

Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

MARCH-APRIL 1985

Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TRAINING

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FRONT COVER

The United States Infantry — the backbone of our country's land forces.



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Commandant's NOTE



Major General John W. Foss

Chief of Infantry

Since becoming Chief of Infantry, I have visited many of our infantry units and have talked with our infantrymen the world over. I have been impressed with what I have seen and heard, and I can't help feeling a surge of pride when I think of how far we have come in the years since I first joined the infantry's ranks some 35 years ago.

At the same time, though, I am concerned that our Infantry community could become a divided one. On one side would be infantrymen who hold that there is only *one infantry* and on the other, those who believe there are many — light, airborne, air assault, mechanized, and the like — and that there can no longer be just one.

In my way of thinking there is indeed only *one Infantry* (with a capital "I"), but, at the same time, there are *several infantries* (generic, with a little "i"). Every infantryman, no matter what kind of label precedes his name, is a plain vanilla infantryman first; and his basic mission has not changed since our Infantry came into being on 14 June 1775. That mission is to get to the battlefield and close with the enemy by fire and movement to destroy or capture him, or to repel his attack by fire, close combat, and counterattack — the hardest task on the battlefield.

All infantrymen, therefore, spring from one source; all are trained in those things that have sustained Infantry units on various battlefields for more than 200 years: the use of terrain, camouflage, marksmanship, and stealth; the basic tactics of fire and movement; and the taking and holding of ground. It is only after they have learned these common lessons that infantrymen can move on to become, if you will, "specialist" infantrymen.

We have a variety of different infantry units — from Bradley to airborne — whose sole reason for existing is to put infantrymen on the battlefield. These units operate at different paces and within different combined arms teams. Bradley infantry units, for example, operate with M-1 tanks, DIVAD guns, self-propelled howitzers, attack helicopters, and close air support aircraft in highly mobile armored task forces that move quickly on the battlefield. They rely on speed, firepower, and shock action, and do considerable fighting while on the move. When the Bradley units dismount their infantry for battle, these infantrymen can be assured of a high volume of supporting fire, especially from the 25mm cannon on their own vehicles. The leaders of these units — the platoon leaders, the company commanders, and the battalion commanders — therefore must learn to orchestrate the firepower and mobility of their particular combined arms team. Yet the Bradley rifle teams, dismounted for a fight, perform the same tasks other infantrymen do — they take and hold ground.

An airborne infantry task force, on the other hand, introduced into an area by parachute assault, normally fights as part of a combined

arms team made up of light artillery, light mortars, tactical air support aircraft, and, possibly, helicopters. It relies on surprise, infantry ground mobility, and small arms firepower to accomplish its mission. Accordingly, its leaders have significantly different tasks to plan for, coordinate, and execute than the Bradley infantry leaders have; yet the airborne rifle squads perform the same tasks and fight the same kind of fight the dismounted Bradley infantry units do to accomplish the time-honored infantry tasks of taking and holding ground. These examples, therefore, describe both the sameness of one Infantry and the great diversity in the many types of infantry units.

Many well-meaning officers, generally not Infantry officers, often suggest giving proponentcy for our mechanized infantry to the Armor School or turning air assault infantry over to the Aviation School. Unfortunately, these officers (and a few infantrymen as well) have become enamored of the means rather than the end — with the transport (the helicopter) or the base of fire (the Bradley). They seem to have forgotten why those vehicles exist — to get infantrymen onto the battlefield.

What would happen if these suggestions were adopted — if the types of infantry were separated from the rest? The focus in those units would probably shift from their infantry role — the primary one — to their fighting vehicles or helicopters. This change in focus would be a normal reaction within the armor and aviation communities, but it would also be the primary reason why ONE INFANTRY under one proponent is so vital to the future of the Infantry in the U.S. Army.

Our Army is unique because of its worldwide orientation. Our country has treaties and security arrangements with many different nations. We have infantry units stationed in many of those countries. We cannot afford to have infantry officers and noncommissioned officers hold a view so narrow and be so specialized that they cannot serve effectively in different types of infantry units around the world.

Furthermore, situations such as that in Vietnam will continue to develop in which infantry soldiers of all grades and backgrounds will be asked to function in a single unique infantry role. They must be ready for this. But to be ready, they must be trained and experienced in a multitude of specialties — mechanized, airborne, air assault, motorized, and the like.

Yes, there are several infantries — and there will always be several — but there is only one overall Infantry. And its mission — our mission — has not changed.

In the future some of our present types of infantry units no doubt will be replaced by newer ones. But all of them will continue to be trained for the Infantry's central tasks, and there will still be a need for cohesiveness to unify the several infantries into one Infantry.

INFANTRY LETTERS



STOWAGE ON THE ITV

The article "Israeli M113's," by Captain Edwin Kennedy (INFANTRY, July-August 1984, page 6), brings up a possible solution to a problem—the lack of space on the M901 ITV.

Present load plans put the required baggage of the ITV crew on the trim vane and in the fighting compartment of the vehicle. Thus, the crew with the required load of ammunition (TOWS and M-60) and personal equipment must be gymnasts to load the launcher with a missile.

The best solution to this problem would be a cargo rack such as the one on the modified Israeli M113 on both sides of the ITV to accommodate the personal equipment of the crew. Such a rack would be a bolt-on device with a lid that would fit flush to the upper deck of the vehicle to prevent damage from the launcher's backblast.

The cargo rack could be fabricated by any battalion welding shop and could be removed in the motor pool when space between vehicles became a factor.

W.E. BARBOUR, JR.
Captain, Infantry
APO New York

BATTLE DRILL TRAINING

Sergeant Robert A. Linthicum, in his letter to the editor (September-October 1984, page 49), is right about the need to conduct more battle drill training. For the past few years, the Army Research Institute (ARI) has conducted research into squad and platoon level training in response to requests from the Army Training Board (ATB) and the 7th Infantry Division.

On the basis of identified needs for detailed training and evaluation guidance, ARI worked with the ATB, the 7th Infantry Division, and the U.S. Army Infantry School to develop a prototype drill trainers' package for infantry squads. The package features a handy easy-to-read, pocket-sized training and evaluation booklet. The drills have since been adopted within the 7th Infantry Division and implemented by elements of the 82d Division, as well as by scattered infantry units throughout the Army.

The Infantry School is also working to incorporate more drill concepts and materials into its new training literature for use by infantry units Army-wide.

Again, Sergeant Linthicum's remarks are accurate and thoughtful. Certainly, drills provide a powerful tool for efficiently conducting standardized training and producing combat-ready infantry squads and platoons.

ELDRA JACKSON, JR.
SFC
U.S. Army Research Institute
Presidio of Monterey, California

OBSERVATIONS ON MORTARS

As a former heavy mortar commander in a light infantry unit, I would like to offer some observations on the current dialogue concerning infantry mortar requirements.

The infantry needs the "hedge" of a light, organic weapon to accompany its maneuver elements and provide indirect fire support. There may be far too many occasions when tactical air, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, or direct support artillery either will not be available early enough (in an airhead, amphibious beachhead, or

mountains, for example), or will be diverted to higher priority missions (such as a deep strike of armored targets).

I'm not convinced, however, that today's perception of a mortar system fits the infantry's needs. Traditionally, mortars have been manpower-intensive systems, with bulky man-pack components, short engagement ranges, long set-up times, and slow rates of fire.

The trade-off to resupply mortars with higher sustained rates of fire (the XM252 81mm mortar, for example, with its advertised rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute) in units with limited transport could mean that riflemen will become load-carrying porters on a scale not seen since the Attu Campaign of 1943.

The improved rate of fire and the trailer-mounting of a 120mm mortar system do not provide any noticeable breakthrough in overall force productivity.

Given today's force, which is fixed at about 780,000, and tomorrow's force, which is faced with a declining manpower pool of eligible personnel, productivity considerations should influence weapon system developments. The infantry should try to reduce its allocation of manpower per unit of expended firepower. And the exploration of any linear, peripheral system improvements should be expanded to consider alternate weapon systems.

Among your recent contributors, for example, James Larsen (November-December 1984 issue, page 49) has suggested the tactical utility of the 2.75-inch (70mm) rocket as an infantry mortar substitute, or complement. I concur with this suggestion and believe that the 9th Infantry Division is now evaluating a "Hydra-70" 70mm rocket configuration for the HMWWV in a close combat role.

As a second suggestion, I'd like to offer a mortar system with multiple barrels on the same mountings. I'm not an engineer, but it seems to me that the mounting of three 81mm or 107mm tubes on a single gun carriage would result in significant savings of crew personnel. When one considers the desired "sheaf-on-target" requirement, one can visualize a rigid mounting of tubes on the same carriage, such as to produce an "open" sheaf at prescribed ranges. Further, with manual gears, a closed or converged sheaf could also be obtained.

The 120mm mortar with trailer chassis, for instance, could be expanded into a three-barrel system, manned by essentially the same crew. The feasibility of this concept would need further study, of course, but the effect would be to replace a 15-man mortar platoon of three tubes with a 5- or 6-man crew and a multi-barrel mortar system.

In addition to manpower productivity considerations, the infantry has not yet come to grips with its self-defeating concept of allocating firepower to a reserve status. Unlike other fire support systems, infantry mortars are habitually assigned to a reserve status whenever their parent unit is placed in reserve. This luxury should not be tolerated, however, in the firepower-scarce light infantry division. Hopefully, a new doctrine and tactical employment concept is already being developed at the Infantry School to overcome this long-term tactical firepower deficiency.

Too, the development of an antiarmor capability for infantry mortars may result in idle tube time for mortar units. Artillery analyses of the effect of Copperhead missions on the total idle time of a firing battery should be studied before adopting this capability for the infantry mortar.

The infantry should also rethink its traditional countermortar mission. A serious gap in engaged mortars could develop between the assigned mortars of two attacking motorized rifle divisions and those assigned to a defending U.S. light infantry division — a ratio of 3.3:1. Although artillery will

complement mortars in executing a countermortar fire plan, the long-term sustainment of artillery fire priority to this mission cannot be assumed.

The response time for countermortar missions could be reduced by creating mortar "hunter-killer" teams in forward brigade areas. A typical team would include an AN/TPQ-36 countermortar radar element, which has a direct communications link to an infantry mortar/indirect fire support element. Target information on enemy mortars would be transmitted from the AN/TPQ-36 element to the infantry fire support element first, before being passed on to the FDC of the direct support artillery battalion. Currently, no such direct link is prescribed by doctrine.

A final thought. Another way to reduce response time is through the tactical application of the "squad-leader adjust" method of fire. While the mortar crew remains in defilade, the squad leader serves as his own observer, occupies an observation post within 100 meters of the mortar position, establishes a wire line from himself to the mortar position, and controls the mission directly. Under this method, the squad leader provides burst corrections in range (charge) and deflection (mils) directly to the gunner. The use of wire permits an effective ECM response to active enemy radio jamming and emission-locating measures.

RICHARD K. FICKETT
COL (Retired), Infantry
Annandale, Virginia

THOUGHT-PROVOKING

I found your November-December 1984 issue most thought-provoking, especially the letter by Lieutenant Colonel Julian M. Olejniczak (page 49) and the article by Captain Samuel K. Rock, Jr. (page 35).

In regard to the article, "Training New Lieutenants," it is part of our job as NCOs to train new lieutenants; we accept the fact that they are just that

— new — and need help.

Captain James A. Hales's comment in his letter on mortars (page 38) reminded me of Vietnam. I remember being greatly relieved when I stopped carrying our 4.2-inch mortar out in the field and started carrying our 81s. Then I saw two Vietnam soldiers strolling down the road. One had a complete 60mm mortar on his shoulder; the other had a pole with 20 rounds lashed to each end. Two men, a mortar, and 20 rounds. And I couldn't help wondering how many men it would take to match that with an 81. It seems to me that Captain Hales is right on the money — we need a lot more small, light mortars in the infantry.

Finally, I found "A Forgotten War," by Captain Michael A. Phillips (page 38), an extremely interesting article and am trying to obtain the pamphlets listed in it.

DEAN A. SIAS
SSG
Region V NCO Academy
Riverton, Utah

EDITOR'S NOTE: We have had several inquiries about the pamphlets known as the German Report Series. We understand that many of them are available through the Army's public relations channels. Some are also available from the Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20401. We do not know the cost from GPO, but payment can be made by VISA or MasterCard number (expiration date should also be included). In addition, the pamphlets can be found in the National Archives and should be available in any library that has a Government documents section.

HEAT INJURY

Reference "Preventing Heat Injuries," by Captain Charles D. Henry (July-August 1984, page 32), there are several things a soldier can do to avoid heat injury. Among them are to

have hit low-flying MIG aircraft with the 7.62mm balls.

The efficiency of American combat rifles can be affirmed, therefore, by their history, but high hopes and bravado should not supersede their real limitations.

JOHN J. SKIFFINGTON
SFC, U.S. Army Reserve
Woonsocket, Rhode Island

ONLY THE ROCKS . . .

I would like to offer some thoughts on ideals for the professional military leader in terms of values and attitudes — thoughts that may be useful as a simple guide.

There is an old Georgia Creek Indian saying that only the rocks live forever. I have selected three rocks for the leader — to provide him strength and to be bulwarks against the temptations and ordeals of life.

The first rock comes from military history. Most historians differ on the great leaders of the past, but my own selections are Hannibal of Carthage, Napoleon Bonaparte, Robert E. Lee, and George S. Patton. In attempting to find a common thread linking these four, I have selected an excerpt from Douglas S. Freeman's last volume on Lee:

And if one, only one, of the myriad incidents of his stirring life had to be selected to typify his message, as a man, to the young Americans who stood in hushed awe that rainy October morning as their parents wept at the passing of the Southern Arthur, who would hesitate in selecting that incident? It occurred in Northern Virginia on his last visit there. A young mother brought her baby to him . . . and (he) looked long at it and then at her and slowly said — 'teach him he must deny himself.' That is all. There is no mystery in the coffin at Lexington . . ."

The second rock comes from fiction — from the novel *Once An Eagle*, by Anton Myrer, about two professional soldiers, Courtney Massengale and Sam Damon. The former is a political

officer, a careerist, a ticket-puncher, and a self-seeker. The latter is a real soldier of great integrity, loyalty, courage, dedication, knowledge, patriotism, and selflessness — with selflessness foremost. It is a simple comparison of extremes. Sam Damon is the ideal.

The third rock comes from sports — from the late great Paul "Bear" Bryant and his guiding principle for his players on the field and for life. Ask any former Alabama, Texas A and M, Kentucky, or Maryland athlete who played under this magnificent leader, and each will relay the same message from him, "Always show your class." There is also no secret under the hickory tree in Birmingham where Bryan is buried.

The three rocks, then, are Deny yourself, Emulate the ideal, and Always show your class. May they live forever and guide all of us as military leaders.

ROBERT LEE POWELL
LTC, Infantry
Fort McPherson, Georgia

NEEDS HELP WITH BOOK

A military author and historian, Jack Britton, needs anything used or worn by a G.I. to photograph for a new book, tentatively titled *The American G.I. 1900 to 1955*. It will be an in-depth photo study of the gear, clothing, insignia, and weapons of the American G.I. during that period.

The book will also contain a section on war souvenirs such as flags, swords and daggers, headgear, medals, and insignia (including German, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese).

Anyone who would like to donate items will have his name appear in the book and will receive a free copy of it. Items should be sent directly to Jack Britton, P.O. Box 702073, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74170.

JACKIE HISOR
Editorial Director
Military Collectors' News Press
Tulsa, Oklahoma

FREE MAP OF SAIPAN

A unique historic and geographical map of Saipan has been designed for distribution by the Northern Marianas Visitor Bureau.

Interesting factual information on this famous World War II battleground is provided, along with intriguing pictorial sketches such as profile of the Pagan Volcano, a cross section of the lagoon, the 1944 U.S. invasion route across the island as well as the Japanese defense sectors, and an underwater oceanic view of Saipan.

This colorful map is a compendium of a wide variety of information about the Northern Marianas. Among the little-known facts shown are the names of the Japanese vessels lost in the area during the war, the names and locations of invasion beaches, and interesting facts on and drawings of sea life and oceanography.

Free copies of the map are available while they last from the Mariana Visitor Bureau, P.O. Box 861, Saipan C.M. 96950.

ECONOMIC SERVICE COUNSEL
INC.
Saipan, C.M.

RESEARCH ON NDE

I am engaged in a continuing research study concerning the "near-death experience" (NDE) as it occurs in military combat situations. I would therefore like to hear from combat veterans who have had unusual psychological experiences while wounded in combat or during a close brush with death.

The identity of anyone who responds will be kept confidential. Combat veterans or others with questions or comments are invited to write to me at P.O. Box 540, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania 19090, or to call (215) 659-3900.

ROBERT M. SULLIVAN
CPT, USAR (Retired)

INFANTRY NEWS



A UNIT RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP Training Guide, Field Circular 23-11, was recently distributed to all major Active Army and Reserve Component units.

The Guide is designed to improve the shooting performance of soldiers. It includes the latest marksmanship doctrine, provides guidance on the use of all new targets and aids, and presents the guidance units need to improve their marksmanship programs.

The Guide also addresses basic and advanced marksmanship subjects, making it useful for basic rifle marksmanship and advanced rifle marksmanship training programs. The Guide also includes information the marksmanship developer or trainer needs to understand effective training procedures better.

Copies of three different versions of the Guide have had limited circulation: an ARI coordinating draft, dated May 1984, and two versions of FC 23-11, dated August 1984. The three are similar, but the latest is the one that has a letter from the Commandant of the Infantry School (MG John Foss) as its first page. This latest copy, therefore, is the one that should be used for local reproduction.

A limited number of copies may be available from the Infantry School or the Army Research Institute. Requestors should use DA Form 17 and mail it to the Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSHSE-TSD, Fort Benning, GA 31905, or mail a request to the Army Research Institute, P.O. Box 2086, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

Two videotapes are also available for use in illustrating basic marksmanship instructional techniques: TEACHING RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP: PART ONE AND PART TWO. These tapes are fully compatible with the new FC 23-11. Part One presents a

detailed overview of marksmanship fundamentals and preparatory marksmanship training. Part Two covers zeroing, shot group analysis, remedial training, and coaching during live fire marksmanship training.

The videotapes can be obtained from the Audiovisual Support Center, U.S. Army Infantry Center, ATTN: ATZB-DPT-TASC-AVSC, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5273.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were submitted by the Director of the National Infantry Museum:

Exhibits that feature World War I and World War II uniforms have been placed at the Infantry Training Center's Reception Station by the Museum. The display also includes the uniform and equipment that belonged to the first enlisted man to parachute into Grenada. This type of display helps to give the soldier a knowledge of his military heritage and to promote esprit de corps and branch identification.

The monument to Calculator has been moved to the National Infantry Museum's grounds from the Old Infantry School building — Building 35 — where it had been since the mid-1970s. INFANTRY readers may recall that Calculator was a favorite pet dog of the troops at Fort Benning in the early 1920s. He received his name because of the way he walked — “putting down three (legs) and carrying one.”

Calculator was eulogized as “a veritable child of destiny, waif of the world, soldier of fortune, and post-graduate of the Infantry School.” The monument is inscribed “He made better dogs of us all.”

The larger volume of traffic at the Museum will enable more people to see the monument, and it will thus get

the attention it deserves. The monument was originally funded with 25-cent contributions that poured in from U.S. infantrymen around the world.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is \$2.00 for a one-year membership, or \$10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, GA 31905, telephone AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were submitted by the Directorate of Combat Developments:

•**Battlefield Management System.** A DCD task force has been established to investigate C/I requirements at and below the infantry battalion level. A number of separate TRADOC and Infantry School initiatives will attempt to document total communications traffic, operational imperatives, and automation possibilities.

The task force will undertake a task and functional area analysis to consolidate and review the results of these initiatives in conjunction with a study of soldier and crew tasks and functional area requirements to determine potential resource savings and increases in operational effectiveness.

Present technology will permit the automation of many routine functions to speed personnel and logistic actions. That technology will also serve as a decision-making aid for commanders and leaders and may revolutionize the handling of target data and intelligence information.

Although referred to as the Battlefield Management System by maneuver proponents, it is essentially the application of an innovative C3I approach through automation.

•**Living TOE.** The 1982 DAIG Force Modernization Inspection reported that the pressures of force modernization had broken the Army's system for documenting organizations. To correct this, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) program to redesign the system.

One result of the DOCMOD is the Living Table of Organization and Equipment (LTOE), which consists of using a series of intermediate TOEs (ITOE) to develop a fully modernized objective for a particular type of unit. Each ITOE must be a doctrinally sound, supportable organization and must represent a significant increase in capability. The intent of the program is to ensure that all like units are modernized through the same series of steps to facilitate management and programming. The ITOE will become an authorization document when the MACOM adds area and mission requirements and publishes the appropriate general orders.

The LTOE system will provide a basis for standardization, will support programming and budgeting, and will reduce the involvement of the MACOMs in the documentation process.

Living TOEs have been documented for the light and air assault infantry battalions. The current mechanized infantry, airborne, and ranger infantry battalions are scheduled for documentation as Living TOEs this year.

•**M16A2 Rifle.** The Directorate is presently coordinating the technology and directing the development of the M16A2 rifle. This rifle is a big improvement over the M16A1 the infantryman now carries. (See *INFANTRY*, July-August 1983, pages 3-4.)

The M16A2 rifle will be given initially to all combat riflemen in the forward combat areas as a replacement for their M16A1s. Although little ef-

fect on personnel strength and only minor logistic changes will result from the introduction of the new rifle, training concepts and strategies could be greatly affected.

The preliminary testing of prototype developmental hardware is scheduled to begin at Fort Benning during the second quarter of fiscal year 1986.

•**JANUS.** For years, simulations have provided combat developers with a tool for modeling the battlefield, and the ability to simulate more complex relationships on the battlefield continues to improve.

Today's simulations can be divided into three categories — manual games, such as DUNN KEMPF; computer-assisted games, such as BATTLE; and pure computer games, such as CARMONET. Each type has its strengths and weaknesses.

Today there is a new simulation called JANUS. It will help developers by providing them with better insight into the modern battlefield's complex relationships. JANUS is one of the few pure computer simulations that permit tactical interaction during the model run. This capability allows the user to make changes based on the tactical situation so that successes can be exploited and weaknesses mitigated.

To achieve this, the model uses high resolution graphics that show the terrain and the allocated forces. Opposing players deploy their forces on the basis of the scenario and the terrain before the simulation run starts. Once the simulation begins, each player is free to re-deploy his forces as the situation develops within the limits of his operational orders and doctrinal teachings. A controller monitors the simulation to make sure the players adhere to the constraints imposed by order and doctrine.

INFANTRY HOTLINE

To get answers to infantry-related questions or to pass on information of an immediate nature, call AUTOVON 835-7693, commercial 404/545-7693.

For lengthy questions or comments, send in writing to Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ES, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

JANUS will be used to test new weapons and equipment to determine their effectiveness on an intense battlefield. The results, when balanced against the costs, will help determine the infantry's needs and support procurement requests.

The plan is for the Infantry School to receive JANUS within a year should allow the School's combat developers to better support and inform infantrymen throughout the world.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were submitted by the Army Infantry Board:

•**Rigging Procedures for M16A2 Rifle.** After the suggested improvements were incorporated into the design of the M16A1 rifle, it was tested by the Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia, and by the Army's Test and Evaluation Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. After the test results were analyzed, both the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Materiel Command recommended that the rifle be classified Standard A and designated the M16A2.

The tests, however, did not include an airdrop of the rifle. Its physical changes — a heavier barrel, a slightly longer buttstock, redesigned front and rear sights, and a redesigned handguard — led the Infantry School to evaluate the Army's current airdrop procedures to see if they were suitable for parachutists to use when they jumped with the new rifle and its ammunition.

The Infantry Board conducted a test evaluation at Fort Benning. In the test, 13 parachutists made 84 jumps while carrying combat equipment and the M16A2 rifle and its ammunition.

Two rigging methods were tested. One with the rifle exposed and the other with it in the M1950 adjustable weapons case. After the first 10 jumps, each M16A2 rifle was inspected, and a bore straightness gauge was used to make sure the barrel was not bent. If a rifle passed all of the safety tests, it was fired to see if it had retained its zero.

Questionnaires, interviews, observations, and comments by trained data collectors were used to collect data regarding the ability of the test soldiers to rig and de-rig the M16A2 rifle for airdrop according to established procedures and regarding injuries to personnel; damages to the weapons or ammunition; human factors aspects of the rigging and de-rigging procedures; retention of zero; and any safety hazards that were noted.


The test results will be used by the Infantry School to prepare and publish Army-wide procedures for rigging the M16A2 rifle.

M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) in the Machinegun Role. The results of tests conducted in the late 1970s indicated that the SAW had operational characteristics similar to those of the current M60 series of machineguns. Senior military officials discussed the possibility of expanding the role of the SAW. As a result of these discussions, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army requested that a test be conducted to determine whether the SAW could perform the machinegun role in infantry units. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command directed the Infantry Board to conduct this test.

The SAW is now authorized for use as an automatic rifle in infantry rifle squads and for a variety of roles in other Army units. It is a belt-fed 5.56mm weapon, with either a 20- or 30-round magazine-feeding capability. It is gas-operated, air-cooled, and fires from the open bolt position. The SAW has a regulator for selecting normal or maximum cyclic rates of fire, and the gunner controls the rate of fire through trigger manipulation. The bipod-equipped weapon can also be fired from a tripod or from the standing position.

In the Board's test, the SAW was compared with the standard M60 7.62mm machinegun and the M60E3 machinegun. (The latter is an improved, lightweight version of the M60 with generally the same operating principles and design characteristics.)

The performance, reliability,



From top, right side view of M249 SAW, M60E3 machinegun, and M60 machinegun.

human factors, and safety characteristics of the three weapon systems were compared in what was essentially a side-by-side test under the climatic conditions existing at Fort Benning in August and September 1984.

Forty-two infantry soldiers, most of whom were recent graduates of infantry one station unit training, completed a special training course with the three weapons before the test began. Then, wearing standard battle dress uniforms and carrying their fighting load equipment, the soldiers fired each weapon under simulated tactical conditions at point and area target arrays. The target arrays were situated at different ranges and on varied terrain over which the soldiers had to move and engage the targets.

The test scenarios, by limiting target engagement times, restricting the amount of ammunition, and varying the number of targets presented at a given time, placed the test soldiers under the type of stress they would encounter in day and night tactical operations.

In addition to firing each of the weapon systems, the test soldiers also negotiated a cross-country course several times to develop portability data and to determine their preferences. Trained data collectors recorded the test results and contributed their observations on the weapon systems.


The Infantry School will use the test results to evaluate the SAW's potential for use in the machinegun role.

THE NEXT GENERATION of Bradley infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles is currently being tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Both the M2E1 (BIFV) and the M3E1 (BCFV) embody a number of common changes, with additional improvements being made to the BCFV.

Two major changes that are common to both vehicles involve improvements to the TOW antiarmor missile

system and the installation of a gas particulate filter unit. The improvements to the TOW system will allow either version of the E1 to use any of three variants of the TOW system: the basic TOW, the improved TOW, or the TOW-2. The gunner's instrumentation will be changed to indicate which of the three missiles is in the launcher.

FORUM & FEATURES



Don't Forget the Privates

MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT H. SMITH, JR., USA (RETIRED)

On Wednesday, 8 May 1985, much of the world will commemorate the 40th anniversary of VE (Victory in Europe)-Day, and will heap praises on those World War II political and military leaders who directed and led the Allied armed forces to victory in Europe.

This is as it should be, I suppose. But on this day I want the world to remember that Infantry privates also won the war in Europe. Of course the Army Air Force, the Navy and the Coast Guard contributed mightily to the final victory in Europe. And in his own way every man in uniform helped defeat the German armed forces. Infantrymen, though, did more than all the others, and young infantry privates proved to be the cutting edge of the U.S. war machine — the teeth of the shark, the claws of the tiger. In fact, if it were not for their courage, determination, initiative, and sacrifice, we might not have a VE-Day to commemorate.

Ernie Pyle, the beloved war correspondent who died on a small Pacific island in 1945, probably best described these low-ranking, rough, tough warriors when he wrote:

The front-line soldier I knew lived for months like an animal, and was a veteran of the cruel, fierce world of death. Everything was abnormal and

ate if and when, slept on hard ground without cover. . . . The front-line soldier has to harden his inside as well as his outside or he would crack under the strain. . . . A front-line soldier has to fight everything all the time.

Major General Ernest N. Harmon, a tough man in his own right who commanded armor divisions in North Africa and in northwest Europe, notes this difference between tankers and infantrymen.

It must be a point of honor with every tanker that he never permit an infantry unit to be overrun by enemy tanks. . . . I always insisted to my tankers that in their rolling fortresses they were secure from most of the hazards of battle, and post-war casualty figures for the European Theater of Operations bore me out; infantry divisions suffered 70 percent of the casualties, armored division 10 percent.

I have talked with many soldiers during the past few years and have found them interested in the lessons we learned during World War II. Junior enlisted men in particular seem to enjoy hearing about their counterparts of 40 years ago — what part they played in the fighting and what they accomplished. In fact, after I would tell them that I believed the privates also won the war in Europe, invariably some would approach me

and ask if I could prove it.

This challenge eventually triggered on my part a concentrated research effort. I was hopeful that this research would prove my contention that low-ranking combat infantrymen won the battles that led to ultimate victory in Europe. I believe it has.

My research plan was simple — I would start by investigating Medal of Honor statistics and then focus on Medal of Honor awards at the division level and Distinguished Service Cross awards at the regiment level.

In analyzing all of the Medal of Honor awards made to Army and Army Air Force personnel during World War II, for example, I learned that 77 of the 292 medals awarded had been won by privates. Put another way, 26 percent of all Army Medal of Honor winners came from our lowest enlisted grades.

In considering just one infantry division — the 1st — I discovered that during its eight World War II campaigns, 16 of its soldiers had been awarded the Medal of Honor. Five of the 16 (31 percent) were awarded to privates. Here are summaries of those five citations:

Private Carlton W. Barrett. St. Laurent-sur-Mar, France; 6 June 1944. On the morning of D-Day Private Barrett, landing in the face of extremely heavy fire, was forced to wade ashore through neck-deep

water. Disregarding the personal danger, he returned to the surf again and again to assist his floundering comrades and save them from drowning. Refusing to remain pinned down by the intense barrage of small arms and mortar fire poured at the landing points, Private Barrett, working with fierce determination, saved many lives by carrying casualties to an evacuation boat lying offshore. In addition to his assigned mission as guide, he carried dispatches the length of the fireswept beach; he assisted the wounded; he calmed the shocked; he arose as a leader in the stress of the occasion. His coolness and his dauntless, daring courage while constantly risking his life during a period of many hours had an inestimable effect on his comrades.

Private Robert T. Henry (Posthumous). Near Luchem, Germany; 3 December 1944. He volunteered to attempt the destruction of a nest of five enemy machineguns located in a bunker 150 yards to the flank which had stopped the advance of his platoon. Stripping off his pack, overshoes, helmet, and overcoat, he sprinted alone with his rifle and hand grenades across the open terrain toward the enemy emplacement. Before he had gone half the distance he was hit by a burst of machinegun fire. Dropping his rifle, he continued to stagger forward until he fell mortally wounded only 10 yards from the enemy emplacement. His single-handed attack forced the enemy to leave the machineguns. During this break in hostile fire the platoon moved forward and overran the position. Private Henry, by his gallantry and intrepidity and utter disregard for his own life, enabled his company to reach its objective, capturing this key defense and 70 German prisoners.

Private First Class Francis X. McGraw (Posthumous). Near Schevenhutte, Germany; 19 November 1944. He manned a heavy machinegun emplaced in a foxhole near Schevenhutte, Germany, on 19 November 1944, when the enemy launched a fierce counterattack. Braving an intense hour-long preparatory barrage, he maintained his stand and poured deadly accurate fire into the advancing foot troops until they faltered and came to halt. The hostile forces brought up a machinegun in an effort to dislodge him but were frustrated when he lifted his gun to an exposed but advantageous position atop a log, courageously stood up in his foxhole and knocked out the enemy weapon. A rocket blasted his gun from position, but he retrieved it and continued firing. He silenced a second machinegun and then made repeated trips over fireswept terrain to replenish his ammunition supply. Wounded painfully in this dangerous task, he disregarded his injury and hurried back to his post, where his weapon was

showered with mud when another rocket barely missed him. In the midst of the battle, with enemy troops taking advantage of his predicament to press forward, he calmly cleaned his gun, put it back into action and drove off the attackers. He continued to fire until his ammunition was expended, when, with a fierce desire to close with the enemy, he picked up a carbine, killed one enemy soldier, wounded another and engaged in a desperate fire-fight with a third until he was mortally wounded by a burst from a machine pistol. The extraordinary heroism and intrepidity displayed by Private McGraw inspired his comrades to great efforts and was a major factor in repulsing the enemy attack.

Private First Class Gino J. Merli. Near Sars la Bruyere, Belgium; 4-5 September 1944. He was serving as a machinegunner in the vicinity of Sars la Bruyere, Belgium, on the night of 4-5 September 1944, when his company was attacked by a superior German force. Its position was overrun and he was surrounded when our troops were driven back by overwhelming numbers and firepower. Disregarding the fury of the enemy fire concentrated on him he maintained his position, covering the withdrawal of our riflemen and breaking the force of the enemy pressure. His assistant machinegunner was killed and the position captured; the other eight members of the section were forced to surrender. Private Merli slumped down beside the dead assistant gunner and feigned death. No sooner had the enemy group withdrawn than he was up and firing in all directions. Once more his position was taken and the captors found two apparently lifeless bodies. Throughout the night Private Merli stayed at his weapon. By daybreak the enemy had suffered heavy losses, and as our troops launched an assault, asked for a truce. Our negotiating party, who accepted the German surrender, found Private Merli still at his gun. On the battlefield lay 52 enemy dead, 19 of whom were directly in front of the gun. Private Merli's gallantry and courage, and the losses and confusion that he caused the enemy, contributed materially to our victory.

Private James N. Reese (Posthumous). Mount Vassillio, Sicily; 5 August 1943. When the enemy launched a counterattack which threatened the position of his company, Private Reese, as the acting squad leader of a 60mm mortar squad, displaying superior leadership on his own initiative, maneuvered his squad forward to a favorable position, from which, by skillfully directing the fire of his weapon, he caused many casualties in the enemy ranks, and aided materially in repulsing the counterattack. When the enemy fire became so

severe as to make his position untenable, he ordered the other members of his squad to withdraw to a safer position, but declined to seek safety for himself. So as to bring more effective fire upon the enemy, Private Reese, without assistance, moved his mortar to a new position and attacked an enemy machinegun nest. He had only three rounds of ammunition but secured a direct hit with his last round, completely destroying the nest and killing the occupants. Ammunition being exhausted, he abandoned the mortar, seized a rifle and continued to advance, moving into an exposed position overlooking the enemy. Despite a heavy concentration of machinegun, mortar, and artillery fire, the heaviest experienced by his unit throughout the entire Sicilian campaign, he remained at this position and continued to inflict casualties upon the enemy until he was killed. His bravery, coupled with his gallant and unswerving determination to close with the enemy, regardless of consequences and obstacles which he faced, is a priceless inspiration to our armed forces.

In the matter of DSCs, and again considering just one unit — the 16th Infantry Regiment — my research turned up the fact that 87 DSCs (our second highest combat award) had been awarded between November 1942 and May 1945 to 42 officers and 45 enlisted men of the regiment. Of that total number, 17, or 20 percent, went to privates. (Twenty-three of those DSCs were awarded to members of the regiment for their extraordinary heroism at Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944. They received their awards from General Dwight Eisenhower during a special ceremony on 2 July 1944. Three of those soldiers were privates.)

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Aside from the awards for valor, there is abundant evidence that Army privates can do it all. Take, for example, Private Clarence R. Huebner. A business college graduate, he left a good railroad job to enlist in the Army at 22 years of age. The year was 1910. Shortly afterward, he became a top-notch soldier and was his regiment's best rifle shot. He was commissioned in 1916, and his distinguished service in World War I earned him two DSCs and the command of a regiment in the

1st Infantry Division. During World War II he commanded the division and, later, the V Corps. He retired as a lieutenant general and was then commanding the U.S. Army in Europe. He received many accolades, but he never forgot to give credit to our infantry privates. Under his leadership, they had fought and won his battles.

Another of my favorite soldiers is Private Ted Dobil. Now a retired command sergeant major, he enlisted just before World War II when a private's pay was only \$21 a month. Serving as a squad leader and then as a platoon sergeant in the 26th Infantry Regiment during its eight European campaigns, he earned a reputation for coolness and courage under fire. His battalion commander described him as "the bravest of the brave."

Following World War II, Dobil's outstanding professionalism was recognized when he was selected as the Army's first command sergeant major. He served as the 1st Division's CSM until his retirement. But that did not end his service, for he visited the "Blue Spaders" when they fought in Vietnam and later when they were in Germany. This past April, our Secretary of the Army honored CSM Dobil by inviting him to Washington for the planting of D-Day commemorative trees. That's the road to follow: Private to command sergeant major to national hero.

Two privates I particularly appreciated in 1942-1943 when I commanded my first company in combat were a Private Plotast and a Private Martin; they were my most important and trusted assistants. Plotast (my runner and enlisted aide) unfailingly delivered my orders and instructions to the platoons. Martin (my jeep driver) was always able to find his way along unfamiliar North African roads and through German minefields, and he always managed to get us where we had to be. Both saw that the "old man" had something to eat and a place to sleep; they also guarded our company CP.

There is little question that privates distinguished themselves in the fighting on D-Day. One young infantry-

man, however, a Private First Class Milander, contributed to the Division's success without firing a shot. After his unit, Company L, 16th Infantry, had fought its way off the beaches and secured certain critical high ground on the Division's extreme left flank, Milander led a three-man reconnaissance patrol southwest to the fortified village of Cabourg. The threesome failed to return because (as we later learned) a platoon of enemy defenders had quickly surrounded them. During the night, Milander somehow talked the Germans into sur-



Infantryman peeks over hedge-row toward German positions near Brest, 24 August 1944.

rendering and took them prisoners. Next morning, American troops holding the town of Colleville cheered three weary GIs bringing in 52 of Hitler's finest. Everyone was happy that Cabourg had fallen without a fight and without another casualty.

The above examples could be multiplied many times over. As I said earlier: Army privates are special soldiers.

In his 1943-1945 Biennial Report, General George C. Marshall, the Army's World War II Chief of Staff, provided the following totals on Army decorations for gallantry during the war: 3,178 Distinguished Service

Crosses, 52,831 Silver Stars, 189,309 Bronze Stars. With the infantry receiving 34.5 percent of all decorations for valor, and with privates earning one of every four awards, it is evident that our young infantrymen distinguished themselves many times throughout the war.

The evidence clearly shows that American privates during World War II were rough, tough warriors who rose to the occasion. Our infantrymen did what needed to be done to accomplish the mission. Their initiative, drive, and ingenuity were unmatched by their counterparts in other military forces.

TODAY'S ARMY

Today's infantrymen, as I have come to know them over the past year, are better prepared for combat than we were at the start of World War II. They can face any military challenge with confidence. If ever a doubt should cross their minds concerning their performance under fire, they need only look back on their proud regimental heritages for assurance. They'll see that other young soldiers during our past wars overcame their fears when the chips were down and accomplished the seemingly impossible. They'll also recognize that American privates are great soldiers — they always have been; they always will be.

Thus, on 8 May 1985, as the world commemorates the end of World War II in Europe and toasts Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin along with their military leaders, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Zhukov, let's also raise our glasses to the privates. Without their contributions, there would be no victory celebration.



Major General Albert H. Smith, Jr., began his Army career in 1940 and served for more than 33 years. Much of this service was with the 1st Infantry Division, either in World War II or in Vietnam. He is now Honorary Colonel of the 16th Infantry.

Initiative: The Spirit of the Offense

MAJOR CURTIS L. COOK

Commanders in the U.S. Army, and in other modern armies as well, rely on several principles of engagement for success in battle. Of the nine principles the U.S. Army uses — mass, surprise, objective, economy of force, maneuver, security, offensive, simplicity, and unit of command — none are more important to the infantry than the offensive and maneuver.

The defensive is also essential, of course, especially in western Europe where the Warsaw Pact forces across the border have a clear superiority in both firepower and manpower. But our leaders should have instilled into them the idea that defensive operations are largely temporary measures whose aim is to blunt an enemy attack — to trade space for time, or to channel an enemy's forces until we can marshal our own to seize the initiative at decisive points and defeat him. The truth of the matter is that rarely, if ever, has a battle been won on the defensive — it is the offensive that is decisive.

To seize that initiative and go over to the offensive, combat leaders must be able to act more quickly than the enemy. Their subordinates, too, must act independently — within the context of the overall plan — to exploit local successes boldly and take advantage of unforeseen battlefield opportunities.

Imaginative commanders have accomplished this in every age and practically every war. As recently as 1973 in the Mideast, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) superbly demonstrated that an offensive spirit and sound tactics could overcome great odds. And in the U.S., improvisation, initiative,

and aggressiveness have historically distinguished our soldiers from those of other countries.

Of the many remarkable commanders to use this concept in this country, none (save perhaps General Robert E. Lee in Virginia during the Civil War) exemplified it more than another Confederate general, Nathan Bedford Forrest, in Tennessee during the same war.

SUCCESSFUL

General Forrest had been so successful in his raids and attacks that in 1864 Union General William T. Sherman authorized the formation of a task force whose sole mission was to find and destroy him. This force, brought together in Memphis under the command of Major General Samuel D. Sturgis, numbered nearly 8,500 men. It had 22 artillery pieces of all sizes, 250 wagons loaded with 20 days' rations, and the latest in individual firepower — repeating rifles.

In spite of Forrest's brilliant record of success against numerically superior forces, Sturgis discounted him as a "plunderer who would not fight anything near an equal force." Sturgis set out from Memphis in early June on his "seek and destroy" sweep, maintaining what he called a compact striking force.

In addition to his advantage in numbers and in firepower, Sturgis had one other advantage — his 5,000-man infantry force, commanded by General William L. McMillen, included one brigade of highly motivated black soldiers who had sworn vengeance on

Forrest and his men for the "Fort Pillow Massacre." (This was an earlier engagement with Forrest in which many of the black defenders had been killed while trying to surrender.)


Sturgis's 3,300-man cavalry force under General Ben Grierson had been experimentally mounted on mules as that animal was believed to be possessed of more deliberate and "intellectual" traits than the "common horse."

Unlike Forrest — who seemed to consider intuitively his mission, the enemy, the terrain, and the weather, as well as the available troops and time (factors we now call METT-T) — Sturgis apparently made no provision for these factors.

By 9 July, he was some 70 miles from Memphis. The skies had cleared after several days of heavy rain, and the Mississippi sun beat down unmercifully on his soldiers as they marched along the muddy roads. He camped that night at a place called Stubb's Farm, about 10 miles northwest of Brice's Crossroad (see map).

Forrest had used his cavalry units and informers as well to keep track of Sturgis's movements. Thus, when Sturgis went into camp that evening, Forrest had already reconnoitered the area and decided to make a stand along the timber-laced low plateau of that same crossroads. He relied heavily on the superior mobility of his forces, which he planned to use as fire and maneuver elements. (He didn't call them that, but he almost always planned to use a reserve so as to be able, in his words, to "hit the enemy on the ee-end.")

Realizing what the weather and ter-



rain conditions had been for several days along the enemy's avenue of approach, Forrest planned to surprise Sturgis's cavalry, which he guessed would be leading the main infantry force by about five miles. If this cavalry could be locked into a defensive position for a reasonable time by a solid base of fire, Forrest reasoned, then it could be out-manuevered and defeated. He knew that word was certain to be rushed back telling the Union infantry to come on the double and that those troops — made up of men from Illinois, Minnesota, and Indiana — would hardly be prepared for the Mississippi delta's heat and humidity. They would be rushed forward pell-mell and strung out along the muddy Memphis-to-Guntown Road, and Forrest planned to hand

them a resounding thrashing.

Forrest's estimate of his opponent proved accurate. General Sturgis did not realize that his adversary was anywhere near and sent Grierson's cavalry out a good three hours before the infantry broke camp. (He wanted to allow his infantrymen time to dry their rain-soaked clothes.)

Meanwhile, Forrest had posted one of his brigade commanders, a Colonel Lyon, and his 750-man brigade in the thick woods directly astride the enemy's approach route with orders to attack their erstwhile pursuers.

In the confusion of the battle, Lyon's troops apparently charged three separate times and each time were repulsed by the Union cavalry. These "charges" were actually only feints, however, used to disguise the

fact that not all of Forrest's troops had arrived.

Nevertheless, Grierson, believing himself to be under attack by superior force, fought back desperately if unwisely, rapidly expending ammunition with his repeating rifle. During the first part of the fighting, unfortunately, his "intellectual" mules ran away, which deprived him of mobility and lowered the morale of those cavalymen who were not trained to stand and fight infantry style.

Grierson, as Forrest had predicted, sent back word to bring up the infantry with all haste as he was being pressed to the extreme and would soon run out of ammunition. Sturgis complied and drove his infantry as fast as possible, losing many men to heat exhaustion along the way. He stopped only long enough to order his most inspired unit, the black brigade under Colonel Bouton, to stay back and guard the supply wagons. It apparently did not occur to him that these black soldiers, largely freed men and ex-slaves from Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, may well have been more accustomed to the heat and humidity than the white troops from farther north.

In any case, by this time Forrest had attacked with two newly arrived brigades. Their attack completely defeated the Union cavalry. At about this time, McMullen's infantry began to arrive on the field. Winded but game, the soldiers were sent headlong into the conflict with neither a pause nor a plan.

Forrest maintained his force astride the road as they had been deployed originally, but then he improvised with his eight-gun artillery battery. He had these guns double-shotted with canister and ordered the artillery commander to join the upcoming charge with these guns abreast of the infantry, keeping pace with them as they advanced. A maneuvering brigade attacked from the flank and rear, combined with pressure on the front, and shattered Sturgis' force, sending it streaming back up the road toward Memphis and safety.

Back in the rear with his black brigade, Colonel Bouton saw that the main Union force had been beaten and was being pursued by the Confederates. He found General Sturgis and pleaded with him to commit the blacks so that a defensive line could be established and the Union force reorganized. Instead of granting any such permission, Sturgis ordered Bouton to join in the retreat. He was by this time so agitated and panicked by the turn of events that in stifling Bouton's argument he said, "If Mr. Forrest will let me alone, I will let him alone . . . Save yourselves."

General Forrest had determined

when, where, and under what conditions he would fight. Having therefore gained the initiative, he did not surrender this "independence of action" until his enemy had been decisively beaten and put to headlong flight.

The concept of initiative, according to Field Manual 100-5, "implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations; it means that the underlying purpose of an encounter with the enemy is to gain and hold an independence of action with the understanding that this requires risk taking and an atmosphere that supports it."

Forrest accepted the risks; Sturgis did not. The result, as usual, favored

the risk taker. As it was on that battlefield of the past, so it will be on the battlefield of the future — the leader who seizes and holds the initiative will win the battle.



Major Curtis L. Cook is assigned to the State Area Command, Arkansas National Guard. He previously served on active duty with the 4th Infantry Division. A 1970 ROTC graduate of the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, he also holds a master's degree from the University of Northern Colorado.

Improved Standards The Standard

HARRY IKNER

For an infantryman, the expert infantryman's badge (EIB) traditionally has been a mark of excellence. Some infantrymen have said, however, that the badge's image has become tarnished because the EIB test is no longer tough enough.

As EIB proponent, the Infantry School recently studied the present test standards and concluded that, while the test is still a tough one to pass, some additional toughening was in order. The result is a new, improved EIB program and a test that will clearly distinguish the highest caliber infantrymen from the typical high-quality performers. Both the program and the test are outlined in detail in a revised Army Regulation 672-12, Expert Infantryman Badge, and in DA Pamphlet 672-12, Decorations, Awards and Honors, Expert Infantryman Badge. These publications will be

distributed to the field in April 1985, with an effective date of 1 August 1985. (Both publications will be printed in the new "update" format.) Units can use the four months between the publication and implementation dates to review the new test requirements and prepare for the test.

HIGHER STANDARDS

The current test has 16 subject areas with 27 tasks; the new test will have 20 subject areas with 41 tasks. The tasks will still come from the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (Field Manual 21-2) and from the Soldier's Manuals (STP 7-11B, Skill Levels 1 and 2), but the standards and performance measures will be higher than those in the manuals. EIB candidates will now be retested by tasks rather

than by subject areas. A candidate can fail no more than two tasks and can be retested only once on each task he failed. Thus, a candidate who fails more than two tasks will be disqualified and will have to take the entire test during his unit's next annual test period.

In addition to the changes in the number of events and in the standards (shown in the accompanying matrix), two items are worthy of note: There is now an SQT for officers, and a standardization committee has been created. Officers must take the 11B Skill Level 4 SQT and score 80 percent or higher on it. And the function of the EIB Standardization Committee, in the Infantry School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, will be to approve or disapprove requested modifications to the training program and test; to monitor EIB training pro-

FORUM & FEATURES

NEW EIB QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

<u>Prerequisites</u>	<u>Current Requirements</u>	<u>New Requirements</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
M16A1 Skill Qualification Test (SQT)	Expert — Can retest — Cdr certifies. None.	Expert — No retest — Cdr certifies. Enlisted soldier must have scored 80% on his last SQT. Officer must take SQT 11B4 and score 80% or higher.	Use last qualification score. No retest — Officers will be administered the test at local TSO.
<u>Tasks</u>			
APRT Land Navigation	Prerequisite — 180 minimum — Cdr certifies. Prerequisite — Cdr certifies.	240 minimum — At least 60 per event. Daylight course lengthened to 4,000 meters with 4 direction changes, 5 legs; 3-hour time limit. Night course lengthened to 2,000 meters with 2 direction changes, 3 legs; 2-hour time limit.	Tested by EIB Committee. Tested by EIB Committee. Increased difficulty by including terrain association and having candidate identify the terrain feature at each point.
12-mile Foot March and Weapon Proficiency Test	Prerequisite — Cdr certifies.	Task must be started within one minute after crossing finish line of 12-mile foot march. Candidate will disassemble, reassemble, and perform malfunction check on M16A1 rifle within four minutes.	Tested by EIB Committee.
First Aid	Apply pressure dressings.	Perform CPR (one-man method), apply pressure dressing, apply a tourniquet, and treat for shock.	Increased difficulty and added 3 tasks.
NBC	Decontaminate skin.	Mask with hood within 15 seconds, name 7 of 8 symptoms of nerve agent, administer nerve agent antidote (self-aid), decontaminate skin, put on and wear protective clothing (MOPP-4).	Increased tasks and difficulty.
Survival Techniques Basic Individual Techniques .	Camouflage yourself and equipment — 15 minutes. Use visual signals — Demonstrate 6 signals. Call for and adjust fire.	Reduced time to 10 minutes. Move under direct fire, estimate range, use visual signals; demonstrate 15 signals; locate a target by shift from known point; call for and adjust fire; construct individual fighting position.	Decreased time. Increased tasks and difficulty within tasks.
Communications	Operate radio set AN/PRC-77 or AN/PRC-25.	Operate as a station in a radio net using CEOI and KTC 600-D.	Must use proper RTO procedures, authenticate to enter and leave net, encode and decode 5 words using KTC 600-D.
Map Reading	Intersection, grid coordinates, and determine azimuths.	Using 8-digit coordinates, plot and identify 5 terrain features. Determine two enemy locations using 8-digit coordinates.	Increased difficulty.
M16A1 Rifle	Disassemble and assemble, load, reduce a stoppage, and clear; mount and dismount AN/PVS-4.	Load, reduce a stoppage, and clear.	Decreased time from 40 to 30 seconds.
Hand Grenades	Engage troops in open.	Engage troops in open, troops dug-in with overhead cover, and troops dug-in without overhead cover.	Increased difficulty. Must engage all three targets using only 5 grenades.
Mines	Install and fire M16A1, and install M16 antipersonnel mine.	Install and recover mechanical ambush. Install and remove M21 antitank mine.	New tasks.

Security and Intelligence	None.	Process known or suspected enemy personnel, documents, equipment. Collect and report information (SALUTE).	New tasks.
Perform Operator Maintenance on an M203 Grenade Launcher	None.	Disassemble, assemble, and identify four 40-mm rounds.	New tasks.
Prepare an M72A2 LAW for firing and apply immediate action to correct malfunction.	Prepare LAW for firing and restore to carrying configuration.	Prepare LAW for firing and apply immediate action for combat misfire.	30 seconds to prepare LAW for firing; 20 seconds to perform immediate action.
M60 Machinegun	Perform operator maintenance, load, reduce a stoppage, and clear.	Added — Prepare a range card.	Reduced time from 8 to 6 minutes on operator maintenance.
Cal .50 Machinegun	Load, reduce a stoppage, and clear. Set head space and timing.	No change.	Reduced time from 10 to 8 minutes.
Dragon	None.	Prepare a Dragon for firing within 30 seconds. Prepare a Dragon range card.	This task will be used only by units not having Cal .50 MG as part of TOE or MTOE.


grams and tests; and to visit 50 percent of the test units during their test periods to observe and to facilitate feedback.

Commanders must notify the Infantry School six months in advance of their EIB test periods and must submit an after-action report to the School within 15 days after their units

have completed the test. The report must include the number of soldiers tested by task, the number of soldiers who passed each task, and the number of soldiers awarded the EIB. The School will use this data to study possible future changes to the EIB program and test and to determine which tasks, if any, need to be revised.

Inquiries should be sent to the Director, DOTD, USAIS, ATTN: ATSH-I-V-T-M, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5593.

Harry Ikner, a retired sergeant major, is assigned to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Infantry School





MAJOR DWIGHT B. DICKSON JR.

OUR INFANTRY HERITAGE

The regimental system that is now being implemented in the U.S. Army offers great promise for improvements in unit cohesion and esprit as well as in the overall quality of life for individual soldiers. The rich historical legacy of the Army is being used in this system to provide a home for career soldiers who in the past have viewed Army life as an endless succession of address changes, new patches, and different sets of unit insignia. Unfortunately, as with the British Army's many changes in its regimental system over the years, the advent of the U.S. system is proving to be painful, even for many of its most ardent supporters.

During the planning process, it became evident that restructuring the Army to form a workable regimental system would mean leaving out many old and famous regiments. For the infantry, 26 colors were determined to be the most that could be accommodated within a 16-division active force structure. This meant that the other 32 infantry regiments of the 1957 Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) would have to be either inactivated or transferred to the training base. (Even with the recently planned addition of two infantry divisions, only about 30 infantry regiments can be represented in the system.)

The present plan also calls for pairing battalions stationed in the continental United States (CONUS) with battalions stationed overseas under one regimental flag so that each regiment will contain from three to six active battalions.

Although the history and tradition of some of these

regiments will be retained in training battalions, few active duty soldiers will ever serve in any of these units. And the new recruits who pass through them will quickly and quite properly go on to transfer their loyalty and affection to their permanent regiments. Similarly, the training cadre will serve in these units only temporarily on "extra-regimental" assignments, then return to their home regiments.

Before long, all the veterans of such regiments as the 14th Infantry and the 28th Infantry will be gone. Those of the 508th Infantry who fought in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Grenada will never be joined by younger veterans of the unit. History books and a set of colors propped up in the headquarters of a training battalion will be the only reminder of the 10th Infantry, the 13th Infantry, and many others. Even the 3d Infantry (The Old Guard), the Army's oldest regular infantry regiment, will suffer an undeserved fate: Although listed as a regiment, it will be one in name only, since it will have just one active battalion and no permanently affiliated members. Thus, as in any other regimental system, only those regiments that maintain an active roll of affiliate members will stay alive. The others will gradually be forgotten.

At the same time, many divisions will be losing regiments that have served with them since World War I, because our planners considered those regiments too junior to be kept under the new system. To me, this disregard for the heritage of many fine infantry units is not

in keeping with one of the primary goals of the regimental system.

One key element of the British regimental system (which the U.S. Army studied before adopting its own system) is its efforts to maintain within its active regiments a strong link with their predecessors. In fact, even though that army has undergone many reductions in active regiments, it has seldom chosen to disband a unit. Instead, it has usually consolidated two or more regiments into a new formation that shared the history, honors, and traditions of its famous predecessors. The great shortcoming of the U.S. system is its failure to do something similar.

Light Infantry Mergers

Sr Regt	Jr Regt	CONUS	# Bns	OCONUS	# Bns
1	47	9 ID	2	25 ID	2
2	35	9 ID	2	25 ID	2
3	63*	MDW/7 ID	1/1	6 ID	1
9	31	7 ID	2	2 ID	1
11	61	101 AA	2	BERLIN/56 FA	1/1
14	53*	7 ID	2	6 ID/25 ID	1/1
17	55*	7 ID	2	2 ID	1
19	87	10 ID	2	6 ID/25 ID	1/1
20	51	10 ID	2	6 ID	1
21	32	7 ID	2	25 ID	2
22	25*	10 ID	2	6 ID	1
23	39	9 ID	2	2 ID	1
26	187	101 AA	2	193 BDE	2
27	327	101 AA	2	6 ID/25 ID	1/1
29	24*	INF SCH	2**		
30	38	101 AA	2	BERLIN	2

*Non-CARS Regiment.

**The 29th Infantry would provide infantry training battalions at Fort Benning.

TABLE 1

What follows is a detailed proposal for consolidating U.S. infantry regiments — a plan that could be carried out with only a minor modification to the plan now being implemented. Under this proposed plan, there would still be 30 regiments, but instead of transferring the excess infantry colors to the training base, all of the CARS infantry regiments plus certain selected non-CARS regular regiments would be reorganized and consolidated into 30 new regiments.

The 30 regiments would consist of 28 infantry regiments, one parachute regiment, and one Ranger regiment. The 28 infantry regiments would be formed by mergers of two regimental colors. Thus, the first 28 CARS regiments (1st through 23d and 26th through 30th) would provide the senior component. Their junior partners would come from the younger regular regiments organized during World Wars I and II, except for those with an airborne background. This merger (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) would preserve the number and recognize the seniority of the infantry regiments that made up the small Regular Army of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Mechanized Infantry Mergers

Sr Regt	Jr Regt	CONUS	# Bns	OCONUS	# Bns
4	34	24 MX	2	3 MX	2
5	36	FA SCH	1	3 AD	2
6	46	5 MX	2	1 AD	2
7	5B	197 BDE	2	3 AD	2
8	48	4 MX	2	8 MX	2
10	52	5MX/NTC	1/1	1 AD	2
12	62*	4 MX	2	8 MX	2
13	54	194 BDE	1	8 MX/3 MX	1/1
15	50	24 MX	1	3 MX	2
16	56*	1 MX	2	1 MX(F)	2
18	60	INF SCH/9 ID	1/1	193/2ID	1/1
28	41	2 AD	2	2 AD(F)	2
5 CAV	12 CAV	1 CD	2	2 ID	1

*Non-CARS Regiment.

TABLE 2

The history and traditions of the junior regiments would be incorporated into the new regiments by consolidation.

In addition to the CARS regiments, seven regular regiments that were not organized under CARS would be reconstituted and merged with a senior partner. Therefore, practically all of the regular infantry regiments that have earned campaign credits would be represented.

This system is simple, and it avoids many of the emotional and subjective judgments that must be made with schemes that use any criterion other than seniority. Moreover, since all of the regiments would be represented,

The Parachute Regiment

Old Regt	Associated Bn	Unit
501	1	82 AB
502	2	82 AB
503	3	82 AB
504	4	82 AB
505	5	82 AB
506	6	82 AB
507	7	ABN TNG BN
508	8	82 AB
509	9	SETAF
511	11	82 AB
513*	13	INACTIVE
514*	14	INACTIVE
515*	15	INACTIVE
517*	17	INACTIVE
325	25	82 AB
551*	51	INACTIVE
188	88	SEP COMPANIES
194*	94	INACTIVE

*Non-CARS Regiments.

NOTE: 187th and 327th Infantry are consolidated with light infantry regiments to provide historical connection for home-based regiments of the 101st Abn Div.

TABLE 3



veterans of the many regiments not included in the current plan would have a regimental home.

The exceptions to the system of paired regiments would be the airborne and Ranger units. None of these special units could compete with the rest of the infantry in seniority, but their special character and heritage is certainly worth preserving. The solution is to organize a parachute regiment in addition to the present Ranger regiment.

The Parachute Regiment (its formal name) would be large, with 11 active battalions. Each of the active battalions would represent one of the former airborne regiments. The 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, for example, would represent the 501st Infantry, the 2d Battalion, the 502d Infantry, and so forth as shown in Table 3. All of the old airborne regiments except the 187th Infantry and the 327th Infantry would be consolidated into the Parachute Regiment. The regimental headquarters would provide a single home for all airborne infantry while the active battalions would keep alive the identity and the traditions of the individual parent regiments.

Since all battalions of the parachute regiment should be airborne units, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) would not have these battalions assigned to it as long as it remained an air assault division with no units on jump status. Of course, the 501st, 503d, and 506th Infantry would all return to their historic employment as airborne forces by serving as active battalions of the Parachute Regiment.

The 187th Infantry and the 327th Infantry would be consolidated with the 26th and 27th Infantry Regiments, respectively, and homebased with the 101st. This would give the 101st two regiments with a history of service with the division, and the combination of the 26th (Blue Spaders) with the 187th (Rakkassans) and the 27th (Wolfhounds) with the 327th would form partnerships rich in tradition and history.

This proposed merger of regiments would offer a number of advantages over the present plan. Because of the requirement in the present plan to pair overseas and state-side battalions, many divisions will no longer contain battalions of the regiments traditionally assigned to them. This is particularly true for divisions linked with the younger regiments that have not been included in the present regimental system.

It is hard to imagine the 9th Infantry Division, for example, without the 39th Infantry, 47th Infantry, and 60th Infantry; nevertheless, since none of these regiments were among the colors selected to be kept on the active rolls, they will all disappear from the "Old Reliables." But a merger of these regiments with the 23d Infantry, the 1st Infantry, and the 18th Infantry, which are to be assigned to the 9th Division, would give the new regiments a solid link with the Division's World War II and Vietnam heritage. This would also enable the veterans of the 9th Division to maintain a regimental home in the division that was tied to their old unit.

Most of my proposed mergers, in fact, are based on divisional affiliations and would return many fine regiments to their home divisions as a part of a new consolidated regiment. Other mergers would link regiments that share a common heritage. The 30th and 38th Infantry, for instance, served in the same brigade during World War I where they both earned the title "Rock of the Marne." The merger of these two regiments would perpetuate that tradition as the "Marne Regiment."

The merger of the 17th Infantry and the 55th Infantry is another example of a consolidation that would recognize historical ties. The 55th Infantry was formed with personnel from the 17th Infantry and assigned to the 7th Division during World War I. This merger would therefore renew the ties of these two units and bring back to the 7th Division one of its original regiments. This merger is also one of nine that would be accomplished by recon-

stituting a non-CARS regiment.

A few of my proposed consolidations neither strengthen divisional associations nor recall historical ties. They simply pair the remaining senior regiments with a junior partner. Even so, these new regiments could use the achievements and traditions of their predecessors to build a new and stronger regiment. By consolidation, the veterans of all the regular regiments would gain a regimental home and could help to ensure that the spirit of their old regiments was fully represented in the new.

Each of the new regiments would be more than just a unit of assignment. It would be a lifelong home for soldiers and would provide them with a sense of belonging and team spirit. The consolidation plan would help in this effort to make the regiment an institution that would strengthen the cohesiveness of the Army.

Each new regiment would inherit the lineage and honor of its predecessors, but it would use the number of its senior component and would display that regiment's coat of arms on its organizational color. The coat of arms of the junior partner would be informally displayed by the unit. Additionally, each new regiment could be granted devices to be displayed on the corners of the organizational color. These augmenting devices could come primarily from charges or crests on the coat of arms of the junior regiment. The use of the devices would also provide an opportunity to commemorate the significant actions of both regiments during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

The new regiment should also be entitled to adopt a regimental badge. One design could be authorized for each new regiment for wear on garrison caps and, in a subdued version, on BDU caps in garrison. These badges could also be worn on belt buckles. The design might be new, incorporating elements of the heritage of both regiments, or it might be a modified version of the insignia currently in use by one of the regiments.

Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI), known as "unit crests," would continue to be worn, but each regiment would wear the DUI of only one of the old regiments, normally that of the senior partner. For example, the 2d Infantry (2d and 35th Regiments) would continue to wear the DUI of the 2d Infantry, but it could adopt as a regimental badge a device that incorporated design elements from both regiments. Likewise, the 10th Infantry (10th and 52d) could wear the badge of the 10th Infantry and the DUI of the 52d. The Parachute Regiment could adopt a regimental badge to be worn by all its members. The battalions could continue to use the beret flash, wing background, and DUI of the old regiment that they represented.

The adoption of a regimental badge would provide a way of identifying soldiers with their affiliated regiment without cluttering the uniform and without devising a complex system for wearing DUIs on different uniforms. The soldiers affiliated with a regiment would wear the DUI of their current unit. (Soldiers who were not affiliated with a regiment would wear a corps or branch

badge that would be designed for each of the current branches of the Army.)

For the 39 years since the end of World War II, the Regular Army has consisted of between 14 and 20 divisions, and this general size is unlikely to change any time soon. The integration of the present regimental system into this force structure will never allow room for more than about 30 infantry regiments. Even a large-scale expansion of the Army during a national emergency would be met by a call-up of Reserve Component units. Although this call-up might be followed by some expansion of the Regular Army, this expansion would undoubtedly be accomplished by the activation of additional battalions of the active regiments. Therefore, any regiments that are not included in the regimental system would be forever relegated to the inactive list, or, at best, to service as training units.

The consolidation option I have outlined here is the only practical way the history and tradition of all the regular regiments could be preserved and continued in the combat elements of the Regular Army. Moreover, such a consolidation, in many cases, would improve the regimental system by strengthening the ties between the regiments and the divisions to which they would be assigned. And for soldiers with strong attachments to their regiments, this consolidation would permit them to maintain a tie with their old unit by requesting affiliation with the new regiment. For instance, the affiliation of veterans of the 31st with the new 9th Infantry would help to ensure that the traditions and the legacy of "America's Foreign Legion" were not lost.

The proposed consolidation of light, mechanized, and airborne infantry (as laid out in the tables), could be accomplished with little modification to the current plan, and the 75th Infantry would continue its role as the Ranger Regiment. The plan is based on the most current information available and includes the new 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions. Future changes to force structure might change the plan slightly, but the flexibility of the system could accommodate these changes.

Although the changes to the current system would be few, there will doubtless be resistance to reopening this issue. But our regiments are more than just numbers on TOE documents. They are corporate symbols of the Army's past achievements and a source of inspiration for present and future soldiers. Moreover, we should not restrict the consolidation scheme to infantry regiments.

Our regiments deserve better treatment than they are getting in the current regimental plan, and the consolidation proposed here would provide a workable and honorable alternative.



Major Dwight B. Dickson is assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. Among other assignments, he previously served on the faculty of the U.S. Military Academy, and as a platoon leader and company commander in Vietnam.

U.S. the infantry



CAPTAIN PETER A. ESCHBACH

We in the military profession generally accept the idea that the study of our past will aid us in understanding the present and in anticipating the future.


In the recent past, there has been a great deal of literature on the history of the United States Army, most of which is broad in its scope. Wars, battles, strategy, and tactics are a few examples of the sweeping subjects found on bookshelves today. And much has been written about the nation's great military commanders. But those leaders owe their victories and, in some cases, their lives to one rugged group that is generally forgotten: The U.S. Infantryman. Unfortunately, little material has been dedicated to that most important participant in U.S. military history.

It is the common foot soldier who has, in the truest sense, closed with and destroyed the enemies of his country. Without the infantryman's perseverance, his ingenuity, and his love of nation, unit, and buddies, U.S. history would have been written in a drastically different manner (and possibly even in a different language).

The next 11 pages depict the evolution of the U.S. Infantryman, his uniform, and the "tools of his trade." Two hundred years of technological progress has had a tremendous effect on the Army's development, but the infantryman and his basic mission have changed little since he first answered the call to the colors of an infant United States.


Captain Peter A. Eschbach is an Infantry officer assigned to the Public Affairs Office of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. A 1978 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has served in several infantry assignments.

U.S. INFANTRY 1784-1794



Musketeer Ball
.75 cal.

3/4"



Headgear

Original

Cartridge, Original
musket ball and powder wrapped in paper or linen. Each man carried 24 rounds.

INDIANA

OHIO

Fort Recovery

Fort LaSalle

N.C.O. Spontoon, used to direct soldiers and to keep the lines

straight.

N.C.O. sword

"Brown Bess"
Musket .75 caliber
Usually pointed, not aimed.



Uniform Button

Canvas Knapsack

Cartridge Box

Cartridge Box (Ammo Pouch)

Musket brush and pick

Hand Grenade

Wood Canteen


Bayonet and Scabbard

U.S. INFANTRY 1808-1814

Enlistment: 5 years
 Private's Base Pay:
 1808: \$5.00/Month
 1812: \$10.00/Month



U.S. INFANTRY 1815-1850




White Pompon for Infantry


Metal Chin Strap

M1808 Musket (flintlock)
Sleeves were made long and open because uniforms shrank.

Leather folding forage cap




Knapsack made of wood and leather



Bedroll

Kindling wood for cooking fire




Hat Brass


Tin Canteen

Percussion Caps replaced flintlock style muskets.

Military "Top Hat" brass percussion caps




Breastplate



Model 1842




first use of stripes for rank



N.C.O. Sword

Waistbelt buckle




.69 caliber musketball




U.S. INFANTRY 1850-1865


Hardee hat




Black felt campaign hat



Tarred canvas knapsack (rucksack) (carried 5 days rations) and sleeping roll



Cartridge Box



1st Corps



2nd Corps



5th Corps




6th Corps



12th Corps

• 1st use of unit patches •

Enlistment: 3 years
Private's base pay: \$13.00/month
Clothing allowance: \$45.00/year
Equipment weight: about 44 lbs.



"Kepi Bummer" cap


Sword Bayonet

Triangular bayonet and scabbard

1 1/2 quart grey wool covered tin canteen & cup



hard tack & coffee



Model 1861 Rifle Musket
weight: about 10 lbs; rate of fire: 3-5 rounds per minute
max range: 500 m ±

Minie Ball for the .57 cal. Model 1861




3/5"

Insignia of the



Handgrenade, weight: 5 lbs.

Infantry Bugle with regimental number.




U.S. INFANTRY 1875-1900


U.S. Infantryman
1880



Model 1881
Dress helmet



In 1875, the insignia
of the U.S. Infantry became
the crossed rifles.



Trowel Bayonet,
used for fighting
and digging.

Campaign hat with unit/branch
insignia

M1892

Krag-Jorgenson
.30 caliber, 5 round
magazine

.30 caliber
round for
the Krag
rifle

Cork
Pith
helmet

Equipment
roll



Canvas
knapsack (rucksack)
with sleeping roll

Haver-
sack
(food bag)
with unit
and
soldier
number

Canvas
leggings

Mills
.30 cal. cartridge belt

Tin canteen.



British style helmet

U.S. INFANTRY 1900-1940




Gas Mask

Collar brass



steel pot

Ammo belt




Trench knives

Dogtags

overseas cap



campaign hat



meat can pouch
overcoat
roll

Gas Mask carrier in "ALERT" position.


Private's Base Pay:
1913: \$15.00/month
1920: \$30.00/month

meat can (mess kit)


1qt. canteen

Take down pick

"Mill's Bomb" handgrenade




.30 caliber ammunition clip



leg wrappings
entrenching tool



M1903 Springfield .30 caliber



bayonet; blade length: 17 in.

AIRBORNE
a new way to get to
the fight.

U.S. INFANTRY 1940-1950




Combat Infantryman Badge
(C.I.B.)

(WWII)





Dog tags
(pre WWII)

Private's Base Pay
1941 \$40.00/month
1942 \$50.00/month



Gas Mask
(no voice meter)

folding
entrenching tool



Collar
brass

.30 caliber
ammo
clip for
M-rifle



Grenade pouch




M-1 Steel Pot

M-1
Garand
.30 caliber
rifle

1 quart
canteen


First aid
dressing



M1918 B.A.R.
Browning
Automatic Rifle
20 round .30 cal.
magazine


MK 2 "Pineapple"
Handgrenade
Casualty radius: 10 yards

U.S. INFANTRY 1950-1960



U.S. INFANTRY 1960-1970

"AIR ASSAULT"
a new way
of moving
around the
battle field.



Combat Infantryman Badge - 3rd award

U.S. Infantryman
Enlistment: 3 years
Private's Base Pay
1965 \$89.90/month
1968 \$102.30/month

M113 Armored
Personnel Carrier
(A.P.C.)

"Base ball"
utility cap →

Bush hat

Lightweight
frame and
nylon
rucksack

Sleeping
roll →

M1956
"Butt-pack"

folding
entrenching
tool


Cotton
webbed
load carrying
equipment
(LCE)

M14
7.62mm
rifle


M72 light
anti-tank weapon

M79 40 mm Grenade Launcher

M26 Handgrenade
weight: 1 lb. 5 oz.
Casualty radius: 15 meters




U.S. INFANTRY 1970-1980




U.S. INFANTRY 1980.

UH-60 Blackhawk

Individual
Lift Device



E.I.B. Expert Infantryman Badge




Collar
Brass

Kevlar
Helmet
with
camou-
flage
cover



AN/PVS7 Night
Vision Goggles

Body Armor
13 layers of Kevlar
weight: 8.5 lbs




M249 S.A.W.
Squad Automatic
Weapon, 5.56mm

Weight:
14 lbs.

rate
of fire:
700-1100 rpm


7.62mm Coax
25mm automatic
gun

TOW Anti-tank
Missiles



M2
Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)

Battle
Dress
Uniform
BDU



BDU cap



A few years back, a *Bundeswehr* team toured major United States Army training centers and gave a presentation on a command technique the Germans call *Auftragstaktik*. The team translated this word as "mission-type" or "mission-oriented" control, but this rendition is doubly unfortunate: It is neither accurate nor elegant, and it focuses the American and British soldier's eye straight onto Paragraph 2 of the operations order instead of on Subparagraphs 3a and 3b. I recently had both reason and opportunity to study this technique and I prefer to use another term for it: "directive control." This is easy to say and it conveys the full and precise meaning of *Auftragstaktik*.

I don't know how much effect the *Bundeswehr* presentation had at the time, but the theme is now highly topical. Directive control, in fact, appears to be the key to the effective implementation of maneuver theory as explained in *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*. I know of no other command technique that offers the speed and precision of response to match the tempo of the maneuver warfare of the future.


Just as directive control is the key to responsiveness, the key to directive control is a chain of trust and mutual respect that runs unbroken from the senior operational commander (army group or whatever) to the squad leader and the tank commander. I have fully explored the upper and middle links of this chain in a book to be released soon. Here, however, I want to address the problems of the lowest links and to demonstrate that the chain needs

one more link — from squad or fire team commander to the soldier in the ranks.

As a foreigner, I must admit that I had some difficulty finding a major American sport to use as an analogy. Football, ice hockey, and basketball, for example, are all controlled by a coach who calls prearranged plays from the sidelines, and these games are frequently interrupted for changes of players and various forms of time out. They are, therefore, an exact sporting analog of the control of troops by detailed orders (*Befehlstaktik*). In baseball, batting and running between bases may call for instant judgmental decisions, but essentially these decisions are made on the individual level. So I hope enough U.S. Infantrymen now watch soccer on television for me to use it as common ground.

In soccer, the team captain, a player, exercises both leadership and tactical command, and the play flows on with as few interruptions as possible. The basis of success is "horizontal team spirit" — horizontal in the sense that there are only two levels, the skipper and the rest. In certain situations a player (the goalkeeper facing a corner kick, for instance) assumes local tactical command. Otherwise, the skipper issues orders only when a change of tactics is called for. The players respond to the situation as they see fit on the basis of their individual skills, their team training, and the situation itself. "Running off the ball" (maneuver) is at least as important as playing it or tackling (combat).

The players' freedom of action is restricted in three



BRIGADIER RICHARD E. SIMPKIN
British Army (Retired)

ways: first, by the rules of the game and the actual situation (which together correspond to the total situation in war); and, second, by conforming to certain principles and drills that have been found to pay off. In soccer and war alike, these are a matter of training; some of them may be covered by "set pieces" (SOPs). Then, third, there are such one-time conditions as the state of the pitch, the makeup of one's own team on a given day, and, above all, the characteristics of the opposition. The coach has to brief his team on these conditions before the game and must issue special instructions on preferred plays and on moves or techniques that are to be avoided.

To complete this sporting analogy, though, we must push it one stage further. In an isolated match, or in the final of a major competition, the aim is simply to win. But now consider a league competition that lasts the whole season. Here the outcome of an individual game is important, but winning it is only an immediate (tactical) aim. The ultimate (operational) aim is to win the league. Broad decisions on the training and the methods needed to achieve this are made not by the captain but by the coach or manager (the operational commander). And matters affecting the resources available, such as buying and selling players or fostering support, are decided upon one level higher still, by the club's chairman or board of management (the strategic commander or war cabinet).

This higher-level planning may call for decisions that trade off immediate benefits for long-haul advantages — buying promising young players — or for decisions that reduce the chances of winning a particular game — resting key players or playing so as not to lose, which is quite different from playing to win.

We now have three levels of command, each of which makes a different functional contribution to the overall aim of winning the league. Yet the club must remain a single entity. All three levels must pull together, just as the players must cooperate with one another. At the same time, each level and each individual within it must be given the freedom of action to make the best possible contribution. This is what I mean by "vertical team spirit" — the moral basis of directive control.

I will next address what I believe to be the underlying and characteristic principle of directive control, using terms I have arrived at by studying the relevant parts of German command manuals from the 1920s to the present, and from discussions with distinguished German officers and with interpreters of the doctrine. Because these manuals are on a razor edge between coordinated initiative and anarchy, they tend to be a bit misleading in some of the key issues. Discussion and historical example are much more helpful.

From these I am in no doubt whatever that *nothing laid down from above in advance is sacrosanct*. It was Helmuth von Moltke (the elder) who coined the phrase we know as "No plan survives contact." A subordinate commander, applying his trained judgment, is justified, in the light of his superior's intention, in modifying or even changing the task assigned him. As one source

makes clear, in the last resort, he would even be right to go against his superior's expressed intention in the light of some broader intention that he knew of. That's quite a bellyful in more senses than one. What I think it means at root is that culpable insubordination ceases to be a matter of disobedience to a specific order and becomes a matter of intent — just as proof of guilty intent is required to sustain a murder charge. This is why the whole thing has to turn on mutual respect and trust.

Under both "control by detailed orders" (the Anglo-American system) and directive control, a commander exposed to fire in effect entrusts his life to his subordinates when he issues orders that delegate action to them. The difference is that in control by detailed orders he relies only on their skill and courage. His subordinates must do what he has told them or die in the attempt. But under directive control he relies on their judgment as well. (I know he should probably be leading from the front, but I have ruled this out here to highlight a fundamental point.)

Not even in the *Wehrmacht*, though, was the principle of directive control universal. Off the field of battle, discipline was a matter of orders and obedience, as we understand them. In action, too, the principle was sometimes overridden. A "strong" superior commander would get things done the way he wanted by force of personality and status. Or sometimes a superior, perhaps two levels up, would issue what General F.W. Mellenthin has aptly described as a "mission in blinkers" — in effect a direct order. Significantly, a large proportion of the specific failures in Erich von Manstein's defense of the Ukraine in 1944 were due to infringements of the principle of directive control — often to the extent of overriding a protest from the commander on the spot.

By contrast, the Germans — unlike the Americans and the British — accept the principle of *forward control* by higher tactical commanders. On two famous occasions, Erwin Rommel and Hasso von Manteuffel (both divisional commanders at the time) actually assumed command of the leading subunit. Manteuffel puts it like this:

I was always located where I could see and hear what was going on "in front," that is near the enemy, and around myself — namely at the focal point! Nothing and nobody can replace a personal impression.

As I see it, the *quid pro quo* of control by detailed orders is noninterference once orders have been issued. Given mutual trust and respect, it surely makes sense for the most talented and experienced man to be on the spot, if he can, to make the crucial decision.

ELEMENTS OF DIRECTIVE CONTROL

The controlling operational commander studies the situation (*Lage*) and forms his intention (*Absicht*). He explains this intention to his subordinates, perhaps two levels down, and it becomes their ultimate guideline. Next (again perhaps two levels down), he lays down the task



(*Auftrag*) assigned to each subordinate; this becomes the subordinate's principal immediate guideline. He then gives the resources (*Mittel*) allocated to each subordinate, and the coordinating instructions. (These were at one stage referred to as constraints, but the latest German command manual uses the word *koordinieren*, which strikes me as more positive.) Within this framework, of situation, task, resources, and coordination, the subordinate has freedom of action.

Much of the coordinating detail found in U.S. operations orders and annexes is covered in SOPs. But wherever the need for judgment may arise, these SOPs are themselves framed on the principle of directive control. We can forget about this detail, which in the future will be covered by data processing and transmission down to brigade and probably battalion level. Likewise, the mechanics of directive control, simple as they are, mainly concern higher levels. So I will leave it at that and drive the point home by stressing that the *Wehrmacht's* army operations orders for major operations during World War II often covered just one quarto page, and never more than three or four.

The clue to freedom of action without chaos lies in immediate, full, and accurate reporting. Covering up foul-ups and errors of judgment is not acceptable. But this is only one side of the coin of mutual trust. To make sure commanders and key staff officers are in one another's minds, briefings and discussions between levels have to be as continuous as circumstances allow. In the ideal, command decisions are not so much made at the top level as they are generated from the bottom up — whence the title of this article, a particularly apt phrase recently used in *INFANTRY* by Steven L. Canby (see July-August 1984, p. 28).

Every platoon commander in every army is trained to command a company (one level up) and to think "two down" (to the squad leader) while doing so. To achieve

its full flexibility, directive control calls for harmony in thinking two up and two down. This means that, to be able to replace a casualty in the field, a commander must know enough about handling a brigade to be able to interpret the situation to the brigade staff, as well as to the divisional staff if he should suddenly have to take over a battalion. This may sound fantastic, but it has been an important principle in the training of German officers, especially General Staff officers, ever since the days of the elder Moltke. By the same token, a soldier in the ranks should be told enough to give him a good working understanding of the company plan and also an inkling of what the battalion is trying to do.

There seems to be considerable difference of opinion among German officers of various arms and vintages about the appropriateness of tasking two down. The more deliberate school feels that every level of headquarters has a contribution to make to the plan and should be given the opportunity to make it. But *Wehrmacht* practice in maneuver warfare was frequently to task two levels down. (Some of my recent studies suggest that tasking two down, like *thinking* two down, makes good sense.)

Looking up from a combat unit to the heights, one is apt to be reminded of the rhyme: "Big fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite 'em; and little fleas have lesser fleas, and so ad infinitum."

In fact, though, different levels of headquarters have different functions. From the controlling operational headquarters (say, army) down to the company, the planning and the executing headquarters alternate. For example, at operational level, an army plans while a corps executes, so the army tasks the higher tactical formation — division. At the higher tactical level, the division plans and a brigade (or task force) executes, so the division tasks its battalion (or even company) combat teams. At the lower tactical level, the battalion plans, and a company executes. But the battalion doesn't usually task platoons because from company down there's little planning and a lot of doing.

If you went around asking the officers and enlisted men of modern armies in the Western democracies where the weak links in the chain of command were, the only printable answer you'd get would be: "We don't have any in *our* outfit." Under pressure, though, some might allow that "all the links are strong, but some are stronger than others."

The fact is, there are and always will be weak links in any chain of command in the armed forces and in industry alike. They come in two kinds — systemic weaknesses, like the Soviets' officer/NCO gap (which they had to set about bridging with a new kind of warrant officer), and individual weaknesses because some folks are better soldiers than others, and some get promoted to the point where they ceiling out (as in the "Peter Principle"). Directive control requires an unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect from top to bottom. Systemic weaknesses have to be identified, faced up to frankly,

and eliminated. Individual weaknesses, which will never be eliminated, have to be bridged by a special kind of discipline.

There are maybe three kinds of discipline. The castest to achieve and most fragile is *imposed* discipline, associated with conventional recruit training and control by detailed orders. Next comes *accepted* discipline, which one might describe as "passive team spirit"; this generally prevails in good field force units. The third is what I'd like to call *self-generating* discipline; this is the same thing as team spirit in the full sense, where each man thinks for the team and acts on his own initiative in its best interests. Few, I think, would question this as a goal; the only small problem is how to get there.

TRAINING FOR MORAL LEADERSHIP

I hate phrases like "moral leadership," but this happens to be the most widely accepted term to use here. Let me cut it down to size. If "leadership" is getting other people to do something they don't want to do, "moral leadership" is working out what you ought to do, then forcing yourself to do it for the sake of the team — in other words, self-generating discipline.

There are at least three good reasons why soldiers should be brought up this way from the moment they join. As the U.S. Army Infantry School is better aware than most, NATO's greatest asset is not the chip, but the "chip off the old block" — the intelligent, educated, independent-minded, resilient, democratic citizen of a soldier. Training should develop these qualities from the start instead of crushing them. Second, just as the child is the father of the man, the rookie is father of the NCO; soldiers need to begin the way they mean to continue. Third, whether it is a large-scale mechanized maneuver, a heliborne assault, or a quasi-guerrilla activity in the hills, the kind of tempo that will win tomorrow's war requires a flexibility that only directive control can achieve. (I know that what I am going to describe is very much the way the U.S. Army trains its Rangers, but maybe I can provide a new slant or two.)

This training philosophy stems in fact from Kurt Hahn, who founded a boy's school called Salem (Germany) that was based on it. Tossed out of Germany by the Nazis, he founded Gordonstoun, where the Duke of Edinburgh and his sons were educated. The Duke, then a serving naval officer, fed the idea into the Royal Navy under the name "expedition training." Then it also caught on in the British Army, which was at that time giving much thought to actions by remnants of units after battlefield nuclear strikes.

In expedition training, no direct effort is made to "knock people into shape" or to impose a stereotype. Rather, those individuals undergoing the training are immersed in a carefully but discreetly controlled general environment that is designed to develop in them certain aspects of character from within. This is complemented

by special environments (mostly arduous or dangerous sports) that entail a genuine if remote risk to life and that can be mastered only by combining individual skill and initiative with teamwork. Evidently both general and special environments can be oriented toward physical or mental attainment, and toward specific goals within these categories. But balance and versatility are key elements in this approach.

The pressures generated this way are far greater than those produced by conventional training and team games. Typically, four to five percent of the trainees will either crack up or drop out, which is fine. Likewise, some of them will achieve far more than others. This is an aid to selection for promotion or specialist training. But it has no adverse effect, for one of the goals is to make the trainees bring out the best in themselves and also get to know both their limits and their limitations.

The problem with applying this philosophy to the basic training of an army lies in creating a right atmosphere without preselection (as for Rangers or noncommissioned officers) or the example set by trained men in a good field force unit. The solution for the U.S. Army may be to send recruits straight to training companies within field force units located in the continental United States.

The effective application of maneuver theory to all forms of warfare calls for flexibility, speed, and precision of response to a degree that can be achieved only by directive control (*Auftragstaktik*). Directive control gives subordinates right down the line the greatest possible freedom of action in accomplishing the task set for them, even the right to modify the task itself without specific approval.

Mechanically, directive control is a very simple system, but morally, it requires a kind of vertical team spirit — an unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect upward and downward all the way from top to bottom. This in turn calls for new thinking about the training of officers and enlisted men alike. The primary aim of training should be to develop character and individuality so as to create a self-generating discipline.


There is a suitable training philosophy, generally referred to as "moral leadership," and it has been extensively adopted (and adapted) in the British armed forces. The main problem in applying this approach to recruits army-wide is that the creation of the right atmosphere may require the preselection of trainees, or the example set by bodies of trained soldiers.

But the Soviet airborne forces appear to have set themselves the goal of bringing every man to *spetsnaz* (special forces) standards. So "Every Infantryman a Ranger" could be a fair challenge for the U.S. Army.



Brigadier Richard E. Simpkin, British Army (Retired), writes and lectures and runs a language consultancy in Scotland. He has published extensively; his works include several books and many articles in *INFANTRY* and other military journals.

TRAINING NOTES



Doctrinal Publications

MAJOR BRUCE D. MACKEY

The production of doctrinal literature for the field that takes place in the Combined Arms and Tactics Department (CATD) of the Infantry School continues to receive top priority.

One of the most recently published and most significant additions to the Division 86 family of field manuals is the coordinating draft of FM 71-2J, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. This AirLand

battle manual is the result of many months of work with the Armor School, a co-proponent, and with many subject matter experts from various other Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools and

NUMBER	TITLE	STATUS
<u>MECHANIZED INFANTRY</u>		
FM 71-2	The Mechanized Infantry Platoon (FM 71-2)	IA Progress cont. Mar-Mar 83
FM 71-21	The Mechanized Infantry Platoon (FM 71-21)	IA Progress cont. Apr-May 83
FM 71-2J	The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor Schools)	Coordinating draft Aug 83
FM 71-2K	The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor Schools)	Coordinating draft (Revised) Dec 83
FM 71-2L	The Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor Schools)	Coordinating draft Apr 83
<u>INFANTRY, AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT</u>		
FM 71-20 Change	The Infantry Platoon (FM 71-20)	Published Jan 83. Published Aug 84.
FM 71-10 Change	The Infantry Company	Published Jan 83. Scheduled Jan 85.
FM 71-20 FM 71-20 FM 71-20	The Infantry Brigade Range Operations	Published Dec 83. Coordinating draft Sep 83.
FM 80-9	Air Assault Operations	Coordinating draft Jan 83.

LIGHT DIVISION

FM 7-10	The Light Infantry Platoon/Company	Coordinating draft Sep 88. (See FC 7-10)
FM 7-11	The Light Infantry Company	Coordinating draft Jun 88. (See FC 7-14)
FM 7-12	The Light Infantry Battalion	Coordinating draft Mar 88. (See FC 7-12)
FM 7-13	The Light Infantry Brigade	Coordinating draft Sep 88. (See FC 7-12)

THE INFANTRY DIVISION HISTORICAL

FM 7-14	The Historical Infantry Battalion, Platoon and Company	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-15	The Assault Gun School, Platoon and Company	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-16	The Cavalry Arms School (Heavy/Light)	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-17	The Light Attack School, Platoon and Company	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-18	The Light Attack Battalion	Coordinating draft TBD

OTHER

FM 7-19	Tactical Employment of Infantry	DA Document 17 May 88
FM 7-20	Readiness Operations in Infantry Units	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-21	Training Range Development Unit	Coordinating draft Jun 88
FM 7-22	Company Skills of the Infantry Rifle	Published Nov 87
FM 7-23	Army Operations Coordinating draft	Coordinating draft TBD
FM 7-24	an Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat	Published Nov 88

FIELD OPERATIONS

FM 7-25	Patrols, Scouts	Est. Mar 88
FM 7-26	Artillery Maintenance	Est. Mar 88
FM 7-27	Light Infantry Battalion and Brigade Operations and SMP	Est. Nov 88
FM 7-28	Light Infantry Company, Operations and SMP	Est. Mar 88
FM 7-29	Light Infantry Platoon and Company Operations and SMP	Published Dec 88
FM 7-30	The Division SO Company Team SOP (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor School)	Est. Jan 88
FM 7-31	The Division SO Battalion Team SOP (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor School)	Est. Jan 88
FM 7-32	The Advanced and Masterclass Infantry Brigade SOP (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor School)	Est. Mar 88
FM 7-33	Formation and Brigade Command and Control Techniques (Coordinated by Infantry and Armor School)	Published Nov 88
FM 7-34	Attack and Assault of a Complex Urban System	

DIALOGUE FILMS		
(Available on order from TASC)		
82-1	Transition Mixes -- M1/M113, M2/M60	Released Feb 82.
82-2	Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Training Strategy	Released Jul 82.
82-3	The Bradley/Abrams Tank Force	Released Sep 82.
83-1	The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Platoon and Squad	Released Apr 83.
83-3	Heavy/Light Concept	Released Mar 84.

the National Training Center.

In addition, the Mechanized Infantry Platoon/Squad, BIFV (FM 7-7J); Battalion and Brigade Command and Control Techniques (FC 71-6); and The Division 86 Battalion Task Force SOP (FC 71-2) are in their final stages of development prior to publication.

Field Circulars (FC) are currently being prepared for the new light infantry division. These publications will provide light infantry soldiers and leaders with the doctrinal know-how to fight, train, and evaluate. Each circular includes the ARTEP Mission Training Plan (AMTP) and emphasizes the divisional units' unique differences in organization, equipment, and capabilities.

Periodically, CATD receives in-

quiries about its publication process. Doctrinal manuals are initially produced in a preliminary draft format after an outline has been internally developed, staffed, and approved. A coordinating draft is then published and sent to the field for additional review and comment.

CATD regards this field review as one of the most important steps in developing a good manual and depends on a thorough and professional review to make sure its manuals are realistic and complete. The comments from the field are then incorporated into the final draft text process.

The current status of the publications for which CATD has proponentcy is shown on the accompanying chart.

(It should be noted that FMs are normally received through pinpoint distribution channels. FCs are distributed on a one-time selected-distribution basis, and MACOMs are authorized to reproduce the circulars as needed.)

The Infantry School stresses the importance of input from the field in the development of its doctrinal and training publications. Questions or comments on a specific doctrinal manual or field circular should be sent on a DD Form 2028 to Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-I-V-PM, Fort Benning, GA 31905; AUTOVON 835-1653/1210.

Major Bruce D. Mackey is assigned to the Doctrinal Literature Division of the Combined Arms and Tactics Department of the Infantry School

Logical Antiarmor Training

CAPTAIN JAMES LENIHAN

It seems like everyone has an opinion on how to conduct good antiarmor training for Dragon and TOW gunners and crews. For the most part our leaders have been successful in converting the emphasis on tracking to an emphasis on crew and gunner task performance. As a result, we have increased the proficiency and the basic task performance of our crews and

gunners, although one problem continues to plague our leaders — how to train antiarmor gunners to track not only accurately but confidently. In spite of the obvious differences between the TOW and the Dragon, gunners for both systems suffer from the same frustration and loss of confidence when they cannot track a target effectively, and both can be helped by

a logical tracking program.

The Launch Effects Trainer (LET) for the Dragon and the M70 TOW Trainer are not the most effective ways to train gunners, although they can and should be used as an integral part of an antiarmor tracking program. Anyone who has ever had a chance to use these devices to track realizes the difficulties involved and

the ensuing frustration. Almost as important is the fact that these systems limit the use of our most valuable training assets — our noncommissioned officers. Both devices do give an NCO supervisor a score or a read-out, but unless he has an extensive background in TOW training, a supervisor cannot “read” gunner errors or correct mistakes that he cannot see.

START AT BEGINNING

For a gunner, keeping the crosshairs on a target is the most difficult thing he has to do. Yet that is the first thing we force him to do when we use the M70 or the LET to train him. This is almost like trying to teach basic rifle marksmanship using only 300-meter targets. We need to start the gunner at the beginning, instead, and let him work his way up. Therefore, a program for antiarmor gunners should be broken down into three phases — initial, intermediate, and advanced.

During the initial training phase, a gunner should be required to track a tactical vehicle that is moving cross country at a relatively short range (300 to 400 meters). Through the use of the Sony Rover TV Trainer (TVT), an NCO supervisor can monitor the gunner's tracking performance. (Sony Rovers can be ordered through Training Aids Support Centers using unit funds or hand-receipted from TASCs that carry them. Change 3 to FM 23-23 provides information on how to set up and use the equipment and gives the NSNs for the mounting brackets for the TOW and the Dragon.) By collimating the day-sight tracker with the Sony camera (using the field expedient method also found in Change 3) and by drawing crosshairs on the monitor to match the gunner's sight picture, an NCO can see the same picture the gunner sees. (See also “Training TOW Gunners,” by Major Michael V. Harper and Major Patrick H. Orell, *INFANTRY*, January-February 1979, pages 12-14.)

By watching the monitor, the NCO can make corrections about the target's center of mass, the gunner's breathing, and the tracking rate. In

addition, the gunner can have his exercise played back to him so he can see his mistakes, hear his supervisor's guidance, and see his own subsequent corrections. This method also positively reinforces teaching procedures. The gunner can stand back and observe his proper sight picture and his tracking efforts.

Once a gunner has demonstrated his proficiency at this initial training level, he should move on to the intermediate level. An intermediate tracking exercise should include a moving target at an intermediate range (400 to 600 meters for the Dragon, 1,000 to 1,500 meters for the TOW); frontal, flank, and oblique shots when the terrain permits; and the use of evasive target vehicles to improve the gunner's tracking ability.

It should be noted here that while there is some loss of continuity between the day-sight tracker and the Sony Rover at the intermediate ranges, the target on the monitor is smaller because the Sony camera operates at less than 13 power. The gunner's performance can still be evaluated with reasonable accuracy, however, if a supervisor will spend a little time familiarizing himself with these differences.

A significant amount of time should be spent in this second phase, because it allows gunners to hone their tracking skills. Wherever the terrain permits it, gunners should also be trained to track targets at the maximum range of their weapons using M64 and M880 launch simulators — but only after they have demonstrated complete competence in tracking at the shorter ranges.

The tracking exercises of the advanced phase should be designed to train gunners in gunnery skills. Beginning back at the short ranges, and again using the Sony Rover TVT, the gunners should be taught to track a “spot on the vehicle.” This requires three things from both the gunner and his supervisor: vehicle identification (friend or foe and what type); knowledge of the vulnerable spots on the vehicle; and tracking discipline.

In a training scenario, for example,

an NCO supervisor might tell a gunner what type of vehicle he is engaging. The gunner would then have to identify the vehicle's vulnerable areas and track one of these “hot spots.” The supervisor could monitor the soldier's tracking by watching the screen and making appropriate corrections. (This is a difficult task. But gunners and crews who can identify enemy vehicles, locate their vulnerable spots, and track those spots are virtually guaranteed first round hits, as long as they are using functional equipment.) The gunner's tracking performance can then be empirically evaluated using the LET or M70 trainers, although these are only methods of *assessing* advanced gunner skills. In other words, they should be used in conjunction with other training, not instead of it.

MILES

The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) is another exceptional tool that can be used to assess the performance of gunners and crews. It can determine the crew's ability to react differently when under fire as well as assess the use of cover and concealment. But it should not be used in training or in assessing tracking.

It should be mentioned, too, that the Sony Rover is compatible with the M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV). In fact, the Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department of the Infantry School has incorporated the Sony Rover into the program of instruction of its ITV trainer course.

While there is no guaranteed way to produce accurate gunners, a logical, sequential tracking program for TOW and Dragon gunners will increase the proficiency of gunners and crews and actually speed up a unit's training time.

Captain James Lenihan served as an antiarmor trainer at Fort Hood and as chief of the antiarmor/missile division of the Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department of the Infantry School. He is presently assigned to the 197th Infantry Brigade.

CALFEX

Tactical Training with a Purpose

CAPTAIN E.J. NUSBAUM
CAPTAIN JOHN T. ROBINSON

The combined arms concept governs the way the U.S. Army is training to fight the AirLand Battle. It is discussed at great length during service school courses and in gameboard simulations. But before soldiers and small-unit leaders can get a real appreciation for combined arms and gain an ability to use the concept, they must be allowed to apply it in a realistic situation. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry conducted a successful combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX) at Fort Riley in 1982, and a summary of the battalion's experiences may provide a "how to do it" for other units.

This CALFEX focused on three rifle companies, each of which conducted a 48-hour exercise. The battalion conducted the entire exercise in five days, as shown in Table 1. Elements of the combat support company were attached to the company teams

or otherwise supported their operations. Command and control was furnished by the battalion tactical operations center in the field, and support to each team was provided from the battalion trains. The CALFEX gave the battalion's soldiers and leaders alike an opportunity to see the effects of combined arms operations, and it also gave the leaders an opportunity to plan and control combined arms assets in a live fire exercise.

Organizing and coordinating the CALFEX was complex and demanding. In fact, the event was planned as a graduation exercise for which the units would have to train.

All the battalion assets were used, and the battalion coordinated with a large number of outside organizations. Battalion planners, for example, began their coordination with the air elements for close air support and

attack helicopters 120 days before the scheduled event. The times and number of sorties, together with the types of desired ordnance for each sortie, were confirmed.

Coordinating a firing battery and the necessary ammunition was only one part of the field artillery support. The fire support team (FIST) for each company and the battalion fire support element (FSE) had to become fully involved in the planning phase of the exercise, and they also participated in the preliminary training before the actual exercise.

Before the exercise, too, combat engineers were used to prepare obstacles in the maneuver area. The materials the engineers needed had to be anticipated and obtained and the equipment requested. Like the artillerymen, the engineers were integrated into all pre-CALFEX training. Sup-

MON		TUE		WED		THU		FRI	
0600	Tactical move Company T&A	Dry attack Live accident Delay Company T&A		Shutdown Tactical move Recovery					
0800		Tactical move Company T&A		Dry attack Live accident Delay Company T&A		Shutdown Tactical move Recovery			
0900				Tactical move Company T&A		Dry attack Live accident Delay Company T&A		Shutdown Recovery	

Table 1

porting armor platoons also trained with their designated mechanized infantry companies during the pre-CALFEX period.

In addition to these combined arms elements, several post agencies were involved in the coordination process. Range control, for instance, played an important part in the planning, because range and training area requirements, including pre-training requirements, had to be arranged for and confirmed. Extensive range preparation was also required; the objective had to be prepared, hard targets emplaced, and range fans drawn and approved.

Class III and V supplies for all participating units also had to be coordinated during the planning phase. The coordination of Class V supplies was a key area. A large draw and turn-in had to be anticipated and scheduled by both the supply and transportation platoon and the ammunition supply point (ASP). Class V needs also had to be coordinated between all of the supporting units and the ASP (See Table 2).

The presence of controllers and

Table 2

Sequence of Events

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Task No.</u>
<u>Day 1</u>		
0800	Prepare for Operations	3-I-1
	Receive Bn TF OPORD	3-I-2
	Prepare & Inspect Equipment	3-I-6
	Issue Team OPORD	3-V-1-1
1300	Conduct Tactical Roadmarch	3-V-1-3
	Operate Quarters Party	3-V-1-4
	Cross SP	3-V-1-6
	Maintain Security	3-V-1-7
	Operate Trail Party	3-V-1-8
1500	Occupy Assembly Area	3-I-1
	Prepare for Operations	3-I-2
	ARR	
<u>Day 2</u>		
0001	Occupy Assembly Area	3-I-1
	Prepare for Operations	3-I-2
0900	Mortar/Artillery Preparation of Objective	3-V-2-5
	Conduct Attack (Dry Fire)	3-V-1 thru 11
0930	Team Attack, Cross LD	3-V-2-4, 5
	Move to Objective (Dry Fire)	7, 10, 11
1000	Mounted Assault of Objective	3-V-2-13
	Consolidate	3-V-2-16
	Reorganize	3-V-2-17
1045	AAR of Dry Fire	
1100	Test Fire of Weapons	
1145	Withdraw to Assembly Area	
1215	Preparation for Operations	3-I-1, 2, 6
		3-V-1-1
1400	Same tasks as 0900-1045. The exercise will be conducted as a live-fire exercise.	
1630	AAR of Live-Fire Attack	
1645	Defend Battle Position	3-V-3-2
	Preparation of Battle Position	3-V-3-3
	React to Indirect Fire	3-V-3-5
	React to Direct Fire	3-V-3-6
	Enemy Probe, Attack	3-V-3-7
	Employ Supporting Fire	3-V-3-14
2100	Clear — Inspect all Weapons	
	Turn in Ammunition	
2130	AAR	
2200	Withdraw to Assembly Area	
<u>Day 3</u>		
0700	Preparation for Operations	3-I-1
	Inspection of Equipment (Final Shakedown)	3-I-6
1000	Conduct Tactical Roadmarch	3-V-1-3

Table 3

evaluators down to platoon level was critical to the success of the exercise. The evaluators provided immediate feedback in the form of after-action reviews, which were scheduled as training events during the exercise, as shown in Table 3.

The soldiers and leaders were given specific preliminary training in the skills they would need to execute the CALFEX. This preliminary training ensured that in the CALFEX itself the soldiers could apply acquired skills instead of being forced to learn and apply new skills at the same time.

Before the exercise itself, the soldiers were trained in the Soldier's Manual skills outlined in ARTEP 71-2 in the Individual/Collective Integration Matrix. The battalion placed special emphasis on individual and crew-served weapon proficiency.

Squad, platoon, and company ARTEP task training, which focused on the tasks selected for the CALFEX, was also conducted. Leader training emphasized the application of combined arms assets through the use of TEWTs, map exercises, and classroom training. The TEWTs were conducted on two levels. The first, conducted by the battalion commander, included the rifle company commanders, the armor company commander, the engineers, the U.S. Air Force forward air controller, and the Army air controllers. The second level of TEWTs, conducted by each rifle company commander with platoon and squad leaders from their companies and leaders from their attachments, consisted of multiple exercises. All of these TEWTs were conducted both on the ground and from the air. Dry runs of the CALFEX were conducted before the exercise and also as an event during the exercise itself.

The value of all this advance coordination, planning, and training became clear during the actual com-

bined arms exercise. Each company team followed the sequence of events shown in Table 3, and the controllers evaluated the ARTEP tasks as the events progressed.

Safety was a key factor, and all safety officer requirements were met by the chain of command during the exercise. A series of well-defined phase lines were used both for safety and for realism. The crossing of phase lines determined when the tactical air support would start and stop, when the indirect fire would be shifted, and when weapons would be loaded. Thus, the maneuver elements did not encounter any dangerous fire. Only the enemy force was simulated, and the units in the exercise accepted all tactical limitations in exchange for the training value to be derived from them.

At the conclusion of each major phase of the operation, an immediate after-action review was conducted for the leaders and soldiers at all levels. These reviews were positive and were conducted in such a way as to maintain the momentum of the problem; no "administrative halts" were called for the purpose of conducting reviews.

LESSONS LEARNED

The CALFEX, as it was conducted by the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, proved to be a valuable exercise in terms of the amount of realistic training the soldiers and their leaders received. A number of valuable lessons were learned during the planning and execution of the exercise, and these lessons should be applied to all similar exercises:

- All agencies and assets from both the installation and the division must be properly coordinated and used to gain the full value from the many resources that must be committed to a CALFEX.

- The coordination of range construction and target emplacement must be centralized at division level.


- Qualified evaluators from outside a battalion would allow all of the battalion's soldiers to focus their full attention on their tactical assignments.

- Even more preliminary live-fire training would be helpful. (Ideally, squad and platoon live-fire exercises should be conducted before the CALFEX; they would help to instill into soldiers and leaders alike a greater degree of confidence and skill in their ability to handle weapons and systems in a live-fire situation.)

The battalion's CALFEX was expensive in terms of both manpower and material, but the training value derived from it made it well worth the cost. The chain of command of each company was clearly identified and validated. The soldiers gained an appreciation for the firepower available in a combined arms team, and the leaders enjoyed a rare opportunity to apply and control the key elements of a combined arms team in a realistic situation. This training experience clearly improved this battalion's ability to fight the AirLand Battle on the next battlefield.



Captain E. J. Nusbaum, when this article was prepared, was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, at Fort Riley. He is a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and recently completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course.



Captain John T. Robinson was also assigned to the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, during the CALFEX discussed in the article. A graduate of Southern Illinois University and Eastern Kentucky University, he recently completed the CAS³ course at Fort Leavenworth.



ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



BRANCH CHIEF'S COMMENTS

One of our goals at Infantry Branch is to match the requests and needs of the individual soldier to the mission requirements of the Army and to match them at the appropriate time. This calls for an extremely delicate balance of all three factors, and a balance that is ever changing. Every soldier must therefore become involved in his own professional development.

There are several things you can do to be involved:

First, send for a copy of your OMPF (it is free), and keep it up to date. And see that the soldiers who work for you send for theirs. No matter how good you are, it is your OMPF that represents you before school and promotion boards. The better you take care of it, the better it will take care of you.

Keep your preference statement up to date, too; it is considered before every assignment is made. And remember that people, not computers, manage your career. The CAP (Centralized Assignment Procedures) III System only nominates an individual; an assignment manager, working with a professional development NCO, actually makes the assignment instructions final.

Keep in touch with Infantry Branch. Make your needs and requirements known to your assignment manager and your professional development NCO. The best ways to do this are:

- Write to your branch with as many details as possible on your situation. Do not wait until you are within a month of DEROS or until you already have orders in hand.
- Call if you have a specific question or want to talk directly with an assignment manager or a profes-

sional development NCO.

- Visit MILPERCEN. We are available during normal duty hours for one-one-one interviews.

- Submit a DA Form 4187, Request for Personnel Action, and make sure you include all considerations in the "Remarks" section when requesting a specific assignment.

The Infantry School has published a very good guide to professional development — ST7-1, Infantryman Professional Development, dated April 1983. Copies of it should be requested the same way as other Infantry School publications. Read it and use it!

LTC Ronald A. Green

TOLL-FREE NUMBER CHANGED

The 24-hour commercial toll-free telephone number given in INFANTRY, January-February 1985, page 43, has now changed. The number to call for personnel assistance is 1-800-255-ARMY.

This toll-free number is available for enlisted soldiers to use in calling the Information and Assistance Office at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate at MILPERCEN.

RC/ROTC DUTY

One of the most challenging and rewarding assignments available to an Infantry NCO is a three-year tour of duty as an ROTC instructor or a Reserve Component (RC) Advisor. Assignment managers and professional development NCOs are often asked how a soldier is nominated and selected for assignment to one of these duty positions. Unfortunately, there seems to be a great deal of confusion about the selection process and even

more about the exact nature and scope of duties these NCOs perform.

Contrary to popular belief, neither type of duty is easy. The NCOs assigned to these positions are challenged daily by many complex responsibilities. And they put in some long hours. A Reserve Component advisor, for example, spends most of his duty days on the road to and from the reserve unit armories in his region. Many of his weekends, too, are tied up with unit meetings and training.

The duties of an RC NCO advisor include those of an operations NCO, a training NCO, an evaluation NCO, and an instructor. And only a few Regular Army NCOs are assigned to advise a fairly large number of units. An NCO charged with these responsibilities must therefore be the best the Regular Army has to offer.

NCOs assigned to ROTC duty must be of the same high caliber; they represent, to tomorrow's company and battalion commanders, the entire U.S. Army NCO corps.

The basic prerequisites for both kinds of position can be found in AR 614-200. Many soldiers meet these prerequisites, but only the best qualified of them will be chosen.

How do assignment officers decide which soldiers of those who volunteer are best qualified?

One of the chief determining factors is a soldier's previous assignments. The most desirable NCO for either ROTC or RC duty is the one who has had "recent or current" TO&E leadership experience as SSG, or platoon sergeant experience as SFC/PSG. ("Recent or current" is defined as being within the past two years.)

An NCO who has had extensive instructor experience or staff time during this period, or who is otherwise not performing in his primary MOS, does not have enough experience to per-

ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

form satisfactorily in an ROTC or a Reserve Component environment. In other words, an NCO who has not performed in all facets of his PMOS in the past three years is definitely behind the NCO who has. After all, Reserve Component units need to be kept abreast of all changes to doctrine, tactics, and new equipment in the Army. And freshman platoon leaders in ROTC units have the same urgent need.

Rater and Indorser comments on Senior Enlisted Evaluation Reports (SEERS) are another important source of information upon which to base an assignment decision. An NCO with a consistent record of poor performance (relief for cause or failing APRTs, for example) will not be assigned to such a high visibility assignment.

Aside from a strong TO&E assignment background and favorable SEER comments, other factors also play an important role in assignment decisions.

To serve on ROTC or RC duty, an NCO must be eligible for such an assignment on the basis of his last date of return from overseas (DROS). If that date places him within eligibility guidelines for another overseas assignment, then he is not likely to be assigned to ROTC or RC duty instead. Ideally, any soldier who wants to volunteer for such an assignment should submit an application on DA 4187 six to eight months before his date of return from an overseas assignment.

A soldier with a large family is not assigned to this kind of duty, regardless of his qualifications. Seldom are such duty locations near a military installation and the family-related benefits it has to offer — such as commissaries, PX facilities, and medical facilities — and the lack of such benefits may place a financial burden on a large family. Few NCOs can perform at peak proficiency if they are preoccupied with such difficulties.

A volunteer for ROTC and RC duty must understand that these assignments are three-year, stabilized tours. Even if he later would like to get out of the assignment, he has to stay through

a complete tour, or until relieved for cause.

It is not our intention here to discourage NCOs from volunteering for ROTC or RC assignments. In fact, we hope to encourage outstanding soldiers to submit their volunteer applications. But they must be soldiers who feel that they have an obligation to both the Army and themselves to accept the challenge that such duties offer to the truly professional Infantryman.

Additional information is available from professional development NCOs here at the Infantry Branch.

NO REELISTMENT BOARDS

The Army, after reviewing the reenlistment program and recommendations from the field, has eliminated all reenlistment screening boards.

This decision does not mean that the Army has lowered its quality standards for first-term soldiers. The boards were important at a time when many first-term soldiers did not meet the prerequisites for an Army of excellence. Now, however, other factors — such as the reenlistment awards program and the higher quality of Army enlistees since 1980 — fill that need.

In order to ensure that all soldiers are treated equally, optional local boards will not be held.

More information is available from MILPERCEN — AUTOVAN 227-5341, or commercial (703) 697-5341.

PROMOTION WORKSHEET

The recently revised Promotion Point Worksheet (DA Form 3355) for promotion to sergeant and staff sergeant is scheduled for implementation in May and June. It emphasizes physical fitness, self-discipline, professional competence, and a commitment to self-improvement and achievement.

The commander's recommendation for promotion will be a part of the new

form; no separate correspondence will be required.

Duty performance points, awarded by the commander, have been increased from 150 to 200. Promotion board points have been decreased from 250 to 200.

Points for Skill Qualification Test (SQT) have increased from 150 to 200. (Soldiers will not earn points for SQT scores of 59 or below.)

Points for military and civilian education will be awarded in two separate categories. Soldiers can now earn up to 150 points for military education and up to 100 for civilian education. Formerly, the combination of military and civilian education was worth up to 200 points.

Points for military training, which consists of individual weapon qualification and the Annual Physical Readiness Test, have been added to the form. Military training will earn up to 100 points.

Time-in-service and time-in-grade, worth 100 points each on the old form, have been eliminated. Soldiers will not earn points for on-the-job experience or for high school completion.

Awards and decorations will earn 50 points on the new form, just as they did on the old one.

For more information, write to MILPERCEN, DAPC-MSP-E, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400, or call AUTOVON 221-9020.

ENLISTED PREFERENCE STATEMENT

The October 1984 UPDATE edition of AR 614-200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training, includes a new enlisted preference statement, DA Form 2635 (August 1984).

The new form contains items about the Married Army Couples Program, the Exceptional Family Member Program, and spouse employment considerations.

MILPOs should use the new form as soon as they exhaust their supplies of the March 1976 version.

For more information, write to MILPERCEN, DAPC-EPZ-H, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400, or call AUTOVON 221-8765.

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

Sending qualified soldiers to the Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, is essential in maintaining the strength of the officer corps. Every commander, staff officer, and NCO is responsible for identifying soldiers who meet the qualifications and then for encouraging them to apply.

To be eligible for OCS, a soldier must:

- Be a U.S. citizen with a favorable National Agency Check (NAC) or entrance NAC.
- Be an enlisted soldier or warrant officer on active duty. Enlisted soldiers must have completed Advanced Individual Training.
- Pass the Army Physical Readiness Test.
- Meet the height and weight standards in AR 600-9, The Army Weight Control Program.
- Have a minimum GT score of 110 if tested on or before 31 December 1975, or after 1 October 1980. Soldiers who were tested between 1 January 1976 and 30 September 1980 who have not taken a retest must achieve a GT score of 115 or higher. All applicants must also score 90 or higher on the Officer Selection Battery, Subtest 2.
- Have completed at least 60 semester hours (90 quarter hours) of college study, except for a Medal of Honor or Distinguished Service Cross recipient.
- Achieve a score of 80 or higher on the English Comprehension Level Test if the applicant's primary language is other than English.
- Be of good moral character.
- Have no convictions by civil or military courts, except for minor traffic violations with a fine of less than \$100. An applicant must not have been adjudged a juvenile offender.

- Have not been previously disenrolled from OCS.

- Be at least 18 and less than 30 years old at the time of enrollment.

- Accept a three-year service obligation upon graduation.

- Meet the standards listed in AR 40-501 (Standards of Medical Fitness), Chapter 2 and Paragraph 7-19.

Applicants for OCS who are assigned overseas will not be permitted to make a PCS move to attend the course until they have completed at least five-sixths of a normal tour. Tour assignments of less than 24 months must be completed before a PCS move.

Soldiers should contact their MILPOs to find out whether they are eligible to apply under AR 351-5, U.S. Army Officer Candidate School.

NO HANDS-ON TASKS

Soldiers who appear before promotion boards for sergeant or staff sergeant will not be required to perform any hands-on tasks. The boards will limit themselves to a question-and-answer format.

In addition, AR 600-200, Chapter 7, prohibits units from adding their own promotion criteria to that required by the regulation. Pre-screening boards to determine eligibility for promotion are also prohibited. The only authorized board is the actual promotion board that determines whether a soldier is to be added to a recommended list.

The soldiers who appear before a promotion board should be fully trained in their MOSs before they are recommended. A commander's recommendation for promotion means that the soldier is fully trained and MOS-qualified, and that the soldier would be promoted immediately if the commander had the authority.

In determining whether a soldier is qualified to hold the next higher rank, a commander can use duty performance, the Common Task Test, the Skill Qualification Test, the Army

Physical Readiness Test, and weapon qualification. Promotion board members can use results of these evaluations when comparing soldiers who are competing for promotion.

WARRANT OFFICER SELECTION

Local selection boards no longer screen applications for warrant officer appointments. Instead, the applications are processed through the individual's chain of command to the next higher headquarters. Then the installation or area commander forwards it with his recommendations to MILPERCEN.

Anyone interested in applying can now refer to DA Circular 601-84-4, Warrant Officer Procurement — FY 85, for guidance.

RC WARRANT OFFICERS NEEDED IN SHORTAGE MOSs

There are plenty of "shortage" MOS warrant officer positions to be filled, both in Army Reserve units and in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Enlisted Army Reservists who are interested and eligible are invited to apply for a warrant officer appointment. There are two major references to be used in applying: AR 135-100, Appointment of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army, and RCPAC Pamphlet 135-100, Information Pamphlet, The Direct Appointment Program for Procurement of Commissioned Officers, United States Army Reserve.

Unit members can obtain information and application packets from their respective Army headquarters and should submit applications to those same headquarters through their unit commanders.

IRR members can obtain information and application packets from USARPERCEN, ATTN: DARC-AD, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132, and can apply directly.

OERs MILPERCEN

OFFICER RECORDS

Each year as selection boards prepare to convene, it becomes apparent that many officers are still not sure what should be in their records or how it should get there. The following is therefore intended to help you understand your records (whether you're facing a selection board or not) and what you need to do to keep them up to date.

Your records include the following:

- Field 201 File — Military Personnel Record Jacket (MPRJ). Your MPRJ is the local file you hand-carry on each PCS move. It is maintained by your local MILPO for use by the unit personnel office.

- Career Management Individual File (CMIF). Your CMIF (or branch file) contains a record of all your hard-copy OERs and AERs and your past assignment history. Although it does contain portions of your official file, such as a copy of your performance microfiche and a copy of your Officer Record Brief (ORB), it is not an official document. The CMIF is maintained by Infantry Branch as an operating document and is used for assignment actions and professional development.

- Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). Your OMPF contains your official records in microfiche form. This file, maintained in MILPERCEN by the Records and Services Branch of the Management Support Division, is the file selection boards use.

The microfiche record of your OMPF is in three parts: Performance (P), Service (S), and Restricted (R). Briefly, the contents and the use of these parts are as shown on the accompanying chart.

Selection boards review and consider the following items:

- A copy of your OMPF performance fiche.
- A copy of your ORB.
- Your hard-copy DA photo.
- Any recently received official items that have not yet been put on the performance fiche of your OMPF.
- Any letters addressed to the President of the Board.

You need not make a special trip to MILPERCEN to check your OMPF. You can obtain a free copy of it and of your most current ORB by writing to DA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-MSR-S; 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400.

You may not see your latest OER on your copy of the performance fiche, because it normally takes anywhere from four to six months for an OER to be fully processed and included. If an OER is received for processing as of the convening date of a selection board, it is included in your board folder and viewed as a hard-copy document. OERs that have an end-date of 61 days or more before the convening date of the board are regarded as mandatory

reports and are considered even if they arrive after the convening date.

To make corrections to your records, you are encouraged to visit your MILPO and submit changes through your personnel officers. Make sure you have the appropriate documents with you to substantiate any changes. You may give a copy of any missing documents to a records specialist at your servicing MILPO.

Examples of authorized documents are:

- Army branch service school certificates (U.S. Army Infantry School, for example).

- Orders and citations for individual awards (excluding badges and tabs).

- Certificates of achievement.

- Letters of appreciation or commendation. (Your name must appear in the basic correspondence and the letter must state that it is to be filed in your OMPF.)

- Active duty report, DD Form 220 (USAR officers only).

Since your ORB is your resume, it is in your best interest to see that it is as complete as possible. Several items in the ORB that you should be

FICHE	CONTENTS	USES
P	Evaluation reports, awards, decorations, letters of commendation, Article 15s, courts-martial, letters of reprimand, course completion, transcripts, etc.	Selection boards, career managers, Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), other personnel actions.
S	Accession package, promotion orders, extension of service agreements, RA appointments, and other data required for service computation.	Career managers, ABCMR, service computation. Not normally seen by selection boards.
R	Denied OER appeals, courts-martial with no finding of guilty, wholly set aside courts-martial or Article 15s, ABCMR case documents. (Not all OMPF's will have an "R" fiche.)	Individual concerned. ABCMR. Not released to selection boards or other agencies without special permission or written request from individual concerned.

sure to keep up to date are physical (height and weight) data, civilian education level and degrees, military education level, assignment history, and awards and decorations.

Finally, don't forget your official photograph. New photos are required within 60 days of promotion to first lieutenant, upon promotion to every subsequent rank, and every four years. When you go to have your photo taken, make sure your uniform fits well and is well pressed; that you don't need a haircut or a mustache trim; and that your uniform does not violate the specific instructions outlined in AR 640-30. (Wearing regimental infantry brass, infantry blue cords, and leadership tabs, for example, are not prescribed for official photos.) Then go a step further and ask your photo facility to show you a copy of the photo before forwarding it to MILPERCEN.

If you want to visit MILPERCEN to review your records, you should call Infantry Branch 72 hours before your visit so that your official file can be made available to you. (The number to call is AUTOVON 221-0207, or commercial 202/325-0207.) No appointment is necessary for you to visit Infantry Branch or to review your CMIF.

POST-OAC ASSIGNMENTS

Officers who attend advanced courses this year should know by their 10th week of training not only where they are going next but what their new jobs will be. Previously, officers learned of their projected assignment locations between two and four months before arriving for the course but did not know the type of unit they would be going to or their duty position.

Because of the recent revision of officer advanced courses (OACs), it is important that an officer's next assignment be projected earlier than in the past.

When the schools begin to add branch-specific modules to the ad-

vanced courses, some officers will stay in school longer than others. The newly revised course is 20 weeks long, followed by from one to six weeks of intensive, job-specific, follow-on training afterward.

Under the new policy, about six months before an advanced course begins, the officers scheduled to attend will be asked to tell the Army where they would like to be assigned after the course. Then, about two months before the course begins, assignment managers will write to the officers about their tentative assignments.

The branch assignment managers who visit within the first two weeks of each class will talk with the officers and make any necessary changes to their original assignments.

Shortly thereafter, requests for orders will be sent to gaining commands, which will decide the type of unit and the duty position for each officer. The schools will then decide what follow-on training each officer will need, if any, to do his new job.

For more information, officers should visit their local military personnel offices or contact MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPD-M, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400. The telephone numbers are AUTOVON 221-7883 or 7884; commercial 202/325-7883 or 7884.

ORB POCKET GUIDE

A new pocket-sized guide to the Officer Record Brief (ORB) has been sent to all Army officers at their home addresses. It is DA Pamphlet 640-1, The Officer's Guide to the Officer Record Brief.

The guide explains the ORB and its importance, and it tells what each data element on it means and how to correct any errors that may appear on it. The pamphlet is important to an officer because his career often depends on his understanding of his ORB and on how well he keeps it up to date.

The guide has also been dis-

tributed in units down to battalion level. Officers who have not received it by now should see their publications control officers about getting a copy, or contact MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPZ-IM, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400; AUTOVON 221-8140.

NEW WARRANT OFFICER MOS

MOS 750A, Operations Research/Systems Analysis, is being developed for Army warrant officers. Those who are selected for this MOS may receive up to 18 months (24 months in exceptional cases) of full-time graduate education paid for by the Army.

The new program will expand the Army's ability to provide its decision-makers with highly skilled analytical support. Operations research analysts gather data and design mathematical models and simulations of military operations. They use these models and simulations to conduct analyses of costs and resources.

To be selected for the new MOS, a warrant officer must hold a bachelor or master of science degree and must have an exemplary record.


Applications should be submitted as outlined in AR 621-1, paragraph 3-3. Additional information can be obtained from the Warrant Officer Professional Development Branch at MILPERCEN: AUTOVON 221-7843.

USAR OERS

Commissioned and warrant officers have a personal responsibility to see that officer evaluation reports (OERs) are prepared on them for a period of duty and forwarded to HQ, ARPERCEN within 90 days of the closing date of the report.

When making inquiries about reports, rated officers should be aware of the date the report was dispatched to ARPERCEN and whether or not the report was returned to the MUSARC or agency for correction.

BOOK REVIEWS



The United States Government Printing Office again has told us about a number of its more recent publications that military professionals should find interesting and useful. Among those publications are:

- **U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY PUBLICATIONS**, Fall/Winter, 1984-85, CMH PUB 105-1. This partially annotated catalog lists CMH's forthcoming, newly published, and still current titles. Titles are grouped by major wars or by the series in which they fall. The catalog, free for the asking, is designed for use by the military professional as well as by the academic community and the general public.

- **THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT**. 1979 Edition. 198 Pages. \$5.50, Paperbound. S/N 008-020-00793-5. This book looks at the future of conflict and explores from a variety of viewpoints the inherent risks to the United States during the next 20 years. The book discusses arms control, the prospects for conflict, the new faces of conflict, and modern societies.

- **COMPETING GLOBAL DEMANDS FOR U.S. ARMY FORCES**. 1984 Edition. 136 Pages. \$4.00, Paperbound. S/N 008-020-00977-6. This study looks at current plans for deploying the United States Army and other land combat forces throughout the world and suggests options for deploying only limited forces that might be better able to meet various contingencies.

- **GERMAN ARMORED TRAFFIC CONTROL DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN**. 1984 Reprint. 52 Pages. \$2.25, Paperbound. S/N 008-020-00989-0. A booklet titled "The March of Motorized Troops," published by the German Armored School in the fall of 1941, was used as a reference source for this study. In actual practice during the course of the

war, the troops adapted traffic control to the various terrain, weather, and road conditions they found in the different theaters of operation. This study describes and develops those principles that were proved valid and worthy of application during combat operations in Russia.

All orders to the Government Printing Office must be accompanied by payment in the form of check or money order payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Payment may also be made by VISA or MasterCard number, with the card's expiration date being furnished.

We also continue to receive a large number of publications for review from publishing houses throughout the world. Here are a number of such publications we found most interesting:

- **ORDER OF BATTLE, U.S. ARMY, WORLD WAR II**. By Shelby L. Stanton (Presidio Press, 1984. 621 Pages. \$60.00). Several years ago Shelby Stanton published his Vietnam order of battle book, which has been accorded rave reviews by both military historians and military history buffs. This new order of battle book deserves the same treatment; it is an outstanding example of painstaking digging for facts and a tribute to Stanton's desire to keep alive the U.S. Army's organizational history. Perhaps one point should be emphasized: Stanton includes information only on the Army's World War II infantry, armor, tank destroyer, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and engineer units, each of which is treated in a separate chapter. Stanton does include, however, a section of four-color unit patches; a discussion of the Army's World War II organizational changes; four fact-filled appendixes; an erratum page; and a discussion of his principal

sources.

- **SOLDIER TALK**. By Frank Hailey (D. Irving and Company, 1982. 73 Pages. \$5.95, Softbound). Frank Hailey is a retired Army first sergeant who became concerned that "the jargon of the 'old soldier' is seldom heard in today's Army" and decided to do something about it. This book is the result. Hailey has refrained from including some of the more filthy words, terms, and phrases — a wise decision — and has "laundered" others. What is left is good soldier stuff that military professionals of all ranks will appreciate.

- **AIRBORNE ALBUM: VOLUME I, PARACHUTE TEST PLATOON TO NORMANDY**. By John C. Andrews (Phillips Publications, 1981. 50 Pages. \$6.95, Softbound). This is a fine pictorial reference publication; it contains more than 100 photographs (some quite rare) and 40 line drawings. The narrative portions are quite short, but complete. Instead, the photo captions are used to tell the story of the U.S. airborne forces from their beginnings to June 1944. Brief sections also deal with the Marine Corps' jump units; the 1st Special Service Force; and OSS (Office of Strategic Services) operational groups.

- **THE IMAGE OF WAR, 1861-1865: VOLUME VII, THE END OF AN ERA**. Edited by William C. Davis (Doubleday, 1984. 496 Pages. \$39.95). This is the sixth and final volume in a truly monumental photographic history of our Civil War. In this volume, the Confederacy is beaten on land and its navy driven from the seas. The Union Army finally has become a formidable fighting force with professional command and logistical supporting structures. The South can do little to stop the Northern avalanche — Mobile falls; Sher-

man marches from Atlanta to the sea and then turns north into the Carolinas; Lee's lines at Petersburg are broken and he surrenders the remnants of his army to Grant early in April 1865; and the last substantial Confederate force left in the field, Kirby Smith's Trans-Mississippi army, surrenders in May. The editor, William Davis, ends the series with a splendid chapter titled "The 'Late Unpleasantness.'"

• **A PHOTO HISTORY OF TANKS IN TWO WORLD WARS.** By George Forty (Sterling, 1984. 192 Pages. \$16.95). More than 500 photographs are used in this book to trace — through their accompanying captions — the evolution of the modern tank from the "No. 1 Lincoln Machine" through World War II's Panthers, Shermans, Churchills, and T34s. This is an excellent reference book that has been put together by a most knowledgeable tank historian.

• **WORLD TANKS AND RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES SINCE 1945.** By Noel Ayliffe-Jones (Hippocrene Books, 1984. 144 Pages. \$19.95). This book makes an excellent companion to George Forty's book, mentioned above. Although this one has more narrative, its numerous photographs are also used to good advantage to trace the evolution of the

world's tanks and reconnaissance vehicles from the end of World War II to the present. Other sections of the book are used to discuss armor, firepower, the threat to armored vehicles by guided weapons, and the future of the armored fighting vehicle.

• **SMALL ARMS TODAY: LATEST REPORTS ON THE WORLD'S WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION.** By Edward C. Ezell (Stackpole Books, 1984. 256 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound). The author, a recognized authority on small arms, takes his reader on a tour of the world in this book to discuss each country's use of rifles, handguns, machineguns, submachineguns, and special-purpose weapons. He also includes a chapter on developments in small arms ammunition since 1939. He does not provide technical data — leaving that for the publisher's more detailed **SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD** — and furnishes only information that someone can use to determine which weapons the world's armies are using today. Ezell's approach to his subject is most interesting, and it certainly is informative.


In addition to these publications, we have also received a number of others we thought you might be interested in:

THE BATTLE FOR HUE. By Keith W. Nolan (Presidio Press, 1983. 201 Pages. \$14.95). Reviewed by Dr. Mike Fisher, University of Kansas.

Apologists for the conduct of the American foot soldier in the Vietnam War should avoid reading this book, for it captures the pride, fury, and elan that characterized American infantry units in many of the war's most violent intervals.

One such chapter began to unfold on the night of 31 January 1968 when 11 battalions of North Vietnamese regular soldiers infiltrated the sacred city of Hue. At dawn on the second day of the Tet holiday period, a Viet Cong flag was draped over Hue's Palace of Peace, and the communists occupied much of the city. U.S. Army and Marine units were south of the city. A command group from the South Vietnamese Army defended part of the Citadel, which formed the city's inner defense.

Against this background, the 20-year-old Nolan, son of a Marine Corps officer, recounts the month-long battle for Hue. He weaves into his narrative 34 interviews with Marine veterans of the battle, and it is through these accounts that the reader can follow an understrength Marine battalion north, up Highway One, and across the Perfume River where two



more Marine battalions join to retake Hue.

Veterans again will feel the excitement of combat as Nolan's scenes tramp by in steady cadence, providing a litany of the courage and resolve that all infantry leaders may well hope to emulate in future combat. Nolan captures the ferocity and resolve of the combatants in a battle in which the North Vietnamese sustained 5,000 dead. The South Vietnamese estimated that the fighting cost them 400 dead, while the Marines counted 147 killed and more than 800 wounded. An additional 5,000 civilians died at the hands of the communists. The 30-day battle destroyed 40 percent of the city.

The author's youth and enthusiasm provide a stylistic strength characterized by the eye witness accounts that enliven the narrative. But that strength also flaws his book. His Marine bias weakens the book's objectivity. The book needed more balance, careful editing, and historical annotation.

Nevertheless, Nolan's book serves as a primer for young infantry officers seeking a description of close combat, for veteran commanders seeking to review the tactics used by squads and platoons to attack fortified positions,

and for civilians seeking a picture of American soldiers slugging it out with their North Vietnamese counterparts. And history buffs can profit from a chapter of the war that merits retelling. As Nolan writes, "'Several men who had shrapnel in legs and arms hobbled around and begged me not to medevac them,' a veteran Marine colonel remembered, recounting with pride how his wounded, ragged Marines returned to the streets of Hue. A sense of pride, comradeship and revenge welded those units together in what the Marines called 'pay back time.'"

"We were better," a Marine commander remarked nearly two decades later. Thousands of others who commanded American infantrymen in Vietnam would second the remark.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA. By Y. Nagai and A. Iriye. Columbia University Press, 1977. 448 Pages. \$20.00.

YANK: THE STORY OF WORLD WAR II AS WRITTEN BY THE SOLDIERS. By the Editors of YANK, the Army Weekly. Greenwich House, 1984. 264 Pages.

JUNE 1944. By H.P. Willmott. Sterling, 1984. 224 Pages. \$16.95.

HISTORY AND WAR. By Theodore Ropp. Hamburg Press. 1984. 81 Pages. \$9.00, Soft-bound.

PERILOUS MISSIONS. By William M. Leary. University of Alabama Press, 1984. 281 Pages. \$22.50.

CATALOG R-4, U.S. GOVERNMENT BOOKS. U.S. Superintendent of Documents, 1984. 56 Pages. Free for the asking.

OPTIONS OF COMMAND. By Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy. Hippocrene Books, 1984. 303 Pages. \$19.95.

BUILDING THE WOODEN FIGHTING SHIP. By James Moore and James Dodd. Facts on File, 1984. 128 Pages. \$19.95.

COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK 1985. Two Volumes. Gale Research Company, 1984. 1,546 Pages. \$95.00.

'44: IN COMBAT FROM NORMANDY TO THE ARDENNES. By Charles Whiting. Stein and Day, 1985. 219 Pages. \$18.95.

ON TO THE YALU. By Edwin P. Hoyt. Stein and Day, 1985. 297 Pages. \$19.95.

THE SPANISH WAR: AN AMERICAN EPIC, 1898. By G.J.A. O'Toole. W.W. Norton, 1984. 447 Pages. \$19.95.

ARMY UNIFORMS OF WORLD WAR I. By Andrew Mollo. A 1984 Reprint. Sterling, 1984. 219 Pages. \$9.95.

WAR DIARIES: POLITICS AND WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1943-1945. By Harold Macmillan. St. Martin's Press, 1984. \$29.95.

THE BRITISH INFANTRY, 1660-1945: THE EVOLUTION OF A FIGHTING FORCE. By Frederick Myatt. Sterling, 1984. \$12.95.

HORROCKS. By Philip Warner. David and Charles, 1984. 195 Pages. \$19.95.

FIGHTING A LONG NUCLEAR WAR. 1984 Edition. U.S. Superintendent of Documents, 76 Pages. S/N 008-020-00993-8. \$2.50, Paperback.

BATTLES IN THE MONSOON: CAMPAIGNING IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, VIETNAM, SUMMER 1966. By S.L.A. Marshall. Originally published in 1966. Battery Press, 1984. 408 Pages. \$18.95.

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From The Editor

1985 INFANTRY CONFERENCE

As we mentioned in our last issue, the 1985 Infantry Conference will be held at Fort Benning during the period 23-25 April 1985. All members of the Infantry Association are invited to attend. Many of the sessions this year will be open to all attendees, and there will be enough space at the open sessions to accommodate all who want to attend.

Infantry Association members who would like to attend the Conference are asked to contact the editor of *INFANTRY* as soon as possible. They will be sent copies of the formal agenda and information on the availability of housing, as well as other information of a general nature.

INFANTRY IN VIETNAM NOW IN PAPERBACK

We have just received a copy, in paperback format, of our 1967 publication *INFANTRY IN VIETNAM*. (See *INFANTRY*, November-December 1967, inside back cover, and *INFANTRY*, November-December 1982, page 48.) It is a Jove Book, reprinted by the Berkley Publishing Group from the Battery Press hard-cover reprint, which appeared in 1982. The selling price on the cover is \$3.50. We assume that it will be placed in local bookstores around the country.

DISTRIBUTION

We send free copies of *INFANTRY* to all infantry and infantry-related units, both Active Army and Reserve Component. Each infantry company and each infantry battalion headquarters, for example, is sent three copies. Yet we often hear people returning from various units say that they have never seen the magazine. If your company or battalion headquarters is not receiving its copies, please let us know. (And you might also check the mail distribution at your end!)

On the other hand, it is apparent that in some units the copies do arrive on time but that few people ever see them. We ask commanders, therefore, to make it clear that the unit's copies of *INFANTRY* Magazine are not just for the first three people who walk in. They're supposed to be shared and used by all, with one copy perhaps kept for reference. The Army pays for these copies! Those three people who usually take them should start paying for their own.

OUTSIDE BACK COVER

Going Overseas in the New Georgias, South Pacific, 1943.
By Howard Cook (U.S. Army Art Collection)

