the current reaction course. Simoneit hypothesized that a man's actual achievements did not indicate as much about his potential as the way in which he attempted to do things. For this reason he would arrange situations as nearly as possible to those of actual combat to see how a candidate behaved.

When World War II broke out, the British also were obliged to select large numbers of officers in a hurry. In doing so, they developed a system that combined the best features of the German selection system. These techniques were especially effective as employed by the British intelligence services, which designed individual and group tasks such as negotiating a water obstacle with 100 pounds of sensitive radio equipment, as well as other tasks to see which member of a group would emerge as the leader and whether the others would willingly follow him. After the war the British continued to use these same concepts as one way to determine the leadership potential of candidates for Sandhurst and the Royal Air Force Academy.

During the post-war era, the U.S. Army Ground Forces command created a Leaders Course at each of its training centers to detect and train potential leaders. This six-week course was designed for OCS nominees and for young soldiers who had been recommended by their company commanders as being potential noncommissioned officers.

During the third week, the soldiers ran a Leaders Reaction Course. It consisted of 20 mock situations set up in difficult terrain. The soldiers were formed into five-man patrols. (Each soldier acted as the patrol leader for four of the situations and served as a member of the patrol in the other 16.) The soldiers were evaluated during the reaction course and were then critiqued on their overall performance at the end.

The value of the present LRC for the Army has been demonstrated for more than 30 years. It has helped trainers identify soldiers who were creative, soldiers who could lead, and soldiers who stifled mission accomplishment.

The Army will likely continue to expand its use of the LRC concept, because the course fosters the development of teamwork and promotes cohesion. It also provides immediate leadership feedback—the leader sees quite vividly how his own actions and those of his comrades either help or hinder the accomplishment of the mission.

It also gives a leader practical experience in evaluating the abilities of other men. By observing the way his team members respond to his actions and orders, he can determine to what degree he is able to get results from others. Finally, the LRC provides an environment in which the validity of a soldier's leadership instruction can be checked.

The LRC is a leader development and assessment course. Its realistic battlefield-like tasks provide an ideal training environment for soldiers regardless of their backgrounds. It also provides an effective analysis of a soldier's leadership abilities, enabling him and his trainers to focus on those leadership skills that require more attention.

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Rail-loading a Heavy Brigade

CAPTAIN MICHAEL V. TRUETT

Moving military equipment by rail is becoming an increasingly frequent task for many infantry leaders. Most Army units in the continental United States are subject to periodic rotations to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, just as many overseas units must deploy by rail for major training exercises. In addition, many units are required to rail-load for deployment to support National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve training, or to facilitate their own off-post training requirements—cold weather training at another military installation, for example.

The planning process for rail-loading is complex and detailed. Rail-loading is done at all levels of command (platoon, company, battalion, brigade), but the higher the level the greater the complexity of the planning and execution. The diversity of a unit's equipment also complicates the operation. For these reasons, a discussion of rail-loading the armor, mechanized infantry, field artillery, combat engineer, and support battalion elements that normally deploy as parts of a mechanized infantry brigade may be the most useful. And these same considerations can be applied to other levels as well.

When a brigade is notified of an upcoming deployment, the S-4 will usually assume staff responsbility for the rail-loading process. He will be responsible for analyzing the mission upon which the

deployment is based and for building a rail-load concept based on his estimate of the situation.

The division transportation office (DTO) and the installation transportation office (ITO) will pass requirements and provide information to the S-4 on an increasingly frequent basis as the brigade's actual deployment date nears.

One of the S-4's early requirements will be to compile a list of equipment to be rail-loaded, and the individual units must be tasked to provide this information early in the process. Changes will occur, of course, and should be allowed within reason, but this document at least will provide a starting point from which the S-4 can identify the number and type of rail cars needed to move that equipment. And since a large portion of the funds allocated to the deploying unit for the move is expended on rail cars, identifying requirements early can greatly assist the units in managing these funds. (For help with this aspect, see also "Rail Movement Spreadsheet," by Captain Charles B. Pelto, INFANTRY, July-August 1986, p. 17).

Another of the S-4's early considerations will be the preparation of a letter of instruction (LOI). Although instructions are usually published as part of the service support annex to the operations order (OPORD) for the exercise, in many cases the rail requirements are due before the OPORD is issued and therefore cannot be clearly defined until immediately before their execution.

Once the initial requirements are known, the S-4 should prepare and distribute a milestone list. (Updates can be published later to pass along current information as it becomes available.) The milestone list should give suspense dates and schedule necessary events. For instance, if the ITO projects that load plans will be available on a certain date, the S-4 should schedule a meeting the following week with all of his unit points of contact (POC) to disseminate this information. To enforce the milestone schedule, the S-4 should provide a copy of the LOI to the ITO and the DTO and should talk directly with the key people in his units to make sure they understand the concept of the move and the importance of staying on schedule.

Likewise, the milestone list should task subordinate units far enough in advance to help them in their planning. For this reason, the milestone sequence must begin at least 120 days before deployment. Additionally, weekly in-process-review (IPR) meetings must be scheduled by the highest staff involved. While the people who attend these meetings may vary as the brigade's deployment nears, the initial attendance of the key staff personnel will ensure a unity of effort. The DTO and the ITO must attend these IPRs as the actual movement day nears, because they can provide timely answers to the units' questions. Written minutes of these meetings must be taken and distributed to the units represented.

MULTITUDE OF TASKS

In large moves, of course, much equipment is involved, and this means that a multitude of tasks—collective and individual—must be accomplished by the deploying unit. Some tasks, such as preparing vehicles for transport, are done by each unit. Others, such as drawing blocking and bracing material, can be performed one time for all the units involved. Tasks that can be consolidated at the highest level should be identified and delegated to one unit. Also, all taskings must include the requirement that the performing unit identify by name the responsible officer or NCO in charge (OIC/NCOIC) and specify a suspense date. Rail-load teams must also be identified. This process forces leaders to do detailed planning.

An initial meeting with the designated OICs/NCOICs should be included on the milestone list, and the S-4 must hold this meeting well in advance of the actual loading so that the units that fail to respond can be contacted. This meeting can also serve as an excellent way for the S-4 to establish face-to-face rapport with the unit points of contact. If this meeting is conducted early enough, the tone can be more informal, less directive, with more time for questions and for gathering information. A last-minute meeting will necessarily be stiff and directive, with fewer questions and an increased possibility of poor execution.

The designated rail-load teams then need to be trained. At the time their names appear on the list, many of the soldiers involved typically have no idea how to tie down equipment on rail cars Because of the normal personnel turnover in CONUS units, even periodic training fails to meet unit needs.

Rail-load training classes are normally conducted by the DTO, the ITO, or by unit personnel. In rail-load "testing" (or the actual deployment), civilian inspectors from the railroad being used approve or reject each piece of equipment. In my experience, it was never possible to have these inspectors conduct training at the unit level three months before deployment. In fact, since the requirement for rail cars is submitted for bidding to all local railroads, the actual carrier is usually not identified until a few weeks before the move. If it were possible to do, the contract should certainly require that the same inspector who conducted the training also qualify the load during actual deployment. I have seen units train to a specified standard only to discover, after an entire track of rail cars had been loaded, that this standard was unsatisfactory to that particular civilian inspector, of that particular railroad, on that particular day.

One solution involves units in conducting familiarization training (as opposed to in-depth training) for its rail-loading teams. In this training, the teams are shown the various tools, the different turnbuckles, and the equipment used and are given detailed safety precautions. On rail-load day, the team ties down the first vehicle on the first rail car; then the entire rail-load team, OIC, and NCOIC gather around as the civilian railroad inspector checks the load. He points out deficiencies and everyone understands what is required. From there, the crews can separate to complete the operation. While this method will get the rail-loading off to a little slower start, it can mean the difference between the soldiers' being at home at 1630 and still there retying vehicles at midnight.

The initial LOI must also consider rail guards to accompany the equipment. The ITO can project this requirement, if it applies, but the unit retains responsibility for the guards. If the assigned units are

Soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division load equipment.



tasked early, they can identify the soldiers who are to act as guards—perhaps using men who would prefer not to fly, for example. The tasked unit is normally responsible for feeding the guards as well. The period of rations specified in the LOI must include total travel time, plus any time the guards sit waiting for the off-load teams to arrive.

Above all else, an S-4's planning process must consider what is actually going to happen at the railhead during the loading.

Equipment to be rail-loaded is normally assembled in one location and sequenced in the order in which it is to be loaded—a process referred to as marshalling. If it is performed the same day as loading, the day will be long and hectic. Marshalling, therefore, can take place the day or afternoon before loading. In either case, problems will arise that must be dealt with. It is common, for instance, for a deadlined vehicle not to show up at all. In this case, if marshalling has been done the day before, there will still be time to shift loads or to identify a substitute vehicle. But marshalling the day before may cause other problems: Invariably, the next morning, some drivers will not report on time, or some vehicles will not start, or other equipment will have flat tires. The trade-offs must be weighed carefully.

A maintenance team and a fuel vehicle should be tasked and placed under the control of the marshalling OIC. In most instances, vehicles must move onto rail cars under their own power, and a railroad inspector usually will not accept equipment with Class III leaks but will require that they be repaired.

Rail teams need tools, of course, and a basic list of what is required must be compiled and distributed to the OICs/NCOICs. The teams must bring the tools on the list with them each day of loading. Most of the necessary tools can be found as part of the equipment of armored vehicles. Other special tools or equipment may be needed on a limited basis—such as cable or boltcutters—and these should be available at the DTO in the form of mobilization tool kits. Any specific items that are not locally available should be identified and requested. Team members should also have

leather gloves available.

When the teams start to work, they will need some basic equipment, which will vary depending on the type of equipment being loaded and the type of rail cars being used. Again, the DTO, ITO, or installation engineers can help determine the unit's needs. Some examples of the equipment needed are turnbuckles, clamps, cable, chock blocks, nails, lumber, shackles, banding material, lacing wire, and tape. Some of these items must also be available in different sizes and lengths to accommodate particular pieces of equipment. (While this may sound obvious, I have witnessed loadings during which a unit was unable to tie down vehicles sitting on the rail cars because its loading teams had the wrong size of lifting shackles. The short time it would have taken to check the equipment against the vehicle a month earlier would have been time well spent.)

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation at the railhead, with all the vehicles there, would not seem a likely problem, but key personnel frequently find themselves unable to maneuver. The S-4 or the rail OIC must seek alternate transportation from non-deploying units or from unit vehicles that are to be moved later (possibly by air). All deploying units will have some transportation problems during this time, because all their cargo carriers will have been prepared for loading.

Accordingly, all rail-loading plans should include buses to return drivers to the company areas after marshalling and loading their vehicles, and to take the rail-load teams to and from the railhead. Some form of transportation will also be needed to deliver the blocking, bracing, packing, crating, and tiedown (BBPCT) materials to different locations as they are needed. (The deploying units will have bought this equipment. Because of the amount of equipment and the time required for loading, it may be necessary to secure the BBPCT in a central location over a period of days.)

The dangers to personnel loading heavy equipment is evident in rail operations. Therefore, a medical evacuation vehicle with trained medical personnel cannot be overlooked. Although an ambulance is the preferred vehicle, it is not required as long as some kind of suitable vehicle is available.

The final item on the subject of transport is supplying food for the rail-load teams and drivers, who will probably be working through at least one meal. Buses can be arranged to take troops to a dining facility, if one is not readily available. But the time used for travel and for dining slows down the momentum of the loading. In addition, it takes time to secure tools, board buses, unload, find missing soldiers, and so on. An alternative is to plan for sack lunches—or for hot food—to be delivered to each loading site. Some form of transportation is required in either event. (Planners should also be aware of the morale value of having coffee or juice available for the unit loading teams, especially when they are either loading in the snow or tying equipment down in 110-degree heat.)

Command and control at the railhead are vital. The overall OIC (usually the brigade S-4 or his representative) cannot run the operation from his garrison office. He must be on the site, with a known command post (CP) location where everyone involved can reach him, including visitors. And visitors will abound, from company commanders to the division or installation commander. The need for someone knowledgeable to be on hand to meet incoming VIPs cannot be overemphasized.

The CP can be a tent, if no other structure is available. It should contain copies of the LOI and possibly charts that depict the rail schedule and track the progress of the loading. It is a good idea also to control the medical evacuation vehicle and personnel from this central location as well as a vehicle loaded with BBPCT to respond to unit needs.

When loading is suspended for the day (usually at dusk, for safety reasons) guards must be posted and the CP can then become the sergeant of the guard's headquarters. The vehicles awaiting loading and already on rail cars—including CONEX containers with unit equipment packed in them—represent a substantial investment. And some of the containers undoubtedly will hold sensitive items such as night observation devices, machineguns, and TOW equipment. Guard duties can cease when rail-load activities resume the following morning.

CONTROLS

Backbriefs are an effective control measure. While loading, crews can be operating at several tracks at the same time. Some crews will complete their loading before others, and when they are finished for that day, the load team OIC should brief the responsible officer before leaving. This insures that all the rail cars are in fact completed and that the railroad inspector has accepted the load. In addition, it provides an opportunity for outlining the following day's activities and for discussing any problem areas (late buses, inadequate rations, and the like).

Communication equipment is also needed for command and control, but the deploying units typically will have packed all their radios for the move. A solution is hand-held radios (walkie-talkies). (Although these are not authorized by TOE or MTOE, some installation agencies such as DTO, ITO, or the military police may have them. The local procurement channel is another alternative that will let the unit retain the radios for off-loading and redeployment operations.) This ability to communicate can solve many railhead coordination problems quickly and also increase the responsiveness of medical personnel. Perhaps most important, it allows the OIC more mobility, and there is no substitute for being on the scene, watching the progress of the loading and anticipating needs.

Finally, on command and control, once the deployment sequence starts, it must proceed on schedule. The OIC will know where he can take extra time and where he has none to spare. Weather cannot be allowed to control the operation. This may require warming tents at each track or simply wet weather gear for the men. Whatever the extreme, the OIC must plan for all contingencies and be prepared to carry out the plan.

Plans for loading the rail cars must also include certain considerations of how the

equipment will be unloaded at the other end and also who will need to be there. For example, if the units want to have a hot meal immediately upon their arrival, the mess equipment should be put on the first train out.

Drivers and crews for off-loading should be among the first soldiers deployed, and the drivers should make sure they have with them the keys to their vehicles. In any event, the OIC, who should also be on that first plane, should have "master keys," in the form of boltcutters, on hand and should use them judiciously.

Maintenance personnel and equipment must be immediately accessible at the unloading site. Since equipment arriving in the first train may have been on the rail cars for as long as a week, some vehicles may not start, may have flat tires, or may even have no batteries or fuel.

An immediate source of water will be needed to refill dry radiators, and units should have appropriate oils and hydraulic fluids on hand. If an immediate road march is projected as soon as the equipment is unloaded, the importance of many of these considerations increases tenfold. Tow cables, wreckers, and slave cables are especially important.

During off-loading, many events will occur as a reverse process of the loading sequence. But during loading, flatbed trailers are usually available for hauling the CONEX containers, cranes are there to help load the containers, and there are many forklifts. Later, at a strange railhead, these items may not be available. If they are, it will be because they have been requested in advance.

SUPPORT

The unit may ship its own support assets, but, once again, their placement on the trains may be critical. If the CONEX containers arrive on the first train but the crane is on the last, hot meals will be delayed and the ration cycle destroyed.

Finally, plans must be made in advance for the redeployment as well. The equipment used to rail-load the unit (the BBPCT) should be salvaged and secured in a consolidated location. Some items, such as a certain number of the chock blocks, will not be usable for redeployment. Extra chock blocks, nails, lumber, and wire may be procured from the redeployment railhead source, but if this cannot be positively confirmed, redeployment supplies should be shipped. These can be turned in for credit later if they are not used or if they are still usable. Logistical flights from the home installation may also be able to deliver preplanned redeployment supplies.

While these considerations are not all inclusive, they do cover some of the reeurring and, hopefully, more applicable concepts. They have not been listed in order of priority. With our current doctrine to fight anywhere in the world and under any circumstances, though, the importance of a unit's ability to deploy efficiently by rail is obvious. These thoughts should help unit logisticians meet that need.

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Brigade First Sergeant

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS PAUL H. JOHNSON

Because of the nature of a brigade headquarters company, the job of brigade First Sergeant is different from that of a First Sergeant at other levels. Yet it is not a subject that is often written about.

I realize that there are many First Sergeants who have held this position in the past, and each of them probably has his own unique insights and opinions about it. But these are my ideas after serving for six months in the position in a brigade in Germany.

First, the person selected for this job does not always have the experience or the training for it. I am a prime example—I was not even on the list for promotion to first sergeant when I took the job, and I had to submit a request to attend the First Sergeant Academy after I began the job. (I still don't know when, if ever, I will be attending.) But my brigade command sergeant major, who interviewed me for the position while on a field problem, said he had faith in me and expected me to be on the next promotion list, so I accepted.

Without the benefit of the academy, I, like many others before me, had to start digging, recalling my experiences with all the good and bad First Sergeants I had known and considering a lot of advice from just about everyone. I had an idea where to start, but the company and I suffered a little while I grew into the position.

All First Sergeants, no matter their experience, are automatically supposed to possess an endless wealth of knowledge on every subject in the Army. They are also supposed to be able to handle every situation no matter how critical, with cool expertise. The company commander and the company personnel rely upon him for his judgment and advice.

As a platoon sergeant or a staff NCO,

I always had my First Sergeant to rely upon, but now all of those people were relying on me. The first thing I had to do was to find out who to trust, who was reliable, and where to get correct information. (This is a problem for anyone new in a company, but it is multiplied by ten for the new, inexperienced First Sergeant.) Fortunately, I had the benefit of about 12 years of staff time to fall back on, and that came in handy.

For instance, a brigade HHC handles all of its own personnel actions, supply actions, and maintenance functions—matters that are usually handled in the battalion staff sections. To be really effective, a brigade First Sergeant must be knowledgeable of all company functions as well as all the functions of a brigade staff section.

In addition, the First Sergeant must keep up with the command group personnel and what they are doing. None of these things are easy even for an experienced First Sergeant. (I always envied those First Sergeants who had clean desks and made it appear that they had nothing to do.)

What are the solutions to these problems? The primary solution I came up with was to learn fast and retain information for future use.

First, it is imperative that the company commander and the First Sergeant work as a close-knit team and that they also include the executive officer in the team. These three must stick together through thick and thin, even if they don't like each other at all. (I was lucky—we all hit it off.)

PROBLEMS

The HHC commander is usually a captain, and he is charged with commanding a company full of officers who are his senior. Many of these senior officers seem to try to influence him and run the company for him, or around him. And the First Sergeant at brigade level, especially if he is a sergeant first class, has exactly the same problem, because he has a lot of NCOs who are senior to him. If he steps on their toes, they will say what many a section NCO has said before (and probably will say again): "To hell with that First Sergeant; he doesn't know what he's doing." (Having been an operations sergeant twice, I've said those words about a couple of First Sergeants who did not seem to have my section's best interests at heart.)

While the HHC commander and First Sergeant must be a team, make hard decisions, and keep the company functioning, each must also work with the senior staff personnel, guiding them instead of using hardline leadership. The fewer bosses the individual soldiers have the easier it is to function as a company team instead of as separate staff elements trying to be small companies unto themselves.

Working with staff officers and NCOs is a complex problem, but it doesn't have

to be impossible. In a company made up of staff, communications, maintenance, and organic company personnel, each group has a specific mission that should be taken into consideration before any edicts are delivered. In all cases, of course, the company missions must be accomplished. But, barring any specific time constraints on the company, each section has specific missions and time constraints of its own that many commanders and First Sergeants don't take the time to know or care about.

The First Sergeant should coordinate daily, if possible, with all sections for updates and feedback on specific problems they may have and any last-minute mission changes. Any First Sergeant or company commander who firmly states that all sections "will comply" with something that directly contradicts higher level commitments is asking for trouble. Each section is usually willing to do its part for the company, but the company must show some compassion.

It is easy to step on toes. High handedness and demands are often met with great deal of resistance. The result is lot of animosity in both directions, an no work is accomplished. The First Sergeant should be firm, not unyielding, an above all, fair.

MORE PROBLEMS

In some instances, however, whe dealing with staff personnel the First Sergeant will hear "You're doing a goo job, First Sergeant," but that person w return to his section leaders and remark "If that guy thinks I'm going to comply, he's crazy. Will you talk to him for me?" Then the section chief comes over to try and work things out with the "upstart Little Dictator" who, in his opinion, is trying to operate the HHC like a line unit. Such tactics create more problems than they solve and should be avoided by everyone, if possible.

One area of conflict is formations. Senior section NCOs and officers can come up with lots of reasons not to make company formations (especially PT) and most other company events. The First Sergeant must first monitor the problem and then talk with the habitual no-shows. Embarrassing those people in front of the company will result in more "stepping on toes" in both directions. It takes a certain amount of diplomacy. That is not to say the First Sergeant shouldn't make those individuals toe the line, but a little understanding will go a long way.

What about the First Sergeant's relationship with the primary staff? A brigade commander usually does take the time to oversee the operations of the HHC but, being a busy man, he uses the brigade executive officer as the liaison between the company and the primary staff. In most brigades, the XO is the primary advisor for the HHC commander, while the CSM is the primary advisor and mentor for the First Sergeant.

The CSM is usually very busy, but when he is available he's a wealth of knowledge. (Of course, the First Sergeant must know the right questions to ask the CSM before he can lend a helping hand.) The First Sergeant should see the CSM at least once each day, if for nothing more than to ask how things are

going and to get command group updates. (This can also save criticism later if an unhappy NCO or soldier bypasses the First Sergeant and goes directly to the CSM with a problem.)

The First Sergeant also has to use the NCO chain and see that information is passed to everyone. In a brigade HHC the situation is unique, because there are different faces at each formation, and the platoon sergeants at many of the formations are only detailed to their positions. Each formation is manned by the personnel "available," depending upon the mission or the crisis at hand. (Our HHC had only three formations a day—PT at 0600, work call at 0830, and recall at 1700.) Most of the time, the information I put out at these formations was passed up and down the chain. The soldiers in the formations got the information but didn't always retain it all, so I found it helpful to put out important things two or three times, at different formations during the week, time and mission permitting, so everyone would get the word.

The problem with information being passed down to soldiers not present at the formations is that section NCOs seldom speak to the soldiers of another section. If the actual platoon sergeant is not there, sometimes soldiers working elsewhere do not get the required information.

Meetings with section sergeants and platoon sergeants should be held only when necessary. The First Sergeant will normally see the section NCOs some time during the day to pass information or deliver notes. (I once had a First Sergeant who required section sergeants—no assistants or representatives allowed—to be in his office every day at 1600 for a meeting, regardless of the mission or the amount of information he had to put out. I always considered that policy totally out of touch with reality.)

Training is a real challenge in a headquarters company. Few section leaders will consider stopping the operation of their sections to do individual or section training. They seem to think the entire brigade will cease to function if they shut down operations for one or two hours a week to train their soldiers in MOS-related skills. Without the First Sergeant's influence, the soldiers' training might never be accomplished. In my brigade, fortunately, there were section leaders who could plan their time and train their soldiers without the First Sergeant leading them by the nose every step of the way. A First Sergeant may tend to rely on NCOs such as those a little too heavily. (Instead, he should *lean* on those who *don't* train their soldiers.)

Another unusual aspect of the job of First Sergeant in a combat maneuver brigade is having women in the unit, and this may take some getting used to, especially if a new First Sergeant has come up only in line companies where there were no women.

Women fill important positions in all the staff sections as well as the company

and even work as mechanics. The same percentage of women as men are good and great soldiers. In my brigade, they worked as hard as any of the rest of the soldiers in the command. It is important not to treat them any differently. But women have their own ideas of how things should be and waste little time telling the First Sergeant what they think. He may or may not be ready for "I don't work on weekends," or "Why did you single me out in formation?"

The First Sergeant may encounter some problems in a "co-ed" barracks environment—making sure visitors of the opposite sex, even from within the barracks, sign in and out on the visitors' log when visiting each other's rooms. And occasionally, when two married service members have a sick child, one goes to the hospital with the child, while the other one has to stay with their other children. These are minor hassles, but usually nothing a First Sergeant can't handle with understanding and a little practice.

Taking a brigade headquarters company to the field is where a First Sergeant must have, among other things, common sense and a good sense of humor. His primary duties include feeding everyone, on time; refueling and keeping the vehicles and generators running; supplying drinking water; keeping the mail flowing both ways; supervising the company trains, which includes keeping mess, maintenance, and supply personnel and the rest of the company motivated and cared for. In some brigades, the First Sergeant also assists the HHC commander by moving the trains while the commander moves the TOC.

If a new First Sergeant has never worked in or around combat or field trains, he is in for several surprises. The trains personnel try to work in all types of uniforms, become unsupervised very quickly, and are on occasion hard to find.

"Beans and bullets" take most of the time, because the trains are at least one terrain feature away from the TOC. The trash and water points in Germany can be from 5 to 25 miles away, each of which turns out to be a daily run. Feeding and taking care of personnel attached to other elements or detached from the main TOC, such as the brigade S-4 and the forward support elements, becomes time consuming, because these elements can be stretched from the far rear of the maneuver area to the most forward part.

ATTACHMENTS

Attachments are another challenge. Sometimes during REFORGER exercises, a brigade has more attached soldiers than are assigned to the company as a whole. All of this doubles the First Sergeant's and the company's role.

The First Sergeant must plan, for example, for the attachment of an estimated 30-person umpire package and for Air Force, artillery, engineer, signal, chemical, and liaison personnel. In addition, the support plan must include VIPs and commanders from all units coming in during meal times for meetings with the brigade commander and the staff. Further planning is required to support elements of the TOC that are detached and moved miles away to perform their duties. The First Sergeant must also personally take care of all the drivers

(assigned or attached) to make sure they eat and sleep and don't collapse from exhaustion. (A good training NCO can take on some of the burden during extended field exercises).

Keeping morale up is sometimes difficult. As with any other unit, the morale fluctuates with field problems, inspections, missions, and very little time off. The soldiers in my brigade worked hard, and their morale rose and fell like a tidal wave. They didn't always understand or like it, but they pitched in and got the job done. I am sure of one thing—morale and motivated, disciplined leaders go hand in hand.

These are some of the problems I encountered, and these are some of the solutions I came up with during my short tenure. I still have a long way to go as a First Sergeant, but I am constantly learning. Luckily, though, the soldiers and the NCOs of the company w[ere] always willing to help with my train[ing]

Sergeant First Class [J]. H. Johnson was [a] Sergeant of Headqua[rters] Company, 2d Brigade [of the] Infantry Division in G[er]many in late 1984. He is [now] assigned to the NCO Aca[d]emy at Fort Carson.

The Soviet BTR-80

CAPTAIN GEORGE T. NORRIS

A recently released issue of *Soviet Military Power* refers to a new Soviet APC, the BTR-80, but does not provide any additional comments. Once again, we have a situation in which the Soviets themselves have said more about a new weapon system than our own intelligence services. Although it is always possible that no such vehicle exists, it is important to consider just what might happen if it does. Beyond that, the question should be what effect the new system would have on the battlefield.

The Soviet description of the BTR-80 and its accompanying sketch indicate that it is much more capable than any of its predecessors. Like both the BTR-60PB and the BTR-70, it is a wheeled, 8x8, squad APC that is amphibious without significant preparations. It does, however, correct many of the limitations of both earlier vehicles.

To begin with, the Soviets have used a single diesel engine instead of the twin gasoline engines of the BTR-60/70. In addition to a lower risk of fire, the single engine makes maintenance easier. An improved power train has been added, so the BTR-80 will have good cross-country mobility. Better armor protection and integral fire extinguishers provide increased protection for the occupants.

In addition to better survivability, the vehicle also appears to offer much better performance in combat situations. One serious limitation of the BTR-60 and the BTR-70 is the fact that they, like our M113, are essentially battlefield taxis—their occupants cannot fight effectively



while mounted. With the BTR-80, the Soviets appear to have changed that: they have provided a firing port for the vehicle commander in the front of the vehicle. The squad members located in the center of the vehicle now sit facing outward, with a firing port for each. Two vision blocks on each side allow the squad members to orient themselves on the battlefield without looking out the hatch. The maximum elevation of the machineguns in the turret has been increased, which allows them to engage aircraft and other targets above the vehicle. This feature and two firing ports in the roof appear to be the result of a lesson learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

If the infantrymen in the BTR-80 are actually required to leave the vehicle, they will be able to do so more easily. In the BTR-60PB, the only ways out were through the hatches on the top of the vehicle or through the side hatch. The BTR-70 added an escape hatch between the second and third wheels on each side, but a soldier essentially has to wriggle in and out and cannot wear any equipment and still fit through the hatch.

The BTR-80 retains the two hatches on the top of the vehicle, but they are not the primary ways of leaving the vehicle—the side hatch has now been enlarged and, in place of the escape hatch, a second hatch has been added directly below the side hatch. The side hatch swings to the front, while the lower hatch opens downward, serving as a ramp for soldiers leaving the vehicle.

With infantrymen who are now in a better position to fight while mounted, and who have an easier time dismounting from the vehicle, how well can the BTR-80 be expected to perform in combat? To begin with, it remains an APC, and the Soviets still do not consider it an IFV. Although it appears to have better armor protection, most antitank weapons can still defeat it. In fact, when the LAW is replaced by the AT-4, every antitank missile we have should be able to defeat it. And it is likely that the chain gun on our Bradley vehicles will also be able to penetrate the armor of the BTR-80, although the Soviets must be doing something to try and counter that as well.

As with its predecessors, the tires on the BTR-80 remain a vulnerable spot, but only if enough fire can be directed at them to destroy their integrity. Machinegun fire that rips up the sidewalls and any any flame weapon that burns the tires should stop the vehicle in its tracks.

With all these problems, did the Soviets really develop the system, or is this another one of their famous disinformation jobs? Since it is an improvement on the existing BTR-60s and BTR-70s, the vehicle most likely actually exists. Recently, when the Soviets provided a good deal of information about an 82mm mortar called the *Vasilek*, many analysts also initially doubted its existence, but it has proved to be an actual weapon that does just what the Soviets said it did.

The Soviets continue to be required to field large numbers of wheeled APCs for two good reasons. First, the vehicle is inexpensive to make and easier to maintain than a tracked vehicle, and second, Europe is covered by a very well-developed road network on which a BTR's mobility makes it superior to almost every tracked vehicle.

The side of this that is unpleasant for the Soviets but pleasant for us is the fact that our Bradley will continue to be capable of defeating all of their infantry vehicles through at least the end of the century.

Captain George T. Norris, a Field Artillery officer, is a military intelligence/Threat instructor in the Field Artillery School. He has served as operations and intelligence officer in the 210th Field Artillery Brigade and has had several Threat articles published in the *Field Artillery Journal*.



COHORT BATTALION TRAIN

CAPTAIN HAROLD E. RA

The conversion of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) to its present configuration resulted in its expansion from two to three active duty infantry brigades. This was done primarily by assigning the Army's first three COHORT light infantry battalions to the division, one to each reconfigured brigade.

All the division had in the way of guidance for training these battalions was the recommended use of Tactical Battle Drills (TBDs) in multi-echelon training and the ARTEP Mission Training Plans (AMTPs). The battalions therefore had to develop and execute their own training plans. One of them was the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry. Other light infantry battalions may find this battalion's training plan useful as they activate their own COHORT units. *

As a newly activating unit, the 5th Battalion initially had only a few soldiers, no equipment, and no billets. The S-3 and the command sergeant major, who were first assigned to the provisionally activated battalion in November 1984, immediately began their planning under the direction of the battalion commander-designate, who was then the brigade executive officer. In addition, the brigade adjutant had been selected to command a rifle company in the new battalion, so he was also available to the battalion from its inception.

This vanguard of the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry met fr quently to establish goals and standards and to create a vis for the new unit. This vision was further translated into a co mand philosophy and explained in detail to each member the chain of command when he came in.

Most of the battalion's officers and NCOs reached the un in February and early March 1985, and they immediately in processed and procured local quarters. Battalion-organize diagnostic hands-on and written skill tests were administere to them, and reinforcement training was conducted to bri them up to the level expected of their MOSs and skill levels and to prepare selected ones to attend the Light Leaders Cours at Fort Benning. There was also a great deal of emphasis o their physical readiness and on increasing their mental an physical stamina.

At the same time, company executive officers and suppl personnel inspected the billets the unit would occupy, inv toried furnishings, accepted lateral transfers of equipm ordered the additional TOE equipment needed, and perfor other administrative and logistical actions.

From 25 March through 22 April 1985, the selected offi and enlisted men attended the Light Leaders Course at F Benning. This course is primarily a leadership and "train-t trainer" course, with more than half the instruction being c ducted by the students. Its goal is to increase the leaders abilities and the proficiency of each student in methods of in struction and tactical battle drills. (See also "Light Leade

* *NOTE. I would like to thank LTC Joseph C. Windle and CPT William B. Crews, former commanders of 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry and Company B of that battalion, respectively, for their assistance, insight, professionalism, and diligent efforts in drafting an earlier version of a similar manuscript based upon their own unit experiences.*

I would also like to thank LTC Thomas J. Kelly, commander of the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry for reading the draft of this article and offering cogent recommendations for improvement. My special thanks go to ISG Cleophus M. Childress, Company B, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry, for reviewing this article from the NCO's perspective. One could not ask for a more professional, competent, and unwaveringly loyal First Sergeant.

Course," by Captain William D. Phillips, INFANTRY, January-February 1985, pages 35-37.)

Some intangible results of the course directly contributed to the battalion's development and cohesion. The shared stress, the high standards, and the inculcation of the "spirit of light infantry" from the Ranger instructors, forced each company's leaders to bond together, an action that definitely strengthened the company chain of command. It also gave the company commanders and first sergeants a chance to observe and assess the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and potential of their subordinate leaders.

(It is important to understand that this course is not conducted like Ranger School. There is no harrassment, each student wears his insignia of rank and is treated accordingly, and the company chain of command is further reinforced by its remaining intact throughout the course. A graduate of the Light Leaders Course is not only more aggressive, tough, and competent in soldier skills and tactical battle drills but also much more confident in his own training and abilities and in those of his leaders.)

Once back at Fort Ord, the battalion's in-house training intensified. The NCOs who had attended the Light Leaders Course taught tactical battle drills and other subjects to those who had not attended. The battalion developed a week-long course that stressed land navigation, physical training and confidence building, tactical battle drills, and the reinforcement of individual skills and leadership attributes. And during this period, barracks renovations and preparations were completed.

Selected chain-of-command members (battalion and company commanders, S-3, command sergeant major, first sergeants, and platoon leaders) and the battalion chaplain traveled to Fort Benning in late May to meet the new soldiers and their families, to give them an orientation on the Fort Ord area and the 7th Division, and to participate in the graduation ceremony.

The ceremony marked the successful completion of the demanding One-Station Unit Training (OSUT) and signified a soldier's transition from trainee to Infantryman. In addition, each company commander was given his own time to conduct small but dignified ceremonies in which the Regiment's history, lineage, and honors were chronicled, and the significance and symbolism of the unit crest was explained. Then each soldier was presented with a packet containing division patches, unit crests, and the unit's Presidential Unit Citation.

RITES OF PASSAGE

When the soldiers arrived at Fort Ord on 3 June 1985, the chain of command was totally prepared to receive them. A highly professional, effective, and efficient in-processing program was adhered to, and the actual activation of the battalion took place at a ceremony and review on 11 June.

From 17 to 21 June, the battalion participated in the Rites of Passage, which consists of five days of intensive training in individual and survival skills and adventure training conducted by a separate committee of NCOs, almost all of them Airborne Rangers. One of the major objectives of this course is to help soldiers make a mental transition to their new surroundings and to assimilate each of them into the division so that they will feel like an integral part of this unique organization. This also provides an ideal opportunity to start training new soldiers on field discipline—stand to, noise and light discipline, proper security at night, frequent maintenance of weapons, field hygiene, and a host of related subjects.

The course emphasizes team-building activities such as road marches, rappelling, bayonet assault courses, confidence and obstacle courses, and the like. These activities are not only fun, they also serve to strengthen the soldierly bonds within each squad. In effect, the course reinforces the NCOs' positions of authority and skill by having them conduct all unit instruction and movements.

The next step was the Light Fighters Course, held at Fort Hunter Liggett, an area of diverse terrain 86 miles south of Fort Ord. The primary purpose of this course, which is an annual requirement in the division, was to teach the soldiers



the squad and platoon tactical battle drills that the battalion's chain of command had learned in the Light Leaders Course.

The battalion's objectives for the course were to:

- Teach squads and platoons the critical skills they would need to become the best light infantry fighting force in the world.
- Develop its units into flexible, tough footmobile fighters capable of using their specialized training to aggressively exploit enemy weaknesses.
- Develop cohesive, high-spirited units capable of aggressive, independent combat action.
- Increase its ability to make the most of its combat power through surprise, stealth, and expert use of terrain and camouflage.
- Conduct the training in a realistic, tactical environment that applied an appropriate amount of stress. At least half the training was conducted at night.
- Increase its soldiers' confidence in their leaders. All unit instruction of critical skills were presented by the leaders who would lead the units in combat.

The course also provided time for individual squad leaders to be innovative and use their initiative, because of the wide diversity of training that was offered during the 19-day course. That training included a combat intelligence training course, combat fire base/night defensive position operations, rappelling/rope work, air assault and small boat operations, and realistic squad and platoon live fire exercises.

When the battalion returned from the Light Fighters Course, the units continued with multi-echelon training, completing squad ARTEPs in September, platoon ARTEPs in October, company ARTEPs in January, and the battalion ARTEP in April 1986. (The battalion ARTEP was originally scheduled for completion in February, but was pre-empted by other missions.) In accordance with doctrine, the squad ARTEPs were planned and conducted at company level and platoon ARTEPs at battalion level.

Although it is still too early for a conclusive assessment of the effectiveness of COHORT light infantry battalions in general, and of the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry training program in particular, some early assessments appear to indicate initial success.

One of these assessments, made by a social science analyst from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, commented on the "contagious professional integrity" and the "relaxed atmosphere" in the battalion. It further concluded that "COHORT provides a foundation on which exceptionally competent units have been and are being developed in the 7th Infantry Division."

In another assessment, the Inspector General of the 7th Infantry Division administered a survey in 12 battalions to 223 soldiers (corporal/specialist 4 and below) in which each was asked to rate his unit's ability to perform in combat. The 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry showed a level of confidence substantially higher than the average for the division as a whole.

The battalion constantly makes its own internal assessments, including regular Battalion Training Management System sessions in which both officers and NCOs participate. From all these assessments, some initial observations can be made:

First, the squad is the most important element in a battalion. A squad must be given the time and resources it needs to conduct its own training. Though the planning for this training may be centralized, its execution must be decentralized so that it will be as effective as possible. Training managers must create an environment that permits freedom to learn, accepting an occasional mistake if an honest attempt has been made to complete the task or mission properly—and they must realize that learning takes place as a result. If a flawless execution of every mission is expected on every occasion, the probable result will be micromanagement in which, for example, the battalion commander over-supervises the company commanders and actually takes away their authority, and so on down the chain of command. Mistakes in this situation can lead to over-reaction, and the situation grows worse as the subordinate whose authority has been usurped becomes increasingly frustrated.

If the training is decentralized, a squad leader is challenged

TRAINING PLAN, 5th BATTALION, 21st INFANTRY, JUL 85-APR 86

JULY 1985	AUGUST 1985	SEPTEMBER 1985	OCTOBER 1985	NOVEMBER 1985	DECEMBER 1985
5th BATTALION (L), 21st INFANTRY, FT ORD, CA					
PREP FOR LFC SQD TNG 15 JUL-2 AUG LT FIGHTERS CRS FT HUNTER LIGGETT	2 AUG-COMPLETION LT FIGHTERS CRS INDIV/SQD/PLT TNG TRADOC TEST ON OSUT POI	10-24 SEP--SQD ARTEPs, FT H.L. AT LIVE FIRES SQD TNG PLT TNG	PLT TNG 16-29 OCT--PLT ARTEPs--FT H.L., CAMP ROBERTS MORTAR LIVE FIRES	PLT COMBINED ARMS LIVE FIRE EXERCISE POST GUARD FORCE LOCAL TNG AREAS	2-10 DEC 85--BN FTX, FT H.L. 16 DEC--BEST RIFLE CO COMP. 17 DEC-5 JAN 86 CHRISTMAS LEAVE PERIOD

JANUARY 1986	FEBRUARY 1986	MARCH 1986	APRIL 1986	
6-10 JAN--PREP FOR CO ARTEPs 12-17 JAN--CO ARTEPs, FT H.L. (ALSO CO CALFEX) SQD TNG PREP FOR DIVISION READY FORCE 1 MISSION	DRF1 MISSION PLT LIVE FIRE EX SQD/PLT TNG IN LTAs (ALSO RE- VERSE CYCLE TNG) CONSOLIDATED MOR- TAR FDC TNG CONSOLIDATED DRAGON TNG	SQD/PLT TNG 16-29 MAR--BN IS OPFOR AGAINST 9th REGT, FTX, FT H.L.	POST GUARD FORCE INDIV SQT TNG 21-25 APR--SQTs 26 APR-3 MAY--BN ARTEP/BDE CER- TIFICATION EX, FT H.L.	1986/87	AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS COURSE EXPERT INFANTRYMAN BADGE TEST LIGHT FIGHTERS COURSE II FT HUNTER LIGGETT MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS--SINAI

to train himself to the unit's standards so that he can effectively train his squad as well as maintain his own credibility. The squads develop a unique identity and a collective "we" attitude. Training standards are also invariably higher when a competitive spirit is created among squads.

In short, we need to train our squad leaders as best we can, then trust them to train their squads any way they deem appropriate so long as the unit's standards are met and the mission is accomplished.

As much individual training as possible should be conducted before collective training, with the NCOs involved, as they should be. The First Sergeant is the senior trainer in a company for individual training. Not only does this increase the NCOs' authority and responsibility, it also improves their positional authority, prestige, self-esteem, and confidence in the chain of command.

On the other hand, if a unit starts with collective training, the NCOs will probably perceive a lack of trust in their abilities and think that the officers want to take over their jobs. If this happens, it may be tough for the officers to regain the trust and confidence of the NCOs, and there may be serious repercussions later in the COHORT life cycle.

Even though safety is of paramount importance, it is essential that all training, especially live fire exercises, be conducted as realistically as possible. The 5th Battalion set a goal to conduct at least one live fire exercise a month to further build aggressiveness, tactical proficiency, self-confidenee, and confidence in comrades and weapons. Tactical exercises that are conducted force-on-force add competition, encourage initiative in small-unit leaders and individual soldiers, and maintain the interest of the soldiers.

Another observation is that COHORT corporals are among the greatest strengths of the COHORT system. Because a rifle company does not have enough sergeants to serve as fire team leaders, it has to select about ten COHORT soldiers immediately to fill these vacant positions. As a result, these soldiers are designated "COHORT corporals," appointed acting corporals, and allowed to wear corporals' stripes.

These young soldiers are usually intelligent, motivated, willing to learn, and in outstanding physical condition. Their potential is unlimited. They are treated as NCOs, become important members of the chain of command, and are trained in the duties and responsibilities of NCOs. In addition, they receive more training in individual and collective tasks, so they can lead and train their own fire teams confidently and competently.

On the basis of its entire COHORT experience, the battalion has several recommendations:

- The Department of the Army must be selective about the NCOs it places in a COHORT unit chain of command and should evaluate demonstrated performance, leadership ability, and potential instead of levying certain posts or units for a required number of NCOs to be reassigned at a specific time to a COHORT unit. If a unit is tasked with providing NCOs for another unit, it is not likely to send its best soldiers.
- When a unit is scheduled to be activated, the soldiers who hold specific low-density MOSs—such as 71L, 75B, and 76Y (especially 76Y)—need to be among the first soldiers assigned to the unit. These soldiers are needed to initiate and conduct all administrative and logistical actions before the COHORT soldiers arrive.
- Also before the COHORT soldiers arrive, all NCOs should either re-enlist or extend their enlistments to cover the entire COHORT life cycle. Re-enlistment regulations must be unwavering on this point, but they have not been in the past. The COHORT system is designed to improve stability and cohesion and to reduce personnel turnover, especially in the chain of command.
- The Army seems to have been merely paying lip service to the statement that officers are affected by the COHORT system. They really do not appear to be. We must also try to reduce personnel turnover among commissioned officers in a COHORT unit.
- Currently, the enlisted infantrymen in a COHORT battalion initially enlisted for three years plus the time required for OSUT, whereas the enlisted soldiers holding low-density MOSs initially enlisted for only three years. This means it is possible for the low-density MOS soldiers to reach the end of their enlistments about three months before the infantrymen and three months before the end of the COHORT life cycle. This situation warrants additional study.
- Senior leaders need to be aware that officers and NCOs carry a tremendous burden of responsibility, physical as well as mental, in a COHORT light infantry battalion and need to watch for leader "burn-out." There is nothing more demoralizing to an NCO who is working hard in a COHORT unit and spending half his time in the field away from his family than to be told that he is going to be stabilized at the same installation to go through a second COHORT life cycle.

In the past year, the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry has trained light infantry battalion COHORT soldiers innovatively and with apparent success. The tie between leadership and training has been clearly demonstrated. The efforts of both the chain of command and the NCO support chain to improve leaders and replace those who seemed unwilling or unable to achieve and maintain the necessary high standards have paid tremendous dividends. The result has been cohesive, combat-ready squads, platoons, and companies made up of tough, skilled, aggressive, and dedicated infantrymen.

The essential element of success in this program has been COHORT. The individual replacement system will never permit the required excellence, and though the price of a COHORT battalion is high, it is not too high. The longer initial training time for a COHORT battalion will yield better results. The stability inherent in COHORT, plus dedicated and competent leadership and a well-planned, demanding, and superbly executed training program, are the essential elements for creating the finest light infantry in the world.

Captain Harold E. Raugh, Jr., commanded Company B, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry at Fort Ord. He previously served in various platoon leader and staff officer assignments in the Berlin Brigade and the 2d Infantry Division. He is now attending the University of California at Los Angeles in preparation for an assignment to teach history at the United States Military Academy.

COHORT COMPANY RECEPTION

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL C. CLOY

DAY 1	OSUT ARRIVAL BATTALION/COMPANY INPROCESSING
DAY 2	DIVISION INPROCESSING CHAIN-OF COMMAND BRIEFING ON-POST TOUR
DAY 3	SHOWDOWN INSPECTION CIF ISSUE VACCINATIONS
DAY 4	ADDITIONAL BRIEFINGS VEHICLE & WEAPON REGISTRATION
DAY 5	OFF-POST TOUR ARRIVAL CEREMONY CLOTHING SALE REFITTINGS

The Army's New Manning System has provided unique challenges for a company chain of command. For example, the organizational and rotational concepts outlined in Department of the Army Circular 600-82-2 have increased soldier-to-soldier and soldier-to-unit loyalty. But much of that loyalty and a unit's commitment to excellence depends upon how well the unit deals with one critical factor—"transfer turbulence." This factor includes the various complex environmental, personal, spiritual, and financial transformations that both an individual soldier and a COHORT unit must go through when changing from one duty station to another.

Unfortunately, transfer turbulence is only alluded to in the circular. And yet the manner in which a company chain of command confronts this turbulence will greatly affect the initial success of that unit in accomplishing its mission.

For many years now, the Army has recognized the need to ease the effects of this turbulence. The family sponsorship and Army Community Service programs are two examples of the Army's efforts. Most such programs, however, concentrate primarily on married personnel and hardly ever on the single soldier or the entire unit. This is a void that a COHORT company chain of command must fill.

The success of a unit's program depends upon how well it integrates the three critical stages of a COHORT company's reception—the preparation phase while the soldiers are still undergoing One-Station Unit Training (OSUT), the reception process itself at the home station, and the actions taken immediately after the reception process has been completed.

It is important to understand that these phases are interdependent and that they will not necessarily follow strict schedules.

Phase I. OSUT Overwatch

The moment an individual soldier raises his hand and takes his oath, the COHORT chain of command becomes inherently responsible for his reception into the service. At this time, the company leadership, with the First Sergeant's valuable experience, should begin to monitor the OSUT unit's progress from an "overwatch" position.

First, each soldier should receive a letter informing him of things he is most likely to be wondering about in regard to his new unit, his place in the unit, and his new station. This will give him a goal to reach for and will help prepare him to take his place in the unit.

Then the leaders should begin to monitor from a distance such information as the soldiers' performance, training, educational levels, GT scores, and medical, personnel, financial, and clothing records. This will enable the chain of command to forecast its own short- and long-range goals and to begin looking at potential leaders.

Coordination is an important aspect of this process. Close communication between the OSUT chain of command and the receiving unit chain of command is critical. An early professional rapport must be established between company commanders, First Sergeants, and executive officers. At least one command visit should be planned to the OSUT site to allow the unit's key leaders to check on the various issues. The visit will also allow the soldiers to take a look at their future com-

pany commander and First Sergeant. (It should be well planned; otherside, the unit's key leaders may discover, for example, that they have not been included on the OSUT training schedule.)

A personnel roster is probably the most valuable item the chain of command can obtain, because it often includes home of record, family and marital status, age, height and weight, educational level, and a variety of diagnostic and statistical data on each soldier. Any data not included on the roster should be requested. Leaders can use this data to prepare, well in advance, personnel readiness folders, assorted records, classes, weapon system assignments, and room assignments, as well as team, squad, and platoon membership.

While the new soldiers are still undergoing their training, the unit's leaders should also be training. Besides the obvious technical and tactical training and the SOPs that the commander must develop, he must also see that all of the unit's leaders will be ready to serve the soldiers and to ease the effects of transfer turbulence. This means arranging for instruction from both on-post and off-post soldier service agencies, and the instruction is best done by having a representative of each of the different agencies come to the unit and provide concise briefings (see Briefings and Appointments Checklist). This will give the leaders a fundamental working knowledge of these particular agencies. (Appointments must be made well in advance.)

Arrangements also need to be made to have some of these agencies brief the COHORT soldiers after their arrival. Question-and-answer sessions on such matters as finance, housing, and legal assistance will be valuable. Furthermore, they will enable leaders to identify any individual problems a soldier may have, and in turn will enable that soldier's first-line supervisor to demonstrate his ability to help solve the problems. Thus, the soldier will begin establishing confidence, loyalty, and trust in his leader.

At the same time, the unit's leaders need to develop their skills in counseling, listening, and leading. This is where many intrinsic COHORT problems can be avoided. The First Sergeant needs to develop a counseling SOP, and for the good of the unit, leaders with prior experience and skill in certain areas should be given the additional duties most closely related to those areas.

Finally, a massive repair and upkeep program should be started to prepare the soldiers' new home for their arrival. The program should concentrate on standard-of-living deficiencies in the barracks. The Directorate of Engineering and Housing should be contacted well in advance of the unit's arrival so that they can conduct structural, electrical, and plumbing inspections. (Hopefully, the previous unit will have initiated this action before closing out.)

While the new soldiers are undergoing their training, the unit's leaders should also be training.

Phase II. Reception

Although Phase I is probably the most important, in that first impressions form a lasting foundation, Phase II is the most exciting, because this is when the unit "family" comes together for the first time.

The success of this phase may lie with one person—the squad leader. He is the one who should monitor the soldier's in-

BRIEFINGS AND APPOINTMENTS CHECKLIST

BRIEFINGS
- Safety
- Crime Prevention
- Sure Pay/Finance
- Housing
- Family Support Group
- JAG/Legal Assistance
- Recreation Services
- Army Emergency Relief
- Army Community Services
- Hospital
- Defensive Drivers Course
- Chapel
- Military Courtesy
- Legal Assistance
- Alcohol and Drugs
- Fire Prevention
- Clothing Sales
- Maintenance
- SAEDA
- Awards/Promotions
- Key Control
- Unit Leave and Pass
- Reenlistment
- Open Door Policy
- Equal Opportunity
- Hometown News Release
- Commodity Areas
- Chain of Command

APPOINTMENTS
- CIF
- Central Enlisted Processing
- Housing
- Finance
- Banks
- Vehicle Registration
- Defensive Drivers Course

SQUAD LEADER'S CHECKLIST

NAME _____

CO _____ PLT _____ SQD _____

Squad Leader's Initials

1. Sign in at battalion on DA Form 647-1 (if granted leave enroute).
2. Meet team and squad leader.
3. Secure government checks and excess cash in unit safe.
4. Issue individual barracks items.
5. Inventory: ID card, ID tags, personal issue items.
6. Secure personally-owned weapons in arms room.
7. Register POV.
8. Chapel briefing.
9. Class A turn-in to cleaners (optional).
10. Issue meal card.
11. Company chain-of-command briefing.
12. Mark high-value items.
13. Squad leader counseling.
14. Orientation of company/battalion area to include:
    - a. Bn Hqs building
    - b. Dining facility
    - c. Supply room
    - d. Orderly room
    - e. Phone booths
    - f. Barber shop/PX annex
    - g. Formation site
    - h. PAC
    - i. S-4
    - j. Company dayrooms
15. Safety briefing.
16. Register personally-owned weapon (if applicable).
17. Battalion aid station (shots and weigh-in).
18. Central inprocessing.
19. TA-50 issue (CIF).
20. Property accountability briefing.
21. DDC (if applicable).
22. On-post/off-post tours.
23. Sure-Pay/finance/travel processing.
24. JAG briefing.
25. Arms room (weapon card).
26. Crime prevention briefing.
27. Family support group/housing briefing (married soldiers only).
28. Re-up card filled out.
29. NBC mask fitting and issue.
30. Showdown inspection (DA Form 3078). Uniform fitting inspection.
31. Personal readiness folder prepared.
32. Extra ID tags made.

processing checklist, and, as first-line supervisor, he is responsible for helping the soldiers make the transition from training to real soldiering (see Squad Leader's Checklist).

The reception and inprocessing should be allotted five working days on the training schedule. For example, the first day might be devoted to OSUT arrival and battalion/company inprocessing; the second day to division inprocessing (finance, housing, banks, enlisted records), chain-of-command briefing, and an on-post tour; the third to a showdown inspection (civilian and initial issue), CIF issue, and vaccinations; the fourth to soldier service agency briefings, chaplain briefing, JAG briefing, fire and crime prevention briefing, and registration of privately owned vehicles and weapons and high-value items; and the fifth to an off-post tour, an arrival ceremony, and clothing sale refittings.

Again, administrative and logistical support must be arranged well in advance. The records of the individual soldiers should be picked up on OSUT graduation day and handcarried by a senior NCO to the unit. These records must be immediately sorted for unit inprocessing, while APFT scores, rifle marksmanship, specialty training (11C, 11H), orders, and the like should be filed for the unit's training records. Financial, medical, dental, clothing, and personnel records should be delivered to their respective battalion, brigade, and division agencies. This will allow these agencies to screen and pre-

Unity in combat will make a unit more effective.

pare for the day the soldiers of a COHORT unit will arrive on their doorsteps for inprocessing.

Uniforms and personal belongings should be inspected for accountability so that the unit supply sergeant can compare and validate the OSUT initial issue and spot potential shortcomings according to DA regulations. Uniform fittings can also be free of charge if the need for them is identified early.

Family support groups both in the company and outside it are a great help. Married soldiers and those considering marriage should be encouraged to participate in these groups and to promote them. Whether the wife is able to arrive with her husband or not, a spouse military orientation program is crucial to military family orientation. This program can also help with on- and off-post tours. Army Community Services packets, with personalized letters explaining predeployment and deployment issues, can reinforce the reality and the challenges of being Army wives.

Phase III. Action and Reaction

The third phase of COHORT reception is the hardest, because it is dependent upon the success of the first two phases and also because it never ends. It is at this point that the unit develops its character, its charter, and its course. During this period, the COHORT soldiers are trained to be loyal to their fellow soldiers and their unit, and to believe that unity in combat will make the unit more effective.

This concept of unity can also work in reverse, however. Certainly COHORT soldiers often do good things in groups, but they can also do *bad* things in groups. In garrison, this seems to be partly because of peer pressure and partly because of an inability on the part of certain soldiers to adapt to the turbulence of the transfer from OSUT to COHORT.

The primary purpose of this phase, then, is to continue to provide a structure for *good* performance. The atmosphere should be hard but fair. The differences between the "real" Army and the basic training one should be continually explained at team and squad levels. Gradually, advanced privileges should be allowed, such as days off if the unit has no AWOLs, no drunk driving charges, or no drug offenses. Good behavior and performance should be openly encouraged and supported. Incentives should be created for soldiers, elements, and the unit as a whole when responsibility is accepted, and someone should be sure to follow up on the incentive program.

At the same time, the soldiers must be forced to take immediate responsibility for bad checks, physical security violations, and the like. Military Police canine teams should be asked to search the barracks, with the soldiers watching. A company-wide urinalysis program, including the chain of command, should be conducted. Although the company's leaders should leave some room for failure on the part of the soldiers, they should not allow habitual irresponsibility.

It helps if a controlled means of expressing problems and complaints is developed. "Soldier sensing" sessions should be scheduled to give the chain of command an immediate and controlled way of getting feedback on unit morale. A company letter should be prepared for parents and spouses, explaining the unit and their sons' or spouses' jobs in it. In general, the soldier and his family should be given gentle but firm guidance on how to act and react, on and off duty, to the military life.

In addition, soldiers should be insulated from the effects of other more experienced sister units, and they should be prepared for the intensive, sequential train-up cycle they are getting ready to undergo.

These are the challenges of being in the chain of command of a COHORT unit from the beginning of the soldiers' enlistment. Teaching, training, leading, caring, setting the example, and controlling the environment are all part of one integrated task. If the unit chain of command exercises forethought and takes the initiative, then the turbulence of going from OSUT to a COHORT unit can be lessened, and the unit will be on its way toward becoming combat effective.

Lieutenant Michael C. Cloy was executive officer of Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light), during the company's reception process and is now support platoon leader in the same battalion. He is an ROTC graduate of the University of Southern Mississippi.

TRAINING NOTES



Light Infantry 60mm Mortars

CAPTAIN MICHAEL T. NATUSCH

Light infantry units rely on soldier power—well trained troops who use the indirect approach. Much of the training for light units is structured on the assumption that their soldier power will be used in a low intensity conflict. These units expect to operate in an environment of rugged, restricted terrain, and they expect to have air superiority. They do not expect to fight a linear battle but guerrilla forces who fight in mostly squad-to-platoon size elements (sometimes up to battalion size). The enemy may be in any direction, and light infantry soldiers will strike at him accordingly.

As a light infantry company commander prepares for an offensive mission, he must consider several things that could affect his 60mm mortars. First, he has six men in his mortar section—a staff sergeant section leader, a sergeant squad leader, two gunners, and two ammunition bearers—and he is concerned with how best to use the combat power these soldiers and two tubes can give him. The availability of mortar rounds and security for the company's only organic indirect fire support element are of equal concern. And where the terrain would totally or partially restrict vehicle traffic, the economical use of his mortar rounds becomes critical. The commander must also have a thorough fire support plan that includes the attached fire support team's role in calling for fires and in integrating all available fire support.

Many units in addressing these concerns have devised innovative techniques. This is the way the companies of one battalion use their indirect fire systems.

In the order of march, the mortar section travels between the second and third platoons. When a target is identified, the forward observer calls the mission over the mortar section frequency, and the crews go into action. The first gun is set up in the hand-held mode, and the squad leader uses his M2 compass and firing table to execute the direct-lay mission. (Of the means of indirect fire support available to the infantryman, this system is the fastest.) As a company's soldiers engage enemy targets, they are assured by the knowledge that the mortar rounds they can hear exploding out front are friendly, while the enemy soldiers experience some discomfort in finding out that indirect fire is already being adjusted upon them.

HANDHELD

The hand-held 60mm mortar, however, is not nearly as accurate as the bipod-mounted mortar, nor does it have as much range. For this reason, while the first gun operates in the hand-held mode, the second gun sets up in the bipod mode. The section leader computes the gun data, and the section is quickly able to deliver its most accurate fire. As soon as the second gun is operating, the first also sets up in the bipod mode.

The availability of mortar rounds to the mortar section, of course, is crucial to its ability to deliver effective fire support. As there are no organic vehicles in the company, the task of transporting the rounds falls upon the soldiers. In his mission planning, therefore, the commander must decide how many rounds the company will carry. His decision is affected by his mission, the distance and terrain he will cover, the availability of alternate fire support assets, and the enemy situation. If he decides on carrying a large number of rounds, each soldier may find himself tasked to carry two mortar rounds, which will add roughly eight pounds to his load. Any decision to exclude certain soldiers from this task—M60 machinegunners or radio-telephone operators—must be made by the commander. The mortar section itself will carry at least six rounds that will be available for immediate use by the gun assigned to fire in the hand-held mode.

When a fire mission is called, the platoon that follows the mortars in movement must move to where the 60mm mortars are set up and off-load its mortar rounds. This platoon is also responsible for the security of the mortar position if that mission is determined necessary by the commander or his pre-established designee—executive officer, platoon leader, or first sergeant.

Upon making contact, the soldiers in the first two platoons in the formation drop their rucksacks and immediately begin fire and maneuver. The first sergeant and the executive officer must ensure that the mortar rounds get to the mortar section as needed and, after contact has ended, that the mortar rounds are redistributed as the company consolidates and reorganizes. If the supply of mortar rounds has been depleted, the company must request a resupply of them. In the light infantry, however, this will depend upon the availability of helicopter support or upon the company's accessibility by wheeled vehicles. At times, these prospects may not be favorable, and this demonstrates how crucial planning is in preparing for a mission.

In most situations the mortar section travels with the company's main element. Although situations may arise in which a commander decides to move his mortars by displacement, the six soldiers in the section in this scenario (or three, if displacing by gun) will be highly vulnerable. The section is authorized only one PRC-77 radio, which makes displacement by gun more difficult. The section leader must identify firing positions while moving, similar to the way a patrol leader identifies rallying points. When contact is made, the section must quickly go to that location and set up. In deciding whether or not to use displacement, the commander must weigh the mortar section's possible difficulty in navigating in the terrain, its vulnerability, and its access to a supply of mortar rounds.

7th Infantry Division soldier lays 60mm mortar.

The fire support team (FIST) attached to the company plays an important role in helping the commander use his 60mm mortars efficiently and effectively and in drawing upon other available fire support to augment his combat assets. The company fire support officer (FSO) must keep the commander informed of the status of 60mm mortar ammunition, whether the mortars can set up in a particular location, and whether nonorganic fire support assets are available. He must also keep the battalion fire support officer (FSO) informed. The battalion FSO has a key responsibility to help the battalion commander use and allocate battalion assets.

On missions that require the company to go beyond the range of the battalion's 81mm mortars or that of any support artillery, the management of the 60mm mortar ammunition is of great importance, especially if the mission and the enemy situation indicate that heavy contact is likely. Here the battalion mortars provide a larger support commitment to the company before it leaves their range fan. If chance contact is made and indirect fires are needed, the FIST will call on the 60mm mortar section for fire. When the company FSO hears the call for fire, he will relay the call to the battalion mortars, and they will take over the mission as soon as they can deliver rounds. This technique can reduce the number of 60mm rounds to be expended, along with the need for a resupply. This often allows the company to continue to go beyond battalion fire support range and still maintain the number of 60mm rounds required to conduct its mission.

This procedure is also followed when a company's mortars are not able to fire immediately because of overhead canopy or restrictive terrain. As the company moves, its FSO keeps track of the 60mm mortar section's ability to fire by using a green, amber, red system. Green indicates that the mortar section is set up or could

set up where it is; amber indicates that the section can be set up and firing within ten minutes; and red indicates that the section will not be able to fire within ten minutes. The mortar section sergeant keeps the FSO abreast of his section's status, and the FSO keeps the company commander and the battalion FSO informed.

The battalion mortars monitor and keep track of the status of each company's mortar section. This allows the battalion mortars to set their guns to respond quickly to the unit that is in the least favorable situation. The battalion commander, through his FSO, determines priority when the battalion mortars are in general support and more than one unit is in a red or amber status.

Even when a company is beyond the range of nonorganic fire support, the green, amber, red system should still be used. If a company's mortars are in red status and out of range of nonorganic fire support, they may still be within the range of another company's mortars. By keeping track of the status and location of each company, and of the range of each company's mortars, the battalion FSO can significantly increase the battalion's ability to meet a company's need for indirect fire.

When a company is nearing an objective, is in red status, and out of range of another company's mortars, the battalion commander may elect to have the company stop, which allows him to position another company so that additional indirect fire support is attainable. This could prevent a unit from making enemy contact when it has no indirect support available.

FIRE SUPPORT

The FSO keeps track of the availability of all organic and nonorganic fire support assets. He can direct the fires of the company and battalion mortars on single or multiple targets as they are needed. He can integrate any supporting artillery to further ensure timely, adequate support.

When the battalion has close air support available, the company mortars have the capacity to spot targets for the close support aircraft. In terrain where landmarks are not distinct, a company commander can guide the aircraft by firing HE rounds at the target. This technique has proven effective and easy to do. It allows a company to be well beyond range of all nonorganic indirect fire support and still deliver a devastating blow to the enemy.

At first glance, a light infantry company commander may conclude that his two 60mm mortars are not sufficient to give him effective indirect fire support and that resupply constraints will further reduce their effectiveness. By concentrating on what his equipment will allow, however, and by conducting in-depth mission analysis and planning, the commander's capacity to use his own indirect fire support to defeat an enemy, and to save his soldiers' lives, will be dramatically increased.

Captain Michael T. Natusch, when he wrote this article, was assigned to the 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry. He has served in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) as company commander, battalion S-3 air, and assistant G-3 training officer.

Live Fire Drills

CAPTAIN WILLIAM B. CREWS
LIEUTENANT RANDY D. LUTEN

Historically, the unit that fires first in an engagement has an advantage, and the unit that fires first and most accurately probably has assured victory. Although this has been known for over 40 years, the Army has done little to train units to gain this initial accurate firepower.

One of the critical reasons that this training is not done is that units tend to draw distinct boundaries between types of weapon training—range firing, MILES/tactical training and live fire exercises. There are several reasons for this, but the primary ones are a perception (as opposed to knowledge) that Army Regulation 385-63 prohibits certain exercises; a "we've never done it that way" attitude; and a belief, usually well-founded, that training inspectors and others who happen by will not understand anything different.

As one watches a unit go through its training, several observations become readily apparent. During range firing, soldiers move in orderly lines, are supervised by NCOs who often are required to wear color-coded helmets, and take orders from someone in a range tower by way of a public address system. (In this article "range firing" refers exclusively to 10-meter, 25-meter, field fire, known distance, and record fire ranges.)

During tactical training, units move in tactical formations, there is little direct control over the soldiers, and commands are shouted above the noise. During live

FIRING DRILLS

DRILL 1. Drop and Engage.
Ammunition: Five rounds of 5.56mm ball.
Starting Position: Soldier faces down range with weapon on SAFE and held at port arms.
Drill: The target is raised. The soldier drops to the ground, places the selector switch on SEMI, and engages with five rounds of rapid fire.
Time Limit: Five seconds from the time the target first appears.
Accuracy: All five rounds on the paper holding the silhouette or the silhouette itself. (This standard is essentially that of placing suppressive fire on a target.)

Drill 2. Drop, Roll, and Engage.
Ammunition: Five rounds of 5.56mm ball.
Starting Position: Same as Drill 1.
Drill: The target is raised. The soldier drops to the ground, rolls left or right, places the selector switch on SEMI, and engages with five rounds of rapid fire.
Time Limit: Same as Drill 1.
Accuracy: Same as for Drill 1. (The same time is allowed because Drill 2 should not be trained until Drill 1 has been mastered.)

DRILL 3. Roll, Rush, and Engage.
Ammunition: Two magazines each of five rounds of 5.56mm ball.
Starting Position: Prone unsupported firing position, weapon on SEMI.
Drill: The target is raised. The soldier fires five rounds of rapid fire, places the weapon on SAFE, changes magazines, rolls left or right, then rushes a short distance, drops to the ground, places the weapon on SEMI, and engages with five rounds of rapid fire.
Time Limit: Ten seconds from the time the target is raised.
Accuracy: Same as for Drills 1 and 2.

DRILL 4. Buddy Team Roll, Rush, and Engage.
Ammunition: Two five-round magazines each.
Starting Position: Same as for Drill 3.
Drill: Buddy team starts as in Drill 3. Two targets are raised. When the targets appear, Soldier 1 engages his target, and Soldier 2 rolls, rushes, and engages his target. When Soldier 2 begins firing, Soldier 1 executes the drill.
Time Limit: None.
Accuracy: Same as previous drills.

fire exercises, depending on the unit, the soldiers may again move in tightly controlled formations, under close supervision, and take orders from an administrative NCO who sometimes is equipped with a bullhorn. On more realistic live fire exercises, soldiers move hesitantly, usually use improper movement techniques, and often simply expend rounds without aiming. In many cases, if their weapons malfunction, they are at a total loss as to what to do.

By divorcing range firing from tactical training, therefore, we have produced a situation in which a satisfactory performance in live fire exercises is difficult to attain and success in a firefight would be problematic at best.

There is a method of bridging the gap between range firing and tactical training. This proposed method consists of four drills as shown in the box. The drills are designed to be conducted on a known distance (KD) range. The distance used is optional, but 300 meters is the most effective. The KD range was chosen because the silhouette is mounted on a large sheet of target paper, which provides feedback to the trainer on a soldier's misses and on the dispersion of his rounds. (A field fire and record fire range can be used instead, but these ranges have only limited means of determining whether a soldier is missing a target because of a poor zero or because of a poor shooting technique.)

These drills should be expanded as the soldiers become more proficient. For example, dummy rounds can be added to each magazine to ensure stoppages; the number of magazine changes can be increased (using a three-round and a two-round magazine instead of a five-round); and the MOPP level can be increased until the drills are conducted in MOPP 4.

There are several immediate payoffs to this program. First and foremost, this is safety training. It teaches soldiers to move with loaded weapons under tactical conditions and to change magazines and reduce stoppages without supervision.

TECHNIQUE

Second, the program teaches the correct technique to be used in combat, and it does so in a sterile environment where errors can be readily identified. It reinforces the need for accuracy and the use of the steady-hold factors. Suppressing targets at 300 meters after rolling or rushing is infinitely more difficult than a similar feat on a qualification range.

The third, and by no means least, payoff is in soldier confidence. A soldier learns that he no longer has to depend upon instructions from a tower, or from an NCO in a white helmet, to be able to change a magazine, move with a loaded weapon, or reduce a stoppage. He also learns that his fellow soldiers have the same abilities. During live fire this translates into swift, confident movements instead of hesitancy and inertia.

While this program is not a cure-all, it is an indispensible phase in a unit's transition from tactical training with blanks to tactical training with live ammunition.

Captain William B. Crews served in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) as a brigade assistant S-3 and as a company commander in the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry. He is now an assistant Inspector General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

Lieutenant Randy D. Luten is assigned to the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light), where he has served as a light infantry platoon leader and a company executive officer.

LRSU Course

WILLIAM LYDE, JR.

The AirLand Battle demands that human intelligence always be available to commanders so they can maneuver their units and put their firepower on target. The training of soldiers to man the Army's new long-range surveillance units (LRSUs) in our light and heavy divisions and in our corps is a major step toward providing that intelligence capability.

The initial LRSU program of instruction was developed by the U.S. Army Infantry School in 1985 and was used in March 1986 to teach an eight-week pilot course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.

Now, the Infantry School is offering a five-week train-the-trainer LRSU course at Fort Benning for Active Army units and has developed a separate program for Reserve Component units. The RC program includes home-station drills and a two-week phase at Fort Benning.

The five-week course is designed to train small groups of selected LRSU personnel in advanced technical surveillance, reconnaissance and communication skills, and mission-specific operation procedures (see Program of Instruction). With these skills, they will be able to infiltrate and move within a tactical area of operations, to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, and to report intelligence information in support of division and corps operations.

In small classes—31 to 36 soldiers—the attendees receive advanced instruction in hands-on, performance-oriented training that includes strenuous field training exercises over varied terrain and with differing threats. Intelligence and communication personnel are also included so that the complete intelligence-gathering team can be trained together. This integration of key personnel is essential to the fielding and implementation of a LRSU team.

The instructors for the course are from the Ranger Department of the Infantry School. In addition to being both airborne- and Ranger-qualified, these instructors have also completed training with long-range surveillance units.

The training days are long and tough, both physically and mentally. The students are graded on their abilities throughout the course and must pass a final comprehensive examination at the completion of the training program.

Reserve Component personnel attend six weekend drills at their home stations before attending the two-week phase of instruction at Fort Benning. During those two weeks, a unit's leaders will receive essentially the same training that students in the active component course receive during their last two weeks of training.

To be chosen to attend the course, an

LRSU PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

	Hours
COMMAND AND CONTROL	
Command and Control	6.0
History, Organization, and Mission of LRSU	2.0
	8.0
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS	
Infiltration/Exfiltration Exercise	34.0
Surveillance Exercise	3.0
Planning/Isolation	25.0
Caching	2.0
Patrolling Activities	7.0
Movement	6.0
Immediate Action Drills	1.0
Survival/Field Craft	4.0
	82.0
COMMAND POST EXERCISES	
Command Post Exercise I	48.0
Command Post Exercise II	72.0
	120.0
FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES	
Field Training Exercise I	72.0
Field Training Exercise II	144.0
	216.0
LAND NAVIGATION	
Aerial Photograph	2.0
Applied Map Reading	3.0
Land Navigation Exercise, Day (Individual)	8.0
Land Navigation Exercise, Night (Individual)	8.0
	21.0

	Hours
THREAT SUBJECTS	
Missile System	2.0
Motorized Elements	2.0
Tank Elements	2.0
Artillery Elements	2.0
Special Equipment	2.0
Transport/Armored Vehicles	2.0
Installations and Units	2.0
Type Aircraft	2.0
Surveillance Electronic Equipment	2.0
Operations/Identification and Reporting	4.0
	22.0
COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS	
Communications Procedures	4.0
Radio Set AN/PRC-77	4.0
Radio Set AN/PRC-70, AN/PRC-74B, and AN/PRC-104	8.0
Digital Message Device Group	4.0
Generator G-76	.5
Transmission/Messages	1.0
Encryption	7.5
Antennas	4.0
	33.0
STUDENT EVALUATION	
Physical Fitness/Combat Water Survival Test	4.0
Comprehensive Examination	4.0
Intelligence/Security Examination	2.0
Dianostic Map Reading Examination	2.0
Communications Examination	1.0
	13.0

LRSU CLASS DATES

Class #	Report Date	Graduation Date	Unit
1-87	06 Oct 86	10 Nov 86	3 ID
			7 ID
			82 ABN
			25 ID
2-87	10 Nov 86	15 Dec 86	V Corps
3-87	05 Jan 87	09 Feb 87	VII Corps
4-87	09 Feb 87	16 Mar 87	9 ID
			101 AA
			8 ID
1-87 (RC)	21 Mar 87	04 Apr 87	I Corps (RC)
2-87 (RC)	11 Apr 87	25 Apr 87	III Corps (RC)
3-87 (RC)	16 May 87	30 May 87	35 ID (RC)
			40 ID (RC)
			29 ID (RC)
4-87 (RC)	06 Jun 87	20 Jun 87	50 AD (RC)
			38 ID (RC)
			49 AD (RC)
5-87 (RC)	11 Jul 87	25 Jul 87	28 ID (RC)
			26 ID (RC)
			42 ID (RC)
			47 ID (RC)
5-87	10 Aug 87	14 Sep 87	3 ID (REPL)
			7 ID (REPL)
			82 ABN (REPL)
			25 ID (REPL)
1-88 (RC)	03 Oct 87	17 Oct 87	I Corps (RC) (REPL)
			III Corps (RC) (REPL)
			35 ID (RC) (REPL)
			40 ID (RC) (REPL)
			29 ID (RC) (REPL)

applicant must meet the following prerequisites:

- Must be a volunteer, male, officer or noncommissioned officer, Active Army or Reserve Component.
- Must be assigned to (or on orders for assignment to) a long-range surveillance company or detachment to serve as company or detachment commander, operations officer, surveillance platoon leader, First Sergeant or detachment sergeant, surveillance team leader, G-2 representative, communication officer, intelligence officer, or intelligence NCO; or may be a selected member of a base radio station communications staff.
- Must be airborne-qualified or Ranger- or Special Forces-qualified. (In addition to soldiers currently working in MOS 18, "Special Forces-qualified" also means a soldier who has received SF training but who may not have worked in or been awarded MOS 18.)
- Must undergo a psychiatric evaluation conducted by a qualified psychiatrist, including the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI) and an Intake Psychiatric History Mental Status Examination.
- Must have a good performance record with no history of drug or alcohol abuse.
- Must be currently qualified with the M16A1 rifle.
- Must have a physical profile of 111111.
- Must have a valid physical examination on record upon reporting to the course.

The divisions and corps that are to receive LRSU training in Fiscal Year 1987 are shown on the accompanying schedule. As the schedule indicates, once the units have received their initial training, the training of replacements will begin.

There is no single project at the Infantry School in which more important gains in combat capability are being made for so little expenditure of resources.

William Lyde, Jr., is manager for the Long Range Surveillance Unit Course, Course Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Infantry School

Flag Signals

CAPTAIN EDWIN L. KENNEDY, JR.

Command and control of the battlefield today presents a number of problems for maneuver element commanders. A unit's ability to communicate has been expanded by the many new types of radio equipment available down to squad or vehicle level. But this communications strength also represents a potential weakness in our command and control structure. Enemy radio-electronic warfare capabilities include an assortment of ways to disrupt our communications and thereby to disrupt control. The destruction of communications systems by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is also a possibility that must be considered.

How can we counter the enemy's electronic warfare capability or our complete

loss of communications due to EMP in a conventional environment? Perhaps some of the problems can be solved by using *aufstragstaktik*, or mission orders, which express the commander's operational as well as tactical intent. This would allow subordinate units to continue their missions according to their analysis of METT-T—mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time—with the emphasis on mission.

The flexibility needed to react to tactical situations and retain communications and control is still possible, however, through the use of other signal communication procedures coupled with good training and SOPs at company level.

Among these other methods of signal communications are visual signals such as hand-arm and flag signals. Hand and arm signals are standardized for mechanized units in Field Manual 21-60, but they are not always appropriate for use over extended distances. The use of flag signals, though, can lead to a solution for communication during daylight.

PROBLEMS

There are several current references on tactical flag signals—FC 7-7J (April 1985), The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley); FM 17-98, Army 86 Scout Platoon; and FKG 17-42-2, Standard Arm and Hand Signals for Track Vehicle Driving. But several problems arise when using these different references. They often show different signals for the same formation or movement technique, and they call for flags of three different colors. This adds to the problem of training and standardization. Aside from that, flag sets containing the three flags of the proper color, more often than not, seem to be difficult to obtain.

What is needed is an easier way to communicate during daylight by flag set and also to train subordinates in their use. There are two tentative solutions—continue with one of the existing three or more flag systems by standardizing it and making the flags easier to obtain, or devise and adopt an easier system.

One such easier system is proposed here. This new flag signal system offers several advantages: It is easy to learn; it can be used with cross-attached units that have different flag sets; it eases the requirement to provide different colored flags; and it is designed to be used with current armor and mechanized infantry formations and movement techniques.



The new set of flag signals is based not on specific colors but on two flags, one dark and the other light. (The flags can be of any two colors so long as they are discernable as dark and light.) The commands they indicate (as shown in the diagram) are a compilation of formations and movement techniques used by both armor and mechanized infantry. Supplemental instructions such as close or open column can be given by hand-arm signals.

To be effective, the flag signals must be relayed between vehicles. In M113-equipped units, air guards must be especially watchful for signals being sent forward. In armor and Bradley-equipped units, the loader/gunner must observe to his assigned security zone (the rear of the

tank or fighting vehicle) and relay signal information to the vehicle commander.

In tactical situations it may not always be possible to observe the signaler. In these cases, the *aufstragstaktik* training and SOPs take effect. A short radio message by the signaler, for example, can be used to indicate a signal is about to be sent. Such a message might be as follows:

"A-26 this is K-09, Flag Over!"

"K-09 this is A-26, Roger, Out."

A-26 would then proceed to a point from which he could observe K-09. This might only require that A-26 give his attention to K-09 when battlefield confusion has intermixed vehicles so that the leaders are not easily recognizable.

Even when the flags cannot be used in a tactical situation—because of obscurations or vegetation, for example—they can be used for simple messages during non-tactical road marches or administrative moves to reduce radio traffic and the inherent burden on the commander's net.

Captain Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., a 1976 graduate of the United States Military Academy, is an ROTC instructor at Texas A and M University. He has attended the Israeli Armor Corps Commanders Course and the Infantry Officer Advanced Course

Emotional First Aid

The Commander's Role

MAJOR GREG LANDE

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) learned a painful lesson in the 1973 Mideast war. During the initial days of the battle, the IDF had a large number of combat psychiatric casualties (CPCs). After the war, in an attempt to reduce the number of CPCs, the IDF embarked on an ambitious training program, which it has continued to the present time. Embodied in the program is the belief that unit commanders can greatly influence the recognition, early treatment, and, ultimately, even the prevention of such casualties.

Commanders become natural allies of mental health practitioners in the prevention of psychiatric casualties because of their need to be keen observers of their soldiers' performance. Intuitively, most commanders know that, in any situation, whatever behavior is expressed is a function of the interaction between a person's characteristics and his environment. In a major conflict, the environment will generally be fixed. In other words, it will always be chaotic, turbulent, and frightening. Learning how individual soldiers may respond in such an environment and how they might be helped to cope with it can be of great help to a unit commander in his manpower retention efforts. Accordingly, all unit commanders must learn to recognize, treat, and prevent combat psychiatric casualties.

The first task in realizing such a goal is to remember that there will be normal behavioral responses to a major conflict. Normal signs and symptoms might include anxiety, depression, a fast heart rate, rapid breathing, shaking, sweating, and incontinence. Such symptoms will not interfere with an individual's ability to function as a soldier, however, and it is important that these normal responses not be over-interpreted.

NORMAL

A soldier who is having a normal response to the stresses of combat can still do his job. He will not show uncertainty in taking orders, protecting himself, looking after his buddy, or performing other required tasks. Duty impairment, therefore, becomes one criterion that distinguishes a normal response from a more disabling one.

In explaining the causes of the more disabling response, an analogy may be helpful. As the stress load increases, similar to the way the electrical load in a house sometimes increases, a person's "emotional circuit breaker" may "trip." The person is more complex, however, in that the "amperage" of the circuit breaker varies for each individual. But the purpose of the circuit breaker in both cases is the same—to protect the system from burnout. Another important feature of a circuit breaker is that it is designed to be reset.

Two examples of typical CPCs will help clarify the identification of a tripped emotional circuit breaker. One soldier, a driver, becomes increasingly more fearful, irritable, and tense. He shakes uncontrollably. He complains to his buddy of a sharp stabbing chest pain, numbness, tingling in his hands, and lightheadedness. He has progressed rapidly over a few hours to the point where he cannot function as a driver.

Another soldier, a radio operator, becomes withdrawn, sad, anxious, and unable to sleep. He feels guilty because his buddy has been seriously injured. He

feels responsible. This soldier's guilt, sadness, and crying interfere with his ability to operate his radio.

These two cases help illustrate features commanders can use to identify pending psychiatric casualties. A commander should be alert for the following:

- Behavior that is unusual for the soldier in question—a normally "happy-go-lucky" type who becomes severely depressed, for example.
- A soldier who becomes less and less able to perform his duties, often despite an obvious willingness to do so.
- A steadily mounting sense of guilt or fear in a soldier.

In addition to these observations, there are clusters of symptoms that can help identify a combat psychiatric casualty. Although ultimately any behavior can be expressed by one of these soldiers, there are two relatively common presentations that can be remembered with the help of two acronyms—S-A-D and F-I-T-T-ful.

If a soldier is S-A-D then a Sleep disturbance with Anxiety and Depression will be apparent. On the other hand, if he is F-I-T-T-ful, he is Fearful, Irritable, Tense, and Tremulous. These symptoms, when added to duty impairment, complete the picture of a casualty.

Armed with these guidelines and groups of symptoms, what can be done at the unit level when a psychiatric casualty is identified? In other words, what can be done to reset the emotional circuit breakers?

Interventions are always made with the full expectation that recovery is possible with simple, but important, treatment. And much as unit members learn medical first aid, so must they also become proficient in emotional first aid. In fact, making sure all unit members are well versed in medical first aid is an important step toward emotional first aid. If a soldier is confident that he could save the life of a buddy—and that his buddy could save him—this confidence also contributes to his emotional well being. The unit medic should therefore be actively involved in teaching personnel both medical and emotional first aid.

RECOGNITION

Emotional first aid includes the "three R's"—recognition, reassurance, and relaxation.

Recognition involves being alert for any changes in behavior and duty performance that might suggest an impending problem. Recognition also involves identifying the specific concerns a soldier is struggling with. This could include guilt over the death of a close friend or just fear of being killed himself.

Reassurance involves using the powers of persuasion and suggestion that are attributed to the commander as an authority figure. The soldier needs to be assured that everyone gets scared in battle. Additionally, he needs to know that he is a vital asset, that his behavior is to be expected in the situation, but that he is also expected to be a soldier—that even if he must leave the unit for treatment, he is expected to return to it, or to some other unit, and perform as a soldier again.

Reassurance also involves allowing a soldier to ventilate his fears, concerns, worries, losses, and guilt. A few minutes here may be enough to prevent an unnecessary evacuation.

The third "R" is relaxation. For an anxious soldier, a quick relaxation technique may allow other interventions to be more effective. A deep-breathing technique can be useful in which the soldier takes a slow, deep breath and holds it for a few seconds, then slowly, gently exhales. A few repetitions can be quite effective in reducing anxiety to a more manageable level. Relaxation can also be achieved from the comfort and understanding of a buddy in time of crisis.

In the final analysis, the identification, treatment, and prevention of psychiatric casualties in combat must be a shared responsibility of commanders and medical personnel alike. Through this cooperative effort they accomplish the most important mission—the preservation of manpower.

Major Greg Lande, Medical Corps, is attending the University of Maryland Medical School. He is a graduate of the Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine. He served a three-year tour as division psychiatrist in the 3d Infantry Division in Germany.

One-Rope Bridge

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS GORDON L. ROTTMAN

For years, the accepted method of rigging a one-rope bridge has been to tie a figure-eight or butterfly knot about one-third of the rope's length from the near-shore end, hook a snaplink to the knot, pass the rope around a tree, run it through the snaplink, and then run it back toward the tree, where a few men take up the slack and tie the rope off.

While this method is effective, it has several inherent drawbacks. Foremost among them is that if the figure-eight or butterfly knot is not tied in the right position, the rope must be at least partially pulled back in, the knot untied, and then

re-tied in a new (and hopefully correct) position. Once the rope is weight loaded, the knot becomes difficult to untie. The type of knots used and this weight loading can also damage the rope. In addition, untying the secured rope from the tree before recovery can be somewhat time-consuming, as is the initial tie-off.

There is an alternative method that eliminates these problems, requires no special equipment, and is much faster to rig and recover. In effect, the knot and snaplink used in the accepted method constitutes a pulley; the alternative method uses three "pulleys," but it is still simple. The only equipment required is three snaplinks, a sling or "Swiss-seat" rope, and two approximately three-foot lengths of rope of a smaller diameter than the bridge rope. The ends of the three-foot ropes and the sling ropes are tied together with square knots, providing three separate looped ropes.



The bridge is constructed in the following manner: A man swims the rope across to the far side and ties it off. At the same time, the looped sling rope is passed around an anchor tree on the near side, and the looped ends are secured together with a snaplink. (This same method can also be used on the far-shore anchor tree to speed up the operation.) The near-shore anchor tree needs to be at least five meters (16 feet) from the water's edge. The bridge rope is passed through the snaplink and run back toward the water. Near the water's edge, one of the three-foot ropes is secured to the bridge rope with a prusik knot and a snaplink attached to the end of the loop. The square knot on the looped three-foot ropes needs to be positioned so as not to interfere with the tying of the prusik knot or the attachment of the snaplink. The running edge of the bridge rope is then passed through the second snaplink and run back toward the tree. In effect, the bridge rope will now follow a "Z" pattern.

The second three-foot rope is secured to the running rope with a prusik knot, the third snaplink attached to it, and, once a couple of men have given a few good tugs to take up the slack, the third snaplink is snapped to the first snaplink on the sling rope. This effectively secures the rope as the two three-foot prusik ropes oppose each other, and the running end can now be dropped without being tied off. The two three-foot ropes can be slid on the bridge rope and their positions adjusted once they are secured.

A word of caution is in order here. The efficiency provided by the three "pulleys" can cause a rope to stretch too much and a well-used rope could even break when a load is placed on it. (It need not be as taut as a guitar string.) This added efficiency can also cause a poorly rooted tree to pull out of a muddy stream bank. A manila rope is therefore the best suited for this type of bridge, because it does not stretch much.

In recovering the bridge, only the one snaplink on the sling rope needs to be unhooked and the entire rope system pulled across with the last man in tow.

This system can be rigged very rapidly. During an exercise, I once saw a five-man patrol (once the swimmer had crossed to the far shore) erect such a bridge, cross it, and recover the bridge and the last man in a total of one minute, 28 seconds.

Overall, this one-rope bridge is an improvement over the one constructed by the usual method.

Sergeant First Class Gordon L. Rottman is a full-time selection and training supervisor, Company G (Ranger), 143d Infantry, Texas Army National Guard. He served in Vietnam with the 5th Special Forces Group.

From The Editor

66 YEARS

With this issue we mark the end of our 66th publishing year. Founded in 1921 as the Infantry School MAILING LIST, our magazine is the oldest continuously published service school journal in the United States (although no issues were printed in 1945 because of a paper shortage).

Your support of the magazine over the years has been outstanding and a real credit to the United States Infantry. We ask that you continue your support in the coming year so that we can keep intact our record of service to the entire Infantry community.

If you know someone you think might want to subscribe to INFANTRY but who does not know the magazine or does not know how to enter a subscription, please send us that person's name and address and we'll see that he gets the word, plus a free copy of one of our recent issues.

At this time of the year, too, you might consider entering a gift subscription for a relative, friend, or colleague. We'll send a special gift card in your name to the recipient.

To all of our readers and to all of our supporters we wish you a beautiful and bountiful Holiday season and all of the best in 1987.

COMING IN *INFANTRY*

"The Regimental System," by Major John A. Hamilton.
"Soldier's Load," by Captain William C. Mayville.
"Divide and Conquer," by Robert E. Rogge.

BACK COVER:
During a multinational chemical defense exercise in Germany, a soldier from the 8th Infantry Division, covered with powder from a decontamination operation, resumes his role in the exercise.

ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



INCENTIVE PROGRAM

Some soldiers overseas may be eligible to receive an extra 30 days of leave, an extra 15 days of leave with free travel to and from the United States, or an extra $80 per month. These three benefits are available to soldiers who take part in the overseas extension incentive program.

Overseas extensions lower the demand for replacements from soldiers in the United States and increase the time between overseas tours.

The program has two MOS categories—space-imbalanced, which have more than 55 percent of their authorized spaces overseas, and non-space-imbalanced that have a turnaround time of less than 24 months. Presently, there are 33 space-imbalanced and 47 non-space-imbalanced MOSs in the program.

Soldiers in these MOSs who complete their normal overseas tours and extend for at least 12 months (up to a maximum of 18 months) are eligible for any one of the three options.

DA Circular 614-85-1 (Assignments, Details and Transfers—Incentives for Enlisted Members to Extend Tours of Duty Overseas) explains the program's policies. The Department of the Army changes the list of MOSs eligible for the program every six months and announces the changes by message.

SRB CHANGE

Effective 1 October 1986, a soldier will be able to pocket more of his Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) "up front."

In the past, a soldier who was eligible for a $10,000 SRB would receive $5,000 (less taxes) when he reenlisted and the remainder in anniversary payments. With the change, that same soldier would receive $7,500 (less taxes) upon reenlistment and smaller anniversary payments.

The change can actually be worth much more than $2,500 to that soldier, because he might be able to use income tax averaging or use it to buy a house, for example.

PROMOTION PROCESS

Many enlisted soldiers may find it hard to understand why they are not promoted as soon as they expect to be. A closer look at the promotion process and how it works may help.

All promotions, whether to private first class or sergeant first class, are dependent upon the needs of the Army. These needs are governed by the number of losses to the force—deaths, separations, and retirements.

Promotions for private through specialist four are made by field commanders. There are no constraints on these promotions provided the soldiers meet the time in service (TIS) and time in grade (TIG) criteria. They may receive accelerated advancements, within the limitations outlined in AR 600-200, provided allocations exist.

Promotions to sergeant and staff sergeant are semi-centralized—soldiers in these ranks compete equally against others in the same MOS based on a point system. Points are awarded for such areas as SQT scores, commander's evaluation, awards and decorations, weapons qualification, physical fitness test score, promotion board appearance, and military and civilian education.

Promotions to the ranks of sergeant first class through sergeant major are fully centralized, with sergeants first class promoted by the needs of their MOSs, and master sergeants and sergeants major by sequence number.

A record of a soldier's total points is forwarded through automated systems to the Department of the Army for consolidation into an Army-wide listing of scores by MOS. The cut-off score that would result in the promotion of the desired number of soldiers for each MOS is then determined.

The number of promotions is often limited on the basis of MOS comparisons of assigned and authorized strengths and budgetary constraints. For example, high cut-off scores mean fewer promotions because of MOS overstrengths (more soldiers than positions) or tight budgets. Once determined, cut-off scores are mailed to all Army installations for the publication of orders.

Soldiers are eligible for promotion on the first day of the third month following their date of selection. For example: A soldier is boarded and recommended in January. Between 15 January and the end of the month, his points are forwarded to DA. In February his points and those of other soldiers boarded at the same time are consolidated with soldiers already on the list to determine how many are on it and the standing of each. At the beginning of March, DA establishes cut-off scores for promotions on 1 April. Soldiers boarded in January and earlier who meet the 1 April cut-off score are then promoted.

Soldiers who are qualified in overstrength MOSs face tough decisions. They can either continue to work in those areas that earn promotion points while waiting for their MOS to balance and cut-off scores to drop; or they can ask to be reclassified into shortage MOSs to improve their chances for promotion.

DA boards held annually select soldiers for promotion to sergeant first class, master sergeant, and sergeant major. Selections are made in each MOS on the basis of the number of projected vacancies. Promotions to sergeant first class are made each month by MOS on the basis of the needs of each MOS and of budgetary constraints. Promotions to master sergeant and sergeant major are based solely on assigned and authorized strengths of the respective ranks and, of course, on budget constraints.

SQTs CONTINUE

Various reports have been published announcing pending changes in the Army's individual training evaluation program. Nevertheless, while proposed changes are being discussed, soldiers will continue to take skill qualification tests as scheduled through Fiscal Year 1987.

KEEP RECORDS CURRENT

Many soldiers continue to underestimate the importance of their individual personnel qualification records, according to MILPERCEN's Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate.

These records, often referred to as DA Forms 2 and 2-1, are the keys to a soldier's career. They stand as a permanent and formal record of his individual qualifications, his past and present duty assignments, and a host of other data as required by AR 640-2-1.

When the information in these records is out of date or incorrect, it can cause assignment difficulties for the soldier or keep a Department of the Army board from selecting him for advanced schooling or promotion.

Continued discrepancies in DA Forms 2 and 2-1 give the impression that the soldiers are not taking their careers seriously. Sometimes outdated records accompany personnel requests to MILPERCEN. Or DA Form 2 does not contain the same information as Form 2-1, and the Enlisted Master File reflects other contradictions in the data that is essential to assignment managers. Members of selection boards may notice, for example, that while a soldier's DA Form 2 shows that he is 66 inches tall, his Form 2-1 shows his height as 68 inches.

Too many soldiers seem to be depending upon the system to take care of them. That may not happen. Although record custodians have a responsibility to maintain personnel qualification records, total accuracy is not possible without the involvement of each soldier. Too many items are required on these documents to leave their accuracy to the records clerk at the personnel office.

Only the soldier can solve these problems. Although an annual audit of DA Forms 2 and 2-1 is no longer required, it is important that all soldiers take control of their own futures by carefully reviewing their records at least once a year.

EMF/CMIF

Many enlisted soldiers seem to think that after they have verified the accuracy of their Official Personnel Files at Fort Benjamin Harrison, there is nothing they can do about their records. But there is.

Two other files also play a vital role in a soldier's career—the Enlisted Master File and the Career Management Information File, both maintained at MILPERCEN.

The Enlisted Master File (EMF) is computerized. It contains more than 250 data elements, such as name, social security number, rank, MOS, date of rank, date of last permanent change of station, date returned from overseas, marital status, number of family members, assignment preferences, and date entered active duty.

Computer transactions from battalion personnel and administration centers or installation MILPOs update the EMF. This file is used by the centralized assignment procedures computer system at MILPERCEN in making nominations for worldwide assignments and future training.

Obviously, then, if the data in a soldier's EMF is wrong, he can suffer. For example, he could be sent overseas sooner than required for his MOS if his date returned from overseas code is blank or incorrect.

The EMF is also the primary source of information for determining assignments and schooling for soldiers from private through sergeant. (MILPERCEN does not maintain DA Forms 2 and 2-1 or Career Management Information Files (CMIFs) for soldiers in these ranks.)

CMIFs are maintained by the career branches at MILPERCEN on all noncommissioned officers from staff sergeant through sergeant major. When a soldier is promoted to staff sergeant, the local MILPO forwards copies of DA Forms 2 and 2-1 to his career branch, where they are used to create a CMIF. The Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center (EREC) provides a microfiche copy of the soldier's OMPF for inclusion in his CMIF.

The CMIF contains items such as copies of evaluation and academic reports, EREC Form 10A (Enlisted Evaluation Data Report), DA Form 2635 (Enlisted Preference Statement), photograph, reclassification orders, retirement application, assignment transaction sheets, volunteer applications, career manager's notes, and correspondence with the NCO.

A soldier's CMIF is updated only when he provides new information or after a promotion board, when EREC sends his microfiche OMPF and DA Forms 2 and 2-1 for inclusion in the file.

Before the career branch takes any action on an NCO in the rank of sergeant through sergeant major, it reviews his CMIF. This ensures that the soldier is qualified for the assignment or training and that it supports his professional development.

An NCO's annual audit of his DA Forms 2 and 2-1 is the best way for him to make sure the files used to manage and develop his career are accurate and complete. When changes are made to these documents, after 30 days he should verify that the changes are in his Enlisted Master File.

The most important information for evaluating professional development is schools completed and assignment history, and this information is available only from DA Form 2-1.

Enlisted Master Files and Career Management Information Files must therefore be as accurate and complete as possible if a soldier is to assist in managing his own career.

RACIAL/ETHNIC CODE

All soldiers are responsible for making sure their racial and ethnic category (REDCAT) data base information accurately reflects the group to which they belong or with which they most closely identify.

Current Department of the Army policy requires that each soldier identify himself as a member of one of the six Department of Defense standard race or population groups—American Indian, Asian, Black, White, Other, and Unknown, as well as choose one of the 21 standard

ethnic groups (which include "Other" and "Unknown").

The accuracy of this data is important to the Army's assessment of its true racial/ethnic composition. It helps ensure that procedures and regulations do not adversely affect members of any particular group. Without accurate information in the data base, such effects cannot be measured.

Soldiers establish and maintain accurate racial/ethnic category data through their servicing MILPOs, and an appropriate time to do this is during the periodic review of their records.

NCO CORPS CHANGES

The Army is carrying out some of the recommendations made by the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Study, which was completed earlier this year, and of the Training and Doctrine Command's Enlisted Personnel Management System Review.

One change will be to limit soldiers' assignments in non-primary specialties and undocumented positions to 12 months or less. This will benefit soldiers and the Army, because it will keep soldiers in assignments that will promote their progression in the careers for which they have been trained. For example, an 11B infantry sergeant could not work for more than 12 months as a 71L administration NCO.

Another change includes limiting back-to-back assignments outside a soldier's normal career pattern. Under this change, an enlisted soldier would no longer be allowed to go, for example, from a recruiting job straight into a drill sergeant assignment or an ROTC job. This will help keep soldiers in the mainstream while supporting the professional development of individual soldiers. Soldiers assigned to special duty jobs such as recreation service will continue to be limited to 90 days in those jobs.

During the next year, MILPERCEN officials will test changes in the centralized assignment process for enlisted soldiers. They will be making recommendations in writing to help the gaining command make final assignments for in-bound soldiers. These recommendations would take into consideration the soldier's training and experience.

Another change calls for the elimination of mandatory secondary MOSs for NCOs in the rank of promotable sergeant and above. Too many soldiers have secondary MOSs in their files for which they have not been trained. This change will affect soldiers in all but the space-imbalanced MOSs.

Secondary MOSs will be awarded only after appropriate training, and if a soldier has had formal training or experience in a certain field, then he would retain that secondary MOS.

The NCO Professional Development Study identified eight requirements that define the responsibilities and duties of NCOs. These include job proficiency, MOS competency, physical fitness and military bearing, basic education skills, leadership skills, training skills, commitment to professional values, and attributes and personal responsibility.

A new EER is now being developed that will include these eight requirements. It should be fielded by the fall of 1987.



OFFICER CAREER NOTES



CORRECTION ON PIN-ON POINTS

The item concerning "pin-on" points for promotion that appears in INFANTRY's July-August 1986 issue (page 47) contains an error. The correct current targets are as follows:

- Colonels—22 years, plus or minus 1 year.
- Lieutenant colonels—16 years, plus or minus 1 year.
- Majors—10 years, plus or minus 1 year.

As the earlier item explains, these are not requirements, only guidelines.

SELECTION BOARD COMMENTS

Feedback from 1986 officer selection boards at MILPERCEN has brought out several areas of concern:

OERs. Too many acronyms are still being used, especially in duty titles. Board members are from various branches, so the duty description must be written in terms that are common to all branches.

The comments in Part IV (Professionalism) should be able to stand alone without reference to the traits listed above. For example, instead of "A.1.—Always, A.6.—Consistently," comments should be straightforward: "Judgment is superb."

Weight. Weight control is a continuing issue with selection boards. Officers who are consistently pushing the maximum screening table weight or who have been given a new, medically determined maximum allowable weight are bound to receive close scrutiny. This is especially true when there has been a history of increasing weight.

A photo can tell the board members a lot about how well an officer meets military appearance standards, even if the officer does not meet the screening table or maximum allowable weight standards (AR 600-9). In these instances, raters are also encouraged to help clarify an officer's appearance and fitness by making specific comments, positive or negative.

Photographs. Although the problems with photos have been discussed time and time again, promotion boards continue to complain about the absence of current photos or the poor quality of the photos they do see. Additional general comments are made about such problems as ribbons not being worn, shoes not shined, poor pressing of uniform, and improper length of trousers.

Officer Record Briefs. Although a yearly audit of an officer's ORB is required, in numerous instances it appeared that these audits had not been conducted. Officers should pay particular attention to assignment history, awards, both military and civilian education, and date of last photo and physical.

KEEP ORB CURRENT

Each year during an officer's birth month, his local Military Personnel Office (MILPO) contacts him and reminds him to review his ORB and make any necessary changes. For the data elements that can be corrected by the MILPO, changes are entered by automated transactions and conveyed to MILPERCEN for posting to the Officer Master File (OMF). For the data elements that cannot be corrected locally, the MILPO sends supporting documentation to the appropriate career branch office.

The problem is that many officers never go to the MILPO to validate their ORBs. And of those who do, many do not follow up to make sure the changes were posted.

New ORBs are sent to MILPOs four months after an officer's birth month and again four months later. In addition, an officer may request an updated ORB by mail from MILPERCEN (ATTN: ASNI-SMC). Requests must include name, grade, social security number, and date of birth. Special requests should not be submitted less than 60 days after an annual ORB audit to allow time for the results to be posted to the OMF.

The importance of accuracy in such categories as pay entry basic date (PEBD), advanced civilian education, and height/weight is obvious. But an officer who lets his ORB go unaudited for extended periods may suddenly find a host of less visible problems. Faulty or inconsistent abbreviations in the assignment history section, for example, take on new importance when an officer knows that a promotion board will shortly be reviewing the ORB in detail.

Another problem worth mentioning—again—is the proper way to fill out and submit the Officer Preference Statement, DA Form 483. The instructions in the upper right corner of the form clearly say that a No. 2 pencil is to be used and that the form is to be mailed unfolded in a 9x12 envelope. But many are still received filled out in ink, crayon, or magic marker and folded or stapled.

SINGLE TRACK OPTION

In accordance with the recommendation of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Study Group, officers are being developed in different career patterns to meet Army requirements through single and dual tracking.

In order to meet the large number of Army requirements at the field grades, especially in the functional areas, only a small number of combat arms officers will be allowed to single track in their branch.

The combat arms officers who do request to single track in their branch must also be aware of potential assignment limitations. Specifically, they will be eligible to fill only the positions coded for their branch, branch immaterial, or combat arms immaterial. They will not be considered for any other positions coded for

a functional area, such as division and brigade personnel positions (coded 41) and operations positions (coded 54).

Limits to the single track inventories will be established by year group for each branch and functional area in which single tracking is permitted.

The personnel proponents for some functional areas have determined that branch experience, through dual tracking, is vital to professional development. Therefore, single tracking is not permitted in SCs 18 (Special Operations), 48 (Foreign Area Officer), 50 (Force Development), and 54 (Operations, Plans, and Training).

Because of current and projected shortages, a very limited number of officers in the following basic branches will be allowed to single track in any functional area: 21 (Engineer), 25 (Signal), 35 (Military Intelligence), 74 (Chemical), 91 (Ordnance), and 92 (Quartermaster).

To qualify for single tracking, an officer must meet the single track criteria established by the personnel proponents as shown in DA Pamphlet 600-3, subject to the above restrictions.

Several methods will be used to implement the single track career pattern:

• Officers who hold two specialty codes in the same branch—for example, an officer who holds SC 22 and SC 23—will be automatically single tracked in the Engineer branch. This also applies to the Military Intelligence, Signal, Ordnance, and Quartermaster branches. The conversion will be automatic with no application required. If an officer in this category wishes to add a functional area, however, and dual track, he should forward his request, by letter, to his career management officer.

• Some of the officers who currently hold two branch codes or two functional area codes have been recommended for the single track career pattern on the basis of Army requirements and individual qualifications. These officers have been advised of the board's recommendation and given an opportunity to appeal before a final decision.

• At seven years of service, officers who are eligible to single track in their branch will be given an opportunity to express their desires before the functional area designation process.

Any officer who wants to single track in either his branch or his functional area and does not fall under one of the above three categories (and who is not subject to the restrictions discussed earlier) may submit his application by letter to USA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPB, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400, by 30 November 1986. Boards will convene in December 1986 and January 1987 to select those who are to single track. Board results will be available in April 1987.

The procedures outlined here do not apply to promotable lieutenant colonels or to serving colonels. Requests from officers in these ranks will be considered on a case-by-case basis by individual application to Colonels Division, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPC, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400.

RESERVE COMPONENT PROMOTIONS

The selection rate for educationally qualified officers considered by Reserve Component promotion boards is high, but too many of the officers not selected are passed over primarily because of incomplete files.

The most common deficiencies in the files being reviewed are missing education documents and missing Officer Evaluation Reports. A significant number of files are also missing photos, or they contain photos of poor quality. Another problem is insufficient data to establish that an officer meets the height and weight standards as outlined in AR 600-9.

If you are a Reserve Component officer whose records are due to go before a promotion board, here is what you need to do:

• Get a copy of your microfiche Official Military Personnel File about one year before the board is to convene. For promotion to captain or major, that means January or February. For promotion to lieutenant colonel or colonel, the boards meet in September and October.

• Take the OMPF to the Reserve Center or any library to use a microfiche reader. Check the "P" (Performance) fiche, which contains such things as OERs, academic evaluation reports (AERs), awards, and disciplinary data. This is the primary document used by selection boards.

• The fiche should contain proof that you have completed the education requirement for promotion to the next higher rank. If it does not, forward a copy of the AER (DA Form 1059) through channels to get that proof on the fiche and before the board.

• While you are looking at the fiche, inventory your OERs. All of them should be there, except possibly the latest one. If they are not, your record will be less competitive than those of other officers before the board. If an OER is missing, ask your personnel officer to initiate a tracer. (A recent records screen showed that more than 25 percent of the records were missing OERs. And a single OER sometimes makes the difference between selection and non-selection.)

• Have an official photo made if you can; if not, a snapshot will do. First, make sure your uniform fits right, get it pressed, get a haircut, shine your shoes. Then have the photo taken against a plain wall. Get the photo enlarged so you can provide a 4x10 copy to the board. Have several copies made. On the back of each, carefully print your name, rank, social security number, branch, date of the photo, and your current height and weight. Sign the photo.

• Make sure your weight is within the standards every time you are weighed. If you have a higher maximum allowable weight (MAW) than the tables permit, send a copy of the MAW document with your packet to the board. If there is any question about your weight, mention your current weight in a letter to the board.

• Write a letter to the board president. In it detail documents that are missing from your fiche, such as OERs or education records. If your weight is near the maximum allowable for your height, state your current weight. If you have a maximum allowable weight from the "pinch test" that exceeds what is allowed in the tables, attach a copy of the MAW statement as an enclosure.

If your fiche does not contain proof of the education required for promotion, tell the board you have completed the requirement, and attach a copy of the proof—DA 1059 or your diploma. If you are working on military education beyond that required, mention this as well.



Daring Books (2020 Ninth Street, S.W., Canton, Ohio 44706) sent us recently a number of its publications we think you will find interesting and useful:

• CADENCES: THE JODY CALL BOOK NUMBER 1, edited by Sandee Shaffer Johnson (1986. 160 Pages. $3.95, Softbound). This is an upgraded version of Johnson's 1983 publication. Although its appearance is different, its contents are the same.

• CADENCES: THE JODY CALL BOOK NUMBER 2, edited by Sandee Shaffer Johnson (1986. 160 Pages. $3.95, Softbound). This second book of Jody calls includes a number of calls from Navy and Marine sources. As in Book 1, the calls are grouped by chapters, the titles of which give a clue to the type of calls found in each—"big, bold and brave," "short timers fever," and "'Nam to now." There may be a few duplications, but not enough to worry about. (Johnson has plans for another cadence book, one that will probably include chants from other countries.)

• THE CONDUCT OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN MALAYA. A Daring Battle Book (1985. 290 Pages. $8.95, Softbound). This is a straight reprint of a 1961 British field manual; its title is self-explanatory. It is also the third edition of a manual that was first published in 1952 and updated six years later. The manual contains the lessons learned by the British forces during their nine years of fighting in the jungles of Malaya (now Malaysia), lessons that are as valuable today as they were 25 years ago.

• DOUBLE WINNERS OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR, by Raymond J. Tassin (1986. 224 Pages. $15.95). Only 19 U.S. fighting men — five soldiers, seven sailors, and seven Marines — have each won two Medals of Honor. In this informative and readable book, the author, chairman of the journalism department of Central State University in Oklahoma, recreates the events surrounding each of the double awards and tells us something about the men who earned them. Only three U.S. Army enlisted soldiers have ever received two Medals of Honor; all six of those medals were earned during the Indian Wars of the 1870s. Thomas Ward "Tom" Custer, who died with his brother George at the Little Big Horn in 1876, was the first double winner of the medal.

The author notes that only 3 of the 19 men were killed in action, only one while earning the medal; 14 were career servicemen; only 10 were born in the United States; and the highest ranking double winner was a major at the time he earned his second award.

• AMERICAN PRESIDENTS: FASCINATING FACTS, STORIES, AND QUESTIONS OF OUR CHIEF EXECUTIVES, by Richard L. McElroy, with illustrations by Walt Neal (1984. 168 Pages. Softbound). Filled with questions (and answers), anecdotes, and the author's personal ranking of our presidents in several categories, this book is particularly appealing during this period of our history when we are preparing to celebrate the bicentennial of our Constitution.

We have also received a number of interesting historical reference books from the Sterling Publishing Company (2 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016):

• VIETNAM WEAPONS HANDBOOK, by David Rosser-Owen (1986. 136 Pages. $6.95, Softbound).

• U.S. ARMY UNIFORMS: EUROPE, 1944-1945, by Cameron P. Laughlin and John P. Langellier (1986. 68 Pages. $5.95, Softbound).

• THE PARAS: THE BRITISH PARACHUTE REGIMENT, by James G. Shortt (1985. 72 Pages. $5.95, Softbound).

• ALLIED TANKS ITALY: WORLD WAR TWO, by Bryan Perrett (1986. 64 Pages. $5.95, Softbound).

• U.S. TANK DESTROYERS OF WORLD WAR II, by Stephen J. Zaloga (1986. 64 Pages. $5.95, Softbound).

• UNITED STATES TANKS OF WORLD WAR II, by George Forty. A reprint of the 1983 book of the same title (1986. 160 Pages. $9.95, Softbound).

• ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES, 1948 TO THE PRESENT, by Lee Russell and Sam Katz (1986. 68 Pages. $5.95, Softbound).

Here are a number of our longer reviews:

THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR: A SHORT POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY, 1954-1975. By William S. Turley (Westview Press, 1986. 238 Pages. $24.95). Reviewed by Doctor Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

From a dearth just a few years ago, today several good textbooks are available on the Vietnam War. Some of the best include those by George Herring, Stanley Karnow, Thomas Boettcher, James Pinckney Harrison, and Paul Kattenberg. The problem with many, however, is the same as that for courses on Vietnam — the division between the Asian specialists and the Americanists. Most Vietnam courses and most texts, therefore, tend to lean heavily to one side or the other: Vietnamese perspectives or American concerns with the war.

Finally, we have an excellent text that has the proper balance. Professor Turley is one of the nation's leading experts on Vietnamese politics and the communist movement. From his personal experience in Vietnam — exchange professor at Saigon University in 1972-1973, Fulbright scholar in Thailand between 1982 and 1984, and two visits to North Vietnam since 1975 — and his extensive use of Vietnamese sources, Turley sets the American experience within the context of Vietnamese politics. He focuses on the experiences, strategies, leadership, and internal politics of both South Vietnam and the communist forces and interprets the dynamics of American actions.

His book is a model of judicious, insightful scholarship that is quite suitable for the general reader as well. Turley has

managed to take a very large topic and present it in a concise but very complete manner. The concluding chapter, "Of Lessons and Their Price," and the bibliographic essay are particularly valuable elements. I recommend this marvelous book most enthusiastically.

THE STRAW GIANT, TRIUMPH AND FAILURE: AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES. By Arthur T. Hadley (Random House, 1986. 315 Pages. $19.95).

Wham! Bam! Pow! Hit 'em again!

And Arthur T. Hadley, World War II tanker and a journalist since, does just that as he pounds away at the U.S. military establishment. He thinks little of the way that establishment is organized and operated; thinks even less of the men and women who run it now and ran it before; and traces many of today's ills to the 1920s and 1930s when the military services were forced to survive on the few goodies thrown their way by presidents and congresses.

He devotes the bulk of his book, however, to post-World War II days and the unification of the services, something he feels has been an abject failure. He fills his pages with horror stories about interservice and intraservice rivalries, less than competent and far too numerous civilian appointees who remain but a short time and move on, egotistical and undisciplined generals and admirals, micromanagement at the presidential level, and research and development efforts gone awry. Marines in particular will not like this book, because Hadley is not kind to them.

An old saying among those who have served any time at all in the Pentagon goes something like this: "The U.S. Government looks better the farther from Washington you get." And while Hadley says some things that need to be said, his nearness to Washington, its politics, and its minions for too many years is all too apparent.

SOLDIERS: A HISTORY OF MEN IN BATTLE. By John Keegan and Richard Holmes (Viking, 1986. 288 Pages. $22.95). Reviewed by Colonel Rolfe A. Hillman, United States Army Retired.

Please do not judge this book by its cover, which features a sturdy Infantry captain looking properly apprehensive as he leads a file of soldiers across a rice paddy. In fact, while one of its 13 chapters is indeed titled "Infantry," the book covers many other military subjects in a time span from before the sword of Gideon up to the recent Falklands War. The subject categories include people, concepts, and things — tanks, artillery, experience of battle, sinews of war, fighting spirit.

The book was assembled as a companion volume to a British Broadcasting Company television series of the same name, which, as far as we can determine, will not be shown in the United States. Accordingly, the text is supported by photographic and art illustrations of a quantity and quality that qualify the book as both informative and decorative for a small coffee table. The illustrations also follow what appears to be a recent vogue: they confront the reader with high body counts and the full graphics of battlefield finality.

A browser will find the book uncluttered by documentation, although those pursuing special byways of military history will wish the clutter had been there. In either case, the book is not burdened by a reviewer's personal conviction that it must forthwith be declared required reading.

SHERMAN'S MARCH AND VIETNAM. By James Reston, Jr. (Macmillan, 1984. 323 Pages. $14.95). Reviewed by Doctor Mike Fisher, University of Kansas.

Reflections on the Vietnam war experience continue to generate a growing body of historical, fictional, analytical, and critical body of literature. This is a contribution to the latter category.

The author draws on our Civil War antecedents to condemn what he sees as the ethical misconduct of the civilian and military leaders of the United States during the Vietnam war. He finds this same leadership responsible for the post-Vietnam disillusionment, divisiveness, and bitterness that he sees as the war's principal legacy.

As a vehicle for his narrative, Reston traces General William T. Sherman's march through present-day Georgia and the Carolinas from Tunnel Hill, Georgia, to Bennett Place, North Carolina. But several problems flaw this book. First, the diverse complexities and differences of the Civil and Vietnam wars make any kind of analogy impossible to draw. Second, the author presents as truth the wanton destruction of the Vietnamese land and people by U.S. troops. Here he mistakenly attributes post-traumatic stress disorder to the commission of atrocities rather than to involvement in sustained, intensive combat. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Reston views U.S. involvement in Vietnam through a dark glass, presenting an unbalanced picture of what actually took place there. It is too bad that the author did not use the same care in examining the Vietnam war as he did in analyzing Sherman's Civil War battlefields.

Reston's criticism may anger veterans and confuse younger soldiers. But the central question of military ethics, though misaddressed by the author, should not be ignored. Too often, time tends to obscure the harsh realities and inevitable horrors of war, masking them with a fragile mixture of glory and romanticism.

Professional infantrymen understand the need to listen carefully to the echoes of the past as they prepare daily for the ultimate test that combat provides. In that arena, the moral and ethical stan-

dard of the individual will be sorely tested.

PERSHING: GENERAL OF THE ARMIES. By Donald Smythe (Indiana University Press, 1986. 399 Pages. $27.50). Reviewed by Captain Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

The story of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I and its commander, General John J. Pershing, are forever entwined in the history of the United States' noble effort to "make the world safe for democracy."

Donald Smythe has been studying and researching Pershing's life for almost three decades, and his current work is the sequel to his 1973 book, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing,* and completes his biography of this almost legendary soldier.

The book begins with Pershing's selection to command the AEF shortly after the U.S. entered the war in April 1917. Pershing grew in maturity and competence as the war progressed, as did the AEF, the evolution of which Smythe tells about in rich detail. Smythe makes magnificent use of unpublished manuscripts, interviews, correspondence, and oral reminiscences in addition to published sources to tell his story.

Although he is an obvious admirer of his subject, Smythe's work has been done with great objectivity, including details concerning Pershing's personal life. He does not try to cover up allegations of Pershing's fathering illegitimate children in the Philippines, his two cases of gonorrhea contracted when he was a younger man, or his surreptitious relationship with Micheline Resco, which started in 1917 and to whom Pershing was secretly wed in 1946.

One of the major contributions of the book is the clarification of the issues that seriously divided the Americans from the British and French concerning the use of the American forces in France.

Overall, the book is a model of clarity, scholarship, incisiveness, and readability. It has a 41-page section of notes and a 33-page bibliography, plus photographs of the major personalities of the day and outstanding, easy-to-read maps. It is an indispensable and authoritative reference for anyone interested in Pershing and in the AEF and the role the U.S. played in the "war to end all wars."

THE 1987 MILITARY HISTORY CALENDAR. By Raymond Lyman (Paladin Press, 1986. $8.95).

Perhaps this particular item should not be in a book review section, but we think it merits a place here because this is not only a calendar, it is also a military history lesson, what with its historical photographs and almost daily entries. History buffs would welcome this as a gift.

THE SOVIET AIRBORNE EXPERIENCE. By Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz. Research Survey Number 4 (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984. 211 Pages. Softbound). Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

Airborne operations form an important part of the Soviet military doctrine of deep battle. Although this surprises many, it is not a recent development in Soviet military theory. Despite the highly publicized uses of airborne forces by the United States, Great Britain, and Germany during World War II, the Soviets also used their airborne forces actively during the war years.

The author of this research survey is a Soviet area specialist who has written his monograph to clarify this little known facet of Soviet military operations. After discussing the Soviet airborne efforts during the 1920s and 1930s, the author uses most of his pages to cover the various actions by Soviet airborne forces during the war years. He provides a thorough discussion of each major engagement that involved the use of airborne troops along with excellent diagrams that detail both Soviet and German movements. The remainder of the book covers airborne developments since the end of World War II.

Colonel Glantz's study is a concise look at a critical aspect of present-day Soviet military operations and the foundation on which it was built. It provides a basis for further study and research. The bibliography and footnotes are extensive — they include both Soviet and Western sources — and an appendix containing ten colored maps is quite useful.

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We do not sell books. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS, 1986-87. 12th Edition. Edited by Ian V. Hogg (Jane's Publishing, 1986. 991 Pages. $136.00).

This latest edition of the standard and indispensable reference work on Infantry weapons and related ammunition and equipment has two new features — a multi-lingual (English, French, German, Italian) glossary of technical terms that are used in describing firearms, and an index of manufacturers along with their full addresses and telephone and telex numbers. It also has the usual addenda section (seven plus pages this time) that includes information on various weapons and pieces of equipment that arrived after the main part of the book had been set.

Otherwise, the book contains the usual detailed information on point target and area weapons and ammunition, antiarmor and antiaircraft weapons, electronics and optics, training aids and simulators, body armor, and national inventories.

In his foreward, the editor, Ian Hogg, discusses a few of the latest developments in infantry weapons and ammunition, including the "pencil tracer" bullet developed by a U.S. firm. Hogg believes this bullet is "more accurate, more consistent in its burning, brighter and easier to spot than any conventional tracer."

GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE MILITARY WRITING. By William A. McIntosh (Stackpole Books, 1986. 223 Pages. $14.95, Paperback). Reviewed by Ms. Marie Edgerton, Deputy Editor, INFANTRY Magazine.

The author is an Army lieutenant colonel and a permanent professor of English at the United States Military Academy. He is in a position, therefore, to be well acquainted with military writing at its best and at its worst.

He discusses the Army's 1985 regula-

tion called *The Army Writing Program*, a program that was developed at West Point. He calls it "not particularly unusual" except for two things — its own economy of language and its announced "standard by which a piece of writing will be judged." He says, "The essence of the regulation is this: Effective writing can be understood in a single rapid reading, and it is generally free of grammatical errors."

McIntosh's basic motto for the military writer is "I will write only when I must." In other words, the writer should see whether there may be an alternative method of communication that he can use short of writing.

McIntosh also calls for a less formal style in military writing, which in the past has generally forbidden such things as contractions and personal pronouns. And it has used the passive voice excessively. *Please* and *thank you* were strictly forbidden.

The author not only advocates using active voice (as most other teachers of writing do) but also urges military writers to use those previously forbidden constructions. This will be a real breakthrough if it catches on.

The grammar and usage section of the book is pretty much like others of the civilian variety, but may be useful nevertheless. One always feels, however, that books of this kind are essentially "preaching to the converted" — that the only people who read them are those who are already fairly competent writers concerned about the finer points of their craft.

One annoying thing about the book is the author's use of feminine pronouns instead of the masculine *he, his, him* normally used in the generic sense. In bending over backward to avoid sounding sexist, he is oddly guilty of a kind of reverse sexism. In a military context this comes across as highly artificial, especially when no woman has been mentioned.

All in all, the book, with the *New Army Writing Program*, calls for clear, simple, straightforward communication, just as the civilian world has for many years. And it's about time.

JANE'S MAIN BATTLE TANKS. Second Edition. By Christopher F. Foss (Jane's Publishing, 1986. 208 Pages. $22.00).

This new edition (the first edition was published in 1983) contains updated development histories, complete lists of variants, and full specifications of all of the main battle tanks in service in the world. The author, Christopher Foss, also includes details of some of the new designs that may enter service in the 1990s. As is usual with all of the Jane's series of reference books, this one, too, has hundreds of selected photographs and line drawings.

Unfortunately, without a table of contents and running heads it is difficult for a reader to wend his way through the book without resorting to frequent glances at the index.

WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By Philippe Contamine. Translated by Michael Jones (Basil Blackwell, 1984. 387 Pages. $29.95). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

The author, a professor of history at the University of Paris, has written an interesting and well documented history of military activity in the Middle Ages. It is a welcome addition to a previously neglected period of military history. For some scholars of military history, writers such as B.H. Liddell Hart, the military significance of the Middle Ages is dismissed in just a few short lines. Contamine's study places the military activity of that era in historical perspective.

Contamine shows that from the decline of the Roman Empire to the rise of the modern nation state (c. 1500 A.D.), the Middle Ages were not merely the "Dark Ages." To the contrary, it was a period of significant military development in terms of organization, tactics, armaments, and social attitudes toward warfare.

Since the author is French, it is only natural that his yardstick for measuring the cultural development of warfare is France. He points out that the Middle Ages represented a period of transition in which armies began to develop as coherent organizations with the rudiments of bureaucracy and specialized divisions of labor.

One of the enduring legacies of the Middle Ages was the development of the doctrine of a "just war." While such a doctrine was later subverted to justify dynastic wars, the contemporary student of military history will recognize similarities in the current policy followed by the United States.

Warfare during most of the Middle Ages was unique. The real problem for medieval powers in waging war was not in assembling forces but in maintaining such forces in the field for any length of time.

The book is well researched, contains an extensive bibliography, and has an impressive collection of prints and drawings.

JANE'S MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS. Seventh Edition. By R.J. Raggett (Jane's Publishing, 1986. 878 Pages. $140.00).

Like its predecessors this volume covers the wide range of military communications equipment that can be found in service with military, naval, and air forces throughout the world.

It is divided into four major parts, the first of which is the largest by far covering as it does the many items of equipment such as ground-based and air-based radios, tactical ground radios, airborne radios, and line communications. The other parts are devoted to the major systems, appendixes, and indexes. There are also addenda that update the main part of the book.

The author's foreward is particularly interesting, discussing as it does the Soviet's inferior electronic technology. But he also points out that the Soviets do not take the same approach to military communications as the Western countries and that they do not rely on the ready availability of radio communications. All in all he makes a number of interesting points that our Infantry leaders should seriously consider in their own planning for active operations.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COUNTERING TERRORISM. Office of the Vice President of the United States, 1986. 44 Pages. $3.25, Softbound. USGPO S/N 040-000-00494-7.

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE: THE QUEST FOR UNITY OF COMMAND. By Thomas A. Cardwell III. Air University, 1986. Reprint of 1984 Edition. 208 Pages. $4.50, Softbound. USGPO S/N 008-070-00520-4.

LESSONS OF GRENADA. U.S. Department of State, 1986. 28 Pages. $1.25, Softbound. USGPO S/N 044-000-02109-9.

MODERN AMERICAN ARMOR: COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY TODAY. By Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop. Sterling, 1986. 88 Pages. $12.95.

THE AIRBORNE SOLDIER. By John Weeks. Sterling, 1985 Reprint of the 1982 Edition. 192 Pages. $7.95, Softbound.

LINCOLN FINDS A GENERAL: A MILITARY STUDY OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOLUME ONE. By Kenneth P. Williams. A Reprint of the 1949 Edition. Indiana University Press, 1985. 443 Pages. $10.95, Softbound.

BOLDNESS BE MY FRIEND. By Richard Pape. St. Martin's Press, 1985. 422 Pages. $11.95.

OVER THE HUMP. By Lieutenant General William H. Tunner. USAF Warrior Series. New Imprint of the 1964 Edition. 368 Pages. $8.00, Softbound. USGPO S/N 008-070-00557-3.

THE KNIGHTS OF CHRIST. Text by David Nicolle, Color Plates by Angus McBride. Osprey, 1984. Men-at-Arms Series 154. 40 Pages. $7.95, Softbound.

OBA: THE LAST SAMURAI, SAIPAN, 1944-1945. By Don Jones. Presidio Press, 1986. 241 Pages. $16.95.

ILLUSTRATED CATALOG OF CIVIL WAR MILITARY GOODS. By Schuyler, Hartley and Graham. A Dover republication, slightly altered, of the 1864 Edition. Dover Publications, 1985. 146 Pages. $9.95, Softbound.

THE RED DEVILS FROM BRUNEVAL TO THE FALKLANDS. New Edition. By G.G. Norton. Hippocrene Books, 1986. 310 Pages. $17.95.

THE PURGE: THE PURIFICATION OF FRENCH COLLABORATORS AFTER WORLD WAR II. By Herbert R. Lottman. William Morrow, 1986. 332 Pages. $19.95.

THE CIA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. By Scott D. Breckinridge. Westview Press, 1986. 364 Pages. $30.00.

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