1-11. The Army’s operational concept is unified land operations. It is based on the central idea that Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. This is accomplished through simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability-setting conditions for favorable conflict resolution.
1-12. Unified land operations describe the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. Tactical action is a battle or engagement, employing lethal or nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or another entity. Tactical actions include varied activities such as an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and training other militaries as part of building partner capacity to assist security forces. Army unified land operations are characterized by flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)
1-13. The foundation of unified land operations is built upon initiative, decisive action, Army core competencies and mission command . By integrating the four foundations of unified land operations, leaders can achieve strategic success.
1-14. To seize, to retain, and to exploit the initiative, Army forces strike the enemy, lethal and nonlethal, in time, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared. To seize the initiative (setting and dictating the terms of action), Army forces degrade the enemy’s ability to function as a coherent force. Leaders then prevent the enemy’s recovery by retaining the initiative.
1-15. Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offense, defense, and stability (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment. Army forces conduct regular and irregular warfare against conventional and hybrid threats. This includes ─
1-16. The operations structure operations process, warfighting functions, and operational framework—are the Army’s common construct for operations. It allows Army leaders to rapidly organize efforts in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide an intellectual organization for common critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for visualizing and describing operations. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
1-17. The operations process is the Army’s overarching framework to integrate processes and activities across the force by means of mission command. It consists of major mission command activities performed during operations including ─
1-18. TLPs are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders within this framework to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Small-unit leaders, company and below, lack formal staffs and use TLP to maximize available planning time while developing plans and preparing their units for an operation. (Refer to appendix A of this publication for more information).
1-19. Combat power is the total means of a unit’s destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that can apply at a given time. Infantry platoons and squads generate combat power by converting potential into action. There are eight elements of combat power which include the six-warfighting functions (mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection ) plus leadership and information. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)
1-20. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Army leaders of character, competence, and commitment understand the strategic implications of their decisions and actions. They motivate others to do what is right understanding that decisions and actions that are inconsistent with the Army profession are not tolerated and that any such act(s) can compromise the mission and have strategic implications contrary to the national interest. (Refer to ADRP 6-22 and ADRP 1 for more information.)
1-21. Information enables leaders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve decisive results. Required complementary tasks include ─
1-22. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of the operation in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established framework and associated vocabulary assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past. Leaders often use these conceptual frameworks in combination. For example, a commander may use the deep-close-security framework to describe the operation in time and space, the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework to articulate the operation in terms of purpose, and the main and supporting efforts framework to designate the shifting prioritization of resources. These operational frameworks apply equally to tactical actions in the area of operation. (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)
1-23. Area of operation refers to areas assigned to Army units by higher headquarters. Within their area of operation, commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders have the authority to designate targeting priorities and timing of fires.
1-24. Area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (ADRP 3-0) The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the area of operation.
1-25. Area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, adjacent areas, and areas and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (Refer to ADRP 3-0.).
1-26. Deep-close-security framework historically has been associated with a terrain orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well. Deep operations involve efforts to disrupt uncommitted enemy forces. Close operations involve efforts to have immediate effects with committed friendly forces, potentially in direct contact with enemy forces, to include enemy reserves available for immediate commitment. Security operations involve efforts to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, provide the force with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, protect the force from surprise, and develop the situation so the commander can use the force.
1-27. Decisive -shaping -sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s purpose. Commanders may combine the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework and the deep-close-security framework when this aids in visualizing and describing the operation. The decisive operation need not be a close operation. Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation. Sustaining operations enable the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power.
1-28. Main and supporting efforts are part of a framework, more simplistic than other organizing frameworks, focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, commanders can employ it with either the deep-close- security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, the main effort shifts one or more times during execution. Supporting efforts are designated subordinate units with missions that support the success of the main effort.