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# Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM



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A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

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## FRONT COVER

With this issue we complete our 62d year of service to the United States Infantryman. We look forward to the challenges of the coming years as the Infantryman prepares to do what he has always done — fight, or prepare to fight, on the ground, for the ground.

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
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# Commandant's NOTE



MAJOR GENERAL SAM WETZEL

## LEADERSHIP AT THE LIEUTENANT LEVEL

Leadership has been the heart and soul of the military profession since men first organized and armed themselves to defend their homelands. There is certainly nothing new, therefore, in the notion that the proper exercise of leadership is absolutely essential to the well-being of both small and large military units.

The Infantry School is in the vanguard of those who believe that outstanding leadership is a positive force that can enable the Army to succeed in all its operations, including combat. In fulfilling our responsibility to promote leadership, we begin at the beginning — with the students of the Infantry Officer Basic Course. It is during this branch qualification process that the tone of leadership development is set and that the enduring values and solemn responsibilities of our profession are instilled. It is here that we try to see that our prospective platoon leaders have the soldierly qualities, that they embody the Army ethic, and that they can exercise the principles of leadership.

The 16-week Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) includes in its curriculum 201 hours of classroom instruction and 727 hours of field and range training. Some aspect of leadership training is present in each of these hours.

In developing and evaluating the students' leadership abilities, the IOBC curriculum uses all of their training — physical, mental, and interpersonal skills and professional knowledge. For example, to graduate, students must pass the Army Physical Readiness Test, complete a 12-mile road march in three hours or less, and be able to function effectively, with little sleep, during high-intensity field training exercises up to 11 days in length. They must demonstrate their proficiency in dismounted drill and command voice as part of the IOBC "School of the Leader" program. In addition, the students are required to present satisfactory periods of instruction on physical training and soldier's manual tasks and to complete all the 11B MOSC soldier's manual tasks themselves through skill level 4.

To further their knowledge of military leadership and to build upon the knowledge they gained during their precommissioning training, the students are given 29 hours of classroom leadership instruction in subjects such as decision-making, planning, and counseling. This instruction includes six hours of counseling workshops in which the students conduct soldier counseling and, in the process, refine the interpersonal skills and techniques they have learned in the classroom.

Because the ultimate goal of IOBC is to turn out a qualified Infantry platoon leader, the students are required to serve in

numerous leadership positions during the course, from squad leader through platoon leader. These positions are in garrison and tactical field training, in both blank and live fire exercises. Before they are allowed to graduate and report to their first unit of assignment, the students must demonstrate the proper use of troop-leading procedures, the proper technical and tactical expertise, and the ability to make decisions.

The key to developing the leadership skills of the lieutenants in IOBC is proper feedback and counseling. The cadre members — usually one captain and two senior NCOs per 40-man platoon — give the students this feedback and counseling. After completing a leadership position, each student is counseled on his actual performance, on his demonstrated strengths and weaknesses, and on what he needs to do to improve.

The format for the performance counseling is derived from the Leadership Assessment and Development Program that is used by ROTC and OCS. Thus, the performance counseling format and the terminology remain consistent and well-understood by the students throughout their Military Qualification Skills (MQS) I and II training.

In addition to receiving counseling on his leadership positions, each student is counseled on his total performance in IOBC during the sixth, eleventh, and sixteenth weeks of the training cycle. Furthermore, the students of each IOBC platoon conduct peer ratings in these same time periods; the results of these ratings are discussed during the counseling sessions. Thus, throughout the course a student officer is periodically presented an overall evaluation of his individual performance, his group relationships, and his leadership ability, with recommendations for improvement.

The Infantry School has a solemn and explicit contract to initiate in this course a developmental process that will give our Infantry units platoon leaders who are filled with a sense of pride and professionalism, confident in their ability to perform their skills in combat and motivated to command high-performance units.

Good leadership that is based on strength, knowledge, common sense, and sensitivity is the truest measure of a unit's overall combat readiness. The Infantry School enthusiastically accepts and actively exercises its critical responsibility to mold the Infantry leaders of the future.

Practice combined arms!

# INFANTRY NEWS



THE 4TH AIRBORNE TRAINING BATTALION at Fort Benning, Georgia, trains thousands of soldiers each year to become paratroopers. The training is tough and demanding, and it calls for soldiers with a high degree of motivation and physical conditioning.

To qualify to attend the Basic Airborne Course, a soldier must volunteer, must have 12 months of active duty service remaining upon completion of the course, must meet the physical qualifications for parachute duty established in AR 40-501, and must be less than 36 years of age at the date of application. (Field grade officers, warrant officers in the ranks of WO 3 and 4, and enlisted personnel in the rank of sergeant/specialist 5 or higher may obtain waivers for age with favorable recommendations from medical doctors.)

In addition, enlisted personnel must have completed basic and advanced individual training or the equivalent, and must not have lost more than 30 days under Section 972, United States Code, during their current enlistment.

All applicants must achieve the following scores on the Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT): Men must do 45 pushups, 45 situps, and complete the two-mile run in 15:59 for a total of 206 points. Women must do 21 pushups, 32 situps, and run two miles in 17:55 for a total of 218 points.

Commanders who select personnel to attend the Basic Airborne Course should refer to AR 614-110 and AR 614-200 for additional information regarding the selection and processing of volunteers for airborne training. They are reminded that airborne training is not for everyone; they should make sure the students they

select stand a good chance of succeeding.

Students must have in their possession when they arrive at Fort Benning a copy of their medical records, with certification that they are qualified for airborne training, and a copy of their official orders. Students who do not have these items with them will not be admitted to the course.

Any student who arrives at Fort Benning in top physical condition and with a high degree of motivation and an eagerness to learn stands a good chance of graduating from the Basic Airborne Course.

A NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM exhibit recently installed in the Pentagon has as its theme "Two Centuries of Proud History." The exhibit, which will remain on display near the office of the Secretary of the Army through November, includes almost 200 items showing the development of weapons, uniforms, and equipment used by the infantryman over the past 207 years.

Firearms from the flintlock musket of the Revolutionary War to the M16 used in Vietnam are on display, along with edged weapons ranging from swords and bayonets to a rare

paratrooper's switchblade knife used during World War II.

The uniforms in the display are all authentic, from an 18th century Massachusetts militia uniform to the "pinks and greens" used in the 1940s to the camouflaged battle dress uniform of today.

In addition to the essential military equipment such as entrenching tools, powder horns, battle streamers, rations, drums and horns, and gas masks, there are artifacts that highlight the human or personal side of a soldier's life. These include such items as coffee cups, playing cards, barber equipment, a soap dish, a hymnal, a prayer book, and photographs from home.

The backdrop for the display features an award-winning photograph of the famous Fort Benning "Follow Me" statue.

In other news from the Museum, the annual Infantry Museum road race was held for the second time this year with the proceeds going to the National Infantry Museum Society Fund to be used for the renovation of the Museum's third floor.

Additional information about the Museum and the Museum Society and its various projects, including next year's road race, may be obtained from the Curator, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, telephone 404/544-4762 or AUTOVON 784-4762.

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THE DISTINGUISHED DOUGHBOY Award is presented each year to an individual who has been instrumental in improving the morale and welfare of the infantryman.

Bill Mauldin, famed author and cartoonist, is the 1982 recipient of the

award and was honored at the National Infantry Ball, which was held in Washington, D.C. on 13 November 1982.

The award, established in 1980, is a brass-plated, World War I doughboy helmet mounted on a walnut base that is decorated with crossed rifles. The previous honorees were Bob Hope in 1980 and H. Ross Perot in 1981.

The nominating committee, which is chaired by the Chief, Infantry Branch, MILPERCEN, realizes that individuals who deserve to be recognized may have been overlooked during the nominating process. Accordingly, any infantryman may nominate a candidate for the 1983 award.

The following criteria are used in selecting the recipient:

- The award is presented to an individual, not to an organization, in recognition of that person's direct efforts to aid the infantryman.

- The award is not presented posthumously except when the recipient dies after being selected.

- Active duty military members are not eligible for the award.

- Civilian executives who are active in the defense establishment are not eligible for the award.


- The recipient must not be directly involved or affiliated with an organization that has defense industry contracts.

- The recipient does not have to be present to accept the award.

The final selection is made by the Commander of the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning.

The name of any individual who meets the above criteria and who has rendered great personal service to the morale and welfare of the Infantryman should be submitted to HQ MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPE-1 (Major Warren), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22332 as soon as possible.


A SOLDIER TESTS A decontamination apparatus in sub-zero temperatures at the Army's Cold



Regions Test Center, Fort Greely, Alaska.

Evaluation Command installations and activities in the United States and the Republic of Panama.

The Center is one of nine Test and



A FIRE SUPPORT TEAM VEHICLE (FIST-V) is shown as it undergoes engineering design testing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.

The test program included automotive, durability, environmental, and mission performance testing.

IN SEPTEMBER 1981, Army Extension Training (AET) distributed a series of new publications, the Extension Training Materials (ETM) catalogs, which were identified as DA pamphlets in the 350 series. These catalogs listed the available extension training materials. There were 77 different books for specific ARTEPs and TOEs. A consolidated listing of MOSS (DA Pamphlet 350-100) was also distributed to TDA units.


All of these ETM catalogs have been updated and distributed to the field. Some additional catalogs to support new ARTEPs have also been distributed. The new editions were distributed in the same way they were distributed last year.

Units that did not receive the initial distribution of the ETM catalog should advise the Army Training Support Center (ATSC), ATTN: ATIC-AET-IO, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604. Requests for additional copies should be addressed to U.S. Army AG Publications, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220. The following information should be included: unit name and address; unit identification code (UIC); unit ARTEP, TOE, TDA; and point of contact (person and telephone number).

A GEORGIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD unit, the 48th Infantry Brigade, recently received 51 M901 improved TOW vehicles (ITVs) and 70 M60A3 tanks. The brigade was one of the National Guard units to obtain new, tactical equipment. It was selected to get the new equipment because in the event of mobilization it will become the third maneuver brigade of the 24th Infantry Division, a part of the Rapid Deployment Force.

THE ARMY RECENTLY ACCEPTED the first of more than 300 multiple launch rocket systems that it plans to buy in the coming months.

This is a highly mobile automatic rocket system that permits its crew of



three, with a minimum amount of training, to shoot a complete 12-rocket load accurately, reload quickly, and fire again. Its surface-to-surface unguided rockets have a range of more than 30 kilometers (18 miles) and can deliver a massive amount of firepower against enemy forces.

The launch vehicle has a sophisticated fire control computer and a position-determining system that make it the most accurate artillery rocket system in the world today.

THE FIRST PRODUCTION UNIT of the Army's new AN/MSQ-103A TEAMPACK radar monitoring system was recently completed.

The TEAMPACK system is housed in a ballistically protected shelter and



is then mounted on an XM-1015 tracked vehicle. The system can be mounted on an M35 utility truck, a light armored vehicle, a jeep, and on other types of vehicles.

Surveillance, air defense, mortar, and artillery ground-based radars are all detectable by TEAMPACK. Some of the improvements it has over the earlier systems of its type are improved reliability, better crew protection, and growth features that will enable it to be used well into the future.

ARMY ENGINEERS AT THE Chemical Systems Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, are developing a portable decontamination apparatus for use on Army vehicles.

Known as the XM13, the portable decontamination apparatus is designed to dispense a standard chemical decontamination solution. It permits the field soldier to cover selected surfaces of a vehicle with a decontaminant, scrub with a brush, and continue his mission.

The lightweight apparatus consists of a prefilled decontaminant container, a manual pump, a hose wand, and an attachable brush. It weighs less than 60 pounds when filled.

Army officials expect the XM13 to be fielded in 1984 after a series of developmental, operational, and production tests.

A TOTAL SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE (SHORAD) system was recently shown for the first time as part of a series of field training exercises by the 9th Infantry Division.

The overall system is composed of a towed Chaparral surface-to-air missile system, a shoulder-fired Saber beamrider missile, a towed light Sergeant York (DIVAD) 40mm gun, and a truck-mounted platoon coordination center that has a Sergeant York gun radar and a fire control system. It has been designed as a lightweight system for rapid deployment by future Army light infantry divisions.

# FORUM & FEATURES



## Building A Team

DANDRIDGE M. MALONE

War sure isn't a game, but thinking about games can sure help you learn about war.

Think about a football team — think about what it does, and how it operates. Now see if you can come up with a half-dozen examples that show how a football team is something like a unit on the battlefield. That ought to give you a pretty good idea of how teamwork works, on either the playing field or the battlefield.

How do you build a team? Let me lay out for you, first, an overall team-building strategy, and second, a number of specific how-to's for doing what one of those principles of leadership tells you do to — train your men as a team.

Fire team leaders build teams out of their subordinate individual soldiers. Squad leaders and above build teams out of subordinate leaders and their teams. In either case, there is one simple overall leadership strategy for building a team. It is an overall way of operating, not a specific how-to, and it has two requirements.

A leader must constantly, on a day-to-day basis, do things and say things that will convince each individual team member that he is a part of a whole team — not just any old part,

but an essential part, a part that other individuals depend upon to get their work done, and that the whole team depends upon to get its work done.

The second requirement of the strategy is that a leader must do and say things daily to convince the individual team members that their



wants, needs, hopes, and goals are tied to the team's performance, output, and work. Each individual team member will usually operate in his own best interest. He'll do what he thinks is best for him. That doesn't sound too admirable, but it's a fact of human nature. In building a team, what a leader has to do is to convince each team member that the best way for him to get what he wants is through what the team does.

In essence, this team-building leadership strategy says:

- Convince each team member that the other team members and the team as a whole are dependent on him.
- Convince him that much of the whole business of reward and punishment, for him, is tied to the output or performance of the team he belongs to.

Building the complex kind of team that a battlefield requires is tough. A leader sure can't get it by asking for it or by just giving an order. It takes time, and thinking ahead, and the sixth principle of leadership: Know your soldiers and what's inside each one.

Beyond the general strategy, there is no step-by-step procedure that is very practical for company-level leaders to use. But there are about ten good team-building techniques that have come from experience and research. They've been around for a couple of thousand years and they'll work for captains, lieutenants, and sergeants.

**Use drills.** The best way to build the kind of team a unit needs is the way that's probably already obvious — use drills. Dismounted drill is good, but the best drills for the kind



of teamwork a unit needs most are spelled out in the ARTEPs. If a unit can't get out in the woods, then it should walk through an ARTEP on an open field. (I wonder if a unit could have an ARTEP parade?) If a unit can't do that, then it should try a blackboard, or a terrain model, or a map.

Drills must always be critiqued, and the performance of the team, and how each individual team member contributed — or failed to contribute — to the team's performance must be discussed. The specific places where the coordination and the timing of individuals and teams worked and didn't work should also be pointed out.

**Use stress.** High stress and heavy pressures applied to the whole team will build teamwork. That's a fact. The trick is to do it right. Events, exercises, and activities that are extreme challenges, and that demand a hardcore, all-out effort by the team and by each team member, will build teamwork. Add danger and that teamwork gets even stronger. The high stress of battle puts teams together so well — sometimes in just a few hours — that they continue to have annual get-togethers for years after the war is over.

In training, a unit should get as close to battlefield stress as it can. If you don't have a war, Captain, try a 100-mile road march; or run 10 miles with weapons, helmets, and LBE; or climb a mountain; or run a super-rough, non-stop, day-and-night, 24-hour battle drill over the worst terrain you can find. Do any or all of these high stress events as a team. Then later, start listening for the bragging and the war stories. About "Us." It'll work. Guaranteed.

**Work by teams.** Get tasks done by teams, rather than by "details." You, First Sergeant, can do a lot about this. Next time the battalion hits you up for "a 10-man detail and one NCO," check into the chain first, but then send a fire team with its own team leader instead of a detail. Chances are good that half as many men, working as a team, can do twice

as much work in half the time. Bet on it. And if you're as smart as I think you are, you'll let the team know you bet.

**Leave teams together.** Whenever there are formations, leave teams together. "Break off and fill it in back there!" may make the platoon formation look better, Lieutenant, but what you're breaking up is a team and teamwork. How units work is more important than how they look. And you're supposed to be a specialist in unit work.

Whenever you, Sergeant, as the leader, must form your men, brief your men, move your men, work your men, critique your men, feed your men, or billet your men, do it the same way you're going to have to fight your men on the battlefield. Do it as a team. You can tell your troops, "Everyone be down at the motor pool at 1300 to clean the tracks." That's the way a Boy Scout leader might try to do it. It may (or may not) get them all there by somewhere around 1330. And, Sergeant, if you do it that way, you've just lost one of those valuable day-to-day opportunities to keep working on teamwork. Instead, form your soldiers as a squad in the company area, march them to the motor pool, in step, stand them at ease, give them their instructions with something like a 3- or 4-minute version of the five-paragraph field order (including standards in the mission part), supervise the fire team leaders, keep the whole squad at it until the whole job is done, form them up again, critique their performance as a team, march the whole squad back to the company area, and only then turn them loose to be individuals.

If you as the leader can keep your subordinates working and living as a team in their day-to-day activities, those ARTEP drills will automatically come out far better, and so will that thing that we call The Company when it fights on the battlefield.

**Move men on manning boards, not names.** Up on the wall in the orderly room or the C.O.'s office, there's a manning board. It probably looks like nothing more than a chart

covered with acetate and filled in with a grease pencil, but it is the main tool for building and maintaining teamwork. The First Sergeant and the platoon leaders will be making the primary recommendations about who goes where, but the C.O. will be making the decisions. Never move a name around, Captain, without first thinking about the effect on teamwork and the team. When you move names around in an attempt to even out strength figures, you may be doing the same thing the Lieutenant does when he evens up his platoon formation. The board may look better, but the unit may work worse because you've unintentionally destroyed some of its teamwork power, some of that "extra."

Each time you move a name, what you're really moving is a man, and you're moving him out of his family. More importantly, when you move him, you're moving a part of something bigger. If that something bigger is a smooth-functioning team — a fighting machine — then what you may be doing is pulling out the carburetor. And a carburetor can't be replaced with an oil pump. As a general rule, hold manning board moves to an absolute bare minimum, and always consider first the effect on that team of which the soldier is a part.

**Talk team language.** There is a simple, guaranteed way all leaders can build teamwork. They should simply start using the team words — *we*, *us*, and *our* — instead of the three individual words — *I*, *me*, and *my*. When a leader starts leading by example with his language, his followers will follow. And they'll start talking and thinking more about *us* than about *me*. The first two letters in U.S. Army are US. The last two are "My." Think about it. It isn't a bad philosophy.

**Build team reputation.** Any man worth a damn will work hard to live up to his reputation. So will a team. Whenever a team does something that is both unusual and good, and when the members do it as a team, all the leadership of the whole unit should

know about it. When this happens three or four times, the word will get back to the team. At that point, they'll find out that they do have a reputation to live up to.

**Reward or punish the team.** Whenever a leader supervises a task that requires a high degree of teamwork, like maybe an ARTEP, then he should try to gear his supervision, critique, reward, and punishment to what the team does, more than to what the individuals do. He should do it in such a way that each individual can see clearly that what he wants most (or maybe wants least) depends more on what the team does than on what he does.

Punishing a whole team is extremely effective, but it should be done very carefully. A whole team should be punished when all the hand-offs are too sloppy or too slow, when there's no trust among the parts, or when all the parts get to thinking more about *me* than about *us*.

**Set the example.** Next to drill, the best thing for building teamwork is that all-powerful, all-purpose leadership tool that has been discussed so many times — the fifth principle of leadership: Set the example. It's not hard to do. If you're a squad leader, for example, you probably want your

squad members to believe that for them the squad's mission is the most important thing there is. If you do want them to feel this way, then all you've got to do is show them that for you, the squad leader, the platoon's mission is the most important thing there is.

If you're a squad leader, never complain about the platoon's mission or the platoon leader in front of your followers. If you do, they're going to follow your example and complain about the squad's mission and about you. Do you want your followers to cooperate, work together, and trust each other? Then show them, by example, that that's exactly how you work with other squad leaders. From the motor pool to the battlefield, in any situation, followers will do as their leaders do. Good or bad. That's the plain chemistry of followership.

**Emphasize differences.** Find out what makes one team different from the others, and keep emphasizing those differences. It may be the kind of work they do, or where they do it, or when they do it — whatever makes them different from other teams. This is another way of telling team members that their team is something special, something different, something important.

Want to build teamwork in your company, Captain? Well, one thing that's always different in any unit is the unit's history. Send a letter up through channels and find out what your company did in the last war or two. Then sit down some time and tell the troops about their team at war, and how it fought in wars in the past. No lectures, just a talk and some stories. Do this two or three times, covering two or three wars, and watch what happens with teamwork.

There now, you've got a simple strategy and some simple how-to's for building a team. All of them are easy, common-sense things to do. Will they work? Well, let's go back to where we started, to the football game. Find a team that nearly always wins. Read up on it a little, how it works inside, and what the coach does. What you'll find is the strategy and most of these same how-to's.

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DANDRIDGE M. MALONE, a retired Infantry Colonel, has published numerous articles, books, and technical reports. He holds a master's degree in social psychology from Purdue University and has completed several military schools, including the Armed Forces Staff College. In addition to his infantry leadership assignments, he also served in either staff or faculty assignments at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Army War College

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## A Neglected Skill

CAPTAIN DEREK HARVEY

When a new infantry lieutenant reports to his first assignment, he may know quite a bit about how he is supposed to help his company win in battle, but he often knows very little about another important concern — administration. He may not even

think that administration is very important, because in too many cases, administration is a neglected skill.

Although the infantry officer basic course gives a brief overview of the subject, it does not adequately prepare a lieutenant in the many aspects

of administration that he will encounter. One reason for this lack of emphasis may be simply a lack of resources — time, money, and instructors. But another reason may be that administration is difficult to teach; it not only encompasses a wide variety

of complex tasks, but the typical lieutenant, at this stage in his military career, has no reference point from which to gauge its relative importance. He finds this reference point only through experience in his unit, and it is there that he must learn about administration.

Most of the responsibility for overseeing this aspect of a lieutenant's professional development, therefore, falls on the unit commander, and this in itself can be a problem. If a commander is to impress on a lieutenant the important role the latter is expected to play in the unit's administration, he must first take a look at his own attitudes toward the subject.

Some commanders, for example, tend to belittle the importance of a lieutenant's role in company administration. Too many also vocally condemn staff requirements in general, perceiving such requirements as intrusions on efforts and resources they feel should be devoted to what is really important — training and maintenance. They may even ask aloud, "Just what the hell is important around here anyway?" The answer, of course, is that it is all important, and that is the attitude each commander must convey to his new lieutenants.

But beyond a positive attitude, how does a commander go about seeing that his lieutenants learn what they need to know? First, he should consider starting an informal on-the-job training program so that the lieutenants can develop the skills and knowledge they need to cope with their various duties. Then the commander should demonstrate the importance of administration by emphasizing it, and he should show an interest in what the lieutenants are doing by asking questions, inspecting, and teaching, and by requiring briefings from them on the status of their various programs. This interest will demonstrate better than anything else the importance of good, clear, well-organized, and responsive administration.

If he uses sound management principles, a commander can do all of this without adversely affecting his unit's

ability to accomplish its major missions. In fact, his major missions may profit from improved administration, because sloppy administration can produce some pretty negative results: The company can have poor morale from long hours, late personnel actions, or pay problems; it can require crash programs to pass inspections, which also cause more work, increase pressure, and further affect morale. Without good administration, crisis management becomes the norm, unit problems may surface at higher levels that could have been taken care of at lower levels, and the quality of life in a unit can deteriorate. In addition, a unit may get a bad reputation from the quality of its administrative products.

The unit's annual general inspection and the numerous other inspections it goes through are all easier to prepare for and to undergo when the many administrative areas have been properly managed, organized, and emphasized on a continuing basis.

### SOLDIERS' WELFARE

Especially important are the many areas of administration that let the soldiers know that the system is functioning and that their leaders have a sincere interest in their welfare — such things as finance, pay, counseling, letters of indebtedness, personnel actions, leaves, weight-control programs, legal affairs, re-enlistment, promotion, and equal opportunity. If these matters are handled well, the results will be worth far more than the time that has been invested in them. And when a lieutenant becomes able to answer administrative questions with authority, to recognize and take care of problems, and to initiate actions, he will be better able to take care of his soldiers.

Another sensitive area of administration involves such duties as fire or building inspector, safety officer, maintenance officer, weight-control monitor, and education officer — duties that are usually assigned to a unit's lieutenants as additional duties.

Some of the more seasonal duties might include voting officer or project officer for the Combined Federal Campaign or the Army Emergency Relief Drive

For all of these, a lieutenant needs a good sound grasp of such administrative fundamentals as writing, organizing, and understanding how to use files and regulations. Although files and regulations may seem unimportant to some people, anyone inspecting them can get a pretty good indication of how well that unit is meeting its other requirements.

As much as possible, a company commander should see that all of his lieutenants receive the same opportunities and duties. If he does not, their experience levels will differ considerably. Sometimes a commander is tempted to give certain tasks to the same lieutenant each time, because he knows that lieutenant will always do a good job. Or he may avoid giving any additional duties at all to an especially hard-charging lieutenant because he has more important things for that lieutenant to do. But both of these approaches are wrong; they deny others an opportunity to prove they are just as capable.

A company commander has a tough job, but there are definite rewards that come from dedicating himself to educating and developing his lieutenants in administrative tasks. The net result will be better, more capable subordinates who can then relieve him of some of his pressures and concerns.

In addition, the entire unit will be better off because of improved morale, respect for the chain of command, a better quality of life, more unit cohesion and pride, and improved inspection results. Finally, those outside the unit looking in will see a more professional unit that has its act together.

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# Understrength Platoon

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL S. HACKNEY

Understrength rifle platoons are not a rarity in today's Army. In fact, they are commonplace. In Europe, for example, many mechanized infantry platoons have only 18 to 25 men in them, and the five- or six-man squad is usual. But the basic TOE for a mechanized infantry platoon in Europe calls for 4 M113 APCs, 4 Dragon trackers (one for each vehicle), 4 caliber .50 and 5 M60 machineguns, 6 M203 grenade launchers, 32 M16 rifles, plus radios, night vision devices, and a mass of other equipment.

The problem for a platoon leader in this situation is to know how to combine the men he has with all this equipment in the most effective way so that the platoon can carry out its missions. He must tailor his platoon to allow the utmost individual and squad flexibility while maintaining

unit integrity. One way he can do this is shown in the accompanying chart.

The platoon's headquarters section consists of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant (who rides in a squad APC), and the command track crew, which consists of the crew leader, the radio-telephone operator (RTO), and the driver. When possible during dismounted operations these men also supplement the squads. Their responsibilities, generally, are as follows:


The command track leader, usually a corporal or a sergeant, mans the caliber .50 machinegun and carries a Dragon tracker. He is responsible for the command track vehicle and its crew. When dismounted, he becomes the second team leader for one of the squads. His individual weapon is an M16 rifle.

The RTO is responsible for an M60

machinegun and is the command track's air guard. When mounted he operates the command track radios. During dismounted operations, the company and platoon net radios are carried by the platoon leader and the RTO (armed with an M16 rifle), or by the driver if the RTO must employ the M60 machinegun in support of the platoon's operations.

The driver carries an M16 rifle and serves as the assistant caliber .50 machinegunner. Dismounted, he acts either as an RTO or as a squad automatic rifleman. He should be the most capable driver in the platoon, since he must perform vehicle and equipment maintenance with only limited supervision.

The five- or six-man squad does have many of the capabilities of a full strength squad both in movement and firepower. But because the small



squad must depend heavily on exploiting the full effects of its machineguns, Dragons, and M203s, a squad leader must make sure his men are trained to use the various weapon systems.

**The team leader** is usually a corporal or a sergeant. If his vehicle has one, the team leader must be capable of firing the Dragon system from the vehicular Dragon mount (VDM). He carries an M203 grenade launcher when dismounted. He and his driver are also responsible for operating the vehicle's caliber .50 machinegun and for maintaining the vehicle.

**The driver** carries an M16 rifle, assists with the caliber .50 machinegun, and mans that weapon in stationary or defensive positions when the team leader is away from the vehicle. When dismounted, he carries a Dragon missile and assists another squad member in operating an M60 machinegun.

**The Dragon gunner** carries the Dragon system and is the primary M203 gunner for the squad. He must

also be able to fire the Dragon from the VDM, and, when dismounted, he must know how to fire the Dragon from the M60 machinegun tripod.

**The M60 machinegunner** must be prepared to operate in most situations without an assistant gunner. He also serves as the vehicle's rear security and air guard.

**The automatic rifleman** rounds out a six-man squad. He carries an M16 rifle and serves as an assistant Dragon or M60 gunner as the situation requires.

In a dismounted situation, the team leader should be on the ground, and the driver should man the caliber .50 machinegun. If additional automatic fire is needed, the automatic rifleman can be given the platoon's fifth M60 machinegun, which is usually carried on the command track.

The small squad does have other definite limitations: The Dragon gunners and the team leaders cannot fire their primary weapons and their M203s at the same time; the amount of ammunition the squad can carry is

reduced because of its small size, particularly the number of Dragon missiles, 40mm rounds, and machinegun belts; and the platoon leader and squad leaders with their radios are not as mobile and tend to tire more easily than if they had someone else to carry those sets.

Understrength mechanized infantry platoons can perform many missions ranging from dismounted patrols and ambushes to mounted attacks. But the platoon leaders must know how to adapt their small units to the changing situations in which they will find themselves. By properly tailoring their platoons and deploying their most potent assets, they can use the inherent flexibility of the mechanized platoon to its fullest advantage.

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LIEUTENANT MICHAEL S. HACKNEY, a 1979 ROTC graduate of the University of Alabama, has served as a mechanized infantry platoon leader and an antitank platoon leader. He is now a brigade S3 Air in the 3d Armored Division. He has completed the Airborne and NBC Officer courses.

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## Modernized Line

CAPTAIN HARRY F. NOYES III

It is a pity the Maginot Line has given fixed linear fortifications such a bad name, because new technology now makes it possible for such fortifications to contribute immeasurably — perhaps decisively — to the defense of western Europe against Soviet attack.

Needless to say, I do not envision a literal reconstruction of the pre-World War II French system of concrete caverns and heavy guns.

What I am proposing is that ultra-modern technology — in the form of a semi-automated complex of anti-tank guided missiles and antipersonnel mines — be combined with such ultra-traditional shelters as holes in the ground to create a thicket of depth that any Soviet invasion force would have to penetrate.

This proposed new line, which for want of a better term we can call the "Modernized Line," would differ

from the Maginot Line in two respects:

- It would require relatively few troops and small amounts of equipment and money. Thus, it would supplement, not compete with, the conventional mobile forces upon which our defenses would primarily and quite properly depend.

- It would not generate a defensive mentality. Because it would never be intended as the primary means of

defending western Europe, its very nature would discourage any such notion. It would be a low-cost, attritional barrier that would deprive the Soviet invaders of their most important offensive advantages — the fast start and early momentum — and thus expose them to early counter-attack by armored and mechanized infantry forces.

The Modernized Line would consist of a belt of concealed, unmanned antitank guided missile (ATGM) positions several kilometers deep and running all along NATO's eastern border, with its heaviest concentrations facing the most likely invasion routes. The widest possible variety of concealment modes would be used — building basements, phony structures, parked vehicles, haystacks, tree-top nests, and camouflaged or pop-up ground sites.

Each ATGM would be controlled from a distance by soldiers sheltered in bunkers hundreds of meters from the actual emplacements. Coaxial television cameras would survey the defended terrain and provide the gunner with aiming information, while a redundant system of wire and secure radio links would carry the proper firing commands.

Fire-and-forget technology would improve the system's effectiveness, but there is no reason why the soldiers could not control wire-guided missiles through their TV monitors, if necessary. The effectiveness of the gunners should be very high, because suppressive fire would have virtually no psychological effect on their remotely situated and well-protected shelter. Only a direct hit on a TV camera or a weapon, or rapid and effective smoke dispersal, would save the target. Ground laser designators could also be used to make the system even better.

The ATGM emplacements could be protected from dismounted infantry assault by thickets of command-detonated antipersonnel mines on all sides, which could also be controlled from the bunkers. In any case, even a successful infantry assault would represent a victory for the system,

since any dismounted attack would diminish the enemy's momentum in the crucial early hours of an invasion.

In favored locations, the bunkers might also control command-detonated antitank mines emplaced in the roads, and the use of remote-controlled antiarmor guns and rotary cannon should not be ruled out.

If well-designed, such a line could start knocking off enemy vehicles as soon as they crossed the border and could continue doing so for many kilometers into the interior. In fact, once the fact of an invasion was clearly established, there would be no reason why emplacement close to the border could not reach well across it to destroy follow-up vehicles. Moreover, remote-controlled strongpoints could be constructed at key locations far behind the border, using the same technology to inflict additional

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**This proposed new line would supplement, not compete with, conventional mobile forces.**

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punishment on the foe as he penetrated deeper into friendly countryside.

In addition, it would be technically feasible to use a slightly modified version of the same concept to create a new kind of maneuver force. For example, prefabricated strongpoints using the same technology could be taken to threatened areas by truck and swiftly dug in, using normal engineering resources, as the enemy approached.

One of the advantages of the proposed system would be its requirement for relatively small numbers of soldiers. One soldier could control a large number of ATGMs, for example, especially if fire-and-forget technology was employed. Too, each soldier might be made responsible for several geographically separated concentrations that would be unlikely to acquire targets simultaneously.

Such soldiers would not need to be highly trained, if we can trust the

claims we hear that anyone can learn to use modern ATGMs in a few hours. Certainly a soldier who can fire from the safety of a remote bunker does not need the same kind of "steeling" he would require to face suppressive fire. In fact, this might be an ideal way to use inexperienced draftees or individual ready reservists who had not been given much recent training. It would also be a good way to use established light infantry units whose training and discipline were not in question but whose equipment might not suit them for an effective role in a NATO contingency.


The demands of such a system would not require a lot of money. For the most part, it would call for off-the-shelf technology and off-the-shelf hardware. It would require thousands of ATGMs, a lot of electronics, and a substantial quantity of shovels and concrete. Nevertheless, the requirements would be small compared to most modern defense programs, and the potential return on the investment would be high — the destruction of large numbers of invading vehicles at slight cost in friendly lives, while quite possibly crippling the enemy's timetable and exposing him to decisive counterblows. The deterrent potential alone probably would be worth the cost.

Given the imbalance NATO defensive forces face in Europe, such a remote-controlled defensive line seems to be an option that is at least worthy of serious study. While it should never be regarded as the prime ingredient in NATO defenses, it could provide a major economy-of-force means to redress some of the imbalances. At a low cost in men and materiel, it could slow down an invading force and made it pay a heavy price, and thus reduce the pressure on the main battle forces.

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CPT NOYES B. LIVINGSTON III



# TOMORROW'S RIFLE



The United States infantryman has fought on many battlefields over the years, always doing his best on each with whatever rifle he happened to have at the time. And his potential battlefield continues to change and expand. Through the use of thermal energy, ground surveillance radar, night vision devices, and intrusion warning systems, detection and engagement ranges are increasing in distance but decreasing in time. As a result, the U.S. infantryman will no doubt eventually get a new rifle to carry into battle — and he will need it.

His present rifle, the M16A1, is a good weapon. It is well made, lightweight, and accurate at battlefield ranges. It is handy to shoot, and it disassembles easily. In fact, it is almost everything a marksman or a service support soldier could ask for. Unfortunately, though, it is not designed to fill the basic requirements of the soldier who has to stake his life on it, the infantryman. So we need to begin thinking now about what kind of rifle we would like to have to replace it. We must not leave it to chance, as we have sometimes done in the past.


No matter how much warfare changes, though, the infantryman's war will still be brutal and intimate, and his rifle must be designed with that in mind. He must also believe in its capabilities and should be encouraged to use it. Besides shooting rapidly and accurately every time it is called on, an infantryman's rifle must be able to double as a club, a spear, or a crutch. It may also have to help make a litter, form part of a hasty ladder, or scoop out a hurried fighting position. In short, it must function when everything else has failed.

How should an infantry rifle be made to meet these high expectations? First of all, it cannot be encumbered with a carrying handle. We have all seen the classic example of a soldier running in training, one hand on his helmet and the other clutching his M16 by the carrying handle, like a commuter with his lunch pail chasing a departing bus. The handle makes the weapon easy to carry, but not easy to fire quickly.

A rifle must be built to fit naturally in a carry that lends itself to an attitude and position of readiness. The firing hand must grasp the small of the stock near the trigger, and the off hand must grab it slightly forward of its center of balance. A soldier should have to move only one hand to point and fire his weapon, not both.

Likewise, while a pistol grip may be necessary for a light machinegun, it is a liability on a rifle. Given a rifle with a pistol grip, a soldier cannot drop to the ground into the prone position without removing one hand from his weapon to break his fall. If he does not use the pistol grip, but holds onto the stock to let the butt of the rifle strike the ground instead, he must release his hold before he can reach the grip and shoot. The same soldier cannot cease firing and jump up to rush forward without removing his firing hand completely from his weapon to grab the stock and push off with it. It is extremely difficult to hold onto a pistol grip and get up another way.

Once up and running, this soldier cannot fire his remaining rounds and then lunge effectively at his opponent with his bayonet, or follow up with a butt stroke, without completely losing hold of his rifle with his



strongest hand. Although bayonet fighting may be a relatively small thing, when it is all an infantryman has left, it is everything, and close combat is no place for changing hands or coming in second best.

### TECHNIQUES

A pistol grip also discourages the use of several important shooting techniques. With such a grip, a soldier's arm follows the angle of his firing hand when he is holding onto his rifle, causing his elbow to press against the side of his body while he fires. This eliminates the shoulder pocket that the weapon's butt is supposed to fit into to lessen the effect of recoil, steady the weapon, and keep it from slipping off his shoulder. Without a good shoulder pocket, it is hard for a soldier to maintain a firm stock weld with his cheek, to make his head move with the rifle as it recoils, and to keep his eye aligned with the sights.

A rifle should have a semi-pistol grip to improve marksmanship and to allow the soldier to hold it while running, leaping, and crawling and still have his firing hand in position to pull the trigger. It should also have a semi-straightline stock with a raised comb. The gas cylinder and operating rod should be above the barrel to reduce muzzle climb when the rifle is fired. Because the small of the stock would drop to form the semi-pistol grip, the rifle cannot have a buffer behind the receiver as the M16 does. There are many existing weapon designs, such as the FN-FAL, the AK, the AR18, the SG 540, and the Valmet M62, that can be modified to fit a traditional rifle stock.

In a rifle of this type, there would be no gas tube — as



in the M16 — to blow contaminants into the rifle's action or gas and excess lubricant into the firer's eyes. The bolt would lock fully until it was withdrawn by the operating mechanism, instead of using a delayed blowback principle, so varying qualities of ammunition could be used. The barrel would be heavy enough to support a bayonet, and its bore and chamber would be chrome-plated to resist corrosion and wear.

The rifle would share many of the beneficial features of the M16 and its contemporaries. The receiver would be split into an upper and lower group held together by takedown and pivot pins. This would allow placing the

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**No matter how much warfare changes, the infantryman's war will be brutal and intimate, and his rifle must be designed with that in mind.**

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rear sight at the back of the receiver, instead of at the front, by doing away with a bolt cover like the one found on the AK. This placement would permit using a rear sight aperture and a longer sight radius.

The lower receiver group would incorporate a sturdy integral magazine well and a winter trigger guard that would swing forward against the magazine when released. It would accept M16 aluminum or nylon magazines and would have all the weapon's controls accessible from the firing position. The selector lever would be manipulated with the firing hand thumb, and the magazine catch button would be worked by the trigger finger. The bolt catch would be released by the thumb of the loading hand after a loaded magazine was inserted. When the firer pulled back on the charging handle to lock the bolt to the rear, the bolt catch would be engaged with the firing hand thumb.

### EJECTION

The upper receiver would have a covered ejection port on its right side and a charging handle fixed to the bolt carrier on its left. There would be no bolt forward assist on the receiver as the charging handle could be pushed forward to close the bolt. Placing the charging handle on the left side would allow the action to be cycled from a





firing position without the firer moving his firing hand or the weapon, as must be done with the M14 or M16. The charging handle would be at the left front of the receiver where it would not strike the non-firing hand. Its motion would be hidden from the firer's view by its speed and by the rear sight's elevation drum, which would also be on the left.

The rifle would be a little longer and slightly heavier than the M16. It should fire at a moderate cyclic rate from the closed bolt position with the bolt remaining open after the last round was ejected. Automatic fire should be limited by a 3- or 4-round burst control mechanism. It would have a concave recoil pad to hold it in place during automatic fire, and it would accept an M16 clothespin bipod.

The new rifle's flash suppressor, sling swivels, bayonet, bayonet stud, and front sight assembly would be the same as those on the M16. Its rear sight would be similar to the one on the M14. The fiberglass stock would be made like the M16's, and the easily gripped triangular handguards would be held on with a slipping in the same way. The stock should not be constructed to fold or collapse because that feature would make it less rigid. In addition to the standard 20- and 30-round M16 magazines, a short magazine that fits flush with the bottom of the magazine well should be issued for civil disturbance and ceremonial duties.

Many excellent weapons made by friendly nations, and some by not so friendly ones, are available that we can

examine and test during the process of developing our own rifle. It is important to keep in mind that our rifleman does not need the most sophisticated design possible, one such as the Austrian STG 77, the French MAS, or the Swedish MKS, but he does deserve an infantry weapon that fits the conditions under which he must fight.

This proposed rifle is offered to support, not replace, the squad and platoon automatic weapons. It would first serve the rifleman with aimed semiautomatic or limited burst fire. Its adoption would result from the recognition that infantry combat is more than a "mad minute" fought by individuals. An updated yet traditional rifle would reaffirm the infantryman's role and signal a return to the tactics of soldiers fighting together. Fire superiority would become the product of superior fire by the unit, not random fire by its members.


If we begin now to plan for the rifle of the future, perhaps when the time comes for a quick decision on a replacement for our present rifle, we will have the right one waiting in the wings.



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# LA RAZA JAPANESE

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In an age of increasing specialization, consolidated training conducted at the company or battalion level, or even higher, occupies more and more of the training time available to an infantry unit. In an effort to ensure that the limited number of experienced specialists assigned to his unit will have the greatest effect on training his soldiers in their critical skills, the commander devises a training program in which the best qualified trainers within the unit teach their specialty to as wide an audience as possible.

This approach may appear to solve many of a unit's short-term training problems. But by removing the responsibility for training from the junior leaders in the chain of command, this over-reliance on consolidated training may actually cause more long-range problems than it solves.

Consolidated training ignores two key military leadership maxims: that the leader is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do, and that any mission is best accomplished at the lowest practical level. These maxims are satisfied best when training is conducted at platoon level, or even better, at squad level. Because such training also offers a unit an opportunity to develop leadership at the lowest and most important levels, the quality of its training improves in the process.

One of the problems with consolidated training is that it demotes the subordinate leader from his position of leadership and makes him a kind of administrative assistant. In that role his primary responsibility is to get his troops to a centralized training location and then to check occasionally to make sure they are at least moderately attentive during the instruction. Sometimes he may be called upon during the practical exercise portion of the instruction to serve as an assistant instructor, supervising part of the class. But even then there may not be any of his own troops in the group. Often he is even further demoted and becomes, like his soldiers, just another student.

## RESPONSIBILITY

This demotion can seriously diminish a squad leader's effectiveness, for while the MTOE sees him as a staff sergeant with perhaps six to ten years of experience, he is much more likely to be a junior sergeant, or perhaps even an acting sergeant who recently was just a member of the squad himself. But if he is to function effectively as a true squad leader, in the eyes of his men at least, he must be vested with the authority to lead the squad as well as with the responsibility for leading it. Unless he is given an opportunity to develop and display his leadership talents, he will probably continue to be a peer to them rather than a leader. Besides, denying him the chance to plan and conduct a significant portion of his squad's training also denies him the opportunity to sharpen the leadership skills he needs to become a senior NCO, and it presents an obstacle to the development of the squad as a functioning team.

Another drawback to consolidated training is that it takes away from a squad leader the responsibility for training his squad. If a task is taught at a higher level, it is almost impossible to hold a squad leader accountable for his squad's performance of that task during subsequent applications. A possible danger is that, since he is not likely to be held responsible for that particular task, the squad leader may neglect it to concentrate instead on functions that will directly affect what he sees as his designated responsibility. He may neglect, for example, important technical functions that are often taught at battalion level, such as Dragon gunnery, even though these functions may be essential to the accomplishment of the squad's overall combat mission. After all, the squad leader may reason, they have experts at battalion to handle Dragon training.

The counter-argument here is that the squad leader may indeed lack the necessary training and experience to conduct instruction for his squad on such a technical weapon as the Dragon. But if the battlefield of the next war turns out to be as it is now envisioned — a decentralized one with small units fighting independently — that same squad leader is not going to have an opportunity to consult the battalion's Dragon experts for advice. And if he has not gained the skills necessary to direct the use of all of his weapons in training, he certainly will not be able to develop these skills under the added pressure of combat.

The responsibility of the senior leaders of a company and of a battalion, then, is not just to direct the training of the individual soldier. It is to ensure that their junior leaders develop all the skills they need to conduct the training the squad has to have to accomplish its combat mission. This approach to readiness requires the establishment at the company level of a comprehensive non-commissioned officer development program in which the junior NCO first masters the various squad tasks so that he can later teach them to his men. Within this training structure, the company officers and the battalion experts can most effectively pass on the technical information they have mastered in the schools they have attended by imparting their knowledge to a cadre of leaders who will deliver it in small classes to the individual soldier.

## IMMEDIATE RESULT

The immediate result of this approach to training is that the squad leader truly serves as the leader, totally responsible for his squad's performance in every aspect of training. He is given the opportunity to train his own troops and must always be ready to account for their performance. Since he brings to the squad the knowledge he has acquired both through his own experience and through his unit's NCO training, he comes to be regarded as an authority on the subject. Then, as the unit's trainer and leader, he can personally see that his squad meets the standards of performance he and his commander have set for it. He cannot use the familiar excuses for squad

failure, when, for the most part, he and he alone has conducted his squad's training.

A corollary benefit of this approach to training is that a person never masters a subject as thoroughly as when he is required to teach it. In consolidated training this benefit is offered only to the few instructors who do the actual teaching. But in most cases, these instructors are already masters of the task, and most of them have little contact with the soldiers who routinely perform the task. But if each squad leader becomes a proficient instructor in the subject, the unit's expertise is greatly expanded, and a qualified instructor is always available for the soldiers who must perform the skill in which he has been trained.

Another advantage of squad-level training is that it enables a unit to tailor its training to the different levels of training the squads need. Consolidated training assumes that all the students share a common starting point and that all will master the task at the same rate. Further, such training is necessarily oriented toward the lowest level. But the various squads usually do not start with identical training or experience, and nothing is more

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**One of the problems with consolidated training is that it demotes the subordinate leader from his position of leadership and makes him a kind of administrative assistant.**

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boring to a soldier than to be dragged through training that he has already mastered. Likewise, nothing is more frustrating to a conscientious soldier than undergoing training that assumes he is qualified in a skill he has not yet mastered. The person best able to assess a squad's strengths, weaknesses, and state of readiness is its squad leader. Therefore, he should be the one who ultimately decides, within the limits specified by his unit commander, how much time he should spend on each of the unit's training objectives and what approach will be most effective in training his troops.

This training philosophy does not reduce the role the company commander and the platoon leaders play in directing the unit's training. They must establish the objectives and the standards that the squads must meet, provide the squad leaders with the assets they need to achieve those standards, and see that the standards they

have established are met. Additionally, they must design and conduct the training of the junior NCOs and monitor their effectiveness as trainers and leaders. The squad-level approach to training thus allows the officers and NCOs to return to the traditional relationship in which the officers plan and inspect the unit's activities, and the NCOs implement those plans and prepare the unit for the commander's inspection.

Finally, conducting training at the squad level develops

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**If a squad leader is to function as a true leader, in the eyes of his men at least, he must be vested with the authority to lead the squad as well as with the responsibility for leading it.**


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a sense of squad identity and teamwork. Too often in the modern Army, the members of a squad live apart and, except for formations and field duty, have little more than an administrative identity as a squad. But when most of their daily activities involve squad exercises under a strong, central leadership figure, a sense of common purpose emerges from the training and carries over into all aspects of unit activities. The squad becomes a functioning body, aware of its strengths and weaknesses, confident in its abilities, and held together by an esprit that is derived from effective small-unit leadership.

For some tasks consolidated training may be a practical approach, and large-scale unit training is logically required for such missions as the rifle company in the assault. But if a commander wants to develop among his junior leaders the leadership necessary to ensure the successful completion of their small-unit missions under all conditions, and if he wants to guarantee the most effective training of his soldiers in their individual skills, he must place his squad leader firmly at the functioning center of his unit's training program.



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CAPTAIN PAUL L. CONWAY

The infantryman's primary mission is to close with the enemy and either destroy or capture him. But this is easier said than done, because the assault — actually closing with the enemy — may be the most difficult task an infantryman is called on to do. He must leave whatever protective cover he has had, expose himself to the enemy's fire, and move directly against his foe's position, often a stoutly defended position. Mechanized infantry units have the additional problem of deciding whether the situation calls for them to dismount, and if it does, when and where they should do it. It takes a lot of courage, discipline, teamwork, and leadership to do all these things and do them right.

Unfortunately, though, too many of our infantry squads and platoons are not given the kind of assault training they will need to carry out this most difficult of all missions. In fact, far too many of our infantry leaders neglect the small details that can greatly influence their soldiers' chances of surviving an assault. As a step toward remedying this situation, these leaders must first understand the tactics of an assault, and then they must see that their units receive adequate training in carrying out these tactics.

In Europe, the average Soviet-style defensive position consists of a series of mutually supporting strongpoints. These have both individual and crew-served weapon positions linked by communication trenches, and they usually have dug-out places behind the forward trench lines in which armored carriers and tanks can be positioned. Often, the defensive positions are protected by minefields, barbed wire obstacles, and antiarmor ditches designed to channel an assaulting force into defensive fire zones.

This kind of defensive position can be adapted to fit almost any kind of terrain and it can be a tough nut to crack. But mechanized infantry units can crack it if they use some common sense and follow the principles laid down in such field manuals as 71-1, 71-2, and 7-7.

For example, we teach our mechanized infantry units to remain mounted during an assault, unless the terrain prohibits it or the defender's antiarmor fire cannot be suppressed. But common sense tells the commander that the absence or presence of mines probably will be the most important factor he will have to consider in deciding whether his unit should dismount. Certainly it would be a suicidal gesture on his part to order his vehicles into an enemy minefield that was covered by fire.

Even a suspicion that a minefield might be present undoubtedly will slow a mounted assault. And because a minefield cannot be suppressed by fire, most mechanized infantry final assaults against defended positions will be dismounted ones. In these cases, the infantrymen will have to dismount a considerable distance from their objective and remain there until the defensive minefield can be breached. If the situation develops favorably, the carriers might be used to move the infantrymen up to the minefield gaps.

At the same time, the defending force's fires must be suppressed; if its members are too stunned or frightened to shoot back accurately they will lose the edge their

# THE ASSAULT



prepared positions have given them. Keeping the opposing force down until the assault platoon gets into the defensive trenches is especially crucial.

Artillery fire is particularly useful in this regard. It can drive the defenders into their dug-outs, kill or wound those above ground, cut through some of the wire obstacles, and use smoke to give the assault force some concealment. Unfortunately, artillery fires must be lifted when the assault unit gets within 200 to 300 meters of the first enemy trenches.

Mortars can be used to thicken artillery fires, to lay smoke, and to hinder enemy movement in areas that the artillery units cannot easily reach. They can also be used to cover the assault troops when the artillery fires must be lifted; mortar fires do not have to be lifted until the first troops get to within 100 meters of the enemy's trenches.

Tank guns and other armor-protected weapons, firing directly on the point where the assault troops will enter

the strongpoint, may constitute the most important part of a fire suppression plan. TOWs may be useful for knocking out bunkers and dug-in armored vehicles when the firing starts, but the smoke, dust, and haze raised by the fires of the other weapons may reduce their accuracy, at least with the current equipment. They may be better used in overwatch positions to protect the flanks of the assault unit, or as reinforcements once the strongpoint has been taken.

#### ASSAULT FORCE

The assault force should be no larger than a platoon. Thus, if a company team of two rifle platoons and a tank platoon is sent against a strongpoint, the tank platoon can be the direct fire suppression force; one rifle platoon can breach the obstacles and minefields while its carrier

weapons help the tanks with suppressive fire; and the other rifle platoon can act as the assault force. Once it has completed its mission, the breaching platoon should be prepared to reinforce the assault platoon.

The assault platoon must get into the enemy's trench line as fast as possible. Every second it delays from the time the suppressive fires lift until the first man enters the trenches gives the defenders more time to recover from the shock of the fires.


The assault unit must move rapidly through the breach in the obstacles and then fan out to move against the defenders in the trench line. All the soldiers who are not rushing should fire at known or suspected enemy positions to their front. If the enemy's fire is light, a straight-forward charge into the first trench line may be the best way to get the platoon into the enemy's position. Once inside the trench line, the platoon should use the standard trench-clearing procedures shown in Field Manuals 7-7 and 7-8.

The platoon leader may be able to position some of his M60 machineguns to cover his assault, but it is not likely that he will find many good machinegun positions close to the defender's trench line. Accordingly, he should send only one or two of his machineguns with the assault squads and keep the others on the carriers to be brought up later. Extra LAWs should be taken along to be used against bunkers. (The Dragons, which are not assault weapons, should remain on the carriers along with extra equipment such as tripods and field telephones.) Thus, each dismounted soldier in the assault squads should carry his individual weapon, some loaded rifle magazines, hand grenades or M203 rounds, possibly a LAW, an entrenching tool and some water, but little else.

Semi-automatic fire should be stressed, because clearing trenches can use up tremendous amounts of ammunition in a short time, and resupply may be slow.

Suppressive fire must be closely controlled during the assault. Although indirect fire will be shifted by the com-





pany team commander before the assault platoon gets inside the strongpoint, the assault platoon leader should also have a signal for lifting it. A flare is ideal for this purpose.

Control of direct fire is more difficult. Tank fire can be shifted or lifted altogether by flare signal, but the best way to control the supporting machineguns is by simple SOPs, such as the following:

- The assault platoon marks its position by throwing smoke grenades as it moves forward, and the machine-gunners aim 50 to 100 meters on either side of the smoke.
- The assault platoon fires 40mm smoke rounds either to identify specific machinegun targets or to mark the platoon's safety limits.

Depending on the size of the strongpoint, the assault platoon may be able to secure only a small part of it, especially if it has to drop off teams to secure communication trenches. Other platoons will have to be sent in to keep the attack going and to completely reduce the strongpoint.

Meanwhile, the assault platoon should organize itself to defend its position. Squad and fire team leaders should redistribute ammunition and account for their men. The platoon's carriers should rejoin the platoon as soon as possible, bringing up more ammunition and other supplies and equipment.

Although these tactical concepts are neither new nor complex in design, they are not simple to do, and infantry platoons, to maintain their proficiency, must constantly

practice fire and movement and trench-clearing drills.

To begin with, as a basis for these drills, the soldiers must be well trained in the individual skills they will need on the battlefield. They must know, for example, how to wear their load-bearing equipment properly, with everything tightly secured. (Follow almost any platoon during a live-fire exercise, and you will probably pick up dozens of items of individual equipment.)

Many soldiers do not know how to change their rifle magazines quickly. They need to work on this relatively simple skill every chance they get so that they need only a quick glance to make sure the magazines are properly inserted into their rifles. And they should not waste time trying to put their empty magazines back into their ammunition pouches; during live-fire exercises they can stuff their empty magazines in the pockets of their field pants or inside their shirts.

Above all else, each soldier must be taught to think for himself during an assault, because his squad leader cannot think for him. If a soldier is not well trained in the proper assault techniques, he will tend to lie still until his leaders tell him what to do.

Fire and movement training, also called battle drill, is probably the single most crucial element in assault training. It can be done either in garrison or in the field during collective training.

Initially, a platoon leader should pick a piece of open terrain — a parade field is ideal — close to his barracks area. He should review the individual skills and then have



his squads practice battle drill exercises, separately at first and then together, with the squad leaders moving their units on his command.

As the platoon improves, the platoon leader should move his unit to more difficult terrain and add blank ammunition and pyrotechnics to his exercises. Although the training should be done as often as possible, no one training period should last for more than three hours.

Trench clearing is another of the skills that a unit has to work on. As mentioned earlier, Field Manual 7-7 covers trench clearing in detail. And while units can build sand tables or outline mock trenches with engineer tape, these expedients are not as good as having a full-scale, Soviet-style strongpoint available. Although a strongpoint of this kind is expensive and takes time to build, once built it becomes a tremendously effective training aid. Squads and platoons can practice their trench-clearing techniques on it as well as their other assault exercises. The use of opposing forces and MILES can also do much to increase realism during the training exercises.

Field Manual 7-7 also describes methods that can be used to clear minefields and other obstacles. Here, again, platoons can practice these skills almost anywhere. For example, tin cans can be buried in minefield patterns, and clearing squads can be required to find and mark them. To make the best use of the available time, each squad can be given a lane to clear. This exercise is well worth doing at night. And, if possible, demolition ranges should be run jointly with engineer units.

Finally, live-fire assault exercises are necessary to give the platoons the "feel" of an actual assault. In most cases, some additional weapons training will probably be needed before the actual exercises take place.

For instance, a unit's caliber .50 machinegunners must know how to fire accurately at medium to long ranges — 500 to 1,000 meters — if they expect to be able to lay down any effective kind of suppressive fire when the time comes. Unfortunately, most posts do not have adequate machinegun ranges, and in peacetime our machinegunners rarely fire at ranges over 400 meters.

Tank gunnery ranges (especially those for Tables VI-VIII) are excellent for this kind of training. The APCs should be in hull-down positions when their guns are fired, and they should change positions frequently. If tank gunnery ranges are not available, mortar and ar-


tillery ranges can be used, but any movement forward of the firing points is usually forbidden. This type of firing might be combined with a mounted firing exercise to give the soldiers practice in firing from their carriers while they move along.

After the platoons have completed their additional weapons training and have mastered the battle drills, the live-fire assault exercises can be held. They can be as simple as or as elaborate as the senior commander wishes. All of them, though, should include two main features: They should emphasize fire and movement, and they should feature some kind of fire support. Thus, an excellent live-fire problem can be run with a unit's organic mortars as the only available fire support weapons. At the same time, they must not overdo fire support, because it can require the various unit commanders to spend most of their time planning for and controlling the fire support means instead of paying attention to the actual assault.

Leaders should not expect things to work well the first time they conduct assault live-fire exercises. Most platoons tend to move hesitatingly and with long pauses between firing. Some soldiers run out of ammunition before they reach their objective, while others fire only sporadically. A number of soldiers always seem to fumble with their magazines as they try to reload their rifles. But with appropriate attention to individual skills and with some practice in battle drills and trench clearing in advance, assault live-fire exercises can be executed successfully — and they *should* be.

The assault, in the past, has received less attention than it deserves, and all infantry commanders must do a better job in training their soldiers to carry out this most difficult of all infantry tasks. If they do not, their soldiers simply will not know how to do it when the time comes.

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# FAME IS A FLEETING THING



L. VANLOAN NAISAWALD

The quiet darkness of the night was suddenly shattered as a storm of incoming artillery shells shrieked and then exploded with deafening crashes, throwing up masses of dirt and stone. Flares popped and small arms fire erupted along with the crunching detonation of hand grenades. Wild screams and yells — in both German and English — joined the racket. It was 0230, 4 November 1917, and a German combat patrol was attacking the out-post line of Company F, 16th United States Infantry.

The fight lasted about 10 minutes before the German patrol withdrew, reaching its own lines seconds before Allied artillery fire came crashing down just in front of the American position. Minutes later, American officers and noncommissioned officers began sorting out the damage: a sergeant and 10 men were missing, 11 others were wounded, and three were dead. Corporal James B. Gresham's jugular vein had been severed; Private First Class Thomas Enright had been shot through the heart; and Private Merle D. Hay's skull had been crushed by a rifle butt.

Within 48 hours, and for some years afterward, the names of Gresham, Enright, and Hay would be recognized by a generation of Americans that now has almost disappeared. As the first Americans killed in action in World War I, they were accorded heroes' treatment. Today, they are virtually unknown.

Their story really begins on 6 April 1917. On that day the United States had declared that a state of war existed with Imperial Germany. At the time, the 16th Infantry Regiment was in garrison at Fort Bliss, Texas, its ranks far below an authorized war strength total of 3,100. Still, its levels of conditioning and training were probably pretty solid, because the unit had just returned from duty with General John J. Pershing chasing the forces of Pancho Villa in Mexico. Gresham and Enright had taken part in that expedition. (Gresham, who listed his hometown as Evansville, Indiana, had enlisted in the Regular Army at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, in April 1914. Enright, born and raised in Bloomfield, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Pittsburgh, had joined in November 1915.)

Enright, apparently, had come from somewhat unfortunate circumstances. Both his mother and father had died by the time he was 14, so the elder of his two sisters took him in, and he lived with her until he joined the Army.

Exactly when young Merle D. Hay of Glidden, Iowa, joined the 16th Infantry is not clear. The extant records show that he enlisted at Fort Logan, Colorado, on 11 May 1917. A post-war newspaper account said that Hay and a number of his hometown buddies had volunteered in the initial rush. If Hay was sent directly to the 16th Infantry at Fort Bliss, it is probable that he had been barely uniformed when the regiment was ordered to move by train on 3 June for Hoboken, New Jersey, bound for France.

The move was done with much secrecy, and it was dark on the evening of 8 June when the long line of sleeping cars squeaked to a halt outside the city. If there had been any doubt in anyone's mind as to where the train was headed, it was gone now.

The urgent need to show the American flag, to march units of big, young, eager American soldiers before the eyes of a war-weary, partially demoralized, exhausted France had been recognized early by the War Department. To that end, the Department had hurriedly typed up plans and orders to quickly combine existing Regular Army units into the 1st Infantry Division — the Big Red One — and to ship it to France beginning in June 1917. The division's four infantry regiments were to be the first contingent, since their 12,400 bayonets would be flashing, visible evidence that American combat troops soon would be available to shore up depleted British and French divisions.

As the long troop trains neared Hoboken and then stopped, Gresham, Enright, and rookie Hay, along with their companions aboard the trains, most likely peered from the windows, eyes straining to catch sight of the glimmering lights of New York City in the distance.

With darkness on 9 June, the men were ordered off the cars and into ranks, and then marched along ill-frequented and sparsely inhabited side streets to the docks. By 10 June, all were aboard transports, which, surrounded by puffing and tooting tugs, were soon pulled from the piers out into the river and down into New York's lower bay.

Sixteen days later, on 26 June, the transports backed down in speed and came to a stop off St. Nazaire, France. The word came down that Company K, 28th Infantry would be the first unit to land.

The Americans were slow in getting ashore, because there weren't enough docks available to hold them. In fact, it would take from the 26th till the 30th before all were ashore. The first landings were made, to the surprise of the American soldiers, with little or no fanfare, crowds, or celebrations. The local citizens simply didn't know they were coming!

If Gresham, Enright, and Hay, and the rest of Company F, 16th Infantry, had any ideas about lots of time off to see the sights of Paris and the French countryside, they received a rough shock. A rigid, exhausting training schedule began at once. There was only one short break in the schedule, and that came on 4 July.

## TRAINING

The training plan adopted by General Pershing, now commander of the American Forces in France, called for the 1st Division to spend its first month in acclimatization and in training the individual soldiers, many of whom, like Hay, barely had had time to learn how to march before they found themselves in France. Squad, platoon, company, and rudimentary battalion drills also had to be crammed into that first month. During the second month, the battalions would be fed into the lines, under French control, for actual combat indoctrination, and in the third month the division would undergo division-level training.

In that first month, then, much had to be done. The division had arrived not only lacking in training at all levels but lacking in everything except the fine Springfield



rifles the infantrymen carried on their shoulders. In fact, Pershing's entire force, for the rest of the war, would be like a poor, third cousin borrowing for its day-to-day existence from the French and the English.

Not only did men like Private Hay have to be taught the rudiments of drill and rifle marksmanship, he and his corporals, sergeants, and company officers had to learn how to operate and maintain a whole bag of non-American weapons — the heavy French Hotchkiss machinegun that was fed by strip clips, the tinny-looking French Chauchat light machinegun, the British-style Mills bomb or fragmentation grenade, the stubby little 37mm or one-pounder infantry cannon.

New tactics had to be learned: how to dig a trench and defend it, how to survive a pre-attack bombardment, how to clear away barbed wire, how to maintain cohesion in an over-the-top infantry attack, how to wear and use the gas mask, and many other aspects of then-modern trench warfare. Squad leader Gresham no doubt had as much to learn as did assistant squad leader Enright and rookie Hay and the rest of Company F. All suspected they'd be going into the line before Thanksgiving.

To some it came sooner, on 20 October. The first battalions of each of the division's four regiments were ordered into the lines, sandwiched between and supported by veteran French units.

The men of Company F, part of its regiment's 2d Battalion, knew their chance would soon come, probably in a week or ten days. As it turned out, there wasn't that much of a wait: The warning order to the battalion came

down from division headquarters on 23 October; the battalion was to begin moving 1 November and was to replace the 1st Battalion in the line the next night.

The sector had remained quiet during the period the first battalions had held the lines. There had been occasional rifle shots and sporadic artillery exchanges as each side checked and rechecked their gunnery registrations. The first American soldier had been wounded on 23 October, but happily had survived. No German raids or attacks had marred the quiet.

## RELIEF

It was unusually dark and cold the night of 2 November as the 2d Battalion moved up through muddy zigzag communications trenches to relieve the 1st Battalion. By midnight, the relief was accomplished.

For the men of Company F, the war was beginning for real. The tiring training days lay behind them; they were now to be tested under fire, even if they were in a so-called quiet sector where battered divisions were sent to rebuild and recover.

Quickly and quietly, Company F deployed onto a small bald hilly salient or bulge in the trench line near the little village of Bathelement. The position was called the "Artois center of resistance." The Americans, when daylight came, would be able to sneak a look at the distant Rhine-Marne canal. But at this moment the men of Company F knew almost nothing of their surroundings.

The first platoon was led into a trench called Est, facing northeast. Fifteen men were singled out in groups of five and assigned to three sentry posts called P1, P2, and P3, which were 100 yards ahead of Est trench. The trench itself was garrisoned by 20 men, divided into three groups. The second and third platoons were placed in trenches called the Boyau Nord position, facing north. Both flanks were covered by French machinegun detachments, and artillery fire support would come from French units with the 1st Division's batteries helping out. Control was strictly French; American tactical command stopped at the company level.

The relief completed and the positions manned, the men began adjusting themselves physically and mentally to their first hours in the trenches. They pulled their long heavy woolen overcoats about their bodies to ward off the cold. Many tried to get some sleep in dugouts or huddled on the firestep at the bottom of the trench. Only those on sentinel duty stayed awake, their eyes straining to pierce the blackness ahead, ears alert for any unusual noise in no man's land out front.

But no doubt many of those huddled in the trench or in the dugouts slept only a fitful sleep, a half-doze, their nerves keyed for instant reaction. Not a man in the trench had ever pulled a trigger at a live German, or had even seen one, for that matter, other than a few prisoners working in the rear areas. Feelings that night were no doubt a mixture of apprehension and anxiety, of fear and determination.

Then, at about 0230, the world seemed to explode about them. Company officers and sergeants yelled to the men to take cover in the deep dugouts; only the men on

guard were to remain above. These hugged the shelter of the trench walls, hardly able to venture a look over the top in the face of the heavy shelling.

The German fire shifted and began falling on the flanks and the rear of the company's position, effectively isolating the American platoon in an intense box barrage. Now different-sounding explosions were heard out front in the protective barbed wire. Perhaps some of the Americans recognized them as coming from explosive charges on long poles that were shoved under the wire supports and detonated — bangelore torpedoes, they were called.

The next thing the stunned Americans heard and saw was a shower of German potato-masher hand grenades landing at Est trench and on the Boyau Nord position. Seconds later, dark forms in huge helmets leaped into the American trenches at the junction of Boyau Nord and Est trench. The few Americans at that point were overwhelmed.

The Germans then broke up into smaller groups and started fanning out right and left, fighting their way westward up Boyau Nord and southward to Est trench. The stunned Americans fell back. The German party working westward came upon an American sentinel, probably Private Hay, and killed him.

By now, though, the Americans were recovering, and rifle-toting Yanks swarmed out of their dugouts in the area directly behind. They stormed forward and the German raiders, not interested in this, began to withdraw.

Out in front, the three sentry posts had taken cover when the shelling began. Now, as the shelling shifted to the flanks and rear, the men came out of their dugouts



and began making their way toward the noise of fighting in Est trench. They stumbled into the Germans who were returning, prisoner-laden, toward their own lines. A flurry of firing broke out — but then it was all over. American and French artillery fire began to crash into the open ground in front, but it was too late. After another ten minutes the night was again black and quiet.

### CEREMONY

The next day there was a full ceremony for the burial of the three dead Americans. Later, the French would erect a monument to the men in the village of Bathele-ment.

Word of the deaths had passed with amazing speed. By 5 November, the next of kin had received the news in telegrams from the War Department. Newspapers seized on the story, and there was an immediate outcry to bring the bodies of the three fallen men home for interment.

But it was not until 1921 that the War Department began the repatriation of war dead whose next of kin wished their remains brought home. In the case of Gresham, Enright, and Hay, the choice, unanimously, was to bring them home.

The three bodies were shipped from Antwerp, Belgium, on the U.S. Army Transport *Wheaton* on 19 June 1921. Thirteen days later the ship docked at Hoboken and telegrams were sent advising the next of kin of their arrival and that the remains were being shipped to addresses provided by the War Department. The three caskets were then readied for shipment from Pennsyl-

vania Station, each escorted by a soldier in uniform from Company F, 16th Infantry.


Word of the event had begun to spread. The Governor of Indiana requested that Gresham's body be allowed to rest in state in the State Capitol for 24 hours before the final burial in the Locust Hill Cemetery in Evansville.

Enright's remains were transported to Pittsburgh where the body lay in state at the local memorial hall before being transferred to St. Paul's Catholic Church for services. A grand parade of veteran and civic groups then escorted the hearse to nearby St. Mary's Cemetery. The city of Pittsburgh officially renamed Prema Street — Enright's boyhood address — Enright Street, and a local theater was also given his name. Today, both are gone.


Hay's remains went to his home in Glidden, Iowa. The reinterment service there was attended by veterans of the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I, following a period of lying in state in the local American Legion headquarters. A wreath of flowers from General Pershing decorated the grave site.

Today there are probably few people who have ever heard of the names of Gresham, Enright, and Hay.

Fame is a fleeting thing. Tragic fame is even more fleeting.



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## Winter Training

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD A. DIXON

The objective of winter training is to teach soldiers to shoot, move, and communicate in the cold and the snow. But before mission training can be conducted in winter, the soldiers have to accomplish certain basic individual and collective tasks that are usually lumped together under the heading of winter survival training or cold weather indoctrination (CWI).

An understanding of the difference between winter mission training and CWI is a vital first step in planning effective winter training. Without a clear differentiation between them, the means may become the end. When that happens, units can find themselves spending precious field training time learning how to live in the cold instead of learning how to fight in it.

The best winter training, obviously, is conducted by Active Army units stationed in areas that have a distinct winter season. Unfortunately, many Army units, both Active and Reserve Component, are stationed in the southern half of the United States and have to travel farther north to conduct winter training. The challenge for the commanders of these units is to find a way to conserve mis-

sion training by cutting the time they have to devote to CWI without risking cold weather injury in the process. This means that their CWI must be preparatory training, training that should be conducted well in advance of the unit's scheduled mission training.

The problem is that while the content of mission training is spelled out in the appropriate soldier's manuals

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**Units have to learn how to live in the cold before they can learn how to fight in it.**

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and ARTEPs, laying out a program of instruction for CWI is not as clear cut, because there is no single source document for developing a CWI program of instruction.

Cold weather indoctrination should consist of eight tasks: Fitting, adjusting, and wearing individual cold weather clothing and equipment; hygiene and first aid; leadership; maintenance; ahkio loading and hauling; bivouac routine (tent drill); snowshoeing; and skiing. The last of

these, skiing, is the only task that requires a winter environment for skill training. The others can be taught in any climate any time the equipment is available. And units that do not have winter equipment on hand can plan to draw some early enough to conduct their preparatory training.

A good example of how this works is the way the 205th Infantry Brigade (Separate) of the U.S. Army Reserve prepares for its annual training. The brigade is scheduled for winter training in February 1983, and even in Minnesota where it is stationed, the unit will not have had enough winter weather before that time for comprehensive cold weather training. To prevent wasting mission training time at annual training, therefore, the unit began training in all the CWI tasks except skiing in August 1982.

As an example of the performance-oriented training conducted during the 205th's monthly training assemblies, during the first hour of each assembly, a rifle squad is required to move its loaded ahkio outside, set up its tent and yukon stove, then dismantle, load, and store the loaded ahkio. By the time the soldiers have



to do these tasks in the snow, they will have a set procedure for doing them.

The following training and evaluation outline should prove useful to any unit that is preparing for winter training:

**Task 1: Fitting, adjusting, and wearing cold weather clothing and equipment.** Individual clothing and equipment should always be issued at the unit's home station and issued early enough to make sure the troops have enough training in fitting and wearing their clothing before they are exposed to a cold environment. The first fitting session should be during the initial issue of clothing, and leaders need to check each man on more than one occasion later for proper fit and wear of his clothing.

**Task 2: First aid and hygiene.** These subjects must be taught early with refresher training just before the unit's winter deployment. Buddy systems, in which two soldiers check each other, should be established early and checked periodically.

**Task 3: Leadership.** The best trained soldiers can become casualties if their leaders place them in situations where they are needlessly exposed.

This means particular care must be taken during mission training in defense, ambushes, and any other training that requires troops to be relatively inactive for long periods of time. Leaders at all levels need to understand that "stand-around time" must be eliminated.

Two leadership techniques not found in the manuals are worth attention. Overheating is always a problem. Soldiers tend to wear too much clothing, particularly while they are on the move. This is because when they start out they are usually cold enough to wear their full kit. But, then, as they warm up from the exertion of moving, they either are not given an opportunity to strip down or are not inclined to do so. Once they begin to perspire, their chances of becoming cold casualties increase dramatically. One way a leader can prevent this is to have the men move out at a rapid rate for five minutes, then stop and remove their outer garments and adjust their harnesses. From this point on, the troops should move at a steady pace that is just fast enough for them to keep warm without overheating. During breaks, leaders should require their soldiers

to don their outer clothing.

The other technique involves establishing, as a standing operating procedure, the rule that, whenever units are ordered to halt, they are placed on 30-minute standby. This means that when they are ordered to move again, they have 30 minutes to get ready. This will prevent units from remaining at the ready while exposed to wind and weather. Too often troops remain immobile in an exposed position for long periods of time because their leaders expect orders to move immediately. The 30-minute-standby rule allows for the preparation of field expedient wind shelters and perhaps for the serving of hot drinks.

**Task 4: Maintenance.** The care and maintenance of weapons and other TOE equipment, as well as special winter equipment, must be taught before deployment.

**Task 5: Ahkio loading and hauling.** The ahkio, loaded with squad tent, stove, shovels, axe, and so on, is called the ahkio group. The composition of the load and the location of the items on the ahkio should be standardized. The ahkio group should be stored intact for ready access by the



assigned squad or section. Soldiers should practice loading, unloading, harness rigging, and hauling techniques prior to field deployment.

**Task 6: Bivouac routine (tent drill).** Units should practice establishing bivouac sites until all its procedures are standardized and can be accomplished quickly with no wasted motion. At least half of this training should be at night. The important things that should be stressed are that there should be no wasted motion, that every member should have assigned tasks, and that everything should be in its place. During winter, the time between an ordered halt and the establishment of a warm shelter is critical, and all troops should learn to stay busy during that time to prevent chilling.

**Task 7: Snowshoeing.** Snowshoeing takes little practice to master and can be taught on grass. Standard issue magnesium shoes are very

durable and can be used anywhere. The older wood and gut shoes are more easily damaged, but they, too, can be used on lawn grass, with care.

**Task 8: Skiing.** Attempts to teach skiing on anything besides snow — on straw, for example — have proved largely ineffective. For units not stationed in northern areas, ski training is generally impractical. Although the ability to ski provides a distinct mobility advantage for well-trained troops who can travel light, as long as troops are required to hand-haul ahkio loads, the maneuver advantage of skiing is lost anyway. Snowshoes are better than skis for hauling ahkios, and under these conditions skis are effective for local security patrolling and not much else. The program described in TC 90-11-1 requires about two weeks for training to proficiency on skis. Even units such as the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska and the 205th Infantry

Brigade in Minnesota usually limit ski proficiency to their scouts.

Victory on the winter battlefield presupposes the ability to use the environment as a force multiplier. The enemy understands this very well; he is trained and equipped to use winter conditions to provide a strong advantage over a less prepared force. The measure of our projected success during winter operations is how well our units can conduct their ARTEP tasks in the cold and the snow. And how well they conduct their ARTEP tasks may be dependent upon how well they have conducted their preparatory cold weather indoctrination.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD A. DIXON is command advisor to the 205th Infantry Brigade (Separate), USAR, and formerly served as Brigade S3 with the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Alaska. A 1961 ROTC graduate of the University of Washington, he has completed the Command and General Staff College course. He has written other articles for publication on subjects dealing with winter warfare.

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# Jungle Rappelling

MASTER SERGEANT DAVE GOLDIE

Rappelling operations have become a routine part of virtually every infantry unit's training program in recent years. But one problem still faces each rappel mission — how to deploy the ropes safely. This problem can become catastrophic if the mission is to rappel into an area covered by dense vegetation, such as the jungles of Panama.

Rappelling is an effective means of inserting troops rapidly in a jungle. But it can be effective only if the ropes can get through the triple

canopy foliage, and often they cannot.

In the past, units based in the United States but undergoing jungle training with the 193d Infantry Brigade's Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) at Fort Sherman in the Republic of Panama have had their jungle training severely hampered by tangled ropes. As a result, the Jungle Warfare Branch of the JOTC set out to find a solution.

Many rope deployment systems had been tried at the JOTC — every-

thing from wrapping a rope around a log and letting it unroll as the log descended to just dropping a carefully coiled rope out the door. But none proved entirely dependable.

The Branch's cadre began experimenting on its own but could not find a workable solution. Eventually, a senior instructor, Sergeant First Class Carol D. Frady, by integrating his parachuting background with his rappelling experience, did come up with a solution to the problem.

The rope deployment bag issued as



Step 1. Starting at the bottom of bag, closest to weight pocket, coil ropes six to eight times.

a component part of the stability operations (STABO) extraction system proved to be an excellent starting point. (A salvaged deployment bag from a military parachute also proved efficient, but it was more bulky.) A device similar to a parachute deployment bag was fabricated and tried out in a field evaluation. After several modifications, the device evolved into an easily constructed, inexpensive deployment system that facilitated rappel missions into the thickest jungle without



Step 2. Slip stack of coils into retainer bands on each side.

entanglement. Here are the instructions for making it:

- Using a flat piece of canvas about 48 inches long and 18 inches wide, bar-tack to it two parallel strips of type III nylon the length of the canvas.

- Next, turn up the bottom 9 inches, sewing it along the sides to form a pocket (see illustration). Put rocks or a partially filled sand bag in the pocket to make sure the ropes deploy fully. Two pounds of rocks are enough to ensure that the ropes deploy properly through the trees. (In open areas, the bag can be used without this added weight.)



Step 3. Repeat the process of coiling and stowing until only 18 inches remain before the lower snap-link.

- Tack the two parallel nylon strips every two inches, and secure retainer bands (type 64 rubber bands work fine) between each tack, similar to those on a D-bag.

- Prepare the ropes in the normal rappel configuration and stretch them to full length. Place the bag at the loose ends of rope opposite the snap-links.

- Make sure all the rubber bands are present along the stowing lines of the bag and then form a bite in the two running ends of the rappel ropes, and place the bite in the center retainer band just above the stow pocket.



Step 4. With final center locking stow in place, roll bag from bottom to top.

- Fold the rope in an S-fold and stow it in the retainer band, working from side to side making sure the folds do not extend past either side of the bag.

- Place six to eight folds of rope in each retainer band, working toward the top of the bag. Then form a bite in the climbing ropes 24 inches below the first snaplink and stow it in the top center retainer band.

- After the bag has been inspected, roll the bag, going from bottom to



Step 5. Secure top flap of bag with tape.

top, leaving the snaplinks exposed. Secure the top flap of the bag with tape.

This bag proved so successful that the JOTC now requires the troops that come from the United States to use it for all their jungle rappel missions. In the JOTC program of instruction, each soldier must be able to attach climbing ropes to the bag and S-fold them so that no folds are sticking out of the sides of the bag. They

have to pack, roll, and tape the bag in 10 minutes.

Because of the effectiveness and ease of packing, transporting, and employing rappelling ropes with this system, many units in the United States, including the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), have adopted it for all of their rappelling missions, regardless of the terrain.

Anyone who has experienced rope entanglements during a rappelling

operation should try this system. It is worth the small cost in time and money.



**MASTER SERGEANT DAVE GOLDIE** is assigned to the Public Affairs Office of the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama. He has previously served with the 19th ADA Brigade and as director of public relations for the Golden Knights, the Army's parachute team.

## CD Training

LIEUTENANT KENNETH W. ARNOLD

Unlike most of the Army's infantry brigades, the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Republic of Panama has the additional mission of protecting American citizens and key installations in the event of civil unrest in its area of responsibility. This additional mission challenges the leadership of the Brigade's various organizations, and particularly that of its infantry companies.

Like other infantry missions, successful civil disturbance (CD) operations result from organized training and practice. The Brigade's CD training program, therefore, has been designed to build on the basic soldiering skills, beginning with the individual soldier and concluding with the company organization. Other types of units as well might find a similar program useful.

In the first phase of the program, individual soldiers, instructed by their squad leaders, learn the three uses of the riot baton: rest, defense, and

offense. They also learn how to care for and use CD equipment, from flak vests to face shields, which are invaluable aids to a unit during an actual CD operation.

Once the soldiers have mastered the use of the riot baton, the squad leaders teach them how to use the M16A1 rifle, with and without a bayonet, in CD situations. Great emphasis is placed on this aspect of the training program, for rifles are used in a CD operation only when the greatest possible force is required.

When a squad leader determines that his soldiers have mastered their individual skills, and with his platoon leader's permission, he begins training at the squad level. This second phase of training builds on the soldiers' individual skills to develop an effective maneuver force that can use the three key CD formations — squad time, squad echelon right (left), and squad wedge.

Because of the fluid nature of most

CD operations, it is important for a squad to be able to change its formations rapidly while remaining under the full control of its leader. And because a CD operation can start at any time, a squad leader must train his soldiers in those tasks that will enable them to react quickly and effectively. These include practicing alert procedures, inspecting personnel and equipment frequently, issuing orders, and conducting rehearsals.

The third phase of training moves from the squad to the platoon level. At this stage, the basic formations are the platoon line; the platoon line with general, close, or lateral support; platoon echelon right (left); platoon echelon right (left) with general, close, or lateral support; platoon wedge; and platoon wedge with general, close, or lateral support. Great stress is placed on coordinating the squads as they move through the various formations.

In addition, the platoons are

trained to establish observation posts, to conduct patrols in built-up areas, to integrate civil authorities into the operations, to evacuate casualties, and to react properly to sniper fire and to bomb threats.

Emphasis is also placed on the strict discipline that will be needed by all of the soldiers if they are committed to a CD operation. This training cannot be geared toward one operation; it must be a continuation of the discipline that has already been developed in garrison. A unit cannot be controlled in a CD situation unless it is a disciplined unit, responsive to the control of its leader.

The final phase of training develops the coordination that will be needed between the platoons and the various other elements of the company that will support them in CD

operations. Platoon coordination is developed by using six company formations: company line in depth; company line in mass; company line with general or lateral support; company echelon right (left) with general or lateral support; company echelon right (left) in depth with general or lateral support; and company echelon right (left) in mass with general support.

In addition, all of the company's elements must be trained to construct and emplace barricades and road-blocks, in particular on erecting triple concertina personnel barriers. This can be done if each squad is trained to lay wire, and it also gives the company commander the flexibility to lay wire at several different locations at the same time.

With positive leadership, the many

aspects of CD training can be combined to form a cohesive force. As a result, this force can be used effectively in a CD operation that calls for an organization capable of reacting quickly and efficiently to changing situations.



LIEUTENANT KENNETH W. ARNOLD is assigned to the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Republic of Panama, where he has served as a weapons platoon leader and a company executive officer. A 1979 ROTC graduate of Middle Tennessee State University, he has completed the Airborne, Air Assault, and Infantry Mortar Platoon courses.

# Advance Party

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS STEVE L. OVERHOLSER

During the past few years I have had an opportunity to observe and evaluate many mortar platoons both in training and in testing. Of all the ARTEP tasks, the methods of emplacement used by the various platoons seem to vary the most. What is standard operating procedure for one platoon seems taboo for another, and our current field manuals have little to say about standardization. This is probably good in a way, for it allows experience and imagination to dictate method. But there are certain techniques, including the proper use of an advance party, that can be used to

save time during the emplacement of a platoon's mortars.

The purpose of an advance party is to locate, secure, and prepare mortar positions for the platoon so that when the latter arrives at a selected position it can emplace its mortars with little difficulty. The advance party's actions often determine how successful the platoon will be in occupying a position. And through its level of proficiency, the advance party can provide a degree of momentum that is essential either during an ARTEP or on a battlefield.

To do its job properly, therefore,

the members of an advance party must be well trained in their responsibilities. Their training should include such things as the proper size and depth of a baseplate hole for ground-mounted mortars, the use of directional stakes, the laying of wire (preferably a hot-loop), positioning and preparing the aiming circle, and security.

Our current doctrine calls for the advance party to consist of at least one man from each squad, one man from the fire direction center (FDC), and either the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant. From experience,

though, I have found it better to have two men from each squad involved in preparing a firing position. This number allows for an equal distribution of the workload, a more thorough and speedy preparation of the firing position, and the immediate establishment of local security.

Although the mode of transportation may vary from unit to unit, it is best to use the FDC vehicle for the advance party whenever possible. This vehicle not only has enough room for the soldiers and their equipment, it also provides an FDC that can be immediately operational when the platoon arrives.

### ALERT

When the platoon leader receives his warning order, he should alert the platoon sergeant to form the advance party and prepare it for movement. The members of the party should collect their equipment and store it in the FDC vehicle where it can be checked by the platoon sergeant. Their equipment should include shovels, picks, aiming stakes, and a TA-1 or TA-312 (where appropriate) for each gun squad, plus an aiming circle, communication wire, a TA-312, and plotting equipment for the FDC.

Although the platoon leader may conduct his reconnaissance with or without the advance party, it is preferable for him to take the party with him. The party can then accomplish many of the preparatory functions that are conducive to an expeditious and orderly emplacement.

The platoon leader's reconnaissance should include the selection of a position, the location of the FDC, some local security positions, a physical or map selection of alternate or supplemental sites, the designation of ammunition holding areas, and alternate routes of movement. He should accomplish these things in accordance with the established tactical doctrine, the existing tactical situation, and his own common sense.

After the reconnaissance has been completed, the platoon leader can

return and lead the platoon to the new position or, using pre-arranged code words, he can radio for the platoon to displace. In the latter case, the platoon sergeant leads the platoon to the new position.

At the new location, the advance party takes care of security matters first. Then each man is assigned a specific task. Thus, if the mortars are ground-mounted, the platoon leader shows one of the men from each squad where to dig his baseplate hole and points in the general direction of fire. He lets the FDC representative know where to park his vehicle, and the proposed location of the guns for the laying of wire. He then prepares the aiming circle for operation.

For mechanized mortar units, the platoon leader uses his compass to

align two aiming stakes at each mortar position four to five meters apart in the direction of fire. When the squads arrive, the squad representatives direct their drivers to align the right sides of their vehicles with the aiming stakes, coming as close to them as possible. This places the mortars in the general direction of fire and usually does away with the need for a subsequent large shift when the reciprocal lay begins.

There are other less conventional methods that can be used to cut emplacement time. For example, after the baseplate holes have been dug, and before the platoon arrives, the squad representatives can be directed to place one aiming stake 100 meters out in the general direction of fire and another on the forward left



edges of the baseplate holes.

Using the aiming circle, the platoon leader then lays the crosshairs on the baseplate stakes and announces and records that deflection for each mortar. He then relays this information to the platoon, by radio or other means, and the gunners place that information on their sights when they displace. This prevents the possibility that the gunners will have to make large deflection changes after their aiming points have been identified. In fact, experience has shown a subsequent change of 10 mils or less to be the rule. Of course, experience and imagination should be the major considerations in using this system.

After the advance party has completed its preparatory tasks, the position is ready to be occupied. Each squad representative then becomes a guide for his squad. For ground-mounted mortars, he directs his squad's vehicle to the emplacement site and, after the squad's equipment has been off-loaded, guides the vehicle to a pre-planned area to be

concealed and camouflaged. At that point he returns to the mortar position to perform his normal duties.

At the same time, the remainder of the squad mounts the mortar in the general direction of fire, and the gunner refers his sight to the aiming circle and performs reciprocal lay according to the guidelines in the appropriate field manual. If the squad uses the alternate method mentioned above, though, the mortar is mounted with the deflection on the sight called in earlier. This enables the gunner to sight in on the aiming circle with a deflection that incorporates a large initial shift. His next reading should change no more than 10 mils, corresponding to a small deflection change.

After the gunner announces "zero or one mil, mortar laid," he then turns his sight to the previously positioned 100-meter stake, emplaces the near stake, and slips the black scale either to 2800 or to that announced by the FDC.

These techniques work very well,

even with Army National Guard mortar platoons, which normally get only about 16 hours of mortar training each year before their two-week annual training period. I have seen these platoons start out taking 15 minutes to emplace their mortars, and then, given 30 minutes of training in these techniques, reduce that time to four minutes or less.

Although these methods are not unique, they are not used on a large scale. Besides the apparent motive of drastically reducing time and avoiding confusion on emplacement, the proper use of an advance party provides stability of operations, an equal workload distribution, and security, all of which allow a mortar platoon leader to concentrate on what he does best — plan.

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**SERGEANT FIRST CLASS STEVE L. OVERHOLSER** has served as platoon sergeant of a 4.2-inch mortar platoon and a weapons platoon and as a drill sergeant at Fort Knox. He has completed the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course and is now assigned to Readiness Group Selfridge in Michigan.

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# Personnel Inventory

**MAJOR JOSEPH A. VERRETT**

When an officer takes command of a company, one of his first tasks is to conduct a joint property inventory with the outgoing commander. But he must also conduct another important inventory at the same time — an inventory of the soldiers assigned to the unit. Just as a commander would never sign a hand receipt for property he had not seen or counted, neither should he assume all the people are there without conducting a personnel

assets inventory (PAI).

The PAI is a unit level physical accounting of enlisted, warrant, and commissioned personnel by grade, name, and Social Security number (SSN), compared and reconciled with the information on the SIDPERS Personnel Strength Zero Balance Report (PZB-C27) and the Personnel Data Card — SIDPERS (DA Form 2475-2).

Army Regulation 680-31 requires

that a PAI be conducted:

- Within five working days before a change in unit commanders.
- Fourteen calendar days before a unit is inactivated, discontinued, moved to another installation, or temporarily reduced to zero strength.
- By direction of commanders in the chain of command.
- When a unit's strength variance is two percent or more.
- Within 30 days after a unit is acti-

vated and personnel are assigned to it.


- Within a year of a previous PAI. (When a PAI is performed, for whatever reason, the annual PAI requirement is considered satisfied for that unit.)

A PAI that is required because of a change of commanders is normally conducted jointly by the departing and incoming commanders. When a joint PAI is not possible because of the delayed arrival of the new commander, the departing commander and a designated acting commander should conduct a joint interim PAI. A final PAI is then required within 15 calendar days after the permanent commander arrives.

Units that are organized under the consolidation of administration at battalion level (CABL) concept receive assistance and supporting documents from the Personnel Administration Center (PAC). The PAC provides the unit's SIDPERS personnel data cards, the latest SIDPERS PZB-C27 report, and copies of the Personnel Asset Inventory (DA Form 3986).

Before the PAI is conducted, the unit should check the personnel data cards to make sure that a card is on hand for each soldier assigned to the unit by written or verbal orders (subsequently confirmed in writing), regardless of his duty status. The next step is for the unit to match the personnel data cards to the PZB-C27 report. Thus, everyone listed on the personnel data cards should also be listed on the PZB-C27. Reassignment gains and losses reported after the "as of" date on the PZB-C27 report must be added or deleted, for this provides an updated roster of personnel assigned to the unit on the date of the PAI. Special procedures are indicated in the regulation for accounting for attached personnel.

On the day of the PAI, the departing commander holds a muster formation of all the soldiers assigned to the unit who are present for duty. Orders and other documentation should be available to verify the recorded status of persons officially



absent (hospital, leave, performing essential duties), assigned but not yet joined soldiers, and soldiers absent without leave. Routine pass requests should be deferred for the date the PAI is held.

The new commander should reconcile the information on these documents with an actual physical count of the soldiers, and should also verify each soldier's name, grade, and Social Security number with that shown on each soldier's identification card. Appropriate SIDPERS transactions should be prepared at the same time to update the automated files.

The departing commander must complete and sign Section I (Commander's Evaluation) of the DA Form 3986 in four copies. The new commander must complete and sign Section II (Authentication by New Commander) of the same form and he may either concur with the report or state his reasons for not concurring.

The completed Form 3986, with attachments, must be sent through

command channels and the SIDPERS office to the Military Personnel Strength Monitor (MPSM) at division, installation, or major army command level. When a PAI is conducted because of a change of command, the Form 3986 must be approved by the MPSM before a final clearance can be given to the departing commander. This clearance can be given by telephone.

By following these procedures, a new commander, as well as a departing commander, can ensure a smooth transition and an accurate accounting of a unit's most important asset — its soldiers.



**MAJOR JOSEPH A. VERRETT**, now assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, was formerly a personnel instructor at the Infantry School. A graduate of Southern University of New Orleans, he has served in numerous assignments, including platoon leader, company commander, and S3 Air.

# JFCC

CAPTAIN GUY C. SWAN III

In the air-land battle of the future, teamwork among the services in planning and coordinating air-ground operations will be crucial. A unique course of instruction offered at Hurlburt Field, Florida, helps officers and senior noncommissioned officers from all the armed services to prepare for that teamwork.

The Joint Firepower Control Course (JFCC), a two-week course sponsored by the U.S. Air Force's Air-Ground Operations School (AGOS), is taught by selected Army, Air Force, and Navy officers, all of whom are thoroughly professional instructors with wide experience in various kinds of military operations.

Like the instructors, the students come from varied military backgrounds and tend to be highly motivated and professional. In fact, a good deal of the learning that takes place during the course comes out of the informal exchanges between the students. This also makes for some lively conversations and promotes interservice respect and confidence.

Much of the first week's instruction focuses on four main topics — Army organization, Air Force organization and missions, threat capabilities, and the functions of the Tactical Air Control System/Army Air Ground System (TACS/AAGS).

In the discussion of Army organization, the emphasis is placed on combat units below corps level. The students are briefly exposed to

current Army weapon systems; combat operations, doctrine and missions; fire support assets; and Army aviation. Military symbols, map overlay techniques, and communication procedures are also covered. In addition to being an excellent review for the Army students, this block of instruction helps to familiarize the other students, many of whom will serve as forward air controllers (FACs), with the Army's battle concepts and terminology.

## OVERVIEW

A similar overview of Air Force organization and missions focuses on operational doctrine, aircraft, weapons, and communications. The Air Force instructors use the primary missions of tactical air operations as a framework for all the subsequent classes — interdiction, counter-air, close air support (CAS), tactical air reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and special air operations.

A parallel look at the threat forces is also presented. Through a series of classified briefings, the students get a comprehensive picture of threat air, land, and sea capabilities and of threat doctrine and strategies.


The first week's instruction concludes with several detailed periods on the Tactical Air Control System/Army Air Ground System (TACS/

AAGS). The students are shown how the various sophisticated Army and Air Force command and control systems work together to provide timely air support for ground operations. The focus is on the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), because it is here that most of the initial coordination takes place between Army commanders and Air Force supporting units. With the TACP as a basis, the instructors cover the Air Force command and control system, following a sample request for air support through the TACS system.

The course's second week includes instruction in such subjects as tactical air reconnaissance, controlling and requesting tactical airlift, beacon bombing techniques, fighter tactics, and forward air control procedures. There is also a good discussion of the employment of the Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT), which calls for the simultaneous use of Army attack helicopters and Air Force fighter aircraft to defeat heavily armored threat formations.

The students then get an opportunity to visit the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing (F-15) at Eglin AFB, and are also given an orientation on Air Force special air operations and unconventional warfare. The special operations briefing includes a static display of the AC-130H *Spectre* gunship of the 1st Special Operations Wing. The AC-130H is a modified C-130 cargo aircraft that carries twin 20mm Vul-





can cannons, a 40mm cannon, and a 105mm Army howitzer.

The training highlight of the week is an eight-hour planning conference during which the Army students in the course act as an armored cavalry squadron staff conducting a covering force operation with the Air Force students playing the roles of air liaison officers (ALOs) and FACs. This exercise presents a rapidly changing tactical scenario in which the students must apply what they


have learned about U.S. air and ground operations, threat capabilities, and the TACS/AAGS system.

The Joint Firepower Control Course is a tremendously valuable tool, and commanders at all levels should use it to prepare themselves and their units to fight the air-land battle. More information on the course and on the other courses offered at AGOS can be obtained from the Commandant, USAF Air

Ground Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544.



**CAPTAIN GUY C. SWAN III**, now commanding a company in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, recently completed the JFCC. A 1976 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has also completed both the Armor and the Infantry Officer Advanced Courses.



# ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



## BRANCH CHIEF'S COMMENTS

As the new Chief of Infantry Branch, I want to assure you that all of us here will continue to work hard to meet the needs of all Infantrymen. In doing our personnel management and assignment tasks, we will use not only current Army priorities and policies, but also some good common sense in the decision-making process. In that regard, our goal is to place the right soldier into the right job at the right time.

It is imperative that all of you get involved in your own careers. Obtain a copy of your fiche record from Fort Benjamin Harrison and review it carefully. Make sure it is accurate and up to date, because decisions on promotions, assignments, and schools are based in large measure on the information on it.

Infantry Branch will continue to use this Career Notes section to pass on information of interest and concern to all of you.

"All the way!"

LTC RICHARD C. PAHLAND

## RIGHT SOLDIER, RIGHT JOB

The Infantry Branch manages assignments and professional development for about 72,000 soldiers, including Rangers, Special Forces, and Drill Sergeants. We try to accomplish this by merging the needs of the Army with the needs of the individual and the priority of the assignment. All possible consideration is given to professional development, personal requests, and common sense, but there are times when the overriding rationale for a decision has to be the Army's policies and priorities. In these cases, we will respond as quick-

ly as possible in providing the rationale for a decision.

To make good assignments, we have to review each soldier's Career Management Individual File (CMIF). This file, maintained at MILPERCEN, is used for assignments and professional development for the ranks of staff sergeant and above. (The CMIF should not be confused with the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF), which is maintained at Fort Benjamin Harrison and used for all boards, such as for promotions and QMPs.)

When reviewing a soldier's CMIF, the assignment managers check his



DA Forms 2 and 2-1 and his preference statement (DA Form 2635) to see if he meets the criteria for a particular assignment and if the assignment would be beneficial to his career.

If the information on the CMIF is to be useful, it must be kept current. It is the job of the soldier's servicing MILPO to forward to Infantry Branch copies of his DA Forms 2 and 2-1 annually. It is the soldier's responsibility to make sure the MILPO does this and to see that we are aware of any changes in his preferences by sending us an updated copy of his preference statement. Also, the individual soldier must ensure that his DA Form 2 is updated at least twice a year. He must also be aware that the entries on the DA

Form 2 are the SIDPERS transactions that update the Enlisted Master File (EMF) at MILPERCEN, and that unless a SIDPERS transaction takes place at the local level, the EMF will not contain the most current information on him.

When the system nominates a soldier for a particular assignment, the Centralized Assignment Procedure (CAP III) retrieves information from the EMF. It is therefore imperative that the individual soldier make sure his DA Form 2 carries all the pertinent information concerning his duty position, his primary MOS, his last tour overseas and when he returned, his preferences, any Skill Qualification Identifier (SQI) — such as "P" for Airborne, "X" for Drill Sergeant, "S" for Special Forces, "V" for Rangers. Any Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) the soldier may have should also be included. The EMF can maintain up to four ASIs on an individual, and the soldier must ensure that the one he is most current in is listed first.

All these factors have an effect on a CAP III assignment nomination. The system assigns point values to each of these items. When there is an open requisition for a particular assignment, all eligible soldiers are considered for the vacancy and the most eligible (the one with the most points) is nominated.

Then a roster of the job vacancies and of the individuals nominated to fill them is sent to the assignment managers and the professional development NCO, and they screen each soldier's CMIF to determine whether he is in fact the best qualified and whether the assignment will benefit his career and the needs of the Army. Branch personnel then decide where and when Infantry soldiers are assigned.

INFANTRY BRANCH



Major Robert C. Ballard  
 Chief  
 Management Section




Major Margaret M. Johnson  
 Chief  
 Management Section

MSG Glen C. Shoreswood Jr.  
 Chief  
 Professional Development



MSG Tyrone G. Jones  
 Senior Instructor  
 Career Advisor

Professional Development  
 (202) 325 or AUTOVON 721-8056/8057/8058/8059



Major Robert C. Ballard  
 Chief  
 Management Section



Major Margaret M. Johnson  
 Chief  
 Management Section



MSG Glen C. Shoreswood Jr.  
 Chief  
 Professional Development



MSG Tyrone G. Jones  
 Senior Instructor  
 Career Advisor

EW/SE Assignments  
 (202) 325 or AUTOVON 721-8056/8057/8058/8059



Elizabeth Johnson  
 CW3  
 Management Section



SFC Davvy R. Stone  
 ET 10B  
 Career Advisor



Knight Finster  
 ET  
 Assignment Manager



Frank Gorman  
 ET 10B  
 Assignment Manager

## E6 Assignments

(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-8056/8057/8058



SFC Franklin D. Bent  
E6 11B  
Career Advisor



Lenore F. Christenson  
Chief, E6  
Assignment Team




Gwendell Heath  
E6 CONUS  
Assignment Manager



Charles Rollins  
E6 CONUS  
Assignment Manager



Joann Filakousky  
E6 Overseas  
Assignment Manager



Brian X. Murray  
E6 Overseas  
Assignment Manager

## E1-E5 Assignments

(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-9517/9543



SFC Robert J. Hayes  
E1-5 11B/C/H/M, E6/7  
11C/H Career Advisor



Stephen W. Steiner  
Chief, E1-5  
Assignment Team



Robert T. Davis  
E1-5 11C/H CONUS  
Assignment Manager



Rosie E. Plummer  
E1-5 11B/M CONUS  
Assignment Manager



Carver E. Poindexter  
E1-4 11B/C/H/M Overseas  
Assignment Manager



Jackie Cohn  
E5 11B/C/H/M Overseas  
Assignment Manager

Special Forces and Ranger Assignments and Applications  
(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-9429/8340



MSG Edward O. Kinsley  
SF/Ranger  
Career Advisor



Theresia H. Palmer  
Chief, SF/Ranger  
Assignment Team



Elizabeth Alexander  
SF Assignment  
Manager



Mary Barkey  
SF Applications



Frances Rawlings  
Ranger Assignment  
Manager

Drill Sergeant Assignments and Applications  
(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-8070/8394



SFC Vale D. Short  
Chief  
DS Assignments



Helen Krizmanich  
DS  
Management Specialist



Sarah Jones  
DS Management



Colleen Hall  
DS Management

**PHYSICAL READINESS TEST**

Soldiers in Army Reserve units now take the same Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) as the Active Army soldiers take. The test, which consists of a two-mile run, pushups, and situps, will be given each year during a Reserve unit's Annual Training period.

Unit Reservists up to the age of 40 will take the APRT at least once a year and must attain a score of at

least 60 points on each test event and an overall score of at least 180 points.

The following chart gives minimum and perfect scores for men under 40. (The number to the right of the slash is the perfect score.)

AGE	PUSHUPS	SITUPS	TWO-MILE RUN
17-25	40/68	40/69	17:55/13:05
26-30	38/66	38/67	18:30/13:40
31-35	33/61	36/65	19:10/14:20
36-39	32/60	34/63	19:35/15:05

Army Reservists who are attending

full-time resident training or instruction for 56 days or more are also subject to the APRT. Students who fail to achieve the minimum standards on the test may be issued a completion certificate in lieu of a graduation certificate.

Reservists 40 and older, for now, will continue to take the four-mile march, but the plan is for these men eventually to run the two-mile event of the APRT after complete medical screening.

# OFFICERS CAREER NOTES



## BRANCH CHIEF'S NOTES

On behalf of Infantrymen everywhere, I want to extend our thanks to the outgoing Branch Chief, Colonel James Sullivan. He never lost sight of the individual officer while satisfying the Army's assignment requirements. He will be missed.

In my first notes as Branch Chief, I would like to depart from the customary personnel management information to share some initial impressions, acknowledging at the same time that first impressions can be deceiving.

This is my rookie season at MILPERCEN, and I'm learning the personnel management system by matching my past experiences on the receiving end against what I see on the transmitting end. Ultimately, each infantry officer will have to judge the reliability of my views on the basis of their dealings with their particular assignment officers.

Like any human endeavor, assigning an officer (and his family) is a complex business. Each assignment must pass the test of common sense. There are no secrets in Infantry Branch or elsewhere in MILPERCEN. Computers are used to generate information, but an Infantry officer actually makes the assignment.

I am honestly impressed by the openness of the entire assignment process. Assignment officers are charged with satisfying Army requirements while taking the best advantage of each officer's inherent abilities, aptitudes, and interests, and also of his family needs. Each officer can influence the process, and so can his commander. The key to the system is a realistic appraisal of where he can contribute most to the Army's mission.

This is the year of progress for Infantrymen. One of our aims is to increase the Infantry officer's participation in the combined arms team. Simultaneously, we are trying to identify top-notch officers to serve as instructors at our service schools. The assignment officers (whose pictures are included in these notes) are determined to do their part. I encourage each officer to contact them and to evaluate my comments in light of his own experiences in dealing with them.

Recently, Infantry Branch has received several inquiries concerning the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS<sup>3</sup>) and Specialty Code 28. The following explanations should provide answers to the more commonly asked questions.

### LTC JOHN F. CONNOLLY

#### CAS<sup>3</sup>

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS<sup>3</sup>) is designed to train Active and Reserve Component officers to function as staff officers at brigade, division, and installation level. The course consists of two phases. Phase I, the nonresident portion, involves about 140 academic hours of correspondence studies and culminates in an open-book comprehensive examination. Phase II is the resident phase in which students attend for nine weeks in a temporary duty status, usually between assignments.

The course teaches the officer what staffs are, what they do, and how they perform. Phase I of the curriculum is divided into a series of self-paced modules intended to provide the student the background knowledge and skills he needs to negotiate the resident phase. Some of

these modules cover the historical development of staffs, the organization of Army divisions, staff roles and relationships, quantitative skills, decision-making processes, threat forces, weapon system review, and a tactics overview.

Phase II is divided into six segments: staff techniques, training, budget, preparation for combat operations, mobilization and deployment, and a European tactical operations scenario. Each of these segments provides the students with a focal point for the staff interactive process. They are tied together with an overall general scenario that runs throughout the course.

Currently, the resident phase is being conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It has not been decided whether this phase will also be offered eventually in Europe. The proposed implementation plan to bring CAS<sup>3</sup> to full operation is: Four courses will be conducted in calendar years (CY) 1983 and 1984, and five courses will be conducted in CY 1985. The size of each class is intended to increase from the present enrollment of 240 officers to 600 in CY 1985. These scheduled increases are dependent, of course, upon favorable budgeting in future years.

To be eligible to attend CAS<sup>3</sup>, an officer must have completed an officer advanced course. He will usually attend between his seventh and ninth years of service, but not always.

Infantry officers will be automatically scheduled to attend CAS<sup>3</sup> by Infantry Branch. The scheduling is based on each officer's date of availability or date of return from overseas. CAS<sup>3</sup> will not be programmed immediately after an officer advanced course. Officers will be notified of resident class dates through their chains of command.


INFANTRY BRANCH TEAM



LTC John Connolly  
Branch Chief



MAJ Dave Grittenden  
LTC SC 11  
and Command




LTC Lynn Hunt  
LTC, Additional SC  
and ROTC



MAJ Jim Gibson  
LTC, Additional SC 54  
Controller



MAJ Cully Warren  
MAJ, SC 11 and ROTC



MAJ Russ Thompson  
MAJ, Additional SC



GPT Jim Dezzutti  
MAJ & CPT, Additional  
SC 54 Controller



MAJ Terry Young  
CPT, SC 11, Overseas  
and Advanced Course



CPT John Kidder  
CPT, Additional SC



CPT Steve Smith  
CPT, SC 11 CONUS  
and Nominative

CPT Ron Thompson  
LT, SC 11



Elaine Martin  
LT, SC 11 Accessions



CPT Mick Bednarek  
Infantry Branch Rep  
Fort Benning, Georgia

normally one year in advance, and will receive their initial nonresident instruction packets soon thereafter.

Beginning with the July 1983 class, only officers of year groups 1976 and later will be scheduled for attendance by Infantry Branch. This is necessary to make sure these year groups achieve the best participation. At present, CAS<sup>3</sup> is not a prerequisite for CSC.

Questions or problems associated with CAS<sup>3</sup> attendance may be directed to any of the captains' assignment officers within Infantry Branch.

### SC 28 ABOLISHED

The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) lost one of its specialty codes effective 1 September 1982. SC 28, Training Developments, has been eliminated from the OPMS. The training function has been absorbed by SC 54, which has been renamed Operations, Plans, Training, and Force Development.

In other changes to these two specialty codes, Special Skill Identifier (SSI) 54A, Operations and

Plans Officer, has been renamed Operations, Plans, and Training Officer; SSI 54B, Combat Development Officer, has become ASI 7Y (SSI 54B has been eliminated); and SSI 54C, Force Development Officer, has had ASI 7X, Manpower and Force Management Functions, added to it.

Officers who formerly held SC 28 have had their records reviewed, and new additional specialties have been assigned. Almost 84 percent of the combat arms officers have been redesignated SC 54 and the rest have received other OPMS specialties that match their qualifications and training. Officers who were qualified in SC 28 were also awarded ASI 7Q to document those skills.

MILPERCEN's Combat Arms Division has sent letters of notification to officers who held SC28 informing them of their new specialty combinations, and it has also changed Officer Record Briefs to reflect the new specialties.

Any officer who wants to change his specialty combination, should write to HQ, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPE-I, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.

## RESERVE COMPONENT NOTES

### 1983 PROMOTION BOARDS

The U.S. Army Reserve's mandatory promotion boards for 1983 have been established and will convene at the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) in St. Louis as shown below:

<b>APL BOARD</b>	<b>CONVENES</b>
<b>1LT to CPT</b>	11 Jan 83
<b>CPT to MAJ</b>	8 Mar 83
<b>MAJ to LTC</b>	7 Sep 83
<b>Warrant Officers</b>	14 Jun 83

Officers will be considered if they are eligible for promotion on or before the following dates:

<b>Warrant Officers</b>	<b>31 Aug 84</b>
<b>1LT to CPT</b>	
<b>CPT to MAJ</b>	<b>15 May 84</b>
<b>MAJ to LTC</b>	<b>31 Dec 84</b>

Officers are advised to pay close attention to the promotion material they receive from RCPAC and to stay in touch with their Personnel Management Officers. They should also be careful not to confuse these boards with the unit vacancy boards that will be conducted by the three continental U.S. armies (CONUSAs).





# BOOK REVIEWS



**WHY WE WERE IN VIETNAM.**  
By Norman Podhoretz (Simon and Schuster, 1981. 240 Pages. \$13.50).  
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Rinaldo, Fort Eustis, Virginia.

Based on the results, the United States involvement in Vietnam was a disaster. Nevertheless, to those of us who served there and who have kept up with some of the literature that has appeared since the end of the war, the nobility of our purpose in being there in the first place is without question.

This book, therefore, is anti-climactic. It will not give us our parade or draw applause from a gathering at our alma maters. Nor will it get us any free drinks at the local bar. Still, it's nice to see our version of the truth published.

Podhoretz, a neo-conservative editor of *Commentary* magazine, tells why we went in, why we stayed in, and why we withdrew. His conclusion, in a nutshell, is that our participation was not immoral. A corollary is that the war was not conducted by brutes bent on sadism.

Despite its virtues, and despite the author's brisk writing style, the book is boring, perhaps because the issue has finally become boring. And that is good in my view.

We know that our nation and our military services must look to fresh challenges freed from the myths and shibboleths about national security policies that were generated in the wake of Vietnam. It is well to remember, though, that noble purpose remains ingrained in the American way of war — and ignoble causes should take heed.

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**THE WAR SYSTEM: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH.**  
Edited by Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim (Westview Press,

1980. 659 Pages). Reviewed by Major John C. Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

The editors, both of whom are political scientists, have compiled a collection of scholarly essays that treat the phenomenon of war and human conflict. The essays are of uniformly high quality and range from an analysis of Konrad Lorenz's theory of human aggression to the international law aspects of the control of force.

The interested reader, whether his background is social psychology, anthropology, sociology, political science, or international relations will find that this book is a valuable resource for the study of war as a system. The military professional will find especially valuable essays in the book's seventh part, which is called *Decisionmaking Inquiries*.

The essays are written in a sophisticated and scholarly manner and assume a background of professional experience on the part of the reader. This does not detract, though, from the book's intrinsic value as a resource guide.

Given the ever-changing technology of war and the changing nature of world politics, the professional military officer of the 1980s and 1990s should have a sophisticated awareness of war as a system. Falk and Kim impart to the reader such a sophisticated awareness.

---

**WHEN TIGERS FIGHT.** By Dick Wilson (The Viking Press, 1982. 269 Pages. \$16.95). Reviewed by Major

**NOTE TO READERS:** All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

C.T. Guthrie, Fort Lewis, Washington.

Dick Wilson has written an excellent narrative history of the Sino-Japanese War that lasted from 1937 to 1945. From the Marco Polo bridge incident near Beijing to the Japanese surrender in September 1945, Wilson describes the events of this conflict between these two Asian giants in a thorough and comprehensive manner. Personalizing his presentation, the author relies heavily on diaries and other materials that were prepared by people who actually participated in the events described in the book.

It is a book for the military historian, the tactician, the Asian specialist, and the general reader. Using photographs and maps of selected battles, Wilson narrates the events of the war from the perspective of a neutral observer. He does not attempt any in-depth analysis of the events he writes about. Rather, his stated goal is to describe the events as objectively as possible, allowing the reader to interpret them.

For the most part, Wilson succeeds admirably, although there are times when he appears to sympathize with the Chinese cause. An interesting and valuable contribution to Asian history, this book should receive your careful attention.

---

**COMBAT MOTIVATION,** by Anthony Kelleth (Kluwer Boston, 1982. 368 Pages. \$38.00). Reviewed by Colonel George G. Eddy, United States Army, Retired.

This is a book whose title should arouse the considerable interest of everyone who is concerned with what causes some men to fight and others to defect from combat. Yet when you realize that the book's preface is the

most interesting and comprehensively arrayed part of the entire book, you have to come away still thirsty for a rousing conclusion that never appears.

There is a paradox here. In the book you will find a fairly comprehensive digest of important and useful material — not original research — and yet it is lacking an effective recapitulation to aid in its practical application.

At the outset, the author declares that his effort is to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, and he certainly sticks to his theme. While there is much to catch one's attention, especially the case histories, those genuinely concerned with combat motivation must laboriously cull from the 19 chapters material that is substantive and worthy of application in the functional selection and battle preparation of both regulars and non-regulars.

The author feels that combat motivation is far too complex to lend itself

easily to simple or unidimensional explanations, and that it varies from soldier to soldier, from situation to situation, and from time to time. Thus, combat motivation is not amenable to policies that generalize the influence of particular factors or stress their unique roles, nor is it amenable to policies that fail to recognize the different levels of willingness and commitment among the soldiers at whom they are directed.

**THE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF THE U.S. FLEET.** 12th Edition. By Norman Polmar (Naval Institute Press, 1981. 421 Pages. \$24.95). Reviewed by Rear Admiral George L. Phillips, United States Navy, Retired.

Norman Polmar's prolific pen is well applied in this masterful overview of the naval forces of the United States. It is a volume that surely will be scanned by the Pentagon planners, for it provides succinct details of our tools of seapower without the need

for digging into abstruse files.

From the clear and informative introductory chapters that deal with the state of the fleet and its organizational and personnel problems, the entire present and authorized array of U.S. naval strength is pictorially displayed, from the mighty capital ships to the workhorse auxiliaries and service craft, from battleships and carriers to aircraft, weapons, and electronic systems. The coverage is complete and reveals a high degree of professionalism.

Particularly interesting is the in-depth review of the Coast Guard and the Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, both of which are valuable adjuncts to the defense establishment. Though separate in administration, these services are usually taken into the Navy in time of war, and they have a distinguished record of service, readiness, reliability, and competency.

The author writes from an authoritative background of consulting and


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analytical work for the Department of Defense on a full spectrum of naval matters. His book is recommended as a reference volume that contains all the answers.

**SIX ARMIES IN NORMANDY**, by John Keegan (Viking, 1982. 365 Pages.) Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Dexter, United States Army.

Combining the empathy for the common soldier of an Ernie Pyle, the psychological insight to human reaction under fire of an S.L.A. Marshall, and the analytical narrative style of a Barbara Tuchman, John Keegan, a noted British military historian, reexamines one campaign of World War II through the experiences of soldiers from six armies of different origin who participated in the campaign as allies or adversaries.

The immediate story centers on the period between 6 June and 25 August 1944, but the author's focus encompasses a much broader time frame as he blends in the national heritage of the various participants and constructs an intriguing story of certain military units involved in the first three months of bloody combat in the Normandy campaign.

The author always ends his books with a note for the future. Circumstances have changed, he feels, and high technology has made some of the old rules obsolete. But as his own countrymen learned in the recent fighting in the Falklands, certain classic principles of land warfare used by infantrymen for centuries still apply.

This book is must reading for all professional soldiers and private citizens who are genuinely concerned about the future and want to learn how to face it by reading the lessons of the past.

**THE IMAGE OF WAR, 1861-1865: VOLUME III, THE EMBATTLED CONFEDERACY**, Edited by William C. Davis (Doubleday, 1982. 464 Pages. \$39.95).

Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Emanci-

pation Proclamation, the Northern blockade, all are included in this third volume of the publisher's magnificent photographic series on the American Civil War.

A project of the National Historical Society, this particular volume concentrates on the war in the east between September 1862 and July 1863 and on the great land battles that, for all practical purposes, determined the war's final outcome. Each of the seven short narratives is complemented by numerous photographs, the captions of which are used to supplement and expand the overall story.

As in the other published volumes in the series, many of the photographs have never been published before. The other three volumes are scheduled for publication in 1983 and 1984.

**AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION IN PERSPECTIVE**, by Anthony Arnold (Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 126 Pages). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).

This concise, well-written book, set in nine chapters, traces Soviet-Afghan relations from 1919 to the present, with emphasis on the events that led to the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The author, a former intelligence analyst, contends that the Soviets have maintained a long-term pattern of aggressive intentions towards Afghanistan first through economic penetration, then through political subversion, and, finally, by military invasion and occupation.

The death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in an era of more flexible and sophisticated Soviet foreign policy. According to the author, during the period 1953-1963 economic aid proved to be an effective tool for the Soviets in their drive to establish a dominant influence in Afghanistan. But despite growing Soviet influence, the leaders of Afghanistan were not prepared to give up the country's non-aligned status.

For the next fifteen years — 1963-1978 — the Soviets continued

their economic penetration but placed greater emphasis on the manipulation of internal Afghan political forces through the Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. And from 1978 on, events in Afghanistan unfolded with an almost certain inevitability.

The strength of this book lies in the author's discussion of Soviet calculations and miscalculations of the cost of their Afghan adventure and U.S. policy options that are available to counter continued Soviet occupation of the country.

This informative book argues that Soviet aggressive intentions have been restrained only by the limitations of Soviet capabilities. It is highly recommended for the specialist and for the general reader.

#### RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

**VICTORY IN BANGLADESH**, by Major General Lachman Singh. Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 1982. 320 Pages. \$19.95.

**THE "AMAROC NEWS": THE DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY, 1919-1923**, by Alfred E. Corneblse. Southern Illinois University Press, 1981. 272 Pages. \$24.95.

**DER ERSTE WELTKRIEG**, by Anton Wagner. 2. Auflage. Vienna: Verlag Carl Ueberreuter, 1982. 420 Pages. oS 95.

**AUSTRALIA AT WAR, 1939-1945**, by John Robertson. David and Charles, 1981. 269 Pages. \$31.50.

**KENTUCKY FIGHTING MEN, 1861-1945**, by Richard G. Stone, Jr. University Press of Kentucky, 1982. 126 Pages. \$6.95.

**A TALENT TO SURVIVE: THE WARTIME EXPLOITS OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD BROAD, M.C.** By Rex Woods. London: William Kimber, 1982. 205 Pages.

**VIETNAM WAR LITERATURE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF IMAGINATIVE WORKS ABOUT AMERICANS FIGHTING IN VIETNAM.** By John Newman (Scarecrow Press, 1982. 117 Pages).

**BRITISH DEFENSE DIRECTORY, VOLUME I, NUMBER 1, MARCH 1982.** Published by Brassey's Publishers Limited. Published quarterly at an annual rate of \$307.50.

**PRELUDE TO FAME.** By Bertram Ratcliffe. Hippocrene Books, 1982. 112 Pages. \$14.95.

# INFANTRY LETTERS



## ASSAULT EQUIPMENT

Dear Sir,

We have received numerous replies and inquiries in response to our article, "Attack of A Desert Strongpoint" (INFANTRY, July-August 1982, page 25). Several questions have been posed in regard to the availability of the items of equipment described in the article, especially tank minerollers and M157 projected demolition charges.

As the article mentions, the tank minerollers are now being used by selected units in USAREUR, and there are presently 360 "updated" (product-improved) M157s in the Army's inventory. Eighty-five were sent to Europe, while smaller numbers were designated for Korea. The M157 projected demolition charges do exist in the inventory and have for a number of years.

The real problem is the ability of units to obtain and train with either the M173 demolition charge or the training device, the M174.

CPT WAYNE J. SABO  
CPT EDWIN L. KENNEDY, JR.  
Fort Benning, Georgia

## STRONG AND EFFICIENT

Dear Sir,

I have carefully read "Keep It Light," by Major John P. Gritz (INFANTRY, July-August 1982, page 6). The author makes some interesting points and brings out the spirit in all Infantrymen. As an Infantryman myself, I appreciate his argument, but I find too many faults in his analysis to allow the article to pass without criticism.

Soviet tactical doctrine has been changing to meet the needs of the

modern battlefield. (An excellent series of articles on Soviet military forces appears in the August 1982 issue of *Military Review*. Soviet forces are highly mobile and will make numerous penetrations to get to our rear areas for exploitation. Without a strong and efficient mechanized combined arms force, we will not be able to counter such an enemy thrust quickly and change on a rapidly moving battlefield.

We do not have to look only at a European battlefield to see this type of action. In the Middle East, for example, some nations also have forces structured along Soviet lines.

Mechanized infantry also enables us to exploit and pursue in offensive missions, which is vital if we are to destroy enemy command, control, and communications, and logistical facilities.

I would be the last to say we should let go of light infantry. I gained a deep appreciation for its need in Korea. Light infantry is needed in many potential trouble spots around the world, and it must be equipped and trained to go. But for the Army to return to a predominantly light infantry force would be using 1940s doctrine on the 1980s battlefield.

RICHARD D. DUBOIS  
CPT, Infantry  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

## HATS OFF

Dear Sir,

Hats off to Major John P. Gritz for his article, "Keep It Light," and to INFANTRY for publishing it in the July-August 1982 issue (page 6).

As a field artilleryman who was drafted into the U.S. Army Special Forces in 1964, I learned just how ef-

fective the foot soldier can be against all types of forces.

Light infantry needs to be a much more significant part of our total forces, and the time to make it such is now! With the current interest in physical fitness, with the ever-increasing cost of weaponry, and with a very strong possibility that our Constitution may be amended to require a balanced budget, we had better get on with organizing and equipping light infantry units as soon as possible.

ROBERT H. WHITE  
LTC, Field Artillery  
Fort Eustis, Virginia

## RIFLE ZERO

Dear Sir,

I am writing in regard to an article in the May-June 1982 issue of INFANTRY entitled "Rifle Zero," by Captain Everett D. Mayfield. I find that I must take exception to a number of statements in the article.

First, I also have served as an enlisted Marine. I have not fired in competition as the captain has, but I have been a basic rifle marksmanship instructor for basic training at Fort Dix for the past two years. I have taught preparatory marksmanship, zeroing, field fire, zero/timed fire, record fire, and target detection.

The thing about the article that I disagree with is his concept of zeroing and the reasons for it. Here are my counterpoints:

- Zeroing is the mechanical process of adjusting a rifle's sights so that the rifle will hit a target at the distance the rifle is zeroed for.

- West European service rifles are not ordinarily zeroed by the soldiers who use them. Yet those same soldiers achieve significantly higher

qualification scores than our soldiers do.

- Every rifle is slightly different, and thus each rifle will have a slightly different sight setting when it is correctly zeroed than another rifle will have.

- If an experienced firer zeroes a rifle so that the shot groups are centered in the circle of the new zero target, then any other experienced firer can pick up the same rifle, fire shot groups at the new zero target, and hit inside the zero circle. (I have proved this in practice to skeptical drill sergeants here at Fort Dix.)

- Stock weld varies from position to position, even with the same firer. Soldiers must be experienced enough in different positions to hit targets consistently from the positions they are most likely to use in combat, including different stock welds.

My next contention, I'm afraid, has little support: I feel that novice firers should not zero weapons until after they can hit what they shoot at. It works this way: Experienced firers zero weapons and periodically check weapon zeros. The new firer is issued a rifle that is already known to be able to hit the target. When a novice is consistently hitting the target, the trainer can see that he has learned to

apply marksmanship fundamentals, and so can the firer. Feedback is the best learning device. If the soldier does it right, he hits the target. If he does it wrong he misses. And the marksmanship trainer trying to diagnose shooter problems doesn't have to worry about where the rifle is hitting compared to where the new soldier is aiming. The trainer knows that the rifle will hit the target if it is correctly aimed, if it is held steady, and if the firer practices breath and trigger control.

This is a theory that I feel should be completely tested. I have personally pre-zeroed rifles for problem firers, then I have taught them to shoot on the basis that if they hit the target they are right, and if they miss, they are wrong.

My final point about zeroing, and, I think, the key one, is this: If a soldier is on the battlefield and his rifle breaks, he has to pick up any rifle he can reach — perhaps one from a fallen squad member — and immediately engage enemy soldiers who are trying to kill him. Is he going to stop and zero that other rifle now? No. But if, while the squad was in its last assembly area, somebody made sure that all the squad's weapons were correctly zeroed, then that

soldier, or any other soldier in the squad, can effectively use the weapon he grabs at effective combat ranges.

There are a lot of marksmanship myths in the field. And there are an awful lot of soldiers out there who cannot shoot. We need to change that. Our lives and our country depend on our doing it right the first time.

MICHAEL D. SETTLES  
SSG, USA  
Fort Dix, New Jersey


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### GOOD SHOT, BUT ...

Dear Sir,

I have just read the May-June 1982 issue of *INFANTRY* and I was especially interested in Captain Everett D. Mayfield's article, "Rifle Zero."

Many times I have been sent to the range to fire for qualification with a rifle I have never seen before, much less zeroed. The weapon I fire on the range is often not the weapon that is specified on my weapon card. It is the rifle that is next on the rack as the unit armorer hands them out. At the range, I have rarely been given time and ammunition to zero my weapon properly.



I fired in civilian competition for many years, starting with small-bore rifles at age 13 and working up to the National Match course with an M1 Garand. I have also fired at moving targets under field conditions during many hunting trips. In short, I am a good shot, and no one can tell me otherwise. Yet I am wearing only a Marksman badge on my uniform because I have never been allowed to show what I can do. You can imagine what this does to my pride.

I hope Captain Mayfield's article will strike a responsible chord in the hearts of those who conduct marksmanship training and qualification firing.

PAUL F. ADAMS  
SSG, USAR  
Tucson, Arizona

#### INFANTRY UPS AND DOWNS

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to "Infantry: A Prevailing Theme," by Lieutenant Peter W. Harris, USN (INFANTRY, July-August 1982, page 16).

The best reason for the rise and decline in the use of infantry could be

the emphasis placed on infantry; that is, the rise of the chariot might have caused a decline in the use of infantry. In other words, the rise of a different (or novel) weapon system could and usually did cause the decline of infantry. But proper usage increases with time, training, and understanding of how to best employ



infantry (or any other weapon system, for that matter).

Two of the examples Lieutenant Harris uses are not correct, as I see it. At Waterloo, Napoleon was declining in his tactical abilities, and he was faced by a soldier who was rising in his abilities. Napoleon used his artillery to weaken the enemy line so that his infantry columns could break

the line for exploitation by the cavalry. Neither Wellington's artillery nor his cavalry stopped D'Erlon's or Jerome's attacks; the British Infantry did! And the author might have mentioned the fact that the British Foot Guards (with assistance from the 52d Light Infantry) stopped and then turned back the French Guard.

As to World War I, the infantry's decline during the middle of that war was due to the fact that most of the combatants' pre-war armies were devastated and the raw recruits had not received proper or sufficient training. The result was the great frontal attack bloodbaths. The successful German Sturmtruppen attacks in 1918 were due to training, albeit in the new tactic of small infantry unit infiltration.

Finally, as to the French column, one tactical formation consistently defeated the column — the British two-rank line — through superior morale, discipline, training, and firepower. As Napoleon once said, "The moral is to the physical as three is to one."

FRANK W. LESLIE  
SSG, USA  
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment

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# From The Editor

The calendar year is once again coming to a close, and with it, INFANTRY closes out another year, its 62d. During this special time of year, not only are there preparations for such time-honored holidays as Veterans' Day and Thanksgiving Day, it's time to review the past year with an eye to making things better during the next year. This is also the one "authorized" time when the Editor can blow INFANTRY's horn — and get away with it.

It's been a good year for INFANTRY. Artistically, we excelled internationally: The cover of our January-February issue was accepted for display at the CREATIVITY '82 show and for inclusion in the CREATIVITY 12 Annual. The CREATIVITY show is a major international award show for visual professionals. We were also able to maintain an excellent number of paid subscribers, which has insured, in part, our Subscription Service Fund's financial good health. Finally, my small staff of dedicated individuals did a superb job in producing the six issues, and in handling the routine office matters in a professional and timely manner. They are, indeed, a committed lot.

Of course, one can't have roses without accepting the thorns. We continue to need new material and new subscribers. We ask all of our dedicated writers to continue to WRITE. For those of you who have never submitted an article for publication, we encourage you to join the discussion, to air your views, and to share your thoughts. We will help you in any way that we can to publish your manuscript.

Many of our readers seem to feel that because INFANTRY is sent to every Infantry unit in the Army, they do not need a personal subscription. We think the answer lies somewhere between professional branch pride and staying actively abreast of our profession. INFANTRY contains the most current combined arms information available at the company level. We will continue to do our part in keeping it an instrument for stimulating professional thought and for broadening your knowledge base.

To all who have supported and read INFANTRY throughout the year, our sincere thanks. All of us at INFANTRY wish you and yours a healthy and joyous Holiday Season. We look forward to serving you in 1983.

MDB

#### OUTSIDE BACK COVER:

Arctic Test Center, Fort Greely, Alaska, 1974, by Lieutenant Mark McFaul. (United States Army Art Collection)



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