

The cover illustration depicts a military unit in a desert environment. In the foreground, four soldiers in camouflage uniforms and helmets are positioned around a large, camouflaged vehicle. One soldier is standing on a platform, another is leaning over the side, and two others are in the foreground, one holding a rifle. In the background, a military truck is parked among palm trees, and a helicopter is visible in the sky. The overall scene is set in a dry, arid landscape with tall palm trees and sparse vegetation.

# ARMOR

*Mounted Maneuver Journal*  
September-October 2011

**Operational Adaptability**



# ARMOR

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-11-5

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## Debunking history: using military history in the military-education curriculum

Dear *ARMOR*,

In this cynical, post-modern world, it's fashionable to quote Henry Ford's celebrated aphorism "history is bunk." This culture of rejecting history has even pervaded the military, traditionally a bastion of conservatism. For example, when I attended a staff ride in 2005 to the Civil War battlefield of Antietam, after surveying the field, one of my glassy-eyed peers yawned and wondered what the point of the ride was "since we don't fight in lines of battle anymore."

My friend was quite right to question the validity of studying military history in a military-education setting. What possible relevance do Alexander's actions at the Granicus River or Napoleon's actions at Austerlitz have to the era of smart bombs and unmanned aerial vehicles? In one sense, the study of military battles has no relevance at all. History doesn't teach tactical lessons. Historians may repeat themselves, but history does not.

However, those who complain that history doesn't offer relevant tactical lessons are missing the point. History doesn't teach us where we should go but rather who we are. There are four basic precepts that military history teaches which make it a critical scholastic endeavor for military education. First, military history demonstrates the principles of war. Second, it creates a coherent organizational memory. Third, it imparts Army values. Last, it teaches critical problem-solving skills.

Although I said that military history doesn't teach tactical lessons, it can, however, demonstrate the principles of war. As an example, the Infantry School produced a small volume in 1934 called *Infantry in Battle*. Its intent, as described by GEN George C. Marshall, was to "develop fully and emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated by concrete cases rather than to produce just another book of abstract theory." The book described principles of war through historical examples from World War I; it showed the true nature of tactical lessons from military history.

Today's platoon leader in Kandahar is not only mistaken but also a fool if he thinks he can win a victory by repeating Lee's tactics at Chancellorsville. Afghanistan is not Virginia, the Taliban is not the Army of the Potomac, his rifle platoon is not the

Army of Northern Virginia, and the year 1863 is not the year 2011. However, what our platoon leader ought to understand from his study of the Battle of Chancellorsville are the principles of mass, surprise and offensive. He can then use these principles to effectively maneuver his own forces against his enemy.

The other advantage to using military history to illuminate the principles of war is realism. The study of past military campaigns brings flesh and blood to what are otherwise dry, unmemorable phrases found in the operations manual. In his introduction to the 1982 reprint of *Infantry in Battle*, Marine Corps MG B.E. Trainor captured this idea when he wrote that the examples in the book "deal with real events and people who react in real ways." Of course, demonstrating the principles of the war is just the first, and perhaps not even the most important, of the several legitimate uses of military history.

Nations and ethnic groups have used history for centuries to make sense of who they are and where they came from. The Army can use military history to do the same. Over the last several decades, many scholarly historians such as Pierre Nora and David Lowenthal have worked to demolish the idea of organizational memory, but despite their objections, I think using military history to interpret an organizational memory of the Army is one of the most important uses of military history. The Army without an organizational memory is like a person with amnesia: It may function to a degree, but it cannot answer the question "Who am I?" Creating a coherent organizational memory is a tricky business and, as historian Gordon Wood notes in *The Purpose of the Past*, if done lightly it can have disastrous consequences. We need look no farther than the pre-World War II Wehrmacht to see that a warped sense of the past is even more dangerous than none at all.

We must be honest to our past. We should never accept apocryphal stories simply because they tell the story we want to hear. The 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment's blundering disaster against the Sioux at the Little Big Horn is as vital a part of U.S. Army's organizational memory as the Continental Army's victory against the British at Yorktown. The major benefit of a mature, coherent organizational memory is creating esprit de corps. As Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-200 observed in 1956, "Every soldier can gain inspiration from the record of the past."

This is often achieved by linking soldiers to history through unit traditions. For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regimental crest symbolically honors the unit's Civil War

victories at the Murfreesboro, Selma and Nashville, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regiment marches with fixed bayonets on ceremonial occasions to commemorate their storming of the Mexican defensive position at Cerro Gordo in 1847. The creation of this organizational memory through military history connects soldiers to the past and reminds them they are part of something much larger than themselves.

Military history is also quite useful in instilling desirable values to the young men and women in the military. The U.S. Army has always expected certain qualities of its members. Presumably, then, a large part of the military-education curriculum should be devoted to imparting these values. The Army historical narrative is replete with the stories of men and women of all ranks, colors and creeds who exemplify either these values or their obverse. Using the historical narrative elevates these values out of the realm of the abstract to reality. Just as the demonstrations of the principles of war show, these are real human beings reacting to real situations in real ways with real consequences. It is one thing to speak of duty or honor in the abstract, and it is quite another to learn of LT William L. Calley at Mai Lai or COL Joshua L. Chamberlain at Little Round Top. Knowing how men and women reacted in similar situations throughout history brings either a comfort or a warning to those faced with similar dilemmas today, and it is vital to imparting the values that make up a complete military education.

The last, and in my view, most important reason to study military history as part of the military-education curriculum is that the study of history develops critical problem-solving skills. According to the historian Allan Nevins, the nature of historical inquiry involves "an attempt to find the correct answer to equations which have been half-erased." This description should sound familiar to anyone who has dealt with the "fog of war." A company commander in Afghanistan's Swat Valley in 2011 must also make decisions based on limited information because, unfortunately, military-intelligence analysts do not have all the answers.

Thinking historically also involves thinking contextually – that is, thinking in multiple dimensions. As John Tosh writes in the *Pursuit of History*, "Historians can claim with some justice to be experts in lateral thinking." For example, the seemingly simple question of why the Athenians won the Battle of Marathon could be answered on any number of levels: tactics, strategy, equipment, logistics, leadership and politics, to name a few. A company



commander in Afghanistan must also be prepared to solve problems based on any number of factors simultaneously: economic, cultural, political, security, agricultural and psychological, among many others. The critical reasoning skills intrinsic to historical inquiry are vital to the multifaceted problem-solving demanded of military leaders, even those who have absolutely no interest in history. For this reason alone, military history must be a fundamental component of a military education.

History is a vital part of any educational curriculum, but this is especially true in the military community. As my friend on the staff ride discovered to his chagrin, a study of history cannot provide useful tactical lessons. History does not repeat itself. However, this is not the true purpose of military history. At its core, history is a supremely humanistic discipline – it is about people. Military history brings life to abstract principles of war. It connects the airborne squad leader clearing a house in Fallujah to the airborne squad leader defending a foxhole in Bastogne by creating a coherent narrative. It puts forth flesh-and-blood examples to impart values the military demands of its members. It teaches the critical reasoning skills needed to succeed in military leadership. There is no question that military history must be part of the military-education curriculum if we expect to produce leaders of the cal-

iber required to win our nation's wars. History is indeed far from "bunk."

MARK EHLERS  
CPT, U.S. Army

## Losing cav mindset

Dear *ARMOR*,

I must echo some of retired LTC Chester Kojro's comments ("It's Enough to Make an Old Tanker Cry") in the March-April issue's Letters column – specifically those concerning a lack of clarity about the role and mission of cavalry and especially his heartfelt lamentation for the approaching death of the last armored cavalry regiment.

I am one of those dinosaurs who still believe that the ACR was the high point of U.S. heavy force development.

The greatest tragedy in the loss of regimental armored cavalry is not the organizational issue – we can always revive that organizational structure if we can recognize the error of our ways. The greatest tragedy is the loss of the "cav" mindset. Divisional cavalry squadrons simply are not "cav" – at least not in the form found in the ACR. The ACR was the last organization in the U.S. Army that was inherently capable of performing the full spectrum of traditional cavalry missions. Its demise will leave a lasting hole in our

doctrinal thinking, both in the Armor School and across the force. Soldiers who have never experienced the robust flexibility of the ACR simply will not (and probably cannot) envision those capabilities in a single unit.

THOMAS P. CURRIE  
U.S. Army Reserve Readiness  
Training Center  
Fort Knox, KY



**2011  
Maneuver  
CONFERENCE**

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Columbus Convention  
and Trade Center  
For information and  
registration visit  
<http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/maneuverconference/2011/index.html>

# Announcing the 1<sup>st</sup> *ARMOR* writing competition

**Theme:** BCT 2020

What should the brigade combat team of 2020 look like? Winners will be published in the March-April 2012 edition of *ARMOR* and recognized at the 2012 Reconnaissance Summit in April.

**Entries are due no later than Jan. 12, 2012.**

Submit an unclassified article examining "BCT 2020." Articles should be no more than 5,000 words, not counting endnotes. Concepts must address:

- The specific organization of BCT 2020 (must be capable of full-spectrum operations; cannot cost the Army more money; must be designed within the framework of existing resources).
- Focus on maximizing full-spectrum operations capabilities and BCT designs optimized for funding, lethality, mobility, sustainment, future operational environments and operational stationing.
- Address the training and professional-development implications of BCT redesign.

Previously published articles, or articles being considered elsewhere for publication, are ineligible. Articles submitted to other competitions are also ineligible.

More details will be available in the next edition of *ARMOR* or on our Website at <https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/ArmorMagazine/index.htm>. If you're eager to start, query [benn.armormagazine@conus.army.mil](mailto:benn.armormagazine@conus.army.mil).



# COMMANDANT'S HATCH

COL Thomas S. James Jr.  
Commandant  
U.S. Army Armor School



## Mark Your Calendars

Greetings from Fort Benning, GA. I am honored to serve as the 46<sup>th</sup> Chief of Armor and new Armor School commandant during an exciting time as we take our honored position on the Maneuver Center of Excellence team! Our objective is clear: help build the team while maintaining our distinguished branch identity. We will rely heavily on the Armor and Cavalry community to help us in this endeavor. The preparation of our soldiers and families will continue to be our top priority!

Our vision is to create the world's premier academy of mounted warfare. As an institution, we will educate, train and inspire our Army's 21<sup>st</sup> Century Armor and Cavalry warriors so they are skilled in the art of mounted warfare; adept at boldly developing the situation through action; physically fit and mentally resilient; intellectually capable of leading decisively under conditions of ambiguity; and prepared to relentlessly close with and destroy the enemy, employing fire and maneuver as part of a combined-arms team.

As we look to the future, defined by reduced deployments, resource constraints and a complex and evolving operating environment, the Maneuver Center is pursuing four major initiatives: the squad as a strategic formation, or SaaSF; BCT 2020; 21<sup>st</sup> Century leader development; and 21<sup>st</sup> Century maneuver training.

The SaaSF concept focuses on achieving overmatch at the tip of the spear. The squad will continue to be the center piece of the tactical fight, but as it is currently configured, it does not have the advanced technology and resources available to dominate the enemy. We will achieve this overmatch through improvements in the network, mobility, protection, lethality, power generation, training and leader development. The effort is initially focused on the infantry-squad formation, but these solutions will apply to Armor and Cavalry formations in the future.

The Maneuver Center has also formed a team, with Armor School oversight, focused on providing input to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on the design of the brigade combat team in 2020. These efforts will help inform TRADOC and the Department of the Army as they prepare the Army 2020 organizational construct that will shape decisions in the next four program-objective-management cycles. We are using an analysis of the operating environment, reduced deployment de-

mands and resource constraints to help design a flexible organization capable of decisive action. As we develop courses of action, we will share them with you to solicit your feedback. I can assure all that our analysis reinforces the need for heavy Armor and Cavalry forces in the future fight.

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century leader-development concept focuses on modifying our leadership courses to build adaptive leaders who are able to develop creative solutions to complex problems. Our intent is to teach how to think, not what to think. We are looking at experiential learning techniques that include scenarios that force our leaders to make informed decisions in varying conditions. We are already using these outcome-based techniques with great results in the Army Reconnaissance Course.

Under 21<sup>st</sup> Century training, we are modifying our techniques as we look to the future, focusing on blended training in the live, constructive, virtual and gaming domains. In the Maneuver Captains Career Course, we are leveraging virtual battlefield simulations, or VBS2, to connect the Aviation and Fires centers to our training. We are also working an initiative to link our Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course and Advanced Leader Course to these training events, similar to the gauntlet technique we used at Fort Knox, KY. At the basic training level, the 194<sup>th</sup> Armor Brigade designed "drill sergeant digital kiosks" that allow soldiers to review training tasks after-hours in the barracks. We are also experimenting with touchpad technology to get training information to the end-user. The 192<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade uses VBS2 laptop computers for squad-level concurrent training in the field.

We will continue to explore innovative techniques that produce creative and exciting training opportunities for our soldiers and pull them away from classroom PowerPoint.

Additionally, we have several important events on the horizon and two new competitions under development. Important dates for your calendar:

- The 2011 Maneuver Conference Sept. 12-15 at the Iron Works Convention and Trade Center, Columbus, GA. This year's theme is "21st Century Training for the Maneuver Force," focusing on blended training in the live, constructive, virtual and gaming domains. (See

the advertisement in this issue of *ARMOR*.)

- On Sept. 23, the Maneuver Center of Excellence will celebrate the official completion of base realignment and closure moves and the opening of the MCoE headquarters, McGinnis-Wickham Hall, which will also house the Armor and Infantry School headquarters. This celebration will be called "BRAC to the Future."
- The MCoE's Reconnaissance Summit is March 13-15, 2012, at Fort Benning. The Recon Summit will bring together Army leaders to take part in vignette-driven discussions on the fundamentals of reconnaissance on the future battlefield. Details on the theme and other important information to follow in a later edition.
- The Sullivan Cup, a precision tank-crew gunnery competition, commences in May 2012. We will unveil details about the Sullivan Cup at the Maneuver Conference.
- The Cavalry Cup, a reconnaissance-focused competition, is currently under development and is tentatively scheduled for Fall 2012 (1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2013).

In closing, I am extremely excited about the opportunities we have here at Fort Benning on the Maneuver Center team! The facilities are phenomenal and the synergy created by pulling Armor and Infantry together will make both branches even better. The future is full of variables that will require creative and innovative thinking to ensure we produce the right force for the right time. I am confident that our Armor and Cavalry leaders are up to the task. We look forward to seeing and hearing from you in the near future. See you on the objective!

Forge the Thunderbolt!



## 21<sup>st</sup> Century Leader Development: Understanding What Is In the Tool Bag

CSM Ricky Young  
Command Sergeant Major  
U.S. Army Armor School



As Armor/Cavalry soldiers and leaders, it is imperative that we understand the tools at our disposal and use those tools to increase our productivity across all three developmental domains of institutions, operations and self-development. This will ensure we are meeting our maximum potential as we move into the future. Our Army has renewed its commitment to developing, training and educating its soldiers and noncommissioned officers to respond to an increasingly ambiguous and challenging environment.

One of our tools is Army Career Tracker, which the Army launched to develop more agile and skilled soldiers, officers and Army civilians through career-progression mapping, leadership development, training opportunities, mentoring and career-broadening opportunities. ACT is an integral component of the U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 mandate to train the 21<sup>st</sup> Century soldier by providing the right training at the right time at the right place. ACT for 19D/K/Z soldiers launched Aug. 8.

**What is ACT?** ACT is the Army's first comprehensive leadership-development and career-management tool that integrates training, formal and informal education paths, and experiential learning gained through assignment and professional history into one personalized and easy-to-use Website. ACT provides distinct portals for enlisted soldiers – including the active, National Guard and Army Reserve components – and for the officer and Army civilian cohort members to manage their careers. The customized portals allow users to review their career histories, including their professional-development model or career map.

Moreover, ACT enables users to easily identify and follow up on education, training and assignment opportunities that pertain to their grade, military-occupation specialty, branch, functional area or career program – along with pertinent self-development opportunities – making it a one-stop career-management portal. Soldiers can also expect ACT to provide a single portal for personalized career dashboard, news, communications with leaders, supervisors and mentors, and a centralized location for other career resources. Leaders and supervisors can expect ACT to provide a single portal for managing the careers of their soldiers

and employees, including a recommendation kit.

ACT Website: <https://actnow.army.mil/>.

ACT allows users to:

- View all career-related data in one on-line portal;
- Examine personalized career maps;
- Receive recommendations from leaders, mentors or supervisors;
- Identify the operational, institutional and self-development requirements for advancement; and
- Plan new activities designed to reach professional and personal goals.

ACT leverages existing Army systems to capture and present career management data; ACT will not replace or eliminate current systems and programs. Source systems from which ACT pulls data include, but are not limited to:

- Army Knowledge On-line;
- GoArmyED;
- Army Learning Management System
- Army Training Requirements and Resources System;
- Integrated Total Army Personnel Database;
- Army Credentialing Opportunities On-line;
- Headquarters Army Civilian Personnel System;
- Civilian Human Resources Training System;
- Army National Guard Reserve Component Management System;
- Force Management System Website; and
- Soldier Fitness Tracker

ACT informational site focusing on general awareness and functionality: <https://www.us.army.mil.suite/page/601000>.

- “About ACT” provides a general description of ACT;
- “All about ACT” describes the leadership-development focus, who the users are, the overall timeline and related Army programs and initiatives;
- “ACT Preview” offers screen shots and the functionality associated with them for each user group; and

- Frequently asked questions provide information that can help answer questions about ACT.

Soldiers and civilian employees are encouraged to use media products and the AKO Website; however, if there are unanswered questions about ACT, they should be sent to the email address [act.now@us.army.mil](mailto:act.now@us.army.mil). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, ACT's proponent, aims to answer email within three working days.

Leader, supervisor and mentor responsibilities. Leader development represents a balanced commitment to education, training and experience. Leaders are responsible for ensuring their subordinates are receiving the appropriate education, training and experience at the proper time for promotion, as well as increasing their potential in current and future assignments.

Leaders are a critical component of the leader development system. They ensure that both the Army's immediate requirements and its long-term needs are being met. Education, training and experience are not three separate events or activities; in many cases, they occur synergistically across the three developmental domains. ACT will leverage technology to help leaders, supervisors and mentors manage the abundance of information. It will also provide them tools to make effective training and career recommendations and track their subordinates' progress.

As we remain committed to the professional development and training of Armor and Cavalry soldiers, troopers and leaders, it is essential that we use all the tools in the tool bag to impact the future of our force. I hope this will serve as a primer for both your professional development and that of the soldiers you lead. We solicit your feedback as we continue into the future and, as always, thanks for your service: past, present and future.

Forge the Thunderbolt  
Treat 'Em Rough



# Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again

by GEN Martin E. Dempsey



*(Editor's note: This article provides context for ARMOR's themes for July-August 2011 (the joint fight/the hybrid threat), this edition (operational adaptability) and the November-December 2011 edition (mission command). All three themes link closely together. ARMOR writers' perspectives in the preceding, this and the next editions are intended to contribute to the Army Chief of Staff's discussion of these topics.)*

Ensuring that our soldiers receive the best training, education and equipment to prevail in today's conflicts will always be our priority. We also have an obligation to our soldiers and to the nation, however, to prepare our Army for uncertainty – the challenge around the corner that we will undoubtedly be called upon to face. This is why we must establish a conceptual foundation that is coherent and provides the building blocks to prepare our Army for what's next. [We] have an obligation to connect our concepts and doctrine in such a way that they provide the necessary framework to build the force we need for the future. That is why I've encouraged our Army to step away from defining ourselves against what an adversary might do to us—*regular, irregular, insurgency, major combat*—and focus instead on the two principal operational competencies we must provide for joint force commanders: wide-area security and combined-arms maneuver. In so doing, we begin to build a coherent narrative about the capabilities necessary for us to confront the uncertain challenges that lie ahead.

I'd like to offer some considerations as we continue our efforts to cultivate a culture of learning throughout our Army. Before I do that, let me set the context by further elaborating on the central idea behind our concepts [in the Army Operating Concept and Army Capstone Concept].

The central idea within the Army Operating Concept is that success in the future security environment requires Army forces capable of defeating enemies and establishing conditions necessary to achieve national objectives using combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security to seize, retain and exploit the initiative as part of full-spectrum operations. These two activities are neither separate nor separable. We must be able to execute both – and often simultaneously – within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts. In addition, to accomplish these two activities and provide forces

capable of achieving speed of action, of identifying and exploiting opportunities, and of protecting against unanticipated dangers, we need forces capable of exercising mission command by decentralizing authority to act faster than the enemy. So let me share some considerations on how these foundational concepts and emerging doctrine must influence our thinking about how we will operate in the future.

First, our forces must be able to operate in a decentralized manner to conduct and sustain operations from and across extended distances. Consistent with the tenets of mission command, commanders consider the experience and competence of subordinate leaders and units, and their ability to integrate additional forces, enablers and partner capabilities. They then organize command structures and empower decisions as far down the chain of command as practical to conduct operations in a decentralized manner and ensure the greatest possible freedom of action. Consistent with mission command, commanders apply design as part of the operations process to understand complex, ill-structured problems and develop a clear concept of the operation. This concept allocates resources and guides the actions of subordinates to enable them to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.

Second, commanders seek to “empower the edge” by pushing capabilities to the lowest level appropriate for a particular mission. Commanders at lower echelons require access to a wide



array of capabilities (Army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational) to confront and solve complex problems. Army forces communicate with and integrate interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partner capabilities at the lowest practical echelon. In addition, Army leaders understand both the capabilities and limitations of partners to integrate them effectively in the planning and execution of operations. They must also be able to work collaboratively when necessary to leverage the capabilities of those actors who operate outside their direct authority and control.

Third, commanders emphasize continuous reconnaissance to gather information on which they base plans, decisions and orders. Effective reconnaissance requires persistent vigilance, the ability to fight for information in close contact with populations and enemies, and available reserves to reinforce units once they gain contact with the enemy. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the distinction between the warfighting function of intelligence, the tactical task of surveillance, and the various forms of reconnaissance operations. Recognition of the differences among these terms—*intelligence*, *surveillance* and *reconnaissance*—stands in contrast to current practice, which collapses the terms into the acronym ISR, thereby diluting their unique meaning. We must also examine closely how well the Army is organized to conduct effective reconnaissance and security operations at the corps, division and brigade combat-team levels and make the necessary adjustments to doctrine, organizational design training and leader development.

Fourth, the success of the future force requires effective integration of land, sea, air, space and cyber operations. We've come a long way and accomplished much in this regard over the past 10 years, but more remains to be done. Such integration is necessary to expand the operational reach of future forces and enable them to operate successfully over wide areas while securing extended lines of communication against hybrid threats. We should seek to establish and develop habitual relationships to gain a common understanding of our capabilities so that we can overwhelm the enemy with disciplined and discriminate force.

Fifth, prevailing in the 21st-Century security environment with our joint partners requires Army forces simultaneously to *inform* allies, partners and indigenous populations while *influencing* the attitudes and actions of adversaries. Army forces inform the American public and civilian leaders, allies, partners and foreign publics to inform decision-making, strengthen mutual trust, achieve unity of effort and establish favorable conditions to sustain support for operations. Army leaders and soldiers also inform indigenous populations to clarify the intent of Army operations, combat disinformation, isolate adversaries from the population and build relationships to gain trust and support. At

the same time, Army forces influence adversaries and potential partners to bring about changes in behavior or attitude consistent with military and political objectives.

Sixth, commanders build cohesive units capable of withstanding the demands of combat. Leaders prepare their units to fight and adapt under conditions of uncertainty. In the conduct of operations, Army forces and leaders always exhibit moral behavior while making critical, time-sensitive decisions under pressure. At higher echelons, we seek to synchronize the training, readiness and deployment cycles of corps, divisions and lower-echelon units to build cohesive teams, mentor subordinate leaders and establish the level of trust necessary for successful decentralized execution. Commanders also adapt to changing conditions and "build in" flexibility that allows them to disaggregate and reaggregate capabilities as the situation dictates. This is particularly critical when leaders are planning operations in a complex and fluid operating environment that requires units to seamlessly, and often rapidly, change from wide-area security to combined-arms maneuver as the situation demands.

Finally, to enable all of these actions, we must conduct effective transitions. A senior leader once told me that it is the responsibility of general officers to manage transitions. Given the complex nature of the security environment and the fact that we've deliberately pushed responsibility and capability to the edge, managing transitions is now the responsibility of leaders at all levels. We must develop leaders who understand both the "art" and the "science" of managing transitions.

Our Army is capable of doing a lot of things, and we have to be prepared to do whatever the nation asks. Success in future armed conflict requires the Army to sustain the expertise we've developed in wide-area security, rekindle our expertise in combined-arms maneuver and develop leaders who understand and embrace operational adaptability. We need to win, learn, focus, adapt and win again on a continuing cycle.



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## GEN Martin Dempsey on Operational Adaptability

"Despite the changing character of conflict and the increased capability of potential adversaries, the challenge of conducting military operations on land remains fundamentally unchanged. Unlike in other domains, actions have meaning on the ground because of the interaction of people and as a result of the interdependence of societal factors, including religion, race, ethnicity, tribe, economy, judicial system and political system. As a result, military operations on land are manpower-intensive, subject to frequent and often unpredictable change, unforgivingly brutal and intensely demanding of leaders.

"Humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and major combat operations are all part of the spectrum of conflict and, therefore, equal claimants to a position along the full spectrum of operations. So, too, is military support to civil authority. By choosing one or more of them to define ourselves, we obscure that which we know we must be able to accomplish: maneuver and security against whatever threat presents itself."



# Getting to Know Our Neighbors: Classifying and Locating Insurgent Support Zones

by MAJ Joseph LaBarbera

An aspect of operational adaptability for deployed Armor leaders and soldiers is successful employment of a combined-arms approach to counterinsurgency at platoon and company level. In other words, success depends on a combined-arms approach itself; use of intelligence assets; skillful collection of atmospheric; an accurate census; focus of the COIN force's efforts at platoon and company level; and synchronization of those efforts at battalion level. From these factors, the COIN force can classify insurgent support zones unique to its area of operation and target them appropriately.

A basic COIN tenant is separating the enemy from the population because, for an insurgency to be successful, it requires a support zone. The Army must therefore seek out insurgent support zones and render them incapable of reconstitution. To find a support zone, the Army must understand its framework and intent because it can't be seen.

A support zone is any area, network, political or legal umbrella in which the insurgent can operate with impunity. To understand where, when and how the insurgent can find this sanctuary is critical to defeating the insurgency. An example of this is the "awakening" of Sunni tribes in Iraq. In this case, the Sunni tribes were the sanctuary al-Qaeda used as their support zone. Once the tribes revoked their support, al-Qaeda in Iraq was unable to realize its

aim of overthrowing the Baghdad government and forcing out the American Army.

This article will discuss several areas:

- Insurgent cells and networks are never standardized but can be put into a template.
- Platoon and company leaders can find and classify a support zone by identifying its functions and quantifying its effects.
- Once the support zone is exposed to the Army, it loses its effect and is then defeated.

## Anatomy of a support zone

All insurgent support zones are permitted to function by constraints imposed on the Army or limitations of the Army's combat power. The insurgent identifies these two factors by using sources, informants, reconnaissance and surveillance. The insurgent then operates from the gaps. From this support zone, the insurgent projects effects on the Army and the local population compatible with his agenda.

The support zone's purpose is to enable the insurgent cell to perform its functions, which are to refit, reconstitute, plan and project combat power. The support zone itself is echeloned with lay-






ers of sensory nodes that provide connectivity with other cells and support networks. These nodes are also a disruption belt that gives early warning about penetrations and other actions that may affect its functions.

Penetrating or isolating a support zone are the only ways to defeat it. This is because infiltrating a support zone requires an extensive human-intelligence effort beyond most brigades' capabilities.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence officers and noncommissioned officers in an Army brigade are seldom employed in a manner that synchronizes their intelligence work with the maneuver plan. Further, a high priority is currently placed on imagery obtained via unmanned aerial surveillance rather than on cultivating an informant network. This prioritization causes a gap in our intelligence and maneuver efforts the insurgents capitalize on. With continued lack of understanding about how a support zone functions and its critical nature to the insurgent's efforts, the Army forfeits a large swath of ground to our enemies.

Gaps left in our intelligence efforts allow the support zone to develop into three mutually supporting operational spheres. The first sphere consists of a root from which all the insurgent's effects indirectly stem. This root is the steady-state operations cell, which may consist of active or passive supporters, or both. This operations cell is a normal and functioning part of its environment. Impenetrable and integrated, the operations cell appears to be a legitimate part of the community. Tracing the cell through its effects shows it resembles the hub of a wheel.



**Figure 1.** The insurgent support zone consists of three operational spheres that can be portrayed as a wheel. The steady-state operations cell is the wheel's hub, since all insurgent effects stem from it. The wheel's spokes are the second operational sphere, the cell's lines of effort. The outer rim is the final sphere, the support zone's connectivity nodes, which warn the insurgents, disrupt the Army and communicate with other cells.

The wheel's spokes serve as the cell's lines of effort. These spokes are the second operational sphere. The spokes are individuals who may be dedicated operatives or unwitting civilians used on sporadic occasions for a variety of missions. There's no template for these spokes because their formation can be diverse and complex. Examples include a chain of farmhouses, a group of cab drivers, a political party, etc. The spokes are the conduits that provide intelligence, financial support, logistics and combat power. Both active and passive supporters, as well as trained opera-

tives, can make these spokes effective. There is no way to observe them in operation or template what they look like without a very skilled HUMINT source.

The final sphere is the support zone's echelon of connectivity. These nodes serve as sentries for the support zone. They provide warning, disrupt the Army when it gets close and communicate with cells in other support zones. It's important to understand that individuals operating in this capacity may be confined to singular roles or may have multiple duties. Soldiers targeting the support zone must grasp that they may be facing an ambiguous and complex network that relies either on a variety of specific events or on certain situations in which to perform its function.

These three operational spheres can be perceived as a succession of battle positions that are sometimes manned by leaders, operatives or supporters, based on whichever echelon is task-critical.

## Identifying and classifying support zones

The support zone can't be seen or made into a template unless it's first understood. The way to understand the support zone is to know it by its effects. An effect is something resulting from an action the insurgents took. For example, a direct-action cell emplaces improvised explosive devices along a route. Following detonation and injury to coalition forces, the Army subsequently classifies the route as "black." The effect is that the community along the route is now unreachable by the Army.

There will be other effects, too, such as exploitation of the incident by insurgent propagandists. These effects will be footprints that lead to the roots. A root in this case is the group of people who benefited from the effect. A large and complex number of roots facilitate insurgent operations and protect support zones. By collecting on and analyzing roots, the Army will conclude where and how the insurgent action stems from it. This will be the support zone.

There are five types of support zones traceable from any single root or group of roots. They are:

- **Restrictive terrain (rural).** This is an effective support zone when the Army is incapable or unwilling to project combat power into it. An example is the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, where an Army unit is burdened by excessive body-armor requirements and, because of this, they forgo the ability to carry a sizable sustainment load. The unit then depends on being close to its vehicles as support platforms.

The roots for this support zone are tangible and the most apparent. Caravans, lines of communication, proximity to assault positions on Army installations, key terrain and any life-sustaining location beyond the Army's reach are likely support zones.

- **Restrictive terrain (urban).** This is an effective support zone when its disruption belt is in the form of either a sympathetic or coerced population support base. The population gives warning, acting as sensors for the support zone. The population is also the cover and concealment for the insurgent cell.

Roots leading to these support zones are very difficult to find and can only be uncovered based on extremely good HUMINT that is corroborated with a detailed census and continuous atmospheric.

- **The ideological umbrella.** This is an effective support zone when the insurgent sphere masquerades as a political or religious entity, winning popular support and media cooperation by pretending to be a legitimate force. It

has highly placed supporters among the government and social elite that exert pressure to legitimize the insurgency and deny the Army the ability to defeat it. This elite serves as the support zone's disruption belt, and the ideological protection it offers constitutes the support zone.

This is extremely dangerous when coupled with another support zone. To penetrate it, the effect is akin to conducting multiple breaches simultaneously. This support zone's vulnerability is that the insurgent group becomes intolerable to the elite if it indulges in excess. Also, the elite will abandon the cause if its power base or comfortable means of living is jeopardized by its support of the insurgency.

Another element of the political umbrella is a nation that doesn't allow the Army to pursue insurgents across its border, and it doesn't cooperate with the Army to interdict the insurgent as he retrogrades across the border. The neighboring country becomes the support zone for the insurgent, who can then perpetuate the war endlessly.

- **The legal umbrella.** Effective when the insurgent notices that the Army is constrained by requirements, laws or rules of engagement. The insurgent isn't bound to the same laws, will operate outside of them and will use those laws to cover his operations. Examples of this are establishing fighting positions in mosques and hospitals, knowing the Army either is prohibited from engaging them there or may have to wait for permission to engage them there. Another example is the more common one, which is an operative pretending to be a civilian who observes the Army and triggers ambushes on it.

In this case, the Army unit must be trained to recognize the observer for what he is and be enabled with rules of engagement allowing it to take action without fear of reprisal. Otherwise, soldiers will hesitate to take action due to fear of being prosecuted – for instance, they may shoot the observer and are prosecuted because a superior officer who is removed from the mission's danger determines the observer didn't show what the superior officer construes as hostile intent. The insurgent will use this technique with impunity if it is successful.

- **The false flag.** This is where the insurgent presents himself to the Army as a businessman, interpreter or other type of cooperative ally and works to develop influential personal relationships with naïve soldiers. From this relationship, he will work to enable and protect his insurgent mission. Even when compromised, he will still be effective because he will have alienated truly cooperative local-nationals from the Army unit, which will likely become unreasonably paranoid because of the insurgent's betrayal. Further, the false flag can refer to insurgents exploiting soldiers as sources by falsely presenting themselves as agents of a government or entity to which the soldier is sympathetic.

## Finding the support zone

Common-sense information collection that is corroborated with atmospherics and reliable HUMINT are the elements that enable the Army to locate the support zone. But first, the Army must know and understand its environment from as close to a native's point of view as possible. That being said, all collection methods will be inconclusive and may lead to misanalysis if not supported by a detailed census of the area.

The census is a numbering and lettering of a given area's homes, institutions and businesses, with the corresponding people listed. From the census a commander issues specific information requirements that his soldiers collect on patrol, which feeds the link chart the company intelligence-support team makes. As sol-

diers identify key leaders, they nominate them to the battalion intelligence officer (S-2) or civil-military operations officer (S-5/S-9) as lethal or nonlethal targets.

Most important is the awareness of the targeted individual's connections and role in the community. If there isn't a thorough understanding of the community's dynamics and its personalities, and the way people in the community relate to and depend on each other, the information collected will not be effectively corroborated with local atmospherics. This will lead to mistakes that will alienate the population and turn them toward the insurgent.

To develop the required understanding, soldiers should conduct a social-network analysis. (An excellent introduction to this can be found in Appendix B, FM 3-24.) Every house, business, institution and essential service must be documented. Without this knowledge, the Army is blind. Without the identification available from a census, the insurgent support zone can be effectively concealed and reconstituted regardless of how many times the Army detains or kills its members.

After building the census, the Army can understand the human terrain in its AO. It won't be dependent only on the word of interpreters and atmospherics. From the census the intelligence officer and civil-military operations officer can quantify the social, economic and political entities that make up the communities in their AO. By corroborating personalities and dependent relationships with these entities, it becomes evident who in the area would be the "go to" person for a specific need or agenda.

Also, institutions such as schools and mosques will be identified that provide essential services and are a necessary ingredient for the community to function. These institutions and people will be the sources to collect on based on how they relate to the effects of an insurgency in their area. The Army must continually develop close personal relationships with all these individuals and place intelligence sources in institutions to be able to assess where the insurgent's lines of effort are.

From these assessments, the Army can then classify sources according to their capabilities in helping the insurgency. Once those who aren't capable of being part of the insurgent line of effort are eliminated from the collection effort, collection assets can be made more efficient by focusing them on those who are. A weekly assessment must be made to the commander on the sources' possible involvement with the insurgency. Sources must be cultivated to be counteractive to the insurgents' cause. This will be the key in beginning to isolate the support zone even if its location is never identified.

A counteractive source is an individual who will be reliably proactive in contradicting the insurgent agenda on one or more lines of effort. Many sources will never be reliable but will be subject to the sway of whichever side puts on the greatest pressure or offers the greatest incentive. Others will never stop serving the insurgent agenda.

Once sources that facilitate insurgent lines of effort are identified, they must be used to lead the Army to the operations cell, either knowingly or inadvertently. This, combined with a counteractive source, is what makes penetration of the support zone possible.

However, penetration isn't complete until the Army identifies the operations cell. Concealing the cell is achieved by total immersion with its environment so it can easily be glanced over as just another establishment – for example, an electronics store, cab company, fertilizer distributor, etc. The key to identifying it as an operations cell is to trace the effects of the insurgent cell back to the other operational spheres of the support zone. From this tracking method, the intelligence officer can identify the op-





Platoon- and company-level soldiers must get to know their local-national neighbors well; anything less will allow the support zone to reconstitute in another place or time. (photo by SPC Kristina L. Gupton)

erations cell by process of elimination. He simply crosses out the unfeasible causes and roots of the effects, then targets the feasible roots with the appropriate intelligence-collection assets.

Sometimes inadvertent containment of the cell will cause it to dissipate without the Army ever noticing where it was. This is dangerous because the cell will then be able to reconstitute once the Army's focus shifts away from it. Trying to just contain the support zone is futile because the insurgent cell is still able to use the support zone to reconstitute, plan future operations and maintain the integrity of its formation. In the same respect, clearing the area the support zone is believed to be in is also futile because the cell will simply pose as local civilians who are then bypassed – and in some cases even assisted – by the Army.

The operations cell is likely made up of pre-existing members of the community who have normal jobs in the area. Their own families probably don't know they're operating for the insurgency. This may not be true in support zones that are remote from the Army's physical presence because the remoteness shields the family; this likely will encourage sharing of information between operatives and their families. In urban areas closer to the Army's outposts and patrols, the level of secrecy goes up so the insurgent's family won't compromise him.

Whether the operations cell is local or not doesn't make a difference in how the cell needs to blend in to the population. The only difference is that the non-local cell requires the community leadership's permission to operate. If no permission, the cell has to either bribe or threaten the locals, and that makes its operational security more tenuous.

What makes the operations cell extremely difficult to locate is when they are not only ingrained into the community but also when they are only part-time insurgents. Further difficulty arises when the operations cell outsources its work to cells from other areas. This creates effects that aren't as obvious and uses non-local sources – and leads the Army's intelligence efforts away from the operations cell that's actually in its area.

If there are any insurgents to be targeted lethally with extreme prejudice, it's those who can be classified as part of an operations cell. It's they who coordinate and plan missions and, more importantly, maintain the framework for the support zone to continue without them. The most effective operations cell doesn't

need the community's popular support because its community doesn't know its members are insurgents. They use the community's resources and lines of effort for the appearance of a legitimate enterprise, but in reality, they serve the insurgency's purpose either as a nested effort or for their own purpose.

## Get the root

The support zone that harbors the insurgency operations cell may be located by targeting the effects of the cell's lines of effort. Lines of effort can only be discovered by quantifying the roots that facilitate them. To destroy the support zone, it must be either isolated or penetrated. This can't be done if a census and social-network analysis isn't first performed to establish counteractive sources who can dissuade the population's support of the insurgency. Platoon- and company-level soldiers must get to know their local-national neighbors well; anything less will allow the support zone to reconstitute in another place or time.



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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Primarily this is because of the murky legal constraints that prevent Army officers from handling sources. Field Manual 2-22.3, **Human Intelligence Collection Operations**, states in Chapter 5 that "[o]perations with formal contacts are only conducted by HUMINT collectors and [counterintelligence] agents who are specifically trained and authorized to do so." The article's author attempted to find a quotable source to specify who could be authorized but was told that the applicable regulations are classified. This seems ridiculous when considering that a small-town police detective can run a source who is an American citizen but an Army officer in a combat zone is prohibited from doing so with a local national.

### ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

**AO** – area of operation  
**COIN** – counterinsurgency  
**FM** – field manual  
**HUMINT** – human intelligence

# Employing the Operational Reserve: Insights from Iraq

by LTC Michael Sullivan and MAJ Nathan Minami

As the responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq continues, the importance of maintaining an operational reserve and using that force for key missions grows. An operational reserve can assist leaders with operational adaptability.

The operational reserve played critical roles during key operations throughout the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some examples are the employment of Task Force 1-14 Infantry on five major out-of-sector missions during OIF II as well as employment of 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry, during the Battle of Fallujah in 2004. With the advise-and-assist brigade's rise, the need to use an operational reserve is greater than ever.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines the operational reserve as an "emergency reserve of man and/or material established for the support of a specific operation." Like all reserves, the decision criteria of when to commit the reserve are paramount and the responsibility of the senior commander. Once committed, that commander loses some of his flexibility to respond across the operational environment.

The operational reserve doesn't necessarily need to remain out of contact. Rather, the careful planned usage of the operational reserve provides the commander with a distinct advantage in weighting his decisive operation. The additional forces may participate in ongoing operations to bolster the decisive operation while still maintaining backfill capability in case an unforeseen need arises. The operational reserve therefore provides the commander with flexibility in maintaining extra combat power while simultaneously adding to an ongoing operation's chance of success.

This article focuses on the employment of the United States Division-Central operational reserve, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 14th Infantry, in support of 1<sup>st</sup> AAB, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division. The 1/3 AAB conducted operations in the southern belts of Baghdad to develop atmospheric and information in the area, which would help inform operational decisions. This case study provides lessons-learned for employing an operational reserve that are both ger-

mane to most operational-reserve missions in general and specific to the contemporary operating environment in Iraq.

## Background

Before departing from theater, 2-14 Infantry served as the USD-C operational reserve. Stationed at Camp Stryker on Victory Base Complex, 2-14 Infantry had about two months left in theater before rotating back to Fort Drum, NY. At the same time, commanders at senior levels were concerned about security conditions in the southern belts of Baghdad. Focused around the area formerly known as the "Triangle of Death," the Mahmudiyah-Yusufiyah-Lutifiyah region was once a known insurgent stronghold and the scene of some of the worst fighting during the 2007 surge. The large swaths of farmland were sparsely populated and had a relatively limited Iraqi Security Force presence. Lack of contact with the population created an information void where potential insurgents could gain a foothold and start to regenerate into a serious problem again.

USD-C devised an operation in May 2010 to gather more information and atmospheric in the area south of Baghdad while focusing on increasing contact between the ISF and the Iraqi population. As 1/3 AAB started mission analysis, one thing was clear: there was a lack of U.S. forces available to expand operations into the southern regions of the operational environment.

Already partnered with five ISF divisions and three operational command centers across the Baghdad province, 1/3 AAB was preparing to conduct a transfer of authority with both 2-10 Mountain and 4-2 Stryker brigade combat teams. In addition, 1/3 AAB was transferring six bases to the ISF while relocating nearly every battalion headquarters in the brigade. By mid-August, 1/3 AAB would partner with all ISF in Baghdad, provide logistical support for every U.S. soldier in Baghdad and remain as the only U.S. forces brigade in the entire province. Clearly, 1/3 AAB required more forces to conduct its mission.

Designed as an area reconnaissance, the mission used humanitarian-assistance packages and combined medical engagements to reconnect ISF with the population. No item was off the table to gather information. The brigade ordered 10 tons of animal feed to gain an information toehold with farmers. Veterinarians conducted visits to assist with animal husbandry. Battalion commanders received \$50,000 in Commanders Emergency Response Program "walking around" money to fund projects up to \$5,000, instantly gaining credibility with the local people. ISF coordinated with both government and Ministry of Health agencies to prepare locations for HA drops and the CMEs. U.S. human-collection teams and human-terrain teams spoke with people at every event, gaining valuable information and atmospheric on the local concerns. ISF used its organic radio stations to announce upcoming events and provided all security for them. In short, all resources available to 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division were on the table and used by all battalions involved in this mission.

## TF 2-14 Infantry in Baghdad's southern belts

Following Iraqi national elections in March 2010, the security situation in Iraq was relatively stable. There was, however, the aforementioned need to gather more information in the area south of Baghdad. Consequently, TF 2-14 Infantry from 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, was attached to 1/3 AAB and assigned the mission of developing information and atmospheric in the area.

One of TF 2-14 Infantry's first tasks was to quickly integrate into the 1/3 AAB team, as the initial mission duration was expected to be just two to three weeks. This task wasn't as easy as might be expected for several reasons. First, the area 2-14 Infantry would be operating in was within another battalion's area of operation, and while 2-14 Infantry would not work for this other battalion, some relationship had to be established to prevent fratricide and ensure unity of effort. Sec-



ond, the battalion had to build a working relationship with trainer teams already assigned to advise and assist the Iraqi army brigades TF 2-14 Infantry would be partnered with. Finally, the battalion had to ensure it quickly grasped the reporting requirements and standard operating procedures of the new brigade to which it was attached.

Further complicating this effort was that all U.S. operations in Iraq, with few exceptions, had to partner with ISF. In this case, TF 2-14 Infantry would conduct partnered operations with the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Iraqi army brigades of the 17<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Division. Typically it can take several months to develop a good relationship with Iraqi counterparts to the point where mutual trust is formed between the two groups, but in this case, a relationship had to be established in just a few days. These relationships would also have to be built on multiple levels: between the TF 2-14 Infantry battalion commander and his Iraqi brigade commander counterparts as well as between U.S. company commanders and Iraqi battalion commanders.

Also, as the task force would be employed as the division's main effort,

many enablers not normally part of the task force were attached for this mission. This included multiple intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms; attack weapons teams; scout weapons teams, multiple human-collection teams; human-terrain teams; more interpreters; a medical platoon; an explosive-ordnance disposal team; military-working-dog teams; military police; tens of thousands of dollars in humanitarian supplies; CERP money; and small-rewards money. Not only did the task force have to integrate these enablers quickly into the team, it also had to allocate these assets between two different forward operating bases from which patrols would originate.

The next major task for the task force was to analyze the relatively sparse information previously existing in the area and to develop an enemy situational template that would focus reconnaissance operations. This was initially difficult to do since U.S. forces hadn't been conducting partnered operations at the brigade level or below for several months due to reduction of forces in Iraq. Nevertheless, 1/3 AAB and the battalion responsible for the area of operations, 2-7 Infantry, provided the information they

had so an initial template could be developed. Once this was complete, target areas of interest were designated based on the believed residences of various persons of interest or warranted enemy combatants. These TAIs were used in developing an execution matrix that synchronized various task-force assets and enablers in efforts to coordinate and synchronize information-collection efforts.

The operational concept was to move back into the area south of Baghdad, from which U.S. forces had previously withdrawn, and focus on rebuilding relationships with the ISF and the population so information could be collected to confirm or deny previously assumed information and atmospherics. In doing so, a number of methods were implemented such as small reconstruction projects as well as the CMEs and HA drops already mentioned, and cordons and searches of select areas. All missions were combined with and approved by ISF commanders to avoid undermining their relationship with the community and local leaders.

## Results

The operation was much more successful than anyone expected. The operation confirmed and denied various aspects of






Figure 1. An example CME set-up.

the situational template; provided aid and assistance for thousands of Iraqis; and built relationships that will prove important to the strategic partnership between Iraq and the United States for many years to come.

During the six-week operation, TF 2-14 Infantry conducted more than 100 combat patrols; in conjunction with its ISF partners, killed or captured more than 60 criminals and terrorists; found a dozen caches; and conducted 20 HA missions and seven CMEs that positively affected the lives of more than 20,000 Iraqi citizens. The battalion also conducted eight humanitarian and minor reconstruction projects and produced more than 40 detailed reports of significant information value.

The crowning achievement for the mission occurred when the task force acquired information that led to identifying and detaining Latif Adnan Muhammad Hamza al-Qarghuli, the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader who ordered eight soldiers from

the task force's sister battalion to be kidnapped, tortured and killed in 2007.

## Lessons learned

**CMEs and HA missions.** The HA and CME missions were extremely effective during the task force's out-of-sector mission. Critical to success was the 1/3 AAB and 2-14 Infantry staffs working quickly and efficiently together to ensure that CME and HA packages were properly resourced.

For CMEs, a standard package of six vehicles with 10 medics, three providers, a pharmacist and eight dedicated interpreters was created. This "CME platoon" could then move independently between TF 2-14 Infantry FOBs and could easily be attached and reattached to different companies so the medical experts could take part in all steps of troop-leading procedures and develop tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the operation.

It was also critical to the success of these missions to have a balanced mixture of male and female providers, as only slightly more women and children came to the CMEs than men did.

Other enablers – such as information-gathering teams, social scientists and tactical psychological-operations detachment teams – were integrated into these missions as well to collect information and atmospheric, and to disseminate important information-operations messages. Further, by supplying the people with something tangible, the task force was able to gain automatic credibility with both the people and the ISF.

During the HA and CME missions, conducting reconnaissance with ISF prior to execution was critical, as this gave the commander on the ground time to integrate all the assets available into the plan. It was also important to be prepared for contingencies on the day of execution. This was specifically important because ISF didn't always follow our



troop-leading procedures process, and sometimes their manpower was pulled away at the last minute to react to the latest threat in the AO. By staying flexible while conducting these missions, and always having a good contingency plan, the commander's HA and CME missions proved very successful.

#### **Enabler management and integration.**

As mentioned, TF 2-14 Infantry was provided many enablers to assist in collecting and developing information. While the addition of these enablers enhanced effectiveness of the platoons and companies, they also brought with them limitations and constraints. It was crucial to quickly and accurately disseminate a tracker that codified pertinent information regarding these assets. In addition to containing basic contact information and staging location for each enabler, the tracker also included how many vehicles or platforms each enabler had and what they required to be attached to a platoon for a certain mission.

Using this tracker also enabled the battalion to track the operation's progress. After conducting a CME or an HA drop, the tracker could be updated to reflect the amount of supplies that remained on hand and assisted different staff sections in coordinating for more resources before they were depleted entirely. Consequently, one of the first things a battalion staff should do during out-of-sector missions is to consolidate all available information on attached enablers and condense it into an easily accessible format that subordinate units can use in planning future operations.

Many of the enablers attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, had request formats and reporting procedures, requiring the enabler manager to consolidate this information to quickly and efficiently request assets when required. For example, to request ISR, coordination had to take place at least 48 hours out, but confirmation of assets did not come until the night prior. The requirements cycle could be shortened if a mission came up short-notice, but by knowing the process of requesting these assets and fostering relationships with key personnel, it became less painful when those instances did arise.

The attached enablers were essential to mission success. With ISF leading security operations in Iraq, U.S. forces could potentially add no value without an extensive support package. By having something to offer ISF, TF 2-14 Infantry received a quick welcome.

#### **Building expedient partnerships.**

When conducting an out-of-sector mis-

sion, there is limited time to establish a working partnership with ISF counterparts. In fact, some ISF units might be offended that an American unit is returning after ISF had been operating independently for some time. One technique that worked well for TF 2-14 Infantry was to partner down to the lowest unit possible. This means that even if a U.S. company is partnered with an ISF brigade, habitual relationships need to be established where a U.S. platoon is operating with an Iraqi battalion – or, even better, with an Iraqi company or platoon. This is important to not only establish TTPs and build friendship, but also because it provides better situational awareness for U.S. forces as to what Iraqi forces are actually seeing on the ground. A large percentage of the intelligence collected during the mission came from ISF at battalion level and below.

In addition, CERP funds, specifically the Commander's Small-Scale Project Program, greatly helped TF 2-14 Infantry build a rapport with ISF, as they saw that U.S. forces in their area were willing to help their people. Small rewards also helped bridge the gap between ISF and U.S. forces, as this provided funding so Iraqi sources could be paid for actionable information and weapons caches.

It's also critical to spend time with ISF partners not just planning and conducting operations, but also relaxing and socializing. Likewise, key-leader engagements with ISF and Sons of Iraq leadership was critical to information-sharing within the operating environment. This helped to earn ISF trust and build a true friendship between Americans and Iraqis quickly so the mission could be accomplished.

**Cooperation.** One factor that added to the complexity was that multiple U.S. units were operating in the same battlespace. Ultimately, 2-7 Infantry was the battlespace owner for the entire area in the southern belts where TF 2-14 Infantry operated. As an AAB, 2-7 Infantry supported transition-team operations across the entire Baghdad AO. Therefore, TF 2-14 Infantry was called on to focus its available combat power (two rifle companies plus two platoons from Headquarters and Headquarters Company and enablers) on partnering with two Iraqi army brigades (25<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> brigades). These Iraqi elements had U.S. transition teams that consisted of, at minimum, a lieutenant colonel and major as advisers, supported by a security element. Thus there were five American lieutenant colonels operating in and responsible for the same battlespace in different capacities, not to mention the Iraqi commanders as well. In the contempo-

rary operating environment, especially in Iraq, traditional boundaries and delineations of command responsibility and authority are not as clear as they are on the traditional battlefield.

This is especially true for out-of-sector missions where one battalion is operating in a "reinforcing" role in another battalion's battlespace. Fostering a command climate that focuses on cooperation and consideration of other units' missions who are operating in the same area is essential. Nightly conference calls between battalion commanders and their staffs are helpful, as is constant communication among all elements. It is critical that the reinforcing battalion always remembers the long-term impact of its actions on the AO and that its operations should reinforce the battlespace owner's campaign plan, not letting its short-term mission planning place the owner's campaign plan in jeopardy.

#### **Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.**

IPB is always important, but especially so for short-duration out-of-sector missions of high importance. Because the incoming unit isn't familiar with the battlespace, the receiving unit must provide it with a detailed but focused IPB product immediately on its arrival so the incoming unit can conduct effective military decision-making before beginning the operation. If this doesn't happen, the incoming unit will waste the first critical days of its mission attempting to ascertain what is important, and what is not, in the AO.

Equally problematic is the case where the incoming unit is inundated with intelligence products containing little analysis, and therefore becomes overwhelmed and unable to focus initial operations. For platoons and companies to be effective, they must receive an appropriate task and purpose for each mission with a limited-in-scope but detailed-in-content target packet for each mission. Accomplishing this is the battalion S-2's main task, but his job can be made much easier with assistance from analysts at brigade-combat-team and division levels.

**Split operations.** Often when employing an operational reserve, the task force on an out-of-sector mission is often forced to permanently separate its command-and-control capability between a tactical operations center and a tactical command post. This occurred with TF 1-14 Infantry in 2004 when the task force split between Diwaniya and Najaf.

There are a number of challenges this presents for a battalion-size organization with limited staff capability, especially for the S-2, S-4 and S-6 components of

the staff. It also has a direct impact on the employment of limited battalion assets such as communications equipment, vehicles and enablers such as information-collection teams, social scientists, tactical PSYOPS detachments, explosive-ordnance disposal and other assets. Consequently, it's often important to provide a battalion with a higher proportion of enablers than what it would typically receive for a routine operation. This applies mostly to communications equipment and vehicles, which are often stretched thin due to extended operating distances.

**Continuity.** During short-duration out-of-sector missions, thinking about continuity is critical throughout the entire operation. Often during these types of missions, it's not always clear how long a unit will remain in the new AO before returning to its parent unit. Therefore it's important to maintain a current continuity book that focuses on all information and atmospherics collected to date, as well as on all operations and projects conducted. If a unit waits until its last few days on the mission to build this continuity product, it will likely fail because inherent in out-of-sector missions is the fact that the unit will return to its parent headquarters after the operation is complete. The focus can therefore easily turn to preparing the unit to move instead of providing good continuity for whatever unit assumes responsibility of the AO after it.

**A "new" unit can have unexpected effects.** Initially there was some concern that 2-14 Infantry would introduce a new combat patch to the area (10th Mountain Division), which would have a negative effect on the population. It turned out, however, that this wasn't the case. The local population and ISF remembered the 10th Mountain patch from 2007, when the unit was previously assigned to the area south of Baghdad. Consequently, the local population saw 2-14 Infantry soldiers as friends returning once again instead of a new and inexperienced unit.

TF 2-14 Infantry's return to the area also signified America's commitment to the people of Iraq in the eyes of the local inhabitants, which was important since many locals had expressed fear of what might occur when U.S. forces left the region for good. Thus, much of the population and ISF embraced the task force, which made it much easier to build immediate relationships and conduct information-gathering operations.

**Communications.** Communications during long-range out-of-sector missions outside frequency-modulation coverage can be challenging due to extended lines of communication and a new unit's unfamiliarity with the battlespace.

During these types of missions, units cannot rely on FM communications but instead must rely on other means such as Blue Force Tracker, tactical satellite and Iridium phones.

All patrols must be resourced with redundant means of long-range communication – ideally, every patrol outside of FM coverage should have BFT, TACSAT and Iridium capability. The reason it's important to have all three is that none of them are 100 percent reliable. Because not all units employ all these assets regularly, it's critical to ensure soldiers are trained down to platoon level on how to quickly employ these assets and to send and receive messages.

## Summary

The operation's results far exceeded anyone's expectations. More than 11,000 HA packages were delivered, and more than 3,000 civilians were treated at CMEs. More importantly, ISF arrested more than 95 warranted al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives within the brigade's AO while developing an even greater source network to counter any future resurgence. Either U.S. forces or ISF had wanted some of the detainees for years.

Also, the ISF realized the importance and value of reconnecting with its citizens. Before this mission, most Iraqis in the southern belts only saw ISF at checkpoints or during night raids of homes seeking insurgents. Neither of these encounters afforded citizens the opportunity to provide valuable information to their security forces.

The 2-14 Infantry primed the pump for the 1/3 AAB's mission. With its battalion staff integrated with the brigade, planning and resourcing efforts were seamless. Six months of partnering established strong rapport to gain the initial Iraqi support necessary for mission success. Once started, the mission yielded immediate results at minimum cost in both manpower and money. With ISF already stretched thin, any operation yielding actionable intelligence at minimum cost is incredibly important.

The continued drawdown in Iraq will strain operational availability of U.S. forces to assist our partners. High-visibility events ranging from elections to religious pilgrimages require an increased operations tempo by both U.S. and Iraqi forces. As a result, the necessity for a flexible and potent operation reserve will only grow more important.

The commitment of the operational reserve to support 1/3 AAB's mission was invaluable. Without 2-14 Infantry, it's

doubtful that 1/3 AAB would have had its success with its Iraqi partners. The resulting successes encouraged other Iraqi divisions to look into conducting similar missions. As a low-cost, high-yield operation, the program was 1/3 AAB's way ahead as Operation New Dawn began in earnest.



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## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- AAB** – advise-and-assist brigade
- AO** – area of operations
- BFT** – Blue Force Tracker
- CERP** – Commanders Emergency Response Program
- CME** – combined medical engagement
- FM** – frequency modulation
- FOB** – forward operating base
- HA** – humanitarian assistance
- IPB** – intelligence preparation of the battlefield
- ISF** – Iraqi Security Forces
- ISR** – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
- PSYOPS** – psychological operations
- OIF** – Operation Iraqi Freedom
- TACSAT** – tactical satellite
- TAI** – target areas of interest
- TF** – task force
- TTP** – tactics, techniques and procedures
- USD-C** – United States Division-Central



# Austere Challenge: an Exercise in Operational Adaptability for Civil-Military Planning and Security-Force Assistance

by LTC (Ret.) Michael Hartmayer and CPT Nathan K. Finney

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**“The U.S. Army must ... hone its ability to integrate joint and interagency assets ... and adjust to rapidly changing situations to achieve ... operational adaptability.” – GEN Martin Dempsey, Army Capstone Concept foreword, Dec. 21, 2009**

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As the U.S. Army increasingly conducts complex operations in this era of persistent conflict, all Army leaders, including Armor officers, must recognize the importance of maintaining flexibility and working with joint and interagency partners. We offer the exercise Austere Challenge 2009 as an example of operational adaptability<sup>1</sup> – the exercise demonstrated that when a comprehensive, integrated approach to civilian and military planning in stability and security-force-assistance operations is used, potential synergies are gained.

In addition to these issues, this article discusses the critical interagency challenges identified during the exercise. First, the article discusses the need for civilian agencies and their liaisons within the combatant command and joint task force to engage in team-building activities. Second, this article discusses the lack of a common and understood planning process; differing operational tempos and planning time horizons; uncoordinated knowledge-management procedures; and lack of enough civilian personnel trained as planners.

## Overview

Representatives from across the United States’ interagency community joined European Command in April 2009 for the execution phase of EUCOM’s annual geographic combatant command exercise, Austere Challenge. Very little documentation is available about the months

and years following this groundbreaking exercise that discusses lessons-learned and their implications for the future. To address the knowledge gap, this article seeks to describe how an integration of all agencies applied operational adaptability in a comprehensive approach to planning SFA<sup>2</sup> activities in AC 09.

The main exercise objectives of AC 09 were to certify Seventh Army as a JTF headquarters; exercise EUCOM subordinate component commands (the joint-force air component command and Sixth Fleet-led joint-force maritime component command) in conducting joint operations in response to a crisis affecting EUCOM’s area of responsibility; and serve as a vehicle in which to exercise and observe the Interagency Management System. As part of standing up the IMS, secondary objectives were to train people from the State Department’s nascent Civilian Response Corps and the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in planning, integrating and coordinating stability and reconstruction operations in conjunction with a U.S.-led JTF.<sup>3</sup>

Other objectives were to plan, coordinate and execute joint combat operations, theater-wide targeting, sustainment operations, coordination with Special Forces, strategic communications and information operations, EUCOM core joint mission-essential tasks, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff high-interest training issues and operational integration across U.S. government agencies and regional embassies at every level under S/CRS coordination.<sup>4</sup>

CRC members exercised organizational structures and processes extant in the IMS during the exercise. Per the IMS, described more in the sidebar (Page 23), the CRC formed an integrated planning cell to provide an organic interagency coordination<sup>5</sup> capacity to the EUCOM commander and staff. The IPC also supplied an advance civilian team to provide the U.S. ambassador an organic planning and operational capacity, and a small operational element of the ACT (described in the exercise as a Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team) was co-located with the JTF to provide connectivity and assist in JTF-embassy coordination and planning.

Notably, this was the first time CRC members participated in an exercise, and AC 09 received the largest commitment of interagency support to a GCC exercise to date. During AC 09, the CRC’s challenge was to maintain situational awareness and accurately assess conditions in the host nation. Their diligence provided urgent humanitarian assistance and met immediate civil-security and public-service needs. Simultaneously, they made plans for long-term governance, rule-of-law and economic-development activities. They completed these essential tasks while applying operational adaptability to coordinate and integrate their activities and actions with the JTF.

## Background

Planning for AC 09 began in the summer and fall of 2008, with EUCOM, Seventh Army and U.S. Joint Forces Command hosting a series of exercise-planning conferences. Parallel to this process, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Joint Center for International Force Assistance representatives integrated with and assisted S/CRS planners in developing a national strategic plan for the exercise. This plan replicated activation of the IMS and efforts of the IPC, ACT, Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group (see sidebar for more information on the CRSG, IPC and ACT) and U.S. embassy at a contingency operation’s beginning stages.

The strategic plan, developed through use of a planning framework developed by S/CRS and JFCOM, was key in tying strategic objectives at the agency level to essential tasks that needed to be performed at the tactical level, essentially “operationalizing” policy.<sup>6</sup>

The replicated CRSG was composed of people from the Departments of State (including S/CRS and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency), Defense, Justice, Homeland Security and Commerce, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. While acting as the CRSG, they portrayed the United Nations, European Union, DoS, Europe/Eurasia Desk, public diplomacy, USAID, regional country teams, U.S. Department of Agriculture, DoC, Department of Energy, DHS, DoJ and foreign embas-

sies for the purposes of the exercise. The IPC consisted of experts from DoJ, USAID, USDA and S/CRS.

The most robust civilian group in the exercise was the ACT. It consisted of regional and sector experts from DoS, S/CRS, INL, the Diplomatic Security Service, USAID (including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), DoJ, DHS, Department of Health and Human Services, DoC, Department of the Treasury, Director of National Intelligence and Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. Finally, members of the JIAC included representatives from S/CRS, DHHS, DoJ, DoC and PRM. All these interagency members replicated the functions of IMS elements in AC 09.

## SFA in AC 09

The AC 09 exercise scenario consisted of a contingency operation that involved an aggressor nation who attacked a sovereign nation. Deputies on the National Security Council determined that the United States would respond under the aegis of the United NSC with Chapter VII authorization and with coalition support to restore sovereignty. The NSC's desired two- to three-year end state was to compel the aggressor to withdraw and to establish new security arrangements to prevent further aggression.

As the conflict evolved, an assessment revealed that the host-nation society, particularly its essential services and armed forces, required significant post-conflict assistance. Its government officials formally requested this assistance.

During major combat operations to eject the aggressor, the GCC (augmented with an IPC), embassy (augmented with an ACT) and JTF (augmented with a JI-ACT) prepared for Phase IV stability operations. During the culmination of Phase III operations, EUCOM received a planning order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasking it to assess the host-nation security forces, then plan and prepare for SFA. This new task integrated into the Phase IV planning.

The PLANORD facilitated host-nation capability to restore order, secure its borders and provide minimal deterrence to external threats. The plan included one important caveat, derived from replicated NSC guidance: avoid becoming a destabilizing influence in the region. The host-nation forces could not exceed their pre-conflict size. This guidance placed the emphasis on regional security arrangements developed through medium-term diplomatic initiatives as the main deterrence factor.

As operations commenced in the joint operating agreement and coalition forces



Representatives from across the United States' interagency community joined European Command in April 2009 for the execution phase of EUCOM's annual geographic combatant command exercise, Austere Challenge. (U.S. Army photo)

began to engage the aggressor nation in combat operations, the extent of the damage to the host nation became clear. Assessments from the host nation and JTF units began to paint a picture of what would be actually required during stability operations.

The aggressor nation inflicted significant casualties in the country and destroyed about 25 percent of the host nation's forces. Its remaining forces were in various stages of disarray and suffering from poor morale. The entire military infrastructure system sustained damage to varying degrees. Police and border forces throughout the country required assistance and materiel. As the level of vital assistance became evident, the host nation's president requested assistance from the USG – ranging from humanitarian to SFA.

In response, the country team and ACT – headed by the ambassador to the host nation – and the JTF with ACT planners supported the development of an R&S plan that included a significant SFA element. This assistance included DoD support to DHS, DOJ and INL. Support of these agencies was to re-establish police and border forces and thus restore civil authority and regain territorial integrity. Civilian-agency support to DoD was to return the host nation's military forces to pre-combat levels (reconstituting the 25 percent of military forces lost in the conflict) and reinstate the regional balance of military force.

The JTF on the ground or a newly formed task force for the SFA mission implemented DoD-led tasks. The GCC deferred a decision until assessments revealed the entirety of the SFA obligation. The GCC also kept its options open and

began initial planning for a task force or security-assistance command designed to handle the SFA mission. DoD conducted support tasks, including assistance to local and national police as well as to justice and corrections organizations to regain internal security and rule-of-law.

The country team led these efforts, particularly elements from DoJ, DHS and DoS/INL. Invited coalition elements supported the R&S efforts, including SFA. Other nations willing to provide support, such as the Italian carabinieri and/or French gendarmerie, trained paramilitary security elements within the host nation.

Integrating a significant SFA element is the key to operational flexibility in R&S planning. Whether it was the IPC located at the GCC, or the planners from the JTF co-located with the ACT/U.S. Embassy, integration allowed for a truly whole-of-government approach.

While the process wasn't perfect, learning occurred along the way. The exercise allowed military elements to focus on overall security in the host nation and assist its military forces. Concurrently it allowed the civilian agencies headed by the country team and ACT to focus on reconstruction efforts and re-establish host-nation law enforcement and rule-of-law capacity.

## Challenges to effective interagency performance

Planning and executing AC 09 displayed many challenges in integrating civilian and military agencies while conducting whole-of-government stability and SFA operations. These challenges will have



significant implications as the USG develops and executes comprehensive operations around the world.

Building the IMS implementation team, both within the CRSG and as the IPC and ACT integrate with military forces, was a significant event. The IMS process is ad hoc by nature; it will differ in each situation. Different specialties are essential in each R&S operation, and in different quantities.

Some operations, like those exercised in AC 09, will initially be military-intensive, while others, such as strictly humanitarian-assistance operations, will largely be civilian efforts supported by military logistics. Civilian and military planners who understand all facets of security-sector reform, stability operations and SFA operations will add value in any scenario or contingency. Regardless of the type of operation, and in lieu of habitual relationships overcoming the realities of ad hoc entities, building a team with the correct personnel and integrating them efficiently will be crucial to its success.

A second challenge the exercise addressed is a lack of common doctrine and processes. In AC 09, each organization understood their agency's culture, doctrine, planning processes and role in the operation. However, they didn't understand every other organization's doctrine, planning or roles. Nor did they understand how their organization fit within the development of the whole-of-government approach. For example, unlike the military, not every agency conducts planning through the "boards, bureaus, committees, cells and working groups" process. Therefore, IMS implementing members may not understand the importance of each meeting and how to articulate their positions into the military or civilian decision-making cycles. This is especially critical as we exercise the interagency process through military exercises as the primary learning environment.

Civilian participants must understand the military decision-making process and where they must engage to be effective. Military organizations must understand that civilian processes can be just as efficient, if not more so, than the military's 24-hour battle rhythm or progress depiction in "green/amber/red" slides.

One of the most difficult challenges, requiring a paradigm shift among all participants, was the difference between civilian and military optempos. The challenge stems from one primary source: the time horizon for accomplishing goals. The military's role of immediate effects has come to assume the immedi-

ate acquisition of information or its proxy.

To accomplish military operational goals measured in hours, days and months, military units require as much information as fast as possible to support their planning. In contrast, the needs of civilian agencies, who measure their goals in years and decades, are not as urgent; their goals take time to develop, requiring patience and the development of relationships to accomplish them.

In AC 09, this radically different view of time led to initial friction between military and civilian planners. The military inundated the IPC, embassy and ACT with requests for information that had near-instantaneous completion times. IPC, embassy and ACT elements often viewed the substance of the RFIs as irrelevant to the facts on the ground, driven by a drive to "know everything about everything now" than by considered analysis of the information critical to mission accomplishment. Unanswered RFIs led to frustration and confusion. From the other side, civilian participants requested information from the JTF and EUCOM that was unanswered or ignored due to more immediate concerns.

Even with the different optempos aside, managing these RFIs were a significant challenge during AC 09. Questions from JTF to JIACT, JIACT to embassy/ACT and embassy/ACT to CRSG received inadequate attention, as did their answers. RFIs were lost in the wave of information requests, leaving all organizations without necessary information.

The end of the scenario affected the issues identified during the exercise as well as the solutions. RFI managers at all organizations cross-leveled their RFIs to ensure each RFI was addressed. Development of a Web-based system allowed all requesting agencies to ask for information on-line and answering organizations to filter, track and answer RFIs in one place.

Finally, there was a gap in specialized training and preparation of civilian planners. There were civilian planners in both the JIACT and ACT, but too few. Civilian personnel were subject-matter experts in their select functions from commerce to governance, development to diplomacy. However, their ability to take part in integrated planning with the JTF, and even within the embassy/ACT, was limited to those with prior training.

The IMS and military participants integrated and pushed through a rigorous exercise for two weeks. The exercise challenged them to develop the operational flexibility and planning systems that allowed civilian and military agencies to

cooperate in multiple operations. The solution also resulted in the development of multiple courses to address the shortfall identified before AC 09 and S/CRS. The courses include Foundations of Interagency R&S Course, R&S Planner Level I Course and R&S Planner Level II Course.

Conducting more exercises with interagency integration will refine the systems and processes until doctrinal development can occur. Ultimately, AC 09 led to a deeper understanding of civilian and military roles, including specific agency practices and cultures during planning and execution of stability and SFA operations. This understanding leads to greater "flexibility of thought ... for leaders at all levels who are comfortable with collaborative planning,"<sup>7</sup> improving the conduct of joint-interagency planning and decision-making. This is the best and quickest way the USG will achieve operational adaptability in a whole-of-government approach.



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*Len Hawley and Michael Zorick contributed significantly to this article. According to the authors, they "truly show the benefits of applying operational adaptability to the integration of civilian and military efforts."*

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Operational adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible and timely actions. (Army Operating Concept, Dec. 21, 2009, Page 51)

<sup>2</sup>Security-force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07)

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Joint Forces Command, Austere Challenge 2009 Planning Phase Exercise Control Plan, January 2009.

<sup>4</sup>Joint Multinational Training Center, distinguished-visitor briefing, Slide 5, April 26, 2009.

<sup>5</sup>Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of the Defense Department and engaged U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental agencies/organizations, regional and international organizations to ac-

complish an objective. (Joint Publication 3-08)

<sup>6</sup>Stull, Jon W. "Effects-Linked Comprehensive Planning: Integrating Military Planning with Interagency Implementation," essay included in **Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation: Interactions and Innovations among People, Organizations, Processes and**

**Technology**, edited by Derrick Neal, Henrik Friman, Ralph Doughty and Linton Wells II. Washington, DC: The Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2009. Page 239.

<sup>7</sup>Dempsey, GEN Martin. **Army Capstone Concept**, Dec. 21, 2009, Page i.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

**AC** – Austere Challenge

**ACT** – advance civilian team

**CRC** – Civilian Response Corps

**CRSG** – Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group

**DHHS** – Department of Health and Human Services

**DHS** – Department of Homeland Security

**DoC** – Department of Commerce

**DoD** – Department of Defense

**DoJ** – Department of Justice

**DoS** – Department of State

**EUCOM** – European Command

**GCC** – geographic combatant command

**IMS** – Interagency Management System

**INL** – International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency

**IPC** – integrated planning cell

**JFCOM** – (U.S.) Joint Forces Command

**JIAC** – Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team

**JTF** – joint task force

**NSC** – National Security Council

**PLANORD** – planning order

**PRM** – (Bureau of) Population, Refugees and Migration

**R&S** – reconstruction and stabilization

**RFI** – request for information

**S/CRS** – State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

**SFA** – security-force assistance

**USAID** – U.S. Agency for International Development

**USDA** – U.S. Department of Agriculture

**USG** – U.S. government

## How the Whole-of-Government Approach Works

The National Security Council begins the whole-of-government approach to contingency operations by activating the Interagency Management System. The IMS establishes operational integration of all elements of the U.S. government's power, including the geographical combatant command, in response to the triggering events or situation. This system, as established by the Deputies Committee, is the approved method by which the USG organizes itself when responding to foreign events determined to require total-government action.

The IMS has three components: Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group, integrated planning cell and advance civilian team.

**CRSG.** The CRSG serves as the central coordinating body for the USG effort and prepares the whole-of-government strategic plan. This group is co-chaired by the regional assistant secretary, coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization and relevant NSC director.

The CRSG secretariat supports this component. Its focus is the country-specific concerns related to the intervention's R&S elements.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the CRSG secretariat (staffed and coordinated through State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) formulates policy through a strategic-planning team, which develops goals with a two- to three-year end state that contains multiple options and major mission elements.<sup>2</sup> We'll come back to the MMEs.

In AC 09's planning phase, a team of planners from the Defense Department and the S/CRs replicated the CRSG. This team produced the conceptual framework that USG power was pinned on to conduct operations in the AC 09 scenario. Forming the framework was a situational analysis describing the circumstances confronting the USG, followed by a policy-guidance memorandum presenting the Deputies Committee with response options. A follow-on Deputies Committee policy memo chose from among the response options to set forth the overarching "crisis transformation goal" that all elements of USG power were to achieve. The DoD-S/CRS team drafted the whole-of-government strategic plan, which a team of interagency planners later refined, to achieve the Deputies' crisis transformation goal.

A strategic plan contains a concept of operations and the essential tasks the USG must to undertake. Tasks include those shared with international partners. The plan also includes the resources required in achieving stability while pursuing the crisis transformation goal.



As replicated in AC 09, once the USG integrated strategic plan was approved, the CRSG facilitated the preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning, which produced the operational plan, in coordination with the GCC, that was put into effect on the ground by the U.S. embassy, ACT and a portion of the ACT called the Joint Interagency Advance Civilian Team. The plan also facilitated operations support, information management, international/coalition partnership development and resource mobilization.

During AC 09's execution, a white cell drawn from DoD personnel and selected S/CRS partner agencies (Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Agency for International Development under S/CRS coordination) replicated the CRSG. As would happen in actual operations, the exercise CRSG managed the interagency process that prepared and forwarded strategic-guidance recommendations for decision by the Deputies Committee. As appropriate, the Principals Committee ensured guidance and direction to all elements of U.S. civilians in Washington and in the field.

It's important to note that the CRSG doesn't direct field operations. Rather, DoS' chief of mission retains control in-country of all USG activities not under the GCC commander.

**IPC.** As was the case in AC 09, an IPC can deploy to a GCC headquarters. The IPC assists in developing operational adaptability with interagency partners. It also integrates the civilian and military planning processes and supports current operations. In the exercise, when the Joint Staff sent the warning order for the GCC's intervention, the CRSG composed an IPC with relevant interagency planners, region and sector experts. With this support, the GCC commander gained more flexibility to integrate the evolving civilian components of the U.S. strategic and implementation plans with the military plan for operations.

**ACT.** Concurrent to the IPC process, an ACT was activated. The ACT deployed to supplement the embassy in the affected country. The ACT was a robust group comprised of members organized into functional and objective teams.

The functional teams broke down into groups dedicated to different operational aspects of the ACT. For example, operations, planning, monitoring and evaluation, situation analysis, strategic communication and resource teams functioned in the exercise.

The objective teams contained regional and sector experts organized around an MME. For example, a team of experts from DHS, Department of Justice and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency focused on rule-of-law issues in the affected country.<sup>3</sup> When a joint task force deploys to an affected region, the JIACT integrates into the military organization to provide connectivity to the ACT and assist in JTF-embassy coordination and planning. The ACT has a communication and coordination link with the IPC but doesn't take direction from it.

**MMEs.** Identified in the strategic plan are MMEs – critical elements that, when accomplished, allow the USG to achieve its crisis transformation goal. MMEs are similar to military lines of effort in that they structure all capabilities to solve a categorized problem. MMEs break down into an analysis of the means, methods, timelines and costs to achieve initial, short-term stabilization. MMEs also perform required follow-on projects and programs needed to obtain the two- to three- year end state desired.

An assessment – both initial then continuous – of a conflict's root causes is the basis for the strategic plan. When USG policy goals resulting from this assessment are approved, the CRSG secretariat develops a strategy to begin the goals' implementation process. MME planning teams organize and develop strategies to achieve each MME's goals, identify essential task areas for each MME, determine lead agencies for each ETA and track donor contributions.

Once the national strategic plan is approved, the lead agencies, ACT or country team responsible for an ETA begin implementation planning for their tasks. No two situations will be identical – agencies, the ACT or country team will collaborate as required by the nature of the MMEs and ETAs. DoD, through orders from the Joint Staff to the GCCs or JTF, will coordinate with the IMS' civilian elements to conduct implementation planning. The goal of this implementation planning is to achieve stability-operations objectives or tasks assigned to DoD in support of its civilian counterparts as appropriate.

In AC 09, the crisis transformation goal was that "the government of the host nation exercises sovereign responsibility over the entirety of its national territory, and regional actors – particularly the aggressor nation – [use] internationally recognized mechanisms to resolve disputes." MMEs derived from this ranged from compelling the withdrawal of aggressor forces to securing critical infrastructure to providing assistance to conflict victims. Of concern here is the fourth MME, "*The host nation's armed forces and security arrangements with regional partners are sufficient to protect critical infrastructure and economic activities and deter future aggression.*"<sup>4</sup> This critical MME was assigned to DoD as the lead agency and to DoS and other interagency partners as participating (i.e., supporting) agencies.

The MME concept paper resulting from the Deputies Committee policy statement and strategic-plan narrative further refined and conceptualized the method by which DoD and DoS would accomplish the fourth MME. The MME concept paper also articulated a mandate, key actors and structures, linkages to other MMEs, assumptions and a concept of operations, including sub-objectives. The concept paper was the base planning document for developing security-force assistance implementation plans.

The MME concept paper tasked DoD to:

- Lead the planning effort to develop competent, credible, capable and confident armed forces;
- Conduct SFA to enable the host nation to meet the goals outlined in the MME;
- Coordinate SFA funding issues with DoS;
- Support the training and equipping of police and border police with DoS, DoJ and DHS;
- Support the training and equipping of maritime security forces;
- Support DoS in the effort to advise and assist as required the requesting country's minister of the interior; and
- Support DoS efforts to develop regional security arrangements.

**SFA.** Within the context of AC 09, therefore, SFA was a subordinate task to the overall stability operation in progress. It focused on reinstating civil control and internal security within the wartorn country while also rebuilding the country's armed forces to constitute a kind of "trip-wire" deterrence to aggression from external sources.

SFA operations, like R&S operations, require significant operational adaptability to plan and conduct a whole-of-government approach.<sup>5</sup> This ensures the integration of Army and interagency capabilities to achieve specific operational objectives.<sup>6</sup> The system reflects the whole-of-government approach for SFA. The interagency partners, both military and non-military, conducting the operations under National Security Presidential Directive 44 and Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act produce the outcomes.

NSPD 44 assigns the Secretary of State, with the S/CRS's assistance, the lead roles in developing R&S strategies. This assignment also ensures coordination of interagency processes as well as civilian interagency programs and policies to identify countries at risk of instability. Also, the assignment provides decision-makers with detailed options for an integrated USG response in connection with R&S operations. Operational flexibility to carry out a range of other actions – including development of a civilian surge capacity to meet R&S emergencies – also results.

The Secretary of State and S/CRS also collaborate with DoD on R&S responses and integrated planning and implementation procedures. Title XVI of the 2009 NDAA resulted in the creation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. This improves civilian partnership with the U.S. armed forces in post-conflict stabilization situations and established a Civilian Response Corps of 250 active members and 2,000 stand-by members.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Joint Forces Command, draft *Handbook for the Interagency Management System*, Chapter 5, updated March 17, 2009.

<sup>2</sup>Department of State, *United States Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, Nov. 1, 2007.

<sup>3</sup>Joint Multinational Training Center, distinguished-visitor briefing, Slide 15, April 26, 2009.

<sup>4</sup>AC 09 exercise (notional) national strategic plan.

<sup>5</sup>See FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, Paragraphs 1-40, 1-42 and 2-9.

<sup>6</sup>Department of the Army, *Army Operating Concept*, Dec. 21, 2009, Page 21.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

**ACT** – advance civilian team  
**CRSG** – Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group  
**DHS** – Department of Homeland Security  
**DoD** – Department of Defense  
**DoJ** – Department of Justice  
**DoS** – Department of State  
**ETA** – essential task area  
**GCC** – geographical combatant command

**IMS** – Interagency Management System  
**IPC** – integrated planning cell  
**JIACT** – joint interagency advance civilian team  
**JTF** – joint task force  
**MME** – major mission element  
**NDAA** – National Defense Authorization Act  
**NSC** – National Security Council

**NSPD** – National Security Presidential Directive  
**R&S** – reconstruction and stabilization  
**S/CRS** – State Coordinator for Reconstruction and stabilization  
**SFA** – security-force assistance  
**USG** – U.S. government



# The Future of Mechanized Forces Post-Iraq and -Afghanistan

by CPT Matthew L. Makaryk

It is simple – as we enter the post-Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the use of U.S. mechanized forces, both in the armor and infantry communities, isn't going away. As we prepare to face the next 20 years of conflict, there are a number of items I feel must be addressed to ensure our continued success.

The enemy we're facing is fast, smart and capable – we captured or killed most, if not all, untrained, unskilled extremists in the early phases of each conflict. The enemies we face are able to maneuver skillfully through areas they are familiar with and often live in. They travel not in the tanks and large diesel trucks of our past conflicts; instead, they are travelling current battlefields in Toyota Forerunners, Nissan pickup trucks and Honda motorcycles. Our enemies have only a few advantages over their coalition opponents, but their overwhelming ability to quickly maneuver and then disappear into the population is something we must continue to identify and defeat.

As Winston Churchill said (as quoted in Field Manual 3-90.5), "However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is necessary sometimes to take the enemy into consideration." With past conflicts that include not only Iraq and Afghanistan but also Egypt, Libya and Palestine, and with the possibility of future conflicts in Iran and North Korea, we're forced to keep a broad perspective when preparing for our future enemies. Most of these conflicts were, are and will be fought in the enemy's large cities. We must continue to develop our mechanized forces to be able to adapt to that kind of threat.

My understanding of current conflicts ranges from a year in southwest Baghdad in 2006 as a platoon leader and company executive officer to a year operating in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk as a company commander. My dismounted reconnaissance company

**The enemies we face are able to maneuver skillfully through areas they are familiar with and often live in. They travel not in the tanks and large diesel trucks of our past conflicts; instead, they are travelling current battlefields in Toyota Forerunners, Nissan pickup trucks and Honda motorcycles.**



Commanders are faced with accepting risk by either training their soldiers to shoot, move and communicate or by ensuring their soldiers get the schoolhouse training they need for the multiple vehicles they operate and perform maintenance on – such as the humvee, Maxx-Pro, Maxx-Pro+, RG31, RG33, BFV, Abrams, LMTV and M88. Shown here are an MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle, built specifically for the mountainous Afghan terrain, and the larger MRAP Maxx-Pro Dash at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan.



in 2006 was able to field, man and operate a fleet of 20 humvees and to conduct mounted patrols when explosively formed projectiles were at their peak. Now, five years later, my mechanized company continues to operate the same humvees but has also added Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles to our fleet. The most dangerous threat for patrolling units is now the RKG-3 Russian grenade with parachute, capable of attacking the top of our armored vehicles, where we are less protected. We continue to update our equipment, armor and tactics, and the enemy continues to devise unique, creative ways to counter our protective measures.

Of all the countering tactics used by the insurgents around the world, there is one simple fact we must not forget: “Fighters are terrified of the tanks and their ability to maneuver, and are often reluctant to attack coalition forces equipped with integral armored forces.”<sup>1</sup> I am not suggesting that we keep large mechanized forces around because they are “scary”; I only suggest that the information-operation campaign for the lethality of both the M1A2 Abrams tank and M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle has already been fought and won. What the United States was able to accomplish during the first 30 days of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 has been recorded in history, thanks to the many embedded journalists that reported near-live feeds during the initial invasion.

With the understanding that mechanized forces are not going away, there are three key components to ensure the continued success of coalition forces and the rich history of the mechanized community:

- Technological advances in our vehicles’ components cannot expand past the user level.
- We need to continue to develop alternate vehicles as well as continually improve current armored platforms.
- Doctrine needs to continue to record the lessons-learned over the last 10 years and make them available to the lowest level in easy-to-comprehend media.

My first component deals directly with the current military view on the evolution of technology. The KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) methodology of the past no longer applies. During Army Chief of Staff GEN Martin E. Dempsey’s discussion with the Senate Arms Committee in March 2010, he expanded on what he believed the next 10 years would look like for the Army. He discussed that young adults entering the Army would be able to use their understanding of computers, videogames and the Internet in a manner that would provide us an advantage during the next decade. Although I respect the lethality of the unmanned drones we operate, the advanced laser-guided missiles and unmatched thermal-imagery viewers, what happens when they fail?

The Army during the last 10 years of enduring conflict has turned to a number of outside civilian contractors, who provide an unmatched level of proficiency on the “system” on which they are trained. The contractors continue to develop as the technology continues to expand; however, the soldier who conducts the day-to-day mission hasn’t been allowed to develop at that same rate. For the mechanized community to continue to be successful, we need to identify a way we can become self-sustainable again and get away from units being limited to the amount of mechanics and specialty-trained Soldiers they are able to develop. Further, although specialty training exists, soldiers are often unable to attend because of their unit’s rapid deployment rate. Commanders are faced with accepting risk by either training their soldiers to shoot, move and communicate or by ensuring their soldiers get the schoolhouse training they need for the multiple vehicles they operate and perform maintenance on (humvee, Maxx-Pro, Maxx-Pro+, RG31 mine-protected vehicle, RG33 mine-resistant light armored vehicle, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams, light medium tactical vehicle, M88 recovery vehicle, etc.).

During a recent 100-percent layout, I conducted a basic-issues inspection with a platoon in my company. I was concerned to see that today’s soldiers are unfamiliar with such



items as slip-joint pliers, crosstip screwdrivers, adjustable wrenches and scissor jacks. Technology is great, and I agree it gives us an unmatched advantage, but we need to focus less on “big screen” simulator training and continue to develop the basic hands-on mechanical skills our great-grandfathers had during World War II.

We may soon come to a point in our “hunger for more” that someone may need to decide that the systems we already have are unmatched, now we just need to teach our Soldiers how to use them.

My second component deals with the continued improvements in our current armor and mechanized platforms; with a projected decrease in Department of Defense budgeting over the next decade, this seems a logical place to start. One area in particular I believe the armor and mechanized communities could focus on is in the continued improvements for the “heart” of both the Abrams tank and BFV: the engine. With most of our perceived future conflicts being fought in oil-rich nations, we can only presume that fuel would not become an issue or concern. However, I view the engine/fuel issue as a weakness and large vulnerability as brigade combat teams continue to deploy around the world.

I am by no means recommending that our two primary fighting platforms go “green”; I am simply recommending that the advancements made over the last few years in the internal combustion engine by U.S. and foreign manufacturers offers a reduced dependency on fuel for coalition forces during a conflict. The Abrams has a 502-gallon fuel cell and can travel about 298 miles, or .60 miles per gallon. The BFV can hold 175 gallons of fuel and can travel roughly 250 miles, or 1.4 mpg. With current technology already developed, I would be curious to see what could be done to double the miles per gallon for both vehicles and what loss of power, maneuverability or effectiveness occurs – if any. An Abrams tank with a cruising range of 1,000 miles would undeniably reduce the burden on all logistical planners in the Army and provide another dimension to the already-lethal Abrams.

My last component focuses on the continued recording of after-action reviews and lessons-learned, and the updating of doctrinal resources and field manuals. The idea that tanks or mechanized-infantry vehicles alone can win a conflict has already been proven an incorrect assumption. Looking back at the Soviet-Afghan War in the mid-1980s demonstrates that “a modern mechanized force with overwhelming technological superiority became embroiled in someone else’s civil war on rugged ter-



We will continue to develop, grow, change and advance as we head into our future conflicts. The only way we can be defeated is if we stay the same. (U.S. Army photo)

rain.”<sup>2</sup> Starting with the December 2006 release of *The Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, written by GEN David Petraeus and GEN James Amos, we can begin to focus on understanding how we must ultimately win the conflicts we are fighting.

Units continue to develop, just as the conflict they are fighting in continues to develop. The responsibility for capturing these important lessons-learned, mistakes made and successes achieved falls directly on commanders at all levels. Eventually the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, VA, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, part of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, must continue to screen, print and distribute those lessons-learned in an easy-to-understand form for soldiers of all ranks.

Commanders at all levels already understand the importance of staying current on doctrine. They read journals and magazines, and openly discuss their lessons-learned. The difficult challenge is encouraging our young soldiers to read those same professionally published articles to ensure future success. For example, *ARMOR*’s January-February 2011 has an excellent article discussing a commander’s view of the Canadian Leopard 2A6M. He shares his view of both the positive and negative impacts of using armored vehicles in Kandahar, Afghanistan. When leaders challenge and continually develop soldiers of all ranks, the possibilities are endless. It is important that we learn from our past and prevent making the same mistakes twice – and that burden lies squarely on the shoulders of leaders at all levels.

The future of mechanized forces after we leave Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe, will be stronger than ever. The threat to the United States and our Constitution is the same – only the enemy changes. We will continue to develop, grow, change and advance as we head into our future conflicts. The only way we can be defeated is if we stay the same!



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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Cadieu, Trevor MAJ. “Canadian Armour In Afghanistan,” *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 10.4 (Winter 2008), Page 21, accessed at [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol\\_10/iss\\_4/CAJ\\_vol10.4\\_03\\_e.pdf](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf).

<sup>2</sup>Grau, Lester W. and Gress, Michael A., translators and editors. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Editor’s preface, Page XXV.

### ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle
- LMTV – light medium tactical vehicle
- M-ATV – Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle
- mpg – miles per gallon
- MRAP – Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected

# Purge of the Red Army: Limiting Military Innovation

by MAJ Derek Mixon

The Soviet Union was on the cutting edge of military innovation during the interwar years between World War I and World War II. However, the purge of the Red Army, initiated by Joseph Stalin, had the single most influence on the development of maneuver warfare in the Soviet Union – and the United States benefitted.

The former superpower's mistakes can be a lesson for us, as the Red Army purge was a classic failure to operationally adapt, for example. It also shows how bad decisions can have lasting effects.

The purge of the Red Army effectively hampered development of the Soviet Union's military innovation by eliminating two vital contributors. The first contributor is an experienced officer corps. The Soviet Union's officer corps, before the purge, had three major conflicts from which it had gained experience and lessons-learned. These conflicts were unique to the larger Eastern European theater of war and encompassed large expanses of land and low concentrations of military forces.

The second contributor is the atmosphere of learning, with the ability to debate and develop new tactics. During the Red Army's development after World War I, innovative debate was encouraged.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the Red Army developed tactics using combined arms and the offensive capability of the deep attack.

## Officer corps gutted

When the Soviet Union's prosecutor announced the conviction and execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other general officers June 11, 1937,<sup>2</sup> this one political act had devastating effects on maneuver-warfare development in the Soviet Union.

As the officer-corps purging lasted from 1937 up until the invasion of Germany, the loss of these senior leaders and the subsequent evaporation of an innovative atmosphere cost the Soviets millions of soldiers in the nation's ensuing fight with Germany.

Losing experienced officers hampered the Red Army's development of mobile warfare in two major ways. First, Tukhachevsky's execution deprived the Soviet Union of an innovator in combined-arms warfare. He had developed a tactic of deep attacks that combined armor, air, artillery, infantry and airborne units.<sup>3</sup> He was also the Red Army's chief proponent for developing this as an offensive capability.

Before the purge, Tukhachevsky's innovations gained government acceptance and funding. The Soviet Union modernized its forces by developing mobile armored units and taught combined-arms warfare in its military schools.<sup>4</sup> After Tukhachevsky's execution, his innovations were seen as treasonous and development of maneuver warfare stopped.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, the Red Army officer corps had experience from the Eastern Front of 1914-17, the Russian civil war (1918-21) and the Polish-Soviet War (1919-21).<sup>6</sup> This experience was lost during the Red Army purge. Since the Red Army officer corps consisted of both imperial officers from the czar's army and the new Bolshevik officers, its variety of knowledge and experience produced theories about mobile warfare unique to Eastern Europe. Tukhachevsky's execution and the purging of most of the Red Army officer corps eliminated the knowledge base required to develop the tactics of modern maneuver warfare. After the purge and loss of Tukhachevsky, the Red Army assumed a defensive-posture tactic. It disbanded many of its armored units and reduced the tank to an infantry-support role.<sup>7</sup>

## Innovation stifled

The purge of the Red Army also stifled innovative thought about maneuver warfare. During the interwar years, there were two main schools of thought for the Soviet Union's military forces.<sup>8</sup> First was the offensive school of thought of annihilation. Annihilation meant using deep strikes with mobile forces to both encircle and destroy a military force while disrupting supply lines and possible reserve forces. Tukhachevsky was the chief proponent of this type of warfare. The Kazan tank school was an innovator in it; the Germans attended this school, and it is thought that they developed many of their blitzkrieg tactics during this time.<sup>9</sup>

The second school of thought was more of a defensive tactic known as attrition. The theory behind attrition is that a nation must fight as a whole nation – the nation's entire strength must be mobilized for war, including the population, politics and industry.<sup>10</sup> Svechin was chief proponent for this school of thought.

Before the purge of the Red Army, these two opposing views were openly debated. In turn, the debates helped refine tactics of both points of view. Ultimately, annihilation won out, and the Red Army started to mold itself into a mobile mechanized force. In 1937, when Tukhachevsky was executed, the tactic of annihilation was seen as a traitorous concept.<sup>11</sup> At this point, all open innovative thought was stifled. The concept of mobile mechanized warfare was no longer debated, as mention of an idea that didn't have complete state approval could lead to imprisonment or







The five marshals of the Red Army. Marshal Tukhachevsky is in the front row, left.

execution. The Red Army purge ensured that the Soviet Union's most innovative theorists would not openly debate tactics and, by default, its military forces assumed the tactic of attrition.

## Summary

The purge of the Red Army limited military innovation in the Soviet Union and decapitated its officer corps. This corps had a wealth of experience fighting throughout Eastern Europe and possessed a unique perspective on fighting in these open areas. The loss of the officer corps, along with Tukhachevsky, eliminated the Red Army's knowledge base on how to conduct maneuver warfare. Once the purge started, fear of innovative thought swept through the Red Army, as only the surviving senior officers' school of thought was permitted to be taught. Both the loss of the Red Army's knowledge base and fear of the state hampered military innovation, specifically in maneuver warfare, in the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviet Union did return to a form of annihilation, as well as attrition, during World War II, this was out of survival for the nation and cost the Soviet Union millions of soldiers and civilians.



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tional Guard, Arlington, VA; battalion S-3, 163rd Support Battalion, Varnville, SC; troop commander, Troop B, 202nd Cavalry Regiment, Beaufort, SC; and company commander, Company C, 1/263rd Armor Battalion, Conway, SC. He is a graduate of Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; combined-arms exercise, Fort Dix, NJ; and Intermediate-Level Education, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He holds a bachelor's of business administration in marketing from Francis Marion University and a master's of science degree in general administration from Central Michigan University.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Rice, Condoleezza. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

<sup>2</sup>House, Jonathan M. "Red Army Developments, 1921-41." *H200: Military Innovations in Peace and War*. Also see Murray, Williamson. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

<sup>3</sup>Rice.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>House.

<sup>7</sup>Rice.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>House.

<sup>11</sup>Rice.





# Building Agile and Adaptive Soldiers Requires Agile and Adaptive Trainers

by MAJ Joseph M. Harrison

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*“The training and education of our entire force must aim to develop the mindset and requisite knowledge, skills and abilities required to operate effectively under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.” – GEN Martin Dempsey, foreword to TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, Army Capstone Concept*

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Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz once said, “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.”<sup>1</sup>

Our military uses leaders and soldiers who have “seen war” to train our future leaders to be agile and operationally adaptive, but we need to go one more step and use a different training method. We use the systems-based approach to training, but we should use an innovative training method called outcomes-based training and education.

## ‘Fog and friction’

The “fog and friction” of war Clausewitz identified requires leaders to know both the art and the science of warfare. The science of warfare is the method by which soldiers plan and account for tangible aspects governing application of forces in a complex environment against an adaptive adversary. The art of warfare is the intangible art of applying forces in space

and time, and considering risk, to accomplish the mission at the lowest cost.

Soldiers at all levels can only be successful if they have mastered the tangible science and intangible art of warfare. Clausewitz believed that soldiers could only attain mastery of the art and science through a career of rigorous self-development and personal experience in war or under the instruction of those who had experienced war.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of warfare and the effects of fog and friction on forces on the battlefield haven’t changed since Clausewitz first published *On War*. However, there has been a paradigm shift in the contemporary operational environment, forcing our Army to re-evaluate our methods of training and preparing leaders for it. The Army Leader Development Strategy outlines this shift and characterizes it by the cumulative effects of complexity and time, decentralization of forces on the battlefield and the need to frame ill-structured problems.<sup>3</sup> In the current operating environment, leaders at all levels of experience



and rank find themselves at decisive points on the battlefield. They make decisions and give recommendations that can dramatically affect the operational and strategic outcomes of our wars.

As an example, continuous reconnaissance drives our tactical planning in counterinsurgency and stability operations. Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq are asked to identify and analyze infrastructure; interact with and assess dynamic societal relationships; interpret the physical terrain; and anticipate threats against them throughout year-long deployments. Their timely and accurate reporting collected within context of the operational environment and informed by commanders' intent allows units to transition effectively between lines of effort throughout their area of operations.

When soldiers effectively collect, assess, communicate and recommend actions based on effective reconnaissance, units and leaders can effectively allocate assets and resources tactically to achieve operational and strategic goals. When soldiers do not conduct effective continuous reconnaissance, units and leaders make ill-informed decisions in the absence of quality intelligence, and their tactical plans can negatively influence operational and strategic goals.

As an Army, we must develop professional soldiers who can understand the art and science of warfare at all levels so we may better apply the tools of national power. We must build within our soldiers' professional judgment degrees of precision and accuracy equivalent to the guided munitions they employ.

## Limits of training the tangible

The systems approach to training is currently the engine that drives much of the Army training system and is the foundation for doctrinal publications and institutional training programs.<sup>4</sup> The value of the systems-based approach is that it provides the analytical (tangible) basis for unit, leader and individual training proficiency and assessment, and a means for efficiently and predictably allocating resources. Army Training and Evaluation Program-mission training plans, soldier training publications and programs of instruction are tangible and consistent.

Under the battle-focused concept, a unit prioritizes training to its standardized wartime mission. This training begins with initially assessing training, determining training objectives, creating a training strategy, preparing for training, executing training and evaluating completed training against an established standard.<sup>5</sup> The battle-focused concept allows great pre-

dictability in identifying, resourcing and training soldiers and units under varying conditions of increasing complexity and difficulty. This predictability in allocating land, ammunition and resources allows for efficiencies in training soldiers to time and standard, but costs in training them to a desired outcome. Individuals and units train to minimum standards and only conduct more training if those minimal standards haven't been met.

Our current training systems stifle development of intangible attributes such as initiative, accountability and adaptability that a more agile and flexible training method could offer. To illustrate, a soldier who qualifies marksman on his weapon system sits in the bleachers with a soldier who qualifies expert until another soldier completes retraining and qualifies to the minimum standard before the unit leaves the range. Is shooting more rounds and gaining more familiarization with your weapon punishment for failing to initially qualify? Is barely qualifying rewarded or recognized the same as demonstrating higher fundamental skill? Is the highly skilled soldier truly being challenged to maximize potential?

Assessments under the systems-based approach, although quantifiable, tie in to the accomplishment of established task lists but are divorced from the desired outcomes of preparing units and soldiers for war. The systems-based approach applied at a training center, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schoolhouse or internally by a peer evaluator within a U.S. Army Forces Command unit focuses upon task and subtask completion checklists maintained by the assessor of training. The assessor of training becomes both the focus of avoidance and obscuration and the target of appeasement.

The separation from desired outcomes and quantifiable tasks is further exacerbated by the difficulty in updating and changing ARTEPs, STPs and POIs to more adequately reflect changing realities based on combat-deployment experience.

Deviations from the systems-based approach occur across units and leaders within the Army. Mandated checklists can hijack these deviations with warrior tasks and battle drills that do not consider unit modified tables of organization and equipment or expected missions in theater. The result is an Army full of leaders and soldiers who:

- Are accountable for knowing the tangible science that governs the application of force; and
- Become masters at gaming the systems involved in training for war without necessarily mastering the fundamental intangible attri-

butes necessary to be successful at fighting in a real one.

## Training for the intangible

The OBT&E approach differs from the systems-based training approach in two distinct areas.

First, and most importantly, outcomes-based training focuses on the intangible and tangible aspects of soldiering that impact mission accomplishment within the commander's intent. These attributes are defined within the context of predetermined measures of effectiveness outlined by the commander prior to conducting training and are flexible enough to allow variations and adjustments throughout its execution.

The value of this shift from a task-based systems approach to an outcome-based training approach is subtle but extremely powerful. Outcome-based training empowers a commander to conduct multi-echelon, ambiguous and complex training events without the requirement of pre-training all the associated individual and collective tasks and sub-tasks that may be involved within the training scenario. The high instructor-to-student ratio associated with outcomes-based training reduces the negative impact one individual can have on collective training. It also increases the opportunity for all students to be mentored on multiple tasks and subtasks throughout a training event. Before and throughout the execution of training, the commander can focus instructor coverage to develop tangible skills and intangible attributes he believes will prepare his unit and its soldiers for war.

An example of this would be a field-training exercise where a company commander conducts force-on-force training, with two of his platoons conducting security operations in an urban and rural environment and a third platoon conducting reconnaissance in preparation for an attack on an inferior force. Within the context of this exercise, the commander could focus on the tangible skills of security and reconnaissance in an urban and rural environment and the intangible leader attributes of initiative, adaptability and problem-solving. The commander could then continue to assess and build these skills and attributes within the exercise by continuing the rest of the security and reconnaissance missions while introducing new variables, or he could change the tangible skills measured in the training exercise by ordering the third platoon to execute their planned attack.

Flexibility in the timing and sequencing of execution allows the commander to

train a wider range of tangible skills within a shorter period. This dramatically increases the ability to train the intangible attributes of his soldiers and his unit by retraining and reinforcing key attributes within the same training exercise. The flexibility in creating and freeing up collective training time comes by reducing the amount of unit time devoted to individual tasks. Training these individual tasks can either occur concurrently during a large collective training event or reinforced with routine short-duration training events.

An example of this would be incorporating land navigation, communication, problem-solving and first-aid skills into physical-training events. Too often physical training is neither physically realistic enough nor mentally demanding enough to prepare soldiers for the rigors of war. By incorporating skills training into physical training, an instructor can adjust the mental and physical stresses his students experience to meet desired training outcomes.

Second, outcomes-based training shifts the relationship between the student and the trainer from subject and evaluator to student and instructor. Within the OBT&E framework, the student and instructor are mutually interested in achieving the desired outcomes of training; they are not restricted to accomplishing tasks and sub-tasks within specified conditions and standards. Training is guided by applying fundamental principles to realistic practical exercises, tactical-decision games or tactical-decision exercises.

The student is expected to have studied and gained an understanding of the fundamental principles associated with the training event he is given. The event itself should be organized in a way that allows multiple solutions and applies principles toward solving a military problem. The student completes the event and achieves the desired outcomes by:

- Assessing the problem and identifying the decision points within it;
- Making tactically sound decisions to minimize associated risk;
- Communicating it effectively to his peers or subordinates; and
- Applying the fundamental principles associated with the problem to solving it.

The instructor facilitates student learning throughout the process by helping the student organize and frame the problem within fundamental principles. He leads thinking with questions that allow the student to describe the situation through the principles and break it down into manageable pieces.

The instructor's assessment of training and the student is interactive throughout

the outcomes-based training process. The instructor constantly adapts to the learning style, personal strengths and professional growth of the student. This maximizes the development of desired outcomes, skills and attributes. Instructors must be experts in understanding and applying OBT&E methods. In addition, they must be masters of the fundamental principles associated with the training exercise.

OBT&E requires involvement by the commander throughout the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of training modules to ensure training outcomes meet his intent. Tangible outcomes will vary between trainees; time and resources invested into training may also vary greatly between training exercises and trainees. The development of intangible soldier attributes, however, will vastly outweigh those gained through the systems-based approach.

Demonstrating initiative and self-development is an intangible skill that Clausewitz specifically cited as a fundamental skill in becoming a master of the art and science of warfare. Timely and accurate feedback provided by knowledgeable instructors during OBT&E training lets soldiers see themselves and their thought process in real-time; this self-awareness grows throughout the OBT&E process and stays well after a training event ends. The result is soldiers who arrive better prepared for training, who are more deliberate in their thought processes throughout training, and who are more self-aware of the tangible skills and intangible attributes they are applying and how effective they are in applying them. The overall result is a marked increase in intangible-attribute growth that leads to increased ability to build tangible skills.

## Opportune moment

Outcomes-based training is not easier to do, nor is it a shortcut to avoid systems-based training. OBT&E requires adaptive, knowledgeable and agile leaders to build training exercises and develop training-certification programs that capture the fundamental principles of warfare within the context of ill-structured, complex and decentralized problem sets that build tangible tactical skills and intangible leader attributes. OBT&E is a deliberate attempt to target and train the intangible attributes associated with understanding the art of applying the physics of warfare in a manner that maximizes retention of knowledge while simultaneously increasing the rate at which soldiers absorb and apply it.

We are at an opportune moment in history where our military both recognizes the need to train for agility and adaptability

in our future leaders and has an abundance of leaders and soldiers who have first-hand practical experience in operating in ambiguous and complex environments. It is incumbent upon us to equip our leaders and soldiers with the tools necessary to pass on their hard-earned skills through this innovative training method.



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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. J.J. Graham translation published in London in 1873, accessed at <http://www.clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm>. Chapter VII, Friction in War.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Army Leader Development Strategy, "Implications of the Operating Environment on Leader Development Strategy," Nov. 25, 2009. Page 4.

<sup>4</sup>Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, September 2003. Chapters 1-18.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. Figure 2-6.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

**ARTEP-MTPs** – Army Training and Evaluation Program-mission training plans

**FORSCOM** – (U.S. Army) Forces Command

**MTOE** – modified table of organization and equipment

**OBT&E** – outcomes-based training and education

**POI** – program of instruction

**STP** – soldier training publications

**TRADOC** – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command



# Reconnaissance Planning and Orders

by CPT Gary M. Klein


Leaders at company level and below plan and prepare for future operations by following troop-leading procedures and using the operations order, as detailed in the Army's Field Manual 5-0. This manual caveats that the process is tailored to a ground-maneuver perspective, implying flexibility in the planning and orders process.<sup>1</sup> This article will introduce a method of thinking about reconnaissance planning and orders that effectively integrates the commander's critical information requirements and commander's reconnaissance guidance into TLPs and the OPORD through the commander's intent.

The primary audience of this article is reconnaissance troop commanders, but all reconnaissance leaders can apply these same principles.

According to FM 3-20.96, the main role of reconnaissance operations is to answer CCIRs, enhancing situational understanding and enabling the higher commander to make informed decisions.<sup>2</sup> The importance of answering CCIRs equals the importance a maneuver commander places on his essential tasks. A maneuver commander establishes what his essential tasks are during mission analysis and course-of-action development within Step 3 of the TLPs. However, for a reconnaissance commander, TLPs do not adequately address CCIRs (reconnaissance tasks), given their importance to reconnaissance operations.

## Reconnaissance planning process

During mission analysis, the commander develops a list of tasks he must accomplish. These tasks come from his orders, both specified and implied. Implied tasks are often times found throughout the order. One area leaders tend to overlook, especially in organizations where reconnaissance isn't their primary mission, is the list of CCIRs included in the coordinating instructions. The recon-



naissance commander, on the other hand, must give utmost attention to determining and analyzing his CCIRs.

Once the reconnaissance commander determines his CCIRs, he must refine the named area of interest assigned by commanders, or he must develop additional NAIs. The NAIs are geographic areas where information collected satisfies these specific information requirements.<sup>3</sup> Then additional NAI development and designation occurs using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield guidance inherent in the commander's mission analysis (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time and civilians).

By establishing NAIs and linking CCIRs to each of these, the reconnaissance commander can further develop his CCIRs or eliminate information requirements he'll be unable to collect. Also, based on his mission analysis, a reconnaissance commander can create additional CCIRs to enable follow-on maneuver forces.

Ultimately, the combination of CCIRs and NAIs creates the reconnaissance task (observe NAI) and purpose (answer CCIRs) assigned to a scout platoon or other asset. An example of how a commander could communicate this task and purpose is included in Figure 1.

The abbreviated reconnaissance planning process described here is an efficient method of developing reconnaissance plans. However, Chapter 3 (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance synchronization within the operations process) in Training Circular 2-01<sup>4</sup> contains a more detailed approach.

## Commander's reconnaissance guidance

Another area of special emphasis to the reconnaissance troop commander during the planning process is the squadron commander's reconnaissance guidance. In the absence of reconnaissance guidance or intent, the commander should seek clarification to ensure his operations nest within the overall maneuver plan. This guidance should address three basic considerations unique to reconnaissance operations: focus of reconnaissance, tempo of reconnaissance and engagement criteria.<sup>5</sup>

The focus of reconnaissance should direct whether operations concentrate on the threat, terrain or civilian considerations. The commander should nest his focus with the squadron's reconnaissance guidance and higher commander's purpose, as described within his commander's intent. The reconnaissance commander should also effectively summarize CCIRs to focus his unit's collection efforts.



The doctrinal terms “stealthy and deliberate” or “rapid and forceful” usually define the tempo of reconnaissance. (U.S. Army photo)

When communicating his focus to his subordinate leaders, the commander should explain the unit's purpose and how this focus supports the follow-on maneuver units' overall purpose, operations and end state. For example: “Our focus of reconnaissance is terrain because we are supporting a tank company, and it must have a valid route to reach the objective it is tasked to seize.” A thorough understanding of this creates an opportunity for commanders to exercise mission command and develop more CCIRs and NAIs.

The doctrinal terms “stealthy and deliberate” or “rapid and forceful” usually define the tempo of reconnaissance.<sup>6</sup> However, it's useful for the commander to expand on these terms to communicate his intent. For instance, it may be important for reconnaissance operations to remain stealthy and deliberate to enable the follow-on maneuver forces to retain the element of surprise. Another scenario may require maneuver forces to maintain the initiative during an exploitation or pursuit. In this case, the reconnaissance commander would likely prescribe a rapid and forceful tempo. Communicating the intent within the reconnaissance guidance will again empower subordinate leaders to act within mission command to achieve the desired purpose and end state.

Finally, troop commanders must address their engagement criteria. A common mistake would be for troop commanders to regurgitate the squadron commander's engagement criteria. A squadron might prescribe to its troops aggressive engagement criteria with an explanation that they can engage up to two armored vehicles and/or a squad of dismounts with direct fires. This enables the troop to develop the situation, yet avoids decisive engagement and limits the risk to subordinate units. However, when the troop commander distills this guidance to his platoons, he might want to modify this criterion to allow direct-fire engagement of individual vehicles or a team of dismounts. Otherwise, he might expose his platoons to decisive engagement and/or unintended tactical risk. By being descriptive in his engagement criteria, the commander will communicate a clear intent and enable the desired end state.

This analysis reveals that the commander's reconnaissance guidance addresses all the traditional elements of a maneuver commander's intent: purpose, key tasks and end state. Actually, this guidance further develops the intent by reprioritizing and adding emphasis to those aspects unique to reconnaissance operations. As such, the commander's reconnaissance guidance is able to replace the traditional commander's intent in reconnaissance orders (Figure 2).

The reconnaissance planning process described here focuses on CCIRs, develops NAIs and guides the troop commander during COA development through a thorough understanding of his higher commander's intent and both his squadron's and his own nested commander's reconnaissance guidance. With this framework, the commander can now develop his concept of operations and scheme of maneuver using the traditional COA development process.

## Reconnaissance orders

Because of the emphasis placed on CCIRs during reconnaissance planning, another aspect of reconnaissance orders to address is the sequence of how the commander presents his CCIRs to subordinate leaders. The reconnaissance commander summarizes his CCIRs' primary intent when he prescribes the focus within the commander's reconnaissance guidance. However, in the traditional OPORD, the detailed list of CCIRs (reconnaissance tasks) isn't expanded on until the coordinating instructions.

According to FM 5-0, the OPORD is sequenced such that commanders brief the commander's intent, followed by the concept



<p>OPORD (FM 5-0)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Situation</li> <li>2. Mission</li> <li>3. Execution             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Commander's intent</li> <li>b. Concept of the operation</li> <li>...</li> <li>i. Tasks to subordinate units</li> <li>j. Coordinating instructions</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>2) CCIRs</p>	<p>Proposed reconnaissance OPORD</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Situation</li> <li>2. Mission</li> <li>3. Execution             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Commander's reconguidance</li> <li>b. CCIRs</li> <li>c. Concept of operations</li> <li>...</li> <li>i. Tasks to subordinate units</li> <li>j. Coordinating instructions</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
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**Figure 2. Reorganization of the OPORD tailored to reconnaissance operations.**

of operations, scheme of maneuver and the CCIRs much later. Since the CCIRs are the details linking the commander's reconnaissance guidance (commander's intent) to the maneuver plan, the commander should brief the CCIRs following the commander's reconnaissance guidance (Figure 2). By doing this, the transition from reconnaissance guidance to CCIRs, followed by the maneuver plan, should be more descriptive and fluid.

Finally, briefing CCIRs before the scheme of maneuver should make it easy for subordinate leaders to understand the purpose of their reconnaissance tasks. By the time the troop commander assigns these tasks to his platoons, they are aware of the troops' overall intent and purpose. The commander thereby enables his subordinate leaders to exercise mission command and to develop the details of their reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

Revealingly, the military decision-making process addresses CCIRs early, during Step 8 of 18 during mission analysis. Likewise, the reconnaissance troop commander should consider CCIRs early during his own planning process, and he should convey this importance to his subordinates by briefing the CCIRs following the commander's reconnaissance guidance.

CCIRs and the commander's reconnaissance guidance are too important for reconnaissance commanders to overlook during their planning process and orders. The commander must integrate these elements into TLPs and the OPORD in line with their significance. Through the proposed analysis and method of delivering reconnaissance guidance, he can empower subordinate leaders while enabling follow-on maneuver operations.



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*a master's of science degree from the University of Illinois at Chicago.*

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 26, 2010, Appendix C.

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 12, 2010, Chapter 1, Section II.

<sup>3</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 21, 2004, Page 1-130.

<sup>4</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training Circular 2-01, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Synchronization, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 22, 2010, Chapter 3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, Paragraph 2-17.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, Paragraph 2-25 to 2-28.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- BOLC** – Basic Officer Leader Course
- CCIR** – commander's critical information requirements
- COA** – course of action
- FM** – field manual
- NAI** – named area of interest
- OPORD** – operations order
- TLP** – troop-leading procedures

# The Patton Tank in Vietnam

by MSG (Ret.) Michael L. Kelley

*(Editor's note: The M48 Patton medium tank – in service from 1953 to the mid-1990s by the American Army and Marine Corps – was named for GEN George S. Patton, one of the earliest American advocates of using tanks in battle. The M48 served as an interim until replaced by the Army's first main-battle tank, the M60, which was in turn replaced by the M1 Abrams. As writer Michael Kelley relates, the M48 served as the Army's and Marine Corps' foremost battle tank in Vietnam. Continuing their infantry-support role established in late World War II, the Pattons performed well in Vietnam in that same role – there were few tank-vs.-tank battles. The M48s, along with Australia's Centurion tanks, were also the only vehicles in Vietnam that could reliably protect their crews from land mines, so they were often used for minesweeping operations.*

*Although no longer in U.S. service, many foreign countries, namely U.S. Cold War allies (especially other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries) continue to use M48 models. The Turkish army is the largest operator of the modernized M48, with about 758 M48A5T2s in its inventory. Other operators of M48 variants include South Korea, Israel, Republic of China, Greece, Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, Thailand, Lebanon and Iran.*

*Of note, Pakistan used M48 Pattons while rescuing American troops during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993.)*

The M48A3, workhorse of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps during Vietnam, proved a reliable warrior in the country's varied terrain. The tank's performance won over the leadership, who didn't always support using heavy armor in Vietnam. For example, GEN William West-

moreland, head of Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, doubted the effectiveness of heavy tanks and thought air-mobile operations better suited the Vietnam jungle, but he came to acknowledge the valuable role the M48A3 Patton tank played.

As with anything, it's not the technology that's of prime importance, it's the people. Both soldiers and Marines crewed the M48A3, and both soldiers and Marines fought in the jungles of Southeast Asia as a forerunner of today's Joint battlefield.

This article looks at a tank that was effective as used both by Pakistan against India in marshy terrain during the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971, and by Israel against Egypt on the sandy Sinai Front in 1967's Six-Day War. But we also look at the brave tank crews who manned the M48A3s.

## The Patton tank

The 1950s tacticians predicted major tank battles where Warsaw Pact tanks fought NATO tanks in the fields and forests in and around the Fulda Gap, and so the M48 was designed to meet the challenges and threats that improved Soviet armor in Eastern Europe posed. However, the M48's early models lacked crew survivability and had poor engine performance. The original gasoline engine was inefficient and prone to catch fire if hit with an anti-tank shell. This vulnerability exposed the crew to dangerous secondary explosions.

To respond to these problems, the M48 went through a series of upgrades in 1963 that resulted in production of the M48A3. At a combat weight of 52 tons, the M48A3

was equipped with a modern Continental AVDS-1790 series, 90-degree V type, air-cooled, turbo-supercharged, fuel-injected, 750-horsepower diesel engine (same engine as the M60A1). The new features also included a new turret-hydraulics system and new fire-control system. These upgrades not only made the tank more efficient but also safer for the crew.

The M48A3 also had a 90mm M41 main gun which could fire 62 rounds of ammunition of varied types, including armor-piercing, high-explosive, anti-personnel canisters (pellets-flechette) and white phosphorus (for marking targets). A .30-caliber M73 coaxial machine gun next to the main gun could fire up to 5,900 rounds. In addition, the tank carried a .50-caliber M2HB machine gun mount on the tank commander's cupola. Its 3,000 rounds could be fired at enemy infantry formations. Some U.S. Army units added an M-60 machine gun on a pintle mount.

The Marines and Army received more than 1,000 of these upgraded tanks by 1964.

## The M48A3 in support

When the United States began to build up forces in Southeast Asia in 1965, the M48A3 was soon in the middle of this new war, far away from the Fulda Gap. When the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived in DaNang, Republic of South Vietnam, it brought M48A3 tanks, including a few variants of the M67A2 flamethrower, nicknamed "Zippo."

The Marines were responsible for protecting the large military complex in and around the DaNang airbase. By late 1965,





the mission changed as local Viet Cong units began offensive operations against supply convoys and security outposts. Marine infantry battalions deployed on “search and destroy” missions to root out enemy forces. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion, reinforced with elements of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion, broke into small detachments of tank platoons. Each platoon consisted of five tanks each, attached to the various Marine infantry battalions and far-flung base camps located in I Corps.

Combat operations revealed that the tank was susceptible to anti-tank fire. VC rocket-propelled grenade crews shot at the lightly armored rear and sides of the tank. The four-man tank crews (tank commander, gunner, loader and driver) developed tactics to counter some of these problems. For example, the TC could place his gunner on the rear of the tank with an automatic rifle to shoot at any VC who attempted to fire an RPG at their tank. Or, supporting infantry could provide flank protection by riding on top of the tank while the TC fired the .50-caliber machine gun at attacking enemy forces.

Some M48A3 crews were creative, attaching sections of chain-link fence, pierced-steel planks and sections of spare tracks on the flanks of their turrets to cause early detonation of RPGs. The crews also hung backpacks, duffle bags and stored cases of C-rations on the side turret rails.

Landmines were a major danger to advancing infantry, so the M48A3 drove along roadsides and trails, detonating the mines before an infantryman accidentally set one off. The tank absorbed the explosions without too much damage, sparing infantrymen injuries and casualties.

## The M48A3 in battle

**Feb. 6, 1968, tank attack.** A squad of VC attacked a Company C, 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion, M48A3 tank Feb. 6, 1968, on its security duty. The VC anti-tank RPGs scored three direct hits on the tank and wounded three Marines. The valiant crew continued fighting, blasting away at the enemy troops with pellets-flechettes and firing their machine guns, killing many VC. The fierce fight one tank put up stunned the enemy, causing them to break contact and melt away into the jungle. To their surprise, the young Marine tankers found 40 dead VC lying around their wounded tank after the battle.

**Hue City.** During the 1968 Tet Battle for Hue City, tanks from the Marine Corps’ 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Tank battalions, along with elements of 1<sup>st</sup> Anti-Tank Battalion (Ontos), provided close-in fire support to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Marine regiments. These units



The M48A3 also had a 90mm M41 main gun which could fire 62 rounds of ammunition of varied types, including armor-piercing, high-explosive, anti-personnel canisters (pellets-flechette) and white phosphorus (for marking targets). (U.S. Army photo)

fought to destroy entrenched North Vietnamese Army and VC forces. One tank of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, supporting 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Marines on the city’s south side, sustained multiple hits from NVA rockets and recoilless rifle fire, wounding the gunner, CPL Rene Cerda. In spite of his wounds, Cerda continued firing his gun with high-explosive rounds so the Marine infantry could advance. For his heroic actions, Cerda was awarded the Navy Cross for valor and a Purple Heart.

On the north side of the Perfume River in the Citadel, a platoon of M48A3s from 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion provided direct-fire support to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, blasting holes in enemy fortifications, allowing the infantry to move forward. After 18 days of sustained combat under deadly enemy rocket and heavy-weapons fire, the weary Marines drove the remnants of the NVA’s 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry regiments out of Hue City and the Citadel. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Tank battalions earned the Presidential Unit Citation award.

**Rubber-plantation deployment.** The Army also deployed M48A3 tanks when 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 4<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment arrived in Phu Loi in late 1965. However, MACV headquarters would not allow the regiment’s commander to take his tanks out on combat operations. The first Army M48A3 tanks allowed to commit to major combat operations arrived in early 1966 when 69<sup>th</sup> Armor Battalion tanks were quickly unloaded off a Navy tank-landing ship in Saigon and deployed to the Filhol Rubber Plantation within two hours after arriving in-country. The green tank crews then received some on-the-job training on flank and rear security, firing their machine guns and canister rounds in jungle combat.

**Mang Jiang Pass.** Company A of 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 69<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, later fought in the Mang Jiang Pass near An Khe. On April 10, 1968, they destroyed an NVA ambush along Route 19, killing 200 men of the 95B NVA Battalion.

**Ben Het.** Company A was also the first Army unit to engage NVA armor in the war. On March 3-4, 1969, Company A sent a reaction force (1<sup>st</sup> Platoon) to Ben Het on the Cambodian border. There they engaged five Soviet-built PT-76 tanks and BTR 50 armored vehicles, knocking out three of the enemy machines with accurate fire.

**Dak To.** SP5 Dwight H. Johnson from Bravo Company was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions Jan. 15, 1968, near Dak To in repulsing an enemy attack on his platoon, saving the life of a fellow soldier. He climbed out of his tank and fought the enemy at close range, killing many of them. Then, he climbed atop his platoon sergeant’s tank and began firing the .50-caliber machine gun until the enemy broke contact and fled into the jungle.

The 1<sup>st</sup> and 69<sup>th</sup> Armor battalions earned multiple citations, including the Presidential Unit Citation and Valorous Unit Citation.

**Saigon.** The 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Cavalry regiments’ M48A3s battled the enemy in the Saigon area, including the Iron Triangle, War Zone D, Michelin Rubber Plantation, the Hobo Woods and Highway 13. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, Troop A’s tanks and armored personnel carriers (M113s) deployed to Tan Son Nhut Airbase to repulse an NVA assault. Then they pushed north into Ap Dong, where they hunted a retreating enemy battalion and



killed 40 NVA at close range. It was the first encounter for most of the crews with urban street-to-street combat.

The 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Cavalry regiments earned the Presidential Unit Citation, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry (Gold Star) and Valorous Unit Award.

## American tanks used by Vietnamese

When U.S. forces began transferring equipment and bases to the South Vietnamese by 1971, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam began to form new armored units equipped with the M48A3. The

ARVN's 20<sup>th</sup> Armored Regiment and its three cavalry squadrons (44 tanks) had barely completed advanced training with their new tanks when they were thrust into battle.

The North Vietnamese deployed a superior infantry and armor force in the 1972 NVA Easter Offensive, rolling over many ARVN fire-support bases near the Demilitarized Zone. Then they drove south toward Dong Ha, where they encountered the well-concealed 20<sup>th</sup> Armored Regiment. The 20th ambushed the leading NVA elements near Highway 1, destroying nine PT-76 tanks and two T-54 tanks. This forced the NVA unit to withdraw north, out of the firestorm.

On April 9, the 20<sup>th</sup> again engaged NVA armor and infantry, killing eight more enemy tanks.

The ARVN's successes also showed the M48A3's superiority. Although designed for large tank battles in Europe, the M48A3 tanks and their brave crews earned their combat cavalry spurs in the jungles of Southeast Asia, proving Westmoreland and other leaders wrong.



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## Other Details, M48A3 Patton Tank

In addition to the facts given about this tank in the main article, here are other specifications for this tank used successfully in Vietnam:

- Range: 287 miles;
- Fuel capacity: 375 gallons;
- Upgrade features: TC's cupola modified with circular ring with vision blocks between roof of turret and base of cupola. Three track-return rollers and no rear idler. T-type blast deflectors and fender dust shields. Airplane-type steering wheel for driver. Xe-

non infrared/white-light searchlight mounted on 90mm gun shield. AN-GRC 12 radio;

- Tank crew weapons: two M14/M16 rifles, one M79 grenade launcher, one M3 .45-caliber submachine gun (grease gun). Each crewman carried a .45-caliber automatic pistol. Some crewmen supplemented their weapons load by adding World War II-type M1/M2 .30-caliber carbines or captured AK-47s.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- ARVN** – Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- MACV** – Military Assistance Command-Vietnam
- NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NVA** – North Vietnamese Army
- RPG** – rocket-propelled grenade
- TC** – tank commander
- VC** – Viet Cong





The main reason for AFVID knowledge is its use in fire commands. For uses other than fire commands, there is time to investigate the suspect vehicle more thoroughly, and thus identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment comes second. (U.S. Army photo)

# Tanker's Guide for Conventional Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification

by MSG (Ret.) Glenn L. Husted III

Being able to identify armored fighting vehicles is a necessary skill for tank commanders, tank gunners and tank master gunners. This article is an essay on the need for skill in armored fighting vehicle identification.

Tank crewmen may study tactical "soft" vehicles that do not pose a direct-fire threat to the armored force (cavalry excluded). Tanker AFVID may also include low-performance aircraft such as helicopters and dedicated ground-attack aircraft. AFVID can also expand to include specific combat support, transport, strategic or command vehicles. A good training program will also include AFVID using night-vision devices found on the tank.

However, identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment should be secondary knowledge in AFVID training and memorization. A unit's operations order should provide tank crews with the necessary special-mission-vehicle identification needs. Disseminating this infor-

mation to the lowest level in the tank battalion must also occur.

AFVID should avoid being confused with the Army's general need to recognize other threats on the battlefield or while conducting policing or pacification actions. They are also dissimilar in their intended application. The main reason for AFVID knowledge is its use in fire commands. For uses other than fire commands, there is time to investigate the suspect vehicle more thoroughly, and thus identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment comes second. Such vehicles require minimum knowledge for evaluating AFVID within the tank community.

AFVID knowledge requires careful evaluation. It may seem like common sense, but all images selected for training and evaluating AFVID skills must exhibit enough characteristics to identify a vehicle accurately. Long-range thermal blobs, cropped images or poor training aids lacking enough detail are of little training val-

ue. They will not meet the task of AFVID and will frustrate tank crewmen attempting to master the skill. Further, poor images or training aids may lead to incidents of fratricide due to incorrect identification.

## Threat

Knowing what your tankers should learn is important. Tankers should learn the minimum capabilities of the equipment and the threats they create. Leaders should address the following questions:

- What kind of an anti-armor threat does the vehicle have?
- Is it amphibious?
- Does it have a special armor package or capability?

Additional considerations should also include:

- The types of ammunition that are effective and ineffective against specific tanks;

- The effective ranges of specific rounds; and
- The ranges that render specific rounds ineffective.

Fire commands must announce the type of ammunition. Therefore, tankers require knowledge of ammunition models and their intended targets. There is no time for asking questions in this process.

AFVID is not an idle topic for tankers. Skills are perishable, and the threats continue to evolve. Commanders should encourage their crews to gain expert knowledge in this area.

Also, company officers should have an excellent working knowledge of AFVID. Proving this knowledge should be a requirement for all tank commanders.

## Reflexive knowledge

Gaining reflexive knowledge regarding threats to the tank is the first reason for learning AFVID. Applying the gunsight to appropriate targets and formulating fire commands are the main purposes of AFVID knowledge. In addition, this knowledge can also be critical in the application of main-gun munitions to the target type.

I can't emphasize this enough: overloading tank crewmen with a requirement to memorize threats not in their theater of operation is counterproductive. Likewise, memorizing obsolete and low-production vehicles is often unwarranted.

Master gunners should provide commanders with a recommended list of threat AFVs for tank crews to study. This list must include all AFVs that unexpected escalation of hostilities may require. Should a nearby third-party army take sides opposing ongoing operations, there will be no time to distribute or study new information, including allied equipment.

The second reason to study AFVID – besides being able to identify what the threat is – is to know what the threat isn't. There must be no tolerance for incorrectly identifying American vehicles in the forward edge of the battle area. To avoid fratricide during a fire-command sequence, the engagement must include the last-second determination of friend or foe.

Also, dependence on information received via satellite or radio signal must not mitigate the need for personal knowledge. Electronic media can be the weak link in armored warfare. Therefore, the tank crew must know how and what to fight without an electronic umbilical cord. Dependence on third-party battlefield information can paralyze our tank units if knowledge is not present in our leadership.

Gathering and reporting accurate threat capabilities in the FEBA – where the threat is and how dangerous it is – is the third reason for gaining AFVID proficiency. For example, knowing the difference between a T-55 and a T-80 is critical in deciding how and where to engage the enemy. Enemy AFVs that possess an armor package capable of dealing with chemical jet penetrators, explosively formed penetrators, tandem warheads and top-strike munitions must be accurately reported up and down up the chain of command. Likewise, vehicles known to have laser alarms and automated chaff-and-flair dischargers must be recognized for their resistance to all but kinetic penetrators.

In the event of total conventional warfare, both shelved and new armor package technologies will rapidly emerge. Retrofitting tank fleets around the world with these technologies may occur. American tank commanders must know the threat today to prepare for what they may encounter in the future.

Tank crews must train to fight numerically or technologically superior armored forces. Any training philosophy that moves away from that standard abdicates the solemn trust and responsibility for national security the conventional force has.

Forms of non-conventional warfare are an indirect threat to the readiness of the armored force. Therefore, they require treatment as an additional duty. The primary duty, though, must remain intact. Core armor competencies, crew integrity and conventional armored-warfare training require maintenance and enhancement, despite temporary involvement in other forms of warfare. AFVID skills are an integral part of meaningful tank crew training.

## Neutrality

Identifying friendly, foe and neutral targets is another way to talk about AFVID. Neutral targets are, at first, little more than targets you determine not to engage at the time of acquisition. Unlike friendly targets, neutral targets can change and become something else. The same process tank crews use to evaluate neutral targets is applicable to target classification: the closest, most dangerous targets are first.

Leaders must educate their tank crews on what constitutes a neutral target. Tank crewmen must know the declarations the U.S. government makes all the way down to local commanders' statements. Further, leaders must disseminate to their crews any stipulations made by international law and conventions. Training for this type of target must be complete and current, as

the tank platoon is capable of destroying small towns and similar-sized targets.

After classing a target as neutral, you may discover that what you're looking at should lose its status as a target. At that point, its disposition should be passed to the next higher command. A more likely outcome for a non-departing neutral target is that it may be either directly or indirectly in use by enemy forces. You must deal with a neutral target used directly or indirectly by the enemy on the battlefield during conventional warfare; rules of engagement determine how to treat or engage them.

The bottom line is that neutral targets that seem docile or of no threat can change. Because of the threat of their status changing to that of an enemy platform, the term neutral can be misleading. For example, during the opening days of World War II, German tactical aircraft herded refugees into the British tank columns' routes of advance, thus creating human roadblocks. This neutral target or threat wasn't immediately recognized for what it was. Because of this and other supporting tactics used by German forces, the British army was defeated in short order.



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### ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- AFV** – armored fighting vehicle
- AFVID** – armored fighting vehicle identification
- FEBA** – forward edge of the battle area



# We Should Still Fight Like Napoleon

by MAJ Young S. Kang

GEN Richard Myers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, implied that the U.S. Army wasn't prepared for full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century when he said in a 2008 speech at Fort Belvoir, VA, that "our military is perfectly suited for Napoleonic warfare."<sup>1</sup> It is my intent in this article to argue that the combined-arms maneuver capability Napoleon mastered is, and should remain, the Army's core competency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

By discussing three historic examples – a limited war in Korea, an unconventional war in Vietnam and a hybrid war in Lebanon – I demonstrate that Napoleon's legacy is highly relevant and critical to full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century. However, first I'll outline the importance of what Napoleon established.

## Napoleon's wars: combined-arms maneuver warfare

The Napoleonic Wars heavily influenced U.S. Army doctrine in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>

centuries. Western military leaders have studied the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars since the wars ended in 1815. In fact, when Sylvanus Thayer and D.H. Mahan first introduced the Napoleonic Wars to the U.S. Military Academy during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, it became mandatory for all West Point cadets to study them.<sup>2</sup>

Napoleon's true genius as one of the greatest military minds was that he refined organizational structure and doctrines to create a concept of combined-arms maneuver.<sup>3</sup> When he seized power in 1799, he didn't make fundamental changes in the existing French army's organization and tactics, which had been adopted during the French Revolution of 1789-1799.<sup>4</sup> Rather, Napoleon simply modified the organizational structure based on his belief that "infantry, cavalry and artillery cannot do without one another."<sup>5</sup>

For infantry, he regularized the use of the corps, which ranged from 17,000 to 30,000 men.<sup>6</sup> The corps contained from two to four divisions, a brigade or division of cavalry and 30 to 40 field guns.<sup>7</sup> It was designed to "march independently and fight on its own" and to initiate and

"sustain major engagements until the rest of the army arrived."<sup>8</sup>

Napoleon also expanded the artillery corps and reorganized the cavalry corps. He created an artillery reserve under his personal command for commitment at the decisive moment.<sup>9</sup> For cavalry, during the campaign of 1796 in Italy, he distributed "a cavalry division to each army corps and formed the remainder, principally the heavy cavalry, into a virtual corps of its own as a part of the Army reserve."<sup>10</sup> This cavalry corps was exclusively under Napoleon's command for commitment at the decisive point of the day of battle.<sup>11</sup>

Overall, these reorganizational changes greatly improved the French army's efficiency.

Napoleon formulated his warfare doctrines based on "speed and mobility,"<sup>12</sup> "boldness and flexibility in battle ... overwhelming and concentrated firepower... and pursuit in the wake of victory."<sup>13</sup> To implement his doctrines, Napoleon "devoted much time and effort to training his forces that officers and men (under his command) would fully understand his tac-



Battle of Wagram. Horace Vernet. 1809. Public domain.



tics and operational techniques.”<sup>14</sup> For example, Napoleon emphasized the professional military education of his officers by urging them “to read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Eugene and Frederick.”<sup>15</sup>

Special inspectors visited regiments to check on maneuvers and test sergeants on their knowledge of the drill regulations between 1801 and 1803.<sup>16</sup> However, Napoleon “did not insist on rigid adherence to every detail of the 1791 drill book,” but he wanted the Grand (French) army to be able to “operate in the flexible spirit embodied in the regulations.”<sup>17</sup> The Grand Army’s capabilities “to move rapidly with a minimum of logistic support and their tactical proficiency on the battlefield enabled Napoleon to transfer his plans into action.”<sup>18</sup> In battles, Napoleon “constantly retained the initiative, striking boldly and ruthlessly, and never gave his foes the opportunity to gather their forces or their senses.”<sup>19</sup> As a result, in 1805-1806, the French army “reached its height during the battles of Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena.”<sup>20</sup>

Although Napoleon was ultimately defeated, Napoleon’s war imposed dramatic changes on warfare.<sup>21</sup>

## Korean War: Inchon Landing and Chipyong-ni

During the Korean War (1950-1953), the combined-arms maneuver that U.S. armed forces employed played a critical role in spite of the restricted terrain and political restraints civilian leaders imposed. By executing combined-arms maneuvers, United Nations forces achieved a decisive victory at Inchon in September 1950 under GEN Douglas MacArthur and successfully countered the Chinese offensive in Spring 1951 under GEN Matthew Ridgway. Thus, the U.S. military achieved the overall national strategy of rescuing the Republic of Korea, ultimately stabilizing the Far East region in the 1950s.

Following a series of defeats in the war’s early days, the U.S. Army won its first major victory against the North Korean People’s Army with an amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950.<sup>22</sup> Just as Napoleon advocated “striking at his enemy with deep, rapid, slashing maneuvers that threatened their communications and threw them off-balance strategically and psychologically,”<sup>23</sup> MacArthur during the first week of July 1950 envisioned striking the NKPA at Inchon and capturing Seoul quickly for strategic, political and psychological reasons.<sup>24</sup>

In spite of the extreme tidal range at Inchon,<sup>25</sup> the X Corps landing force arrived

off Inchon Sept. 15 with a strength of more than 70,000 combatants, including 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and South Korean Marine Corps regiments. It was a brilliantly executed joint and multinational operation that enabled “the liberation of Seoul, the breakout of Eighth Army, the destruction of the NKPA, the restoration of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and the re-establishment of the Republic of Korea.”<sup>26</sup> If Chinese Communist forces hadn’t intervened later in 1950, the Inchon landing “would almost certainly have resulted in the decisive defeat and collapse of the North Korean government, effectively ending the conflict.”<sup>27</sup>

However, when 485,000 CCF troops launched their first offensive Nov. 26, 1950, against UN forces of 365,000 troops, UN units began a long retreat. Many UN units feared encirclement by the enemy, and therefore they “lost all sense of cohesion and organization when they discovered the CCF blocked their lines of communication to the south.” The CCF pushed UN forces back to the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.<sup>28</sup>

When Ridgway arrived in Korea in January 1951 to stop the CCF’s offensive,<sup>29</sup> he wanted a decisive battle to seize the initiative from the CCF. He wanted the UN forces to end their “mystical sense of Chinese superiority, perhaps even invincibility.”<sup>30</sup> Ridgway’s long-awaited decisive battle finally came when 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Regimental Combat Team, 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, commanded by COL Paul Freeman, decimated the CCF by defending the village of Chipyong-ni Feb. 13-15, 1951. The RCT consisted of infantry units (both American and French), artillery units with 105mm and 155mm howitzers, plus 14 tanks and 10 anti-aircraft artillery vehicles.<sup>31</sup>

According to David Halberstam, the Battle of Chipyong-ni was decisive because “American forces finally learned to fight the Chinese.” More importantly, this battle validated tank-infantry-artillery-airpower cooperation in mountainous terrain and was declared by Ridgway to be the most important combined-arms battle of the war.<sup>32</sup> Tactical lessons from this battle changed the nature of the fighting until the end of the Korean War and “ended the fear that UN forces would be pushed off the Korean Peninsula.”<sup>33</sup> In addition, by using tanks at Chipyong-ni, the U.S. Army found that “armor remained an indispensable part of ground combat, regardless of any limiting conditions under which it had to operate.”<sup>34</sup>

Although the immediate outcome of the Korean War was stalemate due to limitations imposed by the U.S. government, the

Republic of Korea and its people validated our strategy to intervene by developing their economy and establishing democracy later in the 20th Century.

## Vietnam War: Easter offensive

Throughout the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Army and the local insurgents in South Vietnam – the Viet Minh, also known as Vietcong – waged highly politicized and unconventional guerrilla warfare.<sup>35</sup> Responding to perceived failure in countering this warfare, the U.S. government had pulled its last combat troops out of Vietnam by 1972 because of domestic pressure.<sup>36</sup>

However, in March 1972, the NVA surprised the world by launching a massive conventional invasion to destroy South Vietnam.<sup>37</sup> The NVA intended this invasion to be its decisive battle.<sup>38</sup> Unlike a previous offensive in 1968, the NVA conducted a combined-arms maneuver operation with 14 divisions, armed with hundreds of howitzers and T-56 tanks.<sup>39</sup>

Initially the offensive seemed to be successful for the NVA.<sup>40</sup> By mid-May, the NVA had attacked three areas in South Vietnam: Quang Tri near the Demilitarized Zone, Kontum City in the Central Highlands and An Loc near Saigon.<sup>41</sup>

However, the NVA underestimated two elements: the South Vietnamese government’s and military’s resolve, and the United States’ logistical and fire support.<sup>42</sup> As the U.S. military began to provide logistics and close-air support to the South Vietnamese army, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. Air Force to launch a strategic air campaign against North Vietnam’s territory.<sup>43</sup> During Operation Linebacker I, the Air Force dropped 155,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam using B-52 bombers, while the U.S. Navy’s airplanes destroyed bridges and oil depots with the new “smart bomb” technology and laced Haiphong Harbor with 2,000 pounds of sea mines.<sup>44</sup> In a matter of weeks, the U.S. military “destroyed much of the enemy’s economic infrastructure.”<sup>45</sup> The South Vietnamese army “wrested the initiative from the invaders” by June.<sup>46</sup>

After many months of counterattacks by South Vietnam’s army and consistent air strikes, the NVA suffered from high casualties, lack of supplies and disease.<sup>47</sup> The anti-tank weapons operated by South Vietnamese infantrymen<sup>48</sup> and close-air support – including B-52 tactical strikes and helicopters with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles – destroyed most of the NVA’s tanks.<sup>49</sup> How-



ever, in spite of heavy losses, the NVA continued to resist South Vietnam's counteroffensive campaign for months by sheer will.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, the NVA's Easter offensive collapsed after eight months. When the South Vietnamese army reclaimed Quang Tri in September, President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the South Vietnamese army to end its counterattacks.<sup>51</sup> Although the enemy continued to occupy 10 percent of the South Vietnamese countryside after the Easter offensive,<sup>52</sup> the NVA lost almost half the 200,000 troops it had initially committed and all its armor fleet. Combined with the heavy casualties suffered from the Eastern offensive and the renewed strategic bombing campaign (Linebacker II), North Vietnam finally agreed in December to resume peace negotiations in Paris.<sup>53</sup>

During the eight long months of the Easter offensive, the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces severely tested the North's "Vietnamization" plans.<sup>54</sup> If, prior to 1972, South Vietnamese army units hadn't been trained and armed for combined-arms operations,<sup>55</sup> and if the U.S. military's logistics support and air campaign hadn't been available during the Easter offensive, the NVA could have achieved its victory in 1972. This was a valuable lesson that an unconventional enemy is fully capable of launching a conventional, combined-arms offensive.

## Second Lebanese War: battle in southern Lebanon

The Israelis learned similar lessons in 2006 from its non-state enemy, Hezbollah – lessons that Americans should take to heart. "No conflict in the recent past provides a more illuminating study for the U.S. Army than the 2006 Lebanese War," according to Matt Matthews.<sup>56</sup>

When the second al-Aqsa intifada began in late 2000, it forced the Israeli Defense Force to focus on operations to stop terrorist attacks inside Israel.<sup>57</sup> In addition, the war in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom "spurred a belief in the Israeli defense establishment that standoff attack by fire (principally by air power) was an effective means to affect the will of the adversary and determine conflict outcomes."<sup>58</sup> As a result, Israel made significant cuts in defense spending for ground forces, both active and reserve.

The cuts, of course, affected training, procurement and logistical readiness, particularly for Reserve ground units and active heavy units.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, by 2006 the IDF

was "largely incapable of joint combined-arms fire and maneuver. The operations in Gaza and the West Bank were highly centralized, small-unit actions conducted almost exclusively by active-infantry formations and special-operations forces."<sup>60</sup> In addition, the IDF pulled tactical-air-control capabilities out of ground brigades.<sup>61</sup>

While the IDF was reforming its tactics and organization, so was Hezbollah. Hezbollah's leaders, such as Hassan Nasrallah, correctly assessed that the Israeli Achilles' heel was "Israeli society itself."<sup>62</sup> During this period, Hezbollah reorganized its long-range rocket units of the 610mm Zelzal-2 and other systems. Overall, it procured 12,000-13,000 rockets by 2006.<sup>63</sup>

As Hezbollah prepared a strategic campaign against both civilian and military targets in Israel, its engineers also prepared for the IDF's anticipated counterattack by building an array of underground tunnels, bunkers and explosive-ridden areas in the region south of Litani.<sup>64</sup> Hezbollah also improved its logistics systems (ordnance, food, medical) by pre-stocking supplies in well-fortified bunkers. It trained troops to integrate mortars and rockets with anti-tank weapons. It improved underground command-and-control systems and intelligence such as its human and signal network. Hezbollah made all these changes under North Korean and Iranian advisers.<sup>65</sup>

Above all, Hezbollah changed its doctrine by combining guerrilla war with conventional war, therefore a new model of "hybrid threat" was created.<sup>66</sup> In many ways, this mirrored the approach the NVA and Vietcong had adopted during their long war against the United States. In fact, one source suggests that "Hezbollah leaders studied the historic model of the Vietcong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network, extending through the main approach into southern Lebanon."<sup>67</sup> Hezbollah had assembled a well-trained, well-armed, highly motivated and highly evolved army on Israel's northern border by Summer 2006.<sup>68</sup>

The Second Lebanon War broke out July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah fighters crossed from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting two others. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called the incursion "an act of war" and proclaimed "Lebanon will suffer the consequences of its actions." Convinced that it could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern Lebanon by initiating an air campaign, the Israeli air force began to strike targets across Lebanon.

Although initially taken aback by Israel's fierce air strikes, Hezbollah launched an extensive rocket barrage from southern Lebanon into Israel within 24 hours.<sup>69</sup> As days went by, it became increasingly apparent to both Israel and Western military analysts that the Israeli air campaign was having little effect on Hezbollah's rockets.<sup>70</sup>

Finally, when the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into southern Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the ground operation and the stubborn resistance of Hezbollah fighters stunned military observers worldwide.<sup>71</sup> The fighting revealed the IDF's deficiency in training and equipment, and senior officers' unpreparedness to fight a "real war."<sup>72</sup> One senior Israeli intelligence officer remarked that Hezbollah fighters had "gone to school" on IDF ground forces and described Hezbollah as "an infantry brigade with modern weapons."<sup>73</sup>

By the time the UN cease-fire resolution (UN Security Council Resolution 1701) went into effect Aug. 14, 2006, many military analysts were convinced the IDF had suffered a significant defeat.<sup>74</sup> Hezbollah had launched 3,790 rockets into Israeli territory. Less than 25 percent (901) of these rockets hit Israeli towns and cities, killing 42 civilians and wounding 4,262 more. An additional 2,773 Israeli civilians were treated for "shock and anxiety."<sup>75</sup>

The UN resolution also marked the first time in Israeli history that the nation had sought a UN resolution to end a war in which Israel was involved.<sup>76</sup> In the end, "the strategic follies and operational deficiencies resulted in a faltering indecisive war" for Israel.<sup>77</sup>

John Antal, who has extensively studied combined-arms maneuver operations in post-World War II conflicts, said that no armed force should assume that superior firepower guarantees victory. After the 2006 war, the IDF re-emphasized "joint combined-arms fire and maneuver training"<sup>78</sup> by adopting and practicing "procedures to integrate artillery and air fires into maneuver brigades" and by assigning "air controllers into maneuver brigades."<sup>79</sup>

The lesson is that defeating a hybrid threat such as Hezbollah requires joint combined-arms fire and maneuver.<sup>80</sup>

## Conclusion

U.S. military doctrine was "focused on maneuver warfare, a concept that involves combined-arms operations, bold, deep attacks and flexible operational methods" in the 1980s.<sup>81</sup> This was rightly and clearly a reflection of "maneuver doctrine and strategy, which is based on swift, unex-

pected strikes coupled with a relentless exploitation of initial success.”<sup>82</sup>

We should still learn maneuver doctrine and strategy, as maneuver-warfare genius Napoleon regarded “the combination of experience plus reflection upon the immediate and distant past as essential guideposts for military professionals.”<sup>83</sup> Therefore Napoleon’s wars may provide valuable lessons, despite vast changes in the technology of warfare.

Our enemies in the past proved to be adaptive, creative and agile – and they were also inspired by historical lessons, as Hezbollah proved.

Therefore I maintain that the Napoleonic Wars still offer valuable lessons in the 21st Century. Napoleon’s “use of bold, slashing strokes and his ability to combine all the service arms effectively” still apply to contemporary military organizations.<sup>84</sup>

As evident in the Korean, Vietnam and Second Lebanon wars, the Army must retain its core combined-arms maneuver capability to prepare for future full-spectrum operations. Defeating our potential hybrid threats demands integrated joint air-ground-intelligence capabilities “similar to those used against conventional adversaries, but at a reduced scale.”<sup>85</sup> As David Johnson, who analyzed the Second Lebanese War, says, the Army needs “balanced Army forces, capable of joint combined-arms fire and maneuver, to provide the range of capabilities needed to prevail in future conflicts.”



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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>I first heard this statement during the History 100 class of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Gordon, GA, in Spring 2011.

<sup>2</sup>Ross, Steven T. U.S. Air Force Academy Harmon Memorial Lecture #28, “*Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare*.” Accessed May 30, 2011, at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/harmon28.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Dean, Peter J. “Napoleon as a Military Commander: the Limitations of Genius,” *The Napoleon Series*, International Napoleonic Society. Accessed May 23, 2011, at [http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c\\_genius.html](http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c_genius.html).

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ross.

<sup>22</sup>Builder, Carl H., Bankes, Steven C., and Nordin, Richard. *Command Concepts: A Theory Derived From the Practice of Command and Control*, Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 1999. Page 73.

<sup>23</sup>Ross.

<sup>24</sup>Builder, Bankes and Nordin.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Mamaux, David H. *Operation Chromite: Operational Art in a Limited War*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987. Page 2.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Antal, John. “28 Busting Through,” *Military Review*, January-February 2000 English edition. Accessed May 30, 2011 at [http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles/PDF/Busting ThroughMilitaryReview.pdf](http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles/PDF/Busting%20ThroughMilitaryReview.pdf).

<sup>29</sup>Summers, Harry G. *Korean War Almanac*. New York, NY: Facts on File, 1990. Page 233.

<sup>30</sup>Halberstam, David. *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*. New York, NY: Hyperion, 2007. Page 541.

<sup>31</sup>Summers.

<sup>32</sup>Antal.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Parker, Geoffrey. “The Post-War World 1945-2004,” *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Williamson Murray and Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2005. Page 366.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Truong, Ngo Quang. *Indochina Monographs: The Easter Offensive of 1972*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. Page 175.

<sup>39</sup>Daugherty, Leo J., and Mattson, Gregory L. *A Photographic History: NAM*, New York, NY: Metro Books, 2001. Page 488.

<sup>40</sup>Truong.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Parker.

<sup>44</sup>Daugherty.

<sup>45</sup>Parker.

<sup>46</sup>Truong.

<sup>47</sup>Daugherty.

<sup>48</sup>Truong.

<sup>49</sup>Daugherty.

<sup>50</sup>Truong.

<sup>51</sup>Daugherty.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Truong.

<sup>55</sup>Parker.

<sup>56</sup>Matthews, Matt M. “We Were Caught Unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War,” *The Long War Series* occasional paper 26. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008. Page 2.

<sup>57</sup>Johnson, David E. “Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza,” occasional paper, Arlington, VA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010. Page 2.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Matthews.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Inbar, Efraim. “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2007, Vol. XIV, No. 3. Middle East Forum Website, accessed May 30, 2011, at <http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war>. Page 5.

<sup>77</sup>Matthews.

<sup>78</sup>Johnson.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Matthews.

<sup>81</sup>Ross.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Johnson.

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

**CCF** – Chinese Communist forces  
**IDF** – Israeli Defense Force  
**NKPA** – North Korean People’s Army  
**NVA** – North Vietnamese Army  
**RCT** – regimental combat team  
**UN** – United Nations



# Security-Force Assistance: Setting Favorable Conditions for Future Deployment

by CPT Daniel Santos

**“In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security ... are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. ... [T]he effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility and sustainability of its local partners. This strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called ‘building partner capacity’: helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training or other forms of security assistance.” – Robert M. Gates, secretary of defense**

One of the relative newcomers to the U.S. Army operational scene is the advise-and-assist brigade, whose role in security-force assistance is vital. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in an article titled “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance” in May 2010, “Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole. The U.S. Army has established specialized [AABs] – now the main forces in Iraq – and is adjusting its promotion and assignment procedures to account for the importance of this mission.”

Key to maintaining proficiency in SFA is sharing lessons-learned and tactics, techniques and procedures from soldiers who are deployed and who will deploy. To that end I offer the findings in this article, which are based on interviews and discussions with 10 deployed or previously deployed SFA brigades, more than 60 stability transition teams, more than 20 Iraqi general officers, two U.S. general officers, select U.S. Forces-Iraq staff and a myriad of battalions and companies executing the SFAB concept. In addition, I talked to institutional training centers in Baghdad, both American and Iraqi.

I said “relative newcomer” earlier because we’ve executed the SFAB concept for more than two years now. While Sept. 1, 2010, marked the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the start of the U.S. armed forces’ “new mission” (Operation New Dawn) to advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces, this was a symbolic marking of mission change – in actuality, U.S. armed forces began to restructure to advise and assist the ISF more than 24 months ago. Since May 1, 2009, when 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX, deployed as the “proof of principle” SFAB, several SFABs have since learned a significant number of lessons. Those lessons have resulted in the consolidated list of considerations presented in this article, which deployed SFAB commanders, staff officers, augmented advisers, STTs, direct-support company commanders and host-nation security forces staff and commanders recommended.

For Afghanistan, the additional AA package from Human Resources Command started with brigades deploying this past fall. One could say 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne, deployed as the SFA proof of principle for Afghanistan-bound brigades, but – as with 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division – the brigade deployed with little to no augmentation to assist with the advising effort; however, they did apply SFA principles and concepts to assist future deploying brigades with lessons-learned.

## SFAB construct

SFA is a broad framework that spans the full spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1) and focuses on assisting foreign security forces supporting U.S. and coalition interests in a given operating environment. According to Field Manual 3-07.1, the SFA manual, it is defined as “a unified action by the joint, interagency, inter-governmental and multinational community to generate, employ,



Figure 1. The spectrum of conflict and SFA as depicted in FM 3-07.1.

**“Conducting successful SFA requires a specific mindset. This mindset focuses on working by, with and through FSF to support the host nation’s internal defense and development (which includes local security requirements) or regional organization’s charter. Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success. Those conducting SFA must understand that the military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive approach.” – Paragraph 2-1, FM 3-07.1**

sustain and assist host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” Brigades deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan with an emphasis on SFA are commonly referred to by a myriad of names such as a *modular brigade augmented for SFA*, or MB-SFA; *SFAB*; *brigade combat team-augmented*, or BCT-A; or *AAB*. We’ll refer to the brigade or BCT for this article as an SFAB.

The SFA mission has unique characteristics that affect not only the BCT but battalions and companies as well. There’s an old saying, “a BCT is a BCT,” but when deploying under the SFA umbrella, the mission focus is drastically different, and the SFAB must change its task organization and structure accordingly to conduct SFA. A major addition to the SFAB concept is the addition of up to 48 soldiers in the ranks of sergeant first class to colonel to assist in the advising effort.

The dynamics of an SFAB and SFA can be intricate and complex. With provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs, State Department officials and 48 more field-grade officers (Iraq augmentation: four colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels and 24 majors), the synchronization and unity of effort and purpose can be challenging. The same can be said about the Afghanistan-adviser augmentation of two colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors and 24 senior noncommissioned officers. However, regardless of the augmentation package or theater of operation, the fundamental principles of advising and assisting are the same. In applying those principles, following are some recommendations to consider.

First, when deploying as an SFAB, a brigade must understand this deployment will not be like its last one. The unit must have the proper mindset to be successful under the SFAB construct. Advising and assisting other nations’ military forces requires a set of unique attributes far different from the last time the brigade deployed as a BCT. It is imperative that SFAB leaders recognize the distinction between the two different

sets of skills required and focus on instilling a patient, persistent and flexible mindset.

Second, an SFAB needs to understand that its mission revolves around relationships. It’s essential for the SFAB to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among its own elements. By its very nature, the SFAB construct forces its members out of their traditional roles. The augmentation of more advisers to the brigade can create some degree of confusion and distrust. An SFAB must purposefully build relationships among advisers, commanders and staffs.

Third, it’s vital that an SFAB nest itself with its agency counterparts. The SFAB is the force-provider in the area of operations and proprietor of a plethora of assets. However, to be successful, the SFAB must understand that the mission is accomplished with a unified effort between itself and its agency counterparts. Continuous communication with PRTs, civil affairs and State Department officials in its battlespace will ensure a collectively synchronized approach in building civil capacity. In many cases, the PRT and associated agents control the funding allocated for a given HNSF or a local government in the AAB’s respective AO. It’s beneficial that the SFAB coordinate with its agency counterparts to see if the PRT (or like agency) is already funding a much-needed project to prevent duplication of effort.

### Training to build civil capacity

Fourth, success begins with the immediate task organization and integration of AAs into training. An SFAB should attempt to task-organize AAs to the battalions they will fall under for command-and-control as soon as possible. (See Figure 2.) It’s extremely beneficial for an SFAB to task-organize AAs before its combat-training-center rotation.

Early task organization allows AAs and battalion staffs to build rapport and exercise their systems and processes during the CTC rotation. Similarly, it is enormously beneficial to have AAs train alongside the DSC that will support them during their deployment. In addition to building a relationship, this provides an opportunity for both entities to develop a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

Fifth, an SFAB should require that all staffs participate in SFA training and use their expertise. Since ineffectiveness in the SFAB construct can be attributed to its staff’s lack of under-




Figure 2. Example SFAB task organization.



standing of the AA mission and SFA, participation in SFA training will provide a vital conceptual understanding of the advisory mission for brigade and battalion staffs. As the SFAB's AAs assist and assess the HNSF, they will look to secure SFAB assets to address HNSF deficiencies – brigade and battalion staffs are more likely to allocate and assist with enablers if they have a workable knowledge of the AA mission and its complexities.

In addition, the SFAB stands to benefit greatly if it leverages staff talents to assist in SFA/HNSF development. A reality for AAs is that they often have to work with an untrained HNSF staff that lacks knowledge and experience. Staff-on-staff training can be mutually beneficial. It educates the HNSF staff and subsequently provides an educated HNSF staff with which to work.

Sixth, it's imperative that SFABs conduct an AA skills assessment. An SFAB should assess its 48 AAs upon reception and expect a diverse set of advisers. The set of advisers an SFAB will receive will come from all across the force. Some will have previously commanded soldiers in combat and will have difficulty understanding the diplomatic nature of the SFAB concept, while others will have a cognitive and in-depth understanding of advisement from their prior experience on a military transition team. An SFAB should recognize that not all AAs are fit for the mission and that some may adversely affect its efforts.

The SFAB may need to revisit its task organization and adjust accordingly. Removal of an AA for betterment of the unit may be necessary.

Seventh, AAs need to be educated in an assortment of supplementary skills. The contemporary operating environment compels AAs to be diplomats, economists, civic planners and social scientists, in addition to SFA coaches and mentors. While the SFAB receives AAs with significant military education and experience, the SFAB mission will require unique skillsets outside the normal military construct.

**“There are two key areas to the SFAB: command / command-support relationships and managing talent.” – COL Jim Rainey, 3-4 SFAB commander**

To acquire these skills, an SFAB should consider sending its AAs and, in some cases, battalion and brigade staffs and leadership to specific developmental courses to gain a basic understanding of how our systems work so that during deployment, the SFAB can assist the HNSF and host-nation govern-

ment in developing their own functioning systems and processes. (See Figure 3.) I suggest courses such as:

- A five-day class with the Department of Homeland Security's Border Patrol in El Paso, TX, to assist with border and port-of-entry operations;
- A course from the city manager of the community nearest the SFAB's home station to gain basic understanding of local governance;
- A civics course from a local university or college to assist in understanding higher-level government operations;
- A civil-affairs course, possibly from 93<sup>rd</sup> Civil Affairs Detachment, Fort Bragg, NC, to aid understanding in building civil capacity and stability; and
- A police trainer/mentor course from Fort Leonard Wood, MO, to gain much-needed police-mentor training and basic-policing-functions skills.

Eighth, as an SFAB prepares to take on the enormous task of deployment, it needs to share its pre-deployment site survey with its AAs or, if possible, it should take select AAs when it makes the site survey. It's just as important for the AAs as it is for battalion and brigade staff to collect important information on the day-to-day function of the HNSF and the local host-nation government. Providing advisers the opportunity to acquire HNSF information such as assessments, reporting requirements and battle rhythm will allow them to begin making general deductions and start the task of framing a campaign plan focused on HNSF development.

Lastly, the SFAB must take into account all its additional advisers when developing its rating scheme. This can be a point of

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10	Day 11	Day 12
Civil capacity (10 pax)	PRT orientation course							USAID	Dept of State	Treasury Dept	Travel	Tour of refinery
Police (18 pax)	Police transition training					Police ride-along	Local DA brief	Local tours (emergency operations center, jail, 911, forensics lab, fire department, emergency medical services)		Law-enforcement mobile training team (capabilities, crime scene, evidence and forensics)		Provost marshal and sergeant major briefs
Ops (10 pax)	Police transition training						Travel	Battle command seminar (Fort Leavenworth, KS)			Travel	
Border (4 pax)	Custom and Border Field Operations Academy (El Paso, TX)					Travel		Local tours (emergency operations center, jail, 911, forensics lab, fire department, emergency medical services)		Law-enforcement mobile training team (capabilities, crime scene, evidence and forensics)		Provost marshal and sergeant major briefs

Figure 3. Example of SFAB training schedule.

## An Adviser's Necessary Qualities

Because advisers operate in very subjective environments, it's difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisers. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the adviser's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include:

- Tolerance for ambiguity
- Motivation of self and others
- Open-mindedness
- Self-reliance
- Ability to withhold judgment
- Strong sense of self
- Empathy
- Tolerance for differences
- Communicativeness
- Perceptiveness
- Flexibility
- Ability to accept and learn from failure
- Curiosity
- Sense of humor

(From *The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook*, June 1, 2009)

contention if it's not done in an open and inclusive forum. The SFAB may receive field-grade advisers who have already commanded a battalion or who are command-select advisers. Based on task organization, AAs can be under dual supervision. In this case, the preferred method is to divide rating-chain positions between the two supervisory chains of command (see Army Regulation 623-105, *Officer Evaluations*). I recommend that the SFAB commander discuss the rating scheme soonest to dispel rumors that field-grade advisers will be "fodder" for a commander's profile. (See Figure 4.)

## AA skills

There was a time when being selected as an AA meant being a member of a 10- to 16-man MiTT, which was significantly over-

burdened and grossly under-resourced. The MiTT had a somewhat strained relationship with the battlespace owner, and command-and-control was not always clearly defined. But over the course of the last few years, the criticality of the advisory mission has been given just attention. The Army now recognizes and prioritizes the advisory mission as one of its foremost missions. In doing so, the Army specifically stood up 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk, LA, to provide AAs with training that's relevant, current, applicable to the advisory effort and focused on SFA. Also, the Army now codes certain adviser SFAB positions as command-select, placing an emphasis on SFA's importance.

However, the principles of the adviser mission have remained constant – it's still geared toward the enormous and arduous tasks of teaching, coaching and mentoring HNSF. Relationships are still an adviser's currency. An adviser's success directly relates to the relationship he has built with his HNSF counterpart and his SFAB team. A good relationship with his HNSF is necessary, but a great relationship with his own brigade, battalion and supporting company is paramount. Advisers should spend just as much time nurturing and cultivating a relationship with their own SFAB team as with their HNSF counterpart.

Key-leader engagements are crucial to the SFAB mission. It's necessary for an adviser to develop engagement themes and prevent KLE fratricide. An adviser should also not overly engage HNSF leaders with unnecessary meetings; when a HNSF leader is obligated to sit with a general officer, followed by a brigade commander and battalion commander, then the AA, there can be a mixture of messages. It is best to communicate predetermined themes and limit interaction with the key leader to prevent conflicting priorities and information.

The first five and last five minutes of a KLE can be the most important, so an AA must build and improve his language skills. An adviser doesn't necessarily need to know how to order a drink or ask for directions to the grocery store in his host country's language. Instead, he should attempt to perfect the host nation's fundamental greetings and farewells. Initial contact in a well-scripted and well-rehearsed KLE can significantly affect long-term trust and respect.

Simply put, language takes practice. Although an adviser will improve his proficiency with his linguists and counterpart once

	Rater	Intermediate Rater	Senior Rater
STT MAJ	STT LTC (deputy chief)		STT COL (deputy chief)
	STT LTC (deputy chief)	Battalion commander	STT COL (deputy chief)
	STT LTC (deputy chief)		Brigade commander
	Battalion commander		STT COL (deputy chief)
	Battalion commander		Brigade commander
	Battalion commander	STT COL (deputy chief)	STT COL (deputy chief)
	Battalion commander	STT COL (deputy chief)	Brigade commander
	Rater	Intermediate Rater	Senior Rater
STT LTC	STT COL (chief)		Division cmdr/dep cmdr
	STT COL (chief)	Brigade commander	Division cmdr/dep cmdr
	STT COL (chief)		Brigade commander
	Brigade commander	STT COL (chief)	Division cmdr/dep cmdr

Figure 4. Example of SFAB rating scheme.



he arrives in-country, he should attempt to converse as often as possible before he deploys.

An AA must exercise patience and flexibility. His effectiveness as an adviser is based on gaining his counterpart's trust and confidence. He should advise with the understanding that he is in "their home" and that decisions will affect them long after the adviser's one-year tour has expired.

Also, the adviser must be flexible in his mentoring approach. HNSF may adopt most U.S. standard operating procedures; however, culture and tradition still play a major part in their processes. Some HNSF will simply choose not to adopt U.S. doctrinal processes, and the adviser will need to be creative in how he coaches and develops his HNSF counterpart. Depending on when the adviser deploys, he may be the fifth or sixth rotational adviser to the HNSF commander. "Adviser burnout" may be prevalent among HNSFs who have "heard it all before" from previous advisers. In this case, creativity, patience and flexibility on the adviser's part are necessary.

HNSFs are often more receptive to employing and refining HNSF TTP than U.S. TTP, so an adviser should plan on "working their system." It can be frustrating in attempting to apply U.S. doctrinal methods to their own systems and processes because not all HNSF commanders and staffs will learn and implement U.S. methods. It is therefore imperative that an adviser learn HNSF systems and processes (logistics, maintenance, supply, etc.) before recommending changes. Often times, it is best to stick to the rule: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

Patience and flexibility is also needed when attempting to acquire support. An AA must understand that his DSC is dually tasked and that support may be significantly delayed at times. Realizing that some systems and processes for requisitions in-theater are fragmented and take time aids in preserving the support relationship – unlike continental United States support, logistical needs and other support requests may take longer than normal to obtain in-theater.

Success comes with synchronizing battle rhythms. Establishing a timeframe is critical to good planning. However, an AA must understand that his time is not always accommodated to his HNSF counterpart. Some HNSF take an afternoon "siesta," where they retreat to their quarters for rest and recuperation and then come back in the evening to engage in operations and planning. This battle rhythm might not lend itself to the targeting cycle of his supported battalion. An adviser should communicate, coordinate and synchronize his and his counterpart's battle rhythms to achieve greater synergy in planning and execution.

An adviser should attempt to understand his HNSF social, cultural and political dynamics. His HNSF partner's tribal, social and political clout in some cases can be more important than his rank. An adviser should recognize that many times a HNSF member may have a title but little to no training in his particular field. Establishing governance can be difficult when HNSF prioritize their tribes and religion before patriotism to their country. HNSFs can be very hospitable, but an adviser should not let their hospitality be a diversion from observing what is actually transpiring.

Last, an adviser should continue to be the leader he has trained to be. The HNSF will test him early in his tour, so he must hold the line. He should do a monthly goals azimuth check to see if original goals still apply and if his unit is still on track to achieving them. We are always being watched, so everyone on the team must be professional at all times and lead by example. The advisory mission will be an enormously challenging one, so an adviser should cling tight to his sense of humor; he will need it every day.

## SFAB-AA relationship

It's often said that relationships are pacing items. They are the pillar on which successful security-force partnerships lean. While there is little doubt that relationships with HNSF are critical and fundamental to mission accomplishment, little is said of how important the relationship is between and among our own forces. If the SFAB and AA relationship isn't a pacing item, it's at least a high priority. The relationship a battalion or brigade builds and maintains with its respective AA team(s) is critical to achieving maximum results.

An SFAB must be proactive in the relationship it develops with its AAs. The sooner a battalion begins to establish lines of communication and a command-support relationship with its AAs, the better prepared it will be for the advising mission. It is simply not enough for a battalion to build and develop rapport with its HNSF counterpart; it must also embrace its AAs.

Depending on the advisory structure, the battalion will need to provide a DSC or support element to support its advisers. Support usually comes in the form of (but is not limited to) logistics, communications, medical, intelligence (through the company intelligence-support team and, if a policing mission, possibly military police and a law-enforcement professional).

It is better for a battalion to develop a shared advisory vision with its AAs prior to deployment than to wait until arrival in-theater. The AAs through coordination with the battalion commander and his staff will count on leveraging the battalion's assets to advise and assist HNSF.

## DSC-AA relationship

The DSC under the SFAB construct demands an innovative, agile and adaptive team. A DSC command team must understand its battalion commander's vision and intent while providing the necessary security and functional-area specialist to support and assist its AAs with their mission. The DSC and AA relationship is also a critical one that needs to be purposefully developed.

**The AA's part.** A DSC is the lifeline for an AA, so the adviser must communicate his needs, build rapport and exercise professional restraint. An adviser should communicate his needs early on and provide some expectation of his requirements to the DSC commander. He should allow the company commander to command his company by not directing his support but allowing him to explain what he can provide. While a field-grade adviser has "abundant knowledge" from his time in command, he must harbor professional restraint and not engage in "company business." He should limit his involvement in company operations.

However, that said, AAs have the opportunity to use their years of training and talents to advise and mentor a supporting company commander. Every company commander is at a different level of performance. When an adviser communicates his needs and vision of support, he should look for opportunities to teach and mentor. The supporting company commander may have the drive and motivation to assist a HNSF battalion commander or higher, but he does not have the needed experience or dedicated staff to mentor and advise.

**The DSC's part.** This is a relatively new and different mission set for a maneuver company, so it's incumbent on a DSC commander to get his AAs' guidelines and requests up front. He should not wait for the field grades to track him down for a conference. A DSC commander will be working with his AAs daily, so he should coordinate a meeting as soon as possible. Establishing an early dialogue and discussion with his advisers will provide him an understanding of anticipated requirements. Figure 5 illustrates a "contractual agreement" between an adviser team and its DSC.

Companies will	Advisers will
Provide functional-area specialties (ops/logistics/intel) – battalion also available upon request for skillsets that exceed company expertise	Provide planning time for companies to execute mission
Provide security for movement	Attend unit operations-order briefs when applicable to STT mission
Provide training, oversight and supervision of dedicated platoon	Participate in patrol drills, rehearsals, backbriefs prior to and following movement IAW TACSOP
Provide STT supply, personnel and other needs to battalion	Submit requests for supply and other needs through companies
Facilitate growing a strong relationship with partnered ISF leaders	Manage EML internally - submit DA 31s through companies to battalion – primary and deputy deconflicted
Provide CoISTs to inform STTs of current intel picture	Facilitate growing strong relationship of companies with partnered ISF
Keep STTs abreast of ongoing and future battalion operations and events	Create opportunities for company and battalion to maximize effective partnerships – provide ideas for how company/battalion can help train partnered units
Receive STT ISF assessment of training needs to enable effective advising and training of ISF	Provide feedback and salient information to CoISTs to ensure a holistic Intel picture
Inform STTs of any company changes that impact the STT/company relationship	Integrate advise-and-assist actions into brigade combat team and battalion-level operations and commander's intent
	Coordinate with company/battalion before making a commitment of battalion resources to ISF
	Comply with battalion reporting requirements
	Produce required adviser reports (ORA assessments, logistics estimates, etc.) to higher STT headquarters for tracking ISF training, manning and equipment status

Figure 5. Example of SFAB training schedule.

A DSC commander should explain how he would be able to support his AAs and inform them of his major constraints. A DSC commander should not be overly concerned about AAs interfering in company operations. If he does have concerns, he should present them early to prevent misunderstanding of the support relationship.

Building rapport with his AAs is a necessity for a DSC commander. Building rapport with HNSF in many cases is much easier than building it with AAs, usually due to the rank disparity. Ignoring or avoiding the field grades will cause friction in the long term. The DSC commander should choose to engage and discuss the mission with his AAs as soon as possible. Early engagement will ensure that AAs understand company constraints and competing requirements within the battalion.

## Keys to SFAB

Confidence and mission clarity under the SFAB construct comes from understanding the command and command-support relationship. Under the SFAB architecture, a DSC commander has two requirements. One, he will adhere to orders and guidance he receives from his battalion commander. Second, he will also have mission-essential directives from the AAs he supports. Although this can be a precarious situation, he should seek to understand all requirements and be an active participant in determining what his priorities are. Gaining understanding will likely result in a harmonious relationship among the advisers, the battalion and the DSC commander.

The SFA considerations included in this article are not all-encompassing, nor do they cover the entire spectrum of the SFAB mission, but they are an assembly of proven methods at brigade, battalion and company levels that have achieved significant effectiveness and resulted in great SFAB and advisory successes. The SFAB concept will continue to gain momentum and remain at the forefront of merging doctrine. As Gates noted, “The advisory mission will only continue to become a staple requirement of the general-purpose forces.”



*CPT Daniel Santos, a field-artillery officer, commands Company C, 1st Battalion, 353rd Infantry, 162nd Infantry Brigade. (Company C is the lead company for training combat advisers under the SFAB curriculum at Fort Polk.) He deployed with 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, in 2003 as a fires-platoon leader supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and with 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, in 2005 as the battalion's assistant S-3. He also commanded Battery A, 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery, Camp Casey, Korea, from 2008 to 2009. CPT Santos earned a bachelor's of arts degree in political science from Texas Tech University and holds three master's degrees: one in criminal justice from Tarleton State University, Stephenville, TX; one in public administration from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK; and one in leadership and management from Webster University, St. Louis, MO.*

## ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

- AA** – augmented adviser
- AAB** – advise-and-assist brigade
- AO** – area of operations
- BCT** – brigade combat team
- CoIST** – company intelligence-support team
- CTC** – combat training center
- DSC** – direct-support company
- FAS** – functional-area specialist
- FM** – field manual
- FSF** – foreign security forces
- HNSF** – host-nation security forces
- ISF** – Iraqi Security Forces
- KLE** – key-leader engagement
- MiTT** – military transition team
- PRT** – provincial reconstruction team
- SFA** – security-force assistance
- SFAB** – security-force assistance brigade
- STT** – stability transition team
- TTP** – tactics, techniques and procedures



# REVIEWS

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***Hurub al-Mintaqah al-Arabiyyah: Mawqif al-Siyasi al-Misri*** by Dr. Salah Salem, Dar-al-Shirook Press, Cairo, Egypt, 2001. 325 pages.

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It is easy, with so much written about the Middle East after Sept. 11, 2001, to overlook the viewpoints of Arab strategic military thinkers. The language barrier also makes the study of contemporary Arab generals' writings intimidating. Nonetheless, the Middle East's stability is linked to America's national security. Future military leaders define their leadership today by their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. These two factors demand analysis of books written by Arab generals and incorporation of their views into the curriculum of America's war colleges. (Just as we passionately kept updated with Russian military thought during the Cold War, we need the same aggressive scholarship with similar Arabic books to enhance our ability to combat Islamist extremism.)

Dr. Salah Salem, an Egyptian army general, ranks among Egypt's most important strategic thinkers and lecturers on military and political affairs. His book, ***Hurub al-Mintaqah al-Arabiyyah: al-Mawqif al-Siyasi al-Misri***, translated ***Wars of the Arab Region: Egypt's Political Posture***, surveys the wars involving Egypt since 1948 (the first Arab-Israeli war) to more recent conflicts in Somalia, the Sudanese civil war and Operation Desert Storm. Salem discusses the negative and positive national-security consequences that Egypt faced with each conflict. What makes his book more significant is that he also discusses potential crises the Middle East will confront in the 21st Century, including resource-based conflicts and nuclear proliferation. (Most Egyptian generals focus their writings on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in this book represents only one chapter.)

Sadly, Egyptian strategic thought – not excluding Salem – obsesses over Israel despite three decades of peace between both sides. This fixation with Israel is not only counterproductive in dealing with global terrorism, which Salem's book doesn't mention, but also with Egypt's ability to realize full partnership in being a major non-NATO U.S. ally. (Ironically, both Israel and Egypt share this special designation as major non-NATO allies.)

Salem's opening chapters educate Arab readers on terms used in the vocabulary of political-military affairs. He defines these terms – many of which are familiar to American military readers and are taken from Western sources – such as *pre-emptive war* and *general nuclear war*. Salem's book, however, also defines terms specifically used in Islamic warfare and gives examples of when warfare is justified. He argues that the Quran sanctions warfare against non-Muslims only to repel aggression and preserve free expression of Islamic ideas by protecting the free religious expression of all peoples (Muslims and non-Muslims).

Salem then gives a synopsis of the history and reasons for each of the four Arab-Israeli conflicts (1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur War), but what is of most interest is Salem's assessment of what Egypt gained and lost in each conflict from a national-security perspective. Then Salem discusses other 20<sup>th</sup> Century wars affecting Egypt, dividing the Arab-Israeli conflicts separately from the Yemen War (1962-1967), the First Gulf War (commonly known in the West as the Iran-Iraq War) and Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), for instance. He provides an Arab and, in particular, Egyptian, perspective on the impact these wars had on Egyptian military thought.

Known as Egypt's Vietnam, the origins of the Yemen War are straightforward – Egypt, wanting to spread pan-Arabism and sweep away Arab monarchies, intervened in a revolution of Yemeni army officers who overthrew the ruling imam of Yemen. This led to civil war between monarchists and republicans, which would devolve into a regional proxy war that pitted Egypt against the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, Jordan and, clandestinely, Israel. It also was a chance for France and Britain to get even for the 1956 Suez Crisis and undermine President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom they saw as a dictator. This conflict split Yemen into north and south, with the north being the first and only communist Arab nation.

The Yemen War led Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council to adopt Carl von Clausewitz's edict that warfare was an extension of policy by other means. Egypt established the Nasser Higher Military Academy to give senior Egyptian officers linkage between military

and political objectives, creating robust discussions of national security and Egyptian policy. Since Egypt's policy was to support nations in the region who were striving for their independence, self-determination and freedom from colonialism, the country sponsored national liberation movements in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, meddled in interne-cine fighting among Syrian generals and supported Palestinian Liberation Organization guerrillas. Egypt also opposed any power that prevented pan-Arabism and supported those who endorsed it – thus Nasser's decision to court the Soviets.

The First Gulf War (1980-1988), Salem writes, taught Egyptian officers the importance of domestic military production, to vary sources of arms, and the effectiveness of deploying weapons of mass destruction and world response to using these weapons (including subsequent non-proliferation agreements and ban on these weapons' use in the world's armies).

Egyptian military strategists still avidly study the Second Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), and Salem devotes 10 pages to this particular conflict. The Egyptians expanded their view on the balance of power in the Middle East beyond just Israel and Egypt and began looking at the impact other regimes in the region had, and how this affected Egyptian security. Egyptian military leaders kept a closer eye on military developments in Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Egyptian military leaders also called for increases in military expenditures and American military aid – moving away from the Nasser regime's pro-Soviet tilt – to modernize their forces, as any remnants of Soviet doctrine were discredited after Desert Storm.

Also recognized was the importance of coalition-building before beginning a major war; however, Salem remains attached to Arab unity and Arab coalition-building, which has been useless in addressing conflict in the region. An Arab form of the "coalition of the willing" emerged from Desert Storm – the Arab states who participated in the Gulf War Coalition signed the Damascus Declaration incorporating Syria, Egypt and the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) as a first line of defense when Middle East conflicts flared up. This was to relieve

the European Union and United States from intervening in the region. (*Editor's note:* Jordan has requested to join the council, and Morocco has been invited to join, so the Gulf Cooperation Council may soon include eight countries.) This agreement has not been successful so far, except in the realm of military exchanges for training.

Salem devotes a chapter to discussing the Egyptian military viewpoint of Arab civil wars and regional border skirmishes, including the border disputes of nations sharing the Nile River. He also addresses border disputes among Arabic states bordering the Persian Gulf. For example, Egyptian observations of Saddam Hussein's campaigns against the Kurds justified Saddam's attacks because the United States aided the Kurds; Salem's argument that the Kurds' affiliation with outside powers endangered Iraq's national security is a view shared by many Arab nations with troublesome minorities (like the Shiites in the Persian Gulf states). Salem's look at the rules of engagement for Arab regimes – which are to use a group's outside assistance, be it Western or regional, as a pretext for purging minority groups – are interesting observations that can only be found in an Arabic book, and they confirm the importance of tribes, cliques and kin in ensuring internal security.

Operation Restore Hope and the North-South Sudanese Civil War represent possible sources of the next wars of the region. For example, Egyptian military thinkers see the continuing civil strife in Somalia as a threat to the security of the strategic Bab-el-Mandab Strait, by which commerce and tankers pass on their way to the Suez Canal with cargo and oil for Europe and Israel. They also view Somali instability as affecting the Nile's security and therefore threatening water sources for both Egypt and Sudan. Salem considers Somali and Sudanese instability as a reason for Israel to insert itself into a conflict and gain an advantage along the Red Sea coast.

The Sudanese civil war ended between the Muslim majority in the north and non-Muslim minorities in the south when the warring parties signed a peace agreement granting autonomy to the southern region. Perhaps the biggest worry for Egypt there is the separation of Southern Sudan as an independent state and any unity with Uganda and Ethiopia, be it military or economic, that leads to control of the sources to the Nile. (*Editor's note:* Southern Sudan voted in a January 2011 referendum to secede July 9, 2011.)

Salem believes the next wars of the region will be over the competition for resources, most likely water, with the following flashpoints:

- Turkey, Syria and Iraq in conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers;
- Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and any future Palestinian state in conflict over sharing water reservoirs and the Jordan River; and/or
- Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania in conflict over sharing the Nile River and its tributaries and sources.

The Israelis do not acknowledge if they have nuclear weapons; their policy of nuclear ambiguity is a form of deterrence. This hasn't stopped Egyptian military thinkers from spending much time and effort dealing with the probability that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them on regional adversaries. Salem devotes an entire chapter on the subject. He reflects the likely thinking of many Egyptian strategists who believe that Israel likely possesses 200 nuclear bombs of various kilo-tonnages. He writes that the Arabs need only three tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, yet the Israeli retaliatory response against the Arabs would likely include:

- Aswan High Dam and Euphrates dams between Iraq and Syria;
  - The Egyptian urban centers Cairo, Giza, Aswan and Alexandria;
  - The Syrian urban centers Homs, Hama and Damascus;
  - The Iraqi urban centers Baghdad, Basra and Mosul;
  - The Jordanian urban centers Amman, Zara and Irbid;
  - The Saudi Arabian cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca and Taif (note the oil-rich eastern province is not included in Salem's calculations); and
  - The Libyan urban centers Benghazi and Tripoli.
- Troop concentrations amassing towards Israel could be neutralized using smaller nuclear payloads.

Salem's final chapter refers to work on Israel's nuclear-ambiguity policies and options by Dr. Shai Feldman of Tel Aviv's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. This indicates that Egyptian military strategists, and likely their Syrian counterparts, carefully read works produced by war colleges and strategic think tanks.

There is much the American military mind can find to disagree with in Sa-

lem's book, but what Salem offers are the strategic national-security concerns of a major Arab nation. Egypt occupies an important geo-strategic location and is the most populous Arab state. Its strategic views influence the general Arab view in the region. Therefore, it is incumbent on American war colleges to analyze and assess the latest works produced by Arab military thinkers like Salem.

YOUSSEF ABOUL-EINEIN  
CDR, U.S. Navy

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*Dhikrayat al-Liwa Muhammad Salih Harb /dirasat wa-tahqiq (Memoirs of General Muhammad Salih Harb: a Study and Analysis)* by Dr. Ahmed Hassan Mohammed al-Kinani, Al-Amal Publishers (sponsored by the General Cultural Commission, a sub-division of Egypt's Cultural Ministry), Cairo, Egypt, 2009.

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As a leader and educator in the U.S. armed forces, I make it my responsibility to introduce our men and women who will eventually deploy to the Middle East to the nuances of the region. Since the late 1990s, I have sought Arabic-language books of military significance as a means of educating, informing and introducing our combat forces to the region's complexities. Complexity is not to be feared, it is to be embraced, for with complexity comes the opportunity to provide America with strategic and operational advantages.

(*Editor's note:* The reviewer is a senior counterterrorism adviser at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism in Washington, D.C. He also teaches part-time at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, where he is adjunct Islamic Studies chair.)

Egyptian historian Dr. Ahmed Hassan Mohammed al-Kinani has collected the memoirs of Egyptian GEN Mohammed Salih Harb (1889-1968) for the first time in a single volume. While Harb was a meticulous diary keeper, keeping notes almost daily from the time of his graduation from Egypt's Frontier Guards, he often lost his diary and papers in battle. Harb lost his diaries on three occasions: during the 1915 revolt against the British along the Egyptian-Libyan frontier; while engaged in Libya against the Italians in 1917; and while aiding Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, in fighting Greek forces that were part of a European contingent at-



tempting to carve up the Anatolian plateau in 1921. It was only during Harb's retirement in the 1960s that he would recollect and gather his notes to write an unpublished and unfinished autobiography. Kinani has done Arabic readers a great service collecting Harb's scarce papers, notes, diaries and a little over a dozen recollections published in *Muslim Youth Magazine* in 1966 to produce these memoirs.

Kinani has also done American readers a service because Harb is an anathema to militant Islamists like al-Qaida. The Egyptian Muslim Youth organization he led supported Egyptian independence movements and did not seek to become a political movement like the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Youth organization wanted to take the best of both Islam and the West to create a strong and independent Egypt. Harb was part of the neo-Salafi movement of Mohammed Abdu and did not choose to follow the regressive Salafism of Rashid Rida that led to the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. These nuances are critical for American thinking on the Middle East in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Harb's inculcation in anti-British sentiment occurred in school, where his teachers encouraged resentment of the British, who had maintained Egypt as protectorate since 1882. He started his military service as a member of the Egyptian Frontier Guard, graduating from the Frontier Guards Academy in 1903. He was assigned to the Libyan-Egyptian frontier, where he distinguished himself as a second lieutenant by apprehending a drug-smuggling ring. In recognition for his leadership, he was promoted and appointed chief of Egypt's Western Desert area, unheard of for a first lieutenant.

When Italian forces invaded Libya in 1911 and colonized the defenseless region – which was part of the declining Ottoman Empire – this unified Egypt's nationalist and Islamic parties. Egypt raised weapons, money, equipment and food, and provided a safe haven for Libyan resistance fighters. Harb at this time began his long association of fighting along the Egyptian-Libyan border with Libyan resistance fighters. Promoted to captain in 1913 and in 1914 to frontier commandant of Mersah Matruh and the Siwa Oasis, he used his command and intimate knowledge of the terrain to smuggle goods and people along the Egyptian-Libyan frontier, and to plan egress and ingress routes from the Western Desert into towns along the Libyan border up to Tripoli.

At the time, the British looked the other way as Egyptians supported the Libyan cause against the Italians. However, as World War I loomed, the British relied more on Egyptian forces to guard the Libyan border to reinforce the Suez Canal. This only increased Egyptian support for Libyan resistance fighters, and Harb expanded his smuggling route to bring into Libya volunteers from the Sudan. Harb went from aiding the Libyan Senussi revolt in 1911 to joining it in 1915, rising to become chief of staff of the 12,000-man Senussi forces.

The year 1915 was key for several reasons. The outbreak of World War I complicated matters with Egypt, the Senussi revolt, the Italians and the British, as Italy was part of the Triple Entente (alongside Britain and France) against Germany, the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungary (the Triple Alliance). The British began cracking down on Egyptian support to the Libyans in 1915. Also, the British made a mistake that superpowers often make: their contempt for Egyptians lowered their guard and they severely underestimated Egyptian officers.

Also in 1915, the Germans – working with elements of the Young Turks movement and specifically with Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha – got the Ottoman sultan to declare jihad against Britain, France and Russia. In November 1915, the British off-loaded Indian forces, armored vehicles and planes to reinforce the Western Desert, supplemented by Egyptian-Sudanese troops. In that month, Harb defected to the Senussi cause, refusing to fight fellow Muslims for the British. He was 25 years old, and the currents of Egyptian nationalism, pan-Islamism and anti-colonialism intersected in his mind. When the British sentenced Harb to death in abstention, he escaped from Libya to Istanbul and joined Ataturk's efforts for Turkish independence.

Harb represented many Egyptian leaders of the period who were torn about serving the military of a country that was a British protectorate until 1922. He returned to Egypt in 1923 after the country was granted quasi-independence and a new government – eager to repatriate its exiled citizens – pardoned Egyptians who had served Ottoman forces.

Harb served as parliamentarian (1926-1930), director of Egypt's prisons (1930-1939) and chief of Egypt's coastal defenses (1939). He was Egypt's war minister (1939-1940) under the government of Prime Minister Ali Maher Pasha. Harb also directed (1940-1967) the Shu-

baan al-Muslimeen (The Muslim Youth), an organization that infused Islam with calls for an independent Egypt.

Al-Qaida views Harb as an apostate for his embrace of democratic institutions and service in the Egyptian security services and Egypt's cabinet. However, Harb's desire for Egyptian independence also led him to pro-Axis leanings, a sentiment the Nazis exploited with an aggressive anti-British propaganda campaign. He wasn't alone in thinking the Nazis would rid Egypt of the British and bring about independence; a young army signals captain, Anwar Sadat, spent time in jail for his pro-Axis sentiments.

In spite of his pro-Axis stance, Harb was perhaps the first Egyptian official to be concerned over the serious threat posed by, first, the Italian fascists in Libya, and later the combined Italian-German forces under GEN Erwin Rommel. German and Italian propaganda seduced a segment of Egypt's leadership; the Muslim Brotherhood, elements of the government, King Farouk and a few Egyptian military officers clandestinely came together in a loose network to capitalize on the crisis of World War II to gain independence for Egypt. In hindsight, both the British and the Egyptians were shortsighted. On one hand, the British wanted to retain the status quo and not negotiate the gradual self-determination of such possessions as India and quasi-protectorates like Egypt. On the other hand, only a few Egyptians read *Mein Kampf* and understood where Arabs fit into Hitler's racial order.

British officials in Egypt began an aggressive campaign to discredit Maher and Harb for their pro-Axis sympathies. This was ham-handed diplomacy and incredible on the part of the British to accuse Harb. As I previously noted, he spent several years fighting the Italians in Libya before and during World War I, and his ideas for defending Egypt against an invasion from Italy clearly demonstrated he was more concerned about Italian occupation of Egypt than the British quasi-occupation. It was an example of wanting a regime change at all costs to install a pro-Allied government in Egypt that would declare war on the Axis without conditions.

The conditions that irritated the British were posed by Maher's government in 1939. In exchange for an Egyptian declaration of war on the Axis, Maher proposed to the British that they negotiate the four restrictive clauses that gave Britain control over Egypt's defense and foreign policies, and agree to evacuate Brit-

ish troops from Egypt and the Sudan at World War II's conclusion. The British prime minister's response was to cable King Farouk, calling for Maher's removal. Although Egypt was outraged over British interference, the Maher government stepped down. However, even more anti-British leaders guided Egypt over the next few years (1940-1942).

Finally the British, fed up with Egypt's refusal to cooperate with them in thwarting the Axis, surrounded Abdine Palace with an armored contingent Feb. 4, 1942, dictating an Anglophile government of Mustafa Nahas Pasha to King Farouk. This was such a painful event to Egypt that Harb refers to it simply as "the 1942 incident." The event humiliated the Egyptian army, causing a young major, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to form the Free Officers Association, which led the 1952 revolt that unseated Egypt's government and forced King Farouk to abdicate.

Harb organized demonstrations among his Muslim Youth organization over the 1942 incident, for which the British insisted that he be exiled. Although the British wanted him exiled to Seychelles or South Africa, for instance, he was exiled to Aswan in Upper Egypt (1942-1945), near where he was born.

After World War II, Harb witnessed the 1952 Egyptian revolution and three Arab-Israeli Wars. He remained active as leader of the Muslim Youth Association and advocated an Egyptian nationalist agenda, merged with Islamic reform, which differed from the Muslim Brotherhood's purely Islamist focus.

Comparing Britain's experiences in Egypt to America's challenges in negotiating with Egypt, Turkey or Pakistan today makes it clear why the historic details of Harb's life matter. They permeate the collective psyche of decision-makers of the Middle East today. Harb's memoirs in Arabic, collected and published in their entirety in 2009, are major works of Libyan, Ottoman, Egyptian and World War I and II history that need to be rediscovered in English by America's military planners and by those who shape policy in the Middle East.

It is vital that Arabic works of military significance be translated, discussed and debated as a means of cultivating a high level of awareness at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Questions remain for the military researcher, such as what type of Islamist was Harb? He doesn't fit the Muslim Brotherhood mold and certainly isn't someone whose biography would stimulate today's militant Islamists. The best books leave one with unanswered questions to ponder, and it is

my hope that **ARMOR** readers are stimulated to conduct their own exploration.

YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN  
CDR, U.S. Navy

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***Hitler's Panzers: the Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare*** by Dennis E. Showalter, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2010. 377 pages, \$25.95.

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Other than the American Civil War, is any subject other than German Panzer and mechanized forces more covered? The problem is that there are books that range the extremes, from extreme detail to simple campaign studies. As a military historian and Armor officer, I had yet to find a book that bridged those extremes. Until now.

There had been no book that bridged that gap until I read Dennis Showalter's ***Hitler's Panzers: the Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare***. In 377 pages of text, Showalter neatly traces why German doctrine and thought evolved from World War I to the collapse of the Eastern Front at Berlin in 1945.

One of the more interesting aspects is Showalter's explanation that Germany's lack of interest in armored warfare in World War I was because, since the nation had rapidly developed effective anti-tank measures, it saw little value in the industrial-infrastructure investment that armored warfare would have required. Showalter ably discusses prewar doctrine and theories in a manner that highlights pertinent facts and trends without bogging down in intellectually interesting but ultimately useless trivia. Even more remarkable is that his approach feels both fresh and unbiased, which is refreshing, as Showalter doesn't simply dress up old dogma with new terms of operational art.

What Showalter examines are several different narratives: the role of national socialism and its impact on German armored development; the panzers' role in German culture and society; and their impact on the war in both a military and ultimately moral sense. If the intelligent and coherent discussion of doctrine and force development doesn't already excite you, Showalter's detailed treatment of the war will leave you wishing for more. His analysis gives you insight into each campaign separately, but he weaves his narrative in such a way that builds context for how the campaigns interrelated and how that influenced the war.

Showalter also highlights that the panzers became not only the critical fighting and operational tool in the German arsenal, but in a larger sense became the focus of the Wehrmacht's identity. For the junior Armor officer, Showalter's focus on logistics is an area you probably need to read slowly and then reread.

For the Armor officer, Showalter neatly continues the post-war narrative of how many panzer leaders were rehabilitated and how the Bundeswehr learned and applied lessons from World War II. The nine-page epilogue is masterful, as it not only tells the tale of the end of the panzers in the operational sense, but also continues the narrative into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Showalter notes that panzer officers often faced trial in the context of the Nuremberg-style justice that the victors exacted.

Of some surprise is a lack of photographs and bland maps that are on a strategic scale. In general, the maps add little value to the book and should be reworked in the next printing.

If there is a single book you buy on World War II this year, this should be it. It simply deserves a place in the bookcase of any serious student of history and with every Armor officer. It is a masterful synthesis whose readability footnotes, although they would have been welcome, would have marred. It is a reasonably priced book that is entertaining enough to disguise its obvious scholarship.

ROBERT G. SMITH  
LTC, U.S. Army

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# 3RD ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT



The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Cavalry Regiment Nov. 25, 1922. It was amended to revise the description Jan. 5, 1923. The insignia was redesignated for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment Dec. 18, 1951. The green and yellow (gold) trumpet refers to the organization of the regiment in 1846 as the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, with uniform facings of green and insignia consisting of a gold trumpet. The words "Brave Rifles" are from the accolade given the regiment by GEN Winfield Scott, commanding general of the Army, for its action at Chapultepec during the Mexican War. The regimental motto, "Blood and Steel," was derived from the same accolade ("Brave Rifles! Veterans! You have been baptized in fire and blood and have come out steel.")

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