



# ARMOR

*Mounted Maneuver Journal*

**IBCT's Recon Squadron  
in Full-Spectrum Operations**

*March-April 2011*



# ARMOR

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-11-2

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# LETTERS

## Remaining Vigilant through the Minefield

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read with great interest the "Commandant's Hatch" by Colonel Martin, "Preparing for an Uncertain Future Operating Environment," in the November-December 2010 edition of *ARMOR*. I read the article through the lens of J. Kotter's article, "Leading Change — Why Transformation Efforts Fail," *Harvard Business Review* (1995), and Kotter's Change Model. I studied this subject at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and it has been reinforced through my graduate studies at the University of Kansas.

In Kotter's article, he lists the common pitfalls that occur when an organization undergoes change, which include the organization failing to create a sense of urgency; failing to create a powerful enough guiding coalition; lacking vision; undercommunicating a vision; not removing obstacles to a new vision; not planning for and creating short-term wins; declaring victory too soon; and not anchoring change in the corporate (in this case, the armor branch) culture. In the Army, this might seem an uncomfortable topic to discuss; however, it is prudent to discuss it during our time of transformation. Many might say that gaining a guiding coalition is a moot point in the Army based on the hierarchical command structure under which we operate. However, I argue that this is very crucial because the goal should be commitment and not merely compliance due to a directive handed down by a higher command.

As we move to a branch and an Army preparing for an uncertain operational environment, I agree with Colonel Martin's focus on live-fire operations; training under adverse conditions; and training with a combined arms focus. These are all great points into which armor leaders can sink their teeth. The challenge, which is common knowledge across the Army, is training core competency tasks while training tasks that make us effective down range are quite often exponentially different.

Retaining skills that we learned over the past 9 years while retraining core competencies is a challenge across the Army with which all commanders will wrestle. Creating and maintaining a "hybrid" Army is a daunting task, which has been the topic of many discussions at CGSC. The prevalent thought is that we cannot simultaneously maintain an Army that is proficient at both conventional and unconventional warfare. I contend that with a well-defined vision and plan for getting there we can. I further believe that Kotter's change model provides necessary ingredients for achieving the end result of an armor force capable (tactically and technically) of planning and executing in an uncertain operational environment.

Finally, I would like to point out that I look forward to the challenges of the uncertain future. As Colonel Martin mentions, it will be a wild and exciting ride. I do believe that developing a clear vision for transforming to a "hybrid" armor corps is key to our future, which Colonel Martin has provided. Through the leadership that guides us

through this transformation, I am confident that the armor corps will continue to lead the way. Implementing Kotter's change model to ensure this vision is properly communicated and implemented across the formation, and remaining vigilant through the minefield, will provide the necessary traction that we need during this time of uncertainty. Forge the Thunderbolt!

FRED RODRIGUEZ  
MAJ, U.S. Army

## It's Enough to Make an Old Tanker Cry

Dear *ARMOR*,

My compliments to Captain John M. Zdeb on his article, "Task Organizing a Heavy Brigade Combat Team to Achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance in Any Environment," in the January-February 2011 edition of *ARMOR*. I firmly agree that the current organization should be drastically changed, but suggest that some of his proposals be reconsidered. Before getting into the details, please let me review some history.

First, and contrary to Captain Zdeb's conclusion, the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) has not yet been tested, let alone "proven successful" in full-spectrum operations. The Iraqi army was defeated by heavy divisions and armored cavalry regiments. The current brigade combat team (BCT) concept was conceived and implemented after the Army chief of staff, at the time, thought it was a good idea to create five brigades from a division that typically had only three. Given the chief of staff's guidance, the Army staff quickly provided the organization and it was pronounced "good," nevermind its weaknesses or problems. Study? Test? Analysis? Don't make me laugh!

Concurrently, the Stryker brigade was the latest "new thing" and portrayed as the "concept demonstrator" for the Future Combat System (FCS), which was going to "revolutionize land warfare as we know it" [this time for sure] and thus render the "heavy force" obsolete. Reality quickly set in and it all flopped, but there was plenty of potential capability with Stryker, or more properly "mechanized infantry (wheeled)," as long as it was properly resourced. Hence, the Stryker BCT (SBCT) is robust, though lacking heavy armor, while austerity was forced on the HBCT, which is why it has only two combined arms battalions (CABs) and only two firing batteries in its field artillery battalion.

Further, and I don't want to repeat too much of my many past letters on the subject, the Armor School has lost sight of cavalry's doctrine, role, and mission. The terms "cavalry," "reconnaissance," and "scouts" are tossed about loosely and often interchangeably when they are in fact distinct and precise. Further confusing the issue is the merger of military intelligence assets into combat reconnaissance organizations, and contending that the reconnaissance troop or squadron could fight as an armored cavalry. Goodness, we are befuddled!

Finally, the deep philosophical question (which should be answered by TRADOC and Department of the Army rather than the Armor School):

If we now have replaced old "divisional brigades" [three or four combat battalions task organized and supported by division assets based on specific missions] with new "separate brigades" [stand-alone, permanent, all-inclusive and non-tailored], what exactly is the role and purpose of the division headquarters and where are all the assets usually provided by echelons above division (corps and Army), and how close are they to the engaged BCTs?

Now, into the weeds and proposed changes to the CAB! Adding a field artillery battery to the CAB places an overarching long-range critical fire support asset too close into the unit's own footprint. Rather than "combined arms," this creates a combined target. Only if the CAB was expected to *routinely* operate independently and out of range of the BCT would this make sense. Otherwise, battalion mortars are more than adequate and operationally suitable, blending well with the CAB's maneuver and fires scheme. Fire support should come from the BCT's field artillery battalion and above.

Mechanized infantry companies lost their organic mortars with the Army's conversion to the Division '86 structure. I always felt that this was a poor decision and therefore I agree that mechanized infantry companies should have their own mortars; however, rather than sections, I suggest full platoons of the heavy 120mm.

Replacing a tank company with an armored recon troop is doctrinally and operationally confusing [as are all issues concerning cavalry, recon, and scouts]. Based on operational experience since World War II, a battalion needs no more than a scout platoon. Instead of adding a recon troop, just keep the second tank company. I like the suggestion to expand the tank company to four platoons (18 tanks total). Before Division '86, the tank company had five tanks per platoon (17 tanks total).

An organic combat engineer company is wastefully inefficient. Seldom will any given CAB need both mobility and countermobility at the same time. When they need either, they need it urgently and en masse, while the other capability is useless. Engineers should be consolidated in engineer battalions at echelons above BCT and should be tailored, allocated, and *surged* as needed.

Related side note: The Abrams (and Bradley) still lack even the most rudimentary obstacle capability, a simple tank dozer kit. The Armor School was working on a modular dozer kit, much like the mine-clearing plow, up until about 1987; however, with a change of leadership priorities, it disappeared. That left armor completely dependent on engineers, who have nothing better than the old and obsolete M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), and it was only intended to keep pace with the M60 main battle tank (MBT) and M113 armored personnel carrier. Shame on armor!

On to proposed changes to the reconnaissance squadron: don't even waste time trying to fix it — get rid of it! Instead of a reconnaissance squadron, add a third CAB. In its place, bring back a heavy armored cavalry troop working directly for the brigade commander



and have the military intelligence company feed intelligence to the BCT headquarters and S2!

I'm not picking on Captain Zdeb, who is dutifully working within existing doctrine. My disagreement is with doctrinal Army restructuring. I cannot even comprehend, let alone agree, with existing and proposed recon organizations. As I read recent reconnaissance articles in *ARMOR*, all I find are vague platitudes and broad amorphous capability claims. Specifically, I disagree with the premise that ground recon units need to be encumbered with organic military intelligence assets. They both report to the same headquarters, but one maneuvers and fights on the ground while the other relies on technical collection means. Yes, the recon unit would benefit from emerging intelligence from military intelligence assets, but so would all the CABs. That's why the BCT headquarters should collect the intel, evaluate it, and disseminate it as appropriate.

Regarding proposed changes to the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), I already stated my opposition to eliminating the field artillery battalion headquarters and headquarters battery and dispersing its individual batteries to the CABs, so of course I would leave field artillery combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) and field artillery radar platoons with the field artillery battalion.

I withhold my opinion on adding an air defense battery (2 Avenger platoons) until a solid determination is made of the threat (enemy tactical unmanned aerial vehicles) and the suitability of the Avenger in dealing with it. I simply don't know.

I oppose replacing the military police (MP) platoon with an MP company (4 MP platoons) based on Captain Zdeb's own rationale: Non-doctrinal tasks such as training teams during stability operations. A task-specific augmentation makes more sense.

On the proposal of adding a heavy engineer battalion to the HBCT: just as the engineer company in the CAB, a heavy engineer battalion in the HBCT is a wasteful dilution of engineer assets that work best when task organized for specific missions, completing them, and moving on to the next mission. Also, construction engineers have a tremendous logistics burden, not only for their equipment, but especially required construction materials and supplies. They have a huge umbilical cord to echelons above division engineer and supply assets. Further, the heavy construction engineer battalion, especially, has little to offer an armored combat maneuver brigade during an offensive, or even defensive, mission if attempting to maneuver along with it. Engineers do not build or fortify positions while under fire; they construct them, where directed, for combat elements to occupy to conduct a defense. And if actually drawn into battle, they must essentially secure their construction equipment and reorganize to fight as infantry. Yes, it inspires heroic tales and yes, engineers will do it dependably and without hesitation, but unless it's an honest to goodness real mission-critical crisis, any maneuver commander who wastes

his engineers this way commits an unpardonable sin.

Added comment on dispersing the field artillery battalion: Captain Zdeb hedged his proposal to scatter the field artillery batteries with the fallback position that the BSTB, led and staffed by field artillery officers, could control and mass the independent batteries when needed. This turns operational planning and execution on its head.

Doctrinally, the brigade assigns missions and objectives to its battalions. The brigade then uses its own assets (organic and allocated from higher) to shape the battle to support the battalion's scheme of maneuver and fires. The brigade establishes priorities for support assets and the battalions plan and execute accordingly. The brigade, as the senior headquarters, is responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing these assets, thus removing that burden from the battalions and allowing them to focus on the close fight fought by the companies.

Under Captain Zdeb's proposal, the battalions will do far more expansive and complicated planning, synchronizing, and executing; however, at any moment, they might be suddenly countermanded by brigade, disrupting everything. Also, though positioned to support its own CAB, a battery might well be out of position to support an adjacent or farther CAB. The obvious answer will be for the brigadier to look over the battalion commander's shoulder to ensure "wiser" placement more in conformance with the brigadier's concept. And that is micromanagement. It is not only inefficient, but corrosive to unit leadership, morale, and initiative. Don't do it!

Now, for the final slap in the face to all armor and cavalry professionals! Despite my rather lengthy critique, I must state that Captain Zdeb's proposal is not far off the mark. My comments are aimed at areas where he has gone a little bit off the mark, beyond what I consider prudent, but his proposed HBCT organization is generally sound. How do I know? It is rather similar to the heavy armored cavalry regiment, specifically, the 3d ACR, the last of its kind, and soon to be converted, as was its sister, the 2d ACR, into just one more SBCT.

The Armor School and Patton Museum should hold special commemorations, a day of mourning, when the 3d ACR finally converts to a brigade combat team. I'm confident that the soldiers and troopers will continue to perform magnificently, given what they have to work with, but consider what a unique combat capability will have been lost. It's enough to make an old tanker want to cry. Forge the Thunderbolt!

CHESTER A. KOJRO  
LTC, U.S. Army (Retired)

### **Focus on the Mission Not Platform: A Horse by Any Other Name is a Tank**

Dear *ARMOR*,

There may be a compelling argument for a medium tank. However, in his article, "Future War Paper: A Modern Medium Tank for Future

Battlefields," in the November-December 2010 edition of *ARMOR*, Major Stuart James' provocative appeal for a modern medium tank is not it. He alleges an "institutional prejudice against the tank" prevents "the ability to fight and win in any environment." Unfortunately, his historical examples dismiss critical facts and modern developments that channel the reader to a narrow material solution.

James' argument ignores key facts and expert analysis. As the basis of his argument, he claims, "a modern medium tank would have dramatically changed the outcome" of the 1993 battle of Mogadishu. However, the exclusion of U.S. armor was a command decision by Major General William Garrison, based on mission analysis and not on political concern. MG Garrison, concluded an "armor reaction force would have helped, but casualty figures may or may not have been different." Furthermore, in *Black Hawk Down*, Mark Bowden's expert synthesis of events concludes mitigation by a U.S. armor quick-reaction force (QRF) was "by no means a definite thing."

Nor were the Wehrmacht's armored columns the decisive factor behind France's 1940 defeat, as James claims. Brigadier General (BG) Robert Doughty's scholarly works, *The Seeds of Disaster*, *The Breaking Point*, and his essay "Myth of the Blitzkrieg," strongly counter James' argument with solid evidence. Invalid assumptions about future war led the French to procure systems and design doctrine that was fatally flawed when pitted against Germany's agile infantry, innovative junior leaders, and decentralized command structure. German miscalculations regarding their own armor prowess in 1940 led to disaster against the Soviets within a year. The Panzerkampfwagen II James epitomizes became obsolete as soon as it encountered the Soviet T-34, the world's most successful medium tank.

But it is difficult to find an effective medium tank after 1960 as they evolved into heavier main battle tanks (MBT). The MBT provides a single heavily armored vehicle that can adequately breakthrough, exploit, and provide infantry support. James describes this well with modern examples in Iraq and Afghanistan. But modern trends indicate tanks may have a mixed resume. Without combined arms, information and air superiority, the hybrid threat is already proving adept at countering MBTs and by logic medium tanks.

James overlooks his own point "that the future battlefield is likely to be in urban terrain," and incorrectly asserts, "on very rare occasions can enough [enemy] antitank systems be massed, much less maneuvered, to defeat enough tanks to make a significant operational difference" to elevate the primacy of the medium tank. Both Grozny (in 1995) and the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War offer cautionary tales where the enemy scored operational victories by decimating armored and mechanized battalions in restricted terrain with massed antitank systems. The tank proved inferior to more agile, innovative, dismounted enemies while

*Continued on Page 49*

*You Are Cordially Invited To Attend*

# THE 2011 RECONNAISSANCE SUMMIT

Hosted by the Commanding General,  
Maneuver Center of Excellence

From  
6 – 8 April 2011  
At Fort Benning, Georgia

The inaugural Maneuver Center of Excellence Reconnaissance Summit intends to examine the Army's Modular Brigade Combat Team Reconnaissance organizations within the framework of the current family of futures documents (*Army Capstone Concept, Army Operating Concept, Movement and Maneuver Functional Concept*) that describe capabilities required to operate under conditions of uncertainty and complexity during the period 2016-2028. The purpose of the conference is to engage senior Army leaders and reconnaissance stakeholders in a professional discussion to examine future capabilities in relation to existing doctrine, organizations, and training and leader development programs. The end state is to outline a strategy that enables operationally adaptive reconnaissance organizations that can execute wide area security and combined arms operations under conditions of ambiguity.

More information will be posted, as it becomes available, at:  
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# COMMANDANT'S HATCH

BG Ted Martin  
Commandant  
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## Leader Development — Armor Style!

I am pleased to report that the Armor School's move from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning, Georgia, is going exceptionally well. All of the hard work of both the former Armor and Infantry Centers is paying huge benefits at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. Buildings and barracks are slowly, but surely, coming on line and equipment transfer between the two posts is well underway. If you get a chance to visit Fort Benning, I recommend you take a few minutes and swing by Harmony Church Complex — you will not be disappointed with what you see! I can safely report that we are on track to meet our timeline objective and in the very near future we will be Forging Thunderbolts in Georgia!

Although we are currently tackling many challenges, leader development, as stated in my first Commandant's Hatch, continues to be my number one priority. As such, we are initiating a systematic review of all our leader development courses to ensure they are both relevant to the current operating environment and reflective of the Army Operating Concept.

As the combat arm of decision, the Armor force must be prepared to prevail across the full spectrum of operations. Secretary Gates said it best during his address to West Point cadets in February 2011, "The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest." The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan cannot, and will not, be cast aside, but now is the time to re-evaluate how we are preparing armor leaders to prevail in an environment of uncertainty.

The Basic Officer Leadership Course-Armor (commonly referred to as "Armor BOLC") is the Armor School's gold standard for leader development. No other single course in the Army prepares recent college graduates to take on leadership positions, such as commanding a lethal mounted combat force, as effectively as

Armor BOLC. In about 99 days of training, young lieutenants must be prepared to serve as either tank or scout platoon leaders. To further increase potential, Armor BOLC develops lieutenants to serve in all four brigade constructs, which include the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB), and heavy brigade combat team (HBCT). Because of the awesome responsibility we place on the shoulders of these young tank and scout platoon leaders, we absolutely must "get it right" the first time, every time.

With this in mind, we are currently reviewing our BOLC program of instruction to ensure we train the right tasks and competencies at the right level of proficiency. The 316th Cavalry Brigade is leading this effort and, as an initial target, has chosen to relook 'how' we teach gunnery competencies to new lieutenants. Revising our gunnery strategy is driven by the need to prepare lieutenants to serve in a multitude of deployable maneuver units while simultaneously continuing a progressive model designed to produce Armor officers with leadership skills, small unit tactics, and branch-specific capabilities.

Current BOLC gunnery strategy is split evenly between M1 tank gunnery and M3 Bradley gunnery. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), with its unique structure, is the only remaining unit where lieutenants customarily lead platoons from the turret of a cavalry fighting vehicle. With the 3d ACR converting to a Stryker brigade, we are exploring the notion of replacing Bradley gunnery with light cavalry mounted weapons training. The objective is to provide Armor lieutenants with the most relevant gunnery experience possible. Feedback from commanders in the field, as well as senior lieutenants and junior captains returning to the Maneuver Captain Career Course, highlight the need to better prepare them for service in IBCT reconnaissance squad-

rons. In the heavy arena, feedback indicates that commanders want platoon leaders to be more confident with the fundamentals of gunnery and preparing tanks for live-fire operations as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.21, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Gunnery*.

We are carefully studying ways to best accomplish these tasks and will consistently update, adjust, and revise our programs of instruction accordingly. It is a laborious process; however, the Armor branch has legendary Armor leaders and master gunners who are dedicated to transforming BOLC gunnery into a world-renowned training event. This is the perfect opportunity for our leaders and soldiers to share their ideas, observations, analyses, visions, and thoughts about imminent gunnery transformation. Our Soldiers know their business; therefore, they are the best source to shape the Armor force from bottom up, as opposed to 'baptism by fire' or attempting transformation via top-down experimentation. Weigh in! Put pen to paper and let us know what you think; your thoughts and operational experience are invaluable.

In the near future, the BOLC review process will include reviewing tasks we currently train during situational training exercises and field training exercises. In addition to field time, we are also assessing ways to employ virtual and gaming opportunities at the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

It promises to be an exciting year and I look forward to reading your comments on these and any other subjects related to developing Armor leaders.

Driver, move out!

CSM Ricky Young  
Command Sergeant Major  
U.S. Army Armor School

## Army Values Serve as The NCO Corps Foundation

*"Honor your Soldiers. They deserve it. They are the backbone of the Army and they are what make us so great."*

—Walter D. Ehlers, D-Day  
Congressional Medal of Honor Recipient

As the Noncommissioned Officer's Vision reminds us, today's NCO is an innovative, competent, and professional enlisted leader grounded in heritage, values, and tradition. Today's NCO embodies the Warrior Ethos, champions continuous learning, and is capable of leading, training, and motivating diverse teams. Today's NCO is an adaptive leader who is proficient in joint and combined expeditionary warfare; continuous, simultaneous full-spectrum operations; and is culturally astute and resilient to uncertain and ambiguous environments. These NCOs must lead by example, train from experience, maintain and enforce standards, take care of Soldiers and adapt to a changing world. They are accomplished military professionals who have combined civilian and military educational opportunities to become the Army's preeminent body of leadership. NCOs are known as the 'backbone of the American Army' and are the standard keepers for the military — training, leading, coaching, and mentoring Soldiers. They are an invaluable and essential part of the Army.

From time to time, we must revisit the very foundation that makes our NCO Corps stand head and shoulders above the benchmark, even in an environment of uncertainty and conflict. This indisputable fact is best illustrated by the Army Values, loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. As NCOs, we owe it to our Soldiers to take time to reexamine the true significance of each value, which supports the sustainment and growth of the NCO Corps. These values honor leadership, professionalism, commitment, courage, and dedication of the NCO Corps and continuously improve leadership skills, which serve as the cornerstone on which to educate and nurture Soldiers:

**Loyalty.** Loyalty to Soldiers is crucial — they deserve it. Small-unit operations are more common in today's contemporary operating environment. Soldiers must know and trust that their first-line leaders, their NCOs, will stand by them regardless of the situation. Many Soldiers will stumble at one time or another; identify the problem, fix it and 'drive on.' Take great care of your Soldiers and they *will* take care of you.

**Duty.** An NCO's duty is much more than fulfilling obligations; they must take the initiative and execute not only specified tasks, but any task that needs to be accomplished. It is easy to overlook the hard jobs when you are not directed specifically to do them. But the superior NCO takes the hard road to ensure all bases are covered. Avoiding the hard right over the easy wrong in garrison may result in a verbal admonishment, but in combat, it may result in losing a Soldier. When in charge, take charge — with no second guesses.

**Respect.** Treat Soldiers with respect — its the most important feature of an NCO's professionalism. The best advice is to 'praise loudly and blame softly.' Loudly berating a Soldier in the company of the entire unit is unacceptable; you will lose respect and likely loyalty of your Soldiers. The last thing Soldiers need is a 'hot head' to lead them in a theater of war.

**Selfless service.** Reinforcing the fact that, as an NCO, you will take responsibility for your Soldiers in all circumstances demonstrates an NCO's selfless service. Leading Soldiers is a very serious responsibility; NCOs must place the needs of their Soldiers above their own needs. NCOs are leaders 24 hours a day, seven days a week — their responsibilities cannot be "delegated."



**Honor.** An NCO's honor is his integrity; it is the idea of doing what is right in all situations. Offering honor to your Soldiers means you value your relationship with them. NCOs live by a code of honor — both on and off duty. NCOs must lead by example; to serve with honor is to serve while living the other Army Values.

**Integrity.** Integrity' is the anchor of an NCO's moral fiber; it should be treated as a daily practice as it describes ethical and moral values. It also represents the virtues of an NCO — solid, firm, stable, and thorough. It means fairness, straightforwardness, and adhering to the facts; it also implies a refusal to lie, steal, or deceive in any way. Above all, it demands an unwavering commitment to the standards of an NCO's profession, which is tried and proven honesty and trustworthiness. Finally, it represents an incapacity for corruption, bribery, and moral deceit.

**Personal courage.** Every Soldier knows the importance of courage, both on and off the battlefield. It takes courage to withstand the rigors of war; and it takes courage to assume responsibility for life and death decisions; and it takes courage to "do the right thing." NCOs build courage by standing up for and acting on the things they know are honorable. Facing fears, both physical and moral, depicts an NCO's personal courage, which begins with taking responsibility for all actions in your area of responsibility and culminates with leading from the front during combat operations.

The Army core values go hand in hand with combat skills; they must be practiced as *the way we live* as U.S. Army Soldiers. TRAIN 'EM RIGHT!



# Candor, Dissent, and Obedience:

# Reexamining Moral Obligations in the Professional Military Ethic

by Major Mark K. Snakenberg

Obedience is the cornerstone of the American military ethic. From a soldier's induction onward, the concept of subordination to superior military authority and ultimately, civil government — as embodied in the Constitution of the United States — is continually imbued. Yet for military officers, obedience must be balanced with the duty to offer professional advice to superiors — whether uniformed or civilian — and regardless of whether the advice conforms to existing thought or policy. Traditionally, this quality has been termed “candor,” a word with passive connotations. An alternate word with active connotations — dissent — exists, which better defines the officer's moral obligation to proffer professional advice; yet prior to accepting this definition one must first closely examine the true meaning of dissent and treat the traditional baggage associated with this word in the military context.

This article explores the legal and ethical basis of dissent in the U.S. Army, its application, and the limits to which such dissent is considered professional and tolerable. Ultimately, this article establishes parameters for appropriate dissent within the professional military ethic and recommends further education and training in responsible dissent.

## Candor and Dissent

*“Candor: the state or quality of being frank, open, and sincere in speech or expression; candidness; freedom from bias; fairness; impartiality.”<sup>1</sup>*

*Dissent: to differ in sentiment or opinion, esp. from the majority; difference of sentiment or opinion.”<sup>2</sup>*

Placed aside each other, the differences between candor and dissent are evident. The definition of candor implies passivity; something must act upon the object to produce candor. Dissent, rather, implies active exercise upon the object. Militarily, this difference is of great significance. This definition implies that the candid military professional must wait for an outside influence to act upon him to produce candor; that is, he must wait for his superior to ask him his opinion before offering a frank, open, et-cetera, response. This situation is inconsistent with the expectations of a professional, who is duty bound to “express [his] expert point of view on any matter touching the creation, maintenance, use, or contemplated use of the armed forces ... regardless of whether the advice was solicited or regardless of whether the advice is likely to be welcomed.”<sup>3</sup>





Superiors are often unwilling to ask subordinates with potentially dissenting views their opinions because they do not want to hear the response. Not being asked does not absolve the professional from a moral responsibility to offer professional advice. The professional must therefore go beyond waiting to be solicited and actively proffer his opinion when, in his professional judgment, his superior needs to hear it. This act is an act of dissent.

It is important here to recognize that nothing in the definition of dissent implies public registration, although dissent in military terms is almost always associated with public dissent. Failure to recognize different types of dissent is an inhibitor to mature discussion of the subject and harms the profession. Dissent can occur privately, publicly, or in a pseudo-public setting. Private dissent is simply a one-on-one discussion between superior and subordinate in which the subordinate vocalizes a view differing from the superior's. This form of dissent is generally considered a professional's prerogative, although it is usually not termed "dissent" because it occurs privately.

Public dissent traditionally consists in registering a dissenting view in a setting that is not private, which means that any dissent aside from a closed, one-on-one setting is public. This definition of public dissent is too broad and must be limited to have useful meaning. Public dissent should be defined as openly dissenting toward a target audience that is not empowered to decide an issue. Strategically, this would encompass publicly registering dissent over policy to the media or American people while still a serving officer. Tactically, this would consist of registering dissent to subordinate military personnel within the chain of command. Thus construed, public dissent should not be allowed because it erodes civil control of the military on one hand, and the military chain of command on the other.

But how is dissent among other key leaders or advisors characterized? Is registering dissent in a meeting public dissent and therefore off limits? Is a discussion between a commander and his staff regarding the implications of an impending or taken decision, conducted for the sole purpose of creating an alternate proposal for a superior, public dissent? Such instances constitute

a gray area in the dialogue over dissent and must be resolved to clearly appreciate the limits of acceptable dissent.

"Pseudo-public dissent" is a useful term under these circumstances. The subordinate is registering dissent outside a closed, one-on-one session with his superior. Unlike public dissent, however, his target audience is the decisionmaker, not a public audience. Other witnesses to this dissent, such as in a closed meeting or staff discussion, may make the dissenting officer's opinion a matter of public knowledge, but the dissent was proffered in an environment of professionals discussing a particular decision. Pseudo-public dissent is therefore totally consistent with professional norms and is necessary to ensure that dissenting opinions are clearly stated to the superior's other advisors, whose calculations and advice might require reconsideration based on the dissenter's position.

An example of this dynamic would be a command and staff meeting conducted within a military organization where the commander decides on a new policy. One of his subordinate commanders recognizes a flaw in the policy that affects his unit. If he privately dissents — that is, waits until the meeting is over and addresses his superior behind closed doors — the parent unit, as a whole, runs the risk that other subordinate commanders will not hear the dissenting view and evaluate whether the same policy flaw affects their units. As a result, the policy is decided on at that meeting without discussion. Later, each individual subordinate commander realizes the policy flaw's effect on his unit and registers private dissent. Because the decision has already been taken and the dissenting voices are heard one after the other, after the fact, the commander decides to continue to policy, negatively affecting the subordinate units and eroding trust in the chain of command. This negative outcome might have been avoided by simple, pseudo-public dissent. The benefit of this dissent therefore outweighs the potential for the dissenting subordinate's disagreement over the policy to be 'leaked' publicly by another attendee to a public audience.

Dissent is therefore not necessarily public, although it can come to the public's attention in the manner described above. The question then becomes: is dissent at odds with the professional obligation of obedience? Our legal and moral codes, even our doctrine, suggest it is not.

### Obedience and Dissent

The legal foundations for the U.S. Army and, by extension, its professional conduct, are many.<sup>4</sup> The capstone document, the United States Constitution, Title X of the U.S. Code, provides the detailed legal basis for the Active Component's organization, manning, and etcetera. Chapter 47, Title X, contains the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is where any legal examination of professional conduct must begin. The UCMJ's 58 punitive articles are silent on the subject of dissent, although two articles (Articles 90 and 92) directly address the topic of disobedience of orders.<sup>5</sup> Additional articles could be construed to prohibit public dissent, although this term is never explicitly used. Legally, dissent — especially private and pseudo-public — is allowed.

This legal understanding must be supplemented by an examination of the Army's moral code. Again, there are numerous moral foundations for professional conduct. That said, one foundation stands out from the rest. On induction into the



*"Obedience is the cornerstone of the American military ethic. From a soldier's induction onward, the concept of subordination to superior military authority and ultimately, civil government — as embodied in the Constitution of the United States — is continually imbued."*





*“The immediately evident difference is that while enlisted soldiers are sworn to obey the orders of the President of the United States and the officers appointed over the soldier, the officers themselves are not sworn to obey. This distinction, however, is reserved for extreme cases; the officer’s oath is not a license to disobey.”*

Army, or one of its offices, every soldier swears an oath; these solemn oaths, individually sworn, form the absolute basis of acceptable professional conduct. Significantly, the enlisted soldier’s oath differs from the officer’s, and the differences are critical:

“I, (Name), do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”<sup>6</sup>

“I (Name) (Social Security Number), having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States in the grade of (Rank) do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; so help me God.”<sup>7</sup>

The immediately evident difference is that while enlisted soldiers are sworn to obey the orders of the President of the United States and the officers appointed over the soldier, the officers themselves are not sworn to obey. This distinction, however, is reserved for extreme cases; the officer’s oath is not a license to disobey. In addition to legal obligations, the Army’s doctrine on leadership states, “Commissioned Army officers hold their grade and office under a commission issued under the authority of the President of the United States. The commission is granted on the basis of special trust and confidence placed in the officer’s

patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities. The officer’s commission is the grant of presidential authority to direct subordinates and subsequently, an obligation to obey superiors.”<sup>8</sup> Obedience to superiors is thus *implied*. The reason for implied obedience rather than a moral imperative to obey is twofold. First, the framers of the Constitution were deeply fearful of the military and, to an extent, the Executive Branch. They feared that by controlling the military, the Executive Branch of government could gain supremacy over the other branches, violating the concept of checks and balances. Therefore, to forestall a military coup or improper extensions of Executive power, the Constitution swears officers to support and defend it, even if it means subordinate officers’ disobeying the orders of superior military (or even presidential) authority. Second, the role of the officer must allow for discretion in the execution of orders. Returning to *Army Leadership*, “An enlisted leader swears an oath of obedience to lawful orders, while the commissioned officer promises to, ‘well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office.’ This distinction establishes a different expectation for discretionary initiative. Officers should be driven to maintain the momentum of operations, possess courage to deviate from standing orders within the commander’s intent when required, and be willing to accept the responsibility and accountability for doing so.”<sup>9</sup>

The bottom line is that while enlisted soldiers are sworn to obey orders, officers are allowed discretionary latitude to uphold their oaths and discharge their offices. Although, in no way sanctioning outright disobedience (except in rare circumstances), the officer’s oath implies a duty to dissent along with the implication to obey. This is particularly true of the Army’s senior officers who “bear a particular responsibility for the consequences of their decisions and for the quality of advice given — or not given — to their civilian superiors” (emphasis mine).<sup>10</sup>

## Senior Officer Dissent

The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — and senior officers' roles in advising political leaders formulating policy and/or strategy to initiate/prosecute those wars — underlie much of the recent inquiry into dissent and the professional military ethic. Interestingly, the conventional association of dissent with public registry appears throughout many of these publications. Thus, much of the discussion regarding dissent and the professional military ethic focuses entirely on public dissent. This is insufficient for our purposes; any inquiry into dissent must address private and pseudo-private dissent, as well as public dissent. Fortunately, many of the constructs advanced to address public dissent are useful in evaluating private and pseudo-private dissent as well.

In his monograph, *Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Profession*, Professor and retired Colonel Don Snider argues that American senior officers must maintain three critical

tively proffering professional advice to superiors — is often taken for granted. History shows this to not necessarily be the case.<sup>13</sup> In addition to dissuading public dissent, military ethicists must also *encourage* responsible public and pseudo-public dissent. Although in many cases, ethicists' impact on serving senior leaders may be limited, encouragement to responsibly dissent may impact future senior leaders during their formative years and ensure these leaders are better prepared to meet their moral obligations upon becoming senior leaders.

Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's 25 February 2003 testimony to Congress is an example of responsible pseudo-public dissent. Asked by Senator Carl Levin for his professional opinion regarding "the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war," General Shinseki responded "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers."<sup>14</sup> This testimony ignited a fierce debate between Shinseki and his civilian superiors over the amount of soldiers required to occupy Iraq, and ultimately led to Shinseki



***"Commissioned Army officers hold their grade and office under a commission issued under the authority of the President of the United States. The commission is granted on the basis of special trust and confidence placed in the officer's patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities. The officer's commission is the grant of presidential authority to direct subordinates and subsequently, an obligation to obey superiors."***

"trust relationships:" the relationship between the military profession and the American people; the relationship with publicly elected and appointed civilian leaders; and the relationship with subordinate military leaders.<sup>11</sup> Failure to maintain these trust relationships results in the profession being reduced to "just another governmental bureaucracy."<sup>12</sup> Thus, senior officers' decisions to publicly dissent must be weighed against the potential damage inflicted on the critical trust relationships.

Taking Snider's argument further, one concludes that the three trust relationships apply to private and pseudo-private dissent as well. Failure to dissent — to provide differing professional opinions when warranted, whether sought or unsought — impinges on these trust relationships just as surely as public dissent erodes them. Private dissent — a senior leader's act of ac-

being marginalized until his retirement on 11 June 2003. Despite countering his civilian superiors' assessment, Shinseki's response was totally in keeping with a senior officer's moral obligation to provide "my best military judgment on issues of importance to the Army, the Department of Defense, and the Nation."<sup>15</sup> What differentiates Shinseki's testimony from public dissent is that first, it was directed toward a decisionmaker (the United States Senate) and not the public at large; and second, it was required by the Army's legal and moral code. Issues of pseudo-dissent are not always so clear-cut, but Shinseki's example should reinforce the importance of pseudo-public dissent at the senior officer level.

Considering Shinseki's testimony through the prism of the trust relationships, one concludes that his testimony adversely impact-



ed only one component of one of the three critical trust relationships (the profession's relationship with civilian leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense); it might actually have strengthened the profession's relationship with the American people by demonstrating professional credibility (especially considering subsequent events), strengthened the profession's relationship with civilian leaders in Congress by demonstrating the apolitical nature of military advice proffered by senior officers, and strengthened the relationship with subordinate military leaders by providing a concrete example of moral dissent.


It is important here to return to Snider's treatment of public dissent and the trust relationships. Snider argues that there are five considerations, which a senior leader must examine when deciding to publicly dissent: the gravity of the issue; the relevance of the professional's expert knowledge and expertise to the issue at question; the personal sacrifice to be incurred in dissenting; the timing of the act of dissent; and the congruence of such an act with the previous career of service and leadership within the military profession.<sup>16</sup> These considerations should be examined whenever dissenting — publicly or otherwise.

Upon deciding to dissent, senior leaders must then decide on the nature of the dissent. Again, Snider provides a useful construct for pursuing dissent. As illustrated in Figure 1, options pursued are balanced by the resistance to the professional's expertise versus the threat to National Security.<sup>17</sup> Private dissent is not included; perhaps because this chart assumes it has already been attempted and failed. The remaining options encompass pseudo-public and public dissent. In total, they provide a dissenting senior officer with differing means to register pseudo-public and public dissent without imperiling civilian control of the military.

### Junior Officer Dissent<sup>18</sup>

Much less examined is the practice of dissent at field grade and company grade officer levels. Before proceeding, one must ask why dissent is less prevalent at these levels than at senior levels? The Officer's Oath applies to all commissioned officers, regardless of rank, and with the office, comes the duty to dissent. The answer is four-fold.

First, dissent at junior officer levels is hardly ever public. Army organizations below strategic leadership levels rarely interact with media; therefore, dissent never truly becomes public. Further, dissent between subordinate and superior officers is rarely expressed to the only 'public' existing within these organizations — the enlisted soldiers. Second, dissent is rarely discussed openly between junior officers; it therefore retains an aura of unacceptability unless a senior officer publicly espouses the view that 'disagreement is not disrespect' despite the moral obligation to dissent. Finally, as Snider relates, the relevance of the professional's expert knowledge and expertise to the issue at question is a critical consideration when deciding to dissent. Among junior officers, the superior officer almost always has more experience and assumed professional knowledge than a subordinate officer; subordinate officers are thus reluctant to register dissent because of a perceived knowledge gap. Finally, the nature of units' missions at the junior officer level often necessitates rapid execution after a decision is taken. Contact with enemy forces and the associated risks to mission and men generally preclude arguments over 'go left' or 'go right' decisions while under fire. This



truth is the ultimate reason for the military ethic's demand of obedience and fulfillment of orders.

As we have observed, however, obedience and dissent are not mutually exclusive. As with senior officers, junior officers retain the discretionary latitude to fulfill their offices, and thus, retain the moral obligation to dissent. The lack of observed dissent at the junior officer level should not preclude its occurrence, nor should it absolve junior officers of their obligation to dissent. Although modified, junior officers maintain the moral imperative to dissent when they believe a superior's decision warrants it.

Although public dissent is not an option and the means to register dissent (including retirement, congressional visit/testimony, etcetera) are usually limited, Snider's five considerations of the gravity of the issue; the relevance of the professional's expert knowledge and expertise to the issue at question; the personal sacrifice to be incurred in dissenting; the timing of the act of dissent; and the congruence of such an act with the previous career of service and leadership within the military profession, still underpin any decision by a junior leader to dissent.

As with senior officers, junior officers should only register dissent (private or pseudo-public) if their assessment is that the risk to the mission and men is incongruous to the decision taken. That said, senior officers do take the personal risk and dissent far more often than junior leaders, which is interesting. Decisions made in close combat produces loss of life more instantaneously than strategic leaders' decisions; in combat, the gravity of the issue (life or death) is often elevated, yet many junior officers are reluctant to register even private dissent in most circumstances. There are instances where the subordinate's professional expert knowledge and expertise exceeds that of his superior: often in matters relating to local conditions (terrain, populace) and enemy behavior. The junior officer faces extreme personal sacrifice (increasing as the echelon of command decreases) if the decision is wrong. In every one of Snider's five considerations, the junior officer in combat is often validated in dissenting, yet fails to.

This extends beyond private dissent to pseudo-public dissent. The example of the command and staff meeting is analogous here. Subordinate commanders and staffs will often acquiesce without comment toward a senior officer's decision in combat,

despite personal reservations. Like the command and staff meeting earlier, the outcome is often disastrous, yet lack of dissent prevails. One explanation proffered by Douglas Lovelace and Leonard Wong for this phenomenon is that the combination of the Army's 'can do' attitude with cultural deference to authority within the military precludes responsible dissent.<sup>19</sup> To this should be added that because the Army does not train and educate responsible dissent to its junior leaders, there should be no expectation that junior officers engage in the practice. Paradoxically, junior officers are quick to offer candid advice and professional opinions when asked by superiors. This suggests that junior officers are capable of responsible dissent if properly educated and trained in its precepts.

## Imparting Responsible Dissent

In a recent interview for the Army's Virtual Conference on "The Future of the U.S. Army Officer Corps," retired General John P. Abizaid remarked that the Army should enable officers to interact with senior civilian leaders prior to attaining the rank of (4-star) general.<sup>20</sup> Although not addressing the topic of dissent, General Abizaid's remarks support educating and training officers to conduct responsible dissent. In exposing Army officers to civilian decisionmakers, who, per capita, have limited military experience and limited understanding of the military profession — the Army must equip these officers to provide relevant professional advice to the civilian decisionmakers with whom they interact. This includes educating officers on responsible dissent and reinforcing the notion advanced by General of the Army Eisenhower in testimony to Congress in 1947, "that I appear before you only as a professional soldier, to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national defense. I am not qualified to proceed beyond that field, and I do not intend to do so. It is my duty as a chief of staff to tell you gentlemen what I believe to be necessary for national security."<sup>21</sup>

The necessity of educating and training responsible dissent extends to junior officers as well. Traditionalists may scoff that junior officers should 'not think, but obey.' Such myopic thinking is betrayed by the nature of 21st-century military operations. Lieutenants and captains are now responsible for areas and populations far exceeding anything imaginable even 40 years ago during the Vietnam War. They also make decisions with far greater strategic impacts as a result of modern information technology. The trend toward decentralized operations necessitates increased professionalization of junior officers. Inherent in this increased professionalization is greater education combined with military training.<sup>22</sup> A critical point of emphasis must be the moral obligation to responsibly dissent.

Candor is insufficient as an imperative to provide professional advice to military and civilian superiors because of its passivity. The term "dissent" is much more appropriate, yet its use in the context of the professional military ethic is confused. This confusion stems from an unfounded association of dissent with public registration of differences in opinion. Careful analysis reveals that dissent is simply the act of differing in sentiment or opinion, and that dissent can take different forms, including private, pseudo-public, and public dissent.

Contrary to popular belief, dissent is not incongruous with the military imperative to obey; a view supported by the Army's legal and moral foundations, as well as its doctrine. All officers have a moral obligation to dissent when their professional opinion differs from that of their superior's. Senior leaders must weigh their dissent against damage to three critical trust relationships that mark the military profession from government bureaucracy and should do so by evaluating the gravity of the issue; the relevance of the professional's expert knowledge and expertise to the issue at question; the personal sacrifice to be incurred in dis-

senting; the timing of the act of dissent; and the congruence of such an act with the previous career of service and leadership within the military profession before deciding on the means of registering dissent. Junior officers also retain the obligation to dissent, but often choose not to. This observation deserves further study by ethicists with an eye toward educating and training junior officers in responsible dissent to further the health of the military profession.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Robert B. Costello, Editor in Chief, *Webster's Time-Life Deluxe Illustrated Dictionary*, Time Warner Libraries, New York, NY, 1991, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>3</sup>Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1957, pp. 72-73.

<sup>4</sup>An excellent summary of the foundations may be found in Paul Oh, Don M. Snider, and Kevin Toner, *The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, Strategic Studies Institute, p. 25, available online at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>, accessed 8 October 2009. Hereafter referred to as "PME."

<sup>5</sup>*United States Code*, Chapter 47, Title X, available at Cornell University Law School website, [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc\\_sup\\_01\\_10\\_10\\_A\\_20\\_II\\_30\\_47\\_40\\_X.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sup_01_10_10_A_20_II_30_47_40_X.html), accessed 21 November 2009.

<sup>6</sup>*United States Code*, Chapter 31, Title X, available at Cornell University Law School website, [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc\\_sec\\_10\\_00000502----000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000502----000-.html), accessed 21 November 2009.

<sup>7</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Form 71, July 1999, available at the Army Publishing Directorate website, <http://www.apd.army.mil/>, accessed 21 November 2009.

<sup>8</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 2006, p. 23.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>Don M. Snider, *Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Profession*, Strategic Studies Institute, p. 16, available online at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=849>, accessed 8 October 2009. Hereafter referred to as "Strategic Dissent."

<sup>12</sup>Don M. Snider, *The Army's Ethic Suffers under its Retired Generals*, Strategic Studies Institute, available online at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=903>, accessed 8 October 2009.

<sup>13</sup>American history is replete with examples of professional military advice not just being ignored, but worse, of not being offered in the first place. See especially Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy*, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1982.

<sup>14</sup>United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 241, available online at [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108\\_senate\\_hearings&docid=f:87323.pdf](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:87323.pdf), accessed 9 October 2009.

<sup>15</sup>General Eric K. Shinseki, *End of Tour Memorandum*, 10 June 2003, available online at Washington Post website, <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/documents/shinseki.pdf>, accessed 21 November 2009. Hereafter referred to as "Shinseki."

<sup>16</sup>Strategic Dissent, p. vii.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7; adapted from Douglas Lovelace and Leonard Wong, *Knowing When to Salute*, Strategic Studies Institute, available online at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB798.pdf>, accessed 21 November 2009. Hereafter referred to as "Salute."

<sup>18</sup>For purposes of this discussion, "junior officer" refers to any officer not serving at strategic leadership levels—typically general officers and senior colonels. For more on Army leadership levels, see FM 6-22, Chapter 3.

<sup>19</sup>Salute, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>This interview available online at <https://www.officer-strategy.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/sessions.php?catid=1>, accessed 21 November 2009.

<sup>21</sup>Shinseki, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup>For more on the relationship of education and training, see James H. Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: the Burden of Military Ethics*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1995, p. 39.

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# A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: Al-Qaeda and the True Nature of Global Jihad

by Captain William Ault

Islam is back on the strategic military offensive for the first time since the Ottoman Empire's military defeat during the siege of Vienna in 1683, at the hands of Polish King Jan Sobieski.<sup>2</sup> The attacks on 11 September 2001 helped define the much debated 'future war' conundrum in the military establishment, which has been raging since the end of the Cold War. Prior to this attack, many theorists had argued that a new type of warfare was on the horizon based on world changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world. One such construct has been coined 'fourth generation warfare' (4GW). Its originators have theorized that the United States and her allies are currently embroiled in this type of warfare against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

The concept of 4GW has developed over time and has taken shape to fit the current conflict with al-Qaeda. Globalization has brought about a shift in warfare from nation-state, conventional, force-driven conflict to one dominated by non-state actors confronting traditional states with

*"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."<sup>1</sup>*

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

asymmetry, irregular forces, and adaptive 4GW methods. As Clausewitz so aptly stated over 170 years ago, "War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case."<sup>3</sup> This article argues that al-Qaeda has adopted 4GW as its doctrine and continues to adapt itself and the use of the 4GW framework in its current global Islamic jihad.

As noted in the opening quote, Clausewitz warned that leaders should clearly understand the type of war being entered before committing forces. This warning is as relevant today as it was in earlier eras. Defining war, especially 'future war,' is sometimes the greatest challenge those who train armies face. This was true at the end of the Cold War when the U.S. military found itself with more than 40 years of conventional doctrine in preparation to fight a foe that no longer existed. Military leaders, at all levels, were asking what they should be preparing

for; if not for a large conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, then who and what would they face? World realities had changed the nature of conflict with which the United States and its allies were faced. It was during this time that a group of military thinkers put forth the concept of 4GW to answer those queries.

In 1989, the *Marine Corps Gazette* ran an article titled, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," that began with the admonition that "the peacetime soldier's principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war. In order to do so, he must anticipate what the next war will be like."<sup>4</sup> William Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson put their minds together and developed the 4GW framework. Their article was written to generate discussion on what future war might look like. In their article, these authors





put forth the notion that there had been three prior generations of warfare beginning in 1648 with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia.<sup>5</sup> This treaty was the result of the bloody Thirty Years War and brought about the birth of the nation-state system. The treaty provided governments the authority to rule within their borders free from outside intervention. In turn, this new 'state' system gave rise to what has been termed the "nation-state's monopoly on violence."

This first generation of warfare was marked by massed manpower where, due to the limitations of armaments capabilities, concentrations of men fighting in close proximity to one another were the decisive form of combat. Massed armies and formations met in close-order battle and tactics, such as charges and line and square formations, were the norm. This generation is typified by the Napoleonic and American civil wars.

The second generation of warfare followed a dramatic change in armament capabilities and was an age that relied on mass firepower. This was the generation typified by World War I and mass artillery, the widespread use of cartridge-loading rifled firearms and machine guns. The increased capabilities and lethality of weapons and armaments caused a shift in tactics. More dispersion, trench warfare, and massive artillery barrages to pound the enemy forces into submission through attrition were the norm during this period.

Due to further technological changes, the third generation of warfare developed and was the age of maneuver warfare. This third generation was seen as starting with the German blitzkrieg of 1939. Tanks, motorized vehicles, planes, and radio communications were the technological enablers of this generation of warfare. This third generation typified warfare through the first Gulf War and combinations of these three generations of war have been the preferred Western method of warfare to date.<sup>6</sup>

The collapse of the bipolar world with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created the world's first 'hyper-power' in the United States. This supremacy in conventional and technological firepower forced a regression to a type of warfare practiced in earlier



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times, according to the 4GW theorists. Low-tech combatants would use improvised weapons and attack enemies everywhere and anywhere they could. They would seek targets of opportunity across the full spectrum of culture and civilization to bring about capitulation of their adversaries. In the originating article by Lind and his comrades, the premise of 4GW was stated: "In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity...all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them."<sup>7</sup>

This viewpoint was echoed by Martin Van Creveld in his book, *The Transformation of War*, when he states, "As new

forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, to become blurred as they were before 1648."<sup>8</sup> A few years later, author Thomas X. Hammes wrote *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, where he went further in defining 4GW: "Fourth-generation warfare uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy's political decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decisionmakers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy — measured in decades rather than months or years."<sup>9</sup>

4GW organizations focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term tactical ones. Ideology, survivability, and continuity are hallmarks of these organizations. The 4GW opponent seeks to bleed the larger and more technically advanced adversary until they can simply no longer continue the fight politically, economically, or socially. As Hammes indicates, "The target of all 4GW actions is the mind of the enemy decision makers."<sup>10</sup> The non-state group, al-Qaeda, has adopted this form of warfare in its global jihad and has continued to develop the concept of 4GW even further over time.

Al-Qaeda and its global jihad present a solid case study to frame the application of 4GW tactics, operational plans, and strategies. As the original brain trust behind 4GW has stated, the 4GW framework brings nothing new, it merely merges and enhances existing practices and capabilities available to the combatant. Al-Qaeda has used 4GW against open and free western societies. Insurgents that gain travel visas and have valid passports can travel to any country where a potentially strategic target exists and prepare



for operations. Using technology, detailed communications with intelligence, including video, high-resolution photos, and other materials, can be transmitted to a website or other location via email not necessarily tied to a geographic-centric operational base. Maintaining this flexibility and freedom from bases and networks is a key strength of the 4GW practitioner. The ability to use the infrastructure that globalized society has come to rely on for business and social interaction as a weapons system further augments the conceptualization of 4GW.

One of the most critical vulnerabilities of the globalized and internet-connected world is the capability to use these very same systems against us. As Thomas Friedman notes in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, "Globalization isn't a choice. It's a reality."<sup>11</sup> In the past several decades, business and other institutions have driven a global society into an internet-connected world culture. This new global communications capability has enabled unprecedented economic and social growth; however, it has also created another medium for insurgents. In this virtual medium, the insurgent can operate remotely, independently, and in a virtual sanctuary from anywhere in the world. No longer are safe havens or secure operating bases limited to geographic terrain-based locations. Al-Qaeda can distribute propaganda worldwide in near-instantaneous fashion from anywhere they have access to the net. "The knowledge of how to conduct an attack is developed

in one country, then that knowledge is combined with the raw materials, personnel, and training available in other countries, which can include the target country, to create a weapon in the target country."<sup>12</sup> True global collaboration between subject-matter experts is possible for everyone. The President of the United States unequivocally agreed with the importance of technology when he stated that, "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."<sup>13</sup>

The virtual community is also a key source of fundraising and finance, which is facilitated through legal, as well as illegal, methods.<sup>14</sup> "The old police technique of tracking illegal activity by watching certain places and peoples does not work when communications is carried out on line."<sup>15</sup> Globalization has created a new combat multiplier in 4GW capabilities. Al-Qaeda networks can be virtual, as Angel Rabasa explains, "Even more challenging from a security point of view is that the people do not have to go out to establish these networks. They do not have to be in the same country or even on line at the same time."<sup>16</sup> The internet has made it possible for the current manifestation of al-Qaeda and its version of global insurgency to exist.<sup>17</sup>

It was through the use of these tools and theories that al-Qaeda planned, organized, and executed the attacks on 11 September and introduced a shocked nation to this different method of waging war. It

was shortly after these attacks that senior al-Qaeda strategy advisor, Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, wrote about what he describes as a fourth-generation war against the infidels, and compares the attacks of 11 September to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. His commentary is worth noting at length herein: "In 1989, some American military experts predicted a fundamental change in the future form of warfare. ... They predicted that the wars of the 21st century would be dominated by a kind of warfare they called 'the fourth generation of wars.' Others called it 'asymmetric warfare.' With the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda entered the annals of successful surprise attacks, which are few in history; for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. ... Moreover, in the pain it caused (al-Qaeda) surpassed these surprise attacks, because it put every individual in American society on (constant) alert for every possibility, whether emotionally or practically. That has an extreme high economic and psychological price, particularly in a society that has not been affected by war since the American Civil War. The fourth-generation wars would, tactically, be small-scale, emerging in various regions across the planet against an enemy that, like a ghost, appears and disappears. The focus would be political, social, economic, and military. [It will be] international, national, tribal, and even organizations would participate (even though tactics and technology from previous generations would be used)."<sup>18</sup>



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It is apparent that al-Qaeda is no stranger to Western military theories and concepts. In fact, copies of the 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article on 4GW were reportedly found by U.S. troops in the caves of Tora Bora, the al-Qaeda stronghold in Afghanistan, and in 2001, after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, a copy of Clausewitz’ *On War* was found in an al-Qaeda safe house.<sup>19</sup> In the spirit of Sun Tzu, and his adage about knowing the enemy and oneself, al-Qaeda has obviously done its homework and used our own analysis to frame its combat doctrine.<sup>20</sup> This group has chosen to target political, economic, infrastructure, and cultural targets in accordance with the 4GW framework. It was a conscious decision to choose the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York as both a cultural and economic symbol of U.S. power.

Sensationalized targets that generate the most media attention are great psychological warfare combat multipliers. The willingness of al-Qaeda operatives to commit suicide in the name of martyrdom and Allah strikes fear in the minds of Westerners.<sup>21</sup> The mass transit bombings of Britain and Spain were huge media successes and did much, due to their timing, to ensure Spain withdrew from the conflict by turning the population there against the war.<sup>22</sup> In accordance with 4GW doctrine, the true strategic target of al-Qaeda is the population and its support of government actions that are counter to the

objectives of Islamic fundamentalists. Their horrific actions continue to have ripple effects throughout our societies. These attacks have generated al-Qaeda’s desired reaction within our society and culture, and placed the United States on the strategic defensive. Dramatic changes have occurred in our lifestyles, economic spending, and security posture. We

have expended vast amounts of national treasure and blood in an effort to counter its actions, capture or kill its members, and prevent any recurrence of attacks. This conflict, as described by al-Qaeda spokesmen and predicted by Lind, Van Creveld, and others, is an ideological and cultural conflict.

Al-Qaeda strategist, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, wrote a 1600-page book titled, *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*, which advances the evolution and adoption of 4GW into the al-Qaeda operational play-book.<sup>23</sup> This work conceptualizes a capabilities-based organizational template, which is not physically structured as al-Qaeda has been previously. It seeks to further decentralize and create a ‘nizam la tanzim’ or a ‘system, not secret organization.’ This virtual organization is more of a philosophy or ideological-based construct rather than one that has a command hierarchy and structure that can be targeted.<sup>24</sup>

Nasar had studied Western doctrine and philosophies on insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. He is reported to have read and lectured on Robert Taber’s *The War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*.<sup>25</sup> The volumes of studies and information available on asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, and insurgencies have merely served as educational material for these 4GW practitioners.



“4GW organizations focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term tactical ones. Ideology, survivability, and continuity are hallmarks of these organizations. The 4GW opponent seeks to bleed the larger and more technically advanced adversary until they can simply no longer continue the fight politically, economically, or socially.”



The further decentralization of operations and continued ability to use the communications methods of a globalized world to disseminate strategic and operational guidance all speak to the adoption and adaptation of 4GW.<sup>26</sup> The overwhelming U.S. response to 11 September and the dismantling of the Taliban has forced al-Qaeda members into this more ideological model as they run and continue to hide primarily in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan on the border of Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda has conducted its global jihad by striking high payoff targets, which has infused fear into the population and created enough paranoia to promote spending billions to prevent another attack. Their selection of targets, timing, and subsequent media coverage is all by design. Al-Qaeda knows it cannot defeat the United States militarily in conventional combat; it seeks to protract the conflict and wear down the will of the people. Hammes asserts, warfare has “shifted from an industrial-age focus on the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces to an information-age focus on changing the minds of the enemy’s political decisionmakers.”<sup>27</sup> Al-Qaeda has masterfully used its resources to mass the effects of media coverage, promote fear, and remain in the headlines.

It is clear that al-Qaeda has used 4GW theories of asymmetry and technology in its global jihad. Global communications allow insurgents to broadcast and disseminate their vision to gain support and recruits on a global scale. It provides for command and control, as well as a means to organize, collect information, plan, and execute disparate operations simultaneously, while exposing al-Qaeda leaders and organizers to minimal physical risk. It also allows them to promote messages, once an attack has been carried out, to further the impact and effect of the attack through mass media outlets globally.

Globalized networking technology enables masses of young disillusioned Islamic fundamentalists around the globe, in madrassas, and across the street in downtown America to congregate and network as a single organizational unit through the internet.<sup>28</sup> As warned in *The Changing Role of Information Warfare*, the very technology and infrastructure we rely on for our global economy could become an instrument to assault society and the world’s economic platform.<sup>29</sup>

Al-Qaeda has proven to be an evolving and learning organization. In its infancy,

the network was principally concerned with training mujahedeen and the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.<sup>30</sup> Many of the training areas they developed and used under the watchful eye of Pakistan and the United States were later used to train the terrorists that launched subsequent attacks worldwide, to include 11 September. Al-Qaeda has since expanded into an organization and ideology with global strategy and reach. Through technology, this network has created easily accessible doctrine for training, planning, intelligence gathering, weapons and device manufacturing, as well as directing strategy for numerous cells around the world.<sup>31</sup> Al-Qaeda is a true example of a practitioner of 4GW.

This article has shown that al-Qaeda has adopted the 4GW strategy and has used it to great effect in its operations. It has shown its willingness to employ weapons of mass effect anywhere in the world to execute its strategic vision. The adaptive nature of al-Qaeda has allowed it to take on the form of a transnational ideological movement, stringing together any number of Islamic fundamentalists across the globe who are willing to execute the directives laid out in bin Laden’s fatwas and declarations. As Al Suri states, “Al-

Qaeda is not an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be; it is a call, a reference, a methodology.”<sup>32</sup> Its resiliency, coupled with adaptive asymmetric tactics of 4GW, make combating this group an extremely tough endeavor. Although no key strategic aim of al-Qaeda has been met, it continues to inspire Islamic fundamentalist actions. As 4GW practitioners, al-Qaeda has mutated into a more ideological movement-based organization that inspires and provides direction to fundamentalists around the world.<sup>33</sup>



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## NOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, *The Readers Companion to Military History*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1996, pp. 490-91.

<sup>3</sup>Clausewitz, p. 89.

<sup>4</sup>William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” *The Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, pp. 22-26.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 226.

<sup>9</sup>Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, Saint Paul, Minnesota, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 215.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, Anchor, New York, 2000, p. 93.

<sup>12</sup>Hammes, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup>George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Congress, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” *The 9/11 Commission Report*, New York, 2004, p. 170.

<sup>15</sup>Hammes, p. 40.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Angel M. Rabasa, et al., *The Muslim World After 9/11*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005.

<sup>18</sup>Middle East Media Research Institute, “Bin Laden Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa’ida’s Com-

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<sup>19</sup>William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” *Military Review*, September-October 2004, p. 12; and Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup>Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 84.

<sup>21</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, The Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2003, p. 97.

<sup>22</sup>Hammes, p. 202 and pp. 230-231.

<sup>23</sup>Brynjur Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musab al Suri*, Columbia University, 2008, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid. p. 226.

<sup>26</sup>The Jamestown Foundation, Andrew Black, “Al-Suri’s Adaptation of Fourth Generation Warfare Doctrine,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, Issue 18, 21 September 2006, available online at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=908](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=908), accessed 24 November 2010.

<sup>27</sup>Hammes, pp. 207-208.

<sup>28</sup>Friedman, p. 322.

<sup>29</sup>Zalmay Khalilzad, John White, and Andy W. Marshall, *Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1999, pp. 253-281, available online at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1016.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1016.html), accessed 10 November 2010.

<sup>30</sup>Hammes, pp. 131-132.

<sup>31</sup>Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al-Qaeda*, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2009, p. 138.

<sup>32</sup>Lia, p. 7.

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## From Surviving to Thriving: Developing a Diverse Army Officer Corps in an Era of Persistent Conflict

by Captain Jacob Sheehan

*In an era of the all-volunteer military, it becomes particularly important to encourage officers to become committed to personally directed, life-long learning, and to ascertain that the military establishment is committed to supporting them in these endeavors.<sup>1</sup>*

— Dr. Don M. Snider

The U.S. Army has invested substantial resources and energy in developing a strategy for growing leaders capable of succeeding in a complex operational environment with persistent conflict. A policy that operationalizes this strategy is allowing commanders the authority to approve short periods of individual leader development, which range from civilian service opportunities to cultural immer-

sion at critical points in an officer's career. The benefit of this policy is to develop a diverse officer corps with specialized talents and individuals motivated by a self-directed, life-long approach to learning. This relatively small change in Army regulations will have strategic implications for producing an officer corps capable of thriving, instead of merely surviving, in a dynamic and uncertain operational environment.

The "Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS)," a 15-page document recently signed by General George Casey and drafted by Colonel Daniel Shanahan at the Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, outlines the Army's approach to leader development as part of the Army Capstone

Concept.<sup>2</sup> The document describes the challenge of developing leaders, exhausted from 10 years of war, who are about to enter a more difficult operating environment. The ALDS describes the future operating environment as "even more uncertain, complex, and competitive" than recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan with "hybrid threats that challenge us across the full spectrum of operations."<sup>3</sup> This operational environment tests leaders with extended campaigns, decentralized decisionmaking, and ill-structured problems.<sup>4</sup> Compounding the complexity of leader development in this environment is a reliance on forming networks with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners to navigate multifaceted missions. Thus, the



operating environment the ALDS describes requires an organization capable of complex tasks and continual adaptation. Although it never explicitly uses the terminology, the ALDS alludes to a need for the Army to become a learning organization to thrive in an era of persistent conflict.

Paul Senge first popularized the concept of a “learning organization” in his 1990 book, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of a Learning Organization*.<sup>5</sup> Senge defines a learning organization as an organization “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together.”<sup>6</sup> Simply put, a learning organization is capable of being flexible and adaptive if it “discovers how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels.”<sup>7</sup> While his definition seems lofty and overly subjective for an organization as large as the Army, two characteristics he describes are not so different from goals stated in the ALDS. The first is mental models, which are “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures and images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”<sup>8</sup> In the complex operational environment the ALDS describes, there is a need to continually revisit and evaluate current assumptions, which ultimately drive decisionmaking and thought processes. If officers at all levels do not offer candid criticism of mental models or challenge assumptions, the result is “entrenched models,” which prevent framing ill-structured problems and hinder the development of effective solutions.<sup>9</sup>

The second characteristic of a learning organization Senge describes is personal mastery, which is the “discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively.”<sup>10</sup> Essentially what Senge describes is an organization where individuals are deeply committed to the process of learning. Senge argues that most of this learning is not the result of formal training, rather incidental learning the individual garners from self-reflection and curiosity. He also claims that “individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning... but without it, no organizational

learning occurs.”<sup>11</sup> This suggests the Army is unable to learn as an organization in a changing operational environment if its officers do not possess personal mastery through an active and personal commitment to learning. Without satisfying these two characteristics, the Army will not effectively develop its leaders to become members of a learning, forward-thinking organization.

To the Army’s credit, the ALDS hints at the characteristics Senge attributes to a learning organization. The ALDS explicitly states it seeks to develop leaders who are “broad enough to operate with a global mindset and across the spectrum of conflict, able to operate in JIIM environments, and culturally astute and able to use this awareness...to achieve an intercultural edge.”<sup>12</sup> Developing these leaders requires a commitment to personal mastery through broad experiences and creating mental models capable of functioning in JIIM and intercultural environments. Additionally, the ALDS outlines eight imperatives to guide policy actions for leader development, three of which are notable. The first is to “encourage an equal commitment by the institution, by leaders, and by individual members of the profession to life-long learning and development.”<sup>13</sup> This recognizes a learning organization is created by both willing individuals and an organization willing to support the learning of those individuals.

The second is managing the “Army’s military and civilian talent to benefit both the institution and the individual.”<sup>14</sup>



*“The ‘Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS),’ a 15-page document recently signed by General George Casey and drafted by Colonel Daniel Shanahan at the Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, outlines the Army’s approach to leader development as part of the Army Capstone Concept. The document describes the challenge of developing leaders, exhausted from 10 years of war, who are about to enter a more difficult operating environment.”*

This imperative recognizes that the Army “needs and values a mix of generalists and specialists that collectively provide diverse talents.”<sup>15</sup> This is particularly important for mental models that require diverse perspectives from individuals throughout the organization instead of a groupthink mentality, which operates under common assumptions. The third imperative is preparing “select leaders for responsibility at the national level” by providing “additional opportunities for broadening and advanced assignments.”<sup>16</sup> This ties individual commitment to learning supported by the institution; thus, the ALDS has elements that reflect the characteristics of a learning organization, which is prerequisite to adaptability in an era of persistent conflict.

However, even though the language in the ALDS alludes to a learning organization, the reality is that the Army does not resemble a learning organization and lacks policies to fully support a learning organization. The vast majority of officer career paths are standardized with regards to assignments and training (see Figure 1). This standardized path also reflects the Army’s approach to professional military education (PME) such as basic officer leader courses, captain career courses, intermediate-level education (ILE), pre-command courses, and the Army War College. As a result, the Army does not have an appropriate mix of generalists and specialists because there is a lack of diverse assignments and education in the officer corps. This results in barriers to mental models and often leads to groupthink with outdated assumptions developed in rigid courses that do not evolve quickly over time. The lack of specialization prevents personal mastery of cultural and technical expertise of the current operational environment. Additionally, a lack of specialization discourages individual officers from committing to a lifetime of learning because the Army limits the scope of their knowledge to common core training and assignments without creating an opportunity for them to stand out among their peers. Thus, there is a large gap between the language and goals of ALDS and the reality of an Army struggling to adapt to the demands of the current operational environment.

Complicating the change needed to move the Army toward becoming a learning organization is a number of constraints that must be considered before evaluating policy changes. These con-

Rank	Professional Military Education	Individual Leader Development (30 Days PTDY)	Assignments
2LT/ 1LT	Basic Officer Leader Course		
		Study Pashto/Afghan Cultural Center	Platoon Leader/Executive Officer/BN Staff Officer
CPT	Captain Career Course		
		Volunteer Thailand Earthquake with Civilian Relief Agencies	Company Commander/BN or BDE Staff Officer
MAJ	ILE		
		House Armed Services Congressional Fellowship	
LTC	Pre-Command Course		
		Division G3 Operations	BN Operations and Executive Officer/BDE Staff Officer
COL	Army War College		
		Internship with Defense Intelligence Agency	BN Commander/BDE or Division Staff Officer
COL			
		African Union Peace and Security Council	BDE Commander/Division Staff Officer

Figure 1. Example officer timeline integrated with 30-day individual leadership development events

straints are best articulated in a recent report, “Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps,” published by The Center for a New American Security, an independent and nonpartisan research institution. The report identifies four trends in the current operational environment that will influence the skills and knowledge officers must develop:

- “Increased incidence of ‘wars amongst the people.’
- Humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in parts of the world with which the United States has little experience.
- Widespread access to highly destructive weapons.
- The 24-hour global media environment.”<sup>17</sup>

However, the study recognizes the solution for developing these skills in officers is not as “simple as adding even more to the already-packed training and professional military education curriculum for junior and intermediate-grade leaders.”<sup>18</sup> Instead, the report cites a need for a distribution and specialization of talents across knowledge areas and differentiated career paths that are not based on standardized assignments and experiences. Further, the report argues a need for “encouraging the accession and retention of more of the best available talent in the

officer corps” by offering “more diverse and flexible career paths that encourage risk-taking and unconventional assignments.”<sup>19</sup> Additionally, policies aimed at leader development are constrained to limited resources given the skyrocketing future budgetary outlays in other areas of government spending. Even though General Martin Dempsey, commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), stated that leader development is his first priority for training and resources, a policy must exist in the reality of diminishing financial resources. Thus, there are numerous barriers to achieving the difficult goal of operationalizing the ALDS into tangible policy changes.

One possible way to operationalize the ALDS is through a subtle regulation change, which has strategic implications for developing a diverse officer corps of specialized talents mixed with common core training. According to Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-10, *Leaves and Passes*, “commanders of units, normally commanded by officers in the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher are authorized to approve [permissive temporary duty] when the period of absence is 10 days or less.”<sup>20</sup> Permissive temporary duty (PTDY) is defined as “a nonchargeable absence from duty...at no expense to the Government to perform a semi-official activity that benefits the Service and the soldier.”<sup>21</sup> Historically, PTDY has primarily been

used to give a soldier up to ten days to look for off-post housing when arriving at a new unit but has been rarely used for “participation in a program that will enhance the soldier’s value to the Army.”<sup>22</sup> However, this is a potentially powerful tool to allow officers to demonstrate their commitment to individual leader development with institutional support from the Army.

Commanders in the rank of O5 and above should be authorized to approve up to 30 days of PTDY for officers who have completed a key developmental position, are en route to or from a PME course, or at their discretion. The commander should retain the ability to grant PTDY at any time, primarily after successful completion of key developmental positions, such as company commander, and en route to or from PME training such as career courses and ILE. For approval, officers must submit an attachment to a PTDY request, which outlines the purpose of the leader development, along with a detailed plan of what the requestor seeks to accomplish. On completion of the PTDY, the officer will submit a report to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), and a summary of the officer’s training will be added to the officer’s record brief (ORB). HRC will add the report and summary to a database, which can be accessed by commanders who seek officers with experience and specialization in certain areas. As a result, senior Army leaders can leverage the referent knowledge of a diverse officer corps.

The impact of this regulation change diversifies not only the officer corps as a whole, but also the experiences of individual officers. Figure 1 illustrates the progression over time of granting PTDY to officers at critical points in their careers. The first opportunity for individual leader development is after BOLC and before arriving at the gaining unit. In this example, the officer is aware of an impending deployment to Afghanistan, and during his 30-day PTDY, he travels to an Afghan cultural center in New York City where he spends time interacting with former Afghan citizens, practicing the Pashto language, and understanding subtle cultural nuances to develop skills for leader engagements. Following his deployment to Afghanistan and attendance at the captain career course, the same officer uses PTDY to volunteer for reconstruction efforts in Thailand after an earthquake damages part of the country. During this time, the officer networks with civilian disaster relief agencies, such as the Red Cross, World Vision, and UNICEF, observing their strengths and weaknesses, which will help prepare the offi-



cer to work with them later in his career. On completion of company command, this officer uses PTDY to participate in a compressed Congressional Fellowship with the House Armed Services Committee and learns about the appropriations process for defense spending. Following completion of ILE, this officer arrives at his unit, but before becoming a battalion operations officer, he uses his PTDY in the division operations shop to learn how planning works two levels higher in his chain of command. This process of personally directed, lifelong learning continues at the pace of the individual officer's motivation, and the Army supports his endeavors, which provides the foundation for a learning organization.

The opportunities for leader development on PTDY are limited only by the creativity of individual officers. Table 1 provides just a small list of opportunities available to officers with the implementation of this PTDY policy for individual development. A brief look at this list illustrates the point that this policy naturally allows leaders to prepare for the threats described in the Army Capstone Concept and the ALDS. As a result, there are a substantial number of benefits for the Army if it adopts this policy change:

**Specialists mixed with generalists in the officer corps.** Officers will have a chance to excel in specialized areas, such as emergency response, weapons of mass destruction, and language training (see Table 1 for more areas), during PTDY. Specializations will exist in the context of common core training in PME courses, removing the pressure to squeeze specialized training (such as cultural training) into an already full PME course schedule. Not only does specialized training create an officer corps with a broad range of capabilities prepared to handle dynamic threats, it also provides common training in the principles of full-spectrum operations.

**Ability of senior leaders to leverage referent knowledge from a diverse officer corps.** Taking advantage of PTDY and tracking individual officer development in a central database at HRC provides senior leaders the opportunity to immediately leverage officers for specific assignments. Indeed, this same process occurred informally when General Petraeus hand-picked his staff officers based on individual experiences and referent knowledge, which contributed to the success of the 'surge' strategy in Iraq.



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**Ability to react immediately to changes in the operational environment.** Unlike many Army programs, which have a lag time from mobilization to implementation to impact, this policy immediately reacts to changes in the operational environment. As previously mentioned, the central database at HRC can track officers with unique abilities to respond to an imminent threat. However, in the event that referent knowledge in the officer corps is unavailable for a particular threat, this policy allows officers to immediately develop specific knowledge before deploying to a particular operational environment. For example, a captain graduates from the career course knowing he is deploying to a particular location. He now has the option of committing his PTDY time to language/cultural training or understanding governance and economic issues related to a specific area of operations. This process transforms the Army from a 'smart card' approach, which oversimplifies complex issues, to officers capable of leading organizations as subject-matter experts.

**Experiencing JIIM operations as a junior officer.** Many JIIM assignments are restricted to senior officers, which prevents junior leaders from integrating into JIIM operations. PTDY facilitates officers learning from and forming small networks with interagency personnel who create direct contacts and interagency trust, which can be leveraged throughout one's career in the Army.

**Low cost.** One primary benefit of PTDY includes the financial and planning responsibility, which is handed off to the officer. This provides an ideal incentive for individuals, as responsible stakeholders for institutional lifelong learning, which encourages the development of a diverse officer corps without the costs associated with a PME course. The minimal costs are limited to developing a database to track individual officer development reports and a small amount of personnel to manage it. Instead of creating an additional program in the Army that diverts resources and personnel, which is often the solution in most bureaucratic organizations, this system pushes the onus on the individual officer to create and report his development.

**Increased retention related to individual officer satisfaction.** A PTDY leader-development program would increase officer satisfaction and ultimately increase retention. The Army has been using a combination of incentives (primarily financial) to reverse the trend of dwindling officer retention rates in an environment with multiple deployments and family stress. However, financial incentives are weak because the Army does not have the resources to pay the true private sector market value of an officer, and officers who want to leave the Army to chase higher paychecks will leave regardless. In this

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE
Volunteer in Haiti	Understand disaster relief and civilian agency coordination
Work with metropolitan police force	Understand civilian approach to targeting and gang conflict
Border patrol	Experience with control and security of border operations
UPS/FEDEX/DLA	Develop knowledge of supply chains and logistical methods
Adventure race in the Caribbean	Raise money for Combined Federal Campaign charity
Work with Air Force squadron	Develop expertise on close air support (CAS) application
USAID	Understand agricultural development methods
Internship with CNN	Develop appreciation and understanding of media capabilities
Observe foreign military academy	Conduct leader engagements with other nations
Red Cross	Understand coordination for mass casualty (MASCAL) situations

Table 1: Example activities for individual leader development

program, PTDY creates opportunities for personal and professional development, which attracts and retains officers with lifelong commitments to self-directed learning and service — the officers who should compose the future bench of senior leaders.

Many officers choose to leave the Army due to peer standardization of career tracks and feel their talents are both mismanaged and underutilized. The PTDY policy directly deals with this concern, giving officers control of specialized talents and planned opportunities for professional growth. Additionally, the Army career timelines offer very few opportunities for planned personal growth such as volunteering abroad or serving as part of a religious ministry for extended periods. This protected time ensures officers have the option to seek personal fulfillment through civilian service opportunities or religious trips, both of which still add professional value to the Army. Even though the Army's current operational tempo is fast-paced, 30 days of PTDY allows officers the chance to slow down for personal recovery and contextualize their lessons learned before moving to a new assignment.

While there is an abundance of benefits, it is important to recognize and discuss some of the possible drawbacks associated with a PTDY regulatory change. Certainly, there are low financial costs associated with this plan, but there may be hidden personnel costs. For example, adding 30 days to individual development may delay an officer's arrival to his unit. It also might complicate planning for personnel movements, particularly if it is not known in advance whether an officer will request PTDY or skip the opportunity to begin an assignment earlier. However, officers can mitigate this possibility by notifying HRC, in advance, of their intention to use the PTDY opportunity for individual development. Additionally, many personnel movements to PME courses result in down (or snowbird) time while waiting for a course to begin. Often, officers snowbird for months, using time that could be used for individual leader development and that likely does not conflict with other meaningful training or assignments.

Another possible constraint is the limitations an officer may have in affording out-of-pocket costs associated with moving his family to another location for 30 days. One way to mitigate this move is to seek local PTDY development opportu-



*"Many JIIM assignments are restricted to senior officers, which prevents junior leaders from integrating into JIIM operations. PTDY facilitates officers learning from and forming small networks with interagency personnel who create direct contacts and interagency trust, which can be leveraged throughout one's career in the Army."*

nities that do not require travel. For example, an officer interested in understanding targeting, criminal network analysis, and police techniques could use PTDY at a metropolitan police organization for 30 days. While there are possible drawbacks with such a policy, many of them can be mitigated.

As a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy, I was selected as a volunteer to serve as a team member on Crossroads Africa during my last summer at West Point. Crossroads Africa was a specialized opportunity that allowed me to travel to Ghana as part of a small team and work with local nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to achieve development goals such as teaching, digging wells, and building schools. Having the opportunity to participate in Crossroads Africa taught me the cultural skills that allowed me to thrive, instead of simply survive, as a platoon leader in southwestern Baghdad. Leader engagements and rapport-building were familiar experiences as I had interacted with many tribal elders while in Ghana and navigated their local culture. Ironically, there was resistance from certain leaders at West Point, who dis-

couraged me from choosing such a divergent learning path, as opposed to the standard cadet summer experience. While attitudes in the Army toward learning seem to have shifted, as evidenced by the language in the ALDS, there may still be opposition to individual officer development through a policy change in PTDY because it deviates from a standard career track. In a complex operational environment such as this, the Army cannot afford to be skeptical of ideas that directly facilitate its development as a learning organization.

The Army faces an operational environment with complex challenges and a high level of uncertainty. To thrive, instead of merely survive in this environment, the Army needs to quickly develop a diverse officer corps, with specialized talents that complement common training and enhance their ability to adapt to current threats while anticipating those in the future. Giving commanders the authority to approve 30 days of PTDY at critical points in a career path is the first step to developing a diverse officer corps.



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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Dr. John A. Nagl, et al., *"Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps."* Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

<sup>2</sup>"A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army," Combined Arms Center for Army Leadership, 25 November 2009, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization*, Doubleday, New York, 1990.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, p. 139.

<sup>12</sup>"A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st-Century Army," p. 8.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Nagl, et al., p. 5.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-10, *Leaves and Passes*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 15 February 2006, Section XVI, Paragraph 5-31, p. 34.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., Section XVII, Paragraph 5-33, p. 37.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., Section XVI, Paragraph 5-32, p. 35.



# TEN TIPS

## FOR TACTICAL COMMANDERS

by Major Mark N. Popov, Canadian Army

Today, Canada's army is a learning institution, with a more effective lessons learned and application process than before. On-the-spot examination and investigation of incidents and engagements, both in Canada and during deployed operations, have identified and rectified shortfalls in tactics, techniques, and procedures, drills, equipment use, movement, and application of firepower in the contemporary operating environment. However, there is a body of intangible, experiential knowledge that is difficult to quantify and more difficult to capture. Normally, it is hard-won through experience, but nearly impossible to pass on in formal courses or training scenarios. After deployments, key leaders are often posted away from their units and not always able to pass on this knowledge informally. In an attempt to capture some of the knowledge and experience my team gained over the past 2 years of training and deployment, this article gleans lessons from individual and collective experiences into

ten tips. Many times during operations, leaders say, "I wish someone had told me this before I deployed." I wish, prior to assuming command of an armored reconnaissance squadron, which later expanded to become a combat team composed of more than 250 soldiers operating in southern Kandahar Province, that someone had offered me the invaluable ten tips that follow.

### 1 TIME MANAGEMENT

Reading, writing, and wrenches; there is never enough time, particularly while deployed, to read or write anything that is not urgent and directly related to deployment. The raft of professional development readings, language lessons, counterinsurgency readings, theater directives, lessons learned, post-operation reports, orders, and information packages, which will be pushed to commanders throughout deployment training, are valuable and should be read. However, com-

manders should make every effort to read and review these publications prior to arriving in theater; once in theater, leaders will be consumed by other things and these valuable resources will go unread. Commanders should commit as much time as possible to soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and junior officers; share mealtime with soldiers, rather than the command crew. Making a conscious effort to focus on studying and reading during deployment training will free up time to focus on soldiering during deployment, which pays huge dividends.

### 2 DIVISION OF LABOR: LET PEOPLE HELP

Our training system requires students, whether undergoing basic officer training or the combat team commander's course, to physically conduct nearly every task, knowing and attending to every detail.



While this ensures candidates are familiar with all subordinate tasks and are capable of accomplishing them, it is an untenable methodology for sustained operations. A tactical commander simply cannot do everything. This causes commanders to burn out, become combat ineffective and fuzzy-minded, which is a disservice to soldiers. Commanders may want to track, manage, and coordinate every single detail, which is not conducive to commanding effectively. Commanders must use the skills, knowledge, and considerable ability of their people, such as the battle staff, to help command the organization. The commanding officer commands the company, battery, squadron, or combat team; however, supporting lieutenants, captains, and NCOs can run it from minute to minute, handle operational details, maintain the command post, and manage the myriad parts and lateral interactions required to keep the organization operating. The combat arms division of labor has evolved over many years and is proven to be effective across the spectrum of operations, from high-intensity combat to garrison training. Division of labor greatly assists commanders by freeing up the time and space to think and make the right decision at the right time. Delegating and leaning on others in the organization is neither a failure of the tactical commander nor a burden to subordinates, it is the best way to use collective

knowledge and skills to accomplish the mission.

### 3 BATTLE PROCEDURES: WHO DOES WHAT?

After receiving a warning order, commanders should provide the command support team early planning guidance based on a very general effect to be achieved and the timeline required. The command team should be given as much notice as possible, as early as possible, in as much detail as possible, and as far down the chain of command as possible, which is often accomplished through detailed radio warning orders and has always paid high dividends. During deployment to southern Kandahar Province, depending on time and distance, the captains on my combat team immediately started looking into planning and linking with the appropriate higher-level staff as required, while concurrently looking at resources. After conducting mission analysis, commanders clarify planning direction based on time, space, and effects, and sit down with the command support team, supporting arms/enabler advisors, and experts to plan collectively.

Whenever possible, commanders should consult their sergeants major on sustainment and replenishment, see what is achievable, and offer a sober second look.

Even on a small combat team, there are so many moving parts that the team commander has difficulty tracking vehicles or assessing maintenance status from minute to minute, which is why the staff and captains should step in. Once the estimate (usually done collectively) is completed, scheme of maneuver roughed out and planned, finish the written order (if time permits) or radio/overlay order if time is short. For written orders, the captains should assist in orders preparation by writing and verifying groupings and tasks, coordinating instructions, and most of command and signals.

In Canada's armor corps, the squadron sergeant major inputs most of the service support paragraph and critical coordinating instructions such as detainee handling details or actions on breakdown. For example, as the commander, I issue formal orders; one of the captains (normally the battle captain [S3]) issues the groupings and tasks, and most of the coordinating instructions; and the sergeant major issues service support instructions. I cannot overstate the need to lean on the team throughout the battle procedure and plan development, which will help ensure that leaders have the time and space to think, all appropriate lateral coordination is complete, and orders are reviewed before they are issued. To support this process, the higher headquarters must be a self-functioning organization with effective and detailed standard operating procedures and a strong battle rhythm that manages key staff time and tasks. If the combat team headquarters is not tight and well-managed, and everyone does not understand "who does what, when and where," it will waste efforts and cause burn out, thus the entire small unit suffers.

### 4 TAKE TIME TO SOLDIER

Remember, leaders are soldiers first, who also happen to be officers; young soldiers will deploy without complaint and follow orders, so leaders need to demonstrate the same skills, abilities, determination, and endurance they do. This is a simple principle, often easily said, but difficult to do given the demands on time. Leaders should take time to deploy with different elements of the organization, particularly new attachments. Leaders need to sit down with soldiers and clean weapons, take the unit's tactical movement group out as a fighting element and fulfill some of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), or complete other tactical tasks. Hands-on soldiering keeps leaders grounded, keeps leaders mindful of the difficulties and dangers of the environment



*"Commanders must use the skills, knowledge, and considerable ability of their people, such as the battle staff, to help command the organization. The commanding officer commands the company, battery, squadron, or combat team; however, supporting lieutenants, captains, and NCOs can run it from minute to minute, handle operational details, maintain the command post, and manage the myriad parts and lateral interactions required to keep the organization operating."*



in which the team operates, and keeps leaders in touch with soldering and how it is done. Soldiering also ensures leaders make decisions from a position of credibility, knowledge, and experience, not from a command post divorced from the battle.

## 5 LEADER MOVEMENT

In Afghanistan, commanders cannot move within the battlespace at will. Every move is a deliberate operation that saps combat power from the rest of the team and places soldiers at risk. To support commanders forward, vehicle crews must be well-versed in all command post duties and be ready to conduct local defense, communications troubleshooting, map preparation, and other command support duties in austere forward locations from the back of their vehicles. They must also be capable of independent action, understanding the big picture and the next steps of ongoing operations, keeping the vehicle ready to move at a moment's notice, and using their initiative to resolve uncertain situations when time and rest are at a premium. Try to plan moves well in advance and link them with sustainment missions, existing patrols, route clearance packages, combat logistics patrols, flanking subunit movements, or any other elements moving in the battlespace whenever possible. Yes, the team's movement will be hampered without choice. If the team has to move, pull assets from the remainder of the team to support requirements to command forward, but be aware of the effect it will have. Ensure return moves are planned as detailed as movements out to prevent being stranded in a location with only one vehicle and unable to return to the remainder of your subunit timely. Maximizing the use of other moving parts in the battlespace is good, but having the combat team commander stuck in a forward location with no way to retrieve him is dreadful.

## 6 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

During deployed operations, the leave plan, which will periodically see large numbers of personnel unavailable for operations, causes such havoc that it may require assigning vehicles and crew members. Often in preparation for large scale, deliberate operations, the captains and sergeant major chess-piece out individual vehicle crewing and patrol make-up. While every attempt is made to give platoon-level leaders and NCOs maximum latitude, this planning often cannot be pushed to them because they would spend so much time gathering combat power, coordinating, planning, and linking laterally to exchange personnel and vehi-



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cles that they would have no time to lead troops. While planning in such detail, driven from the combat team headquarters, is painful and something never encountered during training, it is a reality that cannot be escaped. Egos must be set aside in this instance to permit the whole subunit to function effectively. All leaders must understand that combat team readiness takes precedence over platoon-level cohesion. In training, platoons must practice operating with each other and with sections from different platoons meshed together for taskings.

## 7 KNOW AND UNDERSTAND ATTACHMENTS AND ENABLERS

In the modern battlespace, everything is a combined arms effort; however, the breadth of attachments and enablers used in practice far exceed those typically covered in training. B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, deployed to Afghanistan in fall 2009 as a squadron of less than 100 personnel. However, for most of its deployment, it had more than 200 Canadian personnel, mostly comprised of attachments over and above those normally found in a combat team, such as engineers, artillery forward observation officer parties, and additional infantry.

The B Squadron Combat Team attached civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams, construction management organization

(CMO) teams, police-operational mentor liaison teams (P-OMLT), medics, a national support element logistics detachment, a number of civilian contracted K-9 patrol dog teams, and from time to time, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and explosive ordnance (EOD) teams. The combat team also worked closely with Whole of Government partners in the form of Canadian International Development Agency civilian stabilization officers and civilian police officers. For all deliberate and most routine operations, the team also partnered with an Afghan National Police element. We took time to sit down and learn what our partners, attachments, and enablers had to offer, how they worked, and addressed any restrictions they had regarding employment. Often, perceptions differ from reality on the ground; recognizing them early not only offers the best mutual understanding, it also makes the attachments aware that you have taken the time to understand their significance and see them as part of your team, not just resources to be exploited. Finally, attachments may be drawn from the air force or navy and may not understand combat arms operations; be prepared to educate them.

## 8 TACTICAL PATIENCE

During operations, things occur at a moment's notice and will throw timing

Continued on Page 50



# IBCT's RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

by Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. Flood, Major James A. Hayes, and Major Forrest V. Cook

*In October 2010, the 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (Airborne-Reconnaissance) deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as part of 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division, to participate in a full-spectrum operations (FSO) rotation, which served as a key milestone in the BCT's train-up to assume the global response force (GRF) mission. This was the first FSO rotation in several years at JRTC; it was also the first time an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron participated in a rotation in the reconnaissance and security role envisioned in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, rather than as a landowner in a counterinsurgency (COIN) rotation.<sup>1</sup> Contrary to popular misconceptions, this rotation did not dispose of lessons learned during the past 9 years of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; rather, it incorporates stability operations (of which COIN is a subset) into a scenario that places renewed emphasis on the offensive and defensive portions of the FSO paradigm.*



HARMON



# in Full-Spectrum Operations

*The force-on-force scenario began with a forcible entry operation, via parachute assault into an area held by a “phase III” insurgency, and transitioned to a defense of the airhead line against a hybrid threat (insurgent remnants and their allies, including special purpose forces from a neighboring nation and a rogue host nation mechanized infantry battalion task force). After the defense of the airhead line against a mechanized attack, the BCT executed an offensive operation focused on retaking key terrain seized by the rogue mechanized battalion, and returning those areas to the control of legitimate host nation government.*

*The operational methods, tactical observations, and modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) challenges experienced by the squadron are both informative and timely. A significant portion of the U.S. Army will soon begin to train for FSO as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) contingency expeditionary force (CEF) pool while senior Army leaders review the existing force structure and capabilities of various modular BCT designs.*







*“Reconnaissance missions are an essential part of any FSO endeavor. BCT reconnaissance efforts are intended to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) by employing varying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as an unblinking eye against specific named areas of interest (NAI).”*

## **PART I — RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON AS THE CHIEF OF RECONNAISSANCE**

Reconnaissance missions are an essential part of any FSO endeavor. BCT reconnaissance efforts are intended to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) by employing varying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as an unblinking eye against specific named areas of interest (NAI). The intelligence derived from answering PIR provides the BCT commander with situational understanding and influences key decisions the commander anticipates making during the battle.<sup>2</sup> The BCT reconnaissance effort involves multiple assets with varied command relationships to the brigade. The 3d BCT found that centralizing all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron — designated as the “chief of reconnaissance” — was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the BCT’s reconnaissance operations and the BCT’s deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in ISR employment to better answer the commander’s information requirements. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron also provided reverse-targeting analysis to the BCT’s non-maneuver battalions, thus allowing them to better plan for security of the BCT’s high-value targets (HVT).

### **Synchronizing the Brigade’s ISR Efforts**

As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was allotted the lion’s share of the BCT’s NAI to observe. Therefore, allocating organic, attached, and supporting ISR assets against the NAI set became the primary focus of the squadron’s targeting cycle. The ISR assets allocated to the squadron provided the capability to observe NAI through a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).

The first step of each targeting cycle required the S2 to identify and enumerate, for the upcoming period, the number of NAI the squadron was tasked to cover. The S3 then calculated the

number of ISR assets available to the squadron for the upcoming period. For long-term NAI (requiring 24 to 72 hours of coverage), each organic or attached dismounted scout squad (to include snipers) and each organic mounted scout section counted as an asset; due to Army airspace command and control (A2C2) challenges that limit the flight time and range of Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), troop Ravens were not counted as assets. The number of organic assets was then augmented by attached and supporting ISR assets, including low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, human intelligence collection teams (HCT), Shadow UAVs, Army aviation air weapons teams (AWT), divisional UAVs, and occasional MQ-1 Predator and video downlink (VDL)-capable close air support (CAS) sorties. The last step of the targeting process required the squadron fire support officer to align targets against the appropriate NAI, making target areas of interest (TAI) of the NAI that corresponded to known or suspected locations of enemy high payoff targets (HPT).

By comparing NAI requirements against available assets and cross-referencing with the fire support officer’s target list, the squadron staff advised the commander on the capability of the squadron to cover its NAI requirements with observation as well as fires. They also provided recommendations on NAI potentially requiring pass-back due to a capability gap and/or areas in which the squadron could apply multiple ISR assets to achieve mixing, redundancy, and/or cueing effects of multiple intelligence products. The final step of the squadron targeting process was to graphically overlay each of the tasked NAI with the asset(s) assigned to observe them and the registered target locations to visually verify that the squadron was covering all of its requirements.

As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided a seat at the ‘head table’ for BCT targeting workgroup meetings, joining the fires battalion commander in his role as BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). The squadron’s ISR allocation plan became its key input to the BCT targeting workgroup meetings. The ISR allocation plan was instrumental in informing the de-



cide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) process as it identifies the sensor portion of each sensor-to-shooter arrangement for those NAI that correspond to designated targets for lethal or nonlethal effects as determined by the FSCOORD. Once the BCT executive officer (XO) approves the ISR plan recommended by the squadron, the squadron then proceeds with execution for the next time period.

One key consideration that became evident during execution was the requirement to ensure that decisions on ISR allocation, made in the BCT targeting workgroup, were briefed to the BCT current operations (CUROPS) staff. This became a particularly important point of emphasis, as there remained some institutional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) from COIN deployments that resulted in the brigade battle captain allocating ISR assets across the BCT in a fair share distribution system as the assets arrived on station. This particular TTP was not conducive to maintaining a focused ISR effort, and produced some friction points between the squadron staff and the BCT CUROPS staff until the various actors were educated on the newly created process.

### Task Organizing for Chief of Reconnaissance

The BCT task organized several organic and supporting ISR assets under the reconnaissance squadron, essentially creating a reconnaissance task force. While this task organization technique was quite effective during the JRTC rotation, the attachment of infantry scout platoons, in particular, required a great deal of coordination between the squadron and the infantry battalions to ensure the maneuver battalions' PIR were understood by the squadron and its respective NAI were included in the BCT ISR matrix.

For the forcible entry phase, the squadron was assigned seven brigade NAI to observe; since some of these were quite extensive (approximately 2 square kilometers in the case of three NAI), squadron staff refinement resulted in a total of 13 NAI. The scout platoons from both infantry battalions (comprised of seven total dismounted scout squads), an LLVI team, and an HCT were task organized to the squadron; one supporting AH-64D AWT was placed in direct support of the squadron soon after the BCT executed its airborne assault. Since the squadron's two mounted troops were allocated to the B-echelon air-land package and unavailable for the first several hours of the operation, the additional assets, in conjunction with the squadron's dismounted recon troop, which arrived by airborne assault, provided the squadron with 15 organic or attached ISR assets and one reinforcing asset. This capacity enabled the squadron to observe all of its refined NAI as part of a 12 kilometer-wide screen line around the drop zone to eliminate enemy observers from calling for and correcting indirect fires against the airhead line.

As the mission evolved into a deliberate defense of the airhead line, the reconnaissance squadron was tasked to screen in two noncontiguous security zones. The northern security zone was approximately 12 square kilometers in area, while the southern security zone was approximately 72 square kilometers in area, to include three small population centers.

The squadron was tasked to cover 12 division and brigade NAI before adding eight additional NAI, which were created by the squadron based on its own micro intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the terrain and enemy, which resulted in a total of 20 NAI requirements. Clearly, this area and NAI density exceeded the organic capacity of the squadron. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided with ISR attachments from the infantry battalions and the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), which included two battalion scout platoons, one LLVI team, one HCT, and three M1200 Armored Knight fire support vehicles. All told, the squadron possessed 27 organic and attached ISR assets. The brigade's Shadow UAV was placed in direct support of the squadron, as were echelons above brigade (EAB) assets, which included one AWT, one pair of VDL-capable F16s for nontraditional ISR (NTISR), and the Sky Warrior UAV (divisional asset). These supporting platforms added an additional four ISR assets to reinforce the squadron's organic and attached capacity.

After the enemy's counterattack was defeated, the squadron was tasked to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance in support of the BCT's offensive operations to regain population centers seized during the enemy's offensive. In total, the squadron was tasked with 34 NAI, spread over an area of approximately 110 square kilometers, for the offensive phase. As with previous phases, some of these NAI were extensive in dimensions — one route was 13 kilometers long and the NAI corresponding to the infantry battalion objectives were two to four square kilometers in area. To cover these NAI, the squadron had three organic troops and retained both attached infantry battalion scout platoons (one was to be detached back to its parent battalion after that battalion crossed the line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC) and approached its objective) for a total organic and attached capacity of 25 ISR assets. Supporting assets included one AWT, the Shadow UAV, one pair of NTISR F16s, Sky Warrior UAV, and one armed MQ-1 Predator, for a total of five reinforcing ISR assets (as with the defensive phase, not all of these supporting assets were airborne simultaneously throughout the offense).

### Mission Command Considerations for the Chief of Reconnaissance

The role of chief of reconnaissance required the squadron to maintain a relatively closer relationship with the BCT commander and his staff, both in frequency of interaction and geographic proximity. Recognizing this requirement, the squadron

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positioned its tactical operations center (TOC) within walking distance of the brigade headquarters main TOC, but outside the templated bursting radius of the enemy's indirect fire systems, which ensured two key brigade HVT would not experience effects from the same indirect fire event. The BCT fires battalion located its TOC in similar fashion. This geographic proximity facilitated daily face-to-face coordination between the squadron, fires battalion, and brigade primary staff representatives, specifically, the S3, S2, and fire support officer. It also enabled better parallel planning; for example, it allowed the squadron staff to participate in planning the offensive phase by leveraging the BCT's ISR plan (from warning order (WARNO) 2) as its fragmentary order (FRAGO), and the organic reconnaissance troop leveraging the BCT's ISR/fires rehearsal as its BCT-level rehearsal event. As a benefit of this parallel planning, all three organic troops had crossed the LD/LC and were in the process of gathering information to answer PIR when the BCT executed its combined arms rehearsal.<sup>3</sup>

During the defensive phase of the operation, the BCT and squadron commanders further identified the requirement to have an even more seamless interaction during critical events of the counterreconnaissance fight. To achieve better synergy, the squadron relocated its tactical command post (TAC) with the commander, S3, S2, fire support officer, and air liaison officer (ALO) *inside* the BCT's TOC during hours of darkness when the enemy's first echelon reconnaissance entered the BCT's sector (particularly the security zone), and also during the next period of darkness when the enemy main body entered the security zone and passed through to the BCT's close area. This temporary collocation of command and control (C2) nodes allowed the squadron commander to personally interface with the BCT commander, S3, and CUROPS staff to ensure both the squadron and the BCT were seeing the same indicators and making the same assessments of the enemy's actions and intentions. It also increased the effective synchronization of various organic, attached, and supporting assets.

### Chief of Reconnaissance in the BCT Deep Fight

The BCT commander structured his area of operations (AO) into three primary zones, as described in Chapter 3, FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*.<sup>4</sup> The BCT rear area was essentially defined by the airhead line and included the brigade support

area (BSA); the C2 nodes for the BCT headquarters, fires battalion, reconnaissance battalion, and BSTB; and the area around the field landing strip (FLS), which the BCT used as a continual aerial port of debarkation/embarkation (APOD/APOE) for personnel, equipment, and logistics. During the defense, the close area included terrain beyond the airhead line, controlled by the infantry battalions; during the offense, the infantry battalions conducted a battle handoff of their objectives from the reconnaissance squadron to create their respective close areas. The deep area (synonymous with the BCT security area) included the terrain within the BCT AO, beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), out to the BCT's boundaries.<sup>5</sup> For all phases, the reconnaissance squadron operated in the BCT deep area as a shaping operation, while the squadron's field trains and TOC remained in the BCT rear area, executing doctrinal logistics and C2 functions.

The BCT commander also identified several BCT 'fights' that the BCT would closely synchronize in support of the maneuver battalions. The ISR/deep fires fight became the purview of the reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion (chief of reconnaissance and FSCOORD, respectively) to prosecute. As the BCT quickly discovered, the presence of supporting ISR and fires assets, such as CAS sorties, armed Predator sorties, and the M777 platoon from the 18th Fires Brigade, provided the BCT with the capability to identify targets and apply lethal effects far beyond the limits of the brigade's organic MTOE assets.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the brigade employed lethal precision munitions against enemy HPT (T-80s, ZSU 23-4s) located in and around the main offensive objective, which was an urban area located 15 kilometers away (straight-line distance) from the BCT rear area and about 12 kilometers from the forward line of troops (FLOT) when the offensive phase started. The destruction of key enemy forces as part of the deep fight resulted in a shaping effect in support of the BCT's infantry battalions, as it prevented the enemy from using those assets against the infantry battalions' latter assaults.

The prosecution of the BCT deep fight was formulated in BCT targeting workgroup meetings, in coordination with the chief of recon, FSCOORD, and the BCT XO, which synchronized the ISR plan to the BCT's high payoff target list (HPTL) and attack guidance matrix (AGM). The result was an integrated and centralized system-of-systems approach to the D3A process, which enabled the chief of recon to locate and destroy enemy HPT simultaneous to the conduct of reconnaissance operations focused



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on ground lines-of-communication conditions and enemy dispositions in and around the infantry battalions' objectives. This combination of ground reconnaissance by organic and attached assets, in conjunction with squadron-controlled enablers, operating one phase line to the front of their forward trace to target enemy HPTs, created a capability and lethality far beyond the squadron's MTOE design. In essence, it applied the precepts of pre-rotational troop-level joint fires integration live fire at a squadron level with similarly devastating effects.

The benefit of enablers became painfully evident around midnight of the first period of darkness for the offensive phase. Around that time, for various reasons, the squadron's supporting air assets were all grounded or off station. Almost immediately, the squadron's ground reconnaissance elements began to take substantially heavier contact and increased casualties as the enemy regained his freedom of maneuver, owing to the suddenly 1-dimensional nature of the reconnaissance and targeting effort.

By contrast, the enemy commander admitted, after the offensive phase, that one of his essential tasks communicated in his intent to his forces had been to destroy the BCT's ground reconnaissance forces in *his* security zone to prevent them from identifying his HVT and providing information on the assault objectives to the BCT and the infantry battalions.<sup>7</sup> In the BCT's final after-action review (AAR), the enemy commander specified that the combination of enablers (UAVs, AWT, CAS, and precision 155mm munitions) in echelons forward of the ground reconnaissance elements was not only unforeseen, but significantly eroded his combat power. This caused the enemy commander to constantly reposition his HVT to replace losses in his security zone and avoid detection and destruction prior to eventual engagement with the BCT's infantry companies.<sup>8</sup>

As a final note on the prosecution of the BCT's deep fight, the synergy achieved by synchronizing ISR assets with lethal fires in a D3A process, under the control of a single battalion-level commander operating within the intent of the brigade commander, could not have been achieved under the habitual COIN method of equal distribution of assets. Even with all assets under the squadron's control, the process remained extremely dynamic and required frequent retasking of assets from their originally apportioned set of NAI to achieve the desired sensor-to-shooter linkage between unarmed platforms and armed platforms/precision cannon munitions, as well as the desired effects on the target; for example, destruction vs. disruption.

### Chief of Reconnaissance in Reverse Targeting

In addition to its role in the BCT deep fight, the reconnaissance squadron provided valuable advice and information pertaining to the force protection of a BCT HVT located within the rear area. Specifically, the squadron applied a reverse targeting process to the BSA and the FLS. By analyzing each target and determining how the squadron would execute reconnaissance and target acquisition activities against them, the squadron staff developed a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and recommended NAI overlay for each. These products were provided to the brigade support battalion (BSB) and BSTB staffs, respectively, to assist in security and counterreconnaissance plans.

The 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, not only employed its reconnaissance squadron in accordance with FM 3-20.96, it also developed TTP for using the squadron command and staff as the BCT's chief of recon.<sup>9</sup> In this role, the squadron contributed to the BCT's successful execution of combat operations against a hybrid threat by synchronizing the BCT commander's ISR assets to achieve ISR unity of effort; coordinated with the fires battalion during the BCT's deep fight against enemy reconnaissance forces and HPT; and conducted counterreconnaissance assessments of the BCT's HVT. These functions are beyond the

scope of current reconnaissance squadron doctrine, but speak to the vast untapped potential of these organizations as the U.S. Army explores the employment of modular BCTs during FSO.

## PART II – TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON FULL SPECTRUM RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

### Operational Overview

Before discussing lessons learned, it is helpful to briefly review the missions the squadron executed by phase. During the initial (airborne assault/forcible entry) phase, the squadron was tasked with screening approximately 75 percent of the airhead line perimeter (or 12 kilometers of frontage to include 13 NAI) with four dismounted scout platoons (a total of 15 scout squads, based on personnel strengths at the time). The defensive phase had the squadron screening the BCT's infantry battalions in two noncontiguous security zones. The northern security zone was approximately 12 square kilometers in size, while the southern security zone covered approximately 72 square kilometers. After refinement, the squadron had 20 NAI to observe. To perform this mission, the BCT commander task organized the squadron with its organic mounted troops and dismounted troop (18 scout squads or sections), two attached infantry battalion scout platoons (seven scout squads), and a handful of other supporting ISR assets from the BCT's BSTB and EAB to provide depth of reconnaissance beyond the forward-most trace of scout teams and sections. The final offensive phase required the squadron to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance throughout a 110-square-kilometer area in support of the infantry battalions' follow-on assaults, with particular focus on a large urban area located 15 kilometers from the LD/LC, and a 13-kilometer-long route through several natural chokepoints. The squadron was tasked with 34 NAI for this phase. To conduct its offensive reconnaissance, the squadron had essentially the same assets as it did during the defensive phase.

### Doctrinal Overview

The deactivation of armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons leaves the reconnaissance squadrons in the Army's three BCT designs as the highest-echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on performing reconnaissance and security operations for a higher headquarters.<sup>10</sup> As explained in FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, the reconnaissance squadrons of modular BCTs provide a significant dismounted and mounted reconnaissance force; provide timely, accurate, and relevant combat information; and enable the [BCT] commander to decisively employ his maneuver battalions and joint fires at the time and place of his choosing.<sup>11</sup> This is particularly essential during the conduct of FSO, in which commanders are expected to perform offensive, defensive, and stability operations in simultaneity.<sup>12</sup>

### Fundamentals of Reconnaissance

FM 3-20.96 lists seven fundamentals of reconnaissance, which must be adhered to during the conduct of reconnaissance operations:

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
- Orient on the reconnaissance [or security] objective.
- Report all information rapidly and accurately.
- Retain freedom of maneuver.
- Gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible.
- Develop the situation.<sup>13</sup>

FM 3-20.96 also lists five fundamentals of security operations.<sup>14</sup> However, since those fundamentals parallel and are essentially

inclusive to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, the latter framework will be used for discussion in relating the experiences of 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, at the JRTC and in providing proposed solutions to the situations it encountered.

**Ensure continuous reconnaissance.** By comparing NAI requirements for the defensive and offensive phases of the JRTC experience, and assuming the size and scope of the squadron's NAI responsibilities were typical for FSO, it is clear that the squadron's organic assets are not sufficient to provide continuous reconnaissance, given the size of the defensive security zones and the extensive area in which the squadron conducts offensive operations. To further complicate matters, each NAI is not best observed with ground reconnaissance personnel. The solution to this dilemma is a combination of internal task organization (for the defense, each organic troop was task organized with both mounted and dismounted platoons), and the employment of significant ISR attachments, to include scout platoons from infantry battalions, LLVI teams, HCT, AWT, Shadow UAV, and NTISR in the form of VDL-equipped CAS sorties. This combination of assets provides for different means to observe NAI and lends itself to more effective mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets, as explained in FM 2-01, *ISR Synchronization*, and FM 3-20.96.<sup>15</sup>

Another way to ensure continual reconnaissance is to vary the means by which reconnaissance assets are inserted or infiltrated into the AO.<sup>16</sup> If mounted or dismounted ground insertion from the vicinity of the LD/LC is the only technique used, the enemy can easily focus and mass his counterreconnaissance assets forward, which is analogous to "putting eight men in the box" in football parlance. However, air insertion of dismounted assets, either from the dismounted troop, attached infantry scout platoons, or even dismounted sections from the mounted troops, forces the enemy commander to disperse his counterreconnaissance forces and provides for a better chance of successful insertion (and thus observation of the assigned NAI) by ground reconnaissance elements.


The employment of supporting aerial ISR assets is also a consideration for achieving and maintaining continual reconnaissance. Each air asset has different capabilities that must be understood by the squadron staff to optimize usage. The squadron considered the three key questions below to help optimize the employment of ISR assets during this operation:

- Is the asset VDL capable to enable the squadron to observe feed and adjust its observation area if necessary?
- What type of optics, such as day, infrared, and thermal, does the asset have?
- Does the asset possess the capability to engage targets (within the proper engagement criteria and in accordance with the HPTL and AGM) or is it best used as a 'hunter' for a second armed asset?

These considerations come into play during the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance mission and may require dynamic retasking of aerial assets to exploit each platform's particular capabilities. For instance, if an unarmed UAV observes a stationary enemy reconnaissance vehicle, it can act as the 'hunter' for lethal artillery fires delivered by the fires battalion, to include global positioning system (GPS)-guided precision munitions from supporting 155mm howitzer units. However, if an unarmed UAV observes a moving enemy vehicle, it will likely require the squadron to retask an aerial asset, armed with laser-guided precision munitions, to which the target can then be handed off for lethal targeting and post-strike battle damage assessment. Once hand-off occurs, the unarmed asset can then assume overwatch of the NAI that the armed asset was previously observing. This rapid D3A process was successful several times over a single period of darkness during reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance fights.

**Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.** Idle reconnaissance assets represent a poor employment plan, given the likely volume of NAI tasked to the squadron. The only exception to this is the likelihood of the squadron to maintain a reserve or quick

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reaction force (QRF), most likely in the form of a mounted reconnaissance platoon, to reinforce reconnaissance efforts or provide a killer asset to reconnaissance elements that must remain otherwise static with strict direct-fire engagement criteria. The S2 and S3 must continually compare NAI requirements and available reconnaissance assets to ensure the squadron is optimizing its capacity. Any excess reconnaissance assets, beyond a 1:1 ratio (and the QRF requirement) should be employed to provide mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets of various types.

***Orient on the reconnaissance objective.***

The primary means to ensure organic and attached reconnaissance elements remain focused on the reconnaissance objective is for the squadron commander to provide clear reconnaissance or security guidance during the planning phase for a mission. Reconnaissance guidance should include reconnaissance focus, reconnaissance tempo (stealthy vs. forceful, deliberate vs. rapid), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria.<sup>17</sup> Security operations (screen line) guidance is similar and should include security operations focus, tempo (time duration of the observations posts), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria.<sup>18</sup>

Detailed terrain analysis, performed by all levels of reconnaissance leaders, is another imperative for reconnaissance and security operation planning. Reconnaissance element leaders must analyze the terrain to determine where the enemy is most likely to acquire and destroy friendly units. Terrain analysis requires identifying natural or manmade obstacles, which create chokepoints for reconnaissance forces and require a deliberate process to clear or bypass. In the force-on-force scenario at JRTC, the enemy elected to stronghold a series of natural chokepoints along the squadron's long route. This route reconnaissance effort evolved into a series of intense meeting engagements between enemy mechanized forces and friendly HMMWV-mounted elements — an intuitively obvious combat power ratio mismatch, which resulted in significant friendly casualties and a slower than expected reconnaissance tempo. Had squadron and troop leaders performed a better terrain analysis, a good deal of the direct fire contacts between friendly and enemy ground elements may have been avoided.

Habitual COIN methods of diverting ISR or AWT assets to emerging events (mortar points of origin or troops-in-contact situations) creates friction with the fundamental requirement to orient on the reconnaissance objective and should therefore be carefully considered during FSO. Since air assets often perform zone reconnaissance or screening operations in advance of ground elements, the reconnaissance or security effort tends to lose focus and tempo when those aerial assets are dynamically retasked away from the squadron. As a second-order effect, the tempo of reconnaissance slows as ground elements become more cautious in their technique, particularly when facing an enemy that has combat power overmatch against organic vehicles and weapons systems; for example, BMP-3s against HMMWVs. Current operations cells at BCT and squadron levels need to make a deliberate assessment of each indirect fire event or troops-in-contact situation to determine if the threat presented requires retasking high-demand/low-density assets, such as a UAV or AWT, away from the platform's predetermined reconnaissance focus. One



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potential solution to this challenge is to specify which assets are in direct support (DS) of the squadron and which are in general support (GS) — with the latter being the primary assets to consider for reallocating support for events occurring outside the security area.

Focusing ISR assets on friendly forces could be a security concern. It may be possible for anyone with a one-system remote video terminal (OSRVT), or similar capability, to view the feed of an ISR platform. During the final AAR, the enemy commander revealed that on more than one occasion, he tapped into the BCT's ISR assets; when assets were focused on friendly force dispositions, it provided a great deal of valuable intelligence to the enemy commander.<sup>19</sup> The possibility of a near-peer to view video feed is another reason to carefully evaluate the COIN TTP of diverting ISR assets to monitor friendly forces, but instead keep assets focused on their assigned NAI.

***Report all information rapidly and accurately.*** To develop the BCT commander's situational understanding, the squadron must ensure that all information from the deep area is reported timely and accurately. Early in the defensive phase of the operation, the squadron recognized a gap in situational understanding by the BCT commander. Essentially, the common operating picture (COP), both friendly and enemy, of the security zone (deep area), as depicted by the brigade and squadron staffs in their respective TOCs, did not match. This knowledge gap also existed between the squadron, which was operating on digital systems such as command post of the future (CPOF), and its organic ground reconnaissance troops, which were operating primarily on blue force tracker (BFT). The largest friction point was not the actual reports sent to the squadron TOC, it was the translation of those reports, which primarily came across FM nets, along with some BFT reports (analog to digital reports), and the BCT TOC's subsequent tracking of these reports. The squadron TOC created CPOF events for reports that troops rendered. Those CPOF events did *not*, however, auto-populate the CPOF COP maintained by the BCT TOC; instead, it required a dedicated individual in the BCT TOC to manually "drag" the squadron's CPOF events into the BCT's master CPOF COP. Therefore, the

BCT commander and his key staff did not “see” the same enemy disposition as the squadron. Likewise, not all CPOF events translated into BFT reports (the two systems do *not* auto-populate each other). Thus, if the squadron TOC did not create BFT reports from CPOF events of other battalions, troop commanders were unable to gain a full situational understanding by monitoring BFT systems.

A three-part solution solves this reporting deficiency, which is created by a multitude of analog and digital systems at varied levels of command. First, ground troops must report all contact and observation reports over FM communications and digitally through BFT, if available; dismounted troops may not have BFT, depending on their tactical configuration for a specific mission. This ensures that digital COPs of higher headquarters immediately reflect the situation on the ground. Secondly, the squadron TOC must ensure that all monitored CPOF or FM-reported events from units other than ground troops (or organic elements without BFT) populate BFT, which may require the BFT operator in the TOC to manually create BFT events. Lastly, the squadron must continually synchronize its CPOF COP with the BCT COP, which is a duty suited for the squadron liaison officer (LNO) to brigade.

As a means of fratricide prevention, the squadron must continually track, both digitally and analog, all friendly positions, particularly those in the deep area. The squadron experienced two fratricide incidents during the operation: the first involved an AH-64 engagement against a friendly gun truck and an M1200 vehicle; the second involved a mounted platoon engagement against a dismounted element that was infiltrating into zone. Both incidents could have been averted by a combination of passive and active control measures. First, the squadron (and all BCT elements) must ensure that a common air-ground integration (AGI) vehicle marking system is in place; the markings must be visible by aircraft using day, infrared, or thermal optics. Secondly, all mounted elements must be equipped with BFT systems; for units not equipped with BFT and for dismounted elements, the troop command post must continually update its position on BFT by manually entering an icon. Lastly, graphic control measures (controlled fire lines, infiltration lines, and no-fire areas)

must be disseminated to all elements over BFT to ensure proper synchronization and a clear COP.

***Retain freedom of maneuver.*** Ground troop command posts and troop trains must have the ability to self-secure during FSO. A ground troop cannot maximize its reconnaissance assets forward and maintain its freedom of maneuver if it “bleeds off” gun trucks to secure its C2 and/or logistics elements. To solve this dilemma, the troops collocated their C2 element, 120mm mortar section, and troop trains (to include attached medical and/or maintenance assets) for mutual force protection. However, this method reinforces the requirement of the troop command team to properly position and camouflage key (and vulnerable) friendly positions to prevent compromise by the enemy.

Ground troops require assistance for evacuating casualties and/or recovering damaged vehicles from the deep area to the rear area. As with security of C2 and logistics assets, the troop loses momentum of reconnaissance if it must generate sufficient combat power to evacuate casualties and vehicles located a significant distance rearward from the troop casualty collection point or unit maintenance collection point. To assist the troops, the squadron employed an armed escort element from the distribution platoon to link up with troop first sergeants at predetermined logistics resupply points to retrieve casualties and damaged vehicles for transport to the rear area. This method (and all logistics resupply missions) required the distribution platoon element to conduct forward and rearward passage of lines with the infantry battalions as they progressed from the rear area, through the close area, to the fringes of the deep area, and back. This also required the squadron to resource the distribution platoon with gun trucks, a common method in the COIN theaters, but one that is not enabled by the squadron’s organic MTOE.

At the squadron level, sustaining organic and attached elements forward in the security zone or beyond the LD/LC in offensive operations, quickly overwhelmed organic capability and capacity. The squadron lacks the ability to rapidly and efficiently perform casualty evacuation, backhaul damaged vehicles, and resupply vital logistics (particularly Class I, III, and V). A great deal of planning and assistance from the BCT staff and supporting units (the BSB and potentially the Army aviation unit) is neces-

***“Current operations cells at BCT and squadron levels need to make a deliberate assessment of each indirect fire event or troops-in-contact situation to determine if the threat presented requires re-tasking high-demand/low-density assets, such as a UAV or AWT, away from the platform’s predetermined reconnaissance focus.”***





sary to allow the squadron's troops to operate at extended distances from the infantry battalions or brigade rear area without losing momentum. This planning and coordination must be solidly in place before the BCT publishes WARNO 2 and executes the ISR/fires rehearsal, which often serve as the squadron's FRAGO and combined arms rehearsal, respectively.

***Gain and maintain contact with the smallest element possible.*** Despite previous doctrinal suggestions that reconnaissance elements can gain valuable information without making direct contact with the enemy, is not often the case when facing a determined hybrid threat such as the one encountered at JRTC. Ground reconnaissance elements, particularly those of mounted troops, must expect to make direct contact and tactically array themselves to do so with the smallest element possible. This often requires moving in multiple echelons, with UAV, AWT, or other assets conducting a zone reconnaissance ahead of ground reconnaissance assets who, in turn, move either with dismounts to the front of the mounted formation (if stealthy, deliberate reconnaissance is required) or, at a minimum, a travelling overwatch formation if a more aggressive tempo is demanded by the mission timeline.

This same concept of echeloned reconnaissance applies to security (screen line) operations. Where feasible (by mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC)), array reconnaissance forces with air assets screening forward to provide early warning and detection of approaching enemy forces. Air assets then handoff approaching enemy forces to static and concealed dismounted teams. The dismounted elements, in turn, maintain contact until mounted reconnaissance forces can either observe or, if engagement criteria dictate, destroy the enemy.

***Develop the situation.*** Each reconnaissance element must continue to develop the situation on contact (visual or direct fire) with the enemy. Troop commanders must be knowledgeable in planning and employing joint fires to bring to bear CAS, AWT, and indirect fire assets (from the brigade's fires battalion or troop organic mortars). Troop commanders must also be well versed on tactics, such as defile drills and obstacle breaching procedures, to apply when the unit encounters linear danger areas or man-made obstacles that cannot be bypassed. Lastly, troop commanders must continually update reports as they gain more information about a particular NAI or objective.

### **The Reconnaissance Squadron in Stability Operations**

In Iraq and Afghanistan today, reconnaissance squadrons are employed in much the same fashion as infantry battalions; they are designated as "land owners" for the purposes of conducting COIN activities within a defined AO. In contrast, the 3d BCT conceptually developed several other potential mission sets for the reconnaissance squadron during stability operations that make better use of its capabilities to shape conditions in the BCT AO and improve the BCT commander's situational awareness.

***Route security.*** With its two mounted troops and a habitual relationship with several forms of aerial ISR platforms, the reconnaissance squadron is ideally suited to perform continual route reconnaissance (and route clearance if enabled with attached engineer capabilities) within the BCT AO to ensure freedom of movement for BCT elements, host nation security forces, and host nation civilians.

***Operations within unassigned areas.*** As the brigade's dedicated reconnaissance and security element, the squadron is capable of conducting shaping operations within an otherwise unassigned battlespace to provide the BCT commander with information about the enemy, terrain, or population, or achieve specific desired effects. If the BCT owns a substantially sized AO



*"Ground troop command posts and troop trains must have the ability to self-secure during FSO. A ground troop cannot maximize its reconnaissance assets forward and maintain its freedom of maneuver if it 'bleeds off' gun trucks to secure its C2 and/or logistics elements. To solve this dilemma, the troops collocated their C2 element, 120mm mortar section, and troop trains (to include attached medical and/or maintenance assets) for mutual force protection."*

and elects to assign noncontiguous AOs to its infantry battalions, there remains a potentially large unassigned area that, by doctrine, is the responsibility of the brigade headquarters. As part of the targeting process, the squadron could be assigned the mission to perform reconnaissance of a specific NAI or set of NAI within the unassigned area. If provided with supporting assets, the squadron could then achieve lethal or nonlethal effects against a specified target within the unassigned area in support of the BCT's concept of operations and campaign plan.

***Civil infrastructure reconnaissance and assessment.*** Properly trained reconnaissance elements are capable of conducting enemy, terrain, and populace-focused reconnaissance operations. If enabled with the appropriate civil affairs and engineer assets, the squadron is capable of ranging the BCT AO and conducting reconnaissance and assessments of critical civil infrastructure to support future improvement projects to improve the local populace's quality of life.

***Host nation security force assistance.*** As a reconnaissance and security-focused organization, the squadron is capable of partnering with host nation forces — particularly reconnaissance and security forces, such as cavalry troops or border guards, to conduct security force assistance. This role also takes advantage of the squadron's relatively smaller subordinate elements, which also have a lower soldier-to-leader ratio than most other maneuver units, to act as self-mobile, advise-and-assist teams to host nation units.

***Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief/zone reconnaissance.*** Reconnaissance units are particularly valuable during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. These missions often occur in an environment that has been ravaged by forces of nature and require careful consideration when focusing BCT assets where they will have the greatest effect on assisting the joint task force (JTF) commander, the lead federal agency, and local or host nation authorities. Recent examples of this include disaster relief efforts conducted by 82d Airborne Division units and other elements in New Orleans (2005) and Haiti (2009). The squadron can assist the BCT and JTF headquarters by performing its basic mission essential task list (METL) to answer PIR pertaining to the operational environment. Potential missions during humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations include route reconnaissance from the air or sea port of entry to the most affected locations, area reconnaissance of potential bas-

ing or staging areas for relief forces, zone reconnaissance to locate displaced persons, and area security to assist local authorities in preventing criminal looting.

The reconnaissance squadrons in the modular BCT designs have become the highest echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on, and proponenty for, reconnaissance and security operations. Understanding and adhering to the fundamentals of reconnaissance and fundamentals of security operations are absolutely essential to success during full spectrum reconnaissance and security operations. The lessons learned by leaders and paratroopers of Panther Recon, during its recent JRTC rotation, mandate that reconnaissance squadrons — particularly those in the CEF — incorporate and reinforce these fundamentals during tough, realistic home station training.

### **PART III – ORGANIZING, MANNING, AND EQUIPPING THE RECON SQUADRON FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS**

#### **Organization Challenges and Recommendations**

**Unity of command for BCT reconnaissance assets and elements.** During the JRTC rotation, the brigade elected to centralize all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron. This method was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the BCT's reconnaissance operations and its deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in ISR employment to better answer the brigade commander's PIR.

While this mission command method was effective, the squadron commander and staff experienced some friction in integrating and directing attached ISR assets belonging to the BSTB, which was largely due to the attached assets not having a clear understanding of the squadron's tactical standards of operation and the commander's command style. By contrast, the Stryker BCT (SBCT) MTOE organizes all BCT ISR assets under the reconnaissance squadron in a surveillance troop with HUMINT personnel integrated directly into the squadron's organic reconnaissance troops. This type of organization, where the majority of ISR assets are organized in garrison *and* during training, facilitates coordination, synchronization, and standardization of reconnaissance operations, which creates ISR *unity of command* in addition to temporal *unity of effort* during specified missions.

The continued centralization of all reconnaissance efforts, under the reconnaissance squadron in the chief of reconnaissance role to achieve better unity of effort for BCT ISR assets, is highly recommended. This mission command model should be incorporated into reconnaissance and security doctrine, particularly field manuals covering the BCT (FM 3-90.6, FM 3-20.96, and FM 2-01).<sup>20</sup>

It is further recommended that the Army re-examine the factors that led to assigning ISR assets to the BSTB in the IBCT and heavy BCT (HBCT) designs, in stark contrast to the SBCT design's organization of ISR assets within the reconnaissance squadron. The forthcoming redesign of the BSTB into the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) also reinforces the requirement to relook the command structure of ISR assets in IBCTs and HBCTs.

**Squadron-level mortars.** The FSO experience at JRTC demonstrates the need for a responsive and reliable fire support capability at the squadron level, in addition to the capability resident at the troop level. The mounted troops are currently each authorized a troop mortar section, equipped with two towed 120mm mortar systems, while the dismounted troop is authorized a mortar section, equipped with two 60mm mortar systems. Unlike

infantry battalions (which have a four-gun platoon of towed 120mm mortars) or the legacy light armored cavalry squadron design (a six-gun battery of towed 105mm howitzers) the reconnaissance squadron retains no organic indirect fires capability at the squadron level. The squadron, as currently designed, depends on brigade assets acting in a direct support role, such as the field artillery battalion, attack aviation, and close air support, to provide any required fires assets beyond the capability of the troops' organic mortars.

By design during FSO, the reconnaissance squadron operates forward of the infantry battalions across the brigade's entire AO to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). While the BCT may allocate fire support assets and supporting aircraft to reinforce the squadron, artillery assets can easily be redirected using brigade and air assets, which are specifically subject to the effects of weather and other factors that decrease reliability and may hinder responsiveness. A mortar platoon at the squadron level allows the commander to better reinforce and assign priorities of fire for internal assets; provides a squadron-level, large-caliber indirect fire system to support dismounted troops and the forward support company (FSC); and standardizes 11C military occupational specialty (MOS) training across the organization. Allocating a dedicated mortar platoon at the squadron level is recommended to provide the commander the necessary flexibility to position fire support assets, as required, depending on the tactical situation while allowing the recon troops to maintain control of troop-level mortars and eliminating the need to task troop-level fire support assets with squadron missions.

#### **Manning Challenges and Recommendations**

**18-man mounted platoons.** With the current reconnaissance squadron's MTOE strength of 18 personnel, organized into six 3-man crews, mounted recon platoons are severely limited and challenged in terms of conducting the most basic reconnaissance tasks such as local security, dismounted observation posts (OPs), or clearance of intervisibility lines. The designed manning effects the duration of NAI coverage with troop commanders electing to run with four-vehicle platoons instead of six as designed. Immediately resourcing six additional personnel (per mounted platoon), which is authorized in the FY2012 "R" series MTOE, enhances the capabilities of the mounted platoon while adding a much needed dismounted capability.

**Troop-level intelligence analyst.** During the squadron's JRTC rotation, the absence of an intelligence analyst at the troop level, combined with the severely degraded nature of personnel familiar with company intelligence support team (CoIST) operations was readily apparent to the squadron battle staff. A trained analyst at the troop level provides much needed support to the troop commander who often is conducting operations well forward of the squadron TOC. This addition also benefits the squadron by providing bottom-up analysis and refining the squadron intelligence section. Analysts collocated forward with recon troops provide the capability to analyze and exploit time-sensitive information and material collected by the troops' platoons. The analyst assists the troop command post in verifying reports and correcting errors prior to the reports being sent to higher headquarters. Adding a troop-level intelligence analyst to each reconnaissance troop dramatically improves analysis and understanding at lower levels while allowing the squadron to better integrate and synchronize ISR assets with increased situational awareness.

**All-source intel tech (MOS 350F).** The squadron's role as chief of reconnaissance for the brigade creates a requirement for an



increased intelligence analysis capability at the squadron level. Similar to the initial MTOE for the reconnaissance squadron in the SBCT, the presence of an all-source intelligence warrant officer (MOS 350F) provides a tremendous analysis tool for the squadron commander. Adding an all-source intelligence technician to the squadron intelligence section provides invaluable assistance in analyzing volumes of information in an FSO environment, as well as assists in managing multiple ISR assets provided in support of reconnaissance missions.

**Staff engineer officer.** Currently, there is no authorization for a dedicated staff engineer representative on the reconnaissance squadron staff. However, our experience at JRTC demonstrates there is a valid requirement for an engineer to assist in planning and executing reconnaissance and security operations. Our squadron was fortunate to receive an engineer officer to support its FSO rotation; he assisted in obstacle and survivability position planning in support of screening operations during the defensive phase, provided recommendations for mobility efforts during the offensive phase, and participated as a subject-matter expert in IPB for all phases. Adding a dedicated engineer officer to the squadron staff provides advantageous expertise in planning and executing mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. We also recommend reviewing the potential to add a third sapper platoon to the BCT to provide mobility and countermobility support to the squadron during reconnaissance and security operations.

**“Ranger Coded” Billets.** The “G-series” MTOE is completely void of ranger-coded noncommissioned officer (NCO) billets in the squadron, at all pay grades. All reconnaissance platoon leaders, both dismounted and mounted, are coded ranger qualified, but subordinate platoon sergeants and section leaders are not identified as ranger qualified on the MTOE. This is a disservice to the NCO Corps and the BCT commander. Reconnaissance operations, by nature, particularly those performed in IBCTs, benefit from being led by ranger-qualified NCOs; in fact, NCOs in the scout platoons of the infantry battalions are in ranger-coded billets on the MTOE. The ranger qualified designator (“V” for airborne-ranger billets) should be applied to section leader and platoon sergeant billets within the reconnaissance troops.

### Equipping Challenges and Recommendations

**Improved C2 on-the-move (OTM) vehicle.** The squadron’s FSO rotation demonstrated the need for a C2 vehicle outfitted with a communications package that includes FM, satellite communications (SATCOM) on-the-move (OTM), and BFT capabilities. These assets would enable control of squadron elements located forward, throughout the brigade’s AO. The squadron was unable to maintain a fully capable mobile C2 element (TAC) using MTOE vehicles and equipment while conducting operations in the offensive phase, and squadron elements were spread over 110 square kilometers throughout the brigade’s AO. The TAC personnel could not monitor the multiple required nets, maintain noise and light discipline, and effectively synchronize maneuver, intelligence, and fires while spread between three or four tactically positioned gun trucks. The squadron also experienced challenges in viewing ISR feed. The solution is to develop and add an air-droppable C2 vehicle, which is outfitted with a communications package and VDL capability, and designed to provide C2 forward in an expeditionary role prior to establishing the TOC during forcible entry operations and subsequently positioned forward as required.

**Improved long-range communications capability.** The lack of mobile, beyond line of sight communications directly impacted the squadron’s ability to C2 elements exceeding internal FM capabilities. Currently, the squadron is only authorized seven

SATCOM radios, which includes two in the headquarters troop and five in the dismounted troop, leaving no allocation for mounted troops. The authorized equipment consists of the radio systems without a vehicle-mounting capability. To overcome this current lack of mobile SATCOM capability and mitigate the lack of SIPRnet connectivity below the squadron level during expeditionary FSO, procure the Harris RF-7800M-AD250 and AN/PRC-117G, or similar systems with similar capabilities. This particular system is a vehicle-mounted, 50-watt, multiband radio, which enables both voice and mobile data communications. A distribution of two per platoon, two per troop headquarters, and five at the squadron headquarters (a total of 27 systems) is a good quantity.

**Troop- and squadron-level OSRV capability.** The squadron and its reconnaissance troops have no organic capability, by MTOE, to view the full-motion video (FMV) of aerial ISR platforms such as UAVs and VDL-equipped fixed wing aircraft. This capability deficit hinders situational awareness and the ability to manage ISR assets, particularly when the squadron is employed as the BCT’s chief of recon. The current IBCT MTOE provides this capability only to military intelligence units. The OSRV is used to receive ISR feeds, but is bulky, heavy, and not ideal for use during forcible entry operations. OSRVs also have a limited battery life, normally 4 hours, which requires a form of power generation to recharge the system. In addition, the current BCT MTOE lacks a system from which to broadcast organic ISR feeds across the SIPRnet to subordinate elements. The inability to view and share ISR feeds across the BCT creates an unnecessary time delay and affects the squadron’s situational awareness, the brigade’s common operational picture, and inhibits ISR hand-off to other units within the brigade.

To overcome this current shortfall within the squadron, one ISR viewing system (preferably lighter and more durable than the OSRV) should be authorized for each reconnaissance platoon and each troop headquarters, which allows platoon leaders and troop commanders to view the feed of aerial ISR assets operating in their immediate vicinity. We also recommend an additional four systems be authorized for the squadron headquarters to provide the battlestaff with an ability to view and manage multiple assets while maintaining its ability to establish both a TOC and TAC. An allocation of 15 total OSRV-like systems enables platoons and troops to view both RQ-11 (Raven) and RQ-7 (Shadow) feeds while the squadron headquarters maintains its ability to feed up to four ISR systems into the network. For the squadron headquarters to achieve the ability to stream multiple ISR feeds across the SIPRnet, the headquarters also requires the acquisition of an internet protocol (IP)-based media package such as VBrick’s Streaming Gateway and Office Communicator.

**Forcible entry/FSO vehicle platform for the IBCT recon squadron.** The current standard issue, forcible entry, mounted platoon vehicle platform (M1151/M1167 variant HMMWV) in the reconnaissance squadron is incompatible with the long-range advance scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and improved target acquisition system (ITAS). The turret on both HMMWV variants and the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle are not designed to accommodate the above-mentioned systems without modification, which requires considerable investment of unit operational and maintenance funds. Also, the HMMWV may be vulnerable to certain types of explosive devices, which is particularly noteworthy to the reconnaissance squadron as its vehicles may travel roads that have not been cleared by specialized engineer resources. We recommend conducting a review of available forced entry reconnaissance platform options to ensure



*“The current standard issue, forcible entry, mounted platoon vehicle platform (M1151/M1167 variant HMMWV) in the reconnaissance squadron is incompatible with the long-range advance scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and improved target acquisition system (ITAS). The turret on both HMMWV variants and the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle are not designed to accommodate the above-mentioned systems without modification, which requires considerable investment of unit operational and maintenance funds.”*

selected vehicles can be transported on a C-130, are compatible with modern surveillance and antiarmor systems, and provide sufficient force protection to the crew.

**“Ultra” lightweight laser/target designator.** Based on the nature of forced entry operations in a FSO, there is a need for a lightweight laser/target designator specifically for the dismounted troop of the reconnaissance squadron. The current system, the AN/PED-1 lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR), weighs approximately 35 pounds and is not suited for forced entry operations or dismounted movements over extended distances. We recommend adding the AN/PEQ-1B ground laser target designator II (GLTD II), also known as the “special operations forces laser marker (SOFLAM),” for the dismounted recon troop as it has all the capabilities of the LLDR with a total weight of 12 pounds.

**Platoon-level unmanned aircraft system (UAS).** The current reconnaissance squadron MTOE allows one RQ-11 (Raven) per line troop, for a total of three systems. Considering the extended distances the reconnaissance squadron is expected to operate, with most operations conducted at the platoon level and below, the current number of Ravens is insufficient to provide NAI coverage within the squadron’s AO. We recommend increasing the Raven system’s authorization to provide UAS capability at the platoon level for a total of eleven systems (one per recon troop and one per recon platoon) in the squadron. Note: along with any increase in UAS within the brigade, there will be a corresponding increase in spectrum management and A2C2 measures.

**Additional gun trucks for headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) and FSC.** The JRTC FSO rotation highlights the requirement for additional gun trucks to secure the squadron TAC while operating in forward areas. The FSC also has a requirement to self-secure resupply operations for the distribution platoon, which will traverse long distances to reach mounted and dismounted troop trains.

Currently, the squadron is internally resourcing the TAC’s security vehicles (four gun trucks pulled from the mounted troops) to maximize reconnaissance units forward in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance. This is only possible at current manning levels since, as mentioned above, the troops typically man four vehicles (of six) per platoon to generate a dismounted capability. We recommend the HHT gun truck allocation be increased by an additional four trucks (the current MTOE authorizes gun trucks for the squadron commander and S3) to provide a security element for the TAC. This allows reconnaissance troop assets to remain focused on reconnaissance tasks. The personnel to man these trucks can continue to be an internal bill to the squadron.

The squadron is currently using other undermanned gun trucks to resource a security platform for the FSC, which is also possible due to current recon platoon manning levels. However, manning the gun trucks and resupply vehicles exceeds the manpower authorized for the reconnaissance squadron’s distribution platoon, which is the smallest distribution platoon in the BCT, despite having arguably the greatest distance to travel. We



recommend the FSC be outfitted with six gun trucks and authorized an additional 18 88M MOS personnel to self-secure FSC missions. These additional internal security platforms and personnel allow the FSC the flexibility and freedom of maneuver to perform two simultaneous sustainment missions to different troop areas of operation.

**Additional distribution platoon assets in the FSC.** Sustainment operations identify the requirement for additional assets to support resupply operations. The FSC is currently not authorized palletized loading systems/load handling systems (PLS/LHS) platforms, despite having the ammunition resupply mission. These platforms provide flexibility for ammunition transport, recovery platforms for vehicles and other equipment, and water resupply when using water blivets. The current MTOE only authorizes the use of light medium tactical vehicles/medium tactical vehicles (LMTV/MTVs), which have significantly less cargo space and cannot be used for recovery missions. We recommend authorizing two additional PLS/LHS with trailers for the recon squadron FSC.

### Summary of MTOE Observations

The IBCT reconnaissance squadrons, while capable, are in need of additional organizational, manpower, and equipment modifications to realize their full potential. Organizing the IBCT's ISR assets under one headquarters provides *unity of command* in addition to *unity of effort*, achieved through the chief of reconnaissance employment technique. Providing the squadron with additional ground reconnaissance personnel, intelligence analysts, and an engineer subject-matter expert increases the capability of the squadron and troop command posts to support subordinate elements' reconnaissance efforts. Equipping the squadron with additional C2, communications, intelligence, force protection, fires, and fires support capabilities greatly enhances its ability to act as the BCT commander's "eyes and ears" for the reconnaissance, security, and deep targeting functions inherent to all FSO.

The Army, particularly units assigned to the ARFORGEN CEF pool, is renewing its emphasis on full-spectrum operations, which includes offensive, defensive, and stability missions conducted simultaneously across the BCT's operational environment. The experience of 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, and 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, "Panther Recon," during the recent FSO rotation at JRTC highlights particular operational methods, tactical observations, and MTOE challenges that inform the ongoing FSO discussion. While the TTP developed by 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, at JRTC may not fit every FSO scenario, it should serve as a start point for consideration as units train for FSO, and the institutional Army revises its doctrine.



### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 12 March 2010.

<sup>2</sup>HQDA, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2010, Chapter 6.

<sup>3</sup>The technique of employing assets in advance of the BCT main body to answer PIR that validate the BCT's tactical plan is commonly referred to as "recon push."

<sup>4</sup>FM 3-90.6, pp. 3-6 thru 3-11.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 3-7.

<sup>6</sup>Author's note: Unlike the HBCT and SBCT, the IBCT has no organic 155mm cannon assets with which to employ precision artillery munitions.

<sup>7</sup>Comments by LTC Anthony Judge, battalion commander, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (ABN), Intelligence War Fighting Function AAR, 27 October 2010.

<sup>8</sup>Comments made by LTC Judge at the BCT's final AAR on 28 October 2010.

<sup>9</sup>FM 3-20.96.

<sup>10</sup>Author's Note: Although the battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSB) are intended to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in support of a corps headquarters, their current design does not lend itself to label them as "maneuver" units.

<sup>11</sup>FM 3-20.96, p. 1-1.

<sup>12</sup>HQDA, FM 3-0, *Operations*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 27 February 2008, Chapter 2.

<sup>13</sup>FM 3-20.96, p. 3-2.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 4-2.

<sup>15</sup>FM 2-01, Initial Draft, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 15 March 2009, pp. 3-14 to 3-15; and FM 3-20.96, p. 3-5.

<sup>16</sup>FM 3-20.96, pp. 3-12 thru 3-18.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-5 thru 2-9.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-9 thru 2-11.

<sup>19</sup>Comments, LTC Judge, 28 October 2010.

<sup>20</sup>FM 3-90.6; FM 3-20.96; and FM 2-01, Initial Draft.

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# RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON LACKS A ROLE IN CURRENT AIRBORNE DOCTRINE

by Captain Sean Miller

*You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive... Information is like eggs: the fresher the better.*

— General George S. Patton  
Letter of Instruction, 6 March 1944<sup>1</sup>

## Army Transformation Requires Updates To Doctrine

The 2004 *Army Transformation Roadmap* highlights the need to increase the ability for maneuver forces to acquire the enemy, which supports creating reconnaissance squadrons organic to the new modular brigade combat team (BCT).<sup>2</sup>

In response to the new force structure and associated capabilities, the Army modified, developed, and updated its doctrine to incorporate these changes. However, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-26, *Airborne Operations*, is 20 years old and requires updates to incorporate adding an organic reconnaissance squadron for more effective execution of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks during airborne operations.<sup>3</sup> To better illustrate the concepts discussed in this article, the integration of the reconnaissance squadron focuses on the conduct of airfield seizures. Airborne operations encompass a wide array of missions, including the four doctrinal types of offensive operations; however, an airfield seizure is an integral portion

of the airborne commander's ground tactical plan and the portion initially requiring the employment of the reconnaissance squadron.

## Limitations of Airborne Operations

The nature of airborne operations limits the capabilities of airborne forces and creates weaknesses exploitable by the enemy. One of the most significant limitations is the number of personnel that can participate in an airborne operation. The size of the airborne force is limited by the number of parachutes and aircraft available to support the operation. As a result, joint planners must balance the need for a uniquely equipped combined arms ground maneuver force with the avail-





able airborne delivery assets. FM 90-26, highlights another limitation that “[a]dditional target acquisition assets are needed to provide accurate and timely targeting information.”<sup>4</sup> Tactical mobility is another limitation as airborne infantry companies were previously not allocated a significant amount of vehicles on their modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) because of the emphasis on maneuvering by foot; the airborne force is also limited to the number of vehicles that can be delivered to the drop zone by additional aircraft.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the previous task organization of airborne forces had room for improvement in multiple areas.

### Creating the Reconnaissance Squadron

As a result of transformation, the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) task organization changed significantly in two ways that are pertinent to this discussion. First, the number of infantry battalions decreased from three to two. However, transformation created a reconnaissance squadron, which includes a headquarters and headquarters troop, two mounted reconnaissance troops, and one dismounted reconnaissance troop. In the mounted reconnaissance troops, “reconnaissance platoons are organized with six wheeled scout vehicles” and “[t]he mortar section consists of two towed 120mm mortars and a fire direction center (FDC).”<sup>6</sup> In the dismounted reconnaissance troop, “the reconnaissance platoons are organized into three sections with one Javelin in each platoon.”<sup>7</sup> Thus, this unit provides the IBCT with additional mounted maneuver capabilities and increased firepower, as well as a dedicated reconnaissance and surveillance force manned with 19D cavalry scouts not previously organic to the IBCT. Ultimately, the reconnaissance squadron now “possesses the greatest amount of firepower, mobility, and protection within the IBCT.”<sup>8</sup>

Specialized equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance forces complements the increased firepower within the reconnaissance squadron. Both the improved target acquisition system (ITAS) and the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3) enhance target acquisition capabilities and increase the effectiveness of employing the reconnaissance unit’s firepower. Additionally, the




Figure 1. IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Organization<sup>9</sup>

reconnaissance squadron receives a wide array of communications platforms, including high-frequency (HF) radios, standard FM radios, and vehicle-mounted FM radios with extended ranges allowing reconnaissance forces to push even further from the airhead.

Personnel manning within the reconnaissance squadron also supports employment in the security force role. As outlined in *Airborne Operations*, the task organization of the security force incorporates various combined arms assets such as reconnaissance (scouts), light armor, and aviation.<sup>10</sup> The 19D cavalry scout receives specific training for executing reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, and the 19C cavalry leader has training and experience with both reconnaissance and armor units as established by military occupational specialty (MOS). The recon-

naissance squadron also includes a platoon each of forward observers and medics, which allows the unit to integrate into the overall ground tactical plan by occupying positions on the reconnaissance and security line forward of the assault and support elements at the airhead.

With a designated organic reconnaissance and security force, the IBCT commander and his subordinate commanders, at all levels, can cater their mission essential task list (METL) to more specialized roles, such as assault versus security, instead of maintaining a broader METL that includes assault, reconnaissance, and security roles. By designating maneuver units to routine roles during airborne operations, commanders train fewer tasks more thoroughly and develop stronger unit standard operating procedures (SOP) and tactics, techniques, and procedures



“...the reconnaissance squadron receives a wide array of communications platforms, including high-frequency (HF) radios, standard FM radios, and vehicle-mounted FM radios with extended ranges allowing reconnaissance forces to push even further from the airhead.”

(TTP), which elevate unit effectiveness and boost the tactical confidence of the entire unit. Furthermore, training on fewer METL tasks expands limited training opportunities, resources, and time, which often result from the current operating tempo (OPTEMPO).

### Current Airfield Seizure Doctrine

An airborne assault is one of many methods for arriving on the battlefield. However, airborne assaults are unique not only because paratroopers have special skill sets, but building and sustaining combat power relies on the airborne forces' ability to deliver combat power almost exclusively through the air. To increase airborne forces' ability to build and sustain combat power, one of the essential tasks typically incorporated into the ground tactical plan is the seizure of an airfield suitable for air-land operations. Air-land operations allow airborne forces to evacuate casualties and noncombatants, insert personnel and equipment that cannot be airdropped, and increase sustainment resources. For example, military units recently executed air-land operations successfully in the aftermath of the earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010, providing significant amounts of humanitarian aid and necessary resources required by the military and other aid organizations.

According to FM 90-26, *Airborne Operations*, “[s]ecurity in all directions is an overriding consideration early in any airborne operation, since an airhead is essentially a perimeter defense.”<sup>11</sup> One of the critical security tasks is the immediate establishment of the remote spring launch (RSL). From the RSL, the security force's mission is to:

- Give the airhead early warning.
- Develop intelligence, including the location, direction, and speed of an enemy attack.

- Initially deny the enemy observation of direct and observed indirect fire on the airhead.
- Deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead.
- Delay and disrupt the enemy.<sup>12</sup>

Early in the assault, FM 90-26 specifies that the security force serves in a screening role and may later transition to a guard or cover role.<sup>13</sup> Additional tasks assigned to the security force may be completed prior to the insertion of the main body. When inserted ahead of the main body, the commander uses reconnaissance and security teams to assist in developing situational awareness during planning and movement phases, as well as set necessary conditions, such as destroying enemy air defenses and command and control (C2) nodes or verifying runway conditions to ensure necessary assets are available to make any required repairs, prior to air-land operations.

### Employing the Reconnaissance Squadron

Given its task organization, capabilities, and training, as well as its reconnaissance and security tasks within current doctrine, the reconnaissance squadron is ideally suited for a security force role. In its execution of the security force role, the reconnaissance squadron may be employed using various methods of insertion and given a variety of primary tasks. The remainder of this article presents different considerations and options for airborne operations planners, as well as TTP and suggested topics to be included in an updated version of an airborne operations manual.

### Insertion Methods

One of the primary considerations for employing the reconnaissance squadron is the method of insertion. Airborne insertion is the doctrinal method for obvious reasons; however, the location of the

objective area relative to the departure airfield/home station and the nature of the battlefield environment may permit alternative methods of insertion. One alternative method is a ground assault using the reconnaissance squadron's organic wheeled platforms. This method permits the airborne force to maximize its aerial delivery assets for the assault force and has multiple advantages with respect to the reconnaissance squadron and its likely tactical tasks. Ground assault provides a mounted maneuver force that arrives on the battlefield as an organized element, which allows the unit to quickly move to the RSL and begin executing reconnaissance and security tasks for the airborne force.

Depending on the time of its arrival, the ground assault element may still set necessary conditions for airborne insertion, answer any commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) for the airborne commander, and provide situational awareness of the drop zone and surrounding area to the airborne commander prior to the airborne assault. This is a viable option when the distance from departure airfield to the objective area can be driven in a reasonable amount of time, but sufficient vehicular platforms are not available to move the entire assault force on the ground or in a suitable amount of time. Ground assault should be considered early in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), allowing the reconnaissance squadron to begin moving on receipt of warning order 2 and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) annex. An air assault is another alternate method of insertion. Although planning for this method of insertion is detailed and often lengthy, an air assault maximizes the use of transportation assets available to the airborne force and provides the ability to insert into a larger selection of terrain.

### Alternate Drop Zones

Another consideration for airborne planners with respect to the reconnaissance squadron is the possibility of an alternate drop zone (DZ). If the enemy situation permits, the airborne force inserts the security force into an alternate DZ along expected enemy counterattack or reinforcement routes. Using an alternate DZ



causes confusion among enemy forces, which results in the enemy diverting forces away from the primary DZ used by the assault force, similar to the allied use of dummy paratroopers during the invasion of Normandy in World War II. While the security force inserting into an alternate DZ secures its location without the assistance of the assault force, using an alternate DZ may increase the effectiveness of the security force in repelling an enemy counterattack and/or be an integral part of the airborne force's deception plan.

### Chief of Reconnaissance Role

Creating the reconnaissance squadron also provides the brigade combat team (BCT) with a commander and accompanying staff, which specialize in the conduct of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. This allows the BCT commander and his staff to incorporate the reconnaissance squadron commander into the BCT MDMP to serve as chief of reconnaissance.<sup>14</sup> Similar to the field artillery battalion commander, who serves as the BCT commander's primary advisor and coordinator for fire support, the reconnaissance squadron commander is the ideal leader to serve as the BCT commander's primary advisor and coordinator for reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. When incorporated into existing doctrine, the chief of reconnaissance serves as head of the BCT ISR working group.<sup>15</sup>

Serving as the chief of reconnaissance, the reconnaissance squadron commander has the appropriate maneuver elements in his command to execute reconnaissance tasks early in the BCT MDMP to answer necessary CCIR and set conditions for airborne operations. In the chief of reconnaissance role, the reconnaissance squadron would ideally have priority for use and tactical control of various unmanned aerial systems (UAS), reconnaissance aviation assets, long-range surveillance (LRS) units, manned and unmanned sensors, and any other reconnaissance assets available to the BCT. With a more direct and accurate knowledge and understanding of the reconnaissance squadron's capabilities and mission readiness, incorporating the squadron commander and his staff into the BCT MDMP greatly aids in developing Annex L (ISR) and streamlining the processing and analysis of information received from reconnaissance and security forces. Likewise, incorporating the squadron commander

and staff in the BCT MDMP maximizes planning time for the reconnaissance squadron, which is already limited if reconnaissance operations are required to begin prior to completing the BCT operations order.

### Global Response Force Task Organization

Airborne forces are typically rotated through global response force (GRF) missions and given the task to alert, marshal, and deploy within 18 hours anywhere in the world.<sup>16</sup> FM 90-26, Annex G, discusses the N-hour deployment sequence as it pertains to airborne operations.<sup>17</sup> The N-hour deployment sequence, as it is currently written in FM 90-26, highlights the urgent need for doctrinal updates based on its outdated structure of three infantry battalions in former parachute/airborne infantry regiments. Moving the third infantry battalion to the new reconnaissance squadron reduced the IBCT's third maneuver element to less than half the size of those of adjacent infantry battalions. This hinders the reconnaissance squadron's ability to serve in this role as the "third battalion," as shown in FM 90-26, due to its limited manpower and different training and capabilities.<sup>18</sup>

The absence of a doctrinal example for how best to employ the IBCT in its GRF role creates a dilemma for the IBCT commander, which is being managed by current and future GRF BCTs. This dilemma is further complicated by the alert requirements inherent to the GRF's responsibility. One approach is to treat the reconnaissance squadron as the third maneuver element in the IBCT and assume that its combat power, and that of any ready attachments, such as elements from the field artillery battalion, will be sufficient to accomplish the mission. This allows the IBCT to spread alert requirements across three maneuver elements and maintain the current doctrinal example in FM 90-26 as a basic planning guideline.<sup>19</sup> However, the "three maneuver elements model" limits the initial combat power and reconnaissance/security capabilities of the first assault echelon because the reconnaissance squadron is on a lower alert posture and will not initially deploy until several hours or even days later.

Another approach would adjust the N-hour deployment sequence and GRF alert requirements to a "two-battalion model." In the two-battalion model, the two infantry battalions alternate between two alert postures with each battalion aug-



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mented with a mounted reconnaissance troop, dismounted reconnaissance platoon, field artillery battery, and additional sustainment and C2 units. This approach maximizes the use of the IBCT's various organic combined-arms capabilities and creates routine working relationships between units across the IBCT. The two-battalion model does, however, keep the IBCT's paratroopers at higher alert postures for longer periods and may require additional aerial delivery assets to employ the entire force during airborne insertions.

While there are many factors to be considered in designing a GRF N-hour deployment sequence, the two models presented here serve as examples for what will hopefully result in an updated airborne operations manual. Altogether, there are many updates required for FM 90-26, *Airborne Operations*.<sup>20</sup> The current version of the field manual includes several limitations, risks, and planning considerations that are no longer present and/or accurately reflected in current airborne operations doctrine. While field manuals may be out of date, the Army has essentially solved many of its old prob-

lems and limitations, inherent in existing airborne operations doctrine, with recent transformation efforts. There are still several elements of doctrine that require serious thought and consideration, but the continued efforts of airborne units to identify, adapt, and overcome outdated doctrine and its inherent problems will hopefully soon result in necessary changes.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 4 August 2006, Chapter 4.

<sup>2</sup>HQDA, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*, Washington, DC, July 2004, available online at [http://www.dtic.mil/future/jointwarfare/strategic/army\\_trans\\_roadmap.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/future/jointwarfare/strategic/army_trans_roadmap.pdf).

<sup>3</sup>HQDA, FM 90-26, *Airborne Operations*, GPO, Washington, DC, 18 December 1990, p. 1-6.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>HQDA, FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, GPO, Washington, DC, 14 December 1990, Change 1, 31 October 2000, para 1-5.

<sup>6</sup>HQDA, FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 March 2010, p. 1-8.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 1-9.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 5-2.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, p. 1-8.

<sup>10</sup>FM 90-26, p. 3-7.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>The concept of the chief of reconnaissance was discussed and encountered by the author while on the staff of the 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division.

<sup>15</sup>FM 3-90.6, para 4-7.

<sup>16</sup>FM 90-26.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, Appendix G.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>The GRF deployment models presented are courses of actions encountered by the author while on the staff at 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division.

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***“When inserted ahead of the main body, the commander uses reconnaissance and security teams to assist in developing situational awareness during planning and movement phases, as well as set necessary conditions, such as destroying enemy air defenses and command and control (C2) nodes or verifying runway conditions to ensure necessary assets are available to make any required repairs, prior to air-land operations.”***





# CITIZEN-SOLDIER EXPATRIATES IN AMERICA'S TANK DIVISION

BY DOUGLAS E. BATSON AND BARRY L. ROBINSON



More than 20 years ago, a Saturday morning dawned in Ansbach, Germany, a small rococo-styled city situated 25 miles southwest of Nuremberg. Farmers were up early harvesting beets and turnips as members of the 312th Support Center, a new 7th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) unit, drove by en route to the 1st Armor Division (1AD) Headquarters in Ansbach. Traffic was light compared to a *Langer Samstag*, the first Saturday of each month when shoppers from outlying areas flock to enjoy the extended hours of retail shops. For these citizen-soldier expatriates, 10 November 1990 would be a very “long Saturday” as they prepared to go to war!

If ever a U.S. Army unit was unlikely to see combat, it was the 312th. Established in early 1989 to conduct 1AD rear area operations, the 312th would not see its third birthday. The unit's members had witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall, and planning for 1AD's deactivation had earnestly begun. A historic era had ended; the U.S. Army in Europe had achieved victory in its 43-year deterrence mission against Soviet expansionism. Yet, ironically, members of 1AD — and the 312th — were about to face Soviet T-72 main battle tanks, not in the heavily forested Czech-German border region, but in the stark naked desert of Iraq's Al Muthanna province.

## “All Ready, Already Here”

In 1987, 7th ARCOM became the only forward-stationed reserve command in the U.S. Army with the apropos motto “All Ready, Already Here.” The activation of units, such as the 312th, supported the new rear area battlespace concept within the theater general defensive plan. This was a unique relationship — a reserve unit integrated with an active Army division on foreign soil. Reflecting this close affiliation, 312th members wore their Active Component (AC) parent unit shoulder sleeve patch.<sup>1</sup>

The significant role of the 312th's first commander cannot be understated. Indeed, his credibility with AC officers at division was undoubtedly enhanced by the fact that he was an armor officer. However, he was deemed uniquely qualified for establishing the first USAR unit outside the United States because he was the only 312th member who had been a reservist!

In the year prior to mobilization, the 312th participated in command field exercises (CFX) and, most notably, in what

proved to be the last return of forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise. REFORGER 1990, Centurion Shield, was quite different from the previous 21 exercises, which had been held annually for the previous two decades. Centurion Shield involved fewer troops, fewer tracked vehicles, *no tanks*, and lots of computers.<sup>2</sup> Reflecting on this change, a participant opined, “If I see an enemy HMMWV roll past my position at 50 miles per hour, I can't tell if it's taking out chow or if it's [representing] a platoon of tanks that just broke through our perimeter.”<sup>3</sup>

REFORGER 1990 was a test bed for the 312th's ability to coordinate 1AD rear battle movements. However, this scaled-down, computer-driven simulation, in the snowy Bavarian forests, would in no way resemble what would take place the following winter: a division (+) supply trains, with 3,000 wheeled vehicles and 8,000 troops constantly in motion across open desert.

## Mobilization

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein's republican guard forces invaded Kuwait. Within days, Operation Desert Shield had deterred an expected Iraqi incursion into Saudi Arabia. What followed were 3 months of negotiations and United Nations resolutions that failed to persuade the Iraqi strongman to withdraw from Kuwait. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney held a press conference on Thursday, 8 November 1990. Most Americans in Europe were glued to televisions as Cheney announced the decision to send more troops from Europe to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Army's VII Corps was the major command on the list and everyone in Germany knew that 1AD, “America's tank division,” with its heavy-hulled M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, was the corps' lead unit.<sup>4</sup>

On Friday, 9 November, the 312th commander ordered the unit drill moved up to the very next day! It was, indeed, a very long Saturday. The 1AD's deployment from Europe to Southwest Asia (SWA) was unique because forward-deployed troops had never been further deployed to another theater of operations. Thus, during the ensuing weeks, the division faced an enormous task: it had to prepare war plans; train and move to SWA 17,000 soldiers, who, with auxiliaries, add-ons, and support elements, would grow to 24,000; pack and convoy more than 1,000 military vans to distant ports; rail load 2,000 tracked vehicles; and drive 7,000



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## Deployment

Another delay in the unit's departure date resulted in an unexpected, but much appreciated, Christmas with families. Then, on 27 December 1990, the 312th manifested 27 personnel on a C-141 flight from the Nuremberg civilian airport to near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the initial staging area, a hovel of soldiers overcrowded into a sand pit disparagingly referred to as "tent city" or "Andersonville." The 312th crammed into one general purpose (GP) medium tent with wooden flooring and cots.

wheeled vehicles to the same distant ports, which was much like a REFORGER in reverse.<sup>5</sup>

Not knowing exactly when or if certain units, including the 312th, would deploy made planning exceedingly difficult for a division simultaneously turning in equipment and fielding new combat vehicles. For example, one the brigades had not completed its transition from M113 armored personnel carriers to M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), thus it was replaced with 3d (Phantom) Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, which had transitioned. Because many AC units in Europe had already started drawing down, the 312th, which had no vehicles, was given an unexpected windfall. An artillery unit had readied its wheeled fleet for turn-in, and the battery's NCOs were elated to transfer at least a dozen HMMWVs to 312th.

In an armored division, drivers are combat multipliers. The unit's sergeants and specialists ensured unit members obtained military drivers licenses and conducted preventive maintenance training. The NCOs also acquired radios, weapons, gas masks, tents, and a myriad of supplies from dozens of locations throughout Germany. Not having one, they created a basic unit load plan for equipment and supplies. The unit adapted to overcome every obstacle, including qualifying with M16s on a 25 meter range, accomplishing personal and family preparations, and transporting equipment and vehicles to Rotterdam. Most of the officers performed nighttime duty shifts in the division operations center as the division's staff and advance party began departing for SWA.

When the 312th's departure date was delayed several times in December, rumors swelled that the division, given its reluctance to allow the 312th to march in 1AD's 50th anniversary parade the past July, was not about to take untested reservists to "the sandbox" for what Saddam Hussein billed as the "mother of all battles." Many soldiers resigned themselves to pulling months of guard duty around family housing areas and post exchanges in their adopted hometowns of Nuremberg and Ansbach. Indeed, with thousands of Iraqi nationals in Germany, there was a very real fear of terrorism, and rumors of war abounded. "Television and newspapers were filled with stories of Iraqi flaming pits of oil awaiting American soldiers, long-range artillery fire nailing them, and unforeseeable poison gas killing them in their sleep... and that their own generals expected 20,000 friendly casualties on the first day of fighting."<sup>6</sup>

The 312th's staff attended staff calls and performed shifts in the division tactical operations center (TOC). Soldiers drove vehicles from other units from the port at Al Jubail to paint sheds where forest green gave way to desert tan hues. This pause also enabled the 312th to prepare for rear area missions of base defense clusters. In Europe, strategy was defensively focused, and rear area operations centers were a new innovation to counter rear area threats by coordinating security and boundaries for combat support units spread throughout the rear battle area. In SWA, however, strategy became offensively focused and commanders were concerned that rapid advances would outdistance their supplies and support. For this reason, large logistics support areas, or log bases, were created close to the Iraqi border to facilitate resupply. The 312th was asked to convert some of its base defense liaison teams into "pony express" riders and escort resupply elements as rapidly as possible to and from the front.

Finally, the 312th's equipment arrived and word was given to move 400 kilometers to Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Thompson. The division did not have enough heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) to move its vehicles in one movement, thus the transport had to be staged. Rear area support units, to include the 312th, were the last to move and just in time for a freak climatic event. A 100-year rainstorm turned the desert into a shallow lake. Once off the paved Tapline Road, the 312th, using its Loran geographical locators, waded to its sector of TAA Thompson in total darkness. In the morning, the sun was up and the water had strangely disappeared. "The biggest surprise that awaited the troops was that there was no 'there.' Nothing! As far as the eye could see in all directions!"<sup>7</sup>

Once at TAA Thompson, 1AD began a month of war preparation, which included boresighting and gunnery practice, and rehearsing movements in the featureless desert. The 312th base defense liaison teams, consisting of one officer and one NCO, introduced themselves and their 'iron gothic' call sign to organic and attached 1AD units and advised how to "deploy skirmishers" (conduct base defense on the move). In other words, during pauses in movement, each convoy and unit was to set up its own base defenses. Furthermore, the division G3, in the form of the 312th Support Center, would conduct checks on each unit, which was a very new concept for support units meandering throughout the division rear, a vast area with very fluid boundaries.



## From Shield to Storm

On 17 January 1991, the air war and Operation Desert Storm began. The 312th executive officer (and Vietnam War veteran) encouraged soldiers to be as proficient as possible, thus allowing no opportunity for the AC to blame any foul-ups on “those reservists.” The operational tempo increased markedly and soldiers not organizing base defense clusters or riding pony express missions found themselves in the TOC, pulling 12-hour shifts, writing operations orders and annexes, and creating associated battle graphics.

On 14 February, movement to attack position TAA Garcia commenced. This daylong event featured two tank divisions, 1AD and 3AD, crossing each other in tactical formation over the Al-Batin wadi, a (normally) dry riverbed, but in some places, a craggy valley. The division rear began its movement via the Tapline Road, but could not cross the valley until the maneuver elements of both divisions traversed the wadi. While waiting near the town of Hafir Al Batin, multiple warheads from two Iraqi scud missiles, having been intercepted by Patriot anti-aircraft batteries, landed within 500 feet of the 312th’s idling vehicles. Ever fearful of chemical attack, pandemonium ensued as drivers sped away from the impact area while simultaneously donning their mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear. After seeing no adverse effects on pedestrian Saudis (or on their camels) a few brave souls removed their protective masks and gave the “all clear” signal.


Arriving at TAA Garcia at night, the 312th guided the division rear’s 3,000 wheeled vehicles into positions staked out like slices of a giant pie chart. Vehicle crews navigated in the dark using latitude and longitude coordinates determined by the Lorans and odometer readings measured in tenths of a mile. America’s tank

division now faced its adversaries across a foreboding berm, separating Saudi Arabia from Iraq roughly along the 29th Parallel North. The opposing forces were most notably the T-72-equipped armored divisions of Saddam’s elite republican guard forces. Named Tawakalna, Nebuchadnezzar, and Hamurabbi, these and other Iraqi units in the VII Corps’ “left hook” axis of approach were pounded for 5 weeks, day and night, by B-52 bombing sorties, thus greatly attriting their effectiveness.

## 89 Hours to Victory

The 1AD’s role during the ground war has been well chronicled. In summation, the 350-tank task force battled four Iraqi divisions, destroyed 341 tanks, 924 armored personnel carriers, and 92 artillery pieces during 89 hours of combat. The division also captured nearly 2,000 prisoners. At one point, on the night of 26 February, 1AD fought three republican guard divisions simultaneously. The division’s tanks, IFVs, and artillery fought a close-in battle with part of the Tawalkana Division, while Apache helicopters and long-range artillery attacked part of the Adnan Infantry Division farther to the north. At the same time, the division staff directed a deep attack by Air Force jets against the Medina Infantry Division. “That is air-land battle at its best,” Griffith said of U.S. forces attacking enemy reserves before they had the chance to enter the battle.<sup>8</sup> But during the Battle of Medina Ridge on 27 February, the largest tank battle since World War II and the largest tank battle in America’s history, is where America’s tank division made her mark. In just over 2 hours, 1AD destroyed 186 Iraqi tanks and 127 other armored vehicles while suffering one fatality and had four of its M1A1 tanks disabled by direct fire.<sup>9</sup>

In the final hour before the announced cease fire at 0800 hours, 28 February, 312th and the supply trains of division rear caught



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up with the division artillery (DIVARTY) just as it unleashed a hellacious, ground-quaking "DIVARTY four" on 26 targets. That meant that each target was hit more than 90 times by 155mm and 8-inch guns, plus multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), a total of more than 12,000 rounds in just 45 minutes!<sup>10</sup> The cease fire afforded the 312th's weary pony express riders some much needed sleep. Without pause for 89 hours, they escorted supply convoys to and from the division rear to the log bases in Saudi Arabia along ever-lengthening lines of communications. This was a vital mission because 1AD maneuver units fell short on fuel by the second day of the ground war. The base defense clusters regained significance following the cease fire and units became static for about 45 days.

A full generation of AC soldiers had never worked, much less fought, alongside Army reservists. Soldiers of 312th wore the 1AD shoulder patch; therefore, it was only after the cease fire that 1AD leaders realized that 312th was a USAR unit. They exclaimed, "We had no idea that you are reservists! You did a damn fine job out here!" Verbal accolades and personal decorations pinned on in Iraq were to be the 312th's only recognition. While victory parades and heroes' welcomes awaited troops returning to CONUS, the 1AD left its equipment in the desert and promptly deactivated. Its 17,000 regulars were reassigned from Germany to posts Armywide, while 312th members faced career uncertainties unique to citizen-soldier expatriates. Many were, or would soon be, unemployed and without a USAR unit assignment. All would search for and find new USAR assignments and civilian careers with the same fortitude they demonstrated in combat.

The 1AD's experience in Operation Desert Storm was groundbreaking — a forward-deployed armored division, further deployed to another theater with its organic forward-stationed reservists, marked a seminal change in the relationship between the USAR and the AC. At the outset, neither the 312th nor the 1AD staff knew what rear area operations center augmentees could or should do. The 312th's performance in earlier command field and REFORGER exercises persuaded senior leaders that reservists are force multipliers. The 1AD soldiers who witnessed the 312th Support Center successfully conduct its wartime mission caught a glimpse of the future. Change did not occur overnight or even on a long Saturday in November 1990, but more

than 20 years later, a much more integrated and effective total Army continues to excel at conducting full-spectrum operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>The 7th U.S. Army Reserve Command, available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/7arcom.htm>, accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>2</sup>K.M. Shimko, "The Last 'REFORGER' Exercise – 1990," *Spearhead Magazine*, January 1990, available online at <http://www.3ad.com/history/cold.war/feature.pages/reforger.1990.htm>, accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Tom Carhart, *Iron Soldiers: How America's 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq's Elite Republican Guard*, Pocket Books, New York, 1994, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>8</sup>*The Stars and Stripes*, "Future Tank Battles Not Ruled Out: 1st Armored Division Griffith Points to Combat Success," 15 May 1991, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup>Battle of Medina Ridge, online at [www.answers.com/topic/battle-of-medina-ridge](http://www.answers.com/topic/battle-of-medina-ridge), accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>10</sup>*Iron Soldiers*, p. 317.

Douglas E. Batson served as a cavalry scout with 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Armored Division (1AD), Ansbach, Germany. He began his civilian career as an education counselor for 1AD Division Support Command. He joined the 7th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) and served in the U.S. Army Reserve until his retirement in 2004. Following assignments with the U.S. Geological Survey and Department of Justice, he is currently a human geographer with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). He received a B.S. from Excelsior College, an M.E. from Boston University, and authored *Registering the Human Terrain: a Valuation of Cadastre*, National Defense Intelligence College Press.

Barry L. Robinson is currently a business process analyst, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. He received a B.S. from the University of Texas at Arlington and an M.B.A. from Tarleton State University. He served in various positions, to include staff officer, 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany; and installation coordinator, Herzo artillery base, Herzogenaurach, Germany. He also served in morale, welfare, and recreation positions at Fort Hood, Texas, and U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, Korea. In 1988, he joined 7th ARCOM and served in the U.S. Army Reserve until he retired as a lieutenant colonel in 2003.



*"The opposing forces were most notably the T-72-equipped armored divisions of Saddam's elite republican guard forces. Named Tawakalna, Nebuchadnezzar, and Hamurabbi, these and other Iraqi units in the VII Corps' 'left hook' axis of approach were pounded for 5 weeks, day and night, by B-52 bombing sorties, thus greatly attriting their effectiveness."*



## LETTERS continued from Page 3

the Russians and Israelis succumbed to poor combined arms planning, inadequate training, and overconfidence in technology, protection, and firepower. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 also demonstrates an adversary's ability to mass and maneuver combined arms to defeat a U.S./NATO trained and organized force (Kenneth D. Gott, *Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities*).

If procurement programs in Russia, India, and China are any indicator, the MBT, not a medium tank, remains a system of choice into the future. Even James' heralded Canadian Leopard I in Afghanistan fails to "demonstrate the need for a medium tank in a small-war environment." Canada's Department of National Defense (DND) confirmed the utility of the MBT and scrapped plans to buy the Stryker/LAV III 105mm mobile gun system. But contrary to looking for a more modern medium tank design, such as the CV90-120, the DND opted to purchase 100 Leopard II MBTs (Martin Sieff, "Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada," *Defense Industry Daily*).

My final concern is James' dismissive treatment of the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). He prejudices the "recently acquired family of wheeled and infantry fighting vehicles fail to provide the precision, firepower, protection, and mobility necessary to dominate a determined enemy." James' only source is Kendall Gott's account of Fallujah (Operation Al Fajr) in *Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities*. Gott acknowledges bias against the Stryker in his footnotes and ignores 2004 Stryker performance in Mosul, Samarra, and Najaf. Gott also wrote his assessment in 2006, prior to the surge and the SBCT high-intensity combat successes in Baqubah and on Baghdad's Haifa Street. The Stryker family of systems, integrated as a combined arms organization, has delivered precision, firepower, protection, and mobility to dominate determined enemies. The SBCT remains untested against a fully conventional threat, but has otherwise proven exceedingly capable against the requirements James justifies for a medium tank.

A modern medium tank would not provide a flexible force multiplier. Instead, it risks delivering mediocrity, incapable of decisive advantage in any particular category. The medium tank's zenith was more than 60 years ago. Technologies may emerge to make a medium tank as lethal and protected as a heavier tank, while allowing the operational mobility of a lighter vehicle. Major James thoughtfully continues the debate. Whether dismounted, wheeled, tracked, or flying (manned or unmanned), tank, Stryker, or something entirely different, the armor and cavalry community maintains its identity through mission and not platform.

The mission of armor is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, maneuver, and shock effect. In the 19th century, the predominant delivery system was the horse; in the 20th century, it became the tank. The utility of the tank has not waned into the 21st century; however, trends demand we challenge our own bias instead of alleging "institutional prejudice" against the tank. Regardless of the outcome, history shows that more than the platform, adaptive leaders, flexible doctrine, rigorous

training, and combined arms integration remain the essential components to mission accomplishment.

ERIC J. DUCKWORTH  
MAJ, U.S. Army

### Counterinsurgency on the American Plains

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read Mr. Saccavino's article, "Counterinsurgency on the American Plains," in the January-February 2011 edition of *ARMOR* with great interest. While I understand that space restrictions most likely limited the author's ability to discuss this important period, there are some historical oversights and errors that should be mentioned.

I was glad to see Mr. Saccavino mention the 1864 Navaho Campaign, which is often overlooked, but do not understand why he listed the Modoc Campaign in preference to the 1875 Red River War. Not only did the Red River War eliminate both the Comanche and Kiowa tribes as military threats (and either tribe alone was more militarily significant than the Modocs), it saw the rise to tactical prominence of Ranald Mackenzie and Nelson Miles (two of the Frontier Army's premiere tactical commanders during this time). It also demonstrated the usefulness of converging columns in frontier warfare (and influenced the Army's operational planning during the 1876 Great Sioux War). Both commanders had prominent roles in the 1876 Great Sioux War, and Mackenzie, in particular, had a knack for ending Indian conflicts with

minimal losses on both sides (he seems to have grasped the vulnerability of the Plains Indians' logistics system — they were unable to quickly replace either camp goods or pony herds, so he struck both in preference to engaging the warriors in "stand-up" fights).

It is impossible to discuss this period without mentioning the 7th Cavalry's Little Big Horn fight, but it is incorrect to state that "nearly all of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was exterminated." Of the 12 companies that formed the 7th, 5 companies went with Custer while the other 7 were divided between Major Reno and Captain Benteen. Overall, the regiment suffered about 52 percent casualties, which (although significant) does not qualify as "nearly exterminated." I was also somewhat bemused at the attempt to merge the 1862 Minnesota Sioux conflict with the later campaigns on the Great Plains. The Sioux in Minnesota were a distinct tribal group within what Anglos consider the Sioux Nation, and had precious few links to the Sioux groups led by (first) Red Cloud and (later) Sitting Bull (and even casting Red Cloud and Sitting Bull as tribal leaders is a broad generalization; Native American tribal groupings at this time were complex and difficult for some outsiders to understand).

In conclusion, this is an important historical period for the Army and one that is unfortunately often ignored or reduced to one or two spectacular events. Hopefully, *ARMOR* readers will use Mr. Saccavino's article as a starting point for their own explorations and not consider it the last word.

WILLIAM VAN HORN

## **ARMOR** IS MOVING OUT!

*ARMOR, The Professional Journal of the Armor Branch*, is relocating to Fort Benning, Georgia, in the upcoming months. Please check our website at [www.benning.army.mil/armor/ArmorMagazine/](http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/ArmorMagazine/) for updated information.



## TEN TIPS *continued from Page 25*

and plans out the window. Every time the team rolls out, it may not be back for days, depending on events beyond its control. A defensive measure or radio failure may turn a 30-minute road move, from one position to another, into a 3-day event. Planned H-hours may be pushed off endlessly by enablers, a lack thereof, special forces operations, or other frictions of war. Leaders must remain patient and allow subordinates to work laterally, feed situation reports (SITREPS) and suggestions, and offer work-around solutions to challenges that arise. Frequently, particularly when deployed forward, the command post will have a better grasp of detail than the commander, therefore, the command post should offer contingency plans to provide the commander with the time and space to see the big picture and add minor steering corrections as needed. Plan ahead and remember that things beyond the team's control does not mean its plans are ineffective or that leaders have failed; stay patient, focused, and work with, rather than against, the situation.

### 9 NEVER STOP TRAINING

Leaders must keep their skills sharp and consistently push subordinates to do the same. This is part of leading by example; the combat team commander should never be "too busy" to train critical skills. While it may seem like an unnecessary distraction during war, refreshing simple

things, such as weapons handling, mine detectors, first aid skills, or communications equipment, prevents skills from eroding and saves lives. In large combat teams, not all attachments are familiar with or accustomed to handling weapons or special equipment; therefore, they must be included in refresher training if they are under your command.

### 10 CASUALTIES

Casualties will happen; prepare for it. There will be times when things explode, bullets fly, and soldiers, comrades, and close friends get hurt or killed. Unfortunately, there is nothing leaders can do about it. Leaders have to find a way to deal with casualties, and the sergeant major is a good source of support. Inform the team as soon as possible about casualties from other units, as well as local national security partners, who will likely be close comrades of your attachments. Take the time to publicly commemorate and respect the fallen, but stay focused — the team is still deployed and is conducting operations; it needs continuous and consistent leader oversight. Leaders may be injured, but must continue to lead, and lead well, despite injury. When all is going badly, above all, leaders must remain calm, collected, and lead the organization.

While based on deployed combat team commanders, these ten tips are also ap-

plicable for captains in subunit and unit-level positions and, in most cases, platoon-level leadership teams. While they do focus on deployed operations and have been proven in combat, they are also valuable for training or domestic deployments. Finally, while written in my words, the soldiers, NCOs and officers on my team brought these ten tips into sharp focus, validated them, and will benefit most from the leaders who apply them in future.



Major Mark Popov is currently a student at the Joint Command and Staff Programme, Canadian Forces College, Toronto. He graduated from Canada's Royal Roads Military College, where he received a commission to The Royal Canadian Dragoons. He later earned a MBA from Vermont's Norwich University. He has served as a Leopard tank, tracked reconnaissance, and Coyote reconnaissance scout troop leader, and deployed to Bosnia as an armored reconnaissance squadron liaison officer. He deployed to Kabul Province, Afghanistan, as second-in-command of an armored reconnaissance squadron, concurrent with a posting to Canada's National Defence Headquarters, where he served as the executive assistant to the chief of military personnel. He also commanded B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, an armored reconnaissance squadron, equipped with the Coyote combat reconnaissance vehicle. He deployed with B Squadron to southern Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, as part of Canada's Task Force 3-09 battle group.

*"For all deliberate and most routine operations, the team also partnered with an Afghan National Police element. We took time to sit down and learn what our partners, attachments, and enablers had to offer, how they worked, and addressed any restrictions they had regarding employment."*





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
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# FM 7-0

Training Units and Developing Leaders  
for Full Spectrum Operations

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The new U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*, is the Army's keystone doctrine for training units and developing leaders for full spectrum operations on a rotational cycle using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. It supports the concepts in FM 3-0, *Operations*.

The 2011 FM 7-0 is significantly smaller than the 2008 version and is best viewed on the Army Training Network (<https://atn.army.mil>). The online FM 7-0 links to videos, documents, best practices, examples, and other resources.

In addition to FSO METL, the new manual incorporates leader development as part of unit training; replaces core mission essential task lists (METL) and directed METL with full spectrum operations METL; focuses on a modular, brigade-centric force in the ARFORGEN process; introduces the importance of FSO training against complex hybrid threats; and makes training management an intellectual process rather than a lock-step.



The proponent for FM 7-0 is the Combined Arms Center.  
View FM 7-0 at <https://atn.army.mil>



# 101ST CAVALRY REGIMENT



The 101st Cavalry Regiment's distinctive unit insignia was approved in 1963. Three gold, interlaced chevrons are displayed on the azure body of the shield. The three chevrons represent the three occasions on which the organization had been in federal service at that time: the Spanish-American War (Puerto Rico), 1898; the Mexican Border, 1916-17; and World War I, 1917-19. On the gold upper third of the shield, a falcon, portrayed in natural colors, stands with wings folded. The falcon signifies readiness for high employment, though normally at rest, a relevant symbol for the National Guard. In addition, the falcon is associated with courage, speed, mobility and impetuosity of attack.



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