ARMOR

Mounted Maneuver Journal

July-August 2011



THE JOINT FIGHT

ARMOR

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COMMANDANT'S HATCH

BG Ted Martin
Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

Achieving Irreversible Momentum – Armor School on the Move

I am pleased to report that the Armor School's move from Fort Knox, KY, to Fort Benning, GA, is going exceptionally well as we build toward achieving full operating capability Sept. 15, 2011.

The most recent milestone achieved was the June 10, 2011, Armor School Departure and Brigade Colors Casing Ceremony hosted by LTG Benjamin F. Freakley on Fort Knox's historic Brooks Field. During a ceremony well attended by former Armor Center and School employees, retired officers, noncommissioned officers and our civilian supporters, the Armor School cased the colors of the 194th Armor Brigade, 316th Cavalry Brigade and their subordinate battalions/squadrons. Retired MG Terry L. Tucker, 40th chief of Armor and former commanding general of the Armor Center, and retired SMA Kenneth O. Preston, 13th sergeant major of the Army, provided remarks reflecting on the 71-year history of the Armor School at Fort Knox and its accomplishments in supporting our Army's requirement for trained tank crewmen, cavalry scouts and versatile and adaptive Armor and Cavalry leaders. They also praised local community leaders that have embraced and provided unfailing support to Armor Soldiers and families since the founding of the Armor School in 1940.

The customs, history and traditions that brought us to this milestone – everything that makes us unique as Armor and Cavalry – I assure you will be resident at Fort Benning as we build upon this foundation and write a new chapter in our storied history, a chapter that began June 20, 2011, when we conducted an Armor School Arrival and Brigade Colors Uncasing Ceremony on Brave Rifles Field at Harmony Church.

As we look to the future, it is important to note that our mission to relocate the Armor School was enabled from the start by visionary Armor leaders that recognized the importance of training as we fight side-by-side with our Infantry brothers. From MGs Tucker, Robert M. Williams and Donald M. Campbell Jr., COL David A. Teeples and then MG James M. Milano – their command sergeants major and staffs – they took on the mission: they built the plan, set the conditions and put into motion the plan that has yielded what are unquestionably the world's finest facilities, ranges, training areas, barracks and motor pools – designed specifically for us – but more importantly, with the input of experienced Armor trainers and instructors.

We have not recreated the Armor School – we have taken this opportunity to make the Armor School better. In the process, we have taken everything we have learned from Fort Knox and applied it to Fort Benning. In coordination and partnership with our brothers in the Infantry, we have created the Maneuver Center of Excellence. This center of excellence will shape the Army's maneuver force as every Soldier, NCO and officer in the Armor and Infantry branches will receive initial, mid-level and senior-level Army professional-development training at Fort Benning.

The transformation of the Maneuver Center of Excellence takes shape daily. You will marvel at what you see – as extraordinary effort has been made to bring a sense of balance to Armor, Cavalry and Infantry. On Harmony Church, vehicle displays, street signs and athletic fields are branded in recognition of historic Armor and Cavalry units. Armor School ranges, training areas and instructional facilities are memorialized to recognize and honor distinguished Armor and Cavalry Soldiers and leaders and inspire future generations of mounted warriors.

Who would have imagined when the Base Realignment and Closure announcement came in 2005 – that an M3E8 Sherman tank and an M1 Abrams tank would be standing as sentinels at the main gate of Fort Benning? Who would have thought that on Memorial Day weekend, we would be cutting the ribbon on the future home of the National Armor and Cavalry Museum – at the entrance to one of the largest Army training installations in the world?

These are tangible reminders of the tremendous vision and commitment of those Armor leaders that made all of this possible – those who have served at Fort Knox, who live in the surrounding communities and who continue to this day to support our great Army. They are visible reminders that Armor and Cavalry are agile, adaptive and resilient institutions that persevere through adversity to accomplish all assigned missions.

This is my final Armor Commandant's Hatch Article, so I would like to take this opportunity to thank the entire Maneuver Center staff and the Chattahoochee Valley Region leaders for their warm welcome and tremendous support of the Armor School, our Soldiers and their families. I would also like to welcome promotable COL Tom James as the 46th chief of Armor; he is a distinguished Armor leader, professional Soldier and friend. COL(P) James will build on the tremendous reputation of Armor and Cavalry, prepare our branch to act on future opportunities and continue to produce and train the world's best Armor and Cavalry Soldiers and leaders.

The future for Armor and Cavalry is bright!

Driver, move out!

CSM Ricky Young
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School

The Armor and Cavalry NCO's Role in Training for the Full-Spectrum Fight

As we forge into the future of our force as we know it, we must take the time to define our role as Armor/Cavalry noncommissioned officers in training for the full-spectrum fight. This may be as simple as saying that our role of training our Soldiers and troopers on the required individual skills has not, nor will it ever, change. Although I believe that to be true, it has become more evident that the "strategic corporal" is alive and well on the full-spectrum battlefield. NCOs at all levels have been thrust into situations that only a decade ago were unthinkable. Our sergeants and staff sergeants are required to interact with the local populace, make tactical decisions that will likely have a strategic impact, coordinate indirect fires and close-air support and have an understanding of operating in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. This does not sound like the sergeant of yesteryear, but it is the Armor and Cavalry sergeant of today.

Our NCOs today are able to quickly transition from employing a kinetic solution to nonlethal operations while leading their Soldiers through those same transitions. This is where it comes back to the training piece. Today's mounted warrior has to possess the flexibility to understand the full-spectrum fight. This can only happen through full-spectrum training. For the past decade, our operations tempo has forced commanders to become very mission-focused on training, which has, in turn, built a core of junior and mid-grade leaders who only know one way to train. I am not saying that in a negative vein, since it has often been dictated by the amount of time to train between deployments. For us to turn the corner, those leaders must get back to training for all aspects of warfare to better prepare them for any mission they and their Soldiers may be asked to execute.

As Armor/Cavalry NCOs, we must first get reblued on our core competencies of platform-based fire and maneuver and all the associated individual tasks. We then must train our Soldiers, crews and teams to perform those tasks. Let's call that blocking and tackling. Once we regain command of the core Armor and Cavalry tactical and technical skills, then we must begin the education process or the science of teaching our troopers how to think, not what to think. This is critical in the ever-changing full-spectrum fight. As we have seen over the past few years, critical decisions are being made at a much lower level than we ever thought possible. This fact will likely not go away, and it will be the NCOs of our Armor and Cavalry formations who will use recent experience gained from multiple deployments to continue our primary role of training our Soldiers, NCOs and officers.

The following excerpt adapted from Field Manual 7-0 clearly lays out the NCO role in training and is worth another look. We all agree that we must get back to fundamentals to ensure our armored force is ready for full-spectrum operations.

NCOs train individuals, crews and small teams.

NCOs are the primary trainers of enlisted Soldiers, crews and small teams. Officers and NCOs have a special training relationship; their training responsibilities complement each other. This relationship spans all echelons and types of organizations. NCOs are usually an organization's most experienced trainers. Their input is crucial to a commander's overall training strategy and a vital ingredient of the "top-down/bottom-up" approach to training. This approach is characterized by direction from commanders ("top-down") and subsequent input from subordinate officers and NCOs ("bottom-up"). This two-way communication helps ensure the organization trains on the most important tasks.

Five tenets support NCOs as they train individuals, crews and small teams:

1. Training is a primary duty of NCOs; NCOs turn guidance into action.

2. NCOs identify Soldier, crew and small-team tasks, and help identify unit collective tasks that support the unit's mission-essential tasks.

3. NCOs provide and enforce standards-based, performance-oriented, mission-focused training.

4. NCOs focus on sustaining strengths and improving weaknesses.
5. NCOs develop junior NCOs and help officers develop junior officers.

Tenet 1: Training is a primary duty of NCOs; NCOs turn guidance into action.

NCOs train, lead and care for Soldiers and their equipment. They instill in Soldiers the Warrior Ethos and Army Values. NCOs take the broad guidance given by their leaders and identify the necessary tasks, standards and resources. Then they execute the training in accordance with their leader's intent.

Tenet 2: NCOs identify Soldier, crew and small-team tasks, and help identify unit collective tasks that support the unit's mission-essential tasks.

To identify Soldier, crew and small-team tasks, NCOs begin with individual Soldier tasks. Then they identify the individual, crew and small-team tasks that link to or support the unit's mission-essential tasks. NCOs also help officers identify the collective tasks that support the unit's mission-essential tasks.

Tenet 3: NCOs provide and enforce standards-based, performance-oriented, mission-focused training.

Disciplined, mission-focused training ensures Soldier proficiency in the individual tasks that support an organization's mission-essential tasks. NCOs ensure key individual tasks are integrated into short-range and near-term training plans. NCOs plan, prepare, execute and assess training. They help commanders and other leaders assess training by conducting internal after-action reports and participating in external AARs. NCOs provide candid feedback to commanders and other leaders on all aspects of training – especially individual, crew and small-team training. They base feedback on their observations and evaluations before, during and after training. NCOs identify problems with training and implement solutions on their own initiative.

Tenet 4: NCOs focus on sustaining strengths and improving weaknesses.

NCOs quickly assimilate new Soldiers into the organization, continuously coach and mentor them, and hone their newly acquired skills. NCOs cross-train their Soldiers in critical skills and duties. Cross-training prepares Soldiers to accept positions of increased responsibility and take another Soldier's place if necessary. NCOs are dedicated to helping each Soldier grow and develop, both professionally and personally. This dedication is vital to developing future leaders. It is essential to ensuring the organization can successfully accomplish its mission, even when its leaders are absent. While developing Soldiers' skills and knowledge, NCOs foster initiative and agility in subordinates.

Tenet 5: NCOs develop junior NCOs and help officers develop junior officers.

NCOs train and coach Soldiers. Senior NCOs train junior NCOs for the next higher position well before they assume it. Senior NCOs help form high-performing officer-NCO teams and help clarify to junior officers the different roles of officers and NCOs in training. NCOs also help officers develop junior officer competence and professionalism and explain NCO expectations of officers.

As you have read, our role and responsibility in training for full-spectrum operations has remained fundamentally unchanged. It is important to capture what has changed and incorporate that into our training, and to advise our unit commanders when we find ourselves falling into a myopic view of what we need to train based on what we think our next mission might be. To be successful in the full-spectrum fight, we must train the full spectrum of tasks, both individual and collective. We must be both competent and confident operating in austere and ambiguous environments; master our weapons systems and various platforms we operate from; and be comfortable with the technology we have at our disposal. This can only be achieved through training, and it is the Armor and Cavalry NCO who is charged to conduct that training. I know this is nothing new to those of you who actually took the time to read this article, but we must make sure that every NCO in our ranks – from the newest sergeant through the most senior sergeant major – remains focused on our role and develops their subordinates to do the same.

Thanks for what you and your tankers and scouts do every day in service to our nation.

Treat 'Em Rough!

2011 Maneuver CONFERENCE

Sept. 12-15, 2011
Columbus Convention and Trade Center

801 Front Avenue
Columbus, GA 31901

No conference fee. Registration is free and can be made on-line at the conference Website, http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/maneuverconference/2011/index.html, or at the Columbus Convention and Trade Center's registration desk the week of the conference, Monday 8 a.m.-7 p.m. and Tuesday-Wednesday 7 a.m.-5 p.m.

The Maneuver Conference is an annual event and provides a comprehensive forum for active-duty, Guard, Reserve, Special Operations, joint and multinational military personnel, as well as civilians, contractors and retired military to address current and future issues affecting the maneuver force. This year's conference theme will be "21st Century Training for the Maneuver Force," focusing on the brigade combat team's training capabilities today and in the future.

The event is open to the public, with about 250 vendors and exhibitors expected. Registration is required to attend all presentations but not to view vendors/exhibitors. All social events require an attendance fee and registration on the conference Website. Food will be available for purchase.

Highlights:

- Conference icebreaker evening of Sept. 12
- Primary presentation days Sept. 13-14
- Doughboy Award ceremony and banquet, and St. George Award ceremony and banquet, evening of Sept. 13
- Steak night evening of Sept. 14 at Fort Benning Convention Center

THROWIN' TRACK

by 1LT Josh Scoggin

An orange ball crests the mud huts and lights up the hazy backdrop – a scene that only the select few who have been deployed can paint. An older man sits down outside to join his son for tea before the temperature becomes too much to endure. The convoy passes a child slapping his donkey with a stick, urging it to make the trek to his house. You are somehow reminded of home as a small whirlwind carrying a few loose sheets of paper dances across the blacktop. Iraq does not remind you of home, but instead it makes you rather thankful of where you live.

Today's mission is a key-leader engagement with the town mayor at a school on the outskirt of the city, and your platoon will attempt to set up a community-oriented policing program. You still aren't exactly sure what COP is or what it looks like on paper. The town mayor is stubborn, and your boss is driving you hard to see results. The first two meetings have been far from stellar, and yet you still come back trying to build these relationships. You realize relationships are the key, but how can you make this work? As a scout platoon leader, you're well aware of the hazards that face your platoon – improvised-explosive-device blasts off the main supply route, sniper fire from the third-story window, or even the vehicle rolling over on the bridge.

As the first tire comes to a slow roll in front of the meetinghouse, you perceive your platoon's motivation has begun to wane. This thought resides in your cerebral attic as your team approaches the mayor's office, and you still refute the slightest idea of you, the PL, being the culprit of this mass emotional homicide. You've stated your key tasks in the operations order and hit every troop-leading procedure in textbook fashion. You've fulfilled your transactional-leader contract by reviewing notes from the Army Recon Course as well as some leadership slides you accidentally saved from the Armor Officer Basic Course.

The meeting concluded and your platoon safely returned to base, meeting your commander's end state. Tuesday night, lukewarm lasagna and a steamy cup of coffee offer you sanctuary as you and your television sitcom sort through this madness. "What are my noncommissioned officers not doing right?" is where all likely indicators point, you think.

As junior officers, we're charged with leading men on the battlefield, but even that sounds cliché. The hypothetical lead scenario describes how we sometimes feel. We read about leadership until we are blue in the face, but that alone won't make us great leaders.

2 types of leaders

There are several leadership styles to draw from, but fundamentally there are only two types of leaders: the transactional leader or the transformational leader. Transactional leadership is easy – especially in the Army since the conditions are already set. The chain of command is well developed, punishments and rewards are clearly defined, and the prime purpose of the subordinate is to do what his supervisor tells him to do – cut and dried.

Transformational leadership is the level we strive to achieve. The difficulty in transformational leadership is that it makes people feel they are part of something larger than themselves, rather than just being in the Army. I'm talking about a craving for the mission and having fortitude to do the right thing regardless of the outcome. The transformational leader inspires subordinates through words and actions, not by punishments and rewards.

I'm not declaring mastery of this skill – far from it, actually, nor is it my desire to take invective aims at our organization. The purpose of this article is to opine on general observations made in the JO ranks and to offer considerations that may act as navigational beacons should our ships ever drift from the transformational course.

5 guidelines

One. Give until it feels good; avoid politics and obsequious gestures. President Harry Truman once said, "It is amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit." The transformational leader embodies this idea of selfless service.

There are times when you can make an immediate impact on someone and, when presented the 10-meter target, quickly squeeze the trigger and begin scanning for the 300-meter one. I've seen too often where we focus on "What will my superiors think?" or "How will this look on my evaluation report?" Truthfully, who cares? The thought of chasing evaluation bullets and being caught in a political entanglement degrades our sights.

I recall a brother PL conducting his KLE with a mayor in his area of operation. He asked the mayor what we always ask: "What do you need from us?" He received a tangible request this time – school supplies for the kids. Roger, got it, let's action on it as soon as we return to base – and he did. He acquired the supplies in a matter of hours. He chose to give the supplies to the children rather than wait for the creation of a storyboard because it felt like the right thing to do.

Storyboards are a valuable tool, especially in winning the war in Iraq. First, they allow our organization (including our Iraqi counterparts) to capitalize on wins, thus denying the enemy the opportunity to easily inject exploited propaganda (our successes) into an already volatile system. Second, storyboards are historic art. These boards act as an accountant's book for successful transactions, showing the world what positive effects occur when choosing certain courses of actions. Missions should develop storyboards, not the other way around.

I recall an occasion where we were maneuvering in a small town and saw a little girl hanging around our vehicles. We could have continued with our perfect scanning techniques and ignored her, but the innocent white smile, red hair bows and brown stuffed teddy bear served as a magnet despite our polar tendencies to remain vigilant. Our driver gave the girl some candy he brought for the mission. This gesture wasn't staged or embellished, only a simple gift that rendered a high return on investment after the fact. The girl received the candy, returned to her parents – who were watching her from their house – and the entire street exploded with warm welcomes.

Our treatment of the locals, like this little girl, makes a difference in our engagements with key leaders. *(photo by 1LT Josh Scoggin)*

Our mission in Iraq is to build a stronger bond with our Iraqi family and ensure that Iraq is stable and self-reliant in the coming years. What better way to do that than show the children (the same people who will be eligible to vote and make political decisions in the next 10 years) how much we actually care for them. The point I'd like to drive home is do the right thing because it feels right, not because we need to be published in every news article or video opportunity that passes by.

Two. Speak the universal language. The transformational leader strives to reach a commonality among all walks of life.

My platoon is very diverse. There are people from African, European, Marshall Island and Mexican descent. One of my Soldiers from Mexico is seeking his citizenship. Although there is a variegated bundle of color and culture emanating throughout the ranks, one common theme we all have is love. We all love something: a new Harley Davidson, our wives and children, a cold beer after a long day, whatever. I find speaking with my Iraqi brothers and sisters easy, although we can't understand a word each other says without our interpreter. We show compassion to each other as human beings.

We conducted a counter-IED mission off the MSR in our area of operation. We dismounted as usual, and the platoon maneuvered alongside the road while the mounted element provided overwatch. We approached a small house about 100 meters from the road, noticing several people standing around looking at us. I assumed they were inquiring why we were walking along the road, wearing 40 extra pounds of robot gear and kicking trash. We met them, talked about life in general and drank chai while sitting down. (One thing I've noticed is Iraqi people do not like to talk business right away.) We asked some security questions about the area. Then they informed us the elder's son was bedridden, with screws and pins in both legs, after a severe vehicle accident. Our platoon came to a quick consensus: let's have Doc take a look at him. We called Doc up from the formation, and he checked the guy out. Doc gave him some over-the-counter pain medications and told him we'd be back in a few days to check on him. Five days passed and we made it back to see our friend, but this time the whole village swarmed us with smiles and hugs. The word was out: these cavalrymen cared for the elder's son. No one attacked us in that sector. I attribute that to my men and their ability to show compassion for mankind.

Three. Be visionary, be focused. Leaders should receive their guidance through vi-

PFC Sam Ho, our medic, treats the village elder's son. *(photo by 1LT Josh Scoggin)*

sioning. This art involves the ability to develop that mental image of where your organization will be at a future time. Without a vision, there can be no strategy.

We've all experienced going full speed, slamming on our brakes, doing a 180-degree turn and going again. We're all tasked heavily while deployed. But it's our job as JOs to ensure we focus this energy. Otherwise, our soldiers will become exhausted dogs fed up with chasing too many tires.

My platoon came up with a vision and a few standing orders. Sure, it was simple, and some thought it was cheesy, but we didn't care. Our vision statement was published – we wanted to be the best platoon by being physically fit, mentally tough and having a team-oriented atmosphere. The standing orders, nested with the Army Values, hung along the alleyway where our platoon entered the living area. A few weeks passed, and members of the platoon bought into it.

It's paramount the leader points his platoon in the right direction.

Four. Strive to be "top-down," willingly accept "bottom-up." As a Six Sigma Master Black Belt, I've studied these two terms in depth. Although this doesn't make me an expert in the field, it does mean I have an interest in published theories.

The Army, by fighting nature, must be a top-down organization, but this must be altered to make the platoon work. Organizations may change from the bottom up. Upper echelons should accept a platoon which sets standards and pushes the culture; this transformation requires desire and acceptance from the PL to change from below.

The first step in creating a successful organization, whether it's a 30-man scout platoon or a billion-dollar corporation like Microsoft, is for your subordinates to buy in. Buy-in is built by fully embracing and actively leading the platoon. This is easier to talk than apply. Buy-in starts with the PL setting the stage and producing the energy for the platoon. It's more than speaking confidently during an OPORD brief or having a few sensing sessions with your subordinates to check a box.

For instance, if you want to make physical-training scores higher, you must be in shape yourself. An overweight officer sitting on the sideline preaching to his subordinates the importance of PT is unacceptable.

Also, we must understand our soldiers, veering away from fabricated counseling statements and leaning toward the venerable term "oak-tree counseling." Our soldiers are very intelligent and have the innate ability to sense when our actions are impure. Instead of counseling, we should deem it "active listening" time with our subordinates, remembering the driving force is about the soldier and not about our promotion.

Last, we must never forget that our Soldiers' motivation is the same as their leaders. It's acceptable, and highly encouraged, to make our Soldiers smile – a periodic receipt letting us know we're doing something right. Subordinates will take on the personalities of their leadership, both NCOs and officers. We must believe in the cause before our soldiers can believe.

Five. Have "bone-deep" not "skin-deep" qualities. Growing up in Mississippi guarantees one thing: hearing your share of pearls of wisdom. "Beauty is skin deep, and ugly is to the bone" is one I recall from my childhood. Leaders shouldn't compete for the cover of ***GQ***, but we as JOs should decipher what is and is not important.

A "skin-deep" example would be the ability to quote doctrine. We can better ourselves by reading field manuals and field applications, but is this truly important for lieutenants and junior captains? No.

My old commander, CPT Dave Dixon, sat me down the first day I reported into Ironhawk Troop and said, "Josh, the most important trait you can have as a lieutenant is interpersonal skills." At the time I was thinking to myself, "Really?" Aside from studying a few speeches and attending some character seminars at the academy, I had never sunk my teeth into interpersonal leadership. Enclosed in my comfort bubble were all the high-intensity-conflict tactics and associated FMs – definitely not interpersonal leadership.

I had my fair share of lethal training. I was confident setting a screen line with six Bradleys and 30 dudes, but I was shaky on the nonlethal side; there's really nothing that can prepare you for a KLE with a town mayor or city police chief other than some practice runs. Learning interpersonal skills allowed me to engage in a two-way conversation with these key leaders, winning their hearts – more so than learning to set up a listening post/observation point overwatching a target building.

What can't be learned from an FM are humility and interpersonal skills – the two most important traits a JO can have. We have ample time to memorize our Scout-platoon FM and spout off doctrinal acronyms to impress our bosses later. True traits, or "bone traits," are, first, the ability to admit fault, and second, talking to and inspiring Soldiers.

NCOs mentor and develop JOs. For example, a humble lieutenant or captain who can relate to people is easier and better developed than the know-it-all officer who is the social outcast. Bone traits are much harder to learn, but they are the foundation of leadership.

Bottom line: without these two qualities, those esoteric acronyms and savvy radio conjectures over the net barely pierce the epidermis layer.

In Armor we take pride in our ability to conduct mounted warfare. From a macro view, no one can argue that we are the best; however, at a micro level, we may see that a few "track pads" are beginning to wear. We've all shot our gunnery tables and maneuvered our Bradleys and tanks through terrain our commanders advised against. We've spent countless hours in the blazing heat or bitter cold after a Bradley threw a track – not fun putting it back together.

Leadership is a fluid dynamic. Some days laminar flow is expected, and other days, turbulence. Similar to our pacing items are our leadership styles; these too are combat enablers. There is never a time when a leader should take a cookie-cutter approach, but these five guidelines may help prevent us from "throwin' track" and being stranded on the battlefield.

Strike hard! Thunder! and Ai-ee-yah!

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ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

COP – community-oriented policing
FM – field manual
IED – improvised explosive device
JO – junior officer
KLE – key-leader engagement
MSR – main supply route
NCO – noncommissioned officer
OPORD – operations order
PL – platoon leader
PT – physical training

SGT Steve Brinza conducts a joint patrol with Iraqi security forces. *(photo by 1LT Josh Scoggin)*

Junior Leaders and the Key-Leader Engagement Process

by 1LT Tom Westphal

As the drawdown of forces continues in Iraq and may soon begin in Afghanistan, junior Armor leaders will find themselves taking more responsibility in conducting engagements with influential and senior local-national officials. In the final and crucial phase of these conflicts, junior leaders must become adept at cultivating local allies and using personal relationships to influence their commander's battlespace. Failure to do so may leave junior leaders and their commanders with insufficient ability to secure their areas, and may create tactical challenges at a time when they are least needed. Success in this area, however, will reap dividends in stability at a critical stage of these conflicts.

Crazyhorse Troop's experience

During the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation New Dawn, Crazyhorse Troop (1st Squadron, 3rd Armor Cavalry Regiment) took responsibility for a large and diverse area of operation in the northwestern corner of Iess in the area was in no small part due to the effective use of key-leader engagements to engage local officials and build relationships with tribal, Iraqi government and Iraqi Security Forces leaders. These relationships were critical in influencing local leaders to advance our commander's intent and in realizing this intent with minimal U.S. involvement.

Crazyhorse Troop experienced challenges similar to those the Armor community will face in current and upcoming deployments. Junior leaders must actively seek to improve their skills at building and maintaining relationships with local officials in their commander's AO. We saw limited attempts made to introduce KLE into predeployment training requirements. Current literature focuses on the KLE process relating to targeting or on general KLE tactics, rather than relating to the capabilities and limitations of junior Army leaders. This article explains those capabilities and limitations in the KLE process and provides specific recommendations for junior leaders seeking to improve their proficiency at conducting KLEs within the context of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Defining a KLE

A KLE is the sustained process of building a professional connection with local-national officials to gain their cooperation in fulfilling the commander's intent. Regardless of the desired outcome, our experience shows that every successfully executed KLE builds a resilient relationship between the junior leader on the ground and their local-national counterparts. However, this was based on our operating environment, which did not force us to meet with large groups or councils often (as seems to be the current norm in Afghanistan), and therefore gave us the opportunity to build rapport with individuals rather than continually be required to address large gatherings.

Capabilities and limitations of junior-leader engagement

During Crazyhorse Troop's tour of duty, platoon leaders like myself often took responsibility for meeting relatively high-ranking local Iraqi government, ISF and tribal officials accustomed to meeting with battalion-level leaders (or higher). Engaging such officials presents unique challenges to junior leaders, who must keep in mind their relative advantages and disadvantages to more senior USF leaders to make the most of their strengths.

Junior leaders must become adept at cultivating local allies and using personal relationships to influence their commander's battlespace. *(U.S. Army photo)*

American forces have been in Iraq for more than eight years, and in this time Iraqi officials have learned a lot about the American military. In many cases, this includes a rudimentary knowledge of the U.S. Army rank structure and relative power of each rank. In our experience, local Iraqi government and ISF accustomed to meeting with senior-level Army leaders may have felt slighted if a junior leader attempted to engage them. Also, they may have felt that meeting with junior leaders wasted their time, as they knew junior leaders have less influence over USF actions in the area than a senior leader. One of the greatest challenges to junior leaders is managing the expectations of their counterparts while providing them a reason to maintain interest in continuing the relationship.

However, junior leaders should capitalize on their advantages. Senior leaders may only be able to speak in broad terms about problems facing the area. Junior leaders can better grasp local minutiae and give targeted, specific recommendations to their counterparts on fixing local problems. Also, junior leaders are more available over the course of the deployment to invest in KLEs with more of their counterparts. Junior leaders can build stronger relationships with more local officials over the course of a deployment than a senior leader can.

Strategies for effective engagement

Crazyhorse Troop learned many lessons experiencing the transition from OIF to OND. Following are some strategies for effective engagement at the junior-leader level, from the preparation process to actions on the objective to the post-meeting follow-up. While derived from our experiences, the strategies are broadly appli-

Junior leaders can build stronger relationships with more local officials over the course of a deployment than a senior leader can. *(U.S. Army photo)*

cable to other regions in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in future conflicts. The structure assumes a one-year deployment with opportunities for repeatedly engaging the same key local leaders.

These strategies are common sense. Taken holistically, they may help structure a junior leaders' approach to KLEs and will save future units from re-learning these lessons.

The preparation process

Treat every operation like an information operation. When a patrol leaves the wire, junior leaders must emphasize to their soldiers that their behavior will influence the population they encounter. This will shape the attitudes of local nationals you will interact with during KLEs. For example, one tribal leader in our area bitterly recollected a U.S. patrol that refused to apologize for tearing down his power lines before our unit arrived in-country, and he continually used this as a pretext for his refusal to cooperate.

Identify and define desired outcomes. A junior leader must have a clear idea of what outcome would best support his commander's intent before entering into the KLE. Figure out a way to frame the desired outcome and any preferred solutions to the problem in a way that reconciles them with your counterpart's own goals (or your counterpart's superior's goals). Always try to define the outcome in terms of your counterpart's goals. Present the desired outcome in such a way that your counterpart views it as a matter of his own self-interest rather than some sort of command. (For example, "Decreasing violence along this route will significantly contribute to securing your area and prove how effective your soldiers are to your commander" rather than "You need to secure this route.")

Prepare the battlefield and map the conversation. Like all operations, adequate planning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield and rehearsal is critical to the success of KLEs. Review your notes from past KLEs and prepare a list of agreements or discussions that may help achieve your desired outcome. From there, create a "map" for the conversation that will gradually build the framework for your desired outcome. We found this to be a useful process for planning the general flow of conversation and formulating responses to anticipated questions or resistance.

Prepare and rehearse with your interpreter. Without the resources afforded to senior leaders, the interpreter is often the junior leader's only link to the local culture and can usually provide advice on the cultural context surrounding the KLE. Many interpreters have worked with USF for a long time and have a great deal of negotiation experience. The value of a good interpreter can hardly be overstated in effectively engaging local leaders. Go over your conversation map and desired outcomes with the interpreter and ask his advice. If time permits, use another interpreter to act as the local-national official and rehearse key elements of the KLE.

Actions on the objective: stages of engagement

The initial meeting is one of the only times a junior leader should completely avoid specifics. Your priority during the initial meeting is to secure an agreement on at least one broad goal. This provides a starting place for your interactions and creates the foundation for later agreements. The goal is likely to be a vague, easily agreed upon concept such as security, education, prosperity, etc. Ask open-ended questions to try to uncover your counterpart's priorities and any shared interests you may have.

The first month is critical for junior leaders in establishing your professional and personal relationships with your counterparts. Resist the urge to only talk "business" and try to find out if your counterpart shares a common interest with you. This will help differentiate you from other Americans your counterpart has worked with.

Junior leaders should also take this month to try to determine their counterpart's ability to influence his area. This allows junior leaders to provide an accurate report on the power dynamics in the AO to their commanders.

During this time, emphasis should remain on the broad goal you and your counterpart first agreed on in the first meeting. Also, acknowledge any small victories that occur. Acknowledgement builds your reputation as someone that not only shares your counterpart's goals but is also actively working to help him accomplish his mission.

Months two through 10 sustain the relationship. By the second month in their AO, junior leaders should have a good idea who in their area has influence and merits their attention. At this point, it may be helpful for junior leaders to compile an engagement schedule of who they need to engage with and how often, based on the power hierarchy in their area. Using cell-phone calls when you are unable to meet with your counterparts will help keep your relationship from weakening and can create a culture of communication that isn't dependent on your ability to meet in person.

By the 11th month, junior leaders need to begin preparing for the transition to a new unit occupying their area. Emphasize the professional nature of relationship and list past joint accomplishments with your counterparts to imply that these successes will continue if your counterpart continues to have a strong relationship with USF. When your replacing unit arrives, personally introduce your successor to your key contacts as someone who is interested in continuing this strong relationship. Providing your replacement with the information you collected on each of your counterparts will also ensure that cultivating your relationship did not waste time. Again, this may be common sense, but it's important for the relationship's continuity.

The previous unit handed us several strong relationships. These invaluable relationships helped us navigate the complex dynamics of our AO in the initial months.

Tactics, techniques and procedures for effective engagement

Own the room. This can sometimes be a challenge for junior leaders, who are culturally disadvantaged in Iraq and Afghanistan by their relatively low rank and youth in cultures that place a great deal of weight on seniority and authority. Minimizing the number of soldiers who speak during KLEs will avoid confusion over who is in charge. Try to sit in a central, dominant location. Although most local officials will not be able to understand you, speaking with a commanding voice is still important in establishing your authority.

Establish credibility. By now, most Afghan and Iraqi officials have dealt with American soldiers in some capacity or another, so junior leaders need to be proactive in defining themselves as a reliable partner or risk being tarred with whatever perception their counterparts hold of American soldiers. Consistently and explicitly describing yourself as an honest and reliable person will go far in accomplishing this.

Do your best to keep your word. Don't make promises unless they are easily and immediately kept. When you keep a promise, use it as an example of why you are a trustworthy partner. Being proactive in defining yourself will help preempt your counterpart's negative perceptions.

Use the recorder. The recorder may be the only other USF soldier present with you in the room, and, as such, may fill a variety of roles. On our patrols, the recorder took notes on the proceedings and maintained contact with the security element by monitoring the radio, allowing the platoon leadership to focus solely on the KLE. During large meetings, the recorder sometimes gauged specific individuals' reactions to particular topics. The recorder also kept the leader from going past the time allotted for the meeting by signaling when the KLE was 15 minutes, then five minutes, from completion.

In spite of the recorder's presence, the leader might also find it useful to make notes of his counterpart's requests, as it conveys the impression of attentiveness and concern.

Start with small talk. Even though Iraqi and Afghani cultural norms are well known among USF leaders, many Americans are still tempted to launch straight into "business" at the very start of a KLE. Start instead with open-ended questions or a conversation about a shared interest established at a previous meeting. As a junior leader, you will probably meet with your counterpart repeatedly. In most cases, securing an abrupt agreement to your desired outcome isn't worth setting your relationship back a few steps.

Avoid conflict and defuse tension. A certain degree of tension is probably unavoidable in the current operating environment, but for the most part, junior leaders will be the ones on the ground ensuring that small conflicts don't turn into larger ones. There are many ways to approach conflict, as there will be varying specifics in each situation. The junior leader's personal style will probably dictate which approach to use in each situation.

One tactic we had great success with was turning complaints from local nationals into compliments. For example, one Iraqi-police counterpart constantly complained that his police officers were underequipped and used this as an excuse to decrease the number of patrols in his AO. Our response to his complaints became, "We have a lot of respect for all the hardships that you and your policemen have overcome – it takes a lot of courage to do a policeman's job here in Iraq, and even more courage to do the job without advanced equipment." The police official appreciated the praise and ceased his complaints. In the following weeks and months, he began to brag about how much his police officers could accomplish despite their difficulties.

Snowball agreements. Small agreements lead to big ones. During the IPB process, you should make a list of relevant past discussions and agreements. Use past agreements, as well as your initial broad agreement on shared values, to slowly build toward your desired outcome and develop the impression that you and your counterpart already agree. (For example, "During our first meeting, we both agreed that creating new economic opportunities was a top priority for this area. Working together, we need to find a way to make this area more secure for businesses.")

Know when to call in the "big guns." To establish your authority as the only source of contact with USF and avoid muddling your command's message, you should be the only USF leader to engage with your local-national counterparts. However, there are several situations where a visit from a senior leader may be productive.

Junior leaders can use visits from your superiors (or, more ideally, from high-ranking local-national government and military officials) to reward your counterparts for their cooperation and success. During these meetings, praise the successes of your counterpart in such a way that down-

When your replacing unit arrives, personally introduce your successor to your key contacts as someone who is interested in continuing this strong relationship. Providing your replacement with the information you collected on each of your counterparts will also ensure that cultivating your relationship did not waste time. *(U.S. Army photo)* plays any role you may have played in his accomplishments. This is an especially useful tactic with military personnel, who will usually have a very good understanding of the implications of being in a senior leader's good graces.

Junior leaders can also use senior-leader visits to emphasize particularly important themes or to convince undecided individuals. In all cases, tactful preparation with the senior leader before the meeting is critical to ensure that he doesn't contradict an established agreement.

Win the end game. The meeting's end is one of the most critical times. Because of cultural barriers and the sometimes-mediocre abilities of interpreters provided to junior leaders, it's necessary to repeat the agreed-on outcome several times to ensure that everyone has actually agreed to what they think they have agreed to. Another effective method is to have the interpreter provide a written list to the opposite party in their own language that lists any agreements reached.

Post-meeting follow-up

Be proactive in the follow-up. Lack of follow-up can result in seeing your hard-won agreements put on your counterpart's back burner. If your agreement involved actions on your part, make sure that your counterpart knows you are holding up your end of the bargain, too. A cellphone call can ensure action on the agreement.

Conduct a post-meeting after-action review. Conducting an AAR after KLEs is just as important as it is with any other operation. Doing a quick AAR with your interpreter may help you identify any cultural missteps you committed and capture lessons-learned for next time.

As American forces continue to reduce their presence in Iraq and may soon begin the same process in Afghanistan, junior Armor leaders fill roles previously held by senior officers. In many cases, this will include the responsibility to conduct KLEs with local-national government, tribal and security-force leaders. At the same time, junior leaders will be responsible for engaging senior-level local-national officials. The importance of strong relationships and "soft power" influence with local leaders will exponentially increase as fewer American troops and resources stretch commanders' abilities to directly affect conditions on the ground.

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Acronym Quick-Scan

AAR – after-action review
AO – area of operation
IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISF – Iraqi Security Forces
KLE – key-leader engagement
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND – Operation New Dawn
TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures
USF – U.S. forces

Annotated bibliography for junior-leader reading

Curtis, Joe. "An Important Weapon in COIN Operations: The Key Leader's Engagement." ***Infantry*** magazine, July-August 2008. This article focuses on the experience of an infantry company conducting KLEs over the course of a year in Afghanistan. The author incorporates specific TTPs for conducting KLEs within the Pastun cultural context, with great step-by-step advice that can be applied to any operating environment.

Cummings, Michael. "Influencing the Population: Using Interpreters, Conducting KLEs and Executing IO in Afghanistan." ***Infantry*** magazine, May-August 2010. This is another article from ***Infantry*** about effective TTPs for KLEs in Afghanistan. However, this author provides solid, in-depth advice for junior leaders on best using their interpreters, which should be extremely useful for leaders in all combat theaters.

FM 3-05.401***, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures***, July 5, 2007. This FM lists a step-by-step approach in preparing for and executing KLEs. While it's focused on the specific operating requirements of the Civil Affairs Branch and tactics for mediating between two opposing parties, it still contains information useful to junior combat-arms leaders.

FM 3-24.2***, Tactics in Counterinsurgency***, April 21, 2009. Appendixes A through D of this FM contain a lot of great information for junior leaders, including the distilled wisdom of counterinsurgency experts David Kilcullen and T.E. Lawrence, as well as suggestions for more reading. In particular, Lawrence's "Twenty-Seven Articles" are still as useful as they were 100 years ago to small-unit leaders interacting with people in the Arab world.

Hammervik, Jenny L. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Key Leader Engagement." Swedish Defense Research Agency, September 2010. http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir3034.pdf. The terms of this research paper are too broad to provide specific advice to junior officers, but it's useful for the purpose of learning how one of our partners in Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces, approaches the issue.

Tressler, David M. "Negotiation in the New Strategic Context." The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2007. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/tressler-iraq-negot.pdf. This paper is an academic approach to explaining the science of negotiation and publishes recommendations for improving the Army's predeployment training in the KLE and negotiation process. It provides an academic foundation for junior leaders interested in improving their negotiating skills.

Preparing for the Unknown: Leadership Development for the Next War

by CPT Michael Kiser

How do we prepare our junior leaders and soldiers for the next war?

Army leaders at the company and battalion levels must begin to ask themselves this critical question as the final withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq quickly approaches. Because the next generation of lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers won't necessarily receive battlefield experience before they attain senior rank in the Army, the current generation of company and battalion commanders must institutionalize a professional-development experience to teach lieutenants and junior NCOs how to think critically and adapt rapidly to changing circumstances.

Several possible strategic scenarios exist for employing U.S. forces in the future. For example, a high-intensity conflict in Korea is one possibility. The Middle East riots and the United Nations' passage of a no-fly-zone resolution concerning Libya both present cases where American forces can use a low-intensity military intervention. Still other scenarios include sending U.S. forces to disaster-ridden areas in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles such as in the Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast or other fragile states.

Without a clear mission, how do we prepare our lieutenants and junior NCOs to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict?

'Small wars': lessons from history

The Cold War and the expectation of a high-intensity conflict on the plains of Western Europe overshadowed the answer, the seed of which leaders can find in the 1940 U.S. Marine Corps' ***Small Wars Manual***:

"Training for small wars missions is *carried on simultaneously with training for naval operations overseas and major warfare on land*. Training for naval overseas operations and major warfare on land is often applicable, in many of its phases, to small wars operations. Training that is associated particularly with small wars operations is of value in the execution of guerrilla operations on the fringes of the principal front in major warfare.

In small wars, the normal separation of units, both in garrison as well as in the field, requires development of all military qualities in the individual and in the unit. *Particular attention should be paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork and tactical proficiency of individuals composing the various units*. These qualities, while important in no small degree in major warfare, are exceedingly important in small wars operations."[1]

Historical evidence supports this conclusion. A platoon-sized Marine patrol under the command of MAJ Smedley Butler successfully defeated an attack by several hundred Haitian insurgents (known as cacos) in 1915. The Marine patrol trained in the fundamentals of patrolling and marksmanship. Although the bulk of its combat power was a single machine gun, the patrol easily overwhelmed the cacos. The cacos negated their numerical advantage with an inability to properly mass fires, poor marksmanship skills and lack of coordinated fire and maneuver.[2]

Importantly, MAJ Butler's patrol experience was common among officers during the multiple American interventions between the Civil War and World War II. At the Battle of Parral, during the Punitive Expedition into México, MAJ Frank Tompkins commanded a series of running engagements with two troops of the 13th Cavalry Regiment. About 100 cavalry troopers defeated a force of 500-600 Mexican irregulars.[3] In the Philippines, Frederick Funston successfully evaded enemy patrols during a raid deep into guerrilla-controlled territory. Funston captured rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo and returned him to Manila, resulting in the surrender of more than 4,000 insurgents.[4]

The major American setbacks during the same period occurred when commanding officers violated well-known tactical fundamentals. For example, at the Battle of Balangiga, insurgents armed with machete-like bolos almost destroyed an entire company of the 9th Infantry Regiment after a series of security and organizational failures.[5]

Focused leader development

Moving forward, the need for a focused leadership-development program is clear. Preparing our lieutenants and junior NCOs for the next war first requires company and battalion commanders to focus training on developing lieutenants and junior NCOs as leaders capable of making tactically and morally correct decisions while operating in decentralized environments. Second, training should focus on generating and maintaining a high level of individual and small-unit tactical proficiency. Focusing on these lines of effort during training exercises will pay dividends for units when it is time to deploy.

Theory-of-war through doctrinal instruction should ground lieutenants and sergeants, while practical exercises (i.e., terrain walks, tactical exercises without troops, field exercises) season them. The knowledge taught in one session should link to subsequent sessions, and adjusted mission variables should force leaders to recognize the differences between situations and apply their knowledge accordingly. Leadership development among lieutenants and junior NCOs should "enhance the officer's ability to make rational choices in complex situations; [solve] problems of tactics and strategy, logistics and technology, [and] command and control."[6]

In line with Scharnhorst's *Bildungprinzip*, professional-development programs should combine theoretical instruction with practical exercises. Programs should also include a healthy dose of history, culture, political and socioeconomic instruction, encouraging junior leaders to "understand the political and cultural complexities that will affect their activities," thus helping achieve national goals by nesting their tactical plans inside the strategic concept.[7]

Deliberately placing junior leaders outside their comfort zones is a good way to achieve this effect. For example, allow an infantry-platoon leader to plan a formal dining in/out for the battalion, or task the S-2 or S-4 to plan and execute platoon attacks during training. Presenting junior NCOs with a different set of challenges can also achieve this effect. Assigning junior NCOs to fill roles on the company intelligence-support team or act as supply sergeant during a training exercise can accomplish this goal.

Reinforcing lessons-learned

With the imminent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, most likely, Afghanistan in the next three years, it's crucial we remember lessons-learned about low-intensity conflict during those wars. Weeding out the mentality prevalent among junior NCOs that what worked on the last deployment will work again in the future is also important. A leadership-development program should balance historical vignettes and possible future scenarios. Junior leaders can attempt to solve problems while seeing a historical solution.

What host-nation leaders consider morally or culturally acceptable is often radically different from the American moral and cultural standard, so balanced leadership-development programs should also provide situations that require making morally ambiguous decisions that stress the leader's ability to balance his personal ethics with mission needs. Leaders need training that emphasizes the difference between situations requiring acceptance of the host nation's ways and situations that demand action to rectify the situation.

John Nagl defined the work of a military professional as "the repetitive exercise of discretionary judgment."[8] Discretionary judgment is not only required on the battlefield, but it's also required during key-leader engagements. Leaders not only make decisions about which civil projects to pursue, but they also know when promises made to local civil and military leaders are safe, or when promises risk compromising the long-term situation.

Basic tactical proficiency

Developing tactical proficiency is also important. Individual movement techniques and basic rifle marksmanship remain the two biggest blocks for individual tactical proficiency. Fire must be accurate to suppress the enemy and allow friendly forces to maneuver. Rifle-marksmanship training should allow units to place accurate, sustained fires at ranges of up to 500 meters. (Sustained rifle fire stopped German troops in World War I multiple times, including at the Battle of Belleau Woods.) However, a large volume of fire isn't enough to achieve effects when fighting at long ranges. Once soldiers develop individual movement techniques and marksmanship skills, leaders can combine them in mounted and dismounted battle drills.

Armor and infantry leaders should conduct dismounted and mounted drills skillfully. Platoons mounted in humvees and mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles during low-intensity conflicts can use the same formations tanks employ during high-intensity conflict. The same direct-fire control measures apply regardless of the level of intensity. In addition, tactical surprise and concentration at the decisive point should remain the same.

The Marines realized in the early 20th Century that we don't need to train our soldiers and leaders for multiple kinds of war. We need to teach them tactical techniques and critical-thinking skills scaled to the level of conflict. Rehearsing scenarios containing unexpected contact before the platoon reaches the objective, on the objective and after the objective is critical.

It's also important to instill the mindset that battle drills are a start point, not a solution. Leaders need to adapt battle drills to the present circumstances rather than executing them by rote and becoming predictable in their tactical approaches.

All the focus areas in this article's sidebar (see Page 16) can be trained with little equipment requirements outside of the company's normal modified table of organization and equipment and, more importantly, can be trained during those "hurry up and wait" periods when the unit is accomplishing other taskings.

Doctrinal flexibility

The answer to how we should prepare our leaders is simple. Training plans allow leaders to develop tools to be successful under

Training plans for tactical proficiency

Effective company-training plans focus on the following subjects:

- Composition, armament and equipment of patrols;
- Formations and tactics of dismounted patrols;
- Formations and tactics of mounted patrols;
- Casualty evacuation;
- Battle drills;
- Security on the march;
- Security during short halts and in patrol bases;
- Night operations for defense and offense;
- Employment of weapons;
- Logistical operations;
- Ambushes;
- Attacking a building;
- Tactical movement in an urban environment;
- Riot duty;
- Offensive and defensive operations;
- Scouting and patrolling, to include tracking;
- Basic and advanced rifle marksmanship;
- Map and imagery reading;
- Air-ground integration;
- Training as forward observers;
- Laws of land warfare, escalation of force and (if a known deployment is pending) country-specific rules of engagement; and
- Functional physical fitness and conditioning.

(List adapted from 1940 training plan in the Marine Corps' ***Small Wars Manual***.)

many circumstances. For example, forward-operating-base security and assembly-area security are forms of a perimeter defense. Both use the same principles in their implementation. Cordon-and-search is a form of a deliberate attack. In other words, many tools exist in current doctrine that suffer misuse or neglect because adapting them for use beyond their original purpose never occurred. Adapting doesn't mean creating new doctrine when new circumstances emerge unless something in the changes fundamentally invalidates existing doctrine. Rather, apply existing doctrine in new ways to meet the situation's unique challenges.

By developing a strong baseline in the fundamentals, company and battalion commanders enable subordinate leaders to focus on 1) identifying the unique variables of their new mission, 2) compensating for the variables and 3) ensuring mission success. Just as important, this approach is technologically independent; as technology levels increase, the fundamentals of war don't change. Instead, leaders have to adapt how to implement those fundamentals. Such technological improvements occurred during the Napoleonic era, Industrial Revolution and post-Industrial Revolution, and will no doubt occur in the future. Technology enables leaders to achieve mission success, but it isn't a substitute for tactical proficiency.

Company and battalion commanders need to teach lieutenants and junior sergeants how to be leaders and how to think critically. Develop tactical proficiency from the individual level to the platoon level. There is no substitute for educated, competent leaders – leaders who can make rapid and rational decisions in the face of changing circumstances – and small units capable of applying the fundamental principles of tactical-level warfare in an array of environments. Our company and battalion commanders need to train the fundamental building blocks of tactical proficiency and give junior leaders the skills necessary to develop a solid operational plan for new circumstances.

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Notes

[1]***Small Wars Manual***. Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific (U.S. Marine Corps), 1940; republished 2005. Author's italics.

[2]Boot, Max. ***The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power***. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]White, Charles Edward. ***The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarishe Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805***. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1989.

[7]Nagl, John A. et al. ***Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps***. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

[8]Ibid.

Longer Deployments: Supporting Army Operations in an Age of Persistent Struggle

by CPT Ken Quail

The answer to criticism about the military's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan isn't to reduce troop strength but to increase the time soldiers spend in theater.

The popular media and military and political leaders continue to measure the military's performance in the global war on terror, specifically in Iraq but increasingly in Afghanistan. Some even claim that U.S. performance has not been successful and the time to withdraw troops has passed.[1] One problem is the GWOT's expense. So far, executing the GWOT is far more costly and complicated than initially predicted.

The solution to this problem isn't to reduce troop strength but to increase the time soldiers spend in theater. The Army currently uses time-based troop rotations (six to 12 months, with some units reaching 15 months during the "surge"). The military needs to commit to longer deployments, harnessing the benefits accrued only through long-term immersion in these regions.

Longer deployments provide the military with the following advantages:

- Increased expertise, or "institutional knowledge," in a specific area of operations;
- Increased efficiency in the allocation of resources to units as well as skill training to soldiers; and
- Increased stability in the civilian communities in which U.S. forces are operating.

Current rotational deployments, based on time, remove troops from the fight when they gain the necessary familiarity, cultural skills and intimate knowledge of both the population and the enemy to fight the "long war" against insurgents effectively. Despite the obvious challenges of treating post-traumatic stress disorder, lessening the turbulence of deployments to military families and administering an all-volunteer force, military leaders must implement longer deployments to increase expertise, efficiency and stability.[2]

Expertise

Multiple tours to different locations create generalists, not specialists.[3] Eliminating temporary deployments in an AO can develop professionals with the ability to conduct successful counterinsurgency or stability operations. The military can then tailor courses of instruction to troops based on their particular AO. Distributing general skills useful in multiple AOs across the force, as the Army currently does, dilutes the skills necessary for separate operations.

For example, the Army stations soldiers in diverse locations, including Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Horn of Afri-

ca or even in a friendly host like Germany or Korea. Language training for every soldier for every region isn't feasible in terms of time or resources. Conversely, a brigade combat team assigned to Iraq with specific requirements for a handover of responsibility to the local government could receive language, cultural and tactical instruction tailored specifically to their mission. More troop training in stateside training battalions can occur with the language skills necessary for that area. Every task, from training local police forces to building roads, becomes easier with a working knowledge of the local language and customs.

Elementary language and social skills will enable soldiers to build inroads with the local people and demonstrate U.S. forces' commitment to remain in the region for an extended time.[4] This will counteract the entrenched Taliban fighters' repetitive message that the United States will eventually abandon its Afghan partners, which currently stymies operations in Afghanistan.[5] The ability of soldiers to communicate, understand and live among the population allows them to form bonds at the lowest level, thus signaling U.S. intentions to the population in a way that top-down press releases can't. These bonds with local partners and civilians further separate insurgents from the population. This gives U.S. units a soft power that prevents more violence than any other force multiplier.

Critics may argue that PTSD will eventually overtake the gains of longer deployments. Prima facie evidence suggests that rotating troops lessens the burden on the individual soldier. However, it actually creates greater friction by repeatedly causing them to bounce between the stability of home life in the United States and the harrowing experience of life in a combat zone, testing the soldier's mental resilience in myriad ways.

A soldier's time away from combat is undoubtedly therapeutic and necessary. However, each new deployment brings a new mission-set with an unfamiliar unit in a new AO. The soldier faces repeated shocks to his psychological system. The effect of shorter deployments leads to many periods of great stress. Since every deployment is unknown, a soldier's third or fourth deployment is the psychological equivalent of the third or fourth iteration of a "first deployment." In contrast, longer, more predictable deployments to the same AO distribute the psychological stress over time, create more certainty and allow better adjustment.[6]

COIN or stability-focused deployments do not experience nonstop, high-intensity combat. Troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan for stability operations do not face daily operations like the Normandy invasion or the Battle of the Somme. Firsthand knowledge of and experience in a familiar AO empowers and supports troops, decreasing the likelihood of negative psychological consequences.

Efficiency

Longer deployments allow soldiers to be efficient in two ways. First, this proposal affords a proper allocation of resources by focusing material and training in a very specific problem set. An intimate knowledge of the physical and human geography allows commanders to reduce the footprint of installations, thereby providing a smaller target to the enemy. It also tailors forces in theater based on a better understanding of known threats gained by firsthand experience there.

Equipping a force for operations in Afghanistan is very different, both geographically and demographically, from equipping a force for operation in Iraq or the Horn of Africa.[7] Assigning a specific unit to a specific AO for a protracted time can eliminate redundancy. Consequently, planners can refocus resources into better equipping, preparing and sustaining units already deployed. The improved warfighting skills stemming from specifically tailored equipment in turn lead to less reliance on technology, thus driving the cost of stability and security operations down even further.[8]

Longer tours allow soldiers to gain the trust of the local population, which is necessary in stability and security operations. A finite tour encourages soldiers and leaders to maximize the time devoted to hunting down insurgents. By removing the limitation of a calendar-based deployment cycle, there's an incentive for troops to embed in local communities.[9] Leaders can thereby shape the message that the United States is an honest broker. Constant interaction with the community will accomplish this goal.

Visiting schools, taking part in local celebrations and becoming an asset to the community are shaping operations that make stability operations successful. Familiarity with local political, religious and military leaders is just as important as knowing the physical terrain. Acceptance into the community generates intelligence and facilitates knowledge of the social landscape that may be even more important than knowledge of the physical landscape.

Once U.S. forces dispel the community's perception of them being "commuters," they'll prove their usefulness to it; this intelligence also leads to increased force protection. The U.S. Army learned this lesson during the Philippines occupation:

> Particularly important were the small garrisons. Their ability to eliminate local resistance pacified regions and kept them peaceful. … [L]argely isolated from higher-echelon control, [they] lived and worked in communities. They tracked and eliminated insurgents, built rapport with the populace, gathered intelligence and implemented civil works. The process was slow, but once an area was pacified, it was effectively denied to the insurgency.[10]

In any region in which U.S. forces work and fight alongside local nationals, personal relationships are of paramount importance and have a didactic purpose. First, as stated above, they reaffirm U.S. long-term commitment to the people of that nation. Second, longer deployments allow enough time for military personnel to develop personal relationships within the community. The second-order effects of developing personal relationships are gaining more accurate intelligence and increasing force protection, both of which are necessary for mission accomplishment.

The U.S. Marine Corps employed this strategy with the Combined Action Program in Vietnam. Squads of "CAP Marines" lived in villages with Vietnamese National Defense Forces. Marines ate the same food, used the same equipment and went on the same patrols as the NDF. CAP Marines went on daily patrols in squad-sized elements of one to three Marines and the rest of the squad composed of NDF.

They weren't afraid to move among the civilian population as two-man groups, shopping at local markets, attending local ceremonies and making friends within the population. While Viet Cong insurgents controlled the countryside elsewhere and kept conventional U.S. forces hostage in their own firebases, CAP Marines enjoyed remarkable success, rivaling Army forces in the Philippines. Clearly, a large part of winning the hearts and minds of a population was simply day-to-day physical presence among them.[11]

American soldiers develop a "street sense" when dealing with the same people and places over a period. Knowing the civilian landscape allows leaders to know which local officials, police and army they can trust and when they can decrease their own force protection based on the tactical reality. Soldiers and leaders know when a two-man patrol with local forces is enough or when they need to travel more heavily armed, based on threat analysis. Two or three U.S. soldiers traveling with three or four Iraqi police through a crowded market is a powerful message to the citizens and police that U.S. forces will share the risk. It's also a powerful

American soldiers develop a "street sense" when dealing with the same people and places over a period. Knowing the civilian landscape allows leaders to know which local officials, police and army they can trust. *(U.S. Army photo)*

message to insurgent forces that the U.S. Army isn't afraid.

This physical presence must not only be complete but enduring. Longer deployments mitigate the inefficiency and danger inherent in frequent "battle handovers" or "reliefs-in-place." The point at which a unit turns over responsibility of its AO to another unit is the most vulnerable time for friendly forces. Insurgent groups look to repeatedly exploit this opportunity because the incoming unit doesn't have the intimate understanding of the region the outgoing unit had developed. During the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, historian Brian McAllister Linn said, "For the civil government to work, officers had to maintain close personal relations with the municipal officials."[12]

An outgoing unit can't sign over experience or personal relationships as it would vehicles or an installation. Effective stability operations require trust, which develops over time. Insurgents seek to exploit this weakness and divide U.S. forces from the population. In current operations, this chance occurs with clockwork precision. The hand-off often undoes the good work done by the outgoing unit and forces the incoming unit to repeat the work already completed, rather than building on prior success.[13]

Stability

The U.S. military must extend the length of troop deployments to stabilize our forces. Stabilizing personnel within units is an enduring theme in military reform – the U.S. government has attempted stabilization 10 times since 1899.[14] Stabilizing forces within a unit contributes to the unit's effectiveness on warfare's tactical level, while stabilizing units within a location creates stability on warfare's operational and strategic levels.[15]

Leaders are currently looking rebuild a "bench" of units, ready for commitment to warfare but not earmarked for commitment – thus the unit is able to focus on the full spectrum of combat tasks it's likely to confront. However, creating a predictable deployment schedule is only half the prerequisite to creating a more effective unit. The time that "strategic depth" gives to a unit that's not constantly re-equipping to get back in the fight (a problem seen in the year-on/year-off approach of the last decade) gives it more preparation for a certain AO.

MAJ Donald Vandergrift points out in ***Path to Victory*** that personnel turnover degrades combat readiness. Cohesion developed when individuals and units train together for long periods allows superiors to understand the capabilities of subordinates and mitigate their shortcomings. It also develops a sense of kinship between soldiers that increases the overall effectiveness of the unit.

The British experience at colonial administration in India and Asia, and the American department-and-district system in the Indian Wars and the Philippines, suggest that it's just as important to tie soldiers to one another as to bind a military force to a specific AO. Similarly, high unit turnover in a specific location creates on a large scale the turbulence that personnel turnover creates within tactical units.

For example, the British colonial system of the 18th and 19th Centuries created the need for a constabulary military force to support regional stability.[16] By tying the training battalions at home to specific overseas battalions, the British were able to create and maintain institutional knowledge about a region such as India or Malaya. By stabilizing units, not just individuals, the British were able to create units that understood the physical and human geography of their AOs as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their fellow soldiers.[17] The results led a contemporary military critic to declare, "The real Army is in India."[18]

The British were not alone at developing specialized forces capable of colonial administration.[19] For more than a century before World War II, the American army focused on pacifying Native American tribes in the continent's interior. Small garrisons lined the frontier and acted autonomously in an attempt to set the conditions for regional stability.

The U.S. Army then took these techniques – pacification of the rebellious Southern states during Reconstruction – overseas in the wake of the Spanish-American War. According to Linn, "The key to pacification was learning the identities and securing the weapons of those who continued armed resistance, and this could not be done without troops living among the population for some time."[20]

While one understands intrinsically and from data sets that unit stabilization works, the inference that rotating stabilized units into AOs also works is erroneous. The unit itself gains increased proficiency at tactical collective tasks, but deploying to a different location causes the unit to lose proficiency operationally in relation to the region in which it is operating. In a COIN, it's not enough to know the capabilities and personality of one's own unit; one needs to know the capabilities and personality of local fighters, too. In essence, the current force rotation model gives an advantage to the enemy.

The largest obstacle critics may cite to prolonging deployments is that recruiting and retention of an all-volunteer force under these conditions would be impossible. However, nine years into the struggle, new soldiers still enlist in large numbers.[21] The number of newest enlistees – many of whom were eight years old Sept. 11, 2001 – suggests a society that is coming to terms with the "Long War." Many young Americans are still eager to serve their country and will do so under the long-term-deployment system.

For a nation no longer willing to deploy units the way it did in the Philippines, the world wars or Korea, a compromise may already exist. The model set by the last two forward-deployed duty stations, Germany and Korea, may point the way to mitigating the turbulence of rotational deployments. In both these stations, junior soldiers rotate out in a one- to three-year window while senior noncommissioned officers and officers tend to stay for several years.

The turnover is slower and provides continuity on the ground for the people who need it most. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and company commanders can maintain the institutional knowledge and local relationships that a winning COIN strategy requires. Concurrently, the junior soldiers, who have limited interaction with the local population, often serve as security while senior leaders are working out operational details with their host-nation counterparts.

There would have to be adjustment to the current system, to include longer morale leave for junior soldiers and increased incentive pay for service members who volunteer for these assignments. Each of the major Army component commands would have to make changes as well.

For example, U.S. Forces Command would have to decide which BCTs are assigned to Iraq, which are assigned to Afghanistan and which are to hedge against the future by focusing on high-intensity conflict with less specialized training in area-specific operations.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would have to develop at least three approaches to training: one for Iraq, one for Afghanistan and one for the contingency force. Training battalions stateside that are manned by soldiers, NCOs and officers from that forward-deployed BCT's parent division can incorporate much of this training. TRADOC schools can also serve to cross-pollinate ideas throughout the force by allowing soldiers, NCOs and officers to see how their counterparts operate.

U.S. Army Human Resources Command would have to revamp the criteria for evaluating recruits in a subjective way, to evaluate where to assign them essentially for the rest of their military careers.

All these issues are politically charged as commanders vie to lead a unit in combat, but independent preferences must be subjected to the efficacy of the force and the well-being of individual soldiers.

The suggestion of measuring tours of duty in terms of years or goals rather than months isn't likely to be a popular one. However, as shown by U.S. and British examples, it does have a historical precedent. Critics cite increased mental trauma and the effects long tours will have on military families as reasons to shorten tours rather than lengthen them, but policymakers must decide the purpose of the U.S. armed forces.[22] If the armed forces are an instrument of national will, then they must be capable of carrying out that will.

Policymakers are recklessly risking American lives if they are unwilling to do what is necessary to succeed in stability and security operations while deliberately preventing the military from achieving real marks of success. If a military force deploys at all, it must be to win – and history shows "winning" means staying until the job is complete.

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Notes

[1]McGovern, Sen. George, and Polk, William R. ***Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now***. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

[2]For the purposes of this article, "rotational" deployments are those with a set timeline of six to 15 months, while by contrast a "long-term" deployment is goal-oriented, with a unit committed toward an objective; a long-term deployment could be measured in multiple years.

[3]The current system is based on an egalitarian concept that the burden of combat or stability operations should be distributed evenly, but this notion is wrong on two counts. First, these operations aren't spread evenly over the American population, only over the armed forces, a small segment of the population. Within the armed forces, a small segment of the force also shoulders the burden of COIN operations.

[4]Training can also be extended to courses of study on religion and regional history, creating subject-matter experts at all echelons of the military. For more on types of training needed on the 21st Century battlefield, refer to MAJ Donald Vandergriff in ***Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War***, Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information Press, 2006.

[5]COL Thomas Lynch, federal executive fellow, the Brookings Institute, interview by author Dec. 17, 2007. COL Lynch cites repeated print and video broadcasts of the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam as one example of the message to potential allies that the U.S. doesn't honor its commitments.

[6]Critics who cite PTSD as a reason for not increasing operational tours often refer to the levels of PTSD in U.S. veterans of World War II. This is an erroneous comparison because World War II was a high-intensity set-piece battle and exactly the opposite of the Operation Iraqi Freedom / Operation Enduring Freedom conflicts this article addresses.

[7]Kaplan, Robert D. ***The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War***. New York: Vintage, 2001.

[8]Although I address the issue of recruiting and retention above, it's also worth noting that eliminating the cost of shuttling troops into and out of theater will create a cash surplus that can then be used to increase pay and benefits. This will drive both recruiting and retention.

[9]Weinberger, Sharon. "When Anthropologists Go to War," ***WIRED Magazine On-line***, July 16, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/07/when-anthropolo.html, accessed Dec. 15, 2007, Page 1.

[10]Deady, Thomas K. "Lessons from a successful counter-insurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902," ***Parameters***, Spring 2005.

[11]Goodson, Barry L. ***CAP Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969***. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1997.

[12]Linn, Brian McAllister. ***The Philippine War: 1899-1902***. Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2000. Page 201.

[13]Robson, Seth. "As 2nd ID's Casualty Toll Rises, Troops in S. Korea Fear for Friends' Safety," ***Stars and Stripes*** Pacific Edition, Nov. 22, 2004. Section A. Pan, Esther. "Iraq: U.S. Troop Rotation," Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 10, 2004, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7673/iraq.html.

[14]Vandergriff, Donald E. ***The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs***. New York: Presidio Press, 2002.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Barua, Pradeep P. ***Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Officer Corp, 1817-1949***. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. The Cardwell System, named for Edward Cardwell, secretary of state for war, required soldiers to enlist for 12 years. A soldier served the first six of these years overseas in a colonial possession, at which point he could either serve the rest of his term there or return home to man a training battalion dedicated to training replacements for the colony in which he had served.

[17]For more on how length of service in a specific unit strengthens both the unit and the individual, refer to the German system in Bruce I. Gudmundsson's ***Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the Germany Army, 1914-1918***, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989.

[18]Barua.

[19]According to both John Nagl and Linn, it wasn't until well into the 20th Century that the U.S. military defined its mission in terms of conventional set-piece battles.

[20]Linn, Pages 199-200.

[21]Lopez, C. Todd, "Army Meeting 2008 Recruiting Goals," Army News Service, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/01/31/7221-army-meeting-2008-recruiting-goals/, accessed Feb. 16, 2008.

[22]MAJ Vandergriff interview with the author.

Acronym Quick-Scan

AO – area of operations
BCT – brigade combat team
CAP – Combined Action Program
COIN – counterinsurgency
GWOT – global war on terror
NCO – noncommissioned officer
NDF – National Defense Forces
PTSD – post-traumatic stress disorder
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command

A Guide to Effective Messaging

by COL Thomas M. Williams

Messaging is about managing perception, not facts. Facts are elusive things. Every event has multiple witnesses, each bringing their own points of view – their biases – to the retelling. How you shape the environment with *your* retelling will go a long way toward anchoring the right version in people's memories.

Messaging per doctrine

Almost unnoticed in the new Field Manual 5-0, ***The Operations Process***, is a section called "Develop Initial Information Themes and Messages." Found in Appendix B, "The Military Decision-Making Process" (under "Mission Analysis"), its three paragraphs ask commanders to consider how they will convey the "dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose of their military action."[1] The need for communication savvy showed up again last October in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-3, ***The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command***. It says that Army forces will require the "capability to engage in and communicate via multiple means – everything from social media to face-to-face encounters to influence perceptions, attitudes, sentiments and behavior of key actors and publics critical to mission success."[2]

Yet neither publication gives you much to go by, apart from FM 5-0 telling you to get with the G-7/S-7 to review "higher headquarters' products or their own work created during design."[3] This perfunctory treatment invites confusion and risks mission failure.

To illustrate, consider how any town or village would perceive a traffic-control point or a cordon-and-search. They're inconvenient, disruptive and easily interpreted as harassment. You can bet that's what area insurgents will be saying, and if the people perceive that you and your mission are the problem, your TCP or cordon-and-search will not achieve its objective. To challenge this perception and prevent misunderstanding, you need to share why you're there and what you're hoping to achieve, which in this case is to enforce host-nation laws and protect – not harass – the people.

This article offers a practical model for tactical commanders to meet the intent behind the 300 words in FM 5-0 and to avoid falling into avoidable traps. It has six steps:

- Understand the environment;
- Understand the audience;
- Know your goals;
- Write your messages;
- Determine how you'll deliver your messages; and
- Develop ways to collect feedback so you know what you are doing is working.

Using a matrix (Figure 1) is a good way to capture the results of each step and ensure the parts connect and make sense.

Step 1: understand the environment

Developing a communication plan is not very different from following the operations process – you need to make sure you're solving the right tactical problem before you start sending rounds downrange. In many cases, communication fails because the communicator jumped into message writing too soon, "assuming away" anything that didn't conform to a preconceived agenda.

As described in FM 5-0, Step 1 should be redundant to the work completed during design (FM 5-0, Chapter 3). At minimum, know who the relevant actors are and how they relate to each

Environment	Audience(s)	Goals	Messages	Delivery	MOP/MOE
Insights from design Competing messages? Steady state or crisis?	Primary Composition Age Sex Education Socio-economic status Disposition Informed Hostile Uninformed Neutral or favorable Vacillating Secondary Composition Disposition	Primary Inform Persuade Support Secondary Inform Persuade Support	Simple declarative sentences to inform, persuade or influence toward the goal(s)	Face-to-face: can include meetings, working groups or conferences Telephone calls or telephone conference calls Emails Print: newspapers, newsletters, letters, posters, flyers, ads Broadcast media Text or instant messages Social networks	MOP: Send enough letters, flyers, etc. to cover the populace MOP: Those flyers made it into homes and didn't litter the streets MOE: People acted as intended

Figure 1. A matrix like this one is a good way to capture the results of each step and ensure they connect and make sense.

other. As with design, you can use the operational variables to frame this discussion, considering the political, social, cultural or economic factors as a prism to filter and recolor your ideas. If what you are doing relates to an opposing military force, know what roles its leadership, culture, training, doctrine and equipment play in this equation.

Consider next what information is already out there and how it's shaping the conversation. Often when working in communication, you are fighting existing perceptions previously anchored into a community's consciousness. Eventually the discussion will lead to a complete picture, and your staff will have a richer understanding of the size and scope of the communication landscape. Be wary of groupthink. Don't deceive yourself into thinking the environment is benign because you want it to be.

Step 2: dissect the audience

As you make sense of the operational environment, you will realize there is no such thing as "the" audience. The composition of the people in your communication landscape will be of mixed age, sex, education level or socio-economic status. It may sound like a flash of the obvious, but this complexity matters. Each segment of the population will hear what you say differently, and interpret what you say according to their own particular point of view, assumptions about your motive, self-interests and biases or their understanding of the facts in question.

To illustrate, mentally compare yourself (as a military leader) to an average professor at a small liberal-arts college in New England and realize how different your points of view might be from one another. And if you accepted my sweeping generalization about average professors, perhaps there's some bias in the reader as well.

Disposition is equally important. Think through – and be realistic – about whether your intended audience appears to be friendly, neutral or hostile. Assess whether you believe the people you are trying to reach are well informed or largely ignorant of who and what you are, and what you are doing. Don't confuse disagreement over facts with ignorance. They are not the same. Imagine Republicans and Democrats responding to the same set of "facts."

Since we are fighting in Afghanistan and operating in roughly 100 other countries around the world, there is also the question of culture. There's no easy answer (certainly not within the scope of this primer), as even within some countries we must contend with dozens of dialects and norms. Your best bet is to consult the TRADOC Cultural Center in Sierra Vista, AZ, for one of their excellent Smart Books. Also consult your own experience – you probably know the litany of potential obstacles, including concepts of time, traditional roles, a fondness for the indirect and views on power and authority.

Finally, pick a primary and secondary audience. The primary audience is the precise group of people you're trying to persuade or influence. The secondary audience consists of the people who can most influence these decision-makers. You're not abandoning everyone else, but you should treat them as tertiary. In other words, you don't have to write messages that account for everyone and every opinion.

Step 3: decipher goals

The goal is an articulation of the result you seek.[4] It's what you want your audience to do. This sounds simple enough but bears careful scrutiny anyway. Keep an open mind and reflect on your understanding of the environment and audience. You may need to persuade people or allay their fears before you can impart information.

Your first instinct may be to provide the "bottom line up front" – to spell out the facts and let them speak for themselves. It's what the Army trains you to do. However, if your audience looks at the same set of "facts" with disdain, you are wasting your time or perhaps making the situation worse as they attack *your* ignorance. Check your first instincts and set your goal(s) only *after* you complete your understanding.

If your goal is to instill calm, know that words may be insufficient. Mayor Rudy Giuliani's *presence* on Sept. 11, 2001, comes to mind.

Step 4: craft messages and themes

Message writing is simple and has one basic rule: your messages must align with the goals you established in Step 3; they should plainly state what you want your audience to do. Beyond this rule, there are four best practices to consider:

- Write simple, declarative, short sentences;
- Write in plain English – no acronyms or jargon;
- Fewer = better; and
- Make sure you are writing for your audiences' demographic, not your own.

The last bullet means that when aging Generation X leaders write messages intended for a young Millennial audience which "sound about right," they may be very wrong. Get someone – preferably from the targeted demographic – to "red team" messages for you. In fact, it is a good idea to have people review and red team every proposed message for accuracy, clarity and precision.

The arrangement of your messages is as important as the messages themselves. Look at what you listed for disposition in Column 2 of the matrix. If, for example, you have a hostile audience where emotions are running high due to rumors and fear, they will likely stop listening the moment you begin reciting "facts." To them, "answers" are not simply facts; they want reassurance, or perhaps someone to blame. Better to address the emotions up front and answer their fears before you cover the facts.

It's the reverse for people who are predisposed to like your ideas. If you cover what they already believe, you'll bore them and they will tune you out. Here it's safe and right to give them the conclusion up front.

After segmenting and assessing the community, you may recognize different needs for each audience. This is not to say we are planning to mix messages, but if you are working to persuade the primary audience toward an action and there is a group able to influence that decision (positively or negatively), you may wish to develop some tailored messages as a shaping operation.

Watch teenagers – they are masters at this. They know how each of their parents will react and will appeal to each individually for support of their plans. When a young student wants to go out to a late-night pregame bonfire, she might tell one parent she will be home by 11 p.m. and note that adults will be at the rally. For the other parent, it's simply about getting involved in the community and supporting the cause. Same goal, two audiences, targeted messaging.

Themes are a grouping of like messages that explain the big picture – the "why" of your goals. Unlike messages, they don't relate to a specific goal or ask for any action.

Example theme: "U.S. forces respect all citizens of the country and will behave like guests, but their convoy security has to remain strong because of continued 'al-Qaeda in Iraq' activity."

Sample related messages to your primary audience, the community – these relate to a goal and ask for action:

1. Please cooperate by staying clear of vehicles in convoy.
2. Cooperate at all TCPs or with all security-force instructions.

Sample messages to your secondary audience, U.S. forces:

1. Do not toss litter out of your vehicles, it is not respectful.

Step 5: select the proper medium or multiple media

Once you develop themes and messages, you must select the most efficient and effective medium (means) for delivery. Always remember that in messaging, what people understand is far more important than what you say. If you get the delivery vehicle wrong, nothing else matters.

As expressed in TRADOC PAM 525-3-3, the most common forms of media are:

- Face-to-face (which can include meetings, working groups or conferences);
- Telephone calls or telephone conference calls;
- Emails;
- Print (newspapers, newsletters, letters, posters, flyers, advertisements);
- Broadcast media;
- Text or instant messages; and
- Social networks.

Always keep the operational environment and intended audience in mind as you select your media, but to determine the most effective and efficient means for delivery, you will use three criteria: urgency, formality and complexity.[5]

Urgency is just as it sounds. If it's urgent, use a fast medium like texting, phone calls or social networks, not letters or flyers.

Formality speaks to the issue of appropriateness and dignity. It may be urgent, but sending a text to a senior government official may not be proper protocol. Neither is it the right media to deliver certain kinds of news – we all recognize that social networks are not proper for announcing casualties, for example.

Complexity follows much of the same logic as formality. There are certain concepts for which you need a long letter or report to explain the breadth and depth of the issue. As BG H.R. McMaster famously said in a ***New York Times*** interview last April, "Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable."[6]

The last form of media is the most common, yet least considered, form of communication. It is you and your unit. One untimely action can undo all the good intentions of a message. As in Step 4's example, if you're going to develop themes and messages that talk about respect for the populace, and your soldiers show nothing but contempt, you are mixing messages. The axiom "actions speak louder than words" is true, so when you add messages to your coordinating instructions, make sure you emphasize this point.

Step 6: develop ways to collect feedback

Lastly, and as with any plan, you will need some measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to gauge whether your plan is working and if your messages are resonating properly where intended. You want to verify that you've changed perceptions or behaviors. There are dozens of resources for you to use when considering MOP and MOE, so there's no need to go into any detail here except to offer a few cautions.

A word about working with news media

Although journalists are not part of the audience – they are media – it would be irresponsible to treat them as simple messengers. With mission command comes the expectation that Army leaders at all levels will be able to influence perceptions, and that includes working with reporters. Don't try to avoid journalists or prevent your soldiers from talking to them. Avoidance only adds to mutual suspicion.

The golden rule for dealing with reporters is to treat them as professionals and individuals, not stereotypes (the same as you would like them to treat you!), and realize that most reporters are sincere in wanting to tell a story accurately and completely. However, they're looking to keep readers interested and are always alert for new angles.

The messages you are creating for publication in the operations order are there because when you and your soldiers talk to reporters, improv is not a good strategy. Following are some best practices to train on before going outside the wire.

If you have time, **put yourself in the reporter's shoes and think about what he or she might want to hear from you.** In other words, anticipate their questions. Hint: assume the reporter already knows as much as you – that they already know the answer. They just want the words to come from you.

Develop a short sound bite from your messages. Sound bites are useful when the reporter asks a leading question designed to get you to ramble (such as, "tell me what is happening here?"). They also work when you don't want to answer a pointed question. Watch the Sunday talk shows; guests don't answer the questions they don't like. They use a talking point instead. Stick to your script, not the reporter's – they can only run what you say. Remember, you are talking to an audience through the reporter!

Don't repeat negative phrases, and don't get defensive. Focus on your talking points and key messages, not on the word the reporter uses to characterize the event (such as "misstep" or "mistake." If you repeat the reporter's words, he or she will be more likely to use them in the story, putting the "words in your mouth."

For example, if the reporter asks, "Why are you disrupting these people's lives?" you don't want to answer, "I don't think we are disrupting anything." You just add weight to the negative characterization and sound defensive. Answer with, "The actions we took help us create a safe environment for the people who live here," and proceed to make your points in language you choose.

Never speculate or talk about things you don't know. If you don't know, say so, and offer to look for more information.

Never lie.

Assume everything you say will be on the record. There are too many ways for information to get out; you don't want to be caught by the hidden microphone or camera (or cellphone), saying something you'll regret.

First, write MOP and MOE in enough detail to answer the question, such as, "Success means I will see people doing X." Next, exercise patience. Avoid jumping to conclusions if your com-

munication plan appears adrift. If you react too quickly and assume you need to change messages (when your media is at fault), you will confuse, or potentially lose, your audience.

Everything covered in this article is common knowledge, but just as we develop battle drills and checklists, going over familiar material helps coalesce our own ideas around established thinking. Don't mistake common knowledge for simple. The folks who make it look simple usually spend a lot of time preparing – their polish isn't accidental.

Communication discipline is a matter of choice, and it takes effort. Some otherwise brilliant people – including general officers – have paid a high price for ill-timed, indiscrete or poorly crafted messages. Before publishing your next operations order, look at your coordinating instructions for the messages and themes listed there and decide for yourself what risk you're willing to take.

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Notes

[1]FM 5-0, ***The Operations Process***, March 2010. Page B56.

[2]TRADOC PAM 525-3-3, ***The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command***, October 2010. Page 38.

[3]FM 5-0. Pages B56 to B58.

[4]Hattersley, Michael and McJannet, Linda. ***Management Communications***. New York: McGraw Hill/Irwin, 2005. Page 5.

[5]Ibid. Page 87.

[6]Bumiller, Elisabeth. "We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint," ***The New York Times***, April 26, 2010.

Acronym Quick-Scan

FM – field manual
MOP – measure of performance
MOE – measure of effectiveness
OPORD – operations order
TCP – traffic-control point
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command

Vignette: a look at what the process looks like at platoon level

So you drew traffic-control point duty tomorrow, and here you are in the middle of preparing for that mission when Top not so gently reminds you to pass down the Six's command messages. "They're important," he barks. Without even thinking about it, you answer with a "roger" and get back to work. But later the lieutenant comes by with a pained look and describes a similar run-in, and you realize this isn't going away. You both dig out the operations order and your notes, and take a second look.

The bottom line is that from battalion on down, everyone wants to make sure the people who live near your crossroads know what's going on and why you're disrupting their otherwise peaceful routine. The OPORD has some talking points about being there to protect families and enforce the law. Their law.

Nowhere does it say you have to announce your plans in advance, so you're not worried about security, so what's the big deal? The lieutenant checks his notes; the commander didn't want the soldiers – some of them with less than a working knowledge of common sense – to get creative as they got bored. With more note-checking and discussion, you piece together that, yes, this is a peaceful area, and this TCP is tied to some increased presence patrolling a few kilometers to the north. The OPORD brief had all the details ... and the idea behind the command message is to avoid saying or doing something stupid that'll play into insurgent hands, as opposed to doing some good.

"Got it," says the lieutenant. "Stable environment and people who aren't hostile to what we're doing."

"Roger, and our goal is to keep it that way."

But what nags at you are the fact that those messages from higher are kind of generic, sort of one-size-fits-all.

The lieutenant suggests that you and he craft messages aimed at the village elders – to let them know what's going on so they can spread the word in their own way, and that you share one basic talking point with the soldiers to keep it simple. That makes sense – the goal is the same, and so is the point, they're just delivered differently.

"So we'll tell the leaders we are there to support their efforts to maintain stability and security, and we'll tell the people on the road that it's about protecting them and their families," you suggest, adding that anyone who gets annoyed should get an apology, taking extra pains to treat them with dignity.

"But we have to show them as much as tell them," reminds the lieutenant. You make a note to yourself to make sure you tell your soldiers to watch their comments, and no attitudes. "This means we tell them no shouting or snarling at people – and no trashing the place with their cigarette butts," the lieutenant continues.

"That's right," you say, checking your notes, "because the commander noted that another unit recently caused problems by acting too belligerent, and all it did was cause the village leaders grief when they tried to counter insurgent messages. The insurgents said the leaders were supporting people who claimed to support the people, but instead treated them with contempt."

You agree to watch the situation as the day drags on – to gauge each party's reaction to your talking points and behaviors, and to make any changes if what you try appears off the mark.

Environment	Audience(s)	Goals	Messages	Delivery	MOP/MOE
Momentarily quiet Recent improvised explosive device activity in area not tied to local village Insurgents might describe TCP as indicator of U.S. occupation	Primary: elders Secondary: people at TCP	Secure buy-in that TCP aids their stability effort Maintain local peace - don't let area problems creep in	"This TCP helps you protect the people in your village" "We don't suspect anyone here; we're here to help deter insurgents and protect your families"	One-on-one with lieutenant and platoon sergeant Every Soldier Words as well as actions; treat people like your own neighbors back home and strictly follow escalation procedures	MOP: activity in area - people are annoyed but resigned to TCP MOE: insurgent activity does not gain popularity as alternative to government law

Anatomy of Blitzkrieg:

What We've Learned About the Combined-Arms Battlefield

by CPT Michael S. Ibrahim

(**Editor's note**: *Blitzkrieg, a German term meaning "lightning war," was primarily applied in World War II to swift German military offensives deploying combined-arms teams of tanks, mechanized infantry, artillery and aircraft. The Germans used this type of warfare to devastating effect, concentrating overwhelming force at high speed to break enemy lines and flank enemy forces. Blitzkrieg was highly dependent on terrain and therefore flawed, as the Germans would learn during their invasion of the Soviet Union. Writer CPT Michael Ibrahim looks at the German Panzer units and what we learned from them.*)

The Panzer division changed the way we look at warfare. Speed, cooperation of arms and teamwork became the cornerstones for all modern armies and still are to this day. The Panzer division, and by extension *blitzkrieg*, was more than modern equipment – it was a new way of thinking about war.

Birth of the Panzer

The German army never forgot the lessons-learned from its defeat in World War I. By the 1930s, forward-thinking officers and mechanized-warfare theorists rebuilt the German army into a revolutionary fighting force. These men wanted to create an all-arms armored unit capable of punching through enemy lines. This would allow the infantry divisions, modeled on the 1918 reforms, to follow and quickly encircle enemy formations.

MAJ Heinz Guderian and COL Oswald Lutz led Germany's efforts in mechanized warfare, applying stormtrooper combat principles to the new armored formations to create blitzkrieg. Germany built the first all-arms armored force (the Panzer division) in 1935.

The new all-arms armored force was battle-tested within a few years. In fact, in Summer 1940, Panzer divisions won seemingly impossible victories in France. Through speed and coordination of arms, Panzer divisions became the spearhead, breaking all resistance before the German army.

The German army's enthusiastic approach to warfare, coupled with the tank's qualities, made the Panzer divisions victorious. The German army developed Panzer divisions to be key in decisive victory. Through adept application, the German army earned those victories and prevented the massive loss of life common in more traditional forms of warfare.

This article describes how this extremely efficient combined-arms system worked and what the fighting of 1940 in France was actually like for Panzer divisions.

Battlefield leadership

Stormtroopers found it necessary in 1918 to rely on their own initiative to maintain an attack's momentum. They learned that small-unit leaders should decide when and where to attack or retreat. German officers and noncommissioned officers were later trained to use their initiative during combat operations.

By World War II, this practice had matured to the point where the German army enabled its front-line leaders to accomplish their mission without the hindrance of restrictive orders. Commanders issued guidance in the form of orders called "mission orders." Since Panzer divisions required flexibility in their operations, the latitude given small-unit leaders allowed them freedom of action. They attacked when and where they decided best, using the weapons they thought were best, and they were very successful.

For example, Panzer commander Rolf Penselin said decades after the war that "the great difference between us and other armies was that we were not given specific orders, we were given mission orders." Penselin explained that a mission order wasn't a vague mission statement but rather an act of trust between his commander and himself to accomplish the mission.

"If we were given the order to attack a village, I could decide when and where to do it," he said. "It was my decision how I accomplished the mission; the difference was that I could react to constantly changing conditions on the battlefield as long as I achieved my goal."[1]

Notably, the Panzer division's effectiveness stemmed not only from its combination of arms – discussed in the next section – but also from the quality of battlefield leadership from officers and NCOs within the division. German combat leaders led their units from the front, using their own initiative to make on-the-spot decisions for their men. This eliminated delay from subordinates calling higher-ups for permission to act. If a German commander saw an opportunity, he had to take decisive action.

This freedom of action was the core concept behind German maneuver warfare and was the sole reason freedom was built into how the German army structured its orders process and organized its combat-arms teams.

A combined-arms force

A Panzer division in 1940 included an armor brigade and an infantry brigade. The division used its two brigades the same way a medieval knight would use his sword and shield. The armor brigade, the sword, primarily engaged in quick and decisive offensive operations. The infantry brigade, the shield, defended the division from enemy counterattacks and maintained control of key terrain. The two brigades worked closely together on the battlefield.

As a rule, the brigades always tried to maneuver together in a two-echelon formation. The first echelon contained the armor brigade plus reconnaissance units, combat engineers (pioneers) and a company of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. The second echelon contained the infantry brigade with the rest of the anti-tank and anti-aircraft, units as well as all the artillery and support units in the division.

German forces found the use of combined-arms teams (what they called "battlegroups") extremely effective. They employed combined-arms teams in larger formations such as brigades and in smaller tactical formations as well.

The Luftwaffe, or German air force, also supported the Panzer division. Engaging its reconnaissance and close-air-support assets, the division avoided enemy concentrations and protected its wide-open flanks from the air. The Luftwaffe also dropped heavy ordnance on enemy tanks and enemy positions.

These two teams, the Luftwaffe and the Panzer divisions, completed what the Germans saw as the most effective combined-arms team. Together these forces could break through any enemy position and defeat any enemy army set against them.

'The sword'

The Panzer brigade was the Panzer division's attack force. Organized for quick, decisive action, the brigade consisted of two Panzer regiments, each with two battalions of three companies. Every battalion had two companies of light tanks, one company of medium tanks and a dedicated light-tank platoon for reconnaissance purposes.

The light companies had three platoons of five tanks, while the medium companies usually had two platoons of four tanks. Two more tanks in each company headquarters supported the command element, totaling a battalion strength of about 50 tanks and a division strength of around 200 tanks.

It's important to remember that more than 150 of the tanks in the division were light, while most of the enemy's (the French in 1940) tanks were medium or heavy.

During combat operations, the Panzer brigade had supporting arms attached to it. This allowed the brigade commander to form a battlegroup around his armor units. The battlegroup primarily helped the tanks conduct reconnaissance and overcome enemy obstacles. The combat-engineer companies, as well as the division's reconnaissance assets, attached to the armor battlegroup. The motorcycle battalion also attached to the brigade as part of the reconnaissance units. This battalion, often used as infantry, was indispensible to the tanks during close-quarters combat. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft companies were also brought in to give added protection to the tanks.

How 'the sword' was used

The armor battlegroup fought a much more fluid battle than its infantry counterpart. The battlefield the armor battlegroup fought on was wide and deep. (Most battlegroups fought on a front between four to six kilometers long.)

On the battlefield itself, the regiments and battalions fought independent actions toward the same goal. The armor battlegroup had two main tactical goals. The first goal was to break through enemy defenses and isolate enemy strongpoints by destroying all enemy support (artillery, supply units, etc.) and command elements (headquarters or their lines of communication). The second goal was that the armor battlegroup would simultaneously be supporting infantry formations in destroying the most difficult isolated enemy positions.

To do this, the armor battlegroup organized itself in depth. The two tank regiments positioned in line with each other, and the tank regiments put their battalions in column, making a box formation. The box formation could be between four to six kilometers wide and two to three kilometers deep.

It should be noted here that the tank regiment, much like the infantry battalion, was the primary tactical formation for that arm on the battlefield – meaning that while in combat, the tank regiment's battalions operated within supporting distance of each other. The two regiments usually weren't close enough to support each other directly.

The regiment operated on a frontage of about 1,500 meters, with two regiments fighting on a four- to -six-kilometer front. That meant, on average, there was one to three kilometers between them. The tank regiment, therefore, had to accomplish both tactical goals by itself, so the regiment usually assigned one task to each of its battalions. The lead battalion would be in charge of the initial breakthrough and exploitation. The second battalion was in charge of supporting the infantry in eliminating enemy strongpoints. Both tank battalions would work as closely as possible on the battlefield, and often the second battalion, when not supporting infantry actions, was helping its sister battalion. The support guns of the battlegroup, such as the anti-tank and anti-aircraft batteries, would usually be in the rear waiting for an opportunity to be called upon.

Both tank battalions organized their companies similarly: attached reconnaissance assets were out forward, and the battalion's two light tank companies formed a wedge or were in line, depending on the terrain's openness. The medium tank company stayed to the battalion's rear, waiting to be called upon when needed.

The Germans favored their light tanks over their medium tanks because Germany's light tanks – namely the Pz II and Pz 35/38t, both nine tons and armed with two-centimeter and 3.72-centimeter cannons – proved to be very effective in combat against superior enemy tanks and heavy-caliber antitank guns. By using the one strength they possessed – speed – to their maximum advantage, the light tanks gained the edge over their better-equipped French opponents.

CPT Ernst von Jungenfeld, a light-tank company commander, explained how the tactic worked: "In spite of our courage and offensive spirit, we were forced to conclude that the French tanks were thickly armored, and it took many a shot to make them give in. [We] attacked the enemy from the flank, the 2nd Battalion attacked frontally, and forced many hostile crews to leave their tanks. Whenever our projectiles failed to penetrate, the desired effect was obtained by drum fire directed at the tank. Demoralized by the constant hits of our projectiles, the enemy crews abandoned their tanks with arms raised. Moreover, during the first few minutes of this battle, we recognized the enemy's weakness. Although his armor was thicker than ours and his armament was good, his tanks were slow and difficult to maneuver [making it easier for the faster German tanks to outflank them]."[2]

By using their speed to quickly maneuver around their enemy's position, the German light tanks quickly closed the distance required for their weapons to be effective on their opponent's less-armored flanks. (It was for that same reason the American Sherman tank was an effective weapon when fighting its much more heavily armed and armored enemy, the German Panther and Ti-

ger tanks in 1944.) The speed of the Germans' tanks allowed them to attack and destroy superior tanks and heavy-caliber anti-tank guns by closing the distance to them and then flanking their opponent. Once the light tank was close enough, their small-caliber guns proved effective enough to destroy any of their opponents except the heaviest of French tanks – namely the Souma and Char B1 bis, which weighed 20 and 32 tons, respectively.

The Panzer division's medium tanks, the Pz III and IV, carried more heavy armor than the light tanks and weighed 19 tons and 17.5 tons, respectively. The Pz IV also carried low-velocity 75mm cannon. Although the Germans used the Pz IV primarily in an infantry-support role rather than an anti-tank role, there were many instances of Pz IVs maneuvering on solitary heavy French tanks and knocking them out. When the entire unit wasn't used in the support role, the battalion commander tasked his medium-tank company to stay behind and help the infantry eliminate pockets of resistance.

The tank platoon was the smallest tactical formation in which tanks maneuvered on the battlefield. Individual tanks received tasking for infantry support or reconnaissance duties, but tanks fought most of their battles in platoons.

The platoon generally maneuvered in a wedge or in-line formation with the company. If the platoon was traveling along a road or in restricted terrain, it used a column formation. When in contact, the platoon leader split the formation into two different sections, three tanks to one section if there were five tanks present; the platoon leader and his wing-man tank formed one section, and the other three tanks formed the second section. The sections then took turns bounding past each other while the stationary section provided covering fire. As the tanks maneuvered through enemy-held terrain, they constantly used recon-by-fire tactics.

A light-tank platoon leader explains how a tank platoon worked together on the battlefield: "My driver goes carefully and all the other vehicles creep along, always maintaining their distance in a narrow wedge formation behind me. We cross a road and halt. … Up to the left a woods extends for some distance. Here the enemy must be waiting. However, a burst with the machinegun brings no answer. Quickly we mount the slope and charge up to the edge of the wood. A tank behind me shoots into the trees. I see the tracer and direct my weapons in the same direction. Suddenly enemy fire bursts from countless muzzles. We halt, fire, move forward, halt in a slight depression and fire again. Who is fighting us from the woods we do not know. We can only hear the crack and roar of our weapons, which drown the noise of the motors and the crash of the bursting artillery shells. When someone spots an enemy, his fire indicates the target to the others. So we help each other mutually and are like one tank and one weapon."[3]

'The shield' evolves

As the Battle of France progressed, French commanders directed their units to build strongpoints around restrictive terrain such as cities, villages, hills and small forests, making themselves inaccessible to large tank formations. They attached large amounts of artillery to their subordinate commands and ensured these forces were adequately stocked with infantry and anti-tank weapons. Sometimes this meant taking indirect-fire weapons, such as the French 75mm field gun, and employing them in a direct-fire role.

These defensive tactics forced a change in Panzer-division operations. The Panzer divisions modified their tactics from strictly "sword and shield" to incorporate an ever-increasing role for infantry. The need for more infantry became so apparent that Hitler himself directed a change in the composition of all Panzer divisions after the Battle for France ended – Hitler changed the Panzer division's composition from two Panzer regiments and one infantry regiment to one Panzer regiment and two infantry regiments.

Infantry-support tactics

To overcome French strongpoints, supporting arms – including tanks and artillery – reinforced the infantry brigade commander. The commander formed a battlegroup and used his headquarters to command-and-control his formations. These battles were more systematic than the fast-paced cavalry-type battles the armor battlegroups fought.

The infantry battlegroup attacked as a combined-arms team. Each team member worked in unison with the other so they all made progress together. Such attacks resembled ancient Greek warriors who, as a team, broke their enemy's formation by pushing at them with their hoplite shield.

The French sited their strongpoints to deny the Panzer division freedom to maneuver. By situating themselves along supply routes, the French blocked supply trucks from reaching the division's armor formations. For the Panzer division to continue its attack into France, its infantry brigade had to batter enemy defenses to reopen tank supply routes.

The German infantry accomplished the task of clearing enemy strongpoints because of close cooperation with its supporting arms. The infantry moved among or close to the armor battlegroup's tanks. It was ready to dismount into action whenever enemy positions held up the tanks. The infantry attacked these positions by infiltrating from one or more flanks. Mortars, directly observed tank fire, air-artillery fire and other immediately available fire helped them forward.[4]

The infantry brigade consisted of a motorized infantry regiment, a few anti-tank guns and few infantry guns. To this the division added its anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions, minus the guns already attached to the armor battlegroup. They also added the division's artillery regiment, bringing three artillery battalions to the infantry and a lifeline of indirect-fire support. The infantry battlegroup, therefore, had the agility and firepower to seize key terrain. When called upon, it could defend it as well.

The motorized infantry regiment consisted of three infantry battalions and a cannon company. Each infantry battalion consisted of three companies, a machinegun company with mortars and a heavy weapons company.[5]

Like with the armor battlegroup, the infantry regiment's headquarters didn't concern itself with a lengthy orders process for its battalions when issuing battlefield orders, but concentrated on coordinating fires for its subordinate battalions. Regimental infantry headquarters played a major part in leading the regiment's men, but when it came to the actual fighting, history accounts show that the infantry regiment's headquarters became more of a combat coordinator than an actual combat leader.

For example, when the infantry regiment received a mission, its headquarters immediately started task-organizing its three subordinate battalions for their specific missions. By assigning anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, plus artillery, etc., to their subordinate battalions, the regiment gave battalion commanders the tools they needed to accomplish their assigned tasks. By not detailing an attack plan, the regiment also saved time. The regiment used the extra time to coordinate fires for the upcoming battle and give the battalion commanders the liberty to see the mission complete in the manner they thought best. This exercise in mission-type orders allowed the regimental staff to concentrate on coordinating close-air, direct- and indirect-fire sup-

German combat leaders led their units from the front, using their own initiative to make on-the-spot decisions for their men. This eliminated delay from subordinates calling higher-ups for permission to act. *(illustration by Jody Harmon)*

port for their battalions. When the battle commenced, the regimental staff concentrated on directing supporting fires over the battlefield while the battalions did their work.

The Germans trained a motorized infantry battalion to mount a strong attack directly off the line of march. This attack occurred on a 600-yard front about 40 minutes after the moment the leading Panzers struck the obstacle of the assault. The three phases of the infantry attack all took place, dismounting their trucks several hundred meters to the rear from the point of contact.

The first phase of the assault was gaining fire superiority. The first company in contact established one large frontal base of fire and crew weapons. They used the support weapons attached to the battalion in their direct-fire role. The 37mm anti-tank gun, the dreaded 88mm anti-tank/anti-aircraft gun and tank guns, of course – in addition to the battalion's mortars – would also come into action immediately.

In the second phase, or blinding phase, the battalion's support weapons poured smoke and fire upon the enemy's position. This suppressed the enemy, making it impossible for them to observe the battlefield. At this time, the Germans began to add more fire support to the battle, causing further damage to the enemy position. These fires included the regimental cannon company, division artillery and even close air support if the opposition was great enough.

The regimental staff coordinated these fires when the battalion reported it was preparing for an assault. This phase blinded the enemy, keeping them from observing the battalion's second company as it infiltrated the objective's flank. From there, the second company established flanking fires as well as jumping-off positions for the assault's third phase.

Collapsing the enemy's defense was the final phase's purpose. The battalion headquarters coordinated for mortars and direct-fire weapons to hit the front and flanks of the enemy position, while the regimental staff directed artillery and close-air support to the rear of the enemy position. This effectively isolated the enemy position from the rest of the battlefield. Squads and platoons then assaulted the objective's heart, eliminating their selected targets.

With fires encompassing their sector completely and the centerpieces of their position either seized or destroyed by fire, the defender's capability to form an an organized defense collapsed. This collapse ended the assault phase.

What we learned

Blitzkrieg, with the Panzer division as its centerpiece, shaped the U.S. Army's conception of infantry and armor working together as combined-arms teams. Blitzkrieg's coordinated effort of ground- and airpower is another concept we see today on the Joint battlefield. Most effective when war is conducted as a series of quick, short, decisive battles that deliver a knockout blow to an enemy before it can fully mobilize, the concept of blitzkrieg was evident as recently as the Army's invasion of Iraq.

Perhaps most importantly, the Panzer division's style of battlefield leadership laid the foundation for our own leadership practices. The flexibility inherent in "mission orders" only increased the need for adaptable, agile leaders and mission command. The battlefield of tomorrow will be just as fluid – maybe more so – as the one the Panzers faced in 1940, and the need to overmatch our adversaries just as great.

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Patton's Guerrillas

By CPT Michael S. Ibrahim

Although we don't think of GEN George S. Patton this way, Patton's guerrillas in late World War II represented a type of hybrid threat we face today on the 21st Century battlefield. Patton actively used guerrillas in his operations against the Axis forces.

Patton's strategy

Patton moved his troops farther and faster than any army before. This strategy saw great success during the drive across France in 1944. When asked about his success in France during a press conference in September 1944, Patton, then commander of Third Army, gave the following response, "We have always gotten to each defensive line, not through my efforts, but through the glory of God, three days before the Germans thought we would."[1]

Patton concentrated his units on the battlefield to maintain momentum during the drive across France. The leading historian on American armored warfare, Steven J. Zaloga, explains that Patton also used tens of thousands of French resistance fighters, or French Forces of the Interior, to protect his flanks. The FFIs also cleared out isolated pockets of enemy resistance.[2]

These guerrilla fighters allowed Patton to concentrate all his combat troops into spearheads, famously giving these armored and infantry divisions orders to continue the attack and not to worry about their flanks. With this assistance, Third Army moved through France, defeating more enemy units than any other Western army in World War II.

FFI's organization

The FFI started organizing immediately after the fall of France in June 1940. A month later, the FFI received a huge boost in support with the creation of the British Special Operations Executive. The SOE's mission was, in the words of Winston Churchill, "to set Europe ablaze," and they would do this by organizing the FFI into a real resistance, assigning them targets to attack when the time came.[3]

The SOE began parachuting clandestine agents into France to organize networks of resistance fighters known as "circuits." By 1942, 90 circuits existed. Fifty circuits would survive Nazi counterinsurgency efforts.

Then, in 1944, the FFI activated to support the Allied invasion. The SOE, later joined by the American Office of Strategic Services, created a special command, Special Forces Headquarters, to support and direct the activated FFI in their resistance efforts. This command was in charge of arming, training and directing the FFI in support of the Allied armies in France.

SFHQ created three-man teams called "Jedburghs" to operate as their agents with the FFI in the field. The Jedburghs dropped into France behind enemy lines and linked up with local circuits of resistance fighters created by the SOE agent. In addition, they trained and armed the fighters and served as liaisons between SFHQ and the local FFI commander. The 93 Jed teams began landing in France shortly after D-Day.

Weapons and tactics

When the SOE organized the FFI into operational circuits, they had limited supplies and training ability. The fighters and SOE agents occupied themselves with gathering intelligence on the enemy. As D-Day approached, the SOE planned several operations to cut communication to and isolate the Normandy beachhead. For example, plans existed to deny roads, cut telephone wires and disrupt railroads.

The FFI lacked adequate weapons and tactical training by the time of the attack; these shortfalls limited the FFI fighters to conducting small-arms harassment attacks rather than larger-scale operations. However, this would change with the coming of the Jedburgh teams.[4]

Three-man Jedburgh teams consisted of a British or American officer, a French officer and a radioman. They lived undercover, trained resistance fighters and conducted guerrilla operations when necessary. Jed teams landed on predesignated drop zones, where SOE resistance fighters linked up with them. Once they linked up, the FFI would gather up the Jeds and the 40-odd air-droppable canisters that accompanied them, and moved the team and canisters to a safe location.

The canisters contained weapons, ammunition, grenades and other explosives, and some other items for surviving in a hostile environment. Among the weapons airdropped was the Sten gun, a durable, compact sub-machine gun, excellent for close-quarter raids and ambushes; the Lee-Enfield Rifle, great for sniping; and the Bren light machine gun, probably the best light machine gun of its day.

Once established at the safe location, the Jeds linked up with the regional FFI leader and began training the FFI fighters. Jed teams usually had a month or less to complete the FFIs' training. The training advanced from individual marksmanship to conducting sabotage missions and squad- or platoon-sized raids. FFI fighters usually operated in groups of about 40 men for small-scale raids and ambushes, but this number would increase if the situation allowed.

If time permitted, Jed teams also integrated anti-tank weapons such as U.S. bazookas or British Piats into the training. These weapons gave the FFI a boost in combat power, allowing them to effectively block roads against armored vehicles as well as attack strongpoint defenses.

Team Aubrey

FFI combat effectiveness required more than a month of training with a Jedburgh team. The strategic situation, however, didn't always allow enough training time for the Jedburgh teams and their FFI fighters. For example, Team Aubrey only had two weeks to organize a force of thousands of guerrilla fighters. On Aug. 26, 1944, they fought an action for which they were unprepared.

Team Aubrey landed in France in mid-August and linked up with several thousand FFI in the area immediately south of Paris. As Patton's Third Army approached their area of operations, Team Aubrey prepared to conduct an ambush against the retreating German columns. Twenty FFI vehicles loaded with guerrilla fighters drove from the Paris suburbs to where Team Aubrey wanted to establish the ambush.

Most of these fighters had little training with the team. However, the sunken road between a forest and a swamp they selected as their ambush position was excellent. It was the perfect place to destroy a column of German trucks. Unfortunately, it was armored vehicles, not trucks, headed toward Team Aubrey. The team had four Piat anti-tank weapons, but only the members of Team Aubrey, not the FFI, knew how to fire them due to lack of training time.[5]

French resistance fighters in the Huelgoat region of France.

A German armored vehicle appeared while the FFI fighters dismounted their trucks and began firing on them. The FFI fighters scattered and later recovered to establish a fighting position in the woods. After an 80-minute firefight, two German tanks assaulted their position. When the FFI tried to use the Piat AT weapons, they held them improperly. This injured two FFI fighters, breaking one fighter's jaw.[6] With no hits on the enemy tanks and the casualties increasing by the minute, the fighters withdrew with a loss of 86 men, including CPT A. Chaigneau of Jed Team Aubrey.

Liberating Brittany

The first objective assigned to the Jedburghs and Patton's newly activated Third Army was to seize the ports of Brittany. Brittany – a peninsula jutting out some 150 miles west into the Atlantic from its base in Normandy, France – was ideal terrain for unconventional warfare. It was largely rural, with small, privately owned farms and tiny villages dominating the countryside. Heavy vegetation covered large areas, which provided excellent physical cover.[7]

When Patton's Third Army began its assault on the peninsula Aug. 1, 1944, Jedburgh teams had been working in Brittany for more than six weeks, building a guerrilla army of 30,000 men and women to support Patton. The Jed teams, along with a battalion of soldiers, began landing in Brittany in early June, preparing for what would be one of the largest FFI operations of the war. When the British Special Air Service joined the Jeds, Allied headquarters believed the SAS could jump-start the FFI into operation. The plan envisioned that the SAS would establish two secure bases on the Breton Peninsula, one in the north and one in the south with a Jed team assigned to each zone.[8]

By August, the German forces on the peninsula numbered more than 30,000. Although most armored and mechanized units had already fled the peninsula, and artillery was in limited supply, the Germans were still very capable of putting up an active defense. Their excellent AT weapons, in conjunction with the restrictive terrain, were very effective. The German plan was to delay Patton's forces as long as possible, putting up delaying actions all along the peninsula's interior. By using blocking positions along the major roads and by destroying bridges, the Germans hoped to slow Patton's forces long enough to establish proper defenses around the port cities.

Patton would not allow the Germans to slow his advance through Brittany. He wanted to liberate Brittany quickly. Therefore, he used the FFI to a greater degree than envisaged. Patton used the FFI to support three armored spearheads as they raced for the ports, hoping to capture them before the Germans could establish a strong defense.

Patton took command of all FFI forces in Brittany and immediately assigned them missions through SFHQ to support his spearheads. His northern spearhead, Task Force A, was assigned the capture of the most important series of bridges enroute to the city of Brest, the largest port in Brittany. The task force was a provisional unit made up of armored cavalry, tank destroyers and combat engineers. Very fast, but very light on infantry support, Task Force A raced quickly along the northern coast of the peninsula, bypassing pockets of resistance, to seize the important bridges as quickly as possible.[9]

In addition, Patton assigned Jed Team Fredrick to support Task Force A. Jed Team Fredrick's 2,000 FFI fighters attacked German blocking positions, guarded important roads and bridges and held them until they linked up with American forces. Task Force A accomplished its mission with lightning speed, reaching Brest in only seven days. Along the route, Jed Team Fredrick's FFI fighters ambushed enemy convoys, seized important bridges and reduced isolated pockets of resistance. One pocket consisted of 3,000 Germans, but with a few tanks and P-51 Mustangs in support, the FFI fighters forced their surrender.

Patton's middle spearhead, the 6th Armored Division, raced through the middle of the peninsula. The 6th was originally assigned an infantry division in support but would never receive it due to unexpected German resistance in Avranches. Without accompanying infantry, the 6th had to rely on local FFI for infantry support whenever its tanks hit a German blocking position in the road. When the division moved on, the FFI guarded roads and bridges and ensured that supply lines remained open.[10]

French resistance fighters working with American paratroopers in Normandy, France, June and July 1944. *(U.S. Army Signal Corps photo)*

In Brittany, 11 Jed teams and an OSS operational group also supported the 6th Armored Division. Much like the SAS, the operational groups dropped behind enemy lines, operated in small units of about 30-40 men and conducted guerrilla warfare. Group Donald parachuted onto a bridge and secured it a day before the 6th advanced through the area. While patrolling the countryside to round up German stragglers, Group Donald found a force of 100 Germans and managed to bluff them into surrendering.[11] Actions like these allowed Patton's spearheads to speed to their objectives with little thought put to securing their flanks.

The 4th Armored Division led the southern spearhead of Patton's Brittany operation. This division faced the most aggressive German resistance of the entire operation. However, its tactical objectives put the division directly in the path of the largest FFI unit in the peninsula.

The 4th, like the other two spearheads, began its attack into Brittany Aug. 1, 1944. The division moved south from Avranches, cutting across the peninsula's base. The 4th bypassed the city of Rennes on its route south after a quick diversion east. By Aug. 5, the division was halfway across the peninsula. The city of Vannes was its objective.

Upon reaching the outskirts of the city, Combat Command A (each armored division had three combat commands: CCA, CCB, CCR) linked up with SAS and FFI units. The SAS and Jed Team Fredrick established the southern SAS base next to the city. After the linking-up, the FFI quickly organized to support the assault on the city.

CCA only had a few hundred armored infantry and had to rely on the FFI for the bulk of the infantry support, like the other spearheads in Brittany were doing. The FFI advanced and seized the airport and the high ground north of the city with 5,000 men. With CCA tanks in support and thousands of FFI moving into the city, the Germans quickly retreated.

The next day, the FFI reported to CCA 4th Armored Division that the Germans had established two strong blocking positions not far from the city.[12] The German blocking positions consisted of AT weapons and several hundred infantry. Receiving forewarning about the enemy's blocking positions denied the Germans the surprise advantage they desperately needed to stop the CCA's tanks. Consequently, CCA destroyed German positions without much loss.

CCA pushed on to its main objective, the port city of Lorient 30 miles further west. En route, the FFI safely guided the CCA 4th Armored Division through minefields. When CCA came to a downed bridge, the local FFI led them to a smaller bridge not shown on the American 1:100,000 maps.[13]

Commanders at all levels in Patton's command gained confidence in the FFI from the Brittany operation. Their courageous, daring actions led to seizing important bridges, ambushing German convoys and destroying German dumps. Their brilliant tactical collaboration with tanks also saved countless lives.

The open flank

Patton knew he had to use the FFI on an even greater scale if he wanted to maintain his momentum.

As Third Army was about to attack eastward, its southern flank rested along the River Loire. Patton believed he could protect that flank without having to keep his tanks back. He used the FFI and the air force to protect the river line. Patton needed his armored units to form the spearheads, which were key to his strategy of speed. Patton directed the FFI to protect the Army's right flank as it advanced east along the Loire.[14] Patton again formed spearheads, but this time he raced for the Rhine.

Jed Team George had left Vannes weeks before Patton's assault began there Aug. 1, 1944; the team felt its mission was complete and left the SAS to lead the guerrillas of southern Brittany. Team George moved to the Loire River basin in early

July. By early August, 6,500 FFI fighters had formed battalions and were standing by waiting for arms. Third Army's operations officer briefed the Team George commander and local FFI commander Aug. 6 that the FFI was to support Third Army's attack east by protecting certain bridges along the route of advance; if the bridges were blown, the FFI was charged with finding alternate routes for Third Army's tanks.

The FFI also protected the supply lines, provided scouts and guides to the armored spearheads, and mopped up bypassed German resistance.[15] Third Army helped Team George procure weapons and provided captured enemy weapons such as mortars and heavy machine guns.[16] The partnership of Patton's Third Army with the resistance fighters of the Loire proved even more successful than in the Brittany operation.

"To an army on the advance, there is all the difference in the world being able to roll through a town after smashing a single road block and having to stop to hunt out the half a hundred enemy who can fight you house-to-house with automatic weapons, and who will swarm in on your supply trains if you bypass them," said CPT Ralph Ingersoll in 1944. "From St. Lo to the German border, we never had to worry about a town in our rear. Let one American vehicle appear even in a sizable city, and its inhabitants would have the German garrison dead or disarmed a few hours later. … Every scout car making an advanced reconnaissance was not one pair of eyes but a score. 'There a thousand Germans in those woods' [the inhabitants would tell us, or] 'Beyond that hill around that turn is a tank trap.' … The effect [this had] on morale [for] an army advancing is imponderable."[17]

An estimate of more than 100,000 FFI fighters supported Patton by protecting his southern flank along the Loire. The FFI provided everything from scouts to light infantry in support of Patton's armored spearheads. The teamwork between American tanks and French guerrillas proved unstoppable to the German army in the west. Nothing would stop Patton's Third Army until its gasoline ration was cut to support the British-run Operation Market Garden, forcing the Third to hold its advance.

Lessons for the battlefield today

Today, and in the future, our Army faces enemies who, doctrinally, will not fight along conventional means. They use guerrilla fighters in cities, villages and restrictive terrain to bog down our mechanized forces. Then, while our tanks and mechanized infantry fight rocket-propelled grenade teams through city streets, they attack our uncovered soft targets – supply convoys, depots, communication nodes, etc. – with their own smaller conventional forces.

Our potential enemies of tomorrow may fight very similarly to the Germans in the late summer of 1944. Fighting without air support, and little to no armor, the Germans tried to stem the tide by using strongpoint defenses, employing the terrain to decrease the mechanized forces' combat effectiveness. The Germans saved their meager armored units for the right moment to strike, hoping to hit a vulnerable position in the American lines. It was in this situation where the French guerrilla fighter made his or her greatest contribution. The FFI fighters knew the terrain and directed American tanks around obstacles, and if the Germans laid ambush, the FFI gave the Germans a surprise.

One only has to look at the battle for Paris to understand that it was simply impossible for the Germans to carry on a guerrilla-type action even in one the biggest cities of the world (naturally due to the FFI). Of course, our potential enemies will be fighting on home ground, but that doesn't necessarily forfeit the possibility of friendly guerrilla fighters supporting U.S. combat operations. The people of those countries only need the opportunity to rebel. They need the same training, weapons and support the Jedburgh teams gave the French people in 1944.

Although our Special Forces are completing these missions, they need to be larger and coordinated with conventional units by the ground commanders of those units. If our brigade and division commanders came to the battlefield with the same daring concept in mind that Patton had for the FFI, we will accomplish great things in future campaigns.

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Acronym Quick-Scan

AT – anti-tank
CCA – combat command A
FFI – French Forces of the Interior
OSS – Office of Strategic Services
SAS – special air service
SFHQ – special forces headquarters
SOE – special operations executive

The Critical Path to Failure:

Teaching a Mental Model for Safety

by LTC Bryan Hernandez

There's an old saying that "accidents just happen." Unfortunately, when accidents occur in the Army, our soldiers are seriously injured or killed. In training or combat, daily life in the military is dangerous.

Safety mitigates these dangers and must be encouraged to our leaders and soldiers early in their introduction to military life. Everyone shares the duty of making the job safer. Most training accidents don't "just happen"; they're preventable when leaders and soldiers focus on safety.

We must teach safety in a way that breaks out of the normal methods we habitually use to discuss and think about it. For example, as most of us have experienced, the military accustoms its members to compulsory safety briefings in formations before a training event, mission or long weekend off. Although the briefings are necessary, the soldiers' facial expressions show that many are not paying attention or taking the warnings seriously. Safety – and more importantly, the act of being safe – isn't comprised of simply talking about safety, but rather thinking about it and taking action based on those thoughts or observations.

So how do our leaders and soldiers learn to take a more focused approach to safety? This article describes a mental model for teaching safety to our soldiers and leaders.

The 'critical path to failure'

When an incident causes serious injury or death, an investigation to determine its root cause occurs. The investigation also determines key events that led to the incident and possible responsibility or culpability.

These investigations also determine a critical point: was the accident preventable and, if so, why was nothing done to avoid it? Investigations normally use a deliberate method of tracing the series of events – either from the beginning to the end of the tragedy or systematically backwards – to develop a comprehensive understanding of the accident. This process, much like a television police drama, allows investigators and leaders to develop a clear picture of what happened through understanding the linkage and sequence of actions that created conditions for the accident.

> Understanding the "critical path to failure" model trains soldiers and leaders to recognize the chain of events that lead to injury and death.

In most cases, when an investigation concludes and the results are published, we find two key points: the accident was preventable and, had someone seen the warning signs and taken action, it could have been avoided. Understanding this chain of events requires viewing it as a path with several crossroads and alternative routes. On each path, conditions change and decisions or actions taken set a course for success or critical failure – i.e., disaster.

The "critical path to failure" is the accumulation of events and negative actions that, when not identified or acted upon, creates the conditions for disaster. It serves as a mental model that focuses on looking for, identifying and understanding the events that lead to tragic accidents to prevent them. Achieving this end state requires visualizing and taking preventive actions to break the chain of events causing accidents.

This holistic approach requires leaders to see beyond isolated events that occur in training or combat. It also compels leaders to identify connections between actions and events that set the course conditions for poor decision-making. Many times mishaps occur because those involved or supervising fail to connect the dots. They fail to see how taking no action on certain events creates conditions increasing the probability of a serious incident.

Example

Let's examine the following situation to better understand the critical path to failure. A group of soldiers begins their day by going to a marksmanship range to qualify on their weapons. By the end of the day, one is dead and three are in the hospital.

How did this happen? What turned a simple task into a day of tragedy? By looking at the individual events occurring that day, a chain of events forms.

First, the driver responsible for picking up the range detail overslept and arrived late to work. This mistake, by itself, seems quite harmless, but it sets off a chain of events and decisions within the unit, creating the conditions for disaster.

Because the driver arrived late in the morning, the preparation and range setup scheduled to be complete by the time the main body of soldiers arrived was also running an hour behind schedule. Afraid the late start would cause the unit to look bad, the unit leader orders the range-detail supervisor to "hurry up and get more people out there to the range" so the unit is ready as soon as possible. The chain of events on the critical path to failure has now begun.

Instead of loading the five-ton truck, according to regulation, with 14 soldiers, the supervisor adds six more soldiers, totaling 20 personnel. More soldiers are now required to prepare the range for the unit on time, he reasons.

After receiving several reprimands for his tardiness, the driver now feels pressured make up for his "costly mistake." With the 20 soldiers loaded on the truck, he drives as quickly as possible to get to the range, ignoring the posted speed limits because he received orders "to get out there as quickly as possible." While enroute to the range, the driver misjudges his speed – which is 10 miles greater than posted speed limit – and the truck's ability to negotiate a turn. He loses control of the vehicle and flips the five-ton truck, ejecting half its occupants and pinning one soldier under the truck's massive weight. The result is one dead, three in the hospital.

Another unit has traveled along the critical path to failure. How could this happen? Simple, single, insignificant events – combined with other factors – sets off a chain reaction of risky actions, perceived pressure to deviate from appropriate procedures and poor decision-making.

In the case of this terrible accident, the truck driver's tardiness set the underlying condition within the unit of increased pressure on all decision-makers. Leaders, in turn, placed unnecessary pressure on the personnel involved, leading to several poor decisions that further aggravated the situation. This is evident in the unit leader placing pressure on the range-detail supervisor to hurry up and get the range ready for the unit. The soldier receiving a reprimand from his superior, although warranted, then focuses on making up for his mistake. Thus, he drives fast rather than following safety protocols.

As this chain reaction begins, anyone within the unit or chain of command should identify the various events occurring and take preventive action. However, all stakeholders saw single events that occurred as separate actions without a link to other actions or decisions made that morning. They failed to look at all the events holistically and put the pieces together. To do this requires developing a mental acuity and intuition to connect the dots – a mental model to train our minds and senses that can see when a path to failure is emerging and quickly take action.

Analyzing the critical path to failure

Figure 1 depicts the various possible end states based on actions or variances taken along the path. Importantly, it also shows actions that will lead to catastrophe. Critical to this model is following the impact and flow of negative or risky actions. Poor decision-making or inaction compounds the situation, worsening overall conditions.

Altering the path's direction can occur if identifying the conditions and acting on them correctly happens early. The middle box on the diagram depicts the area along the path to failure where a proper action may deviate a unit or individual off the road to disaster or where, unchecked, an improper action will propel events along their destructive course.

As a mental model, understanding the concept can assist leaders and decision-makers in comprehending the correlation of the various factors at work. Then, by analyzing them together, leaders can anticipate possible outcomes based on snapshot events.

Why employ such a method? Because most post-accident investigations teach us the following key points:

- The incident or accident was preventable.
- Someone in the chain of command failed to take an action that could have prevented the accident.
- The indicators and warning lights were flashing but were not noticed or understood.
- Leaders and key personnel involved missed the warning signs and made poor decisions.
- Everyone knew better.
- No one connected the dots.



Figure 1. The critical path to failure.

Teaching soldiers and leaders to think using the CPTF addresses these areas by building the mental sharpness of all individuals involved in training. CPTF teaches leaders to identify situations others may not and identify when actions or pressure are creating conditions that lead units to make poor decisions. It trains us to make smarter decisions or take appropriate actions by visualizing the possible results.

Teach a mental model

After watching my own unit conduct training and discussing safety with my cadre, I realized that the mental focus I wanted was missing in our approach to thinking about safety. The cadre knew the battle drills in case of an emergency and the requisite steps to take to mitigate risk in training by using composite risk management, but thinking critically about safety was challenging. I decided to try something different, avoid the normal emphasis on safety through standard briefings and talk about safety by introducing the CPTF model to the entire group.

My purpose was to get them to think about safety along a mental model rather than with a checklist mentality. A mental model explains the thought process involved in how something works. It establishes relationships between its various parts and a person's perception regarding their actions and resulting consequences. Mental models are powerful tools because they can shape what we pay attention to and what we do.

One the greatest attributes to training a model is its impact on decision-making. The Army's CRM process has drastic impact on reducing the amount of accidents in training and combat through a deliberate process of identifying risks and placing measures to mitigate them with varying control measures. The issue is how we influence decision-making during situations not covered in our CRM or accounted for as events unfold. What mental tool can we provide to those making decisions without the ability to foresee the consequences of those decisions?

The CPTF model provides such a tool. It expands on cognitive capabilities to rapidly process varying actions and decisions that occur in time, establishes possible cause-and-effect relationships and identifies probable outcomes. When things appear normal, it causes us to question unknowns in situations that may occur. The result is individuals taking an extra second to think carefully and make well-informed decisions.

How do we teach the model to an organization and its individuals?

How to employ a new way of thinking

The first step in changing the organization's approach to safety is through leader involvement and education. Teaching leaders to use critical thinking skills is a necessary task. It's also important to instill a command climate that focuses on great training and safety while not confusing it with risk aversion.

Subordinates shouldn't think of safety as the commander's pet peeve but rather as a fundamental principle of the entire organization, understood and embraced by all within the unit. To achieve this outcome, the commander must create the dialogue from the highest to the lowest level about thinking safely.

Don't delegate

Within our unit, I personally conduct a formal safety stand-down discussion every quarter, where we apply the model with vignettes and lessons-learned over the previous quarter. I don't delegate this responsibility because there's nothing that makes a greater statement than the chain of command being personally involved. If it's important to the command, then the commander should address it.

To effectively educate unit members about the path to failure, leaders should gradually apply instruction within the processes they use to develop and execute operations in both training and combat. This concept isn't understood overnight and requires constant discussion and reiteration. A good method is to take a training- or mission-concept plan, along with a CRM matrix, and sketch out a possible CPTF. This activity allows a commander and his subordinates to visualize possible outcomes they may not have planned for, as well as develop decision points and triggers based on possible warning signs and changing conditions.

Figure 2 depicts applying the CRM with a CPTF model in preparing a squad live-fire exercise. After reviewing the concept plan and the CRM matrix, we develop possible flow patterns that may create a CPTF. Possible conditions, unforeseen events and decisions that may turn a normal situation into a hazardous one receive further review so leaders and individuals are better prepared. This process is similar to the military decision-making process and wargaming the worst-case scenario in course-of-action development. It serves as a tool for all participants to make smarter decisions and take appropriate action when required.

Safety a hallmark

In today's complex environment, we need critical thinkers at all levels with a higher level of mental sharpness to identify risks and hazards so they can take appropriate actions. The only way for a unit to succeed in executing tough, realistic and safe training or to reduce the risk of accidents in combat is to provide the individuals conducting and supervising these operations with the tools they require to be safe and smart.

Accidents in the Army are preventable. They don't "just happen," but they do occur every day. The CPTF is one method of building increased mental capacity within an organization and its individuals.

Safety is a hallmark of a good, disciplined unit. We should all strive to reduce the chance of losing or injuring a soldier due to unfortunate accidents.

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ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

CPTF – critical path to failure
CRM – composite risk management

Figure 2. Analyzing a squad live-fire exercise using the CPTF model.



The ~~Mouth Breather's~~ Platoon Leader's Guide to IPB

by CPT Brandon Colas

You! Yes, *you*, platoon leader, are responsible for intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Yet another acronym, you whimper to yourself. *When will this end? They already made me the fire-safety officer – why am I responsible for something else?*

Well, stop whining! This is important! Even more important than dental appointments and putting "how to respond to a bomb threat" papers by your telephone and posting stickers that remind everyone to "turn the lights off to save electricity because our budget isn't getting any bigger"!

This article, written by a mouth-breather, is for you, a fellow mouth-breather. We'll walk through the steps of IPB and learn how it applies to the Armor platoon leader and the company commander's fight.

IPB is a reference document with two parts. First, we'll discuss how to do IPB; second, we'll look at what the S-2 shop needs from you to help with their IPB at the battalion level.

What is IPB?

IPB is the "systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area." IPB helps the commander determine how to apply his combat power by determining the threat's most likely course of action and describing the environment, and effects of the environment, on both friendly and enemy forces.

A few 'take-aways' based on this definition:

- IPB is a process that is constantly happening because each new fact can change or help clarify our perspective of the battlefield. These facts and trends can come from reading a newspaper reporter's observations or seeing a Raven feed or conducting an after-action review after a firefight.
- IPB is very similar to what you do already during your troop-leading procedures. As you analyze mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilians, you're looking at both enemy and terrain.

Full-blown IPB for the battalion is the S-2's responsibility. That's why he gets quick access to secret and sometimes top-secret databases. Also, it's why he works closely with higher elements (like the brigade S-2) and other enablers (like the brigade's military-intelligence company or three-letter government agencies).

While the S-2 shop is responsible for the big picture for the battalion commander, the details that matter for you – and the judgments that affect how you fight your platoon – will need a significant amount of input and work on your part. What did you expect? In other words, drawing from your previous experience, you will need to tailor and assess the products you get from your S-2 shop and company intelligence-support team.

How do I conduct IPB?

IPB takes place in four steps. Let's look at the steps, and then go into more detail.

First, define the battlefield environment. Second, describe the battlefield effects. Third, evaluate the threat. And fourth, determine threat COAs.

Hint: use this section as a checklist. Hence the boxes.

Step 1: define battlefield environment

In this step we identify specific features of the environment or activities therein that may influence COAs. If we do this right, we can save time and effort by intentionally deciding to focus on areas that matter – the ones that will affect the commander's decisions and what the enemy will do.

❑ **Identify significant characteristics of the environment.** (For example, *The Chattahoochee River between Fort Benning and Fort Mitchell is crossed by only one bridge.*)

- Geography, terrain and weather
- Population demographics (ethnic groups, religious groups, age, income, etc.)
- Political factors (role of tribes, gangs, etc.)
- Critical infrastructure (powerplants, hospitals, etc.)

❑ **Identify limits of the command's area of operations and battlespace/operational environment.**

- This is something higher headquarters gives you.
- Don't forget to consider the area of interest as well (and don't let this become too broad).[1]

❑ **Identify the amount of detail required based on time available.**

❑ **Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps.**

- Your S-2 shop will have some of this for you. Don't forget that open sources[2] can be of great value for this.
- Don't forget that many of your gaps can be filled through requests for information you send up through your CoIST.

Step 2: describe battlefield effects

In this step, we look at how the battlefield affects, through its effects, both friendly and enemy forces. You may need to read that sentence twice. When we do this right, we help the commander exploit the terrain (and weather, politics and economics, etc.) that best support the operation. It also helps the commander know how to plan deception operations. Evaluate the battlefield *from the perspective of the threat* and from your own as much as possible. In counterinsurgency operations in particular, we look at battlefield effects from the perspective of the local population, besides that of the enemy and friendly sides.

❑ **Terrain analysis**

- Make sure to identify gaps. You've identified that bridge, but how much weight can it sustain? These gaps that you identify help us make reconnaissance plans at battalion, company and platoon levels.
- Observation and fields of fire
- Cover and concealment
- Obstacles
- Key terrain
- Avenues of approach

❑ **Terrain's effects on operations**

- Identify engagement areas and ambush sites
- Identify battle positions, objectives, observation posts, etc.

❑ **Weather analysis and effects**

- Visibility
- Winds
- Precipitation
- Cloud cover
- Temperature and humidity

❑ **Other characteristics**

- What other factors from Step 1 – such as demographics and economics – are going to have a direct affect on how you conduct operations in your AO? This is where you go into detail discussing things like how 51 percent of the population of Pakistan uses only four cellphone companies and this could affect our information-operations plan if we conduct earthquake relief, etc.

❑ **Describe the battlefield effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad COAs.**

- Remember, other countries' vehicles and weapons systems are affected in different ways than U.S. vehicles and weapon systems (think about the performance of an AK-47 in extreme weather conditions).

Step 3: evaluate threat

This is when you determine the threat capabilities, doctrinal principles and tactics, techniques and procedures. Note that you are not yet determining what you think the threat *will* do – you're making an assessment about what the enemy *can* do. When you do this right, you're able to effectively evaluate what the threat is capable of doing against our forces.

❑ **Update or create threat models**

- Doctrinal template: looking at databases and an evaluation of past operations, determine how the threat employs his combat forces. This is something the S-2 shop will help you with. For this, think "org chart."
- Description of preferred tactics and options: this goes right along with the doctrinal template, but you go into more detail about actual TTPs. For this, think in terms of how they conduct battle drills and the like. Military and paramilitary forces always follow patterns.

Warfighter function	System	Capabilities	Strengths	Weaknesses	Other
Movement and maneuver	5x T-72 tanks	40 mph hard-ball road 25 mph off-road 500-gallon fuel tank max range of 250 miles 1x122mm cannon 1x12.7mm AA gun thermal sights	4" of steel armor	Maintenance issues Requires particular type of diesel fuel	

Figure 1. A table describing threat capabilities can help you visualize what the enemy has and what those systems can do.

- Identify high-value targets and high-payoff targets: the point of identifying HVTs / HPTs is that you can determine what to fight first and what the threat needs to protect for their operations.

❑ **Description of threat capabilities**: go by warfighter function.[3] Think in terms of what the enemy has and what those systems can do. Time permitting, a table can help. (See Figure 1.)

Step 4: Determine threat COA

This final step identifies the likely threat COAs that can influence accomplishment of the friendly mission. When this is done right, the commander will avoid being surprised by an unanticipated action of the threat.

It might seem like this is the step where we take a wild guess. Wrong! Think about it. There is only one right answer (what the enemy actually does), but if we can anticipate, say, 70 percent of that, we're very well prepared.

Based on what we've already learned and studied about the terrain and weather, as well as what the enemy is equipped with and what the enemy tends to, there are fewer "options" for the enemy than it seems. We don't have to know 100 percent about the enemy to be effective enough to win. We just have to know enough. *Your best guess should never be uneducated.*

❑ **Identify the threat's likely objectives and desired end state.**

- Start with a level above your own (if you're fighting a squad, ask what the platoon would do).
- Objectives and end state are usually assumptions, so keep that in mind.
- Beware of mirror-imaging (other cultures do not think like ours).

❑ **Identify COAs available to the threat.**

- Tie this in to threat doctrine and likely objectives.
- Think about threat COAs that could significantly influence your mission, even if they are less optimal for the enemy.[4]

❑ **Develop each COA in detail.**

- Needs to pass the FADS test: Is it *feasible* (can it happen)? Is it *acceptable* (in terms of risk)? Is it *distinct* (different from the others)? Is it *suitable* (will it meet threat objectives)? If the answer is yes to all these questions, you have a legitimate COA.

❑ **Identify initial collection requirements.**

- Think in terms of what you would need to know to determine if the opposing force was choosing a particular COA. If the enemy was planning on defending a particular hilltop, you'd expect to see fighting positions emplaced. If you don't see said fighting positions, you need to look at the other COAs of the enemy.
- This is where you can do more research on your own[5] and send up RFIs through your CoIST.

How do I contribute to the big picture of the battalion?

Great question! Thanks for asking!

You contribute in two ways.

Debriefs. Debrief reports (Figure 2) are critical to the S-2 shop. Without receiving your perspective on where you went (i.e., terrain) and what happened (i.e., enemy), your shop won't be able to get a full picture of the AO. Your S-2 shop doesn't have the ability to go on patrols as often as you do (although they probably will embed when they can), so you need to serve as their eyes and ears to help merge the other intelligence reports from other battalions, brigade, division, three-letter government agencies and the like. What you see and observe matters;

DATE	Date of report	UNIT	Unit submitting report
PATROLLER	Senior patrol leader	MISSION TYPE	i.e. reconnaissance, engagement, etc
SP (DTG)	SP time and date	RP (DTG)	RP time and date
MISSION (TASK & PURPOSE)	Brief task and purpose of the mission with accompanying brief		
INCIDENT TYPE	Type of significant activity (if any)		
GRID	Point grid of specific actions	FOB/TOWN/CP	Towns, CPs, FOBs operated in
SUMMARY OF INCIDENT	Short 3-5 sentence summary of patrol events for use on the SIGACT tracker		
ENEMY BDA	As needed		
FRIENDLY BDA	As needed		
RTE TRAFFICABILITY	By route account of trafficability as per route reconnaissance standards		
OBSTACLES	Significant road or route hazards with bypasses if found (with grids)		
SITUATION BRIEF	The detailed, factual account of the partrol from SP to RP. This does not include the patrol leader's opinions *(this goes in the remarks section).* Includes pictures, times and grids - account of radio traffic *(if possible).*		
ENEMY TTPs	Any notable TTPs observed during the patrol to aid the AAR process after mission		
REMARKS	Any opinions the patrol leader or soldiers on patrol may have regarding TTPs, enemy activity, populous interaction or general perceptions		
# OF PERSONS DETAINED	As needed		

Figure 2. Sample of a patrol debrief report.

the quality of the S-2 shop's analysis is only as good as what you tell them!

Based on your reporting, the S-2 shop can build data (including predictive analysis) on attacks based on particular enemy units. And don't just give them "raw data"— please include your own analysis. What you think matters; just make it clear if you are making an assessment or observation.

Feedback. The S-2 is a service shop. If their analysis isn't what you need or isn't right, they need to know. Let your CoIST know when they're wrong (and when they're right). If the imagery they provided wasn't what you were looking for, or was perfect, let them know. If you want to see the interrogation summary of the guy you captured last week or want to make sure he is asked particular questions, tell them. They have some great resources and can tap into much bigger platforms, not only at the brigade level but above that. Work through your CoIST and they'll help get what you need.

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Notes

[1]Actual quote from a space-operations officer at the Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course: "Your AI isn't just the ground outside your AO! It's 20,000 feet up! It's the sun! And solar flares! You need to brief your commander on solar flares!" Right.

[2]About 90 percent of all intelligence is readily available through the Internet, newspapers, magazines and books. It's the analysis that turns it from data into a truly valuable product. If you don't have an opensource.gov account, you should open one today. Also, intel soldiers get access to more data on this site – remember that as your CoIST is developed.

[3]You know: movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, command-and-control and protection.

[4]For example, think about what happens when a soldier is kidnapped while downrange. Everything stops, and everything focuses on recovery. One lost soldier costs far more resources for U.S. forces than a spectacular attack on a humvee or mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle.

[5]For example, you can refer to Field Manual 2-01.3, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*** (new); FM 2-19.4, ***Brigade Intelligence Operations***; FM 2-91.4, ***Intelligence Support to Urban Operations***; FM 34-8, ***Intelligence for Commanders***; FM 34-130, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield** (old); and Training Circular 7-100, ***Hybrid Threat***.

Acronym Quick-Scan

AI – area of interest
AO – area of operations
CO – course of action
CoIST – company intelligence support team
FADS – feasible, acceptable, distinct, suitable
FM – field manual
HPT – high-priority target
HVT – high-value target
IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield
RFI – request for information
SIGACT – significant activity
TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures

Simplifying the Garrison Planning Process

by Steve Griffin

While managing two separate wars over the past seven years, the U.S. Army is in a new kind of officer-development struggle. The good news is that the Army can address this struggle with a simplified planning system for junior staff officers.

Situation

Both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the Army, particularly the company-grade officer corps, into a virtual personnel tailspin. Aside from a higher attrition rate, these personnel issues now result in aberrant career-development timelines for company-grade officers. These problems have also resulted in a training and development challenge that continues to puzzle newly exalted field-grade officers.

Due to deployment-adjusted career timelines, junior officers receive staff billets at an earlier stage in their careers. Then, in some cases, they stay there longer than usual due to a unit's operational tempo. Traditionally the Army has tried to train officers serving in staff positions at the mid-level captains' career course. However, officers placed in a staff billet before attending this course may find themselves with increased duties and responsibilities but little formal training to help them perform those duties.

It's this lack of formal training and the absence of an easily learned and practiced planning system that prevents new staff officers from adequately preparing for and executing operations while in the garrison environment. If the Army developed and disseminated a simplified planning system, it would aid junior staff officers, who lack formal training and experience, to think and perform as seasoned planners while managing their garrison operations.

The issue of junior company-grade officers on a battalion's or brigade's staff during combat operations is not, in itself, a major concern. Over the past seven years, units in combat zones accomplished their assigned missions and goals with a junior staff. However, when these inexperienced staffs redeploy, junior staff officers end up unsure how to perform their jobs effectively at their home station. Assigning company-grade officers to a unit's staff prematurely in their career, or leaving them on staff longer than acceptable, can result in several shortcomings.

One result is a staff with limited garrison exposure and thus little experience in planning the unique agglomeration of events found in a garrison setting. This is partially due to a lack of time spent in entry-level positions and the absence of formal training a newly assigned staff officer receives. Units may also lack field-grade or career course-qualified officers to train new staff officers in the art of planning.

The lack of formal training and the absence of an easily learned and practiced planning system prevents new staff officers from adequately preparing for and executing operations while in the garrison environment. *(U.S. Army photo)*

However, the issue compounding all these problems is the lack of a clear system to guide those new officers in planning and executing garrison events. The lack of a system contributes to newly assigned and ineffective junior staff officers. These young officers blindly plan and execute operations without following procedures designed to ensure completeness during their preparations. This fallacious type of planning, also known to some as "satisficing," is choosing the first option that comes to mind without any type of systematic analysis.[1]

The scope of experience limits many of the junior officers put into primary or even assistant staff positions. While older soldiers and officers of the pre-Sept. 11, 2001, Army might recall a more focused and structured garrison training environment, newly commissioned officers entering the fast-paced tempo of today's operational units only experience the round-robin training, deployment and redeployment set by the Army's still-relatively-new Army Force Generation cycle.[2] The overexposure to this cycle results in what equates to only wartime experience for many of the Army's junior officers. Often, these officers find themselves on a unit's staff prior to redeployment from a combat zone with the duty to plan reconstitution, reset and retraining operations with little to no guidance once back at their home station.

Critics of this concern argue that an officer's experience in combat can easily translate to the garrison environment, especially since combat operations are typically more taxing. However, those with experience managing garrison operations understand that, although some parallels may be drawn, training in the garrison environment is different from operating in a combat zone. Advocates of this school of thought argue that the Army has lost the "art" of garrison training in recent years, especially since the onslaught of the most recent wars. Senior operational commanders are now attempting to teach junior leaders how to plan garrison training events by forcing them to set up events in local areas not traditionally used as training grounds.

In addition to the limited experiences of their junior officers, units are also facing knowledge-management privation. Upon returning from year-long deployments, many units, regardless of organizational hierarchy, are seeing a mass exodus of their senior and most experienced leaders. These personnel losses are primarily due to permanent-change-of-station and end-term-of-service moves, but accompanying those losses is the organizational knowledge that has been developed, refined and perfected during that unit's past several years of training and deployments.

Units caught up in relentless deployment cycles often fail to capture both explicit knowledge[3] ("the knowledge that is easy to write down, communicate, teach and learn – the facts and rules)"[4] as well as tacit knowledge[5] ("the experience that enables us to do things without being able to explain how").[6] "Tacit knowledge cannot be learned from a textbook"[7] but comes through experience and doing. However, the difficulty associated with capturing these types of knowledge, as well as any staff systems that might be in place, is proving to be a difficult task for many operational units. Newly commissioned officers receive a minimal amount of staff-oriented training during their basic course, amplifying the problems. Then, the arduousness of training replacement officers on previously established staff systems frustrates many senior officers.

Finally, replacing commanding officers causes units to suffer a major setback. Commanders are typically the largest source of knowledge and systems-continuity within a unit. A new commander, once in place, typically establishes a new staff system because one is absent or he/she finds the current system ineffective. Both instances are prevalent in units where senior leaders depart and take the unit's organizational knowledge with them.

Nonetheless, all these problems together remain symptoms of the true issue: the Army lacks a clear and simple procedure for new staff officers to follow during the planning and execution of garrison operations. Supporters of the Army's current decision-making process, the military decision-making process, argue that a system is already in place. Conversely, opponents argue that the MDMP is bulky, time-consuming and manpower-intensive. More importantly, the MDMP doesn't always fit. Garrison-type missions can range from complex, multifaceted training operations to simple, single-man events. Using the MDMP for all garrison operations would simply be overkill. Also, the MDMP is primarily taught during higher-level military educational courses, starting with the captains' career course, so untrained and unfamiliar junior staff officers are unable to use the process.

In addition to the MDMP, the Army has two other primary systems already in place to aid with planning, training and decision-making. The first, the scarcely known rapid decision-making and synchronization process,[8] has one fundamental flaw: it requires an already established plan (or order) from which to adjust. A second flaw is that "RDSP seeks an acceptable solution, rather than an optimal (most desirable) one."[9] This is a commonly seen problem that relates to "satisficing," discussed previously.

The second system, the Eight-Step Training Model, is currently the closest solution to any other system the Army has to offer. However, even the Eight-Step Training Model – useful when planning large field-training exercises or even small-unit training events – can be lengthy and time-consuming. More importantly, this process doesn't always "fit" either. Staff officers don't always need all eight steps to accomplish some of the more simple events they might be managing. Furthermore, remembering all eight steps or constantly referring to a chart to ensure that one is following the process correctly can be burdensome.

Planning systems

The Army needs a new system. The system needs to be simple, easy to learn and train, easy to remember and, most importantly, easy to use. As GEN George C. Marshall said, "We must develop a technique and method so simple and so brief that the citizen-soldier of good common sense can readily grasp the idea."[10]

This new system must be both methodical and intuitive. It needs to capture the analytical aspects necessary to compensate for a lack of experience in the user and, at the same time, allow the user to draw on any prior experience he or she might have. Finding the proper balance between these two attributes is critical, as the system can't rely too heavily on either type of knowledge. Its analytical side must be clear, making it easily trainable and able to compensate for a potential lack of intuitive knowledge in the user. Put together, this combination of systematic analysis and intuition must result in the development of a thinking staff officer – one able to use a simple analytical system in combination with parallels from prior experiences to accomplish the various types of missions he or she might encounter in the garrison environment.

Experienced staff officers develop unique systems for managing the multitude of events they encounter during their garrison time. The systems usually materialize in one of three ways:

- Adopting it from a predecessor who previously established it;
- Learning it from a supervisor or colleague in a previous job; or

- Accruing enough time and experience in that position to understand the full scope of their responsibilities and thus develop a unique system of their own.

Some self-created systems may be better than others. One proven system, passed down through generations of successful staff officers, is the "coordinate-anticipate-verify"[11] method. Staff officers regardless of rank or experience level can use this method in planning, coordinating and managing any type of garrison operation. It is especially useful for operations that don't seem to fit into any of the other previously established Army planning systems. The previously mentioned criteria necessary to accommodate the unique needs of operations in a garrison environment fit into this method. It is simple, easy to remember, easy to follow and easily trained.

To break the process down, begin with the first step.

Coordinate

According to Field Manual 6-0, "Staffs prepare and issue plans and orders to execute their commanders' decisions, coordinating all necessary details."[12] Coordination is the step that most inexperienced junior staff officers think they do but in reality fail to complete adequately. This is the planning phase, the time when the assigned action officer completes his or her most important responsibility: planning the event. The Army refers to it as "synchronization," "the arrangement of actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place."[13] Simply put, it means developing a viable, executable plan that isn't just the first option that comes mind.

A properly framed plan must ensure that it coincides with the commander's intent as well as with the established end state. It must also be within the scope of the higher unit's established concept of the operation (if available). Developing the plan takes careful consideration and might even draw from outside sources. However, it's also only half of the first step. The other part of this step is to inform parties affected by the plan and ensure proper conveyance of pertinent concept details to those impacted parties.

This occurs prior to publishing any written order and serves two purposes. The first is to give the affected parties a "heads up" that a plan is in development and could potentially require action on their part. This allows those parties to start their own planning process and enables them to begin any necessary initial movements in anticipation of an official order.

The second reason for informing affected parties is to solicit feedback on the proposed plan. Although the assigned staff officer is ultimately responsible for developing a plan and getting it approved, most junior officers don't have the insight or experience to predict all possible problems or even consider all possible methods for accomplishing a prescribed mission. Feedback from subordinate units may not only help the staff officer realize his or her planning constraints but also allow third-party input from organizations or individuals who will most likely be responsible for executing the task.

Anticipate

As stated in the manual, "staffs continually identify current and future problems or issues that affect mission accomplishment. Once they identify a problem, staff members analyze the actions or coordination needed to solve it."[14] As any experienced staff officer can note, few plans are perfect, and the "enemy" – in many cases Murphy's Law[15] – always gets a vote. First, the action officer must analyze and identify potential problems with the plan that may occur during both planning and execution. He or she then must develop contingency plans to overcome identified problems should they arise.

Finally, the action officer should convey those potential problems to affected parties, as well as articulate the identified actions to take if they occur. This method of developing circumstantial plans not only forces the planning officer to think through the operation, but also gives him or her a starting point to adjust from if he or she must use those plans.

Admittedly, identifying potential problems in any plan is not an easy task. Traditionally it takes vast amounts of experience and repetition for even senior staff officers to identify potential problems in a plan. This difficulty is even more aggrandized in junior officers who have no experience or repetition to draw from during a planning process. There are, however, techniques that may aid a planner in thinking through an operation to identify potential problems.

One established method is the "premortem"[16] or "crystal ball"[17] technique. A hospital conducts a postmortem procedure to discover why a patient died. Various parties benefit from this: the physician, the medical community, even the patient's friends and family. However, a postmortem doesn't help the patient. Similarly, military officers might conduct a "postmortem," most commonly in the form of an after-action review, to find out why an operation failed. They do this to learn what went wrong, but obviously it's too late at that point – the mistakes have already been made. By moving a "postmortem" to the beginning of the process before execution, we can attempt to anticipate problems as well as become more realistic about the challenges and outcomes.

In the "premortem" or "crystal ball" technique, the planning officer or team pretends that upon completion, the operation in question has failed. The planner or planners then write down all the reasons why it could have failed. Naturally, this method isn't expected to be a panacea for every plan, but it can be used to prepare an action officer for potential predicaments in most plans by aiding in anticipating their problems.

Verify

Once the action officer identifies and plans for as many potential problems as he or she can realize, the final step is to verify. "Staffs assist their commanders by ensuring that subordinates execute their decisions. This practice allows commanders to focus on the overall operation."[18] At this point, the operation moves into the execution phase, and action occurs on the previously established plan. The action officer ensures the correct actions occur. Attending the operation personally or having a representative present in his or her place can accomplish this. The representative should either be a participant in the planning or receive a thorough briefing of the plan and necessary contingencies. Both the action officer and the representative should immediately recognize and identify problems before they happen or, at minimum, identify the initial warning signs to act quickly.

Planning an event and then failing to observe it is one of the most common mistakes among junior staff officers. Often times those officers are overwhelmed by other tasks and don't fully understand the management technique of delegation. Even the simplest of operations that don't have a planning representative present can quickly go awry – and often times even fail.

Verifying the planned execution of an event enables the action officer to provide the necessary feedback to his or her supervisors and commanders to manage their units. The "verify" step is crucial in the overall process, as it aids staff officers in painting an operational picture for their commanders. This allows com-

Commanders must make a conscious effort to identify training events or operations that might be useful to junior staff officers and require them to participate. Gaining relevant experience doesn't happen when sitting behind a desk. *(U.S. Army photo)*

manders to focus their limited time and attention on other operations that may be in more need of it.

Once senior staff officers understand the simplicity of the CAV method and decide to use it, the final phase is to train and implement it. Teaching the systematic, analytical side of this process is easy. It is only three easy-to-remember steps. Simply reading this article or receiving a quick briefing should suffice for just about any officer, regardless of rank or experience level. The simplicity of this method makes it easy to both teach and learn. Also, adding this method to a unit's garrison standard operating procedure is fast, easy and requires little analysis.

Alternatively, teaching the intuitive side of this method might be a bit more difficult. How does one quickly train experience? Both commanders and senior leaders run into this problem when attempting to train their junior staff officers. The only way to accomplish this is for commanders and supervisors to focus on exposing their junior officers to all types of operations – garrison or tactical – as much as possible. Doing this enables those junior officers to draw relevant parallels from participating in or witnessing events. Commanders must make a conscious effort to identify training events or operations that might be useful to junior staff officers and require them to participate. Gaining relevant experience doesn't happen when sitting behind a desk.

Ultimately, teaching a new staff officer, particularly one who is still junior, is easy. Many senior officers struggled with this task in the past and are not eager to repeat the same trials in the future. Compounding the problem is the lack of a systematic and easy-to-use planning tool for senior officers to teach and for junior officers to learn. By understanding the need for this type of process, and recognizing how it should be both analytically and intuitively structured, current and future leaders of the Army can capitalize on a time-proven, orderly solution.

The CAV method is the answer to a habitual question plaguing generations of staff officers throughout the force. Taking the short time required to learn this system, use it and teach it to others, officers will not only improve their personal job performance but also the performance of their unit and the units around them.

Steve Griffin is a former Armor officer, graduating from Auburn University's ROTC program in May 2004. He served as platoon leader with tank, rifle and scout platoons; troop executive officer; battalion civil-military officer; and S-3 operations officer with units such as 1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division; Troop G, 1st Cavalry Regiment (2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division Brigade Reconnaissance Troop); 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment; and 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, 170th Brigade Combat Team. He deployed to Iraq in 2006 and 2008 and holds two Bronze Star medals for those deployments. A winner of the Army's GEN Douglas MacArthur Award for leadership, his military education includes the Armor Officer's Basic Course, Scout Leader's Course, Airborne School and U.S. Army Ranger School. He also holds a bachelor's of science degree in management information systems from Auburn and is pursuing a master's degree in security studies. He currently works as a Defense Department program manager for Syn-Tech Systems, Inc., Tallahassee, FL.

Notes

[1]Simon, H.A. ***Models of Man: Social and Rational***. New York: Wiley Press, 1957.

[2]U.S. Army Field Manual 7-0, ***Training for Full Spectrum Operations***, Paragraph 1-4.

[3]Klein, Gary. ***Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions***. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.

[4]Klein, Gary. ***Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making***. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009.

[5]Polanyi, Michael. ***Personal Knowledge***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

[6]Polanyi, Michael. ***The Tacit Dimension***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

[7]Orr, Julian. ***Sharing Knowledge, Celebrating Identity: Community Memory in a Service Culture***. London: Sage Press, 1990.

[8]U.S. Army Field Manual-Interim 5-0.1, ***The Operations Process***, Paragraph 4-5.

[9]U.S. Army Field Manual 3-90.6, ***The Brigade Combat Team***, Paragraph 3-8.

[10]Bolger, Daniel. ***The Battle for Hunger Hill***. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1997.

[11]This method was first introduced to me in Summer 2009 by LTC Dan Kelley. At the time, LTC Kelley commanded 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Baumholder, Germany.

[12]U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0, ***Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces***, Paragraph D-3.

[13]Joint Publication 1-02, ***Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms***, 533.

[14]U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0, ***Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces***, Paragraph D-5.

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Acronym Quick-Scan

CAV – coordinate – anticipate – verify
MDMP – military decision-making process
RDSP – rapid decision-making and synchronization process

Rethinking the Mobile Gun System Platoon's Training

by SFC Branden Syverson

Tankers are responsible for their treatment as the redheaded stepchildren of light-infantry units because we don't conduct the right training and we don't successfully integrate our Mobile Gun System platoons into light-infantry companies. This article discusses the situation and makes recommendations to correct it.

The biggest concern of tankers in a Stryker brigade MGS platoon is not functioning to their full capability. At home station, MGS platoons rarely see members of their chain of command watching them shoot Table VIII on the gunnery range. Company commanders include MGS platoons in live-fire plans only as an afterthought. During deployment, MGS platoons serve as forward-operating-base security or escort convoys instead of in their role as infantry-support platforms on other missions.

How do we fix this?

Different mentality

MGS is not a tank. Successful integration within a light-infantry company takes a different mentality. You must think of yourself as a 19B or 11K.

In a Stryker brigade, it's all about the infantry. The brigade's focus is the nine-man infantry squad. Everything else in the brigade exists solely to support our dismounted brethren on the ground. MGS' principle function is to provide rapid direct fires to support assaulting infantry. Therefore, MGS commanders may receive guidance from infantry-squad leaders holding lower rank.

Employing MGS requires trust and respect between infantry platoons and MGS platoons. Stryker company leadership, beginning with squad leaders, generally comes from a light-infantry background. Many infantry platoon leaders lack direct experience working with tanks. Thus, they see tankers as short, overweight individuals who can't pass the Army Physical Fitness Test. Participating in the infantry's training is the best way to overcome this perception and build trust.

Battle drills: training with infantry

Current field manuals covering the Stryker Brigade Combat Team rifle squad through company are well written; however, they don't go in depth in incorporating the MGS platoon into the battle drills. It's up to the leadership to decide how to have an MGS platoon assist a rifle squad (team, platoon or company) on any given mission.

As an example, before every infantry-oriented training event, my company commander asked me for the training plan for my platoon. As the MGS platoon sergeant/platoon leader, I insisted



In a Stryker brigade, it's all about the infantry. The brigade's focus is the nine-man infantry squad. Everything else in the brigade exists solely to support our dismounted brethren on the ground. MGS' principle function is to provide rapid direct fires to support assaulting infantry.

that we train with the company instead of remaining in garrison to conduct "tanker training." I divided my platoon into three teams and attached them to the infantry platoons. I challenged the infantry to use them as independent fire teams or within the squads as dismounts. As a platoon sergeant, I also participated as part of a fire team, learning Battle Drills One and Six. My platoon also conducted foot marches with the infantry platoons.

Training with infantry platoons answered the question: how can you hope to support a platoon conducting an assault on a building if you've never done it before? We proved we could accomplish the same tasks as the infantry platoons. We also showed the infantry that tankers are highly capable and adaptable soldiers rather than oxygen-thieving slugs who ride around all day. As a result, we built invaluable camaraderie and trust between MGS crews and infantry.

Integrating infantry into MGS training

The next step is integrating the infantry into MGS training. At this point, the MGS platoon is successfully integrated into the infantry's training; how do you get the infantry integrated into yours? They take one look at that long 105mm cannon and don't want it anywhere near them. Yet you must integrate them into your training, as one primary MGS mission is to conduct a wall breach in support of an infantry assault.

There are no established tactics, techniques and procedures in conducting a wall breach supporting an infantry assault. The current MGS platoon manual (FM 3-20.151) describes in detail how to breach a wall, but it doesn't describe how to coordinate with the infantry. Added to the difficulty are the infantry platoon's normal procedures. Usually infantry platoons will have a trained master breacher, since the light fighter prefers to have someone breach a wall with C4 and detonation cord rather than watch an MGS platoon do it. You must make an effort to integrate your vehicles into the infantry training at every level.

The current gunnery engagement for conducting a wall breach is to shoot a pop-up wall at 300 to 500 meters from a short halt and then engage a sniper. However, my experience in operational environments with conducting wall breaches shows that coordinating the breach location with the assault element is the most difficult part.

For example, the assaulting element's squad leader must designate the breach point. Once the assault element is set, the squad leader signals the MGS platoon to conduct the breach. If the gunner can't identify the breach point with his optics, the vehicle commander may have to identify the breach point for him or fire the breach himself. According to standard operating procedures (if any), the VC then initiates a short count prior to firing. Should a reinforced wall require multiple rounds to breach, the MGS commander communicates with the assault element to avoid a rush after the first round. (MGS commanders and assault teams should avoid this scenario their first time in theater.)

This example is a collective task completed during platoon or company live-fire training. As I said, the infantry would rather conduct a wall breach with demolition. Therefore, you'll likely perform a support-by-fire role rather than a direct-support role during company and platoon live-fire exercises.

Joint gunnery

The key to getting the infantry more involved with MGS training is to conduct a joint gunnery, as opposed to the current way of doing things. The gunnery plan for most Stryker units consolidates all MGS vehicles to shoot a brigade-level gunnery. Tankers gather, run their gunnery "the right way" and have top MGS and platoon competitions. But remember, MGS is an infantry-support vehicle. Any time the infantry company is conducting any training, the MGS platoon should be involved. By training separately from the company, you lose an excellent opportunity to show your equipment and training capabilities.

I recommend rethinking the wall-breach engagement during gunnery to correct this issue. Every infantry platoon should include an MGS platoon when it conducts live-fire training to provide direct-fire support as well as a wall breach. A company can establish and practice its SOP for wall breaches using MGS. Also, the infantry sees and knows the MGS is accurate and "nearby" their main gun. In addition, the MGS platoon and most of the squads conduct live-fire exercises together. The result is a MGS platoon assuming a more active role with the infantry platoons during a future deployment.

Like the MGS, the company's Strykers must qualify during gunnery every six months. In an ideal situation, the MGS platoon would conduct its gunnery on the same range and at the same time as the company. In the new MGS gunnery manual, it's possible to establish a range allowing an MGS and infantry-carrier vehicle with either a MK19 or .50 caliber to engage the same targets. For example, if the MGS is in the left lane, an ICV with a dismounted squad could be in the right lane next to the range safety officer.

Once a crew completes gunnery and moves to platoon live-fire, a wall-breach engagement should occur. As I said, coordination is the most difficult part of a wall breach – details such as figuring out where the dismounts want the hole, the composition of the wall and when the infantry can move forward need to be addressed in the first collective-training opportunity. The wall target can be a pop-up target or a façade erected by the company. In addition, the target can have circles on it to represent optimal placement of the round(s).

In the joint MGS/infantry engagement, the infantry-squad leader requests a breach, designates the target and the MGS engages. The company commander, also on the range, observes the engagement to ensure safety. If this engagement is done during every collective table, and the platoon has two or three MGS vehicles, most of the infantry squads can conduct the engagement.

If the range complex used for platoon or company live-fire doesn't allow firing the 105mm main gun, master gunners are integral players in figuring out how to overcome this obstacle. The solution may be combining the MGS as direct support with the master breacher and his demo. When the MGS and the assault element are set, admin can take a time out. During this, the master breacher can place his charge and set the fuse for a specific time. Then, the MGS and assault element can still perform their assigned roles, per the SOP, before and after the explosion takes place.

Common sense

The current MGS gunnery manual contains five offensive and five defensive engagements, but we must always look ahead to what could happen and train accordingly. For instance, a Stryker brigade may face off against a conventional enemy. An MGS platoon may face an enemy tank platoon and fight from a defensive (reverse slope) position.

The proper techniques for conducting a defensive engagement are frangible tasks and require regular practice. However, we need not practice all five defensive engagements. I recommend that only two engagements be conducted from an improved defensive position per table due to common-sense reasons. For example, the only digging asset the Engineer company in a Stryker brigade has is shovels, making a doctrinally correct three-tiered fighting position out of the question in normal Stryker operations.

Most of the MGS engagements we conduct during deployment today are in the open from a stationary position. The MGS platoon may conduct bounding while overwatching a dismounted patrol, in addition to overnight screening of a suspicious area. Security at traffic-control points or meeting places are other tasks the MGS platoon may perform. When the MGS is stationary, its position is unprotected and exposed. The vehicle may be able to move behind a low wall to be in a semi-hull-down position. Preparation for deployment to current theaters should include gunnery engagements of this type for vehicles.

Scanning procedures are another important area of training. The difference in scanning procedures between a turret-down and a hull-down position is substantial. In turret-down, only the VC can scan with the commander's panoramic viewer because the gunner's sight is below the main gun. The gunner waits for the commander to designate him to the target and pull the driver forward. On the other hand, if the vehicle engages from a hull-down or stationary position on the course road, the gunner has the opportunity to scan his sector constantly.

In scanning-procedures training, the VC needs to assign sectors to his crew and decide what target to engage when multiple targets are present. This forces crews to conduct a more aggressive scanning posture when stationary and trains VCs to quickly assess targets and engage the biggest threat first.

New gunnery manual

Also, when designating from the command-post vehicle, the gunner is only laid on in deflection. Elevation then doesn't line up and the gunner can lose time acquiring the target. In the future MGS gunnery manual, commanders can choose the posture for the vehicles for each engagement. Effectively training crews to react correctly requires fighting at least four engagements from a stationary position.

Training with the infantry can be demanding and frustrating. There are times the "us/them" mentality will take intensive effort to overcome. Maintaining positive crosstalk with the chain of command and developing relationships with the infantry platoon will go far in fixing this problem. The new gunnery manual touches on these issues.

The tanker is the linchpin in the process of integrating MGS into the infantry platoon. Commanders at all levels should work toward fully integrating their units. Our design is to be a mutually supportive, integrated, combat-ready fighting force!

SFC Branden Syverson serves as a special-projects noncommissioned officer with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Striker Brigade Combat Team, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA. Previous assignments include various leadership and staff positions, including MGS platoon sergeant for Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, in Afghanistan and at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA; Abrams master-gunner instructor, 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; and battalion master gunner and tank commander, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and at Fort Hood, TX. His military education includes M1A1 and M1A2-SEP master-gunner courses and Senior Leader's Course.

Acronym Quick-Scan

FM – field manual
ICV – infantry-carrier vehicle
MGS – mobile gun system
SOP – standard operating procedures
VC – vehicle commander

Update: Relocating Armor History, Honor and Lineage to Fort Benning

by LTC Matthew Boal and CPT Miles Murray

On June 20, 2011, 194th Armor Brigade and 316th Cavalry Brigade uncased their colors in a ceremony on Brave Rifles Field at Fort Benning, GA. *(photos by Kristian Ogden)*

BG Ted Martin, Armor School commandant, and CSM Ricky Young, Armor School command sergeant major, officially cut the ribbon May 26, 2011, to dedicate the M1 and M4A3E8 displays as well as the future home of the National Armor and Cavalry Museum.

The M1 Abrams tank is displayed on Fort Benning Boulevard adjacent to the access-control point, marking the future home of the National Armor and Cavalry Museum. This tank represents 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment's actions with 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), 24th Infantry Division, which contributed to the liberation of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. During the coalition ground offensive in February 1991, the 2/69th penetrated deep into Iraq to choke off enemy supply routes in the Euphrates River valley and cut off the escape route of the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions.

*(**Editor's note:** The following article is provided as an update to "BRAC: Relocating Armor History, Honor and Lineage" published in the March-April 2009 edition of **ARMOR**.)*

Fort Benning has grown and changed significantly since Dan Nelson reported on the relocation of Armor and Cavalry history, lineage and honor from Fort Knox, KY, to Fort Benning, GA, in the March-April 2009 edition of ***ARMOR***. Many Maneuver Center of Excellence and Armor School leaders and countless hardworking subordinates have worked to ensure the proud Armor and Cavalry heritage is appropriately displayed at Harmony Church and across the MCoE.

This important work is organized into six categories that capture the history and lineage of Armor and Cavalry. At Harmony Church, vehicle displays, streets and athletic fields are branded in recognition of historic Armor and Cavalry units. Armor School ranges, training areas and buildings at Fort Benning are memorialized to recognize and honor distinguished Armor and Cavalry soldiers and leaders and inspire future generations of mounted warriors.

One of the most visible and important aspects of Armor and Cavalry branding is display of a representative collection of historic armored vehicles. As of this ***ARMOR*** issue's publication, Fort Knox has shipped its entire collection of historic armored vehicles to Fort Benning. Twenty historic vehicles from Knox are now positioned strategically around Harmony Church and at the Fort Benning Boulevard access-control point adjacent to the future home of the National Armor and Cavalry Museum (Figure 1). Construction is nearly finished on a new elevated pedestal at the Harmony Church ACP along Highway 27/280. Once construction is complete, an M1A1 Abrams tank will occupy this elevated pedestal to welcome visitors to Fort Benning and the Armor School. Plans are under development to display an M551 Sheridan tank alongside airborne artifacts near historic Eubanks Field and the U.S. Army Airborne School.

The 12 primary roads and streets in and around Harmony Church have been named to honor the history of both active and inactive Armor and Cavalry organizations whose contributions extend from World War II through the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Figure 2). Harmony Church roads and streets pay tribute to a broad array of armored divisions, separate tank



Figure 1. Twenty historic vehicles shipped from Fort Knox, KY, make up the Armor-collection displays around Harmony Church and on Fort Benning Boulevard adjacent to the National Armor and Cavalry Museum's future home.

battalions, cavalry regiments and armor regiments. An additional 31 roads and streets outside the Harmony Church footprint are also named to honor historic mounted warriors, units and significant mounted engagements. Many of these other roads and streets are located within the newly constructed Patton Village family-housing area with names such as Strike Swiftly Loop, 34th Armor Street, Chaffee Street and Tank Corps Way, among others.

All the buildings located in Harmony Church are memorialized in recognition of officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers who fought heroically while serving in Armor and Cavalry units. Current and future Armor School cadre and students will draw inspiration from the battlefield narratives that tell the story of generations of selfless and dedicated mounted warriors as they work, train and live in these facilities. Fifty-five buildings at Harmony Church are approved or pending final approval to recognize and honor mounted warriors who served during representative campaigns that have defined Armor and Cavalry. Many of the names are familiar – they are legends of the branch who represent mounted warriors who served and trained at Fort Knox, such as GEN George S. Patton, COL H.T. Cherry, MSG E. Kouma, LTG D. VanVoorhis and CPL J.L. Wickam. Others are less familiar names – they are mounted warriors from our Army's more recent conflicts like SGT J.E. Proctor, SPC H.F. Bradfield and CSM E.F. Cooke. Regardless of when they served, these extraordinary heroes will continue to inspire the next generation of mounted warriors and leaders who will train over the course of their careers at the Armor School.



Figure 2. The names of the primary roads and streets in and around Harmony Church honor the history of Armor and Cavalry organizations whose contributions extend from World War II through the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Armor School and MCoE leadership also selected the names of six famous mounted formations for five new athletic fields and one new parade field at Harmony Church. Tank crewmen and Cavalry scouts in training will conduct physical training on fields named Blackhorse, Iron Knights, Thunderbolt and Steel Tigers. The fifth athletic training field at Harmony Church will be named Leatherneck in honor of U.S. Marine Corps tank crewmen, who have trained and fought alongside Army tank crewmen for years. Appropriately, all future generations of Cavalry scouts and tank crewmen will graduate from training on Brave Rifles Parade Field, the centerpiece of the new 194th Armored Brigade footprint at Fort Benning.



Figure 3. Fifteen small-arms ranges and two mounted-gunnery ranges honor mounted-force luminaries who span the Armor Branch's history. Four training areas, created specifically to support mounted-training requirements, are also set aside to memorialize Armor and Cavalry leaders.

Oscar Range Complex Memorialization

- Oscar 1 Zero, CPT D.W. Lee (WWII, MoH)
- Oscar 2 MRFR, CPL D.M. Call (WWI, MoH)
- Oscar 3 MRFR, CPL E.L. Copple (K, DSC)
- Oscar 4 Zero, SP4 F. Davis (VN, SS)
- Oscar 5 FMR, SSG C.B. Morris (VN, MoH)
- Oscar 6 MRFR, SGT W. McBryar (IW, MoH)
- Oscar 7 MRFR, 2LT T.W. Fowler (WWII, MoH)
- Oscar 8 Zero, SGT J.L. Butler (OIF, SS)
- Oscar 9 MRFR, BG C. Pulaski (RW)
- Oscar 10 Zero, SSG R.H. Dietz (WWII, MoH)
- Oscar 11 MRFR, 1LT R.A. Steindam (VN, MoH)
- Oscar 12 MRFR, CPT F.J. Baum (WWII, MoH)
- Oscar 13 Zero, PFC E. Soto (WWII, DSC)
- Oscar 14 FMR, SSG S.A. Booker (OIF, SS)
- Oscar 15 FMR, CW2 L.G. Pool (WWII, DSC)

Fifteen new small-arms ranges and two new mounted-gunnery ranges represent a significant portion of the recent construction at Fort Benning (Figure 2). These ranges will be memorialized in honor of mounted-force luminaries who span the entire history of the branch – from BG Casimir Pulaski of the Continental Army to SGT J.L. Butler and SSG S.A. Booker from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Other notable mounted warriors such as CPT F.J. Baum, PFC R.H. Brooks and 1LT R.A. Steindam will also find homes on new live-fire ranges at Fort Benning.

Four training areas, created specifically to support mounted-training requirements, are also set aside to memorialize Armor and Cavalry leaders. For example, new Armor lieutenants will learn to maneuver individual vehicles, sections and platoons in the Arracourt Maneuver Training Area, while Abrams and Bradley mechanics will hone their recovery skills in the Sandy Hook Recovery Training Area. Soldiers in scout and tank-crewman one-station unit training will learn to drive their assigned vehicles at the Kall River Driver Course, then further develop those skills at the Buffalo Soldier Maneuver Training Area (Figure 3).

The proud heritage of the Armor and Cavalry force is on display at the Armor School in Harmony Church. Our notable and inspirational mounted leaders are well represented at Fort Benning. Perhaps more importantly, the MCoE leadership has asked that we leave some new facilities unnamed to recognize and honor future generations of distinguished Armor and Cavalry warriors. Future mounted heroes have a new home at Fort Benning, where they will only add to the rich history and traditions of our storied branch.

Starting in late Fall 2011, the Armor School will begin to formally dedicate our new facilities through a series of dedication ceremonies at Harmony Church, sponsored by our Armor School brigades and their subordinate battalions and squadrons. We will publish memorialization-ceremony schedules and more planning information in future editions of ***ARMOR***.

LTC Matt Boal is executive officer of the Armor School's management staff at Fort Benning. He has served in a variety of leadership and staff positions in Germany and at Forts Riley, KS; Rucker, AL; and Irwin, CA, during his career. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor's of arts degree from Penn State University and a master's degree in military arts and sciences from Command and General Staff College.

CPT Miles Murray is an operations officer for the Armor School's management staff, also stationed at Fort Benning. He has served as a platoon leader and company executive officer in 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, 4th Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, at Fort Bliss, TX, prior to assignment at the Armor School. His military education includes the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course and Cavalry Leader Course. He holds a bachelor's of science degree from West Point.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ACP – access-control point
MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence



ARMOR Evolves to Change with the Times

by Lisa Alley

The Army and the Armor Branch are on the cusp of change as we wrestle with how best to support our nation. And although a printed publication is "old technology," we'll adapt ***ARMOR*** within its limitations, over time and with ***ARMOR*** readers' input, to recognize the changes in how the our younger audience (sergeants/staff sergeants/newly promoted sergeants first class and lieutenants/captains/new-in-grade majors) consumes information. We must reach, and be relevant to, this multitasking generation who relates best to a visual presentation and content offered in scannable chunks, with resources provided for digging deeper. We'll need not only the support but the best efforts of ***ARMOR*** writers to make this happen.

Reasons for change

On-line and social networks take learning out of the Armor School and far beyond the pages of ***ARMOR***; ***ARMOR's*** printed edition and its on-line version will reach beyond the classroom and provide food for thought across the globe as Armor soldiers and leaders dialogue among themselves about topics presented in the schoolhouse and in ***ARMOR***. In fact, there is a shift away from the classroom as the only means of learning, so ***ARMOR*** – at least its Web version – may take on a more significant role in keeping Armor institutional knowledge going within the branch.

This sets up a very important mission for ***ARMOR*** writers: you're a subject-matter expert/mentor, and you're a filter for the branch's institutional knowledge. You filter expertise for other Armor soldiers and leaders, and they do the same for you (sometimes based on your example). Thus you develop a common trust and understanding with your colleagues as you serve them with your writing.

Helping readers 'consume'

Keeping the fact that the Armor School's command greatly values the dialogue ***ARMOR*** readers and writers carry on, we call on ***ARMOR*** writers to provide not just content but to enable readers to "consume" their articles. This means that when you share your ideas with others, expect them to share their ideas with you – and provide opportunities for them to do so by clearly, concisely focusing your article so they can easily understand and extract your main points/most important information. We'll have several benchmarks to accomplish this:

- Open with a direct, powerful purpose sentence that emphasizes the main point of your article and tells readers what they should do, understand or take away from your article. This is your reason for writing, or the bottom-line-up-front. If the BLUF isn't in your first sentence, it should be in the first or second paragraph. Catch your reader's attention and draw him to your conclusion(s) right away.
- Put your recommendation(s), conclusion(s) or lessons-learned and analysis near the BLUF – again, in the first or second paragraph. If you're writing a history, for example, forthrightly state the current lessons-learned and analysis to help establish clear relevancy to your readers. We're looking for "right-seat ride" approaches to transfer institutional knowledge rather than history for history's sake. Same approach with personal-experiences stories: if you include lessons-learned that are applicable Army-wide, or at least Armor Branch-wide, your colleagues will have clear take-aways.
- Follow the BLUF, naturally, with the necessary background information, details or plans. Clearly separate each major section by using headings, section titles or paragraph titles. (If you forget, we can add these in the editorial office.)
- Be sure to include points your ***ARMOR*** colleagues can discuss/dialogue about. Don't be shy about creating a "buzz" or some kind of memorable quote!
- Stay with ***ARMOR***'s area of proponency. There are general topics, such as leader-development articles, that we'll gladly consider, but for the most part, we'll stick with the Armor School's proponency areas. (See the inside front cover of any ***ARMOR*** edition for what those are.)

Army writing standards

If you submit an article to ***ARMOR'***s editorial office, you'll see that we apply the writing standards of DA Pamphlet 600-67, AR 25-30 and DA PAM 25-40 because, at their core, they put the reader first, and that's our bottom line. If you look closely at the standards, you'll see they guide you to write according to how ***you*** want to read material as a busy professional with a high op-tempo. For instance, from DA PAM 600-67, the standard for Army writing is writing the reader can understand in a single rapid reading, generally free of errors in grammar, mechanics and usage. If an article meets the standard, it's clear, concise, organized and to the point.

Each author has his or her own style, and we're not trying to squelch that, but we're looking for articles that primarily follow Army writing-style rules. Following these proven practices enhances readability, which also enhances comprehension – which enables your reader to better consume what you've written.

The "rules and tools" aren't meant to curb creativity but to concentrate on the reader; if a writer eliminates long words and long sentences without changing meaning, writing becomes clearer. You're not insulting your reader's intelligence but instead are increasing your reader's time-savings and understanding.

In summary, we ask ***ARMOR*** authors to keep the publication's younger audience uppermost in their minds and ensure the information in their article is relevant and focused for all age groups. An article useful for battalion commanders can include a sidebar, for example, giving concrete details and scenarios with which to teach a first lieutenant. Dialogue with us about your intent and audience, and allow us to give you feedback – which isn't offered as criticism of you but for us to keep ***ARMOR*** audiences uppermost in our minds as well.

Contact us at benn.armormagazine@conus.army.mil.

*Ms. Alley is **ARMOR's** new editor in chief. The Keith L. Ware award-winning editor has spent most of her 29-year uniformed and civil-service career as an editor and staff member of military newspapers and magazines, including publications such as **Army Communicator,** the U.S. Army Signal Regiment's professional-development publication, based at Fort Gordon, GA; **The Sheppard Senator,** 82nd Training Wing Public Affairs, Sheppard Air Force Base, TX; **Panorama**, 7th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Ord, Fort Ord, CA; and **MWR Guide**, Fort Ord. She also has 15 years' experience in Army Web publishing and policy, including assignments as Training and Doctrine Command's Web Content Manager; TRADOC Public Affairs' Command Information Branch chief and director of Web operations (which included TRADOC News Service); and the Signal Regiment's Web manager. Other assignments included command-information officer and division move/Base Realignment and Closure information specialist, 7th Inf. Div. (Light) and Fort Ord Public Affairs Office; public-relations specialist, Directorate of Community and Personnel Activities, Fort Ord; and, as a soldier, sports editor and staff writer, **Panorama**. Before joining the Army, she served as editor of the **Rose Hill Reporter,** Rose Hill, KS; and correspondent for both **Elgin Courier-News**, Elgin, IL, and **St. Charles Chronicle**, St. Charles, IL. Ms. Alley holds a bachelor's of arts degree in journalism and mass communication from Judson College in Elgin, IL. She has been a Keith L. Ware judge at Army level and for the Installation Management Agency Northeast Region in the print and Web-publishing categories.*

ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

AR – Army regulation
BLUF – bottom-line-up-front
DA PAM – Department of the Army Pamphlet
RGL – reading-grade level

Web resources for CSA thinking

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and other entities have material available on how GEN Martin Dempsey (current CSA and former commanding general of TRADOC) thinks so you may better discuss in your articles concerns vital to the Army over the next year-plus. (Your BLUF may point out changes and take-aways for your reader in these areas, for example.) If you know of other resources, please forward them to benn.armormagazine@conus.army.mil.

ARMY magazine series of articles

November 2010 edition, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2010/11/Documents/Dempsey_1110.pdf

December 2010 edition, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2010/12/Documents/Dempsey_1210.pdf

January 2011 edition, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2011/1/Documents/Dempsey_0111.pdf

March 2011 edition, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2011/3/Documents/Dempsey_0311.pdf

TRADOC News Service

Army Operating Concept, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/08/20/44058-army-operating-concept-provides-capstone-follow-up/index.html

103rd Armor Regiment

The 103rd Armor Regiment Unit Insignia was originally approved for the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Light (Towed) Sept. 11, 1942. It was redesignated for the 628th Tank Battalion March 1, 1954. The insignia was redesignated for the 103rd Armor Regiment, Pennsylvania Army National Guard Aug. 14, 1961. The armored shell of the voracious man-eater, cracking the scales of the fish is an allegorical allusion to the destructive power of the organization and its skill in snaring the wary enemy. The motto, "Expedite (With Dispatch)," emphasizes the speed of the operation, while the idea of power and destruction is shown in the shield.

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