

ARMOR

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Eyes and Ears

"Change has a considerable psychological impact on the human mind. To the fearful, it is threatening because it means that things may get worse. To the hopeful, it is encouraging because things may get better. To the confident, it is inspiring because the challenge exists to make things better."

— King Whitney Jr.

As I contemplate the words for my first editorial for *ARMOR*, I am reminded of the need for change. During more than 18 years of active service, I have seen a number of changes in the Army and throughout the Armor Force — some of which I have supported; some of which I have not supported. In the end, change happens, which is generally a fact of life.

I recently arrived back at Fort Knox to take the position as 42d editor in chief of *ARMOR*. During my short time away, many changes have taken place on this installation — Brave Rifles Avenue doesn't look the same; there are dozens of new billets, dining facilities, and motor pools being built to house thousands of soldiers from 1st Infantry Division. The Accessions Command and Human Resources Command are moving in quickly and the Armor Force will join the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Many of the highlights from the recent Armor Warfighting Conference dealt directly with "inevitable change." Retired Colonel Maxie McFarland delivered an outstanding brief on the topic of, "The Future Operational Environment." In his presentation, he briefly underscored the effects of a changing world on the United States military and how we have to adapt our past ways of thinking to meet imminent challenges. Many of the changes we currently see occurring in the structure of our forces address this; in my opinion, others do

not. However, as professionals, we must keep open minds, and remain adaptive and flexible.

One of the most sensitive issues the Armor Force currently faces is the move to Fort Benning to join forces with the MCoE, which has caused some angst among many of our armored cavalrymen. When I first learned of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative to establish the MCoE at Fort Benning, I was aghast, as were many of my armor buddies. The first question we asked was, "Who in their right mind made that decision?" We assumed that there must be some mistake. However, I had the opportunity during this assignment to learn a great deal about the changes planned for the future of the Armor School, and I am confident that we are doing the right thing for both branches and our Army.

During the Armor Conference in May, Major General Walt Wojdakowski, Commanding General, MCoE, gave an excellent rundown on how his installation is preparing for our move and integration into the MCoE schoolhouse. I was impressed with the number of initiatives for building new classrooms, headquarters, and ranges. I believe that there is a great deal of good to be gained from this move. The new MCoE will provide an excellent opportunity for great cavalrymen and infantrymen to share their skills and acumen to create a more lethal and flexible fighting force.

The bottom line is: there are many of us who are feeling the stresses of change in our military; some think the changes are coming too fast and we should slow down. I say, welcome the change and get onboard. Besides, good cavalrymen have always prided themselves on being able to adapt and overcome.

"Eyes and Ears" — MAR

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
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


U.S. Army Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership

U.S. Army Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is the Army's keystone field manual on leadership. It establishes leadership doctrine and fundamental principles for officers, non-commissioned officers, and Army civilians across all components. FM 6-22 uses the BE-KNOW-DO concept to express what is required of Army leaders. It is critical that Army leaders be agile, multiskilled "pentathletes," who have strong moral character, broad knowledge, and keen intellect. They must display these attributes and leader competencies bound by the concept of the Warrior Ethos. Leaders must be committed to lifelong learning and remain relevant and ready during a career of service to the Nation. Leaders must set the example, teach, and mentor, and this manual provides the principles, concepts, and training to accomplish this important task on which America depends.

Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development

Today's fast-paced, development-focused Army demands that a commander's first priority is a trained and ready unit. Leader development makes a substantial contribution to a unit's ability to train effectively and accomplish its mission. Yet commanders across the Army acknowledge the constant challenge to effectively implement unit leader development. The *Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development* is designed to provide commanders with an efficient and effective way to develop leaders. It draws on the input of successful Army commanders and noncommissioned officers, recent Army leadership studies, research on effective practices from the private and public sectors, and applicable Army regulations and doctrine. An online and downloadable version of this handbook is available on the Center for Leadership's Army Knowledge Online (AKO) web page. Feedback on this handbook can also be sent to the Center for Army Leadership on this web page.



Self-Development Handbook

The Army accomplishes a wide array of missions and unusual circumstances globally. At the same time, the Army is engaged in a massive and accelerated transformation that will infuse new organizations, technologies, and capabilities throughout the Army. To meet recurring challenges, Army personnel must supplement institutional and organizational training and education with continuous, planned self-development, which is important to achieving both personal and professional goals.

A soldier's personal growth benefits both the soldier and the Army. Due to the diversity of the Army's missions and needs, there are many self-development topics to study — from gaining leadership skills to learning a new language. This handbook draws on lessons from the field, educational and leadership research, and applicable Army regulations and doctrine to provide soldiers with state-of-the-art guidance on designing and implementing individual programs of self-development. Soldiers can use the information and exercises in this handbook to set a direction for self-development and reach high levels of professionalism.



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Armor Conference Outlines Road to the Future Force

by BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

As we conclude the 2008 Armor Warfighting Conference, plans for next year's conference are in full swing. Before this year's conference becomes a distant memory, I would like to thank everyone who made it such a successful and memorable event, especially those from across the maneuver force, our guest speakers, and allied partners, who traveled from distant countries to attend the conference. I will also take this opportunity to share this year's conference with those who were unable to attend.

The theme of this year's Armor Warfighting Conference, "Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Conflict," was chosen because it reflects the hard work underway across the Army to continuously prepare our Soldiers for war during a time when there is no foreseeable end to conflict. One of our guest speakers, retired Colonel Maxie MacFarland provided us with a comprehensive futurist's view of the "Age of Persistent Conflict." His briefing touched on the factors influencing the strategic and operational environment, such as demographics, energy, urbanization, cultures, and how the threat is only one component that must be addressed.

Brigadier General Mark Brown, the Program Executive Officer for the Soldier, provided a detailed overview of the great work his team is doing to procure, test, and field only the best equipment to our Soldiers. His team touches every one of our Soldiers through tactical clothing, weapons systems, and sights, and truly provides our Soldiers with the decisive edge as the world's most capable Army.

Command Sergeant Major Ciotola from III Corps and most recently the Multi-National Corps-Iraq echoed Brigadier General Brown's comments about our great force and provided vivid, firsthand accounts of the many great things that all of our Soldiers are doing in a very complex fight. He has many great lessons to teach and I know that everyone in the audience, regardless of rank, learned something that day about how to build a team, understand the human element, and inspire discipline and trust.

We were extremely fortunate to have Major General Tony Cucolo, the Army Chief of Public Affairs, speak about dominating the information domain. Major General Cucolo is a proven warfighter who truly understands how information and influence operations can and should work at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In sharing his vision, he explained that the information domain is key terrain and we must fight for it just as we would a dominating hilltop or critical pass.

Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston also helped our audience understand a little more about the strategic situation as he spoke about the current state of our forces and the plans to grow the Army. He is personally involved in the Chief of Staff of the Army's four imperatives, which are to sustain, prepare, reset, and transform the all-volunteer force. His personal connections to Soldiers around the Army made his briefing that much more informative as he recounted stories of how our great Soldiers are making a difference in more than 80 different countries worldwide.

We were also very fortunate to have Colonel Lee Fetterman, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager for the Future Combat System (FCS), speak about the materiel and doctrinal developments with the Army's number one procurement project. The FCS has arrived with specific systems and capabilities already fielded to units and more technology being developed daily.

The TRADOC Commanding General, General William Wallace, spoke about the future and the three critical capabilities — protect, connect, and project — that we must keep in balance for our future force. In other words, if we want the capability to rapidly deploy (or project), then we will have to limit the weight and protection of the force. Maybe a future broadband network with "connect" capabilities will assist the "protect" capabilities through an increased situational awareness and an active protection system. Regardless of which point of the tri-



angle of capabilities is emphasized, there will be trade-offs and it will be difficult to find a one-size-fits-all solution. The FCS will be optimized for this triangle, but we still foresee a future battlefield with various types of brigade combat teams working in concert.

Of course, the Armor Warfighting Conference would be incomplete without an update on the Maneuver Center of Excellence and the ongoing preparations at Fort Benning to receive the Armor School. Major General Walt Wojdakowski briefed for the third consecutive year at our conference, and we owe him a big debt of gratitude for his work in preparations for our pending move. I am convinced that the move to Fort Benning is the right one for the force and will make our two branches even more lethal and strong.

The 2008 Armor Warfighting Conference offered so much more than our outstanding keynote speakers, which included update briefings, industry vendors, and premier social events that provided a casual forum for discussing lessons learned, reconnecting with old friends, and discussing points of interest from the day's briefings. As we begin to prepare for next year's conference, I am ever mindful of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who are deployed every day in harm's way. All of you are in my thoughts and prayers, and I wish you all a speedy and safe return to your loved ones. For those of you who are available next May, consider this your first invitation to the 2009 Armor Warfighting Conference — you will not be disappointed.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

The Noncommissioned Officer

by CSM Otis Smith, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Before I move off the objective and fade into retirement, I'd like to take this opportunity to express the noncommissioned officer's value to the force. Right from the beginning of my enlistment, I realized that the Noncommissioned Officer is the backbone of Army. They are warriors, promoted from the ranks to lead, train, teach, inspire, push, intimidate, and keep their soldiers alive. The NCO Corps is the heart and sole of the "Band of Brothers" concept; their loyalty to each other and their soldiers goes beyond mere camaraderie or friendship — it is a fraternal brotherhood. It is within this brotherhood that I salute the NCO Corps and its invaluable contributions to our Institution.

The Noncommissioned Officer plays many vital roles in the accomplishment of a unit's mission. NCOs are the relentless driving force that keeps soldiers and units motivated through tireless leadership and dedication. Once in a while, I like to remind the force of the essential influence that NCOs have on their soldiers. It is imperative for NCOs to be prepared to execute a myriad of duties on demand — they are leaders at all levels. As a personal salute to our Armor Force's outstanding NCOs, I share with you their many faces:

The Tank/Scout Vehicle Commander

The tank/scout commander leads his soldiers. He must be prepared to take over as squad leader. He alone must instill in his team the importance of the mission; and he must keep them motivated and totally informed at all times. If he expects them to risk their lives on his orders, he is morally obligated to let them know the score.

The Squad/Section Leader

The squad leader must take the initiative to keep his squad alert so they are ready on short notice to move out on a mission. The squad leader must be ready to act as the platoon sergeant. He must ensure his soldiers receive proper training to standard. He is responsible for their welfare and for the accountability and maintenance of the squad's equipment.

The Platoon Sergeant

The platoon sergeant must know the platoon leader's job inside out and be prepared to take over the platoon. He must keep current with the tactical, as well as the logistical, situation. The platoon sergeant is also the mentor and role model of the entire platoon. The entire platoon looks up to him because of his leadership ability and experience.

The First Sergeant

The role the first sergeant plays in the company's mission is a significant factor to its success. In combat, the company commander will often be busy preparing operation orders (OPORD) and other command functions, and the executive officer will be organizing logistics and combat support. The first sergeant has the responsibility for ensuring the logistics system works and the platoons are preparing for the mission. He will ensure his company NCOs carry out their duties. The first sergeant turns plans into action.

The Staff NCO

From company training to division G3, the staff NCO is critical to a unit's success. He is involved in many different jobs — he ensures everything is running smoothly whether in garrison or in the field. Without him, soldiers in the field wouldn't get supplies or intelligence they need to accomplish the mission. He must support 24-hour operations by being an integral member of the staff planning, preparation, and execution process.

The Command Sergeant Major

The command sergeant major is the backbone of the battalion. He makes sure things happen. He ensures the battalion's soldiers are properly trained and are being looked after. He advises the battalion commander on troop, logistics, welfare, and discipline matters, and trains his first sergeants. He is the consummate role model for every soldier and NCO in the battalion.



Only a few soldiers have the natural ability to be good leaders; most soldiers learn by constantly improving their leadership skills through education, training, experience, self-development, and "leading by example." I leave you with four tenets that I developed years ago, which helped me to become a better man, soldier, and professional Noncommissioned Officer (leader):

- Never forget where you came from.
- Learn to draw a line between personal and professional.
- Take care of soldiers, no matter the cost.
- Always be a role model; enforce standards and discipline.

I take this opportunity to thank every Soldier for their hard work. The Armor Force continues to be the lead for everything the Army does and will continue to be not only Army Strong, but Armor/Cavalry Strong because its strength comes from Soldiers and NCOs.

This is a perfect opportunity to welcome Command Sergeant Major Clarence Stanley as the new Armor School command sergeant major. He joins the Fort Knox family from Fort Stewart, Georgia. I would also like to announce my successor, Command Sergeant Major John Troxell, who comes to us from the 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. Both of these Soldiers are the right guys, at the time, in the right position. As a team, they will ensure the Armor Center, the Armor School, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence continue to Forge the Thunderbolt!

Green Tab to Green Tab Fire Support — The BCT Commander's Best Fires Asset

by Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Chief of Field Artillery

Reprinted as requested from *Fires* March-April 2008 issue

Six years of war against a determined enemy has presented us with a number of fire support challenges, however, it also has provided an opportunity for introspection. It is imperative that we examine whether or not our organizational and operational designs and concepts are working as originally envisioned. Under modular force design, the Army's core unit is the brigade combat team (BCT), a unit with organic enablers and capabilities that allow ground commanders to conduct operations that formerly required significant augmentation and/or task organization changes.

During my initial 100 days of command, I spent a great deal of time engaging field commanders — particularly BCT commanders — on the topic of fire support. At the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, we are committed to resolving fire support coordination and integration capability gaps that may have arisen as unintended consequences of the transformation to modularity. We must provide BCT commanders with the finest fire support system in the world and allay their concerns and confusion about who best can provide advice, field artillery (FA) training and certification support for lethal and nonlethal fires. Modularity has presented some unique challenges for BCT commanders in terms of scope and integration — especially in the fires warfighting function.

Unintended Consequences. The modularized BCT concept empowered the maneuver commander by placing the capability to deliver responsive fires in his operating environment *within* his formation. As with any change, however, it also created unintended consequences that may hinder his ability to integrate and coordinate fires in his area of responsibility (AOR).

One area of concern is the fire support coordinator's (FSCOORD's) role. In the past,

the term "FSCOORD" was attributed to the senior commander of the firing unit supporting the maneuver commander. The FSCOORD was responsible for all aspects of fires — from coordination through delivery.

Redefined roles and missions of critical fires personnel in the BCT also have redefined the FSCOORD's position. He is now a staff officer organic to the BCT, without command authority which inhibits his ability to coordinate training and certification for subordinate battalion fire support assets.

Other areas of significant concern are fire support training, certification, and professional development. Under modularity, because fire support personnel are organic to maneuver battalions, the subordinate maneuver commanders have training, resource and oversight (TRO) responsibility for all fire support personnel in their units. It is here that the unintended consequences of modularity seem to have "struck a chord" with BCT commanders.

The following are summarized comments from BCT commanders regarding unintended consequences of modularity. Modularity placed fire support training and certification directly in the BCT commander's lap — a task that he is not trained to supervise or execute. It increased the BCT commander's span of control to the point where, because his attention is captured by other command issues, he cannot focus energy on holistic fire support training. A third consequence of modularity centers on professional development.

BCT commanders have expressed some frustration about handling the training management and leader development of their fire support assets. They realize that fire supporters are being retained in units longer than they should be due to a fear that replacements will not be forthcoming. They

also are aware that, because in many cases there is no lethal or core FA mission, these adaptable soldiers now are performing BCT-critical, non-FA functions that have been short filled by other branches, and subordinate commanders do not want to lose them. Further, maneuver commanders are not as cognizant as they feel they should be with respect to correct assignment patterns and appropriate professional development training for their fire supporters.

Continued dialogue with active BCT commanders has reinforced their most pressing concerns:

- 1) Defining the roles and functions of the staff FSCOORD and the fires battalion commander; and
- 2) Addressing who best can provide fire support professional development, training, and certification.

As BCT commanders experience these issues, I continue to receive inquiries from the field. Among them are: "What should I expect from my FSCOORD? What role does he play with my staff? With my other battalion commanders? How much advice is he capable of giving? What role should my fires battalion commander fulfill? Isn't *he* the senior fire supporter in my brigade? How can I best take advantage of his special skill set for the good of the formation?" These are logical questions and concerns, and it is instructive to examine our doctrinal sources for guidance and consideration before making recommendations.

FSCOORD. The BCT FSCOORD executes critical fires tasks for the BCT commander. Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, defines the BCT FSCOORD as, "...the special staff officer responsible for BCT fires, which include Army indirect fires and joint fires. He advises the BCT commander and staff on all aspects of indirect fires planning, coordination, and execution in support of BCT operations. He assists the BCT S3 to integrate fires into the maneuver commander's concept of operation." Figure 1 lists some of the BCT FSCOORD's responsibilities.

Similarly, Joint Publication 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, dated 13 November 2006, defines the U.S. Army FSCOORD as "... the senior Field Artillery (FA) officer permanently assigned as the full-time fire support staff advisor to the commander and staff. The FSCOORD performs all the staff functions associated with fire support."

- Direct fires section operations.
- Recommend essential fire support tasks to the commander.
- Recommend fire support coordination measures to the commander.
- Coordinate the commander's fire plan with the fires battalion, the fires brigade, and the division fires section.
- Facilitate the targeting meeting.
- Accompany the BCT commander, deputy commanding officer, or tactical command post to assist in the execution of tactical operations.
- Advise the S3 on positioning of fires units.

Figure 1: The fire support coordinator's (FSCOORD's) responsibilities as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team (BCT)*.

There is no specific mention of the experience level or qualifications of the BCT FSCOORD lieutenant colonel (LTC) assigned to the position. Based on current assignment priorities, patterns, and the fact that the demand for FA LTCs far exceeds the inventory, the reality is that a LTC serving as a staff BCT FSCOORD will be the *exception* rather than the rule. BCT commanders should anticipate that this position likely will be filled by an FA major. Ideally, he will have served as a fires battalion operations officer or executive officer and be an intermediate-level education (ILE) graduate, but even that is not assured. Thus, the experience level of the officer assigned to the BCT FSCOORD position ensures an able staff officer, but may not provide an experienced leader to cultivate the fire support advisor relationship that a BCT commander desires.

Fires Battalion Commander. The fires battalion commander executes a number of critical tasks for the BCT commander. The fires battalion commander controls all the tactical, logistical, administrative, and training activities of the fires battalion. He directs employment of the battalion in accordance with assigned missions from the BCT commander. Figure 2 lists some of the fires battalion commander's duties.

The fires battalion commander can serve also as a maneuver battalion commander when directed by the BCT commander. While this utilization augments BCT capability on the ground, it does not eliminate the requirement for effective fire support advice.

In addition, the fires battalion commander should assist the BCT commander with personnel management and leader development for FA soldiers and leaders within the BCT. The fires battalion commander is uniquely aware of professional development "gates" and timelines for artillerymen and can help the BCT commander assign leaders to various developmental jobs.

A thought for the BCT commanders — in terms of leadership experience, the fires battalion commander has been selected by a Department of the Army board. It is most probable that he has served as a fire support officer at some level from company to division and has acquired the requisite brigade and higher-level fire support experience in previous assignments. He is not simply a peer battalion commander within the brigade, but one with a special skill set — he is an expert in lethal and nonlethal fires integration and coordination. He brings other assets and skill sets to the table to help the BCT commander solve current "fire support training gaps" identified by a number of BCT leaders. He would be my recommendation as the BCT commander's personal fire support advisor.

Addressing training and certification gaps. In examining the functions of the FSCOORD and the fires battalion commander, we see that neither has TRO responsibility for fire support personnel within the

brigade. It appears that the staff FSCOORD will be unable to perform this task in the foreseeable future. His newly assigned nonlethal tasks and duties will demand all of his available time. In my view, the best asset to resolve this gap is the fires battalion commander. He has a staff, assets, and resources to execute effective training. Of course, the BCT commander will need to emphasize the importance of fire support training to his subordinate maneuver battalion commanders, but it seems logical for a BCT commander to synchronize and consolidate fires system training under a single commander who answers directly to him.

At least 10 BCT commanders have conveyed to me that they are considering consolidating the FA fire support assets either at the BCT headquarters and headquarters company level or giving them directly to the fires battalion for training and oversight. Such a situation certainly would enable better fire support training, but the commander would need to ensure that his fires battalion commander clearly understands that *support to maneuver battalion commanders is his first priority*. Because the BCT commander now owns all the assets in question, his guidance will be followed.

An added benefit is that the fires battalion commander, as a "green tabber," is experienced and, therefore, can provide the higher-level fire support perspective and advice that the BCT commander needs and desires.

Under modularity, the staff BCT FSCOORD *should* be the senior FA officer within the brigade, but current inventory and personnel management priorities cannot support this concept. So who should the BCT commander look to for advice on fires matters? FM 3-90.6 offers us an opening: "The fires battalion commander is no longer the BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). *The BCT commander must clearly define the roles of his fires battalion commander and his staff FSCOORD*, and ensure that they clearly understand their respective responsibilities."

In the foreseeable future, the fires battalion commander, without question, will be *the* fire support expert within the BCT. He is a centrally-selected commander, often with sufficient experience to function as the BCT commander's indispensable right hand for fires. He also has a number of other assigned tasks related to the employment of a

fires battalion that lend themselves to effective fire supporter training, certification, and professional development. He is a valuable tool for the BCT commander with a critical skill set who can help with fires integration, coordination, and execution.

A strong interactive relationship between the BCT commander and his fires battalion commander is paramount. It must be based on confidence and competence — a relationship in which the fires battalion commander enables the maneuver commander to dominate his AOR through the effective application of both lethal and nonlethal fires.

Our fires battalion commanders are self-assured in their abilities and willing to help the BCT commander manage fires across his AOR. The fires battalion commander must be "that guy" on whom everyone can rely for all matters related to fire support. The fires battalion commander should be responsible for the fires warfighting function within the BCT. He should be accountable to the BCT commander to ensure all lethal and nonlethal fires assets and organizations are trained and proficient. To that end, we at the Fires Center of Excellence will ensure we provide current and cogent training on lethal and nonlethal fires application and integration to future fires battalion commanders so that they are competent and confident in their roles as the BCT commander's primary fires advisor.

This is an excellent topic for discussion, and I have included it in our agenda for the Fires Seminar in June. The theme for the conference is "Artillery Strong: Challenges and Opportunities in an Era of Persistent Conflict." I know that all FA leaders will arrive well prepared to discuss innovative solutions to a number of issues regarding the branch.

If you have insights to share, please visit the Fires Knowledge Network website at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/130700>, and provide your thoughts so that we can capture them for use during the seminar. It is critical that we also receive input from our many respected maneuver leaders who can help us frame the issues because, ultimately, we are the maneuver commanders' 24/7 fire support force. *Anticipate – Integrate – Dominate! Artillery Strong!*



- Oversee the training of the entire battalion with particular emphasis on those elements directly concerned with delivery of fires.
- Continually assess the needs of the battalion in terms of its ability to sustain its internal operations and support assigned missions.
- Establish clear and consistent standards and guidance for current and future operations. Ensure battalion staff and battery commanders understand the battalion commander's intent.
- Establish policies to promote discipline and morale within the battalion.
- Provide for the administrative and logistics support of the battalion.

Figure 2: Some duties of the fires battalion commander from FM 3-09.21, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battalion*.



Maintaining an Offensive Mindset During Defensive Operations

by Major Chad Roehrman

The current operating environment demands deployed units to occupy forward operating bases (FOBs), patrol bases (PB), combat outposts (COPs), and fixed-site security locations. All too often, forces securing these sites focus on the defensive aspects. Albeit crucial to success of the overall mission, the defensive preparation is only partial preparation, leaving soldiers and units more susceptible to enemy attacks. General George S. Patton stated clearly, "In war the only sure defense is offense, and the efficiency of the offense depends upon the war-like souls of those conducting it."¹ Effective defense requires continuous and aggressive offensive security execution, which starts with the basics of engagement area development and transitions to an offensive mindset through patrolling, random antiterrorism measures, and using all available assets. By being more aggressive, we take the fight to the enemy and improve security.

Present Shortcomings

Two common operational mistakes include a perception that base defense or security missions stop at the perimeter wire and focusing on the defensive nature of the fight, instead of an offensive posture. These two shortcomings translate to a lack of detailed engagement area development and a passive security on the occupation of bases, which severely degrade the defensive posture and security, placing all members of the base at higher-level, unnecessary risk to enemy attacks.

When occupying these bases, units too frequently occupy positions held by the outgoing unit and do not confirm or deny the validity of the engagement area. Soldiers and leaders understand the seven steps in developing an engagement area, but fail to see it through. This is usually because the base defense unit does not have terrain or proper equipment, leaving the FOB as a large listening post/observation post (LP/OP), which would be unthinkable during high-intensity conflict.

When a unit is given terrain and views the surrounding terrain as an engagement area, the primary shortcomings in engagement area development are enemy analysis, placement of friendly ob-

stacles and weapons systems, and incomplete rehearsals. The unit enemy analysis is generally limited to a generic course of action, whether indirect fire or suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at an entrance control point (ECP). Units frequently limit active defenses with direct and indirect fires by placing security with individual weapons in towers, a crew-served weapon at the ECP, and one or two indirect systems with poor planning and integration of indirect fires. Units usually execute reactionary rehearsals, such as mass casualty (MASCAL) and commitment of the quick-reaction force, but rarely focus rehearsals based on actions outside the FOB. For example, during operations at the National Training Center, FOBs are frequently overrun by a complex attack of 10 to 15 insurgents, resulting in a MASCAL situation and a command post severely degraded, which is due to ineffective preparation and execution of the FOB defense plan. This example of enemy exploitation not only affects the security of the FOB, but disrupts future combat operations from the base.

The second issue is the defensive and passive mindset regarding base security operations. Although our doctrine clearly ascertains that defense is an active and aggressive mission, most units fall short in preparation and execution. Units do not provide additional depth in defense through patrolling, establishing and changing OPs, and using all available assets. The static nature of defense is translating to passive defense and not active aggressive defense.

Whether located with a platoon COP high in the mountains of Afghanistan, a company securing a power generation station in Iraq, or a task force in a forward operating base, the highest headquarters has the responsibility for security and the overall fight. The unit or units tasked with security have the primary responsibility for the defense, but higher headquarters' synchronization increases the aggressive "in-depth" nature of the defense. Coupling synchronization with improved preparation and changing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as enemy and friendly situations change will increase the effectiveness of defense and security.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Improvement

The two primary areas of improvement for static defense missions are a detailed engagement area development and maintaining an offensive aggressive mindset in the execution of the defense plan. Following the seven steps to engagement area development to confirm or deny the plan as executed by the outgoing unit is the first step in establishing a solid, aggressive defense (see Figure 1). Second is using all available assets to establish and maintain an offensive and an aggressive defense. The TTP are all mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians (METT-TC) dependent, but implementing them based on the mission set can result in a doctrinally aggressive defense.

Engagement area development is as applicable to a FOB or COP as it is to stopping an advancing horde during high-intensity conflict. The purpose of an engagement area is to trap and destroy enemy forces using massed fires of all available weapons; the seven steps to engagement area development are:

1. Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
2. Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
3. Determine where to kill the enemy.
4. Plan and integrate obstacles.
5. Emplace weapons systems.
6. Plan and integrate indirect fires.
7. Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.²

Although we are accustomed to a linear or L-shaped defense, the FOB is 360-degree security, where understanding the terrain (to include urban and human terrain), understanding the enemy, and correctly positioning weapons systems are critical.

During the identification of all likely enemy avenues of approach, the enemy task and local terrain are the key factors. Roads and trails are obvious avenues of approach for suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs). The key task in identifying likely enemy avenues of approach is ensuring *all* avenues are identified. Once accomplished, this can be refined through the enemy scheme of maneuver.

Understanding the local enemy's equipment, capabilities, and TTP will help determine the scheme of maneuver. Determining the enemy's most likely and most dangerous courses of action will help to properly develop the base defense plan. If SVBIEDs predominate in the area, focus defense on maintaining standoff and protection; on the other hand, if it is a predominately indirect fire area, the focus is on the counter-indirect fight. Additionally, if units receive reports of lost or missing Iraqi security force or Afghanistan security force equipment, the preparation and defense should shift to a swarm-type attack. The enemy analysis is continuous and requires refinements in the base defense plan.




Figure 1. Company defense sector sketch

Determining where to kill the enemy in a base defense is more difficult than a standard high-intensity conflict defense. The area in which to kill the enemy differs between ECPs (outside the entrance) and perimeters of FOBs. Closely tied to determining where to kill the enemy is the integration of obstacles. Whether it is a berm, a triple strand of concertina wire, a wall at the perimeter, or obstacles integrated in the surrounding terrain to deny or canalize enemy movement, these measures allow units to engage outside the wire.

Placement of proper weapons systems greatly improves the success of the defense. Two key points are ensuring overlapping fields of fire for primary and secondary sectors of fire and use of proper weapons systems. Using dismounted machine guns is better than an individual weapon; and an Abrams tank or Bradley is better than a dismounted crew-served weapon. The more combat power dedicated to securing the perimeter, the better; and understanding the forces available will always be an issue.

Planning and integrating indirect fires is no different than a high-intensity defense. Again, the priority and focus lies with the enemy threat. A good way of integrating indirect fires is against known or likely mortar and rocket points of origin. Additional-



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


Figure 2

Engagement area development is a complex series of tasks requiring parallel planning and a clear priority of work. With the priority of work issued, units can continually improve the engagement area and work toward establishing the defense. Units can do this by either allocating the base defense unit terrain 5 to 7 kilometers from the FOB or by treating it as a task force defense. In completing the engagement area development to trap and destroy enemy forces, bases are prepared for the most dangerous course of action and can easily transition to defeating or deterring the enemy on a more likely course of action (see Figure 2).

With the defense established, it is time to transition to a more aggressive and offensive defense. The offensive mindset extends the fight from the perimeter of the base and disrupts the reconnaissance, surveillance, and direct or indirect fire attacks on the base. The TTP for an aggressive defense includes patrolling, establishing and changing observation posts, and using available assets, to include aviation.

ly, harassing and interdicting (H&I) fires, when authorized, work well to deny enemy movement or terrain for observation. Observation for H&I fires can be achieved in a number of ways, whether OPs, lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), or unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

Base defense rehearsals need to include reactions to friendly and enemy activities in the engagement area. To be more successful, units should prioritize and then execute rehearsals, which include actions at triggers, MASCAL, react to contact, and commitment of the reserve. Although not a comprehensive list, soldiers will be better prepared to defend by rehearsing.

As outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230, *Special Forces Base Camp Operations*, "The overall defense posture of a base camp is enhanced by continuous aggressive operations conducted by the base camp personnel. These are patrolling, ambushes, observation..."³ Patrolling the area outside the base provides information and security and disrupts enemy movement. Reconnaissance patrols are dispatched to confirm or deny any suspected enemy activity. Recon patrols and OPs work well in identifying enemy movement into and out of historic points of origin, which help in the counter-indirect firefight. Additionally, reconnaissance patrols can attempt to identify and track enemy forces, whether indirect fire related or as part of the counter-reconnaissance fight. On the other hand, security patrols are sent out to make contact with, and then destroy, the enemy within the capabilities of the patrol. In doing so, patrols prevent the enemy from infiltrating, disrupt enemy reconnaissance, and deny or desync enemy attacks.

Internal security patrols, especially when securing fixed sites with local workers, assist in preventing sabotage of those sites. For example, while securing a power generation facility in Iraq, our company dispatched daily internal security patrols of a fire team to prevent the sabotage of the turbines, power conduits, and control room. An additional security patrol, outside the doctrine of a tank company, was the boat security patrols on the lake-side of the dam. Using a boat, a trained crew, and a mounted machine gun, the company conducted limited patrols of the water, which ensured fishermen did not approach the earthen or cement portions of the dam walls. At the very least, patrolling, whether or not continuous, prevents or disrupts enemy attacks.

Continuous observation from differing positions aids in defense by providing early warning. Maintaining multiple primary and alternate positions and frequently changing OP locations prevents enemy knowledge of which sites are occupied, thereby making it more difficult to exploit a seam. Additionally, building and manning deception OPs adds to the perceived security level of a facility. Using the power generation plant example



"Supporting aviation assets provide extended range and are not frequently used in base defense, but can be easily integrated. For instance, in Iraq an operational control (OPCON) OH-58D troop provided frequent overflights and reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAI), both at the FOB and forward security sites. Upon their approach, the OH58s flew around the FOB 3 to 4 kilometers from the wire, reconning NAI and likely points of origin."

above, we developed numerous alternate and deception OP locations along the top and sides of the dam. Throughout the day, we would randomly change OP locations and move personnel to and from deception positions (see Figure 3).

In an urban environment, securing and operating from a border check point, we frequently changed mounted vehicle OP locations to observe the most likely enemy avenues of approach (see Figure 4). The dismounted positions rotated between hard-stand towers and buildings. In addition to the random antiterrorism measures (RAM) outlined in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 07-19, *Base Defense*, these RAM are simple techniques to improve security.⁴

Using all available assets extends the range and depth of the defense and is often overlooked. Combat patrols and units executing missions in town can be integrated into the base defense's patrol schedule. Depending on its mission, the outgoing patrol could conduct a security patrol along a designated route or conduct reconnaissance of a known point of origin. Additionally, on return, they could conduct a reconnaissance or security patrol around the FOB.

Supporting aviation assets provide extended range and are not frequently used in base defense, but can be easily integrated. For instance, in Iraq an operational control (OPCON) OH-58D troop provided frequent overflights and reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAI), both at the FOB and forward security sites. Upon their approach, the OH58s flew around the FOB 3 to 4 kilometers from the wire, reconning NAI and likely points of origin. For this TTP to be successful, supporting aviation must understand the reconnaissance requirement around any base and the ground unit providing the ground unit graphics. Using UAS also increases the "in-depth" nature of the defense. Incorporating these additional assets into the base defense plan improves the overall security posture.

Detailed planning, preparation, and maintaining an offensive mindset while executing these defensive tasks can be effective in destroying, deterring, or denying the enemy attackers. In doing so, we will be taking the fight to the enemy on our terms, instead of sitting back and allowing him to bring the fight to us on his terms. We all know the capabilities of the armor and cavalry troopers in the formations around the Army, and with their "war-like souls," they will superbly accomplish any mission asked of them. As leaders, we owe it to them to properly plan and prepare, so they can execute the offensive-minded security missions.



Notes

¹U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington DC, 14 June 2001, p. 7-2.

²FM 3-90.1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*, HQDA, GPO, Washington DC, 9 December 2002, p. 6-16.




Figure 3

³FM 3-05.230, *Special Forces Base Camp Operations*, HQDA, GPO, Washington DC, 30 July 2003, p. 3-58.

⁴CALL Handbook 07-19, *Base Defense*, U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2007, pp. 31-32.

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


Figure 4



Accurate Battlefield Information in the Digital Age

by Captain Andrew Hubbard

“Taken as a whole, present day military forces, for all of the imposing array of electronic gadgetry at their disposal, give no evidence whatsoever of being one whit more capable of dealing with the information needed for the command process than were their predecessors a century or even a millennium ago.”¹

— Martin van Creveld

Military commanders since the dawn of warfare have struggled with command and control of their subordinate units in combat, using a variety of different methods such as messengers, signaling flags, and more recently, Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2). However, one method used by commanders, such as Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and General George S. Patton, has fallen into disuse in the contemporary operating environment — what modern historians, such as Martin van Creveld, refer to as the “directed telescope.” In *Command in War*, van Creveld explains that, “Climbing through the chain of command ... reports tend to become less and less specific; the more numerous the stages through which they pass and the more standard-

ized the form in which they are presented, the greater the danger that they will become so heavily profiled (and possibly sugar-coated or merely distorted by the many summaries) as to become almost meaningless. To guard against this danger and to keep subordinates on their toes, a commander needs to have in addition a kind of directed telescope ... which he can direct, at will, at any part of the enemy’s forces, the terrain, or his own army in order to bring in information that is not only less structured than that passed on by the normal channels but also tailored to meet his momentary (and specific) needs.”²

This article examines the reporting phenomena that van Creveld discusses in the context of the modern Army in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and addresses which role the directed telescope should play in the contemporary operating environment. It further argues that due to the complexity of the COE, senior commanders should employ a directed telescope system to assist them in obtaining a better situational awareness than typical reports from subordinate commanders currently provide.

History of the Directed Telescope

Several commanders have used various directed telescope methods to acquire the information they need to make timely and informed decisions. Napoleon’s use of the directed telescope is well documented; in addition to the normal reporting channels, Napoleon employed smart, energetic, and brave lieutenants and captains to provide him not only with more detailed information than the routine reports contained, but the “intangible aspects of a unit’s status — like leadership, morale, and esprit.”³ Napoleon also used these officers (and colonels with a similar mission) as his eyes and ears to personally observe various tactical situations, convey his intent to subordinate commanders, and report to him levels of detail and intangible aspects that often did not appear in normal reports.⁴

General Patton also used a directed telescope system to great effect during World War II. Patton had two squadrons of cavalry that operated as “a special liaison and monitoring system for the army commander and his staff.”⁵ Led by highly qualified, intelligent, and combat veter-

an junior officers, the patrols visited the headquarters of units in contact, and in addition to reporting the situation on the ground to Third Army headquarters, exchanged information about adjacent units with the division G2s and G3s. Although subordinate commanders initially perceived “Patton’s household cavalry,” as they became known, as “spies” from Third Army headquarters, they came to appreciate them for the up-to-date information they often possessed.⁶

Another directed telescope method Patton used to ensure that he and his staff had an accurate situational understanding was requiring his staff officers to visit frontline units daily to gain a better understanding and provide encouragement. Incidentally, these visits also reduced the number of reports that subordinate units had to routinely submit.⁷

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s directed telescope system was perhaps the most effective — he used brave, young, and often decorated officers (mostly majors) to ensure his orders were carried out, convey his intent to subordinate units, and ensure units reported directly to him with objective observations. These officers could travel anywhere within Montgomery’s area of operations; even though one can see the potential for a commander to abuse such a system and some of Montgomery’s subordinate commanders did initially look on the liaison officers with suspicion, they eventually came to know and trust Montgomery’s liaisons because of the officers’ personality, competence, bravery, and honesty in reporting.⁸

During a visit to Montgomery, Winston Churchill had the opportunity to observe Montgomery’s liaison officers render daily reports directly to their boss, “Each had come back from a different sector of the front... As, in turn, they made their reports and were searchingly questioned by their chief, the whole story of the day’s battle was unfolded. This gave Monty a complete account of what had happened by highly competent men whom he knew well and whose eyes he trusted. It afforded an invaluable cross-check to the reports from all the various headquarters and from the commanders. I thought the system admirable, and indeed the only way in which a modern commander in chief could see as well as read what was going on in every part of the front.”⁹

Commanders from Napoleon through Patton have used a directed telescope in



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various forms to gain a more accurate situational understanding than that acquired through more traditional methods. At the end of World War II, a review board chaired by General Patton recommended that a directed telescope of some sort become a permanent, formal fixture in the U.S. Army's organization — a recommendation that was never implemented. However, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM)

6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, mentions that directed telescopes are a "method of positive control" that can be used "to observe selected events or units and report directly to the commander."¹⁰ FM 6-0 additionally states that directed telescopes "can validate information received through regular channels or obtain important RI [relevant information] more rapidly than



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through regular channels. It is important that directed telescopes not interfere (or be perceived as interfering) with the normal functioning of the chain of command. The perception of spying or intruding on the province of the subordinate commanders can damage the trust between seniors and subordinates vital to mission command."¹¹

Given that directed telescopes have worked well when used by commanders in conflicts from the Napoleonic times through World War II, and are mentioned as useful, though not mandated or otherwise formalized, by U.S. Army doctrine, the next section of this article examines the usefulness of directed telescopes on the modern battlefield.

Technology and the Contemporary Operating Environment

Given advanced equipment, such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT), FBCB2, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and satellite communications, the U.S. Army currently possesses and plans to field in the near future to maintain situational awareness and facilitate command and control, some may question the need for a directed telescope. Indeed, due to the very rapid nature of present-day, high-intensity conflict operations, modern technology has perhaps alleviated much of the need for a directed telescope during these types of operations.

However, in what the military refers to as the "current operating environment," in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan, these modern technologies do not always accurately relay full situational awareness to higher commands. In the COE, high-intensity exchanges between U.S. soldiers and the enemy are infrequent on a scale above the company level. Leaders at higher levels can track these types of exchanges quite easily by using modern technologies such as the FBCB2 and UAV. In these types of exchanges, modern technology is a tremendous force multiplier and undoubtedly saves lives. However, decisively winning these types of battles at the tactical level does not directly translate to victory at the operational or strategic levels of war.

To truly defeat insurgent forces, as the United States is learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must recognize the conflict's center of gravity in any COE that it may face — accurate situational awareness is absolutely imperative in determining a conflict's center of gravity. In this respect, the U.S. Army struggled after large-scale, high-intensity operations ceased in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although

the policy blunders made by senior civilian officials are now well documented, and therefore will not be discussed here, the U.S. Army is not entirely innocent for failing to understand the nature of the conflict it confronted, particularly in Iraq.

The U.S. Army seemed to struggle to understand the nature of the conflict that they confronted in late 2003, and failed to produce a coherent strategy to combat the burgeoning insurgency. Unfortunately, a good strategy is precisely what is needed to combat insurgency. In Thomas E. Ricks' *Fiasco*, retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Killebrew, a Special Forces Vietnam veteran, argues that "when you're facing a counterinsurgency war, if you get the strategy right, you can get the tactics wrong, and eventually you'll get the tactics right ... If you get the strategy wrong and the tactics right at the start, you can refine the tactics forever but you still lose the war."¹²

Although many factors that contributed to the insurgency were outside the realm of the military's control, such as de-Baathification, disbanding the Iraqi army, and other such policies, the lack of a coherent military strategy further hindered the U.S. Army's prospects for success. The advanced command and control systems senior leaders in Iraq had at their disposal did not help them realize the magnitude of problems they faced nor help formulate a strategy to confront them — namely, to focus on securing the population and improving governance rather than overly focusing on "killing bad guys." Although it is by no means certain that events would have been different had senior military leaders used a directed telescope system (as it must be properly focused by the commander and the enemy still "has a vote"), it would surely have helped to "paint the picture" for the commander during those crucial early months.

Other Uses for the Directed Telescope

A directed telescope system could also verify official routine reports by spot checking information, which would likely reduce the optimistic reports made by some leaders. Retired U.S. Army Colonel Larry Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin Powell's former chief of staff, noted that such reports are "not an attempt to lie or mendacity... It's the way the military shapes the statistics ... to make it look as if they are meeting whatever objectives they have. That's as old as the United States Army. That's as old as Alexander the Great."¹³ In *The San Antonio Express*, another officer puts it more bluntly, noting that, "if you're not paint-

ing the perfect picture ... you can be a hindrance."¹⁴

Establishing a directed telescope system could perhaps encourage commanders to provide accurate and realistic assessments to their superiors, since these reports could be prone to direct verification from higher headquarters. A directed telescope could also give senior leaders more accurate viewpoints from individual soldiers, who often see a conflict much differently than do their superiors, as the now famous op-ed, "The War as We Saw It" by seven 82d Airborne Division soldiers published in the *New York Times* in 2007, vividly displays.¹⁵ Such varying views are valuable and add to, rather than detract from, situational understanding.

A directed telescope can also illuminate a unit's morale. For example, when a senior leader, such as a brigade or division commander, speaks directly with lower-ranking soldiers, they are not likely to express their concerns or be negative; however, the personality and aura that surround many senior leaders can prevent this from occurring. However, a captain who is part of a directed telescope is likely to get a more accurate perception of morale by speaking with soldiers and company commanders.

The distinguished military historian Martin van Creveld stated that, "While up-to-date technical means of communication and data processing are absolutely vital to the conduct of modern war in all its forms, they will not in themselves suffice for the creation of a functioning command system, and that they may, if understanding and proper usage are not achieved, constitute part of the disease they are supposed to cure."¹⁶

Van Creveld's revelation more than 20 years ago remains relevant. The U.S. Army is in the midst of the most ambitious modernization program since the post-Vietnam War era, acquiring more computers, digital communications equipment, unmanned aerial systems, and other modern equipment to aid in command and control. However, in the type of conflict that the U.S. Army is likely to face in the foreseeable future — mostly a mix of stability and reconstruction operations as part of a counterinsurgency — such equipment is necessary, but by no means is sufficient. This type of warfare's most important aspect is choosing the correct strategy, and to do this, senior leaders must understand the environments they confront and the center of gravity in the fight.¹⁷

One tool that successful commanders throughout history employed is the di-

rected telescope, essentially a group of mid-grade officers sent by the commander to subordinate units to verify official reports, check morale and other such intangibles, and confirm that units are properly carrying out the commander's intent — in general, supplement the commander's situational awareness, which, as noted above, is imperative to selecting a proper strategy and thus achieving mission success in the contemporary operating environment. In sum, the U.S. Army should formally institutionalize a directed telescope system similar to one used by Napoleon, Montgomery, and Patton to help senior commanders achieve accurate situational awareness — something Patton recommended more than 60 years ago.



Notes

¹Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 265.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

³Gary B. Griffin, *The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command*, Combat Institute Studies Report No. 9, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, p. 6.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, August 2003, para. 3-102.

¹¹*Ibid.*, para. 3-103.

¹²Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p. 195.

¹³Sig Christenson, "Do GIs Have to Spin War's Facts," *The San Antonio Express*, 22 September 2007.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance T. Gray, and Jeremy A. Murphy, "The War as We Saw It," *The New York Times*, 19 August 2007.

¹⁶Van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 259.

¹⁷It must be noted that the present leadership in Iraq under General Petraeus understands the nature of the conflict they confront and its center of gravity. Additionally, General Petraeus seems to have a good situational awareness — no doubt because he frequently travels to various parts of the country to personally oversee things and get updates.

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Tactical Patience

by Captain Daniel J. Pecha

In November of 2004, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment deployed to Afghanistan, where I was assigned as platoon leader of Charlie Company's first platoon. The company consisted of four platoons (two dismounted, one mounted, and a headquarters). First platoon was one of the dismounted platoons and I arrived just as the company was completing its cycle of local patrolling missions, which allowed me to get a feel for the terrain, learn how day-to-day operations were conducted, and get to know my soldiers.

Charlie Company conducted its routine long-range missions out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-e. The unit's normal battle rhythm was to conduct 12 to 14 days of force protection, 12 to 14 days of local or counter-rocket patrols, and finally complete its cycle by conducting a 3- to 5-day mission in our company's extended area of operation that would reach as far east as the Pakistani border.

Within a few days, we transitioned to the force protection element and were beginning the planning process for our extended mission. As a platoon, we conducted necessary preparations for the mission, which included battle drill rehearsals (mounted and dismounted), vehicle preparation, weapons maintenance, and a map reconnaissance of the route we would be traveling. Our preparations also includ-

ed a map reconnaissance of various dismount locations that would require either of the dismount platoons to clear the high ground along the route in the absence of air assets. The evening prior to our departure, we had completed all necessary preparations and were ready to execute.

Our mission was to be conducted in four phases. Phase I involved the unit conducting a medical civic action program while dismounted units would conduct random searches to gather intelligence on the local population in and around the town of Ghaybikhel. We then moved a short distance and conducted rest-over-night operations near the ruins to the north of Tora Wrey. Phase II required the company to divide into two sections and move along the northern and southern routes to the village of L'wara, about 3 kilometers from the Pakistani border, where the company commander would attend a meeting with local leaders.

Phase III involved the company moving back to the west along the northern route to the village of Gayan, where it would link up with the local police chief to get a situational update on significant activities that had occurred in the area over the past month. Finally, Phase IV completed operations in Gayan and the company continued its move along the northern

route and returned to FOB Orgun-e. The unit had conducted similar missions on at least four other occasions, including one in this same area.

On the morning of 25 January 2004, Charlie Company departed FOB Orgun-e en route to Ghaybikhel to conduct a medical civic action program and random searches inside the village. All activities were going as planned during the company's movement to Ghaybikhel and during the medical civic action program. The company's air assets arrived and provided information and route clearance during our movement, which relieved the dismounted platoons from ascending into the mountainous terrain and clearing the high ground and possible ambush sites that surrounded a vast majority of our movement.

Charlie Company spent the better part of the day in the village getting a feel for the area and ascertaining what types of civil affairs projects local elders deemed beneficial to the area. As the sun began to set, Charlie Company saddled up and initiated movement to its rest-over-night site near Tora Wrey. The company executive officer moved to the front of the formation and took a section from second platoon to conduct a reconnaissance of the site. When he returned, the dismount platoons moved into the high ground, sur-



rounding the old ruins that would become our home for the next few hours. The two dismount platoons conducted their priorities of work, such as range cards for the defensive perimeter, security roster, weapons maintenance, hygiene, and a sleep plan, which were overseen by the platoon sergeants.

Charlie Company's commander soon called for all platoon leaders to report to his location. The platoon leaders gathered with maps in hand to discuss how we would conduct our movement into L'Wara the following morning. There was little change to the plan that had been established prior to our departure from the FOB. Our platoon would move along the southern route with the executive officer and have a section from the up-armored wheel platoon to lead us to our dismount point.

After reaching the dismount point, our platoon would begin the approximate 2-kilometer movement to high ground, overwatching the intersection leading into L'Wara. The foot movement, which would take us from 8,800 feet to nearly 10,000 feet in elevation, would take no less than 2 hours in perfect conditions. This would place our platoon on the eastern side of the "Y" intersection with excellent vision along the planned approach route. The other dismounted platoon would move with its company commander along the northern route and conduct a similar clearance of the high ground to the west of the intersection. Their climb would be shorter in distance, but higher in elevation. Either way, it was apparent that it would take a significant amount of time for the dismounted platoons to get into position and conduct a proper clearance of the high ground. Another factor that added a bit of difficulty to our mission was the lack of air assets to cover our movement into the area. This subject had become a point of irritation between the company commander and senior leaders in the company — we were moving into a known ambush site without bringing all assets to bear on the enemy.

At 0330 hours on 26 January, Charlie Company began to move to its staging area as they prepared to meet the 0400 hours departure time. After working through some issues with the maintenance assets that were attached to our company, we were finally able to get moving around 0430 hours. Each element had about a 25- to 30-kilometer mounted movement that would take up to 2 hours, followed by another 2- to 2½-hour dismounted movement.



"Charlie Company conducted its routine long-range missions out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-e. The unit's normal battle rhythm was to conduct 12 to 14 days of force protection, 12 to 14 days of local or counter-rocket patrols, and finally complete its cycle by conducting a 3- to 5-day mission in our company's extended area of operation that would reach as far east as the Pakistani border."

We were less than 2 minutes into movement, moving through the wadi system, when our light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) got high centered, which took nearly an hour to break free because we did not have any additional heavy assets that were capable of pulling out the vehicle. We were now nearly 90 minutes behind our planning timeline as we finally reached our checkpoint and split into the northern and southern elements.

From the checkpoint to the dismount points things went as well as could be planned. We arrived at the dismount location at around 0745 hours and made our best attempt to get into position by the drop-dead time of 0900 hours, but an infantryman can only move so fast in full

kit, carrying an assault pack and moving up extreme elevation. The disposition for the company at this time had the two dismounted platoons on their way to clear the high ground and the two mounted sections, along with their respective headquarters elements, holding at the dismount points and waiting for us to get into position.

During the movement into the mountains, the radio communications between the mounted and dismounted elements were degraded to the point that we did not have communications for 15 to 20 minutes at a time. The difficulty with communications continued for about an hour until the dismounted elements had moved into higher terrain. At 0845 hours, the

calls starting coming from the commander and the executive officer, asking for situational updates. I reported that we needed at least another 45 minutes before we would have eyes on the intersection and could catch sporadic radio traffic from the other platoon as they were reporting a similar situation.

The persistent calls for situational updates continued for the next 30 to 45 minutes and the responses from both of the dismounted platoon leaders were the same: “We are moving as fast as we can, but we need more time to get into position.” At 0930 hours, we received the call for the final time and both platoon leaders requested an additional 10 minutes. This was the last situational update; the commander had given the order for the mounted elements to move.

Within 5 minutes, we heard the distinct sounds of AK-47s, PKM and RPK machine guns, and the random exploding

rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) round. Both elements had been ambushed at or near the templated locations. The element moving with the company commander took the brunt of the fire. As soon as contact was made by the mounted element, my lead team, along with one mortar tube, dropped all additional gear and moved out as fast as we could with the weight we were carrying.

In approximately 5 minutes, we were able to get eyes on the lead elements of the convoy and elements of the enemy ambush squad. At the same time, the dismounted element on the western side was also moving into position and had another enemy team trapped between them and the mounted element. Since we were initially out of position, the enemy disappeared into the surrounding village because we were unable to cordon off the village in time because we had only four M1026s from the mounted platoon. During this exchange, we had two casualties

from the engineer team that was attached to us, along with one M998 that had a RPG go directly through its front windshield and explode in the cargo area. This incident forced us to miss the event to which we were hurrying. We changed our focus to tracking down the people responsible for the ambush — our efforts netted little return.


I learned three invaluable lessons during this mission. The first lesson is to realize we are operating in an environment where time means nothing to the local people; friend or foe this culture does not share our respect for time. Therefore, scheduled meeting times with locals should not be the sole driving force for our operations. The second lesson is to bring all available assets to the fight. In Afghanistan this probably means you will have to plan your missions around certain available assets. Understandably, we must assume risk during our missions, but moving through a known ambush site without air assets in direct support is unacceptable. Finally, the most important lesson learned is that of tactical patience. We could have mitigated our lack of aviation assets by allowing our organic assets to move to planned locations to provide coverage for the safety and security of troops moving through the ambush site.

Our plan was sound and the enemy had no idea we had dismounted forces in the high ground; had we been given adequate time to get into position, we would have killed no less than two ambush teams and possibly a third, as well as protected our soldiers moving through the wadi system.

Senior leaders owe it to their soldiers to provide them with the highest level of protection at all times. If we have the ability to control the situation or influence the situation, we should use all means possible to make it happen. Listening to your senior noncommissioned officers and exercising tactical patience is an invaluable asset to mission success.



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The Company Intelligence Section

by First Lieutenant David R. Cowan



The experiences of the U.S. Army operating as a counterinsurgency (COIN) force in Iraq have demonstrated a compelling need for military intelligence sections within every company-sized maneuver force. Intelligence in low-intensity conflict is a bottom-up process, where human intelligence is largely developed by small units coming into close contact with the population, thereby building the intelligence that drives operations at the company level. In the COIN environment, company-sized forces must have a robust intelligence collection and analysis capability to be effective at executing these intelligence-driven operations.

The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for infantry, armor, and artillery companies/troops/batteries does not authorize intelligence sections at their level. The Army should modify the MTOE so each maneuver company is authorized one military intelligence officer (1LT 35D), one intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer (35F30), two intelligence analysts (35F10), and one human intelligence (HUMINT) collector (35M10). This augmentation would provide a robust capability, allowing the company to independently collect and analyze intelligence.

Changing the MTOE to reflect the need for intelligence sections at the company level would be the preferred solution, al-

though it is unlikely that military intelligence trained personnel would be available due to current demand for these soldiers at higher echelons. Even with an updated MTOE, it would take time to train and integrate adequate numbers of military intelligence personnel into existing company formations. Battalion and brigade S2 sections, as well as brigade military intelligence companies assigned to special troop battalions, are unlikely to be able to internally resource company intelligence requirements without losing capabilities at the battalion and brigade levels.

An immediate solution is to use existing personnel at the company level. The company fire support team headquarters can fulfill this intelligence personnel gap when properly trained and employed. In the COIN environment where the law of armed conflict (LOAC) severely restricts the use of conventional fire support assets in urban terrain, fires are normally kept under the control of brigades and battalions.¹ In these environments, the fire support team is not routinely employed in the same capacity as it would be in a high-intensity conflict.

The fire support team is uniquely suited in the low-intensity fight to fulfill this S2 section requirement. The armor company fire support team consists of one fire support officer (1LT 13A), one fire support

noncommissioned officer (13F30), and two fire support specialists (13F10), while the infantry company adds three forward observer teams, each with one forward observer (13F20) and one radio telephone operator (13F10).² All 13F military occupational speciality (MOS) soldiers already possess the required secret security clearance. By Army regulation the handling of classified information demands that soldiers be cleared to handle information of the appropriate classification level.³

The company fire support officer (FSO) would serve as the company S2 section officer in charge (OIC), responsible for coordinating intelligence collection and analysis efforts that drive the targeting process at the company level. The fire support noncommissioned officer (NCO) would serve as the senior enlisted leader for the section, training the fire support specialists as intelligence analysts, and assuming the duties of the FSO in his absence.

Army regulations prohibit non-military intelligence trained personnel from conducting source-based intelligence collection; therefore, the fire support team cannot assume this capability. The company S2 section requires augmentation in the form of at least one military intelligence qualified HUMINT collector.⁴ Without this support, the company S2 section cannot reach full capability.

The company S2 section is not intended to replicate the functions the battalion S2 section performs, but complements their efforts. The company S2 can focus on a smaller battlespace with a smaller set of targets. The company S2 becomes the de-facto subject-matter expert on targets inside his company's battlespace, maintaining a company-level target list worksheet. The company has direct insight into their operating environment through dismounted combat patrols and can leverage atmospheric from the population quickly and frequently.

The battalion S2 is responsible for all targets throughout the battalion operating environment, coordinates higher-level assets for collection, and assists the companies in shaping their intelligence collection priorities. Nearly all operations to capture and detain high-value targets (HVT) remain at the company level. In this environment, the battalion S2 section's function is to coordinate for additional intelligence assets, deconflict assets based on the commander's priorities, and synchronize intelligence collection efforts among the companies to maximize payoff against HVTs.

The company S2 is responsible for developing targeting packets for individual insurgents and groups operating in his company's operating environment. These targeting packets are then forwarded to

the battalion S2 and nominated for the battalion's high-value target list (HVTL) based on the battalion's targeting priorities. Once a company target is accepted as a battalion HVT, the battalion provides higher-level assets to collect additional intelligence on that target. Information must flow in both directions, with the company and battalion S2 sections communicating frequently. Target refinements are made at all levels based on reliable intelligence.

A fully functional company S2 section can collect intelligence, conduct analysis, and provide a finished intelligence product to the maneuver company to plan operations. The company S2 would work in coordination with the battalion S2 to synchronize the companies' efforts into the targeting process. Communications between the company and battalion S2 elements is therefore essential to mitigating redundant efforts.

Training

Using the company fire support team as the company S2 section requires more than simple task reorganization; it also creates a demand for informal training in intelligence analysis. Ideally, this training would start at home station prior to an operational deployment.

The company S2 section will spend a fair amount of its time using classified

military intelligence applications to develop targets. Many of these systems are theater-specific and require on-the-job training for battalion S2 sections. During the unit's relief in place, all company S2 sections should join the battalion S2 for training on these systems.

Essential tasks that the company S2 section must perform are the development of targeting packets, link-analysis diagrams, use of biometrics tools, tactical questioning, sensitive site exploitation, and pattern and trend analysis. All of these functions are core competencies that all members of the company S2 section must be proficient in to support the company with intelligence products.

Additional resources for enhanced training include mobile training teams from the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group and civilian intelligence professionals. The battalion S2 section must also be able to provide additional training as new systems are fielded and techniques shared. Civilian law enforcement professionals, when assigned to units, provide a non-military perspective with years of civilian law enforcement experience. All of these assets should be used when available.

Intelligence-Driven Company Operations

In a COIN environment, the populace serves as the greatest source of information on insurgents.⁵ To gather information of intelligence value from the populace, leaders must build relationships within the community. The most meaningful relationships are often built by junior leaders conducting daily interactions with the population they are securing. In the COIN environment, it is platoon and squad leaders who are out leading patrols. They, not military intelligence personnel, are most likely to encounter information of intelligence value.

To collect information from the populace, a patrol must be dismounted where face-to-face interactions with the local population are a routine occurrence. The local population can provide a wealth of information on insurgent activities. Tribal communities in Iraq easily recognize outsiders and can provide detailed information on enemy locations, strengths, weapons caches, and emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Intelligence products, such as tips cards, which are nondescript cards that contain a unit's contact information, are used to provide the populace a method of anonymous reporting. Individuals who provide specific, credible information on insurgent activity may be further developed by a trained HUMINT collector into valuable intelli-



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gence sources, who serve as vetted informants.

The longer a unit spends on the ground, developing relationships with the community and its leaders, the more likely the population is to trust them. The more friends that patrol leaders make on a patrol, the greater the likelihood that the next time the unit comes through the area, they will receive information of intelligence value. This dynamic can be an extreme challenge when the COIN force does not share a common language or culture with the host nation.

Developing relationships that build intelligence requires patience and cultural acumen. For example, our company platoon leaders, operating in eastern Baghdad, stopped by a local tea shop once a week to talk with the owner. Each time a platoon leader visited the shop he was received warmly, drank tea, and talked to the owner and his patrons. A month of visits passed before the shop owner offered information on a suspicious house in his neighborhood. The company then focused collection assets in the area, developing additional intelligence on the house, which eventually led to a deliberate intelligence-driven operation.

If the platoon leader had not invested the time in developing that relationship, the information would likely have never been shared. Building relationships takes time and patience, but produces dividends well worth the effort.

The Company Targeting Process

The same targeting methodology for lethal fire support is used when targeting insurgent forces in a low-intensity conflict. The acronym D3A (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) is the Army's doctrinal process for targeting and remains unchanged in the COIN environment.⁶ The biggest deviations between the COIN and high-intensity environments are the assets used to service targets and the length of the targeting cycle. Targets in a high-intensity conflict may go through all four phases of the targeting cycle in the course of several hours. In the COIN environment, a target may take weeks or even months to complete the cycle:

Decide. During the decide phase of the targeting cycle, the company S2 identifies targeted areas of interest. These may be places that are extrapolated as significant from human or signal intelligence reporting, atmospherics during patrols, tips received from local nationals, or previous enemy activity. It is primarily the job of the company S2 section to analyze this in-



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formation and make a recommendation to the commander for future targets.

During the decide phase, the company S2 section conducts analysis on recent HUMINT reporting within the operating environment and develops a list of named targets and areas of interest in the operating environment. These targets are then briefed to the commander and prioritized for collection efforts. For example, the company S2 section has identified an in-

surgent named Abu Ahmed, who has been reported by a HUMINT source to be the leader of an IED emplacement cell in the company's operating environment. The same source is also reporting that Abu Ahmed owns and operates a fish and juice stand at a local market, which has been used to monitor friendly forces' movements and provide early warning for IED emplacement. The company commander decides that his most significant threat to force protection is Abu Ahmed's cell and



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wants to focus his targeting efforts on their disruption.

Detect. The detect phase of the targeting cycle focuses assets on targeted areas of interest with specific information requirements. Every patrol in this cycle should be treated as a reconnaissance patrol and given specific information requirements. These information requirements must be briefed to the patrol leader and understood by the entire patrol. These information requirements are drawn from data received from previous patrol debriefs and human and signal intelligence reporting. The company S2 develops the information requirements in accordance with the company commander's collection priorities. As in conventional operating environments, information requirements are used to confirm or deny an enemy course of action. For example, a patrol has been tasked to conduct a reconnaissance of Abu Ahmed's stand, with the specific information requirements of confirming the location of the fish and juice stand, identifying Abu Ahmed, and photographing everyone in the vicinity of the juice stand.

During the reconnaissance patrol, the patrol leader stops by the stand and en-

joys a cup of juice, engaging in small talk with local nationals in the area. The patrol makes no obvious efforts to show specific interest in the juice stand. The patrol even makes an effort to visit other shops in the market. The patrol leader is even savvy enough to convince the shop owner to pose with him for a picture. At the conclusion of the patrol, the patrol leader submits his patrol debrief with his findings to the company S2 section. The S2 section then confirms the identity of Abu Ahmed by providing the HUMINT source the picture collected during the reconnaissance. At this point, the company has confirmed the identity of the target, his location, and now has a method for positive identification.

Deliver. The deliver phase begins when a specific named target can be identified and assets are directed to it with a desired effect. Returning to the previous example of Abu Ahmed's cell, the company commander decided that based on the intelligence available that an operation should be conducted to capture Abu Ahmed at his fish and juice stand. The desired effect of this operation was the disruption of IED emplacement activity in the operating environment.

Operation "Juice Stand" was planned and executed, resulting in the detention of Abu Ahmed at his stand. Subsequent interrogations of Abu Ahmed will likely provide additional intelligence on insurgent activity in the area and the names of other members in the IED cell. This intelligence fuels the targeting processes.

The deliver phase does not always require that a target be serviced with a kinetic asset, resulting in detention and, in the most extreme cases, death. Non-kinetic assets can include using psychological operations (PSYOP) products meant to disrupt insurgent activity in a specific area, using reconstruction funds to deprive an insurgent group of support from the community, or reconciliation of a target that was previously a hostile entity.

In the case of Abu Ahmed, the company had been unable to capture him after multiple operations and decided on an alternative approach, which they believed would achieve a similar desired effect. The company S2 section developed a leaflet with Abu Ahmed's picture and name, offering a cash reward for any information leading to his arrest. This leaflet was

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Company Intelligence Support Teams

by Major Rod Morgan

“Units must resource S2 sections down to the company level,” Major General Jeffery Hammond, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, makes clear his vision and intent for operations during deployment in his memorandum, “How We Fight.” In this document, he states several times that his “subordinates will have a 70 to 90 percent read of the enemy prior to conducting any patrol.”

Currently across the Army, these company S2 sections exist by a multitude of names; some are referred to as the “company intel cell,” “company exploitation cell,” “company S2 section,” or “company intel support team.” For the purposes of this article, we will use the company intel support team. Just as there is no established title for this team, there is also no unified training or doctrine available, nor is there an established manning and materiel formula.

The time has come to establish a standard for company-level intelligence sections that can drive bottom-up intelli-

gence. These company intelligence teams deserve the same level of care, thought, and resourcing as that of the company combat recovery team or the company master gunner. These teams are required to provide many functions for the commander, thus the key to their success is not just resourcing them, but resourcing them with the right soldiers and leaders.

The Company Intel Support Team Mission

In today’s full spectrum combat environment, the company commander cannot perform intelligence analysis and fusion alone at his level. As the Army maintains its focus on counterinsurgency and “every soldier is a sensor,” a commander can quickly become overwhelmed with the daily data he must sift through for relevance. Weapons intelligence (WIT) reports, patrol debriefs, intelligence summaries (INTSUMS), link diagrams, and be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) lists are just a few examples of the hundreds of important documents that compete for a commander’s time.

As combat-arms leaders, we heavily rely on our subject-matter experts. For example, company commanders need to understand weapons capabilities and range operations, but the company’s master gunner is the unit’s expert in this field just as the company intel team noncommissioned officer should be the commander’s expert on matters of intelligence.

The Marine Corps jumped out ahead of its sister service by publishing a manual that outlined doctrine for company intel support teams in December 2004. Moreover, the manual points out that the intel support team is not a new concept, regardless of how foreign it may now seem. According to U.S. Marine Corps X-File 2-1.1, *Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)*, “The mission of the company intel cell is to describe the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain, and local population upon friendly operations in order to reduce the commander’s uncertainty and aid in his decision making.”¹

This is a simple and clear mission statement with a powerful purpose. Working with this mission statement as a starting point, we can extrapolate the specified and implied tasks that must be accomplished by the intel support team to achieve its purpose.

The Company Intel Support Team Functions

The company intel support team must be able to manage five functions to aid in the commander's decisionmaking. These functions follow a logical cycle:

Manage the company's lethal and non-lethal targeting. At the company level, targeting is the overall synthesis of all sources of available intelligence — battalion and sister-company INTSUMs, link diagrams, events pattern analysis (indirect fire, sniper, improvised explosive device), terrain analysis, BOLO lists, and most importantly, patrol debriefs. This continuous data fusion helps create a running situation template (SITTEMP) of the unit's operational environment. The intel support team takes this data and works with the commander to further develop targets and identify gaps in the current intelligence picture.

Supervise the company's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) program. Based on the commander's guidance regarding particular targets, the intel support team develops collection specific information requirements (SIR) and an ISR collection matrix. This may require the intel support team to request battalion or higher level assets, task the company's unmanned aerial vehicle team, or work with the commander to task organic patrols to gather required information through observation or tactical questioning.

Manage the patrol prebrief/debrief process for the company. The patrol prebrief is not to be confused with the patrol order given by the patrol leader. The prebrief is generally given by a member of the intel support team to the patrol leader prior to departing the forward operating base (FOB), combat out post (COP), or joint security site (JSS). The prebrief is perhaps the most important function of the intel support team. During this brief, the team shares events that occurred in the operating environment over the

past 12 to 24 hours; route status; ISR collection assets in use throughout the battalion's operating environment; SIR tasked to answer; other units operating within the operating environment; BOLO lists; applicable target packets; and predictive analysis based on analysis during the targeting phase.

The debrief, when based on a solid prebrief, feeds the intel support team with data to continue their intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and ultimately help begin the next targeting cycle for the company. The debrief should provide feedback on all areas covered in the prebrief, as well as provide updated pictures, and may also include data from detainee operations and tactical site exploitation.

Detainee operations. Detainee operations for the intel support team are twofold: to ensure departing patrol units are armed with complete detainee packets and the knowledge to properly complete the forms and use the equipment; and maintain detainee packet data, copies of complete packets, and track current location and status of the company's detainees.

Tactical site exploitation. This function is similar to detainee operations; in that, the intel support team must ensure units depart on patrol trained and equipped with the proper tactical site exploitation paperwork and equipment. Upon completion of patrol and following debriefs, the intel support team sorts through photos collected, downloads biometric data, and manages databases. It is here that the intel support team once again begins its

data synthesis to update its targeting, thus beginning the cycle again.

Manning and Materiel

To accomplish its mission, the intel support team should be resourced with one officer, one noncommissioned officer, and two trained soldiers, which allows the cell to be manned for 24-hour operations and continuous supervision. Intel support team soldiers should be skilled and motivated; and not be part of the command post crew.

To effectively perform its functions, the intel support team should be equipped with dedicated computers and access to communications. The intel support team can function on two computers, but ideally, would be resourced with three: one for biometrics (if allocated); one for mapping, personality and event linkage, and event-trend analysis; and one for prebriefs and debriefs via tactical ground reporting network (TiGRNET), if available. Currently, the Army resources mapping through Falcon View, a mapping application; personality linkage through Analyst Notebook, an analyst development tool; and event linkage through Crystal software application. However, units are currently fielding newer, updated software, such as Axis-Pro.

The intel support team must stay current on all operations and should be collocated with the company command post, which allows them to communicate directly with the battalion S2, as well as units on patrol. Further, their proximity to radios increases their situational awareness. Again, to maintain continued intelligence collection and analysis, do not use the intel support team to run the command post.

Trends at the National Training Center

During the past 6 months of rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), five major trends affecting the intel support team have been revealed: poor vertical and horizontal communications; lack of nesting intelligence timelines and efforts; lack of information processing; continuous personnel turnover; and lack of soldier and leader training.

Two of these trends are issues that one expects any training unit to experience — poor ver-



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tical and horizontal communications and lack of nesting intelligence timelines and efforts are common, but also easily remedied. Through the course of NTC rotations, units normally improve their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and standard operating procedures (SOP) regarding these two trends, and by the end of the rotation, they have greatly refined their systems prior to deployment.

Unfortunately, the remaining three trends are not as easily fixed because they are core problems that involve fundamental individual training. It is these three trends that are crux of the issue:

Lack of information analysis. During recent rotations at the NTC, intel support teams hit and miss on their ability to process data. While a few teams have done exceptionally well, the majority have processed little to no analysis on incoming data as it is received. We also see a trend of intel support teams who receive large amounts of information they do not process. For example, an intel support team may not update patterns, IPB, link diagrams, and patrol prebriefs as data is received. This failure is generally tied to intel support teams being tasked to perform the duties of the company command post in addition to their appointed tasks, which appears to be directly correlated to the next trend.

Continuous personnel turnover. The intel support teams are primarily manned from one of three pools in a company: the fire support team, chemical personnel, or combat arms headquarters section personnel. While some companies deploy to combat fully manned with low-density MOS personnel, the majority of units rotating through the NTC do not, which results in intel support teams being pulled primarily from combat platoons. Just as maintaining qualified squad and vehicle crew integrity during deployment often takes divine intervention, personnel in headquarters companies often shift with necessity as well — a Bradley gunner slot may become vacant or a squad may need a rifleman for a patrol. Personnel management of combat-series soldiers is dynamic at the very least, which greatly affects the intel support teams that are manned by these soldiers. For example, the intel support team member who received home-station training prior to deployment will not likely fill that role during deployment.

Lack of soldier and leader training. Perhaps the most important trend issue is a lack of training, which at the soldier level is either a direct result of personnel



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turnover or a lack of training opportunities. At the leader level, this stems from a lack of training — fire supports officers (the defacto OIC of the intel support team) are not trained prior to assuming their responsibilities. Further, commanders are receiving minimal guidance on the intel support team’s functions and resourcing; bottom line: a lack of soldier and leader training sets the stage for commanders to shoulder a large amount of the work expected from intel support teams.

Where We Go From Here

Intelligence-driven operations have become the cornerstone of how the Army conducts its business. Senior tactical commanders are requiring more of their subordinates to establish company intelligence support teams. We understand the mission of the intel support team, we understand its function, and we know how it must be resourced; however, its success in combat will be limited just as it was at the NTC. The secret to its success is training the correct personnel for the job.

To meet the intent of a growing number of division commanders, the Army must realign its manning requirement at the company level. There are several recommendations for intel support team manning and training; however, the recommendations below may be a solution:

Captains. There must be a change in the program of instruction (POI) used in maneuver captain career courses to put a greater emphasis on intelligence-driven operations, which includes, at a mini-

num, an increased focus on the IPB process. Further, students should receive instruction on how to establish and maintain an intel support team.

Lieutenants. As fire support officers are frequently assigned the job of intel support team OIC, the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course POI should include IPB, ISR synchronization, tactical site exploitation, and detainee handling. Further, creating an intel support team leader course for lieutenants to attend following their OBC would continue to cross-pollinate the combined-arms team.

Enlisted. To prevent personnel turnover at the core of the intel support team, the section must consist of specialized soldiers; just as master gunners and medics, intel support team personnel must be specialized. Understanding that battalions are not always fully manned with analysts, it is unrealistic to recommend placing these low-density MOS soldiers at the company level. However, many installations and divisions are now running their own intel support team courses for non-intel soldiers, so the Army should capitalize on this thought process by creating a one-station unit training (OSUT) follow-on course for future intel support team members. This additional training assists the gaining unit twofold: it allows new soldiers to maximize collective training time with their section, as opposed to being absent for individual training during field exercises; and it awards soldiers a

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Platoon Operations in Iraq: Setting Conditions for Success

by First Lieutenant Kyle T. Trottier



The 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division developed a model for success in the city of Ramadi, defeating al Qaeda in Iraq on the field of battle and in the fight for the respect and cooperation of the local national population.

At the platoon level, soldiers and leaders must be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. This article demonstrates how tactical-level leaders can implement these three characteristics into every aspect of daily operations to make lasting contributions to the security and stability of their area of operations.

Leadership

“Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”¹ Subordinates will replicate and embody the attitude and demeanor of their leaders. Aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined leaders will develop highly skilled warriors capable of succeeding in the complex, and often undefined, realm of counterinsurgency operations. The counterinsurgency fight is difficult because it demands soldiers



and leaders to be highly flexible and adaptable throughout full-spectrum operations. In 2005, the Secretary of the Army Transition Team (SATT) began to emphasize “pentathlete leaders.” In Colonel Robert Tipton’s *Professional Military Education for the “Pentathlete” of the Future*, the SATT defines leaders as “innovative and adaptive, culturally astute professionals that demonstrate character and integrity,” and expresses a desire for “a leader that is well versed in a range of areas and not just one discipline; leaders who have mastered their military or core career field tasks and have developed skills in the broader, more complex, politico-military arena.”²

Based on my experiences in Iraq, the priorities a leader displays will be followed by those they lead and establish the daily operational tempo for success. The daily life of a soldier must be tempered with maintaining good order and discipline based on his military training. Some examples of promoting good order and discipline include:

- Daily sensitive-item checks to ensure accountability of all property and enable leaders to inspect the living quarters of soldiers and the condition of their equipment.
- Unit leaders ensuring thorough pre-combat inspections are completed prior to each mission. Leaders are obligated to check each small detail of their soldiers and equipment to ensure mission success.
- Every mission, no matter how small, receiving a thorough patrol brief from the unit commander. Every soldier must understand all aspects of the operation, contingency plans, and be familiar with adjacent units when applicable. A thorough back brief is a highly effective tool to ensure soldiers have a complete understanding of each mission.

Vehicles in a combat zone regularly get abused by rugged terrain and long mission hours. Effective leaders plan maintenance into their patrol schedules in addition to pre- and post-operations preventive maintenance checks and services. Each unit must have a dedicated day for 20-level maintenance and vehicle services to be completed, including quality assurance and quality checks and vehicle dispatching. If this is neglected, leaders will fail their soldiers by not providing them with reliable transportation and may endanger their lives in the event of a vehicle breakdown in hostile locations.

Combat requires leaders with great initiative, who work within the commander’s intent, and often with minimal guidance. Leaders must be highly motivated and possess the will to fight and win on the battlefield. It is a platoon leader’s job to create a disciplined environment where subordinate leaders can display these characteristics without destroying the team’s capacity to find, fix, and destroy the enemy, and while providing continual security and a nonthreatening front to the civilian population. The fundamentals of leadership, planning, fire, and maneuver provided by commission-source training and officer basic courses provide a firm platform from which to build a unit’s capacity to fight and win in combat; however, the platoon leader’s flexibility and adaptive nature will be the decisive element in the counterinsurgency environment.

Training Soldiers to be Warriors

Pre-deployment training is equivalent to the 400-meter dash track-and-field event. Units will cram a year’s worth of training, including small-arms, wheeled-vehicle, tank gunnery, and shoot-house training; battalion- and brigade-level field problems; and a rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) or Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), into a 6-month timeframe. During this 6-month timeframe, units were also required to complete dozens of other mandatory training classes, ranging from combat lifesaver (CLS) to Arabic language and cultural sensitivity training.

The Army’s current 12- to 15-month deployments are marathon races, tests of mental and physical endurance, during which individual and collective skills sharpened during the 6-month crash-course training period will deteriorate, making remedial training essential in every warrior task and drill to ensure mission success. Physical training, marksmanship, and medical skills are three vital areas to continually focus training efforts while deployed.

Physical training. Physical training is the cornerstone of training success. The modern warrior is required to execute a great variety of tasks such as mounted operations using M1A1 tanks and M1114 high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); dismounted patrols; observation post operations (OP); traffic control points (TCP); training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and many other missions. Each mission requires great strength and agility — carrying individual body armor (IBA), ammunition, water, and mission-specific equipment during all seasons, places excessive strain on the body. Missions are extremely long in duration and soldiers in good physical condition are more likely to stay alert and execute tasks when physically strained: “The benefits to be derived from a good



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physical fitness program are many. It can reduce the number of soldiers on profile and sick call, invigorate training, and enhance productivity and mental alertness. A good physical fitness program also promotes team cohesion and combat survivability.⁷³ Additionally, physical training is an excellent way for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to develop individual soldier and unit discipline, when standards are enforced.

Marksmanship. Marksmanship is the heart and soul of a soldier — he must be lethal with all weapons systems and weapons platforms. But, as Robert Tomes states, “Mistakes made in the process of waging a counterinsurgency war often reinforce an insurgent’s propaganda.”⁷⁴ Hitting a target is the easy part, hitting the right target is the difference between widespread insurgency support and killing the enemy.

While deployed, units have access to plenty of ammunition; leaders should take advantage of unique training opportunities around them, sometimes requiring creativity and ingenuity, to finely hone warrior skills. For example, our platoon established a joint security station (JSS), approximately 40 kilometers east of Ramadi, with 65 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The JSS was a permanent checkpoint established on a main supply route that served as the primary east-west route between Baghdad, Syria, and Jordan. The checkpoint was established to prevent the shipment of illegal supplies and materials from Syria and Jordan into Baghdad and block vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and illegal materials from entering the city of Ramadi.

Our area of operations provided the perfect setup — miles of unpopulated desert, a huge stockpile of ammunition, a supportive chain of command, and creative leaders — to build a small-arms and crew-served range. We built targets from excess HESCO barriers and other construction material, and developed a training plan to shoot small-arms and crew-served weapons weekly. For small arms, we confirmed zero, then executed various scenarios, shooting from the prone, kneeling, and standing positions. We executed reflexive fire drills and “stress tests.” The stress test was designed to provide realistic training by requiring soldiers to sprint, crawl, and buddy rush, or carry their buddy up to a given point and then fire from a pre-designated position (prone, kneel, or stand). This realistic training not only met the train-as-you-fight principle, but also gave great confidence to individual soldiers by building immense trust and unit cohesion.

Once weekly, during another training day, we executed crew-served gunnery from both the M1114 and M1A1 platforms. This is a great way to zero the tank’s coaxial machine gun and maintain 19K skill sets, as well as build confidence in truck gunners. Concurrent training must include weekly classes on the rules of engagement (ROE) and escalation of force (EOF). Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has disseminated training slides with specific ROE/EOF guidelines that soldiers should sear into their

memory weekly so they will not hesitate to make a correct decision. It will likely come to the point where they can repeat slides verbatim without reading them, when this happens leaders must get creative in their training to continually instill these values.

Just like the physical training plan, marksmanship training must be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. If executed properly, leaders will build strong warriors who will not hesitate to pull triggers, when necessary, and will do so with great accuracy and lethality. More importantly, warriors will be disciplined and intelligent enough to know when not to pull a trigger, which in the counterinsurgency fight, may be even more important to winning the trust and respect of the local national population.

Medical skills. Medical skills are certainly very important to soldiers at all levels. The platoon-level medic will serve as the primary trainer for medical training, using the combat lifesaver (CLS) skill set as the basis for training. Every soldier must know how to properly apply the hemorrhage control compressing bandage, nasopharyngeal airway device, and tourniquet. After soldiers completely understand the basic procedures, the medic should demonstrate the proper use of the warrior aid and litter kit (WALK), which is in every vehicle, and each item in the medic’s aid bag in the event the medic is unavailable during an emergency situation.

The Army currently requires an annual recertification of CLS training, which is insufficient during combat conditions. Monthly recertification at the platoon level, supervised by the medic, will provide soldiers adequate skill levels and confidence to treat wounds and save lives. Intelligent warriors, who are competent in CLS, are a major combat multiplier because they increase the unit’s capability to continue operations and accomplish the mission.

With professional training, leaders ensure soldiers maintain their skills and level of focus through the long and strenuous combat deployment. Conducting physical training, marksmanship, and medical training with routine discipline and increased standards for success will produce aggressive and lethal soldiers, as well as aid them in preparing to be good will ambassadors to win the trust and respect of the local national population. An intelligent and disciplined warrior will respect the power he controls and will be judicious with the implementation of that power when properly trained and that training is regularly reiterated. This process enables the unit to deal with the dichotomy of counterinsurgency warfare, “to redress the basic social and political issues of a nation while being shot at.”⁷⁵

Patrolling

Patrolling is the bread and butter of a combat platoon; it requires the warrior to be at his best. As a junior leader, it is the culmination of all the schoolhouse classes, training, and mission planning. Intelligent patrol leaders must understand the motives of their enemy, how they will fight, and the tools they will implement against you: “The insurgent may not seek to *do* or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a *mujahid*, earning God’s favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.”⁶ Another option is, “insurgents act as ‘strategic spoilers,’ seeking to discredit and undermine the government by targeting coalition forces.”⁷ Political power is the major point of contention during an insurgency. Highly skilled and organized men will try in every way possible to discredit U.S. and coalition forces. The high-level leaders of insurgent organizations will recruit the “mujahid,” who may not fully understand the political details being planned, but are willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause to “earn God’s favor.” Knowing al Qaeda in Iraq’s objectives helped shape U.S. operations to serve multiple purposes. Operations had to be lethal, but disciplined, to eliminate al Qaeda presence and simultaneously develop a positive rapport with the local populace.

In a RAND Corporation essay titled, “Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts,” Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe describe counterinsurgency conflicts. Essentially the insurgent problem can be broken down into two forces: the rebels and the authority. Rebels always start with an information advantage over authority (because they almost always start small and on the fringe of society). Authority always starts with a force advantage over rebels. The counterinsurgency fight essentially is the capacity of the rebels to grow fast and thereby overcome its force disadvantage and authority’s capacity to over-

come the information disadvantage and bring its force to bear on a comparatively weak insurgency (paraphrase).⁸

Leaders with high levels of situational awareness help U.S. and Iraqi governments, the authority, overcome the intelligence disadvantage by serving as sensory instruments during combat patrols and submitting patrol debriefs within 24 hours to be assessed by the battalion S2. Gathering timely and accurate intelligence is critical for U.S. and coalition forces to be successful during a counterinsurgency fight; however, protecting the local national population from terrorist violence is just as critical.

In Ramadi, al Qaeda had informants in every neighborhood and any local citizen who aided U.S. forces would be captured, tortured, and/or executed. To combat this issue, our company executed large-scale intelligence gathering operations, during which our platoons, partnered with Iraqi army and Iraqi police, conducted soft raids under the cover of darkness. These operations proved to be highly effective: we entered, cleared, and secured homes, then conducted thorough searches for contraband or intelligence; we checked all persons against the high-value target (HVT) list and all vehicles against the be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) list; and finally, we spoke with the male elders of the household, gathering as much intelligence as possible, and then left.

During each operation, the company visited 25 or more households and gathered a great amount of intelligence, which was untraceable, thereby protecting the citizens from al Qaeda harassment. We also used this opportunity to create and regularly update our database with pictures, names, ages, occupation, and other information on the occupants of each house. Since personal contact between U.S. forces and Iraqi nationals was minimal at this time, it was a golden opportunity to display our truest intentions to the locals — we were here for their assistance,



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not to make their lives more miserable. We distributed sugar, stuffed animals to children, and other small goods, encouraging citizens to become active participants in the revival of their city. This combination of maneuver operations and information operations was a highly effective way to defeat insurgent tactics. Through disciplined and respectful treatment of the civilian population, we brought credit to U.S. and coalition forces and discredited al Qaeda, reducing their ability to recruit mujahid. Overall, these operations took away the information advantage shared by al Qaeda (rebels), transferred the initiative to coalition forces, and, in the process, built trust between coalition forces and the civilian population.

Another highly effective, but significantly more dangerous, means of gathering intelligence is using a dismounted observation post (OP) or small killer team (SKT) normally consisting of sniper teams. The SKT provides information on traffic patterns (vehicular and pedestrian) and behavioral patterns of citizens; or it can be used as part of an ambush at frequently used mortar-launch sites or locations of multiple improvised explosive device (IED) sites. Incorporating SKT requires serious consideration, including a plan for the infiltration and exfiltration of these teams, and preparing a quick reaction force (QRF) to be ready in the event the team is compromised. Communications is a huge consideration due to the varied reception of urban terrain. SKT leaders must be aggressive and disciplined in scanning their sector for possible threats, and must be intelligent enough to know when they are compromised and must exfiltrate.

Dismounted and Mounted Patrol Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

While conducting dismounted operations, the fundamental principles of patrolling, “planning, reconnaissance, security, control, and common sense,” cannot be overstressed.⁹ I recommend using the *Ranger Handbook*, even if you are not a Ranger, to assist with planning considerations of dismounted patrols.¹⁰ Whether clearing urban terrain in downtown Ramadi, mud hut villages and palm groves along the Euphrates River, or conducting traffic control point (TCP) operations, thorough planning and reconnaissance, followed by a solid operations order, is essential. Maintaining a constant 360-degree security and a forceful presence sends a strong message that your unit is comprised of disciplined warriors.

Based on the prevalence of suicide bomber vests in the Ramadi area, we maintained a 50-meter standoff distance from all local nationals when patrolling congested areas. When stopping by market areas, we frequently searched the shop owner and his shop, prior to any discussions, to ensure security. After conducting several patrols in the same area, we became familiar with the people and their typical dress and behaviors, so we would forego searches, which helped build a greater trust and rapport with the citizens. In the United States, competent police departments describe this activity as “community policing.” Our form of community policing led to a greater exchange of information during conversations where Iraqi citizens would regularly voice their likes and dislikes with the current situation and make suggestions for future improvements. This is just one example of how culturally astute leaders, armed with situational awareness and the ability to make adjustments during a patrol, can simultaneously gather information and disperse positive information during a maneuver operation. It was a major turning point for the city of Ramadi when soldiers and citizens had built a rapport familiar enough to engage in verbal exchanges in free and open

dialogue. Our actions proved to the citizens that we would listen to them and respect them, and even if they criticized our actions, they would not be punished for their self-expressions.

In his article titled, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” David Kilcullen, states “at the operational level counterinsurgency remains a competition between several sides, each seeking to mobilize the population in its cause. The people remain the prize.”¹¹ In short, it is not only what a soldier does, but what he fails to do that the local national population will observe. The daily actions of a patrol will either serve as a bridge between the local populace and the desired endstate of a free and democratic Iraq, or will form a wedge further separating the two, making the desired endstate even more difficult to achieve. If a civilian knows a U.S. patrol will make contact with insurgents in their neighborhood, Kilcullen suggests, “far from finding the ‘presence patrol’ reassuring, the population finds them alienating and a source of danger.”¹²

Our mounted patrols varied greatly during our 15 months in Ramadi, from kinetic use of tanks to patrolling vast stretches of the main supply route in M114s, but the principles of being aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined never changed. These training principles are critical for a gunner riding in a vehicle at 35 kph, who has only a few seconds to make a decision. Escalation of force must be implemented at all times, but is especially important during mounted operations. Gunners must have both day and night signals that alert drivers of a U.S. patrol to pull to the shoulder of the road. Pen flares are especially effective instruments for this purpose, both day and night; they provide both an auditory and visual signal to civilian traffic and are nonlethal.

M114s have been receiving new gunner protection kits (GPK) with electric turrets and rearview mirrors — there is no excuse for gunners to stand up unless they are engaging a target (audio, signal, or weapon). These kits greatly increase the survivability rate of the gunner in the event of an attack. All vehicles should also be equipped with an electronic countermeasure (ECM) device. The ECM should always be used, but especially in high-density locations.

Leaders must ensure all vehicle occupants buckle up — even if it is uncomfortable over all their gear, it will save lives in the event of an IED or vehicle rollover. Mounted patrols should avoid driving against the flow of traffic, if at all possible. This has resulted in numerous vehicular accidents and may increase the need for EOF, and needlessly end in the use of lethal force.

Tactical-level leaders in Ramadi demonstrated how to simultaneously gather intelligence while integrating maneuver and information operations into combat patrols. Soldiers in Ramadi proved to be highly flexible and adaptable through a variety of missions, mounted and dismounted. They maintained a balance of lethality and disciplined respect for the local national population, which shaped the battlefield and served to be a catalyst for peace, security, and rebuilding in the city of Ramadi.

Integrating Iraqi Security Forces

The training and integration of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is without a doubt the most important mission in Iraq. It is through proper training and equipping of the ISF that long-term peace and stability will be established, legitimate governments recognized by the people will take power, and the United States will be able to reduce its force levels in Iraq. If U.S. trainers can teach the aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined philosophy to the ISF, they will be set up for future success.

After establishing JSS Arcala, our tank platoon of 20 soldiers assumed responsibility for Company 1, 2d Battalion Provincial Security Force (PSF 2). Of approximately 65 Iraqi soldiers, we received a mixed bag of young and old, with various previous work experiences from former military to farmers. In many cases, they were desperate men just trying to support their families and the PSF was one of the few good paying jobs. David Kilcullen suggests, "In modern counter-insurgency, victory may need to be redefined as the disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society."¹³ Without a doubt, many of the new ISF once worked with al Qaeda for the same reason they joined our ranks — to have an income. Failure was not an option; these men had to succeed in bringing security to their area and set an example of cooperation for a peaceful future.

There are a host of unique challenges, such as training, procurement, equipment, and forging an esprit de corps, when creating a military from scratch. Our first priority was to create a positive rapport with the PSF company commander and battalion commander. It was essential to build a trusting relationship and ensure them that all decisions would be firm and fair and they would have every available resource to help them build a ready and relevant security force. Over many cups of chi tea and cigarettes (smoking is an Iraqi custom that garners respect), we came to a mutual understanding of our joint mission.

We established JSS Arcala in May 2007, just as "the surge" of five additional brigade combat teams were moving into Baghdad and while 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, was still in the process of "clear, hold, and build" operations in Ramadi. As part of the "holding," new combat outposts were being built all over the brigade's area of operations. As a result of both the "surge" and our own demands for increased combat outposts, construction supplies were in great demand and limited in availability. Due to limited engineer assets to construct facilities or housing structures, we lived in the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) DRASH tent for nearly 6 months. PSF 2 had four living containers, 20-foot U.S. MILVAN containers lined with plywood walls, lights, and a heating and air-conditioning unit, which we relocated from a previous site. The containers were transformed into a kitchen, an arms room, officer's quarters and office space, and one as a living container for PSF soldiers. To create extra living space, we acquired a second DRASH tent from our battalion for the PSF. This proved to be advantageous for building a rapport between the units; it showed that the PSF would have the same accommodations and amenities as U.S. soldiers, or better, since they had the four additional containers.

Once the life-support area (LSA) was established, we initiated an aggressive training program with the PSF. We began with fundamental military classes, including rank structure and chain of command, military discipline, and drill and ceremony, and quickly integrated the PSF into our platoon physical training program three times a week to increase their physical well being, and over time, trained their sergeants to conduct physical



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training on their own. Athletic events, such as soccer or ultimate Frisbee, were great cardiovascular workouts that bred newfound respect through competition. Often when playing against each other, both the PSF and U.S. teams seemed to compete for their nations and put in an extra bit of effort for national pride.

We taught the PSF property accountability and proper preventive maintenance checks of all vehicles, weapons, communications equipment, and other items. Together, we developed an arms room, established property books, prepared hand receipts for all items issued, and created a daily inventory system. To make certain that PSF soldiers turned in their issued weapons at the end of their shift, they would be docked pay for each missing item per day. This proved to be the perfect discipline motivator, as we very seldom had anything missing from the arms room.

JSS Arcala was built along the main supply route and was a permanent vehicle checkpoint to search all east/west traffic between Syria, Jordan, and Baghdad. With most intelligence indicating that VBIEDs and suicide vests entering Ramadi were coming from the east, places such as Fallujah and Samara, the checkpoint served as a gate to stop such attacks from occurring in Ramadi. The checkpoint served its purpose well — it received three VBIED attacks, but stopped all related attacks within the city of Ramadi. We did, however, shift our training focus to proper vehicle and personnel search procedures. We taught weekly classes on these topics, which progressed from basic to in-depth and advanced techniques, until the PSF was able to give the class and properly train its new members. We received one Backscatter x-ray van and trained the PSF to use the van, which greatly enhanced their search capabilities, especially for vehicles carrying cargo. The ability to x-ray vehicles allowed for non-evasive searches of spaces such as door panels, ceiling, inside seats, and wheel wells.

We obtained a simplified version of Iraqi laws and judicial processes from brigade, which we used as a basis for weekly training sessions on local laws and how they applied to the PSF as law-enforcement officials. We conducted classes on how to properly detain personnel, ensure humane treatment of detainees, and complete forms for processing detainees, as well as provided an overview of trial processes. We repetitively reminded the PSF not to abuse their authority; it was essential for them to win the trust and respect of their fellow citizens as fair and impartial protectors of justice, rather than serving as another force of oppression.

Our platoon developed a constant rotation of personnel at the vehicle checkpoint to overwatch operations and ensure thorough searches were conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Additionally, we had a ground-based operational surveillance system (GBOSS) forward-looking infrared (FLIR) camera system with two monitors in our TOC. The system has two cameras, which were connected to the monitors, mounted on a tower. These cameras enabled us to overwatch all aspects of operations,

day or night, and under all weather conditions. This major force multiplier not only provided a means of 24-hour observation, but also served as a great tool for teaching and reinforcing behavior. If PSF soldiers did not perform to standard, we invited the PSF company commander to our TOC to show him the below-standard results of his troops, giving him the opportunity to conduct remedial and corrective training for the failing soldiers; if that failed, the threat or actual deduction of pay would always prove its point and immediately correct the below-standard behavior.

After our checkpoint operations were fully functional, we began an intensified training effort with our Iraqi partners to include them in all of our weekly training, to include small-arms ranges, reflexive fire drills, medical training, battle drills, patrolling techniques, operating the Backscatter van, and search techniques. It was not long before we had a rigorous weekly cycle with the PSF, which included physical training, technical and tactical classes, professional-development classes, and joint 24/7 checkpoint manning and daily patrolling of the 35-kilometer main supply route. We conducted in-depth after action reviews (AAR) with the PSF to stimulate professional growth and development.

The checkpoint operations at JSS Arcala also proved to be a rich tool for gathering accurate intelligence and dissemination of positive information operations. Within the first month, regular traffic patterns became obvious through the checkpoint. Certain vehicles and personnel regularly passed through as part of their daily or weekly routine, especially vans loaded with students who attended Al Anbar University and truckers carrying commerce between Jordan, Syria, and Baghdad. When local citizens noticed the PSF were treating them with respect and dignity in the execution of their searches, they began to provide small bits of information that, when put together, would paint a clear picture of al Qaeda operations in our area of operations. Oftentimes, the intelligence we received would be from an adjacent unit's area of operations, and when units cross-talked, it helped narrow the safe zone along unit borders that al Qaeda would exploit as safe havens.

Further expanding our intelligence-gathering capabilities, our battalion put up large billboards with pro-Iraqi propaganda, and tip hotline numbers and e-mail addresses to report anonymous tips. The battalion also printed thousands of flyers, which the PSF handed to citizens as they traveled through the checkpoint. This was a powerful tool for positive change and gave frightened citizens a voice in their pursuit for a secure country.

In counterinsurgency operations, the people are the objective; whichever side makes the most convincing argument that their ruling of the region/country will best serve the general population's interest will ultimately win. Mobilizing the population is



"Once the life-support area (LSA) was established, we initiated an aggressive training program with the PSF. We began with fundamental military classes, including rank structure and chain of command, military discipline, and drill and ceremony, and quickly integrated the PSF into our platoon physical training program three times a week to increase their physical well being, and over time, trained their sergeants to conduct physical training on their own."

political power; if the U.S. and PSF successfully work together, it will mobilize the local citizens, who will join forces with us, and thereby deny safe haven to insurgents, who would otherwise seamlessly blend into the local populace. In his classic, *Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency*, Roger Trinquier concludes "that the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants."¹⁴ To counter this, the U.S. must recognize that, "his total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point."¹⁵ This is why it was so important for PSF to become a



"The checkpoint served its purpose well — it received three VBIED attacks, but stopped all related attacks within the city of Ramadi. We did, however, shift our training focus to proper vehicle and personnel search procedures. We taught weekly classes on these topics, which progressed from basic to in-depth and advanced techniques, until the PSF was able to give the class and properly train its new members. We received one Backscatter x-ray van and trained the PSF to use the van, which greatly enhanced their search capabilities, especially for vehicles carrying cargo."

ready and relevant security force; they speak the language, they know the locals, and, if motivated, they could do a more effective job in gathering intelligence to shape operations and deny insurgents the ability to control terrain or the hearts and minds of the local population.

Through aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined efforts, even soldiers without official military transition team (MTT) training can turn a group of ordinary men into a ready and relevant security force. If this force is disciplined and respects the people whom they are paid to protect, they will become a catalyst for incredible change within their area of operations. Iraqi forces with purpose, direction, and motivation are capable of defeating insurgent elements and serve as the key component to deny them safe terrain. Aggressive pursuit of intelligence, in conjunction with the spread of positive information, has the potential to persuade citizens to align themselves with coalition views and turn away from the oppressive restraints of insurgents.

Local Interactions: A Critical Element in Counterinsurgency

The simple fact that Iraqi Security Forces are working with your unit is an indicator of local cooperation. The powerbrokers in a tribal society, especially in Al Anbar, are the sheiks. If thousands of men are volunteering to join the ranks of Iraqi police and other city workers, it is through the approval of their tribal leaders, which is a good example of why it is mandatory for U.S. leaders to make frequent visits to the homes of local sheiks and show respect for their tribal society. However, only a quick learner with good interpersonal skills will be successful in this arena.

The common Iraqi greeting tradition of handshakes, hugs, and kisses on the cheek is a bit overbearing for the “personal space” of most sensitive Americans, but is required. Soldiers of all ranks must quickly become adept at the “man kiss” and realize it is a cultural act demonstrating respect. When meeting with tribal leaders, you should schedule at least 6 to 8 hours to respect their cultural norms of long conversations and lengthy meals. These events usually begin by discussing business matters, then progress to a lengthy meal, and end with multiple cups of chi tea and cigarettes.

Soldiers must understand the Iraqi mannerisms of eating with their hands and not show signs of disgust at what Americans would normally consider unsanitary. The sheik will want to get to know his American partners in depth, and usually at the end of the meal, will discuss personal matters over chi in an attempt to forge a strong friendship. These are great opportunities for Americans and Iraqis to find shared interests and similarities and understand one another at a higher level. It is through this process that tribal leaders will realize that we have a lot in common and our joint partnership will be more advantageous to success in their area than through an alliance with insurgents.

By early July 2007, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, completed a massive clear-and-hold operation, which encompassed the entire area of operations and set the conditions for major reconstruction operations. The heart of this endeavor was a unified effort from the sheiks of Ramadi — together an amazing transformation unfolded. From the rural outskirts of the city to its downtown area, a massive renewal project began, which included removing trash and rubble, repaving streets and sidewalks, installing solar-powered street lights, rebuilding damaged buildings, filling in potholes and craters, filling bullet holes in buildings, and repainting streets, walls, bridges, overpasses, and homes. Brigade-level efforts to renew city services, such as police, fire, ambulance and hospital services; developing a small-

business bureau; and repairing sewer, water, and power lines, all slowly progressed, and within 6 months, a new city was reborn. Markets and restaurants were thriving again; museums, banks, and schools were operational; and U.S. forces were freely patrolling areas on foot, which was previously unsafe.

Unified efforts always result in a win-win situation for all participants — by January 2007, the city of Ramadi had four major operating bases and dozens of company outposts. By creating conditions for peace, 1st Brigade Combat Team proved that it is possible to reduce the United States’ footprint in Iraq. By March 2008, three of the four major operating bases in Ramadi were closed and operations and logistics consolidated into one facility, Camp Ramadi. Numerous company outposts were demilitarized and turned over to Iraqi control, further reiterating to the locals the U.S. is in Iraq as a force for positive change, not oppression or colonial control.

At the platoon level, soldiers and leaders need to be aggressive, intelligent, and disciplined. Soldiers in Ramadi applied these fundamentals to all their operations to transform a city into an example of success in Iraq. If future platoon leaders continue to provide purpose, direction, and motivation, emphasize continual training, and apply the fundamentals learned at the schoolhouse, they will be successful. Future leaders in Iraq must be “pentathletes,” capable of wide-spectrum operations — they must be flexible and adaptable to mission changes, but always cognizant of political and cultural implications of their actions. Our behaviors represent the desires of an entire country and must be carefully guided. Ramadi is an example that this war is heading in a positive direction. With intelligently sustained operations at the platoon level and up the chain of command, the desired endstate of a free and stable Iraq is possible.



Notes

- ¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington D.C., 31 August 1999, p. 1-4.
- ²Colonel Robert A. Tipton, *Professional Military Education for the “Pentathlete” of the Future*, Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2006, pp. 2-5.
- ³Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*, GPO, Washington D.C., 1 October 1998, p. iii.
- ⁴Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *Parameters*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Spring 2004, p. 22.
- ⁵David Kilcullen, “Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” online at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php>, p. 8.
- ⁶Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” online at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php>.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, RAND Corporation, February 1970, pp. 8-12.
- ⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Ranger Handbook*, Student Handbook 21-76, GPO, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 5-1.
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux.”
- ¹²Ibid.
- ¹³Ibid.
- ¹⁴Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee, Praeger, New York, 1964, p. 6.
- ¹⁵Ibid.

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Expanding Staff Responsibilities for Nonlethal Targeting

by First Lieutenant Micah Hall

Commanders appoint capable junior officers to their staffs to increase battle-field understanding and facilitate decisionmaking. Traditional staff functions have developed well-defined, common roles throughout the military that meet the needs of a commander during a kinetic fight. However, as units transition to nonlethal targeting and reconstruction operations, so must their staffs. This article describes the modifications our unit made to respond to the additional planning and information-gathering needs in the nonlethal operating environment. It also demonstrates how this reorganization assisted our cavalrymen in mission planning and execution in the contemporary operating environment.

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, defines the staff's gener-


al role as, "Staffs continuously provide relevant information (RI) to their respective commanders on the progress of operations. The RI helps commanders achieve situational understanding. One piece of information alone may not be significant; however, when combined with other information from the common operational picture (COP), it may allow the commander to formulate an accurate commander's visualization and make an appropriate decision."¹

Squadrons focused on a lethal fight have a staff model that has been tested and proven through engagements over time. Commanders have coordinating staff officers in the fields of personnel management, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications to facilitate managing units at war. These experts, augmented with a few personal staff members, offer enough

assistance to the squadron commander that he can decide the next appropriate action to take on the enemy.

This system works well for fighting a traditional kinetic fight; it provides the commander with the means of determining what the enemy is doing, how to defeat the enemy with fire and maneuver, and sustain his force throughout the process. While civil-military needs are acknowledged in FM 6-0, they are mainly addressed as activities necessary to enable commanders to proceed with kinetic action. The first two civil-military operation (CMO) responsibilities listed are "advising the commander on the effect of civilian populations on military operations," and "minimizing civilian interference with operations. This includes dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions."² It is not un-





til the fifteenth delineated responsibility that they state the civil-military officer “Provide(s) instruction to units, officials (friendly, HN [host nation] civil, or HN military), and the population on identifying, planning, and implementing pro-

grams to support civilian populations and strengthen HN internal defense and development.”³ This demonstrates that the doctrinal focus of CMO is to minimize the effects of civilians on kinetic military operations.

The contemporary operating environment within our area of responsibility demanded a different approach to CMO. The advent of the Sons of Iraq program, in conjunction with the clearance of al Qaeda in Iraq, largely pacified our operating environment. Rather than seeking to minimize the effect of civilians on military operations, we focused the majority of our squadron’s efforts on establishing governance and essential services, and reducing dependence on coalition support. To accomplish these nontraditional military tasks, our squadron, along with its parent brigade, underwent significant staff reorganization to facilitate nonkinetic missions.

From the brigade level down, a substantial amount of combat power was dedicated to understanding and developing the nonlethal environment in our operating environment. The brigade had a robust pool of officers and experts to accomplish this end. For starters, the brigade had an embedded provincial reconstruction team (ePRT), which consisted of the State Department, Department of Agriculture, bilingual-bicultural advisors (BBAs), and U.S. Army officers. As shown in Figure 1, the ePRT was further augmented with staff officers from the brigade troops battalion who were assigned additional duties as subject-matter experts (SME). Barring few exceptions, the brigade successfully distributed the responsibility for sub-



“Our operating environment was divided between the two teams, and in turn they divided up the battlespace, which accomplished a secondary SME effect whereby certain civil affairs personnel were dedicated to studying and understanding the CMO environment of a given town. This expertise was used to gain a better understanding of the operating environment and execute the projects as we took on CMO missions.”

jects across its assets in such a way that each individual was responsible for only one topic. These SME then used their expertise to drive the targeting and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process at the brigade level.

When compared to brigade, our squadron was at a significant personnel disadvantage. Where brigade had flexibility to singularly task individuals to become experts on particular subjects, the squadron was required to double-task modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions and expand responsibilities to facilitate the IPB and targeting process. While this occasionally strained our staff members by forcing them to juggle both SME and MTOE job-related work, this multitasking was crucial to accomplishing our mission. Our squadron had direct contact with the lowest level battlespace owners and the ability to gain the best understanding of ground truth in the operating environment. A complete depiction of the demarcation of responsibilities is shown in Figure 2. Assigned areas of expertise included, but were not limited to, governance, medical, agriculture, irrigation, and women's affairs.

As soon as staff officers were assigned as SMEs, they were charged with rapidly developing an understanding of their ar-



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reas of interest, which were established from information gathered by our squadron civil affairs teams and respective bri-

gade counterparts, who had been working in our operating environment for more than 6 months prior to our assuming responsibility for the battlespace. Information gathered from this process was augmented by information gathered from our troops, as they had owned their battlespace for 3 months prior to the reorganization. Once compiled, we took the raw data and produced a database that allowed each SME and the commander to understand the squadron's position on each nonlethal area of interest. This database not only confirmed the squadron's current status, but also mapped out the way ahead by assigning tasks for the coming week, identifying intermediate goals, and establishing desired endstates for each subject.

The demarcation of tasks established in our reorganization was accomplished along several lines; some were a result of identifying underused assets and others were natural extensions of existing jobs. For example, our squadron medical officer served as the medical subject-matter expert — he was trained to manage medical personnel and had immediate access to medical professionals, which allowed him to assist in understanding and developing the medical systems in our operating environment. His experience and expertise yielded many positive results within




Figure 2

his particular subject area; his involvement ranged from assigning medical reconnaissance objectives during our targeting process to spearheading the squadron's effort to host both coalition and Iraqi-led combined medical exercises.

Reorganizing at the squadron staff level was a function of supporting our troops. Throughout their careers, our cavalry troopers' training focused on a kinetic fight with traditional cavalry reconnaissance objectives. Although we augmented our pre-deployment preparation with critical tasks, such as language skills, tactical-site exploitation, and negotiation skills, the long-term objectives of restoring essential services and establishing independence are well beyond the limitations of our training. Thus, our squadron staff was charged with repackaging tasks from brigade and developing squadron tasks in the terms of a cavalryman. Our research, assessments, and assigned reconnaissance objectives were simply the evolution of IPB focused on infrastructure and civil capacity building.

In addition to reorganizing the responsibilities of our staff, our squadron was allocated eight civil affairs soldiers. Seven of these soldiers were organized into two teams that worked closely with the troops and frequently accompanied them on patrol, and an eighth soldier served as

the squadron's project purchasing officer (PPO) for the commander's emergency response program (CERP) projects. Our operating environment was divided between the two teams, and in turn they divided up the battlespace, which accomplished a secondary SME effect whereby certain civil affairs personnel were dedicated to studying and understanding the CMO environment of a given town. This expertise was used to gain a better understanding of the operating environment and execute the projects as we took on CMO missions.

The magnitude of the gap between familiar reconnaissance objectives and those specific to a nonlethal operating environment varied greatly between and within different subject areas. Some objectives had a strong correlation to traditional tasks; for example, a major focus of our squadron was to fix the irrigation system in our largely agrarian operating environment. After staff analysis was conducted to identify suspected blockages, cavalry troops were assigned terrain-based reconnaissance objectives to confirm or deny the presence of blockages at discrete grids. In this typical example, the staff took a nonlethal mission and reframed it as a traditional reconnaissance mission with a named area of interest (NAI) and a specific order or request (SOR) for our scouts.

One significant change that resulted from this organization was that staff officers served as information collectors as they developed their own squadron-level spheres of influence. For example, our women's affairs representative regularly attended women's events, our medical officer inspected the local clinics, and the S9 attended many of the local council meetings. Again, using the canal blockage example, our squadron engineer regularly met with the local government representatives responsible for irrigation management to try to leverage them to clean the canals. This face-to-face interaction and firsthand experience greatly increased the SMEs' level of understanding, allowing them to paint a clearer picture to the commander and troops. This also drove future operations and reconnaissance objectives in the physical or nonphysical domains.

The staff model we created to respond to nonlethal targeting and mission planning was in keeping with the principles that staffs exist to support the commander's decisionmaking and squadron staffs exist to support troops. The database constructed by our SMEs provided the squadron commander with a concise snapshot of where we stood, where we wanted to be, and how we intended to get there. Also, framing our tasks as traditional cavalry missions enabled our troopers to achieve success.

Once our operating environment was currently secure, we understood that it could quickly change and that our troopers needed to maintain the ability to transition lethal engagements without hesitation. Bottom line: preparatory staff work supports the troops by engendering a mentality of soldiers deployed to war while simultaneously facilitating mission accomplishment.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 6-0), *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August 2003, p. D-2.

²Ibid, p. D-20.

³Ibid, p. D-21.

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Iraq and the Young Maneuver Leader

by First Lieutenant John P. Burns

A commonly accepted aphorism heard throughout chow halls and barracks lines in Iraq is “in this theater everybody is an infantryman.” A dismounted tanker will swear he does the same job as his infantry counterpart, which is a true statement, but horribly misunderstood.

Throughout Iraq, especially in Baghdad, soldiers from many different military occupational specialties generally do perform the same tasks; however, these are not branch-specific missions. Few of these roles are specific to any single specialty and many, until this war, did not fall within the confines of a combat arms branch. A maneuver leader in Iraq must be a flexible leader, able to fill a multitude of roles, sometimes all within the same patrol or operation.

The U.S. Army faces a multitude of training challenges; in particular is the fluidity of the operating environment in Iraq — the type of fight in a single area of operation (AO) can vary from neighborhood to neighborhood and from day to day. Therefore, it is impossible for a basic

course or National Training Center rotation to prepare leaders for every challenge they might encounter. It is, however, necessary for Army officers and soldiers to quickly learn and understand their specific fight. If a tank platoon leader cannot understand why mounted tactics do not work well inside the muhallahs of eastern Baghdad, he inevitably will not see progress, or even worse, he will reverse progress in his AO.

Leaders must adapt and conduct operations appropriate for the fight at hand, not the fight they want. Young maneuver leaders must possess several skills and work to hone those skills before and during deployments. Realities on the ground might mean that a platoon will conduct dismounted operations, closely coordinating with human intelligence collection teams (HCT) to develop local sources. Other situations might dictate that a platoon leader and his soldiers act as mediators between two feuding neighbors. Another scenario might place the platoon leader and his noncommissioned officers in roles

as Iraqi Security Force mentors and trainers. At other times, the same platoon leader might be required to understand problems with local electric services or the economy and make recommendations on ways to fix it. It is quite likely that new platoon leaders will not have experience or training in these types of situations; therefore, it is important that:

- Leaders possess a thorough understanding of Iraqi culture and customs, and at least a basic knowledge of the Arabic language. Also, once on the ground, leaders must quickly develop an understanding of the culture and its influences in their specific areas of operation.
- Leaders have the knowledge and ability to understand local civil-service related problems and help local governments develop solutions to these problems.
- Leaders transition from security operations to civil military operations and Iraqi Security Force training operations.

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- Leaders must possess the ability to think critically about what challenges their specific AO is facing and develop tactics that address those specific issues. A leader must also develop metrics to determine if those tactics are in fact ameliorating that problem.

Operations and Challenges

Like many second lieutenants, my tour in Iraq started on a battalion staff; unlike many armor second lieutenants, I was assigned as an assistant effects coordinator. I focused on nonlethal effects; worked daily as a liaison between our battalion, Iraqi Security Forces, and local Iraqi politicians; and worked with local district and neighborhood council members to facilitate contracting, guide them in developing solutions to district governance problems, and aid them in improving the way that they served their constituents. My formal military training did not provide me with a solid foundation to conduct these operations.

During 8 months on staff, I was involved in many combat patrols and operations to assess local infrastructure, visit local dignitaries, and survey damaged areas to assess what was required for rebuilding. At times, I interacted with senior Iraqi military and political leaders. In some instances, this required an inordinate amount of patience and a good understanding of how to interpret the actions and words of our Iraqi partners. It also required a clear un-

derstanding of the conditions in the area concerning governance, security, and civil service issues. Again, I had no formal military training on the skills and knowledge necessary to deal with these situations. I quickly realized my responsibility to improve my cultural skills and AO-specific knowledge. I spent a great deal of time researching our AO, building relationships with the local people in our AO, and ultimately conducting duties as a civil-affairs soldier rather than an effects coordinator.

After completing my time on staff, I became the battalion scout platoon leader. My scout platoon moved out of the forward operating base and into a coalition outpost located in the middle of one of eastern Baghdad's densely populated Shiite neighborhoods. Our platoon was part of a combined-arms team, Team Dealer, which included two tank platoons, a mechanized infantry platoon, and my scout platoon. When I arrived, the team's focus was still on lethal targeting; several nights a week, we conducted raids to capture high-value targets in the AO. At the same time, we used HCTs to develop human intelligence (HUMINT) sources to facilitate future targeting in the area.

Our AO was Baghdad Al Jadida, a neighborhood heavily dominated by Shiite Islamic religion, politics, and militias, and was made up of 12 smaller neighborhoods, called "muhallahs." When our company took over the AO, all the Sunni

Muslims had been forced out by Shiite militias and replaced by new Shiite families. Shiite militias heavily influenced the people and the local government against cooperating with us or our predecessors. Security was chaotic; murders and kidnappings were a daily occurrence. The economy was extremely weak because consumers avoided going to markets or stores unless absolutely necessary. A large percentage of the population was unemployed and could only afford the bare necessities for survival. Civil services were also poor because the local public works department was intimidated and directed by narrow militia interests. At first, Team Dealer focused on lethal targeting to re-establish security and break the militia hold on the area. This process was already well underway by the time I arrived.

Within a matter of weeks after I arrived, the team had completed disrupting, and then defeating, the extremist cells in the muhallahs. This effort was a culmination of several months of aggressive targeting and I was fortunate enough to arrive for a portion of it. The next 3 months, we worked hard to capitalize on the increased security in the muhallahs. Once again, we were conducting operations on which we had no formal training and we had to quickly gain a working knowledge of civil infrastructure, local economics, and local politics. Scouts, tankers, and infantrymen were all walking the streets, developing friendly and symbiotic relationships with the locals.

The enemy was no longer our main focus; it became setting the conditions inside the AO that would prohibit the enemy from reconstituting and conducting future operations. Setting these conditions meant a tactical shift that emphasized building trust and cooperation between local nationals, Iraqi Security Forces, and Team Dealer. It was not unusual for us to sip chai (Iraqi tea) with an Iraqi army major and several local nationals in a courtyard or living room while a combined section of Iraqi army soldiers and our scouts cleared the local national's home. On some occasions, we discussed ways to improve profits with local businessmen in the market; and at other times, we conducted impromptu surveys of local civil services so that we could take raw data and recommendations to the local government. By the time we left Baghdad Al Jadida, the economy was steadily improving, jobs had been added to the area, local national perceptions of security were high, and Sunnis were returning to the area.

Lessons Learned

Our platoon was required to fill many unusual roles and was ill-prepared to handle city planning, economic stimulus, and civil security operations, and we had no in-depth formal training in Arabic culture and language. Although military ba-

sics, such as the fundamentals of patrolling and reconnaissance, were always relevant, they were insufficient to accomplish the mission.

All of Team Dealer's platoon leaders spent the bulk of their time learning and understanding the local culture and conditions that shaped our AO. Many of our soldiers learned Arabic and local customs so they could interact with the local nationals they lived and worked around, which enabled us to develop useful relationships that benefited both parties. We also learned that our tasks to destroy or defeat the enemy reduced once we got past the lethal-targeting portion of the deployment.

Eventually, we moved from Baghdad Al Jadida and assumed new missions. Even during those missions, which often included more combined arms team-specific tasks, such as disrupting improvised explosive device (IED) activity on major main supply routes, our team never stopped using the skills we learned in Baghdad Al Jadida. Those skills, which are not emphasized during military training, were just as important to route security and reconnaissance as they were to rebuilding a neighborhood.

The most valuable lesson learned from my experiences, both as a staff officer and as a platoon leader in Iraq, is that a lead-

er must always remain flexible and adaptable. Learning how to be an effect flexible and adaptable leader requires intense study, research, and a desire to learn about your surroundings. Our platoon focused on the skills discussed in this article and constantly sought to improve the conditions in our AO. Our patrols were never just presence patrols; there was always something to be learned about the people and places around us. We constantly debriefed each other, discussed the changes that we saw in our AO, and shared lessons learned. We never let the fact that we were not pulling triggers and destroying the enemy get in the way of accomplishing our mission. Our mindset was not to kill, it was to win. We constantly evaluated our situation and made certain we were fighting the war we had and not necessarily the one we wanted.



First Lieutenant John P. Burns is currently a scout platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Basic Officer Leadership Course, and Maneuver Officer Basic Course. His assignments include, assistant effects coordinator, HHC, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning, and assistant S1, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning.



"Our platoon was required to fill many unusual roles and was ill-prepared to handle city planning, economic stimulus, and civil security operations, and we had no in-depth formal training in Arabic culture and language. Although military basics, such as the fundamentals of patrolling and reconnaissance, were always relevant, they were insufficient to accomplish the mission."

Be There: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency Warfare

by Captain Jim Capobianco and First Lieutenant John Dickson

“Article 10. ‘Be there.’ The first rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach, living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.”¹

This article focuses on one of four fixed sites that the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry (3-1 CAV) Regiment, 3d Brigade, 3d In-

fantry Division, established during Operation Iraqi Freedom V; however, it also applies to all of the squadron’s established patrol bases — being there enabled us to achieve significant effects along all lines of operations in our area of operations (AO).²

Upon assuming responsibility for the Mada’in Qada, the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer at an isolated Iraqi army training base.³ All troops within 3-1 CAV were initially located at FOB Hammer and conducted operations outside the base. At times, we conducted extended operations, 24- to 48-hour missions, in an attempt to achieve a sustained presence in an area and build personal relationships with the populace. Although productive, it was evident that a forward patrol base would best enable the squadron to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations (COIN).

U.S Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, outlines “successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency op-

erational practices,” and instructs units to “emphasize intelligence.”⁴ Using this as a foundation, the squadron staff framed a critical path that required its troops to be unremitting in their engagement of the local populace. All operations were aimed at improving security, making visible improvements, gaining the trust of local professionals/leaders, and building capacity — the cumulative effect that could allow the squadron to retain critical terrain and set conditions to transition to tactical overwatch in the future.

Prior to the arrival of 3-1 CAV, the local area had a very limited coalition force (CF) presence over the past 4 years. To be successful, the staff determined that the squadron should aggressively pursue immediate relationships with the local people. To accomplish this, the squadron was required to identify the needs of the people, and key terrain from which it could project combat power. Establishing a patrol base required a detailed reconnaissance, which focused on the physical terrain, human terrain, and enemy activity.



Physical terrain. Our AO, Assassin, which was named after the call sign for A Troop, 3-1 CAV, was approximately 310 square kilometers. There were three major avenues of approach that ran along the perimeter and through the middle of our AO. There were two north-south routes (one of which was a main highway that connects the Al Kut Highway to Baqubah), and one main west-east route. The west-east route was a two-lane highway and served as the brigade's main lines of communication (LOC). The intersection of the west-east route and the main north-south route was referred to as "four corners," a four-way intersection that contained the largest market and business district in AO Assassin. Controlling this intersection allowed the squadron to interdict extremists along two main LOC in the Mada'in Qada.

Human terrain. AO Assassin had a total population of approximately 200,000. There were six major villages dispersed along the main routes, which were made up of roughly 60 percent Sunni and 40 percent Shia populations. Prior to the fall of Saddam, Sunni and Shia Muslims lived together as a united people; however, the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra in February 2006 turned the area into a sectarian fault line.

Enemy activity. Following the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque, sectarian conflicts engulfed the area. Al Qaeda pushed into the northern area of AO Assassin and Shia militias dominated the southern and central portions. Intense fighting erupted along the Shia-Sunni seams, resulting in numerous abandoned villages and an improvised explosive device (IED) obstacle belt that obstructed local national and CF movement. Local Sunni who lived within Shia-dominated areas went into hiding; they rarely left their homes and, when they did, were often forced to lie about their Sunni identities for fear of reprisal.

The Shia militias dominated the area and maintained control through intimidation, coercion, and extortion. Brutal murders occurred in broad daylight and kidnappings were reported daily. The local populace was terrorized; the economy was stagnant and essential services were all but nonexistent.

Patrol Base Establishment

Based on the results of a reconnaissance in zone and a desire to put an end to the violence, the squadron staff conducted a deliberate military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and selected an abandoned ministry of transportation compound as



"Once construction was completed, Patrol Base (PB) Assassin contained a life support area (LSA); morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) area; dining facility; motor pool; 25-meter zero range; forward aid station; and a troop command post that contained a command post node for secure internet protocol routing connectivity, a surveillance system for enhanced local force protection, a surveillance system for enhanced force protection and surveillance, a lightweight counter-mortar radar system, and a command post of the future for seamless communications and situational awareness."

the site for the patrol base. The compound was 100 meters wide and 400 meters long and was located 100 meters north of four corners; the proximity to the four corners markets facilitated increased interaction with the locals. From this location, A Troop could conduct 2.5 patrols (a patrol consisting of 4 up-armored HMMWVs and 12 soldiers) daily while simultaneously maintaining a dedicated force-protection platoon. Of course, the patrol base security requirements reduced the total number of soldiers available for combat patrols, but the effects achieved by merely "being there" over time justified the troop-to-task cost.

Once construction was completed, Patrol Base (PB) Assassin contained a life support area (LSA); morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) area; dining facility; motor pool; 25-meter zero range; forward aid station; and a troop command post that contained a command post node for secure internet protocol routing connectivity, a surveillance system for enhanced local force protection, a surveillance system for enhanced force protection and surveillance, a lightweight counter-mortar radar system, and a command post of the future for seamless communications and situational awareness. PB Assassin housed both CF and Iraqi national police; in total, the base could sustain up to 250 soldiers.

Enemy reaction. The Shia militias were not going to allow the patrol base to be

established without a challenge. Attacks remained relatively low for the first few weeks after the patrol base was built; however, enemy activity suddenly spiked during the third week of its operation. IEDs increased along the main west-east LOC and indirect fire (IDF) attacks, launched from a Shia stronghold, became increasingly commonplace. Locals that frequented the market, located within 100 meters of the patrol base's front gate, received threats. Shia militants attempted to infiltrate the patrol base by posing as local national contractors and walk-ins (people who approach the gate claiming to have enemy information). Several militiamen were found on nearby rooftops conducting surveillance of the patrol base's inner-layout. By the end of the first month of operation, PB Assassin had been attacked four times with IDF, and on six occasions, patrols in the vicinity of the PB were hit with IEDs.

Counteraction. The squadron's counteraction consisted of a multipronged approach to assume security in this critical area, which included developing the trust and confidence of the local populace; neutralizing key enemy leadership through precision targeting; and empowering/employing the local populace by thickening the lines via establishing the local "Sons of Iraq" (SoI) program.⁵

By living in the local community, A Troop quickly developed the trust and confidence of the local populace. Dis-



"The squadron's counteraction consisted of a multipronged approach to assume security in this critical area, which included developing the trust and confidence of the local populace; neutralizing key enemy leadership through precision targeting; and empowering/employing the local populace by thickening the lines via establishing the local "Sons of Iraq" (SoI) program."

mounted combat patrols were conducted through the markets and all the villages in the area. Local people grew comfortable with increased CF presence and began to provide detailed information on extremist networks, which was integrated in target development at both the troop and squadron levels. The human intelligence (HUMINT) that was gained through personal relationships developed by our troopers was critical in identifying various enemy organizations and the specific networks that comprised each of those organizations. Once the organization and network information was developed, the squadron could deliberately target key individuals and neutralize the cells.

The Iraqi National Police (INP) assigned a platoon to live at PB Assassin, which enabled A Troop to be partnered with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) daily. The troop trained and conducted joint operations with the INP platoon at every opportunity. The INP became an increasingly effective and viable security force. The local perception of the ISF improved and increased their confidence in their government and its ability to secure the area.

As security improved, local leaders began to emerge and resume their place as productive members of their communities. Over the past few years, many tribal and political leaders were forced into hiding by extremists, but as they saw the conditions around them improving and CF conducting daily patrols, they felt empowered. Through a series of negotiations and meetings, the squadron established a local SoI group.⁶ A local tribal sheik, who

spent the majority of the past 2 years confined to his house, was chosen as the SoI leader.⁷ The SoI was created in areas where no ISF were present, which allowed the ISF to focus on main LOC and populated areas. The SoI worked hand-in-hand with both the ISF and CF in fighting extremists who had, until recently, dominated the area. Within 3 months, the tables had literally been turned on the extremists.

Effects. The establishment of PB Assassin achieved gains that were unimaginable just weeks prior. Security improved markedly — attacks against CF decreased by 80 percent; kidnappings and murders went from a reported 20 per month down to zero. More than 120 extremists were killed or captured, and over 18 cache were seized or turned over to the ISF or CF. Economically, the four-corners market grew from 30 businesses to more than 150 businesses in 6 short months. Vast improvements were made in essential services — canals were once again full of irrigation water, and drinking water and fuel were no longer controlled and manipulated by the militia — everyone had equal access to these basic commodities. Local government began to function as effective legislative bodies; two local community councils, comprised of tribal sheiks, business leaders, and SoI leaders, were formed to link the people and their needs to representatives on the Nahia council.

The establishment of PB Assassin enabled 3-1 CAV to dominate the battlespace by winning the support of the people (trust and confidence), controlling the

main LOC, and projecting the perception of security and stability to an area long dominated by extremists. The ability to "be there," among the people, was the critical factor in achieving immediate results and was the catalyst for a chain reaction of improvements in this area and the remainder of the Jisr Diyala Nahia. Forward-positioned patrol bases and fixed sites enabled 3-1 CAV to connect to the people and thus deny extremists sanctuary.



Notes

¹David Kilcullen, "Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May-June 2006, p. 31.

²To maximize resources and synchronize all targeting efforts, the squadron staff organized along four lines of operation — security, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), government and economics, enduring employment and essential services (E3), and information operations were integrated into each line of operation and operation.

³The Mada'in Qada is a part of the Baghdad Province and is comprised of the Jisr Diyala Nahia, Narhwan Nahia, Wahida Nahia, and Salman Pak Nahia.

⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 2006.

⁵The "Sons of Iraq," previously known as the "Awakening," was recently changed to "Concerned Local Citizens." Due to political sensitivities within the government of Iraq and difficulties in translation, the name was changed to reflect the cross-sectarian unity and nationalist ideals, which is the essence of the program.

⁶The SoI program was a multiphased operation. The names of all volunteers were provided to the local government, ISF, and CF. Each organization vetted the names to ensure that no extremists were accepted into the program. Once vetted, the volunteers were entered into a biometric database, given an identification card and uniform and swore their allegiance to the government of Iraq.

⁷The SoI leader was adamant that for a security program to work in the area it must include both Shia and Sunni volunteers and they must serve together at the checkpoints. This integration facilitated reconciliation meetings and sparked the reconciliation process throughout the entire Jisr Diyala Nahia.

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The Future of Battalion Mortars in an Urban Counterinsurgency Fight

by Captain Daniel W. Redman

The current war in Iraq has forced a high-intensity conflict-focused Army to completely transform the roles and uses of arguably every military occupational skill (MOS) in its inventory. Armor and cavalry soldiers are patrolling the streets of Baghdad in up-armored HMMWVs, rather than M1A1 tanks, and artillery soldiers are not calling for fire, but are instead busy organizing nonlethal projects to clean streets and revitalize businesses while coaching Iraqi governments on how to effectively govern and provide for their people. As a platoon leader for the battalion mortar platoon, this dilemma has been no less challenging. Soldiers trained to place fast, accurate, and lethal indirect fire on the enemy find themselves in an urban environment where indirect fire is not only infeasible, but specifically denied by senior Army leaders due to the significant potential for collateral damage.

A combined arms battalion has several available options when using a mortar platoon in the urban counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Specifically, two options exist for using the battalion mortar platoon when operating in an environment where indirect fire is not a fea-

sible option. The first option is to attach the mortar platoon to one of the line companies; the second option is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized high-value target (HVT) strike team and a full-time quick reaction force (QRF).

Attaching the battalion mortar platoon to one of the maneuver companies can be highly beneficial. Every operational environment (OE) is inevitably going to have one or two key areas that are more tactically vital to the success of the battalion. It is within these areas that the battalion commander often commits the most combat power, as success or failure at this decisive point often influences the entire OE. By attaching the mortar platoon to the company that controls the key terrain within the battalion OE, the company commander gains a much greater capability to influence events within that terrain.

In the current operating environment, where company-level coalition outposts (COP) are becoming more and more common, and in most cases, directed by higher headquarters, having the extra platoon can alleviate the force protection strain that can be very taxing on a tank compa-

ny or a task organized infantry company. Over the course of a 12- to 15-month deployment, every unit must conduct frequent maintenance on vehicles, equipment, and soldiers. For example, a traditionally organized company, with three platoons, would have days when one platoon conducts force protection at their COP, a second platoon conducts maintenance/recovery operations in between patrols, leaving only one platoon for full-time combat operations.

Adding a mortar platoon provides the company with the ability to maintain a significant forward presence while conducting all necessary maintenance and force-protection operations. The success of this option was shown during Operation Iraq Freedom V, in the Karada Peninsula of central Baghdad, when our battalion attached a battalion scout platoon to increase the capabilities of the tank company. During this time, the tank company, consisting of two tank platoons and one cross-attached infantry platoon, was attempting to establish a new COP, while simultaneously conducting combat operations in the middle of one of the most densely populated areas of Iraq. The high

number of personnel required to secure the new COP severely disrupted the battle rhythm of the company. This strain was most evident when 16-man tank platoons were forced to draw personnel from the company headquarters section to effectively man force protection positions.

Adding the 27-man scout platoon increased the available manpower in the company by a full 30 percent, allowing the company commander to have two to three platoons at a time conducting combat operations, rather than just the one to two platoons that would have otherwise been available. The extra combat power allowed the company commander to maintain a constant focus on the security line of operation, while still having elements available to have a tremendous impact on governance and the other lines of operation. This scenario clearly presents a very significant benefit in attaching a fourth maneuver platoon to a line company. In this situation, the battalion chose to use the scouts in this role, but the battalion mortars could have been used to achieve the same result.


The major roadblock to this organization is that attaching the mortars to a line

company significantly degrades the battalion's flexibility in other areas. The mortar platoon is one of only two specialty platoons directly employed by the battalion commander; by attaching the platoon to a line company, he forfeits direct control of this asset. Once they are worked into the company battle rhythm, it is much more difficult to maintain the level of flexibility that having the platoon remain under direct battalion control provides. Tasks that can be accomplished without disrupting a company battle rhythm must instead be tasked to the company to be completed. Rather than this option of attaching the mortar platoon to a line company, there is the option of retaining the mortar platoon under direct battalion control.

The COIN environment has driven the military into a much more defensive/reactive tactical posture in Iraq. The insurgency relies almost exclusively on hit-and-run engagements. The primary initiation technique we faced in eastern Baghdad in 2007 to 2008 was explosively formed penetrators (EFP) or improvised explosive devices (IED) frequently followed by small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire. These engagements

rarely last more than a few minutes with the insurgents either eliminated or faded back into the dense urban terrain. This choice of tactics by the insurgency makes tactical maneuvers, such as deliberate attacks, less common and the more reactive approach of movement to contact becomes the standard. Success in this type of fight largely depends on a unit's capability to maintain flexibility. Once contact is initiated, there is frequently a need to push additional combat power to the location of the contact whether it is to help in the fight, exploit the IED/EFP strike, or recover potentially damaged vehicles. By retaining the mortar platoon at the battalion level, the battalion has ensured a consistent asset that can accomplish any of the above tasks without other missions being affected.

The second option for the employment of the battalion mortar platoon is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized time-sensitive target (TST) and sensitive-site exploitation (SSE) platoon with a secondary tasking as a full-time battalion QRF; in effect, a battalion reserve. In an ever-changing combat environment, last-second missions frequently arise, elements receive unexpected contact, and



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“Specifically, two options exist for using the battalion mortar platoon when operating in an environment where indirect fire is not a feasible option. The first option is to attach the mortar platoon to one of the line companies; the second option is to maintain the mortar platoon as a specialized high-value target (HVT) strike team and a full-time quick reaction force (QRF).”

there are a variety of other instances where having an uncommitted platoon available can ensure the success of a mission. In the Karada peninsula in central Baghdad, we achieved a level of security that allowed a large portion of our missions to be directed at nonlethal effects. By retaining the mortar platoon at the battalion level, it will relieve requirements on companies for missions such as securing barrier emplacement, escorting staff to governance meetings, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) escort, and other late-notice missions. Using the mortar platoon in this manner allows line companies to maintain their established battle rhythm while still accomplishing peripheral missions.

As mentioned previously, major threats to coalition forces in the current operating environment are IEDs and EFPs. These attacks on combat patrols require the battalion to maintain at least one platoon as a QRF at all times. This is a tasking for which the mortar platoon, as the battalion reserve, can bear the majority of the burden, allowing companies to focus on operations within their respective OE. If the mortars were attached to a line company, they would likely have plenty of other taskings and would not be available as

frequently to serve as the battalion QRF, and a greater burden would be placed on the line companies and would overall degrade the battalion’s flexibility.

The greatest benefit of maintaining the mortar platoon under battalion control is its employment as a specialized HVT/SSE platoon. In the COIN environment, as it has developed in Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, primary offensive operations conducted by coalition forces have become point raids driven by a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT). There are numerous benefits to having a single platoon specialize in these operations and two main reasons that the battalion mortar platoon is the most logical choice to serve in this capacity.

The first, and most important, reason is that with the technological advances in gathering SIGINT, the approach to point raids has changed. The level of classification of SIGINT assets demands a specialized training that must be completed by any platoon that will use these assets. By maintaining one platoon as the HVT/SSE platoon, the battalion can focus necessary specialized training on one group, rather than spreading out across the bat-

talion. The ability to understand the capabilities and limitations of this equipment can and will determine the level of success achieved during operations. Repeatedly conducting operations allows the mortar platoon to sharpen their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and can lead to a higher success rate when targeting elusive HVTs. If the operations were instead spread throughout line companies, it would be much more difficult to implement lessons learned and improve mission success rates.

All points detailed above were evident during our combat operations throughout central and eastern Baghdad during 2007 and 2008. Upon our arrival in theatre, none of our companies or platoons had any experience working with SIGINT assets. After speaking with other battalions within the division, our battalion commander opted to have the mortar platoon serve as a dedicated HVT/SSE platoon and operate throughout the OE. In preparation for this tasking, we conducted 3 consecutive days of training on how to effectively use SIGINT assets. This training provided the platoon with a basic understanding of the capabilities of SIGINT assets, but it was not until the fourth or fifth operation that we became comfort-

able with the capabilities and limitations of these assets. Understanding these assets set off a 3-month period during the summer of 2007 when our battalion captured seven of our top-ten HVTs, to include four members of the brigade's top-ten target list. The key to our success in the capture of these HVTs was the relationship we developed with the SIGINT asset operators. By continually working with the same platoon, the operators were able to understand how we approached the TST operations and the SSE that followed, which enabled them to better communicate vital information to us during the missions.

The benefits of this partnership became readily apparent in the fall of 2007 when the SIGINT teams rotated and the number of HVTs detained dropped sharply until new working relationships were formed. The development of these partnerships is not possible if there is a different platoon executing each TST mission, as the TTP and leadership personalities are constantly changing for each mission.

The second significant reason to maintain mortar platoons as HVT/SSE teams

is that HVTs do not drive their movement patterns based on our internal company boundaries. In our OE, targets often moved between Zone 23 and Zone 14W, which were controlled by two different companies, but several of our targets moved freely between the two zones. This movement pattern meant that when we planned operations targeting these HVTs, we had to prepare for the target to potentially be located in either company OE. By maintaining the mortar platoon as the unit conducting the operation, we did not have to worry about which company zone the HVT appeared in. With the mortars maintaining the tasking as the search element, the company was only tasked with providing an outer cordon for clearance. The last-minute notification about which OE the HVT was located in did not disrupt the operation because it was easier for the company to react and provide an outer cordon element, a task that does not require any specialized preparation, than it was to react and conduct the point raid.

Overall, the key to success in the COIN environment in Iraq is flexibility. By maintaining the battalion mortars as a specialized HVT strike team and full-

time QRF, the battalion maintains a high level of flexibility, while allowing line companies to establish and maintain a relatively steady battle rhythm. Identifying the mortar platoon's role while still at home station better allows leaders within the mortar platoon to begin training on successful TTP well before their arrival in theater. Simply understanding the capabilities and limitations of SIGINT assets greatly increases the early success rate of TST operations during the first months in theater. Building necessary partnerships with SIGINT operators will progress at a much faster rate if the technical specifics are already understood.



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"...choice of tactics by the insurgency makes tactical maneuvers, such as deliberate attacks, less common and the more reactive approach of movement to contact becomes the standard. Success in this type of fight largely depends on a unit's capability to maintain flexibility."



ONE FORCE, ONE FIGHT

by Don Sando

The mission of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) is to provide the Nation with the world's best trained infantry, armor, and cavalry soldiers and adaptive leaders imbued with the Warrior Ethos; to provide a power projection platform capable of deploying and redeploying soldiers, civilians, and units anywhere in the world on short notice; and to define capabilities for the infantry and armor to meet the needs of the future force. The Infantry and Armor Schools have a long tradition of training, preparing, and equipping soldiers to fight together and win. This culture of teamwork continues as the MCoE is established.


The new organization within the MCoE primarily responsible for ensuring soldiers retain their dominance on all future battlefields is the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID). Its mission is to develop operational and organizational concepts, requirements, and integrated capabilities across maneuver formations and into the joint, inter-agency, and multinational arenas. CDID combines armor, cavalry, and infantry capabilities development into a unified, effective team to support our warfighters.

The director of CDID was recently selected and assumed duties in February 2008. With this move, both centers have taken another critical step toward the MCoE. CDID consists of several organizations responsible for overseeing conceptual development across the warfighting functions, developing and overseeing the fielding and sustainment of the Army's premier fighting vehicles and equipment, and providing the point of entry into the Generating Force for brigade combat teams to address their issues and needs for the current fight and future requirements.

As early as Fiscal Year 2010, the CDID Director will be supported by an integration staff that will assist in the development and transition of the organization. In the interim, the staff is working to prepare each center to integrate into CDID

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate Organization

Capabilities Development & Integration Directorate

through a series of progressive milestones. Upon approval by the MCoE board of directors (chaired by the commanding generals of the Armor and Infantry Centers), the CDID will establish a virtual operating capability. Equipment and personnel movements to Fort Benning will begin CDID's transition to an initial operating capability. When the transition is complete and CDID is operating under its objective organization, it will have reached final operating capability, which will occur before 15 September 2011, according to guidelines in the base realignment and closures (BRAC) law.

The transitional milestones will continue to be developed as both centers move toward the MCoE. Effective communications will inform military, civilian, and

contract personnel of key dates and timelines as CDID comes on line. CDID represents a unique opportunity to put together what is best in each organization to provide unparalleled support to our Nation's warfighters.



Mr. Don Sando was selected to the Senior Executive Service in February 2008 and is currently assigned as director of the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate for the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia. A 1981 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a Master of Science degree in Operations Research from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Science degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College.



2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference

Fort Benning will host the 2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference 15-17 September 2008 at Fort Benning and the Iron Works Convention Center in Columbus, Georgia.

The conference is open to all Infantry and Army leaders. Register online at:

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Intel Support Teams

from Page 25

specialized skill identifier, allowing intel support team trained soldiers to fill slots in a specialized job.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs). These senior soldiers are the backbone of this concept and they must master the functions required to achieve the purpose of the intel support team's mission statement. Thus, the training for the NCO must be rigorous and the admission process selective. Ideally, the intel support team NCO would be an intelligent staff sergeant from the combat-arms branch. Once the NCO completes the intel support team NCO course, he would be locked into his position, much like that of a company master gunner. However, the intel support team NCO career path is only through the company level, thus selected sergeants would not serve repeat assignments in this position.

The requirement for company intel support teams will not soon go away. Our Army's most current published doctrine, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, is deeply rooted in intelligence-driven operations, particularly at the lowest levels.² Just as our Army is finding success in moving from larger collective FOBs to smaller JSSs, it must reinforce this success by continuing to push the right assets and training to the lowest possible levels. As commanders give directives for meeting the fundamentals of counterinsurgencies through intel support teams, the Army should match this guidance with updated oversight in training and management.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps X-File 2-1.1, *Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)*, GPO, Washington, DC, 17 December 2004.

²Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, December 2006.

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Company Intelligence Section

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then distributed throughout the local market. The desired effect of this leaflet was to force Abu Ahmed to go into hiding or flee the area to avoid capture, thereby disrupting his ability to attack friendly forces. While no intelligence was gained from Abu Ahmed in this scenario, a disrupt effect was still achieved.

Assess. During the assess phase, the focus of targeting remains the effect achieved during the deliver phase. Operational priorities must be taken into account when considering reengaging a target. As operational priorities change, so must targeting priorities. Targeting individuals across multiple cells can produce dramatically different effects than targeting multiple individuals in a single cell. Effects can also diffuse over time, as a cell reconstitutes with new members, new cells are formed, and others branch out. Effects on a target cannot be assessed in a vacuum isolated from other targeting efforts throughout a unit's area of interest, including targeting conducted by adjacent unit and host-nation forces.

Using the example of Abu Ahmed, who was forced to flee the area, the unit assessed the achieved effects. After a short rise in IED attacks, in retaliation by the rest of Abu Ahmed's IED cell, the company S2 section determined that overall IED activity dropped 50 percent within 14 days. The S2 section assessed that the desired effect was achieved and recommended the commander continue targeting Abu Ahmed's cell until it could no longer conduct operations.

Throughout the targeting process the company S2 section has an integral role in the company. By evaluating intelligence, forming information requirements, and refining targets, the S2 section ensures the company is equipped with the intelligence it needs to conduct COIN operations. Without the capabilities that the company S2 section provides to the unit, companies will not be as effective at conducting intelligence-driven operations.

The experiences of the U.S. Army operating as a COIN force in Iraq has demonstrated a compelling need for a military intelligence section within every company-sized maneuver force. Intelligence in a COIN environment is almost exclusively a human-driven,

bottom-up process, where information is collected and acted on at the lowest possible level. Intelligence must drive all operations on the low-intensity battlefield, yet company-sized maneuver forces are the formations most likely to conduct operations and the least equipped to develop and analyze intelligence.

Changing the company MTOE to make intelligence personnel organic to maneuver companies would be the preferred response to fix company-level intelligence gaps, yet this may not be possible. However, in environments where fire support assets are under centralized control, and are unlikely to be routinely employed, the fire support team presents one solid alternative.

Commanders must carefully weigh the loss of fire-support capabilities against an increase in intelligence capabilities when they decide to employ company fire support teams as provisional intelligence sections. The flexibility of the fire support team, along with the fire supporter's understanding of the targeting processes, increases their relevancy in conflicts of all intensities.



Notes

¹Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, *DoD Law of War Program*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 9 December 1998.

²Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-09.42, *HBCT Fires and Effects Operations*, GPO, Washington, DC, 15 April 2005, p. 6-13.

³HQDA, Army Regulation 530-1, *Operations Security*, Washington, DC, 19 April 2007, p. 1-6.

⁴HQDA, FM 2.22-3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, Washington, DC, 6 September 2006, p. 5-1.

⁵HQDA, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, DC, 15 December 2006, p. 3-16.

⁶HQDA, FM 3-09.31, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander*, Washington, DC, 1 October 2002, p. 1-7.

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REVIEWS

Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations by John J. McGrath, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, 196 pp., free online at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_boots.pdf

"Then it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' Tommy, 'ow's yer soul?' But it's 'Thin red line of 'eroes' when the drums begin to roll."

— Rudyard Kipling

Napoleon's axiom that "God favors the largest battalions," appears to have gained new converts in the recent political debates about Iraq. While history has proven that size alone is not always the deciding factor to victory — the World War II Battles of France and Midway provide stark examples — other factors provide better paths to military victory. Type and organization of troops are usually better indicators of future success on the battlefield. A new edition of the Combat Studies Institute Press' *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Papers*, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations* by John McGrath, provides a timely historical analysis of both numbers and organization to challenges currently faced by coalition forces in Iraq.

McGrath's book shows the immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no standard against which to judge. Politicians and media commentators often cite a figure of 20 troops per 1,000 of the local population as the standard, but McGrath shows that such a figure uses assumptions that are questionable at best. By analyzing seven military operations from the past 100 years, McGrath arrives at some average numbers of military forces per 1,000 of the population that have been employed in what would generally be considered successful military campaigns. For example, in the United States' Philippines campaign (1899-1901), the author cites numbers as low as 12.5 military forces per 1,000. He also points out a variety of important factors affecting those numbers — from geography to local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, as well as the use of contractors, among others.

Of particular interest to military planners is McGrath's study of police department organizations in controlling violence in various urban areas. He looks at five major metropolitan areas, including New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and Los Angeles, to help bring some clarity to comparing force strengths. Additionally, McGrath includes troop density numbers for the California Highway Patrol (CHiP), a state whose geography and population are about the size of Iraq. This fact was not lost on Army planners who, according to the author, studied CHiPs and other California law enforce-

ment agencies, to help determine force requirements for stability operations in Iraq before the start of Operation Iraq Freedom.

One shortcoming of *Boots on the Ground* is McGrath's omission of data from the French operations in Indochina and Algeria; Israeli operations in the West Bank and Gaza strip; and South African and Rhodesian operations in the wars of liberation from the 1960s and '70s. Although McGrath's introduction does mention this oversight very briefly, he offers little as to why the operations are not relevant to his book, especially the French and Israeli operations against Islamic opponents.

Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, *The Washington Post*, and many Democrats and Republicans have converged over the past months in support of a serious expansion of the U.S. Army — a permanent addition of 40,000 to 90,000 over the current ceiling of 507,000 troops — all in an effort to help bring the insurgency in Iraq to a successful conclusion. While our troops are the best, their training first-class, and equipment unparalleled, the demand for more troops based on mathematical formulas cannot guarantee military success. But *Boots on the Ground* does provide policymakers, commanders, and staff officers a guide from which to begin an analysis of a particular campaign. However, military planners and politicians must still apply their understanding of the center of gravity, objectives, local cultures, and political consideration in determining troop density for a winning military strategy. This book is well worth the time to read, especially at the corps- and division-level staff.

JAYSON A. ALTIERI
LTC, U.S. Army

Jihad: From Qu'ran to Bin Laden by Richard Bonney, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2004, 552 pp., \$35.00 (hardcover)

Richard Bonney is the founding editor of the *Oxford Journal for French History* and the Director of the Center of Religious and Political Pluralism at the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. His book, *Jihad*, is a focused study of the history of this concept from Islam's founding in the late 6th century CE to present. It is a tour de force, and in my opinion, cannot be read without first getting a basic view of Islamic history by reading such books as Karen Armstrong's *Islam: A Short History*, Modern Library, New York. Only by a detailed comprehensive analysis of Jihad, Islam, and the evolution of Islamist extremism can we deconstruct Islamist militant ideology and use Islamic argument to expose the pseudo-intellectualism of Islamist militancy.

Islamist militant theorists use the concept of *naskh* (abrogation) to emphasize only those portions of the Qu'ran (the Islamic book of divine revelation) that justify violent direct action.

The book reveals how the very concept of abrogation is debatable within Islam, with some scholars making a compelling argument, for instance, that no *hadith* (saying of Prophet Muhammad) can abrogate any verse of the Qu'ran. Other scholars debate the danger of abrogation can be used to the point of invalidating large swaths of the Qu'ran. This is exactly what al Qaeda ideologues have done.

Readers will learn how the *hadith*, promising 72 virgins to the martyr is a weak *hadith* of dubious quality. The chain of narrators linking this *hadith* to Muhammad is short and questionable. It is contravened by a Qu'ranic verse 3:169, "Those killed in the cause of God are not reckoned dead but are fed a heavenly sustenance with their lord." Therefore, proximity to God and not sexual or worldly pleasures is the reward for the martyr. Yet radical clerics use the saying of the 72 virgins to lure Muslim youth to their death, knowing well the dubious quality of this saying attributed to Muhammad.

The section on Taqi Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1327) is well written. Ibn Taymiyyah is considered the earliest of Islamist radical theorists who existed at a time of the Crusades and the Mongol invasions that destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate. Ibn Taymiyyah demonized Christians and the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyyah would ignore Qu'ranic verses that called for toleration of Christians and Jews, viewing them as collaborators with the Crusaders. In this climate, Christian leaders saw in the Mongol invasions the legend of Prester John, a mythic messianic warrior who would come from the east to rescue Christianity and destroy the Muslims. Muslim clerics critical of Ibn Taymiyyah found his condemnation of all Christians and Jews unacceptable and argued that the Mongols are recent converts to Islam, who cannot be expected to immediately give up their heritage.

The troubling aspects of Ibn Taymiyyah are his theories on the centrality of jihad and its singular definition as meaning "combat in the name of God." Ibn Taymiyyah's critics would argue that this centrality of jihad could lead to an obsession, causing a Muslim to abandon all other required duties such as prayer and fasting. Islamist militants today do not even quote from Ibn Taymiyyah entirely; for instance, consider this sentence from Ibn Taymiyyah, "the priority is not to wage war in the Abode of War but to turn inwards and purge the Sunni world of infidels and heretics." If one only reads Ibn Taymiyyah, then one can make the argument for the so-called "near enemy (Arab regimes)," versus the "far enemy (the United States and the west)" — a schism still argued among Islamist militant groups today. However, consider this sentence from Ibn Taymiyyah, "the state is neither a divine commission nor a power based on military might; it is a cooperation between all members of the community to realize common ideals." Another Ibn Taymiyyah quote ignored by modern Islamist militants is, "the commendable way to fight is with knowledge and understanding, not with rash impetuosity of (the) one who takes no thought and does not distinguish the laudable from the blameworthy. Therefore, the stronger and valiant is the one

who controls himself when provoked to anger and so does the right thing; whereas, he who is carried away under provocation is neither courageous nor valiant.”

The book continues with the same analysis of Muhammad Abdul-Wahab (1703-1792), the founder of Wahabism. It reveals the selective reading of Islamist radicals, such as ignoring Abdul-Wahab's admonition of descending into a cult of martyrdom. It exposes the clerics who argued against Abdul-Wahab's theories, such as Ibn Sulayman al-Madani who used Prophet Muhammad's warning of the evil of a Muslim questioning the faith of another Muslim. Madani also used the Qu'ranic injunction 2:256, "let there be no compulsion in matters of religion," to argue against Wahab's demonization and declaration of apostasy of those Muslims who did not share his beliefs. Bonney's work ends with an analysis of how Hamas and al Qaeda distort Islamic texts and are selective in their quotations.

This book represents the kind of nuances U.S. military planners and counterterrorism experts must debate, discuss, and dissect to understand our adversary and disaggregate Islamist militancy from Islam. We need to understand the mechanics of how Islamist militants have hijacked Islam as a means of undermining the appeal of their ideology and compete in the so-called battle of ideas. It is a battle of importance to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

YOUSSEF ABUL-ENEIN
CDR, MSC, USN

Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day by David Stone, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, DC, 464 pp., 2006

The study of the German military tradition can be divided and subdivided into numerous specific, primarily chronological, areas of study — general examinations of the *long durée* are the exception and not the rule. Occasionally, authors attempt to provide a one-volume, all-encompassing study of the topic as a whole, of which Gordon Craig's *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* is the most notable. David Stone undertakes a similar project with *Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day*, emphasizing the experience of the common German fighting man from the Thirty Years War to the present-day, reunified German Bundeswehr. While Stone does not achieve complete success in his endeavor, he nevertheless provides an excellent study that goes a long way toward achieving his goal.

The reason there are so few broad studies is simple — such long-term examinations are very complex and difficult. Stone tackles the myriad challenges of such an endeavor by approaching episodes of German military history, some lasting a few decades, some a few years, and

focusing his efforts on the trials and tribulations of the common German fighting man. Of course, as Stone admits, one cannot conduct such assessment without discussing certain battles and campaigns that took place throughout the course of German history. The crucial challenge, then, becomes finding the correct balance between the back-story of campaigns and big battles, and the saga of the fighting soldier. For the most part, Stone strikes this balance fairly well.

Some areas of his study bear up better than others. Two instances, in particular, stand out as excellent case studies of the German fighting man: the period immediately following the Thirty Years War and the interwar period of 1871 to 1914. In these two cases, Stone does an excellent and noteworthy job of illuminating the life of the German soldier within the context of German social and military culture. Additionally, while most studies of this type treat the major wars in Germany's past with extra care and analysis, Stone weaves in the periods between the "great wars" of German history much more equitably, so that he devotes balanced study to the transitional periods between wars (such as the mid-19th century), treating them not as brief interludes between the "high spots," but as crucial and important stages of development in the tapestry of German military history. Similarly, his treatment of the post-World War II Bundeswehr (as well as the East German *Nationale Volksarmee*) is not a mere postscript, but another step in the history of the nation's military development, and one that is continuing through the present day.

While other sections of the book, in particular the chapters on World Wars I and II, seem to be a summation of key campaigns with the lives of soldiers more an afterthought than a focus, the reader can easily overlook such curtailment. The strength of Stone's work lies not in the parts, but in the whole. In this regard, he succeeds in presenting the history of the German army as a well-balanced portrait.

MICHAEL A. BODEN
LTC, U.S. Army

Marines in the Garden of Eden: The True Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq by Richard S. Lowry, Penguin Group (USA) Inc., New York, 2007, 422 pp., \$16.00 (paperback reprint edition)

Marines in the Garden of Eden: The True Story of Seven Bloody Days in Iraq by Richard S. Lowry is a well-written and thoroughly researched book. It is based extensively on firsthand accounts acquired through personal interviews and correspondence conducted by the author, and official oral histories recorded by the Marine Corps History and Museum Division concerning the events surrounding the Marines of Task Force Tarawa during the battle for An Nasiriyah. Additionally, Lowry includes an extensive bibliography that will serve as a valuable resource for those conducting aca-

demical research on Operation Iraqi Freedom with emphasis on the battle for An Nasiriyah.

Lowry sets the stage by letting the reader get to know the principle characters on an individual level. Everybody has a story to tell and Lowry does a terrific job intertwining the facts of what happened, along with plenty of firsthand accounts that he takes from across the full spectrum of the chain of command and rank structure. What is particularly interesting about Lowry's book is that he provides a window into both the human and business side of the military. The civilian reader will appreciate the insight into a world that is foreign; and the military reader will appreciate the fact that a writer took the time to record the details. As evidence of Lowry's dedication to details, he provides an extremely vivid description for the administrative, logistics, and training challenges of putting the task force together, while concurrently preparing it for sea transport to move en masse to the theater of operations. Additionally, he fully educates the reader in the composition and manner in which Marine force packages are configured based on mission requirements.

Lowry does a first-rate job explaining why An Nasiriyah is key terrain not only from the friendly perspective, but also from the enemy viewpoint. The Iraqis arrived at a decision to use this key piece of terrain for a decisive fight with U.S. forces as a result of their rapid defeat during the first Gulf War. The Iraqi regime would not attempt to engage the U.S. military in conventional warfare in the open desert again. As a result, Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid al-Tikriti (Chemical Ali), was sent to the south to serve as commander for the approaches leading to Baghdad with the intent to exploit the complex urban terrain at this critical junction on the Euphrates River as a means to offset the superior capabilities of U.S. forces.

Lowry enables the reader to see the situation on the ground, from both the friendly and enemy perspective, through his extensive use of maps, photos, and diagrams, which allows the reader to visualize the fight as it unfolds. The Marines of Task Force Tarawa fought a tough fight to soundly defeat a well-entrenched foe, whose defense incorporated the road junctions and bridges tied in with the complex urban terrain in and around An Nasiriyah. The Marines' control of this key terrain enabled follow-on forces to continue their spearhead toward Baghdad, and Lowry does an excellent job of documenting their heroic actions.

I highly recommend this book to *ARMOR* readers who are interested in studying the conduct of mounted mobile warfare in urban terrain, and particularly, the integration of attack and fixed-wing aviation in support of maneuver elements. Undoubtedly, Lowry's well-researched, detailed account will be valued by current and, probably more so, future historians and military professionals who will refer to this book as a resource to study the events that transpired in An Nasiriyah during this critical 7-day fight.

DONNIE R. YATES
MAJ, U.S. Army

The World's Largest Caliber Tank Gun

by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

The threat Soviet heavy tanks posed in Central Europe during the 1950s prompted the development of several measures to counter the threat. One of the most remarkable was Britain's design of a tank with a 183mm gun, which is still the largest caliber tank gun ever made.

The tank that would mount the 183mm gun was named Heavy Gun Tank No. 2 and carried the designation FV 215. It was intended to defeat any successor to the Soviet IS-3, or Stalin, heavy tank, which caused much concern at the time to western armies, although the Arab-Israeli Six Day War of 1967 subsequently showed that it was not as formidable as was earlier thought.

Preliminary studies of FV 215 commenced in 1950, and in 1954, Vickers-Armstrongs, which was Britain's longest established tank manufacturing company, was awarded a contract to build a prototype. However, FV 215 got no farther than a full-sized wooden mock-up as its development was terminated in 1957.

On the other hand, the 183mm L4 gun, which was intended to arm the FV 215, was not only designed, but was actually built. Moreover, it was successfully fired in 1955. Since the FV 215 had not been built, the 183mm gun was mounted instead on the chassis of the contemporary British medium tank, the Centurion. In one case, the installation took the form of an open mounting atop the Centurion hull and incorporated a six-round drum magazine. In another case, the gun was mounted in a tall, slab-sided turret. Both of these experimental installations were given the designation of FV 4005, as if they were part of the Centurion FV 4000 series.

The choice of a rifled tank gun with a caliber of as much as 183mm was inspired by the high opinion held at the time in Britain of the relative effectiveness of squash head, or high-explosive squash head (HESH), which the U.S. Army subsequently called high-explosive plastic (HEP). HESH ammunition was originally developed in England during World War II by Vickers-Armstrongs for use against concrete fortifications. Its use was abandoned toward the end of the war and interest in it only revived some time after its abandonment.

The revival came around 1950 with the development by the British army of the Heavy Gun Tank No.1, or FV 214, which preceded the design of FV 215. This tank, which was later called Conqueror, was to be capable of defeating the Soviet IS-3 and for this purpose, a gun of 120mm was considered necessary; however, the British army had not yet developed a gun of this size. In consequence, it made the decision to adopt the 120mm gun, which was being developed at the time for the U.S. T43 (later M103) heavy tank. However, the British army decided to develop its own, and what was then new, type of ammunition.

The contemporary U.S. 120mm rifled tank guns were derived from an earlier heavy anti-aircraft gun, and like others of their generation, were still designed to fire full-caliber armor-piercing (AP) and high-explosive (HE) ammunition. But when the British army adopted the U.S. gun, it decided to replace the AP with the armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) ammunition, which was already used with the 83.8mm gun of the Centurion medium tanks. The Centurion fired APDS projectiles with a muzzle velocity of 1465 m/s (4807 ft/s), which was higher than any other tank gun projectile had fired, making APDS the most effective type of kinetic energy AP ammunition at the time.

At the same time, the British army decided to replace the HE, which the U.S. gun was designed to fire by HESH. It considered the HESH



Photo courtesy The Tank Museum, Bovington, England

to be relatively more effective and, in particular, more versatile as it could be effectively used against hostile tanks as well as other targets. Since then, HESH has been the standard secondary type of British tank gun ammunition and it is used to this day in preference to the shaped charge-based high-explosive antitank (HEAT) or multipurpose ammunition used in U.S. and other tanks.

Once the use of HESH ammunition was satisfactorily established with the 120mm gun of the Conqueror, it was possible to consider its use as more than a complement to kinetic energy armor-piercing ammunition. In fact, in larger caliber, it could make the latter redundant, which led to the idea of developing the large caliber 183mm gun that fired only HESH. The gun fired massive, 160-pound projectiles, with a muzzle velocity of 716 m/s (2350 ft/s), that were heavy enough to kill any hostile tank.

The choice of the somewhat odd 183mm caliber was driven by other factors. It was the outcome of a simple, metric conversion of 7.2 inches, which was the caliber of the gun/howitzers that formed the equipment of the heavy regiments of the royal artillery during World War II, and was later used for the development of large HESH projectiles.

How effective the 183mm HESH would have been in combat will never be known, but the British army retained considerable faith in HESH even after it abandoned further development of the L4 gun. This was illustrated by the British army adopting the heavy Malkara anti-tank guided missile with an even larger, 8-inch (203mm) diameter HESH warhead, in contrast to all other anti-tank guided missiles, which have had shaped charge warheads.

Although the development of the 183mm L4 gun was abandoned in the 1950s, at least one example of this remarkable gun has been preserved together with the experimental turret in which it was mounted. Both are now at the British National Tank Museum at Bovington in southwest England, the home of British armor. The turret, along with the gun, has been remounted on a Centurion tank chassis, and work on restoring the FV 4005 configuration has commenced.

The British National Tank Museum, which dates from the 1920s, is the oldest tank museum in the world and has 248 British, U.S., and German tanks, as well as other tanks and armored vehicles. These vehicles will be displayed in new buildings, which are part of the museum's expansion project, made possible by a financial grant from the National Heritage Fund.



Richard M. Ogorkiewicz is a visiting professor at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, England. He received a B.S. and an M.S. from the University of London. He is also a trustee of the British National Tank Museum, has authored three books on armor, and has contributed 78 articles to *ARMOR*.

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