ARMOR

January-February 2008

ARMOR

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Features

Departments

"From My Position..."

"What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun."

Ecclesiastes 1:9

For those of you who are members of the U.S. Armor Association, you may have noticed some changes to the association's copy of the November-December edition of *ARMOR*. Among those changes was the addition of advertisements and a change to the magazine's logo, which incorporated the association's official seal. What you may not have known is that *ARMOR*, for a number of years, was actually reprinted by the Armor Association. Although seemingly identical, the U.S. Government and Armor Association issues actually contained a couple of subtle differences. Obviously those differences will become more pronounced as the association begins printing its own magazine.

Although adding advertisements to the Armor Association's *Armor and Cavalry Journal* represents a change from recent practice, it is not a new concept. In fact, advertisements were part of the *Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association* as far back as 1888. From the very beginning, the July 1888 edition ran advertisements for California wines, Flor de Adelina Patti Cigars, and Remington Standard Typewriters. In the September 1910 edition, there are ads for Santa Fe, Kodak, and the Army National Bank, among others. The 1888 journal printed advertisements for the same reasons the Armor Association is printing advertisements today: to cover print costs, pay employees working for the organization, and raise funds to meet the needs of its members. In short, advertising's renewed role in the life of the magazine is not really new. Ads were part of the magazine's long and storied history and will continue to play a role in its future.

As you might expect, however, there are a number of legal issues that must be resolved to ensure there is a clear boundary between the Army and the U.S. Armor Association. The most visible difference between the two issues of the magazine is the title. There will be no changes to *ARMOR*, the U.S. Government's free issue edition, while the association's edition as mentioned above will now be known as the *Armor and Cavalry Journal*.

Without going into too much detail on the regulatory and legal issues that apply, the title change is necessary to comply with U.S. Postal Service regulations. The actual content of both editions will remain essentially identical. With the exception of advertisements in the *Armor and Cavalry Journal,* and the possible addition of association-related content, the articles will be the same in both magazines. As long as we continue to receive great articles from the force, the overall quality of both publications will continue to meet or exceed all expectations. Transitions are often difficult and the changes described above represent only a few of the significant challenges that lay ahead for the magazine and the Armor Association staffs. With your patience, however, we will do our best to make these changes as painless as possible.

After a long absence, Civil War articles have returned to *ARMOR* in the form of Major Chad Foster's article, "James Longstreet: A Controversial Warrior." Although the magazine has rightfully focused primarily on current operations over the past few years, this article represents a slight, but welcome, change of pace. Additionally, for those of you who are interested in historical articles, Lieutenant Colonel Prisco Hernández's article, "Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba — Master of the Light Horse," appears in this edition as well.

The remainder of this issue covers a number of currently useful topics, ranging from consequence management to route security. As I have said before, one of the strengths of this magazine is the passion with which our authors and readers approach the important topics of our profession. If you feel strongly about something that one of our authors has written, take the time to put your thoughts on paper and send them to us. In the end, we will all benefit from the ensuing discussion.

S.E. LEE

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knox.armormag@conus.army.mil

When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing address and daytime phone number.

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Writing for *ARMOR*

We appreciate your interest in writing for *ARMOR*, the oldest of the Army's professional journals, with a history that began with the frontier horse cavalry in 1888. Today, *ARMOR* is the professional journal of the Armor and Cavalry force, published bimonthly by the Chief of Armor at Fort Knox, Ky.

The journal's focus is the Armor and Cavalry soldier up to the battalion and brigade levels. Our articles discuss the training, equipping, employment, and leadership of mounted soldiers, and the historical background of mounted warfare.

ARMOR articles seldom reflect the Army's official position, nor is the journal's purpose dissemination of doctrine or command information. As the chief proponent for Armor and Cavalry units in the Army, the Chief of Armor is charged with sensing feedback from the soldiers under his proponency, and *ARMOR* is a forum that meets this requirement.

Your Submission

Articles can be submitted in a number of ways:

- Most articles are sent as e-mail attachments to:

Knox.armormag@conus.army.mil

- Articles can also be submitted on CD or floppy disk with a double-spaced hard copy to ensure that the complete file is included. Mail to *ARMOR* Magazine, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Artwork

Photos and useful graphics greatly increase the number of readers attracted to an article. Even simple snapshots are adequate to help readers understand a situation, and can also be used as a basis for drawings by *ARMOR's* artist.

Do not write on the back of photos. Write caption material on paper and tape to the back of the photos. This will eliminate ink transferring to the surface of the photos, making them unusable. Let us know if you want the photos back.

When using PowerPoint to produce maps or illustrations, please try to minimize shading. (We seldom use the illustrations full size and shading becomes blotchy when reduced. Keep graphics as simple as possible. It is easier for us to add any shading desired during the publication process than to modify your efforts.) We can accept electronic photo files in most formats, but prefer 300 dpi TIF or JPG files.

If you have any questions concerning electronic art submissions, call Vivian Oertle at DSN 464-2610 or COM (502) 624-2610.

Article Length

We do not set an upper limit on length; however, an ideal length is 13 manuscript (double-spaced) pages or less. We have made exceptions; we will probably make others. But that's a good rule of thumb. We try to avoid multipart articles because of the two-month interval between issues.

Electronic Formats

Our standard word processing format is Microsoft Word, but conversion programs allow us to accommodate most popular formats. Please indicate word processing format on CD, disk, or cover letter.

"Shotgunning"

Due to TRADOC publication guidelines, and the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one Army journal at a time.

Copyright

ARMOR has occasionally printed copyrighted material, but we would prefer to avoid that if possible. The most likely end-use of an *ARMOR* article is as a study aid in the training of Army soldiers, and complying with copyright regulations when a protected article is reproduced can be onerous.

Deadlines

Within two or three weeks of submission, you will either receive a notice of acceptance or rejection. If accepted, we will send a "permission to publish" form and a "biographical worksheet" for your signature.

ARMOR is due at the printer about three weeks before it is mailed to units, and work on each issue usually begins about seven weeks prior to mailing.

Please refer to the table below for submissions:

Issue Date	Submission Deadline
January-February	1 November
March-April	1 January
May-June	1 March
July-August	1 May
September-October	1 July
November-December	1 September

Rewards

We are not budgeted to pay contributors for their articles, but authors receive extra copies of the issue in which their article appears and a certificate of appreciation from the Chief of Armor. Additionally, the U.S. Armor Association may provide a free one-year subscription to the *Armor and Cavalry Journal* to published authors. This action by the U.S. Armor Association should not be construed as an endorsement of the Association by the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the Army, or the Armor Center and Fort Knox.

COMMANDER'S HATCH

Major General Robert M. Williams
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center

A Final View from the Commander's Hatch

Throughout my career, I have held several command positions, which is truly a blessing; however, I feel especially blessed to have been the commander of Fort Knox and the U.S. Army Armor Center and School. It is here that I have learned why the Armor force has the world's greatest Soldiers — it is due to caring leaders and this school's world-class training. After what seems to be a very brief time, I am turning over the reigns of Chief of Armor and Cavalry to Brigadier General Don Campbell, the 42d Chief of Armor, and I couldn't be more excited for him. I have no doubt that the Armor force will carry on dutifully in my absence and continue to do those things that distinguish it as the "Combat Arm of Decision."

Over the past few years, we have worked hard to transform our officer, noncommissioned officer, and initial entry military training programs to train our Soldiers for the current fight while maintaining necessary skills for the next fight. We must continue to train adaptive leaders and find new ways to incorporate technology. We will continue to struggle with the dilemma of how to infuse junior leaders with new experiences. Clearly, we will continue to immerse leaders in challenging situations, physically, mentally, morally, and with new equipment, allowing them to learn from their mistakes in a non-life-threatening environment. The day is fast approaching when we will assign new lieutenants to "virtual platoons" in the Basic Officer Leader Course so they can truly train on the tasks they must master. Our Soldiers must be the centerpiece of what we do. Simply put, if and when we acquire this technology, we must remember that it will remain the "enabler" for Soldiers and not the other way around.

Speaking of technology, our force has, from its inception, been somewhat reliant on technology to complete its mission. As I stated in my July-August 2007 Commander's Hatch, "Your Next Tank?" there is an emerging need for significant upgrades to our Nation's main battle tank. When new threats emerge, new capabilities must be incorporated, and there is a similar, and maybe even greater, need for upgrades and improvements to our scout and cavalry systems. Not to put too fine a point on it, but I recently heard a trooper claim that "the last successful scout platform in our inventory dedicated solely to the cavalry scout's mission was the horse." That claim is probably overstated, but we should consider its merit — our future scout systems must be pushed ahead.

Technology does not only apply to new platforms; we must get away from designing platforms in a stovepipe. Clearly, the current battlefield, as well as the future battlefield, requires holistic survivability in which a common network backbone and a true common operating picture is available to our formations, as well as our allies' formations. In both armor and cavalry organizations, interoperability with the future force is essential, and regardless of where we function on the broad spectrum of future operations, there will always be a need for network-enabled battle command and situational awareness. We will continue to develop equipment, weapons, ammunition, and enablers to ensure that our Soldiers are never in a fair fight.

I have addressed two of the three critical resources necessary for our mounted force — soldiers and technology. The third critical resource is time. As an ancient philosopher said, "Time is the most valuable thing a man can spend," and I add, "it is also the one thing that a combat leader never has enough of." The challenge of training our mounted force to defeat multiple and varied future threats will be in time and training management. There will always be more requirements than resources; it is a leader's job to prioritize and apply available limited resources to appropriate tasks. It is the job of the generating force to provide the operating force with training strategies and trained Soldiers. Shifting from a core mission essential task list to a directed mission essential task list will always require a leader's assessment and guidance. What we must do as a force is determine what critical core skills must be trained, where those skills are trained, and how often they are trained. As the operating environment continually increases in complexity, the list of Soldier tasks to train continually increases. While we cannot expect our Soldiers to become experts at every skill, there must be mastery of critical skills. Defining those critical skills and determining the best method to train those skills will require training strategy refinement and a recommitment of our force to teaching training management at all levels.

While I could continue indefinitely about the future of our mounted force, I will close this column with one final thought — the strength of our Nation is our Army, and the strength of our Army is our Soldiers.

My brief time as the Chief of Armor and Cavalry has reinforced my belief in the strength of our Soldiers and the resilience of their families. I thank you for your contributions to this journal over the years — knowledge shared between professionals is essential for continued success. But most of all, I thank you for your service and commitment to our Nation — past, present, and future.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

CSM Otis Smith
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder:
Know the Symptoms and What to Do

In this issue of *ARMOR*, I would like to discuss a subject of great importance. It is about taking care of Soldiers — and Soldiers are our most precious resource. Recent studies have highlighted the need for making soldiers and leaders aware of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This serious condition affects soldiers and their families, friends, and fellow soldiers.

PTSD is a condition that often follows a terrifying physical or emotional event, causing the person who survived the event to have persistent, frightening thoughts and memories, or flashbacks, of the ordeal. Persons with PTSD often feel chronically, emotionally numb. Once referred to as "shell shock" or "battle fatigue," PTSD is a mental health disorder that requires a health care provider to diagnose. The symptoms of PTSD may include the following signs:

Physical: fatigue, vomiting or nausea, chest pain, twitches, thirst, weakness, insomnia or nightmares, breathing difficulty, muscle tremors, teeth grinding, profuse sweating, pounding heart, diarrhea or intestinal upsets, and headaches.

Behavioral: withdrawal, pacing and restlessness, emotional outbursts, anti-social acts, suspicion and paranoia, loss of interest in hobbies, increased alcohol consumption, and substance abuse.

Emotional: anxiety or panic, guilt, fear, denial, irritability, depression, intense anger, agitation, and apprehension.

No amount of training can totally prepare soldiers for the realities of combat. Studies show that 20 to 30 percent of military personnel returning from combat operations report psychological symptoms. These symptoms may include difficulty sleeping, feelings of depression, or social withdrawal. Most of these soldiers will transition successfully in a few weeks in a normal healthy way. However, it may take some soldiers longer than others to transition; these soldiers may require significant assistance to cope with the reactions they are having due to their military experience.

Leaders — know your soldiers! It is essential that leaders know, understand, and recognize the signs and symptoms of PTSD. Awareness of the symptoms of combat stress is key to helping soldiers get help. Soldiers who may need help are likely to pull away from those who may be able to support them the most. They may have significant issues with irritability, anger, or aggression, which affects them both at work and home. Soldiers may also abuse alcohol or drugs to "escape" their troubles or help calm them down. They may also become hyper-alert and try to secure their environments, while others may engage in high-risk behaviors, such as driving recklessly or too fast, in an effort to get back the adrenaline rush they had while in the theater of operations.

Leaders at all levels have a responsibility to watch for any signs or symptoms of PTSD affecting soldiers. They must identify and assess hazards to their soldiers' health from PTSD. As a part of controlling these hazards, leaders must ensure that soldiers receive appropriate care and support — make sure you have lined up the resources soldiers need and are ready to provide the assistance they may require when needed.

We also know that soldiers with the highest combat exposure, those conducting missions outside the wire, have higher rates of post-combat stress. Soldiers experiencing post-combat stress may continue to struggle with symptoms long after redeployment. Some do not "reset" quickly after coming home and may continue to struggle even 12 months later. Leaders and soldiers must recognize the continued effects of exposure to combat stress; however, leaders must also remember that post-combat stress is part of a soldier's experience, and that most soldiers will successfully adapt to their reactions. However, there are soldiers who may have difficulty in coping with post-combat stress, which leads to PTSD. If soldiers receive help at the onset of their symptoms, their recovery will be faster and more complete.

A word of advice to all soldiers: not everyone who is exposed to traumatic events has long-term problems; in fact, many people involved in traumatic events grow from the experience. But if you find yourself struggling at work, in relationships, or in other important parts of your life as a result of a traumatic event, immediately seek a professional assessment. Visit your unit Chaplain, your installation Department of Behavioral Health (or Community or Division Mental Health), Social Work Services, or your primary care manager. These folks will make sure you get the help you need.

Additional information on PTSD is available online at *www.behavioralhealth.army.mil*.

"Teach our young soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think."

JAMES LONGSTREET: A

by Major Chad Foster

General James Longstreet is the most controversial figure of the American Civil War. He was a tough, determined fighter who suffered in the postwar court of public opinion due to malicious, and often unjustified, criticisms leveled by those who sought to elevate the legacy of Robert E. Lee and entrench the myth of the "Lost Cause" within the consciousness of the South. Longstreet uninten-

CONTROVERSIAL WARRIOR

tionally aided his enemies through awkward attempts at self-defense, in which he frequently sounded like a sullen and bitter old man. As historian Glenn W. Lafantasie so accurately stated, Longstreet was "outmaneuvered and outgunned" by the pens and oratory of his political enemies, known collectively as the 'Lee cult.'[1] However, the swirl of controversy surrounding James Long-street tends to obscure his many excellent qualities as a combat leader and divert attention from his impressive battlefield accomplishments. He was, first and foremost, a fighting general who had a "nose" for combat. His appreciation for the ever-changing conditions of the battlefield allowed him to learn from mistakes and adjust his tactics accordingly.

Kurz and Allison, Art Publishers,
Chicago, USA, c. 1890

Credit: H.A. Ogden

at Gettysburg was still a close, bitter memory within the Army of Northern Virginia, and Longstreet's post-war critics usually point to his suggested redeployment to the west as evidence of his disloyalty to Lee and of his rabid ambition for independent command. While a desire for advancement very well could have played a part in his motives, it is equally likely that Longstreet actually believed in what he was advocating. In one of his letters to Lee, Longstreet offered a realistic assessment of the army's readiness, and he proposed that the Army of Northern Virginia might remain on the defensive along the Rappahannock while reinforcements moved west since "[the] best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee."[2] It was not the first time he had suggested taking advantage of the South's interior lines to mass against one of the other Union commands, but the recent fall of Vicksburg and Bragg's inability to gain even the smallest success against the Federals in that strategically vital theater, certainly would have added an increased sense of urgency.

Eventually, Longstreet was ordered west with elements of his corps, traveling a circuitous route through the Carolinas and Georgia necessitated by the Federal occupation of Knoxville. Meanwhile, Bragg and his Army of Tennessee had been maneuvered out of Chattanooga by Major General William S. Rosencrans' Army of the Cumberland, and on 18 September, Bragg opened an engagement with the Federals near Chickamauga Creek in the heavily forested lands on the Georgia-Tennessee border. Longstreet and his staff arrived at Catoosa Station in Georgia at approximately 1500 hours on 19 September, with the battle already underway. To the surprise of the new arrivals, Bragg did not bother to send a guide to meet them, forcing Longstreet and two of

Major General William S. Rosencrans

his staff officers to spend hours searching for the commanding general in the north Georgia woods. After a close encounter with Federal pickets, Longstreet found Bragg at approximately 2300 hours.[3]

General Bragg rose from his slumber and directed Longstreet to assume command of the left wing of the army (See Figure 1). The right wing would be under the direction of General Leonidas Polk. The attack would begin the next morning with the advance of D.H. Hill's corps on the far right of Polk's line. Bragg's plan called for each unit to advance in succession, following the one on its right. This would continue across the entire length of the Confederate front as the army swung to the left like a huge door, pivoting on General William Preston's

So successful were attempts to make Longstreet the scapegoat for Confederate defeat in the Civil War that his performance in combat has been savaged unjustifiably by generations of historians who blindly accepted the claims of the Lee cult without considering their barely concealed agenda. What little credit remained for Longstreet's generalship was confined to a grudging acknowledgment that he was merely a fine defensive fighter who otherwise moved his troops slowly and ineptly into battle. Such notions were born of the self-serving criticisms of those who were not his equal in combat.

Longstreet's skill as a warrior was certainly evident in the defense at places such as Fredericksburg, but his martial prowess was equally evident on other fields when he maneuvered his troops forward to strike crushing blows against the enemy, particularly in September 1863, in the bloody woods along the Tennessee-Georgia border. At the Battle of Chickamauga, James Longstreet showed that he was truly a bulldog who could be relied on to deliver powerful, punishing attacks. Chickamauga was not the first example of this, and it certainly would not be the last. However, modern day combat leaders can look to his performance at Chickamauga for examples of flexibility and shrewd battlefield assessment under extremely difficult conditions.

Longstreet Moves West

In August of 1863, Longstreet corresponded with his commander, General Robert E. Lee, regarding a strategic reinforcement of Braxton Bragg's army in Tennessee. The defeat


Major General Braxton Bragg

division on the far left of the line. If successful, Bragg's army would cut off the Federals from Chattanooga and destroy them.[4] The plan was simple, but that did little to alleviate the difficulties with which Longstreet would have to contend. He had arrived in darkness with little time to locate and organize his forces for an attack over unfamiliar ground against a confident and well-supplied enemy. Bragg, in keeping with his reputation, had done little to facilitate the integration of his newly arrived reinforcements.

The brigades of John B. Hood, however, had arrived from Virginia ahead of Longstreet in time to participate in the fighting on 19 September. Hood's assessment of Bragg's command was as dark as Longstreet's must have been. The atmosphere that Hood and his men found was certainly in shocking contrast to what they had enjoyed in the east. Just as consistent victory had built confidence in the Army of Northern Virginia, consistent defeat had drained the spirit of the Army of Tennessee. Hood found that "not one [of Bragg's officers] spoke in a sanguine tone regarding the result of the battle in which [they] were then engaged."[5] Hood's spirits surely rose when Longstreet arrived on the field.

Major General John B. Hood

Organizing the Left Wing for Battle

After a short rest at Bragg's headquarters, Longstreet set out in the predawn darkness to locate the units of the left wing. Upon finding them, Longstreet quickly set about making adjustments and organizing his wing for the attack. The difficulty of this task cannot be overstated, especially considering the circumstances in which the newly appointed commander of the left wing found himself. He had arrived in darkness with the battle already underway. Bragg and his staff provided very little assistance with integrating this new and highly important subordinate leader. Most of all, Longstreet received a very difficult assignment, and he would have to operate on completely unfamiliar terrain. Without the communications equipment that commanders on later battlefields would have, all orders would have to go by courier or be personally delivered by Longstreet.

Longstreet quickly surveyed the terrain, finding that it "was not a field proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice

of artillery."[6] Observation was broken by the thick trees, making long range adjustment of artillery impossible. The terrain would have an equal effect on Federal artillery. Throughout the course of the battle, Union forces would expend only 7,320 rounds for their cannon, less than one-quarter of the total fired during the battle of Gettysburg earlier that year.[7] It is clear that the Federals suffered under the same limitations as their Confederate opponents. The fighting in those northern Georgia woods would depend on the close combat of determined infantry.

In addition to the severe restrictions of the terrain, Longstreet discovered problems with the alignment of his units. These problems were the result of both the rugged landscape and the confusion of the previous day's combat. Longstreet found that he did not have contact with the right wing; therefore, he ordered A.P. Stewart, commander of his far right division, to locate them. Stewart soon reported that his line was nearly one-half mile in advance of the units to his right. Longstreet had much work to do before he would advance against the Federal positions to the east.

As it turned out, he had more time than anticipated because Polk's forces failed to advance at the appointed hour. The delay was due to a failure to properly relay orders to subordinate commanders. Longstreet used this time to fashion a plan of attack that suited the dense, compartmentalized terrain of the Chickamauga battlefield. He recognized that the thick woods would make lateral coordination of units virtually impossible since, even in the most open areas, "one's vision could not reach farther than the length of a brigade."[8] Additionally, he knew from experience that by stringing out his divisions in long lines, he would weaken his striking power by dispersing troops across a broad front. Such a deployment of forces might gain a small penetration of enemy lines, but it would lack the strength to exploit a breakthrough.

Left Wing
LTG James Longstreet

Division	Brigade	Regiments and Others
Hindman's Division: MG Thomas C. Hindman BG Patton Anderson Escort: Lenoir's Company, Alabama Cavalry: CPT T.M. Lenoir	Anderson's Brigade: BG Patton Anderson Col J. H. Sharp	7th Mississippi: COL W. H. Bishop 9th Mississippi: MAJ T. H. Lynam 10th Mississippi: LTC James Barr 41st Mississippi: COL W. F. Tucker 44th Mississippi: COL J. H. Sharp, LTC R. G. Kelsey 9th Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters: MAJ W.C. Richards Garrity's (Alabama) Battery: CPT James Garrity
	Deas' Brigade: BG Zach C. Deas	19th Alabama: COL Samuel K. McSpadden 22nd Alabama: LTC John Weedon, CPT Harry T. Toulmin 25th Alabama: COL George D. Johnston 39th Alabama: COL Whitfield Clark 50th Alabama: COL J.G. Coltart 17th Alabama Battalion Sharpshooters: CPT James F. Nabers Dent's (Alabama) Battery: CPT S.H. Dent
	Manigault's Brigade: BG Arthur M. Manigault	24th Alabama: COL N.N. Davis 28th Alabama: COL John C. Reid 34th Alabama: MAJ John N. Slaughter 10th-19th South Carolina: COL James F. Pressley Waters' (Alabama) Battery: LT Charles W. Watkins

Figure 1

As a consequence of his rapid and highly perceptive assessment, Longstreet formed a powerful assault column under that wily fighter and fellow veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, John B. Hood. Choosing Hood made sense for many reasons, the most obvious of which was he and his men had already seen fighting during the previous day and he was most familiar with the ground to their front. Longstreet arrayed the left wing's other divisions in two lines with two brigades forward and the others in support, but he stacked Hood's brigades in a tight column at intervals of 100 paces.[9] The enemy situation before him was unclear and the terrain rough and unfamiliar. He lacked the time to conduct a proper reconnaissance, so Longstreet decided that his best chance for success was to advance in strength sufficient enough to pierce the enemy's lines and continue to carry the fight to his rear areas.

There is little doubt that the pain of the charge against the Union center at Gettysburg still lingered in Longstreet's mind. Before leaving Virginia, his last words to Lee had been that he would "not give a single man of my command for a fruitless victory."[10] Gettysburg had clearly been a bloody defeat, and he viewed previous triumphs, such as Chancellorsville, as Pyrrhic victories because of the immense and irreplaceable casualties suffered. James Longstreet was preparing to launch an attack that would have the power to do far more than gain a small penetration in enemy lines. He was going to break the line and push

Map 1

into the Federals' rear areas as part of the Confederate plan to isolate and destroy the Army of the Cumberland. Such a victory would definitely not be "fruitless."

Fortune Intervenes

The Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg had experienced little good fortune before the Battle of Chickamauga. However, with the arrival of Longstreet's forces, not only were they gaining some of the best combat formations that the South could offer, they also seemed to be gaining a touch of luck. It was the sort of good fortune that always seems to accompany those who act with confidence and decisiveness during times of turmoil. The 20th day of September 1863 would prove to be the "high watermark" for Bragg's army.

Of course, the opening of the day's operations did not bode well. Polk's inability to launch his attack at dawn understandably enraged Bragg. He wanted to hear none of the excuses offered by his subordinates. D.H. Hill, the corps commander who was to advance first, did not receive timely orders due to negligence on his part and also by his superior, Polk.

As Longstreet stirred on the left, aligning his forces and strengthening his line for the coming thrust, Bragg's frustration grew until he began personally ordering individual divisions forward, beginning on the right of the line. It was about 1100 hours when Longstreet finally decided to send the commanding general his recommendation to advance his wing. As he was preparing to send the message, he discovered that Bragg had already ordered A.P. Stewart's division forward. Fortunately, Longstreet was able to quickly order Hood and the remaining units on his left to hold long enough for the brigades of Joseph Kershaw and newly promoted Brigadier General Benjamin Humphreys to close up on the rear of the assault column, adding additional depth and power to Hood's formation.[11]

It was at about this time that fortune intervened on the side of the Confederates. Due to a mistaken report of a gap in the Federal line between the units of Thomas Wood and Joseph Reynolds, General Rosencrans began shifting units across his front. As historian John Bowers put it, "the catastrophe was put in motion" when Wood attempted to close up on Reynolds, but was then redirected by General George Thomas, the corps commander on the Union left, farther along to the left of the line.[12] This actually created a gap in the Federal line, rather than closing one up. That gap was now directly opposite from Longstreet's impending attack.

Longstreet Attacks

As Longstreet surged forward, his forces experienced both the benefits and difficulties associated with the terrain of the Chickamauga Battlefield. The approach march toward the Federal lines was difficult due to dense woods and undergrowth. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's chief of staff, offered an understatement when he noted that, "[t]he ground was, in parts, difficult before us."[13] However, this ground offered advantages to the attackers. A local man, whose family farm was located near the center of where Longstreet now planned to attack, acted as a guide for his forces, showing them the best way through the woods. The foliage hid the 11 Confederate brigades until they suddenly emerged from the trees just east of Lafayette Road.

Longstreet's forces surged forward toward the gap left by Wood's departure, cresting the small hill at Brotherton Field. Federal units on either side of the gap attempted to reposition in an attempt to stem the gray tide that was now rushing toward

them. This slowed the Confederate advance, but the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys that Longstreet had closed up to a better supporting position during the realignment of the morning, gained the enemy's first lines and allowed for the capture of "a large number" of Federal cannons.[14]

Even in the face of this success, albeit aided by the serendipitous appearance of a gap in the enemy line, Longstreet's efforts met with criticism that is colored by the post-war assaults on his military record. Historian Steven Woodworth seems to imply that the only reason for Longstreet's successes at this stage in the battle was the fortuitous withdrawal of Wood's troops from their reverse slope defensive positions on the west side of Brotherton Field. Prior to his departure, Wood was positioned so that his troops would be sheltered behind low breastworks below the small hill top where the Confederates would have to "skyline" themselves as they approached. Undoubtedly, the first ranks to advance would have met with a vicious volley from the Federal positions, but as Woodworth himself acknowledges, the Southern troops would have, by that time, been within 50 yards of Wood's lines.[15]

The Federal troops would have been unable to fire on the attackers before that point due to the intervisibility line created by the small hill. A determined charge would have covered the 50 yards rather quickly, and given the fact that Longstreet's troops were fresh and rested, it is likely they would have been able to do so. Additionally, the assault column was several brigades deep by design, providing more than enough combat power to penetrate Wood's position and hold it against a counterattack. Had Wood remained in position, it is certain that the cost in Confederate lives would have been far greater, but with Kershaw and Humphreys' units in close support and the commands of Thomas Hindman and William Preston to the rear and left of the assault column, there is little reason to suspect the end result would have been different.

A further testament to the strength of Longstreet's thrust came as Union Colonel John T. Wilder's Lightning Brigade, armed with Spencer repeating rifles, struck Hindman's division in the left and rear near Widow Glenn hill. The rapid fire of Wilder's Spencer rifles and the surprise of this flank attack initially pushed back a brigade of infantry to Lafayette Road, prompting Hindman to send a distressed message to Longstreet. The commander of the left wing was calm and steady in his response, as were the troops that he knew to be moving up in close support of Hindman's flank.[16] The attack continued forward as the follow-on units closed up on those in the lead helping to secure the flanks. Wilder's Brigade subsequently withdrew to escort fleeing Union staff officers back to the relative safety of Chattanooga.

With the attack of the left wing advancing rapidly, Longstreet was quick to realize that a change in the overall battle plan was necessary. He recommended reversing the scheme Bragg had conceived the night prior: instead of the right wing sweeping to the left, the left wing would sweep toward the right, pushing

Credit: J.F. Hillen

"The Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg had experienced little good fortune before the Battle of Chickamauga. However, with the arrival of Longstreet's forces, not only were they gaining some of the best combat formations that the South could offer, they also seemed to be gaining a touch of luck. It was the sort of good fortune that always seems to accompany those who act with confidence and decisiveness during times of turmoil. The 20th day of September 1863 would prove to be the "high watermark" for Bragg's army."

the Federal troops to their soon-to-be famous stand on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. This delaying action by Union General George Thomas would allow the Army of the Cumberland to escape disaster on that day.

Longstreet's Tactics Considered

There were two basic schools of thought regarding infantry fighting in the 1860s, and understanding each of these is important in assessing Longstreet's performance at Chickamauga and his combat leadership in general. The most influential school of thought regarding Civil War commanders of both the North and South was termed an "engineer" solution to the problem of infantry combat. This emphasized the natural tendency to shelter behind fieldworks or protective terrain features in a position of strength, forcing the enemy to attack across open ground where they were vulnerable to the firepower of the defenders.[17] There could be no better description of Longstreet's own masterful defense of Mayre's Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg or the Union defense of Cemetery Ridge on the third day at Gettysburg. As the war drew to a close, complex defensive entrenchments, such as those at Petersburg, would become more common, foreshadowing the horrors of World War I.

Another school of thought regarding infantry tactics in 1863 was prevalent in the European drill manuals of that day. This philosophy emphasized what we today call "shock action," delivered at the point of a bayonet. It still acknowledged the marked advantage of strong defensive positions, but it advocated launching strong counterattacks from the defense or carrying out violent charges once one's infantry had marched to within close range of the enemy. This tactic could be accomplished by skillfully using terrain to conceal an approach march until one's forces emerged unexpectedly at a vulnerable point on the enemy's line.[18] The vulnerable point could be an assailable flank identified through reconnaissance or, if locating such a position was impractical, that point could be "created" by massing a large amount of force against a narrow portion of the enemy's line to overwhelm him. The accompanying "shock" could be delivered

to the enemy through a bayonet charge, a fierce musket volley, an ear-splitting war cry, or a combination of all three.

Considering these two contrasting conceptions of infantry tactics, it seems clear that Longstreet, either by training or through instinct, applied both methods with equal effectiveness. The Battle of Chickamauga is a stark example of his use of shock action to carry the day, just as his performance at Fredericksburg showed his ability to apply an "engineer" solution in battle. The wooded terrain at Chickamauga allowed Longstreet's forces to execute a concealed approach march at the end of which he massed overwhelming combat power against a small segment of the enemy's line with the intent of overwhelming whatever Federal unit had the misfortune of being positioned there. Longstreet arrayed his forces in depth to ensure he had the strength to not only penetrate the first line of Federal defenses, but also exploit that success, thereby rupturing the entire Union defensive scheme.

Aftermath

Although the Battle of Chickamauga forced Union forces to retreat back to Chattanooga, Bragg's great chance to cut their escape route and destroy them was lost. Internal dissension within the Army of Tennessee was rampant, and Bragg's subordinates united in an attempt to have him relieved of command. In this depressing drama, Longstreet played a sad part, coming to be seen as the leader of the anti-Bragg faction. As he would realize in the years following the war, he was out of his element in dealing with politics and intrigue. Ultimately, Bragg's greatest ally, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, ensured that he would remain in command, and Longstreet departed for a difficult and unsuccessful campaign in eastern Tennessee. However, Longstreet's battlefield performance at Chickamauga was a fine example of highly effective and flexible combat leadership. He stepped into an extremely difficult and confused situation and managed to fashion a sound plan of attack. His analysis of the terrain was quick and perceptive, and he rightly understood the need to adjust his tactics based on preexisting conditions and other considerations.

Great commanders build their reputations on battlefields; unfortunately, history attempts to judge James Longstreet based on political and personal biases. There is no doubt that many aspects of his career deserve criticism, but this outstanding commander amassed a formidable record of combat achievement that is little appreciated. He was a fighter who rapidly and accurately assessed a situation and subsequently applied the best solution based on that assessment. Even though he, like many other commanders of that day, preferred to fight from a position of formidable strength that would force his enemy to attack in the open and suffer heavy casualties, he was not chained to any particular tactical dogma. Longstreet adjusted his tactics to the terrain and the enemy in an effort to gain victory while sacrificing as few of his soldiers as possible.

Despite post-war assertions that he was merely a capable defensive fighter, James Longstreet was equally effective in the offense. During many other engagements both before and after Chickamauga, he clearly showed his mettle. The observations and comments of his enemies in blue attest to his prowess in the attack. At Gettysburg, as he personally led elements from one of his brigades forward to seize the Peach Orchard, a captured Union soldier who saw Longstreet in action commented admiringly, "[o]ur generals don't do that sort of thing."[19] At the Battle of the Wilderness, it was Longstreet who fiercely attacked the Federal flank and saved the Army of Northern Virginia from disaster before falling severely wounded. Union General Winfield Scott Hancock, recalling Longstreet's Wilderness flank attack said that "[he] rolled me up like a wet blanket."[20] However, it was

from his own commander, the legendary Robert E. Lee, that Longstreet would receive his highest compliment. No other subordinate, not even Stonewall Jackson, enjoyed Lee's confidence more. Had he been merely a capable defensive fighter, it is doubtful that Lee would have referred to James Longstreet as "the staff in my right hand."[21] Theses statements are testaments to the bravery and dogged determination of a general whose skills as a commander were not confined to merely one form of warfare.

The controversy surrounding his disagreement with Lee at Gettysburg has clouded the judgment of history against James Longstreet. However, a close and impartial examination of his military record exonerates him from the false indictments leveled by his politically motivated and self-serving enemies in the postwar years. He was not perfect, but he could hit the enemy as hard as *any* leader on either side of the Civil War. The Battle of Chickamauga is just one example of James Longstreet's talent as an offensive commander, and it is one that future military leaders and historians should remember.

Notes

[1]Glenn W. LaFantasie, "Considering Longstreet's Legacy," *With My Face to the Enemy: Perspectives on the Civil War*, Robert Cowley, ed., Berkley Books, New York, 2001, pp. 332-347.

[2]James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America,* Barnes and Noble, New York, 2004, p. 373.

[3]Moxley G. Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer*, Neale Publishing Company, New York, 1905, p. 193.

[4]Longstreet, p. 376.

[5]John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1959, p. 62.

[6]Longsreet, p. 376.

[7]Sears W. Cabell, *The "Bulldog": Longstreet at Gettysburg and Chickamauga*, Ruralist Press, Inc., Atlanta, 1938, p. 15.

[8]Longstreet, p. 385.

[9]Ibid., p. 377.

[10]Ibid., p. 373.

[11]Ibid., p. 383.

[12]John Bowers, *Chickamauga and Chattanooga: The Battles that Doomed the Confederacy,* Harper Collins, New York, 1994, p. 114.

[13]Sorrel, p. 195.

[14]Longstreet, p. 383.

[15]Steven E. Woodworth, *Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns*, The University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1998, p. 116.

[16]Longstreet, p. 384.

[17]Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Civil War*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987, p. 140.

[18]Ibid., p. 141.

[19]Randall Bedwell, ed., *May I Quote You, General Longstreet? Observations and Utterances from the South's Great Generals,* Cumberland House, Nashville, 1997, p. 43.

[20]Ibid., p. 46.

[21]Jeffrey D. Wert, *General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier—A Biography,* Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 152.

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Consequence Management during Counterinsurgency Operations

by Major Ernest Litynski

While counterinsurgency (COIN) operations may differ regionally due to distinct environments, insurgent ideologies and objectives, and cultural variations, maintaining governance, legitimacy, and popular support remain a resounding coalition force (CF) objective during these operations. Regardless of COIN conditions, unintended consequences as a result of CF-led actions will undoubtedly occur on the battlefield. Unfortunately, these actions have the potential to influence a negative perception of CF by the populous, or even worse, exploitation of the unintended consequence via an insurgent-led information operations (IO) effort. Hence, the need for consequence management in such situations is certainly a relevant requirement to maintain legitimacy and stability within the host nation.

Actions, Insight, and Tactics at Battalion and Below

Task Force (TF) 4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (4-73 CAV), 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division, experienced such unintended consequences during their current deployment to Afghanistan. Subsequently, the organization developed consequence management tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to maintain local stability, legitimize local governance, and isolate insurgents from their cause and support. Events, such as the accidental wounding of an Afghan civilian by a ricochet warning shot, or the death of local Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) soldiers who unsuccessfully tried to disarm unexploded ordnance (UXO), highlight the need for consequence management and preventive actions within the COIN fight.

As a result of the two aforementioned events on the battlefield, the squadron methodically developed "consequence management" battle drills, plans of action, and formal TTPs to mitigate such situations. It must be noted, however, that consequence management is more than a positive IO message to the populous.

Conversely, it must be "operationalized" holistically within the organization and requires "full-spectrum" engagement, to include:

- Internal actions — synchronization and efforts of all staff sections within the battalion or squadron.

- External actions — continuous cross-talk and integration with the higher headquarters, relevant staff sections, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), as appropriate.

- Local security actions — incorporation of the Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) and local ANSF leaders into the process.

- Local governance actions — coordination for shuras/meetings with the governor, local governance, and tribal elders.

As this article demonstrates, holistic, continuous engagement with respect to the aforementioned actions is not an op-

"Units must have the ability to collect information at collateral damage sites, which enables them to take proper consequence-management steps and mitigate second/third-order effects. Furthermore, the incorporation of humanitarian aid (HA) and appropriate solatia payments must be a reinforcing and continuous process within the affected area. Similarly, conducting shuras at the appropriate levels, such as local, district, and/or provincial, should occur as soon as possible during the consequence-management process."

by organizations using leadership judgment based on current conditions (melding of battle command "art and science").

The following lessons learned were developed by 4-73 CAV and deemed so significant that they were disseminated throughout Combined Joint Task Force-82 as a tool for consequence management. They were developed as a result of a gap discovered in the unit's standard operating procedures (SOP) following the aforementioned accidental wounding of an Afghan civilian. All actions during the actual incident were conducted properly and in accordance with theater escalation of force (EOF) and rules of engagement (ROE) criteria.

Lessons Learned

The following lessons learned were developed from after action reviews (AARs) and subsequently led to creating the demonstrated TTP and battle drills that assist in mitigation and/or elimination of negative consequences, such as a noncombatant casualty or collateral damage, created in a COIN environment:

Consequence management battle drills. Currently, there is no systemic process established to ensure the tactical operations center (TOC) can rapidly inform all necessary personnel and begin necessary procedures. As a result, the course of action process becomes disjointed and proper staffing functions are lengthy. Hence, the need to develop comprehensive battle drills to ensure all appropriate actions are taken, personnel are notified, and coordination is executed.

tional requirement, but an essential task in the consequence-management process. Therefore, an "isolationist" or "economy of effort" approach, as well as a lack of proper planning, coordination, communication, and execution of these actions, can potentially result in more harm than good (result in further consequences, de-legitimization of CF/governance, and exploitation of negative IO by the insurgency).

The lessons learned outlined in this article provide any organization a good starting point or template for consequence management. It must be noted, however, that they are not the approved solution for every situation, as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC) conditions differ within every organization's battlespace. However, these lessons learned and TTP should be adapted

Recommendation: Develop battle drills for solatia (condolence) payments, noncombatant casualties, and consequence management for these actions. An example battle drill is demonstrated in Figure 1.

Lack of coordination with higher headquarters. Higher headquarters can become proactive and better prepared to send talking points or approve radio messages if coordination occurs earlier in the process (hence, the need for battle drills). Updates must be sent, as available, to maintain a common operating picture (COP) with the higher headquarters, enabling them to provide the necessary resources and enabling effects warrant-


Figure 1

ed to mitigate risk in the consequence-management process.

Recommendation: In accordance with the commander's established guidance, communicate with higher headquarters IO section at least every 48 hours. For consequence-management incidents, communicate with higher headquarters at a minimum of every 2 to 3 hours (or as updates become available).

Immediate distribution of solatia funds. Multiple instances have existed in which reparations and positive IO could have mitigated risk and reduced consequences had solatia funds been on-hand and immediately available. Hence, the timeliness of solatia payments becomes a requirement to link the negative action with a suitable and well-timed reaction. The timely linking of solatia payments with the negative action can significantly reduce risk in the consequence-management process. Therefore, a full understanding of the solatia payment system, as well as development of related SOPs, becomes a requirement within the organization.

Recommendation: Receive guidance and legal review from the appropriate staff judge advocate's (SJA) office prior to relief in place/transfer of authority. Such a review allows the unit to maintain solatia funds locally, rather than waiting for higher headquarters to distribute these monies. The brigade SJA section can provide guidance on how to maintain and distribute local solatia funds in accordance with legal guidelines.

Timely and appropriate key-leader engagement (KLE) and humanitarian assistance. Units must have the ability to collect information at collateral damage sites, which enables them to take proper consequence-management steps and mitigate second/third-order effects. Furthermore, the incorporation of humanitarian aid (HA) and appropriate solatia payments must be a reinforcing and continuous process within the affected area. Similarly, conducting shuras at the appropriate levels, such as local, district, and/or provincial, should occur as soon as possible during the consequence-management process. During these shuras and meetings, local officials (district/provincial levels) must be incorporated in the process to maintain government and security legitimacy.

Recommendation: The unit must establish an SOP for information collection and an action plan following an incident. Each troop- or company-level unit must have the SOP and action plan on-hand during missions. Below is an example of

"Once an incident occurs, a local shura should be convened as soon as possible, preferably within 48 hours, to address the concerns of the local community. This shows respect for the victim and the community's cultural sensitivities; it also negates insurgent IO opportunities."

a squadron-level plan of action (wounded noncombatant):

❑ Medical personnel obtain noncombatant's name, height, weight, and other relevant information. Update medical-condition report to fire effects coordination cell (FECC), as necessary.

❑ Administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) maintains soldier at hospital with victim's family and attends to their needs.

❑ FECC submits plan of action to brigade FECC and continues to update status of items completed.

❑ S5 schedules meeting between provincial chief of ANSF and squadron commander on date-time group (DTG).

❑ Squadron commander briefs provincial chief of ANSF on plan of action.

❑ S4 coordinates solatia payments for victim's family.

❑ S4 coordinates for HA drop at victim's village.

❑ Squadron commander meets with provincial chief of ANSF to discuss plan of action.

❑ FECC develops IO campaign to counter negative IO fallout.

❑ Troop commander coordinates with local (district) police chief to conduct combined investigation of the incident site. Squadron commander and provincial chief of ANSF transported by air to accident site.

❑ Troop commander and local police chief conduct a combined investigation of the site and individuals involved.

❑ Troop commander and S5 conduct HA drop at the victim's village (50 bags rice, beans, flour, children's clothing, shoes, tea, cooking oil, etc).

❑ Local police chief and company commander host a shura on DTG. The district com-

missioner, provincial chief of ANSF, and squadron commander also attend shura.

❑ Troop commander receives the victim and family on arrival from coalition medical facility and escorts to village.

❑ Troop commander delivers solatia payment, once approved.

❑ FECC and S3 create executive summary of events and findings.

Repeated HA should be used as pre-solatia payments to victims of consequence-management events; this serves as an initial compensation and alleviates some of the family's burden. Furthermore, it also serves to establish an immediate foundation of trust between the victim and the family (IO focus on the human terrain). Once an incident occurs, a local shura should be convened as soon as possible, preferably within 48 hours, to address the concerns of the local community. This shows respect for the victim and the community's cultural sensitivities; it also negates insurgent IO opportunities. A district-level tribal shura should be conducted after the local shura to negate insurgent IO opportunities; this also emphasizes the CF's understanding and respect for the Pashtunwali (an unwritten, democratic, socio-political culture, law and ideology of the Pashtun society inherited from their forefathers and carried on to the present generation). This same message must be continuously emphasized to establish legitimacy and true caring for the affected individual, family, and community. Notional themes (talking points) should continuously reiterate the same positive message at all levels during the consequence-management process. Be-

low is an example of notional themes used for shuras and meetings for civilian casualty incidents:

• Our hearts and prayers go out to the injured person, his family, and his friends. (International security forces will never intentionally injure or bring suffering to the citizens of 'Province A.' We work to improve the standard of living for those who have requested our support).

• International security forces are here at the request of the people and the leadership of 'Province A.' (We work alongside national security forces to promote security and stability of the people of this region. We will continue to conduct combined operations to pursue the enemy and address the population).

• We must work together with national security forces and the population to prevent similar incidents in the future. (We will conduct a thorough, combined investigation to determine how we can best rectify any damages we have caused. We have established measures to prevent this type of incident from occurring).

• The population must work and obey the directives of local security forces. (The local leaders must explain to the population the necessity of cooperating with security forces. The enemy hides among the population, so we must interact with the populous to find them. The information you provide and your assistance make us successful).

Finally, district and provincial-level officials should be incorporated into the entire process. Provincial-level representatives should be at all local and tribal shura meetings. When possible, the national security forces should be encouraged to conduct their own investigation of the incident to maintain governance and legitimacy.

Weapons system employment during escalation of force. Although soldiers fully comply and understand escalation of force measures, a well-placed warn-


Figure 2. Example SDZ for firing small arms, machine guns, and shotguns at a fixed ground target (40-degree SDZ in each direction from gun target line).

_____

ing shot injured an Afghan civilian during such an incident. The resultant ricochet, at no true fault of the soldier, resulted in a consequence-management process to mitigate the risks associated with the injury.

Recommendation: Units should develop weapons system effects and surface danger zone (SDZ) SOPs and periodically retrain escalation of force monthly to reaffirm TTPs and shoot/no shoot criteria; ensure units understand hostile intent; and ensure there is no ambiguity with engagement criteria and warning shots. This understanding and associated SOP/TTP is clearly important, as it mitigates risk and will actually prevent a number of consequence-management situations from occurring in the first place.

Units should develop formal tools, such as TTPs, SOPs, and battle drills for the consequence-management process. Within all kinetic and nonkinetic operations, these tools will provide the commander with potential options and unity of effort when developing the appropriate courses of action for a consequence-management incident.

Furthermore, organizations should ensure full engagement by all staff sections, as well as request support from higher headquarters, to mitigate the risks associated with an incident. As previously mentioned, this will facilitate timely and continuous engagement with the human terrain — the local populous (to include elders and tribal leadership), local/provincial political leaders, and local/provincial security leaders.

This timely and continuous engagement must come in all appropriate forms available — shuras, humanitarian aid, solatia payments, informal/formal investigations, print/radio/televised IO messages, and potentially public works projects. Once again, conditions-based actions and METT-TC play a critical role in determining the appropriate engagement strategy. Although every situation on the COIN battlefield will be different, the aforementioned lessons learned (the hard way) will undoubtedly assist in risk mitigation and positive outcomes during the consequence-management process. Most important, however, is that we treat the affected local populous with the same dignity, compassion, and respect we would show our own families and citizens.

Consequence Management Prevention: Understanding Weapon System Effects

Historic instances of unintended noncombatant injuries and deaths, as well as structural collateral damage, will occur on the COIN battlefield. These events, often the result of unintended weapons system effects, are routinely published in open-source printed or televised media and require consequence-management actions. Fortunately, proper TTPs, SOPs, and training on weapons system effects and SDZs can mitigate or even eliminate such unintended consequences.

As a result of such instances within the COIN environment of Afghanistan, 4-73 CAV developed in-theater sustainment training, modified TTPs and SOPs, and reformulated pre-mission briefs to ensure that unintended weapons system effects, such as noncombatant casualties, collateral damage, and fratricide, were mitigated during combat, logistics, and humanitarian missions.

For example, in addition to normal pre-mission operational and safety briefings, the vehicle commander briefed and reiterated the developed SOPs and TTPs associated with potential employment of weapons systems. For instance, the "40-degree rule" for small arms warning shot engagements should be a mandatory briefing for all soldiers, including those who are attached for subsequent missions. By reiterating these principles continuously,


Figure 3. Field expedient method to estimate the 711 mils (40°) for a small arms or machine gun. Estimate two open hands and add four fingers, at full arm's length, *for that side of the gun*; this will give you 725 mils, which is relatively close to 711 mils.

Direct Fire Weapon System	Rule of Thumb****
Small arms, machine guns, and shotguns firing at a fixed ground target	40° (711 mils) to each side of the gun target line
Ground or vehicle-mounted small arms	15° (267 mils) to each side of the gun target line
TOW; Improved TOW; TOW 2A; TOW 2B	47° (836 mils) to each side of the gun target line
Javelin	21° (373 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area "A" = 500m up to 1000m; slopes to 200m between 1000m-4000m
Fragmentary or high-explosive grenades	150m danger area
CS grenades	10m danger area
Smoke grenades	10m danger area
White phosphorus grenades	40m danger area
M79/M203 40mm grenade	10° (177 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area "A" and "B" both 165m
MK-19 40mm grenade	10° (177 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area "A" and "B" both 310m
M256 120mm tank cannon	40° (711 mils) to each side of the gun target line
M242 25mm BFV/CFV chain gun	55° (978 mils) to each side of the gun target line
****All data is referenced from DA PAM 385-63, *Range Safety.* Based on combat conditions/METT-TC, these rules may change.	

Figure 4

the unit mitigates risks associated with hazardous fragment escape from the maneuver box (fratricide); noncombatant casualties or collateral damage on the battlefield (negative IO); and inability to close with and destroy the enemy (unachieved effects).

Lessons Learned and Takeaways

Soldiers need to understand the SDZ to account for ricochets, bounce/skip, and splash before/after the munition hits its intended target. Through this understanding, soldiers can execute a well-placed warning shot that accounts for the danger areas associated with the munitions. An example SDZ for small-arms munitions is demonstrated in Figure 2.

However, in a combat environment, soldiers must often make split-second decisions and cannot figure out the true millimeter/angle measurements associated with SDZs. Therefore, the development of field-expedient TTPs can be used to quickly assess and mitigate the risk. For example, the hasty millimeter/angle estimation demonstrated in Figure 3 for the "40-degree rule," (which is equivalent to 711 mils) *for each side of the gun target line* is used to give soldiers an idea of the minimum safe line (MSL) for small-arms or machine guns. The hasty battle drill allows soldiers to quickly assess the risk to both friendly forces and noncombatants on the battlefield. With enough training, the 40-degree rule becomes second nature and soldiers can quickly and mentally define the placement of the warning shot with respect to the target. Figure 3 demonstrates how to calculate the millimeter in this example; similarly, a compass, or even marking the gun truck's turret with degrees/millimeters, could assist in defining the 40-degree SDZ associated with small-arms munitions.

SDZs not only apply to individual and crew-served direct fire weapons, but should be understood and taken into account for all mechanized platforms, to include the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle, launched grenades (M203 and MK19), indirect fires (artillery and mortars), close combat attack helicopters, and close air support. Furthermore, during echelonment of fires planning (suppression using both direct and indirect fires as the unit closes with the enemy), leaders need to plan for all weapons system SDZs and effects.

Developing SDZ, risk estimate distances (RED), and minimum safe distance (MSD) "cheat sheets," based on unit type, mission, and potential weapons system employment, can assist in this process. Finally, incorporating SDZ, echelonment of fires, and weapons system effects into unit operations plans, contingency operations, briefings, and rehearsals, is a necessity. Figure 4 depicts field expedient TTP examples for direct-fire weapons systems. These examples are for combat use and not for peacetime training.

For additional information, doctrinal planning requirements, and guidelines associated with weapons system employment and SDZs (to include indirect and aerial delivery systems), refer to Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-63, *Range Safety*; Training Circular 7-9, *Infantry Live-Fire Training*; and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-09.32, *JFIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower*.[1]

Clearly, improper or unforeseen weapons system effects will occur on the COIN battlefield and lead to unintended consequences. However, every unit has the ability to mitigate these risks through the development and execution of appropriate training, SOPs, and TTPs related to weapons system effects and SDZs. While the aforementioned insights and observations were learned the "hard way" in Afghanistan's COIN environment, future units can use these principles to reduce the potential of negative effects on any COIN battlefield.

By following these simple principles, units can successfully employ firepower and eliminate the unforeseen, negative consequences associated with a misunderstanding of weapons system effects. As commissioned and noncommissioned leaders, we owe these SOPs and TTPs to our soldiers, and more importantly, to the local populous whose lives we potential-ly affect by improperly employing direct, indirect, and aerial weapons platforms.

Notes

[1]Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Pamphlet 385-63, *Range Safety*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 10 April 2003; Headquarters, DA, Training Circular 7-9, *Infantry Live-Fire Training*, GPO, Washington, DC, 30 September 1993; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-09.32, *JFIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower*, GPO, Washington, DC, October 2004.

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Hunter–Killer Teams

by Major Mark J. Aitken

The deployment of reconnaissance squadrons and employment of organic cavalry troops to combat operations throughout Iraq in support of the infantry brigade combat team illustrate the importance of synchronization between reconnaissance and killer forces. This synchronization of forces is not a new or novel concept, but actually a tried and true, and extremely successful, tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) used by armored and cavalry forces for many years. The "hunter-killer" team concept was tested and perfected during countless rotations in the deserts of Fort Irwin, California, and then successfully employed in the Fulda Gap of Germany, liberation of Kuwait, and most recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The officers and troopers of the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry (Recon), 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, adopted this technique as they patrolled and secured the Multi-National Corps-Iraq's main supply route (MSR), Route Tampa, southwest of Baghdad. This route was used daily by military and contractor convoys, as well as a high volume of civilian traffic. The squadron was responsible for securing a large portion of MSR Tampa, which included three tier 1 im-

provised explosive device (IED) sites and two tier 2 sites. A tier 1 IED site is identified by a significant number of IED events in a 1-kilometer radius over a 30-day period, and a tier 2 site is a lesser number of IED events using the same criteria.

Reducing IED emplacement was our first priority, which included directing all lethal targeting efforts against the insurgent cell, including financiers, bomb makers, and transport personnel. Our second priority was to conduct direct action operations against actual IED emplacers. These tactics, while separate and distinct, ultimately combined to reduce violence throughout south Baghdad. As scouts, we tend to ignore the things we cannot immediately see or impact, and revert to our default mode of taking the fight to the enemy we can see, like insurgents emplacing IEDs. Therefore, as the war entered its 4th year, we had to develop new innovative techniques and recycle old TTP to capture or kill insurgents in our areas of operation.

We initially conducted a thorough mission analysis, which focused on enemy activity and highlighted prime IED emplacement times and preferred locations. Additionally, our S2 conducted a com-

prehensive terrain analysis, focusing primarily on the terrain, supporting tier 1 and 2 sites, as well as the line of sight (LOS) that enabled the insurgent "trigger man" to target coalition convoys while maintaining the freedom of movement to escape immediately after the attack. Our initial course of action was to establish a combination of mounted and dismounted observation posts (OP) to confirm or deny enemy activity in an effort to disrupt their operations. While initially successful, these "old school" techniques quickly proved ineffective as insurgents quickly adapted their operations to avoid frequently used OP positions. We attempted several other techniques, including counter-mobility obstacles, unmanned aerial vehicle coverage, ground sensors, and countless other techniques, each with some limited success. We finally decided to use a combination of mounted and dismounted OP locations, coupled with dismounted ambush and hide positions — the light cavalry version of the hunter-killer team.

The squadron commander assigned the task of capturing or killing IED emplacers in the vicinity of the "mixing bowl" to C Troop (Crazyhorse). The operation

developed by the C Troop commander required the employment of three platoons, each with a separate and distinct task purpose: the first scout platoon (main effort), the "killer" element, was to establish three dismounted subsurface hide/ambush positions on the most likely insurgent avenue of approach; the second scout platoon (supporting the first platoon), the "hunter" element, was to establish a combination of mounted and dismounted OPs overwatching the target area of interest (TAI); and the third scout platoon (supporting the second platoon) was to conduct routine mounted patrols in the vicinity of the operation, while reinforcing both the main and supporting effort platoons as its secondary task, as shown in Figure 1.

Selecting dismounted ambush positions is critical to the success of the operation, thus it is imperative to integrate the squadron/battalion S2 into the planning process and provide timely accurate enemy and environmental information, which should include, at a minimum, the following information:

- Insurgent pattern analysis.
- "Rat lines," or trails, that feed the IED site.
- Line of sight products (OP to TAI, ambush position to engagement area).
- Light and weather data.
- Photos of known insurgents.

Once the ambush positions were selected and plotted, the platoon leader conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the tentative positions, using caution to avoid alerting the local populace or insurgency to possible future operations. The platoon leader's primary goal was to finalize the exact location, determine resource requirements, and develop an accurate time estimate for the dismounts to covertly prepare and occupy OP positions.

The success of the operation hinged on the successful covert insertion of the ambush positions, which C Troop was extremely successful at accomplishing! This task can be accomplished several ways, but C Troop infiltrated their OPs when MSR Tampa was shut down to traffic as a result of a possible IED. This enabled C Troop to seal off the route to mounted traffic and enabled the dismounted elements to move into position and establish their ambush positions. Simultaneously, the mounted OP platoon established their positions overwatching the TAI. Once all positions were established, the route was reopened and traffic moved freely.

Once established, the length and duration of the operation was determined by the ability of the ambush positions to remain covert and undetected, a function based on the stamina of the dismounted elements. Accordingly, only the most disciplined and technically proficient troopers were selected to man the ambush positions because it requires self-discipline, commitment, and training to remain undetected for extended periods of time. The key to the operation was clearly patience. As in any defensive position, the team leader completed a sector sketch, established communications, and developed courses of action for all contingencies, all of which were well thought out and rehearsed prior to occupation. The ambush team leader maintained constant communication with the mounted OP element, who kept them informed of movement in their vicinity.

During C Troop's operation, the mounted OP platoon observed both vehicular and foot traffic in the vicinity of the ambush positions for nearly 36 hours. Prior to first light on the second day, the OP element observed two unidentified individuals moving north in the vicinity of ambush position two. The two suspected insurgents were attempting to move covertly by using the terrain for cover and concealment. The OP element tracked their movement for several minutes, while simultaneously alerting the ambush element of possible activity in their area.

The decision to execute a lethal ambush, or to apprehend the suspected insurgents, was made by the overwatch element, as they had the best vantage point from which to positively identify weapons. The insurgents continued their covert movement north, approaching to within 10 meters of the ambush position. It was precisely at this moment that the team leader executed a perfectly timed assault and apprehended the suspects. Once the suspected insurgents were secured and searched, it was determined that they were moving weapons to establish a user-level cache


Figure 1

"...the first scout platoon (main effort), the "killer" element, was to establish three dismounted sub-surface hide/ambush positions on the most likely insurgent avenue of approach; the second scout platoon (supporting the first platoon), the "hunter" element, was to establish a combination of mounted and dismounted OPs overwatching the target area of interest (TAI); and the third scout platoon (supporting the second platoon) was to conduct routine mounted patrols in the vicinity of the operation, while reinforcing both the main and supporting effort platoons as its secondary task..."

in place and report on activities within the TAI for the remainder of the operation. No further activity was reported or observed for the next 24 hours.

This operation, as well as many others in our area of operation, illustrates that cavalry TTP can be used effectively in a counterinsurgency environment. Integrating and synchronizing mounted and dismounted elements provides outstanding results, which we applied throughout our areas of operation.

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
north of MSR Tampa. The insurgents were captured with several AK-47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers with warheads.

During the execution of the ambush, the quick reaction force (QRF) platoon moved in to support and reinforce the

ambush positions, and assisted in evacuating and moving the detainees to the squadron's detainee holding area. The troop commander then had to make a decision whether to continue the operation or withdraw his forces. The troop commander made the decision to withdraw the remaining ambush position, but directed the mounted OP element to remain

"Reducing IED emplacement was our first priority, which included directing all lethal targeting efforts against the insurgent cell, including financiers, bomb makers, and transport personnel. Our second priority was to conduct direct action operations against the actual IED emplacers."

The Battle of An Nasiriyah

The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Team in Urban Operations

by Captain Steven M. Sutey, U.S. Marine Corps

On 23 March 2003, the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) attacked to seize a corridor through the Iraqi city of An Nasiriyah to create a second axis of advance for the 1st Marine Division as it attacked north toward Baghdad.[1] Intelligence estimations forecasted an attack in name only; multiple sources predicted a jubilant welcome by the local population and the mass capitulation of Iraqi forces near the city. In spite of these optimistic intelligence reports, An Nasiriyah became a fiercely contested urban battleground, making 23 March one of the bloodiest days in Iraq. This article examines the battle at the battalion and company levels to identify the relationship between key moments in the fight. While this brief account cannot begin to provide the necessary critical analysis of the battle, it is however intended to provoke professional discussion and encourage further study of this complex and confusing urban operation.

An Nasiriyah is a sprawling city of more than 250,000 residents occupying approximately 10 square kilometers in southern Iraq. The city's core is wedged between the Euphrates River to its south and the narrower Saddam Canal to its north. A modern four-lane highway, Highway 7, runs north through the eastern portion of the city toward Al Kut and provides one of only two improved crossing sites of the Euphrates River in southeastern Iraq. The other site is in a less populated area several miles west of the city where Highway 1 crosses the river and heads north to Baghdad.

First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) planners identified the strategic importance of An Nasiriyah, but wanted to avoid urban combat in the early stages of the war by sending its 1st Marine Division across the Euphrates River at the Highway 1 bridge as it advanced from the Rumaylah oil fields toward Baghdad. The division commander, on the other hand, believed that limiting the division to a single axis of advance would create a chokepoint at the western bridge and slow down his rate of advance. Seizing a corridor through An Nasiriyah would open up a second axis and allow the general to protect the right flank of his main effort by fixing the Baghdad infantry division in their defensive positions around Kut with one of his regimental combat teams (RCT).[2]

The 2d MEB was a latecomer to the An Nasiriyah mission. Originally comprised of just two infantry battalions and tasked with rear security in southern Iraq, the brigade commander championed for a more active part in the invasion for his Camp Lejeune-based Marines. Changes to the war plan in the months immediately preceding the invasion gave the 2d MEB a more prominent role in support of the 1st Marine Division's advance near An Nasiriyah. Re-designated Task Force (TF) Tarawa, the MEB was now to travel north and conduct a relief in place with the U.S. Army's 3d Infantry Division (3ID) at the western Euphrates bridge.[3] The job of securing the eastern crossing sites remained a "be prepared to mission," which the task force commander was eager to execute.

TF Tarawa made an early morning crossing into Iraq on 21 March and moved unimpeded between 3ID and the 1st Marine Division to the Jalibah airfield south of An Nasiriyah. Bolstered by an additional infantry battalion, TF Tarawa now had a full RCT as its ground combat element. Still, RCT-2 was not as robust as its 1st Marine Division counterparts. The Marine Corps assigned the majority of its armored vehicles to the three RCTs headed for Baghdad, leaving RCT-2 with only enough amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) to transport one battalion into battle. The remaining two battalions traveled across the desert in unarmored 7-ton

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trucks. A platoon of light armored vehicles (LAV-25) and a company of M1 Abrams tanks from a Fort Knox-based Marine Corps reserve unit rounded out the task force. The RCT-2 commander attached the tank company and AAVs to his first battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (1/2). The remaining two battalions, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (2/8) and 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (3/2), became motorized units.[4]

The TF commander accounted for this lack of armor in his plan. The LAV platoon and one motorized battalion were to rapidly move north and conduct the relief-in-place mission with 3ID. The mechanized battalion and remaining motorized battalion would defend in sector south of the city to prevent interference with the forward passage of the 1st Marine Division. In the event the "be prepared to mission" was executed, the mechanized battalion would attack to secure the two eastern bridges then defend north of the city. The motorized battalions would then seize the Highway 7 corridor and pass forward RCT-1 through An Nasiriyah.[5]

The 2d MEB received its mission on the evening of 22 March. The RCT-2 commander and his operations officer arrived at TF Tarawa's headquarters around 2030 hours to receive an update on the relief in place, which was scheduled for 0430 hours the next morning. "We got the bridges," the 2d MEB commander announced, referring to the eastern Nasiriyah spans.[6]

The "be prepared to mission" was now real; TF Tarawa became the MEF main effort at 0600 hours the next day with orders to seize a corridor through the city between 0700 and 1000 hours local time and pass forward RCT-1.[7] The RCT-2 operations officer issued a verbal order over the radio to move 1/2 and 2/8 forward in preparation for the morning's attack and then sped along Highway 1 with his commander to coordinate the relief in place between 3/2 and 3ID at the western bridge. These instructions seemed to confirm the earlier relief-in-place and defense-in-sector missions; however, the mission to attack and seize the corridor between 0700 and 1000 hours was never relayed to the battalion commanders.

RCT-2's mechanized battalion reached its predetermined location by 0600 hours on 23 March and received permission to move forward a few kilometers to a better position. With the tank company in the lead, 1/2 encountered unexpected resistance in the form of sporadic mortar and small-arms fire as it advanced. Still under the impression that the mission was to defend in sector, the tank company engaged several machine gun positions and adjusted indirect fire while the rifle companies cleared potential ambush sites along either side of Highway 7. In the midst of the fighting, a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) sped south along the highway and came to a halt in the middle of 1/2's tanks.

Sometime before dawn on 23 March, a small convoy of HMMWVs, 5-ton trucks, and heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) passed forward of the Marines defending along Highway 7. The 507th Maintenance Company, a U.S. Army Patriot missile repair unit, made a critical navigation error and continued north along Highway 7 through An Nasiriyah. Realizing their mistake only after crossing the Saddam Canal, the convoy turned around and headed back the way they came. This time, the Iraqis were ready for them. The ensuing ambush killed 11 of the 33 soldiers in the convoy and wounded at least 9. An additional seven soldiers were taken prisoner when they surrendered to Iraqi forces.[8] The HMMWV now halted at 1/2's position belonged to the unit's panicked commander who fled the ambush scene in search of help. It was now approximately 0730 hours, 30 minutes after the attack to seize the corridor was meant to begin.

Realizing that U.S. soldiers to his front were in need of help, the tank company commander relayed the bizarre situation to the battalion commander and then led his company north in search of survivors. The tanks located the remnants of the 507th Maintenance Company and, using rotary-wing close air support (CAS) to suppress the enemy, loaded ten soldiers into two AAVs and returned to 1/2's lines. The rescue was a success, but the mission took precious time and the tanks, already low on fuel, needed to refuel. Still unaware of the mission to seize the bridges, the battalion commander ordered the tanks to the rear.

The rescue operation was complete at approximately 1000 hours, the no-later-than time for TF Tarawa to seize the eastern corridor through An Nasiriyah. RCT-2's mechanized battalion was still defending in sector more than 10 kilometers south of the Euphrates River and elements of RCT-1 were beginning to arrive on the scene expecting to pass through the city. The 2d MEB commander, impatient with the delay, flew forward to confer with the RCT-2 commander and the 1/2 Battalion commander in person. The disconnect between the MEB and RCT staffs was readily apparent; the RCT-2 commander thought the battalion commander was doing a fine job adhering to his systematic plan of clearing the highway south of the city — the MEB commander thought otherwise. Pulling the battalion commander aside and addressing him personally, the MEB commander expressed the urgency of the situation: "I need you to get up there and seize the bridges by 1500 hours today. I don't need you clearing houses."[9]

The general wanted the bridges secured and he wanted it done fast. Further emphasizing the need for immediate action, the regimental executive officer contacted the 1/2 Battalion commander over the radio and told him that a company from 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance (2d LAR, the vanguard for RCT-1) was headed his way and would take the bridges if his battalion did not. The frustrated 1/2 Battalion commander got on his net and addressed his company commanders: "If we don't take those bridges now, regiment will give our mission to LAR…it will be a cold day in hell before I allow regiment to send a LAR company to assume our mission, especially when Barbarian 6 (the LAR battalion commander) has had no time to plan or prep for this task like we have! Now press hard for those damn bridges."[10]

The Marines of 1/2 had indeed prepared for this moment months in advance. Their battalion commander's original plan intended to maximize the shock value of armor by having the attached company of tanks lead the assault. One mechanized company would hold the Euphrates River bridge from the far bank of the river while the remainder of the battalion executed a sharp right turn and then continued on to the Saddam Canal bridge using the less populated area east of the city's core. This maneuver avoided the stretch of Highway 7 that ran straight through the city, a danger area dubbed "ambush alley" by task force planners long before the 507th Maintenance Company's incident. The plan looked perfect on a map, but the morning's attack was far from perfect.

The 1/2 Battalion's tank company was refueling far to the rear when the 2d MEB commander ordered them to commence the attack. Problems with the single pump at the refueling station required the tanks to gravity feed, a process that would take more than an hour to refuel each tank. The general made it clear that there was no time to wait, the assault must commence immediately. The 1/2 Battalion commander mustered a platoon of tanks to lead the assault while his anti-armor forces engaged a handful of T-55s south of the Euphrates River bridge. The platoon was far less than the 14 tanks originally planned for, but the shortage was not deemed critical enough to delay the attack any further. The 1/2 Battalion commenced its assault around noon, with the tank platoon in the lead, followed by the mechanized columns from A, B, and C companies.

The old axiom that no plan survives first contact proved to be more than a hack-

"The division commander, on the other hand, believed that limiting the division to a single axis of advance would create a chokepoint at the western bridge and slow down his rate of advance. Seizing a corridor through An Nasiriyah would open up a second axis and allow the general to protect the right flank of his main effort by fixing the Baghdad infantry division in their defensive positions around Kut with one of his regimental combat team."

neyed maxim in the battle of An Nasiriyah. The 1/2 Battalion's lead element made it across the Euphrates River bridge without incident and assaulted along the eastern portion of the city. The tanks and B Company began to fan out into some open terrain when their attack was brought to an abrupt halt. The maneuver space that appeared so appealing on maps and satellite imagery was in fact a drainage area for the city's sewage. Three tanks, three B Company AAVs, two anti-armor vehicles, and the battalion commander's AAV quickly broke through the deceivingly thin layer of earth on top of the sewage and became mired in the disgusting mess. A tank retriever also got stuck as it tried unsuccessfully to extract the immobilized vehicles.

Back at the Euphrates River bridge, A Company occupied the northern side of the bridge under heavy, but inaccurate, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms fire as C Company moved forward. C Company was meant to follow B Company to the east and secure the Saddam Canal bridge while the tanks and B Company supported by fire. However, as C Company crested the Euphrates River bridge, there was no sign of B Company or the command element. Unable to locate B Company, C Company's commander incorrectly assumed that the lead element had skipped the maneuver to the east and attacked straight up Highway 7 to the northern bridge. With two mechanized companies bunched up in an increasingly contested piece of terrain, C

Company's commander decided to deviate from the original plan and advance through "ambush alley" and take the northern bridge by the most direct route.[11] Although in keeping with the commander's intent to rapidly secure the bridges, this decision would have unfortunate consequences for the men of C Company.

C Company's AAVs raced through ambush alley at over 40 mph, making it difficult for Iraqi gunners to target the boxy amphibious vehicles. Their speed also made it difficult for vehicle crews to provide accurate suppressive fires from the 40mm grenade launchers and .50-caliber machine guns mounted in the AAVs' "up-gun" turret system. The company almost reached their objective unscathed; however, as the last vehicle approached the Saddam Canal, an RPG pierced the thin armor, damaging the vehicle and severely wounding the Marines inside.[12] The AAV limped across the bridge and came to a rest on the far side of the canal. C Company had accomplished its mission, but now had casualties that required urgent medical attention.

These initial casualties were just the beginning of the company's problems. An Nasiriyah's defenders, expecting an airborne or helicopter assault to seize the bridges, built an engagement area north of the Saddam Canal to trap invaders. C Company, unsupported by heavy armor, halted in the preplanned kill zone. Within minutes of their arrival, mortar and artillery fire bracketed the mechanized com-

"A platoon of light armored vehicles (LAV-25) and a company of M1 Abrams tanks from a Fort Knox-based Marine Corps reserve unit rounded out the task force. The RCT-2 commander attached the tank company and AAVs to his first battalion, 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (1/2). The remaining two battalions, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (2/8) and 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (3/2), became motorized units."

pany while small-arms fire poured in from all sides. The company's organic 60mm mortar section immediately began suppressing the enemy, but the fires from its three small mortar tubes were no match for the Iraqi gunners.

Communications troubles limited the fire support team's (FiST) ability to respond with 81mm mortars or artillery. The company was also without a forward air controller (FAC) to direct CAS; the FiST leader forgot to pick up A Company's FAC during the initial excitement at the Euphrates River bridge.[13] The lopsided indirect fire exchange began to exact a heavy toll on C Company within minutes of crossing the Saddam Canal. An exploding mortar round knocked out one of the 60mm mortars, killing the platoon sergeant, severely wounding the FiST leader, and forcing the remaining two tubes to displace. The team's artillery forward observer was also killed as he directed counter-battery fires from the 155-mm howitzer battery supporting the task force. C Company was in desperate need of support, if it was to hold the Saddam Canal bridge.

As work continued back at B Company's position to free the stuck vehicles, the 1/2 Battalion commander ordered the company commander to take whatever elements he could and head for the canal bridge. The battalion commander and his operations officer, unable to communicate with either the forward command post (CP) or the main CP south of the city, moved with B Company to a position that afforded better control of the deteriorating situation. The battalion's radios were alive with chatter as the battle developed, but many key personnel, including most of the battalion staff, could not communicate due to line-of-sight obstructions and electromagnetic interference from nearby high-tension power lines. C Company managed to get a brief transmission through to the battalion commander to inform him the canal bridge was secure. Unfortunately, the battalion air officer, fire support coordinator, and B Company commander and his forward air controller did not monitor the transmission. These key personnel were still operating under the assumption that B Company was the lead element and C Company was somewhere to the rear.

The wounded piled up at C Company's casualty collection point north of the Saddam Canal. The C Company commander determined that evacuating the casualties by helicopter was too risky due to the heavy volume of enemy fire, but without immediate surgical attention, several of the casualties would likely die. One AAV crew took matters into their own hands and sped south through ambush alley to evacuate four urgent casualties. This first AAV took advantage of the element of surprise and reached an aid station south of the Euphrates River bridge without incident. Subsequent attempts were not so fortunate. More casualties were loaded into AAVs and prepared to race back through ambush alley. In the confusion of battle, some Marines mistook these actions as a signal that the company was withdrawing and joined the column. A total of five AAVs lined up on Highway 7 and pointed south. Unable to reach the vehicles by radio to halt their movement, the company commander watched in disbelief as nearly half his remaining combat power headed away from the fight.

As the column of AAVs lined up on Highway 7, a pair of Pennsylvania Air National Guard A-10 attack aircraft circled above An Nasiriyah. The battalion air officer, still experiencing communications difficulties and unable to request air support, managed to raise the B Company FAC and told him to transmit a request for immediate air support over an uncovered emergency frequency. The two A-10s responded to the FAC's request and quickly established visual contact with B Company in the eastern portion of the city. The A-10s also reported a large concentration of vehicles north of the Saddam Canal and requested permission to engage. The FAC still believed that B Com-

pany was the lead element for the battalion and interpreted the report as enemy activity. The FAC was in no position to observe the attacking aircraft, much less their target of choice. Unable to communicate with both the fire support center and the battalion commander, the FAC decided to use type III control and cleared the A-10s to attack. Type III is the least restrictive control method for CAS and is not commonly used by the Marine Corps. Before the battle, the 1/2 Battalion commander specifically forbade the use of type III CAS without his approval due to the high risk of fratricide.

The A-10s made several strafing runs on C Company. The Marine Corps traditionally marks it vehicles with large orange panels to aid in identification from the air, but these were replaced before the war with more modern thermal imagery panels. The A-10s lacked the technology to observe the thermal panels and were unable to identify the AAVs as friendly vehicles from the air. Thinking the column of AAVs headed south into the city was an enemy counterattack, the A-10s rolled in again and fired three Maverick missiles at the vehicles.

The five AAVs came under simultaneous attack by a torrent of enemy mortars, RPGs, and missiles from the A-10s as they crossed the Saddam Canal bridge. The lead vehicle was damaged, but managed to limp through the city before it was destroyed by several direct RPG hits within sight of A Company's lines at the southern bridge. The second vehicle in the column became a catastrophic kill almost as soon as it started moving, only the driver and vehicle commander survived. A third AAV became a mobility kill and stranded its passengers in the middle of ambush alley. The remaining two vehicles rescued a few of the survivors and managed to make it back safely to the protection of A Company's position. Several official investigations into the friendly fire incident conducted after the battle were unable to identify conclusively the effects of the A-10 attack due to the simultaneous engagement of C Company by the enemy.[14] Whatever the causes, the results were indisputable at the time: the attempt to evacuate C Company's casualties was a disaster. The company commander was left with little more than a platoon to maintain the tenuous foothold north of the canal and dozens of his men were dead, wounded, or missing.

The tank company commander sensed the precarious nature of the situation after witnessing the surviving AAVs offload their casualties. Refueled at this point and supporting the heavily engaged A Company at the Euphrates River bridge, the tank company commander led two M1s

forward to reinforce the northern bridge. The tide started to turn in C Company's favor with the arrival of the tanks north of the canal. The main gun and coaxial machine gun fire from the two tanks quickly silenced enemy gun positions and relieved the pressure on the small force. The A Company commander, satisfied that the southern bridge was secure and eager to reinforce his peer to the north, violated his orders to remain at the Euphrates River bridge until relieved by 2/8 Battalion and moved out. Supported with tanks, rotary wing CAS, and indirect fire, Company A sped through ambush alley without incident. The remainder of the battalion joined them a short while later and by 1430 hours, the majority of 1/2 Battalion was consolidated north of the Saddam Canal.

The motorized 2/8 re-secured the Euphrates River bridge after a brief firefight, and by nightfall on 23 March, the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah were firmly in the hands of the Marines. With RCT-2's third battalion, 3/2, still in possession of the Highway 1 bridge west of the city, TF Tarawa held only three pieces of key terrain; the problem of ambush alley persisted and the mission to seize a corridor through An Nasiriyah remained unfinished. That night, RCT-1's armored reconnaissance battalion negotiated the route under cover of darkness and established a defensive perimeter 10 miles north of the city, awaiting the remainder of the regiment. The following night, a mechanized battalion from RCT-1 seized the stretch of highway between the bridges and finally secured the contested route through the city. RCT-1 was forward of TF Tarawa and on its way to Kut by dawn.

TF Tarawa began the tedious task of clearing the city on 25 March. Although some resistance remained, the battle for An Nasiriyah was over. In the final accounting, 33 Americans lost their lives during the operation; more than half of which belonged to C Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.

The battle of An Nasiriyah is one of the few modern examples of U.S. forces engaged in large-scale urban operations in a nonpermissive environment. Although well documented, most of the existing work focuses on individual participants and lacks objectivity. The shortage of impartial commentary on the interplay of key events and decisions during the battle detracts from the valuable lessons An Nasiriyah has to offer.[15] The controversies of the day stem from the complexity, confusion, and disorder inherent in urban combat. A determined enemy, the timeless elements of friction, and the fog of war also contributed greatly to the events of the battle. The attack to seize a

corridor through An Nasiriyah was far from a textbook operation, but it is precisely this quality that makes knowledge of the battle so valuable to the military professional.

Notes

[1]A Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is a scaleable crisis response force. Larger than the Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that regularly deploy aboard naval ships, and smaller than the Marine expeditionary force, a MEB is ideally suited for independent missions requiring self-sustainment for up to 60 days. The assistant division commander commands the MEB and its usual ground combat element is a reinforced infantry regiment.

[2]A regimental combat team (RCT) is a task organized infantry regiment. In addition to its three organic infantry battalions, an RCT usually adds a company each of tanks, amphibious assault vehicles (enough to transport the entire regiment), and engineers. Additional assets are added or substituted as required. An artillery battalion normally provides direct support to an RCT.

[3]Richard S. Lowry, *Marines in the Garden of Eden*, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2006, p. 7.

[4]The organic 2d Battalion from RCT-2 was deployed with a Marine expeditionary unit during the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. To provide the 2d MEB with a complete RCT, the 2d Battalion from the 8th Marine Regiment was attached to RCT-2. This commingling of battalions is not uncommon in the Marine Corps.

[5]Karl C. Rohr, "Fighting through the Fog of War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, available on line at *http://www.mca-marines. org/Gazette/2006/06rohr.html*, June 2006.

[6]Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, Pantheon Books, New York, 2006, p. 235.

[7]Lowery, p. 120.

[8]United States Army, "Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq," Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2003, p. 3.

[9]Gordon, p. 242.

[10]Personal email from LtCol Grabowski (1/2 Battalion commander) to Richard Lowry as cited in *Marines in the Garden of Eden*, p. 154.

[11]Company commanders of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, "The Battle of An Nasiriyah," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2003, p. 40.

[12]Enhanced appliqué armor kits are available for the AAVs to augment the armor protection provided by the vehicle's thin aluminum hull. TF Tarawa's AAVs were not equipped with these kits during the battle.

[13]Gordon, p. 246.

[14]United States Central Command, "Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03," Central Command Headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, 2004.

[15]The author's own objectivity bears mention at this point. As a minor participant with RCT-1 during the battle, the author has firsthand knowledge of some events as they unfolded or as they were interpreted at the time. Throughout the article, the author attempted to avoid bias by balancing personal experiences with additional primary and secondary sources to achieve a more accurate picture of events. That said, bias is an inherent part of every piece of written work and must be considered when contemplating this article.

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Small-Unit Kill Teams

by First Lieutenant Ken Segelhorst

About 80 percent of U.S. soldier deaths in Iraq are caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The U.S. Army has employed various preventive measures to reduce IED damage on the battlefield: military vehicles are equipped with jamming devices that prevent remote IED detonation; engineer patrols clear debris and vegetation from heavily traveled supply routes, which assists convoys in identifying possible roadside bombs; explosive ordnance disposal teams conduct route clearance in heavily armored vehicles specifically designed to counter mines and roadside bombs; additional armor is continuously being added to vehicles; and new mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles are being fielded to help defeat newer and deadlier explosive devices.

While these defensive measures provide increased survivability against IEDs, they are reactionary in nature and designed to help avoid and defeat IEDs, rather than destroy or neutralize those who put them to use. Only through a combined effort of passive defensive measures and aggressive dedicated IED interdiction operations can we effectively work to neutralize the threat of IEDs in the contemporary operating environment.

Small-Unit Kill Teams

One method of bringing the fight to the enemy is to employ small-unit kill teams along main supply routes (MSR) and alternate supply routes (ASR) where enemy activity is most prevalent. Small-unit kill teams use stealth, camouflage, and patience to deliver discriminatory and highly accurate fires against enemy targets, specifically IED emplacers. Operating along supply routes in rural Iraq, small-unit kill teams have proven capable of effectively identifying and eliminating enemy targets at distances up to 1,000 meters.

While similar to snipers, small-unit kill teams differentiate from traditional sniper teams on two levels: manpower and firepower. A traditional sniper team operates using a two-man team, consisting of one shooter and one spotter. A kill team generally operates in at least a four-man element: designated marksman, spotter, radio telephone operator (RTO), and machine gunner. The designated marksman is responsible for taking discriminatory and accurate shots on isolated enemy targets. The spotter acts as the kill team's leader and is responsible for identifying targets and directing each member of the team to destroy them. The RTO is responsible for maintaining communications with higher echelons and providing additional security when not directly involved with radio operations. The machine gunner provides the element with additional firepower. His primary task is to provide the team with overwhelming fire superiority in the event of compromise; however, he may also provide additional firepower on the target area, if deemed necessary by the kill team's leader. The additional personnel and firepower aid in increasing the team's security and sustainability beyond that of a traditional sniper team, allowing them to operate independently for extended periods of time without relief.

and IED Interdiction

Small-unit kill team operations are best conducted at the platoon level. The platoon is divided into 1, 2, or 3 four-man kill teams and a mounted element. Multiple teams can either be tasked with the same target area for increased observation and depth, or can each be assigned a different target area along the same route to broaden the platoon's area of operation. The mounted element provides a platform for insertion and extraction, as well as a quick reaction force in the event a team is compromised. The mounted element may also move forward to investigate suspicious activity that does not meet the kill team's rules of engagement (ROE). The platoon leader must position the mounted element close enough to his teams to maintain effective communications and rapid support, concurrently ensuring his vehicle positions do not deter enemy activity on the target area, spoiling potential targets for the kill team.

Planning and Preparations

The planning phase of any operation is critical to mission success. Detailed planning of each phase of the operation is necessary to avoid potential disaster. This cannot be overemphasized for kill team operations due to the small size of operating elements and increased risk of fratricide due to uninformed friendly forces traveling routes the teams observe. For small-unit kill team operations, meticulous planning, coordination, and preparations are required to mitigate risks and facilitate a well-orchestrated and precisely executed operation.

The first step in planning a kill team operation is to determine the target area. The target area must not be selected arbitrarily; intelligence drives maneuver. All available intelligence sources should be pooled to determine the most probable location for upcoming IED activity. By tracking the location of recent IED strikes, patterns of insurgent activity can often be identified. A special computer program was developed for this very purpose; its software can help predict the location and time of upcoming IED strikes several weeks out, making it an invaluable tool when planning IED interdiction operations of any nature.

Upon determining the target area, kill teams must next identify suitable locations from which to observe. Survivability is essential — surveillance sites should provide good cover and excellent concealment. The site should be far enough from the target area to provide the team with stand-off, but close enough to effectively engage targets with the team's weapons systems. The site must also provide sufficient egress routes and subsequent positions should the team need to break contact. The most important factor in site selection is the ability to observe the target area. Even the most survivable site is useless, if the team cannot observe and engage the target from within the surveillance site.

A reconnaissance should always be conducted prior to a team committing to a surveillance site. While maps, imagery, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) footage can provide useful information pertaining to a site, there is no sub-

stitute for a thorough reconnaissance performed by the soldiers conducting the operation. While a mounted reconnaissance can often be disguised as an ordinary patrol, it is important to conduct the recon several days prior to the kill team operation to prevent compromising potential surveillance sites. While conducting the reconnaissance, each element focuses on its portion of the operation; however, all personnel should know their counterpart's role. At a minimum, each soldier should know the locations of the surveillance sites, vehicle hide, and the actions taken by each element in the event of enemy contact.

The kill team's primary focus during the reconnaissance is to locate suitable surveillance sites. When testing a site, the team should observe the target area from the same elevation as they will be observing during the actual mission. Even small changes in elevation can make a huge difference in observation and fields of fire when conducting long-range surveillance. For example, a team may be able to observe a target area while standing at their proposed site, but when observing from the prone or dug-in position at the same location, the team's observation may be severely hindered due to terrain or obstacles. Often man-made features, such as abandoned buildings or ruins, provide the most suitable locations; however, teams must be prepared to use or improve on natural positions should the situation dictate. Whether using a man-made or nature-made site, teams must look for evidence of nearby personnel, vehicle, and animal activity that could potentially compromise the team.

In addition to transporting the kill teams to potential surveillance sites, the mounted element must conduct reconnaissance on its area of responsibility of the operation. The mounted element must recon insertion and extraction routes to the detrucking and pickup points selected by the kill teams. The element must identify holding areas near the detrucking point to remain near the teams and provide rapid support should a team be compromised during infiltration to its surveillance site. The mount-

ed element should also locate a vehicle hide that offers good communications between both the proposed surveillance sites and the company command post. From this vehicle hide, the mounted element must have planned routes to the target area, as well as the surveillance sites to quickly respond to any scenario.

Once these key locations are selected, the platoon leadership can coordinate with local friendly forces. In addition to assisting with target-area selection, the battalion S2 can often provide additional intelligence information pertaining to the mission, including updated be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) lists, black lists, and weather and light data. The platoon should also request UAV flights over both the target area and surveillance sites early on the night of insertion. The UAV's thermal imaging can be used to ensure the area is devoid of squatters, herders, and other nomadic personnel that could compromise the team during infiltration.

As kill teams can be easily mistaken for IED triggermen, additional coordination is required to reduce the risk of fratricide. Adjacent units and the battalion battle staff should be briefed on the location and duration of each operation. It is extremely difficult to coordinate with combat logistics patrols (CLPs); however, by placing a friendly observation post icon on the Blue Force Tracker, the platoon leader can mark the locations of his teams for all friendly patrols passing through the target area. Coordination should be made with attack aviation units, not only to prevent potential fratricide, but to provide additional surveillance and firepower capabilities to the teams, if needed. Teams should know the call signs and frequencies of supporting aviation assets; while aviators should be aware of the general location of all platoon elements, and the means of marking friendly positions during day and night.

After the coordination process has been completed, the platoon leaders can complete the plan. While planning for a kill team operation is similar to planning for any other mission, there are some areas that must receive special emphasis. The communica-

tions plan is essential. Communications windows should be established, providing designated times for the kill teams to call situation reports (SITREPs) back to the mounted element. For short duration operations, this method may be conducted hourly, with one kill team reporting at the top of the hour while the other reports at the bottom. For longer operations, times should be extended to approximately every four to six hours, instead of hourly. While teams can switch radios to "standby" between windows to save on battery life, the mounted element must continuously monitor all team nets to ensure any communications made outside commo windows are heard. All communications should initiate from the surveillance sites, which prevents incoming transmissions from compromising the team if indigenous personnel are near the surveillance site.

Kill teams should be equipped with at least two long-range radio systems, a primary and an alternate. While the PRC-119 advanced system improvement program (ASIP) can be used to achieve this requirement; the PRC-117 with its higher power output, wider frequency range, and tactical satellite (TACSAT) capability provides the kill teams with a more powerful and versatile system. The PRC-148 multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR) provides the kill team with team internal communications over secure nets and can act as the team's contingent communications system. A satellite phone or local cell phone, while unsecure, can act as the emergency system if all others fail. Even though teams are equipped with redundant communications systems, a detailed "no commo plan" should be developed. The plan should describe, in detail, the actions taken by both the kill team and the mounted element if commo windows are missed.

A compromise plan must also be developed; however, it is important to note that a compromise will not always constitute mission abort criteria. There are two types of compromise: hard and soft. A hard compromise immediately places the team in an increased state of danger and threatens mission accomplishment. For example, a herder who stumbles on a surveillance site and immediately begins making calls on his cell phone would constitute a hard compromise. Two young children who see the site while playing games and simply continue to play without much reaction would be a soft compromise. While their spotting of the site increases the risk to the team, there is still a good chance of mission accomplishment. It is the responsibility of the kill team leader to assess the compromise and offer his recommendation to the platoon leader. Depending on the situation, teams may continue mission, relocate to a new position, extract early, or abort the mission immediately.

Along with the no-commo and compromise plans, the escape and evasion (E&E) plan is an important contingency and requires planning. The E&E plan will vary, based on a number of variables. If the team is operating from a defendable position, such as an abandoned building, the plan

may be as simple as defending in place until the mounted element or quick-reaction force (QRF) arrives. If the kill team is operating from a less-survivable position, the E&E plan should provide a strategy for repositioning the team from its surveillance site to a known safe and defendable position for emergency extraction. Leaders must ensure the plan remains realistic and simple; if the team needs to execute the E&E plan, conditions are likely to be controlled chaos, at best.

Final preparations are similar to any other mission: precombat checks and inspections should be conducted to ensure all personnel are properly equipped and all weapons and equipment are functioning properly; rehearsals should be conducted to work out any flaws and fine tune the plan; and kill teams should conduct full dress rehearsals to prepare for the weight of their load, which is often quite cumbersome. At a minimum, the kill teams should rehearse dismounting procedures at insertion, dismounted tactical movement for infiltration and exfiltration, react to contact, clearing procedures for the surveillance site, the E&E plan, and friendly linkup procedures for extraction. In addition to its normal rehearsals, the mounted element should also work with the kill teams to rehearse actions at insertion and extraction, linkup procedures, and the mounted element's actions if a kill team is compromised.

Insertion/Infiltration

Typically, kill teams will be inserted into the operational area via foot or ground tactical vehicle — the latter being preferred. Foot insertion provides the team with the best stealth. Kill teams can often slip out of an operating base unseen; whereas, friendly convoys leaving the main gate are often observed by insurgents or enemy sympathizers. While foot insertion provides the team with the best stealth, it is also the most dangerous and physically demanding. If spotted during movement, a four-man kill team poses an inviting target to insurgents. Heavy loads and sweltering heat can quickly sap a team's energy, reducing their effectiveness. Foot insertions should be limited to kill team operations conducted in close proximity to friendly operating or patrol bases.

The preferred means of kill team insertion is by vehicle during hours of limited visibility. Vehicles conducting the insertion can often blend in as an ordinary patrol, deceiving the enemy as to the element's true intent. Inserting teams by vehicle reduces phys-

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ical demands on the team, allowing them to carry more equipment and supplies. Vehicle insertion requires less time to execute, allowing the kill team more time to improve its surveillance site prior to first light.

Deception measures should be employed when conducting vehicle insertion to help mislead the enemy. Deception measures are limited only by one's imagination. One method is to blend in as an ordinary mounted patrol by using similar routes and times as typical patrols in the area. Attention should be given to ensure the insertion appears as similar to a normal patrol as possible. Details, ranging from the number of vehicles to the use of headlights, are all important when using deceptive techniques.

The element may use various means to insert the team. For example, the mounted element may give the impression of mechanical problems by coming to a halt and opening the hood of a vehicle, allowing the team to dismount and slip away into the darkness; if there are abandoned buildings or homes in the area, the platoon may conduct a stay-behind operation; or the platoon performs a standard cordon and search of the dwelling and, upon completion, leaves the kill team in place as the mounted element departs the area. These are very effective methods and can be accomplished on the actual site from which the kill team plans to operate.

When conducting a vehicle insertion, the detrucking point should remain a sufficient distance from the kill team's surveillance site to avoid compromising the site (unless deception measures are used). Well-executed detrucking is key to a successful insertion; the team must dismount quickly and quietly. Upon dis-

mounting, the kill team should quickly rally at a nearby covered and concealed position as identified in the team's reconnaissance. The team leader must rapidly account for his team and equipment. Prior to moving to a preplanned holding area, the mounted element waits for the team to conduct a final radio check.

Upon successful detrucking, the kill team moves into the infiltration phase of the operation. After the mounted element departs, the kill team should remain in a covered and concealed position for a minimum of 15 minutes. During this time, the team should conduct stop, look, listen, and smell (SLLS) to become acclimated to its surroundings and identify possible threats in the vicinity. When deemed safe, the team leader terminates SLLS and the team prepares to move. Prior to initiating movement, the team radios a SITREP to the mounted element. It is vital that the kill team keep the mounted element informed of its location, so in the event of enemy contact, the mounted element can quickly locate the team with minimal radio communications.

During infiltration, kill teams must focus on both stealth and security. While a detailed route is developed during the planning phase, teams must adapt to unforeseen circumstances, such as dogs, herders, and other unexpected personnel. The kill team must stop short of its planned surveillance site in a covered and concealed position. At this point, the team makes preparations to move to and clear its surveillance site, entering the execution phase of the operation.

Execution

To clear the surveillance site, one element must move forward to clear while another provides overwatch. Typically, the desig-

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nated marksman and machine gunner will provide overwatch as the team leader and RTO move forward to clear the site. Once cleared, the designated marksman and machine gunner may be signaled forward and site construction or improvement may begin. Depending on the type of site, this may take several hours. The team must maintain security during site improvement, ensuring the machine gun is constantly manned. The team leader should periodically inspect the position from different angles, ensuring the site blends in with the surrounding environment. All improvements to the surveillance site should be completed no later than 1 hour before morning nautical twilight, allowing the team enough time to make final equipment preparations and settle into its positions prior to first light.

Once the site, equipment, and personnel are prepared, dedicated surveillance of the target area begins. Each team member should be assigned a sector to scan with the spotter and designated marksman, focusing on the center of the target area. The team leader ensures all sectors overlap and establishes target reference points to assist in passing information between team members. Communications between team members is essential, as target exposure times may be brief and the marksman may have to readjust to engage targets outside of his sector.

During hours of suspected enemy activity, all team members should be alert and performing assigned tasks. When deemed appropriate by the team leader, the element may move into a predetermined rest cycle. A rotation is especially important for the spotter and designated marksman; being in awkward and uncomfortable positions, as well as eye strain from peering through optics, quickly fatigues these personnel. Clearly defined priorities of work must be established for the rest plan; these often include weapons, optics, and radio maintenance, as well as personal hygiene, food, and sleep. To implement a rest plan while maintaining operational efficiency, all team members must be cross trained to perform each other's jobs. This ensures capable personnel are manning the machine gun and designated marksman's weapons at all times.

The mounted element has its own role to play during the execution of kill team operations. Upon inserting kill teams, the mounted element normally moves to a holding area nearby as the team conducts foot infiltration. The mounted element closely monitors the radio and watches for signs that the team may have been compromised, such as gun fire or pyrotechnics. Upon the kill team reaching its surveillance site, the mounted element may relocate to a predetermined hide site further from the objective area. Often, dried wells or old vehicle fighting positions can be located and offer excellent positions for the mounted element.

Once at the vehicle hide, the mounted element must take proper precautions to establish its position. A dismounted reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrol should circle the element upon arrival, looking for signs of recent indigenous activity and ensuring the vehicles are best positioned to avoid detection. If it does not interfere with communications, antennas should be tied down to reduce visibility. While gunners may be able to provide

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adequate security, dismounted observation posts may be required if the gunners' fields of view are insufficient. Just as in establishing the kill team's surveillance site, the mounted element should limit all movement at first light to avoid detection.

If the area of operation lacks sufficient terrain to conduct vehicle hides, a number of deception measures may be employed, allowing the mounted element to remain near the kill team without compromising the mission. The simplest form of deception is to simply conduct ordinary patrol operations in the area. The mounted element may also establish overt observation posts along other hot spots on the MSR or ASR, deterring enemy activity in the area, or possibly even driving the enemy into the kill team's target area. Just as in the case of insertion, deception measures are limited only by soldiers' imagination and creativity.

No matter whether the mounted element occupies a vehicle hide, or performs complex and elaborate deception measures, its role remains the same: to support the kill team. The mounted element, with its increased communications range, must relay information to and from the kill team, acting as a go between for friendly units. The mounted element must remain poised at all times to move in support of the kill team. This may consist of rushing to the team's pickup site for an emergency extraction, maneuvering to intercept a suspicious vehicle or searching vehicles and personnel engaged by the team.

The kill team must have a clear understanding of the ROE. There is often inadequate time during this type of operation to report the situation and request guidance from a party that lacks visual contact. The team leader on the ground has the best perspective and must be trusted to make the right decision. If suspicious activity does not meet the team's engagement criteria, the team should document the activity in the surveillance log, photograph the vehicle and personnel involved, and report the activity to the mounted element. The platoon leader then determines the mounted element's course of action. If the activity does not merit compromising the element's location, the report may simply be entered into the patrol log or reported to high-

er. If the reported activity requires more serious attention, the mounted element may move to intercept the target or request the establishment of a traffic control point at a specific location to halt and search the target.

When the ROE have been met, targets should be engaged. The designated marksmen should engage first, as one well-placed shot may be enough to eliminate the enemy threat. The marksman should continue to engage targets until all targets are eliminated or instructed to stop by the team leader. To avoid drawing additional attention to the position and collateral damage to passing bystanders, the other team members should hold their fire unless engaged by the enemy or instructed to fire by the team leader. The team leader may order his team to engage if the designated marksman is unable to eliminate his target, there are multiple targets on the objective, the team is receiving fire, or the enemy is preparing to flee the target area.

Immediately upon the kill team engaging targets, the mounted element should initiate movement to support the team. Normally, this consists of moving along the MSR to intercept fleeing targets or searching dead or wounded enemy personnel and vehicles on the objective. The kill team should remain in place and provide overwatch for the mounted element as it conducts its search. The platoon leader should be prepared to establish a perimeter around the site and call for an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team to disarm enemy munitions. Upon clearing the

site and gathering intelligence, the mounted element returns to a suitable hide position and continues the operation.

Exfiltration/Extraction

Upon completion of the execution phase, the kill team must prepare for its exfiltration and extraction. The team should wait until nightfall before breaking down the site and preparing for movement. The team must sterilize the site, removing all traces of its presence, to prevent the enemy from gathering information on friendly operations. Just as with site construction, the machine gun should be constantly manned during site deconstruction and sterilization. Upon successful sterilization of the site, the kill team is ready to exfiltrate.

The team should never be extracted from its surveillance site except in the case of emergency extraction. Extracting the team from its operation site "burns" the site, compromising the location for future operations. For this reason, the team must exfiltrate to a predetermined pickup site. The pickup site must be defendable, away from natural lines of drift and enemy avenues of approach. At the same time, the terrain must not be so rough as to prevent friendly forces from quickly reaching the site in the event of compromise or enemy contact.

The team's exfiltration can be extremely dangerous; enemy personnel who may have observed the team's operation may be waiting to engage the team as it moves from the site. For this rea-

"A dismounted reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrol should circle the element upon arrival, looking for signs of recent indigenous activity and ensuring the vehicles are best positioned to avoid detection. If it does not interfere with communications, antennas should be tied down to reduce visibility. While gunners may be able to provide adequate security, dismounted observation posts may be required if the gunners' fields of view are insufficient. Just as in establishing the kill team's surveillance site, the mounted element should limit all movement at first light to avoid detection."

son, the team will often bound in pairs, initially, for added security. On reaching a covered and concealed position, the team links up and conducts movement as a single element to the vicinity of the pickup site. Just as the kill team clears its surveillance site, the team must also clear the pickup site. On clearing the pickup site, the team establishes a security perimeter while the RTO notifies the platoon leader the team is in position and ready for extraction.

The mounted element should remain in place until the kill team confirms it is ready for extraction, as linkup between two moving elements should be avoided. The mounted element should confirm its direction of approach with the kill team and its estimated time to destination. The kill team may need to assist the mounted element by verbally directing it to the team's location, and should be prepared to activate the pre-designated signal on visual contact. Common signals often consist of infrared (IR) flashes from night-vision devices, IR strobe lights, or chemlights. On receiving the confirming signal from the mounted element, the kill team may move forward to conduct linkup with the mounted element. The team leader should ensure his personnel and equipment are loaded prior to mounting the platoon leader's vehicle. On receiving confirmation from the kill team leader, the mounted element may begin extracting.

Extraction should be executed much like insertion: the mounted element should avoid simply making a B line for home; extraction routes should vary; and, if possible, the element should not enter the camp though the same gate from which it exited. Deception measures should be employed to hide the platoon's true intent and maintain operational security. Leaders must ensure that soldiers remain focused, as it is easy to become complacent at this stage of the operation.

Debrief/Recovery

The operation is not over when the trucks enter the wire. While many leaders brief recovery as the final phase of an operation in their operations order (OPORD), seldom is it actually conducted. All too often, units return from patrol and are almost immediately released without conducting a proper after-action review (AAR), mission debrief, or recovery plan. This complacency often occurs later in a deployment as soldiers and leaders become overconfident in their abilities. However, this phase of the operation is fundamental to mission success and essential for future operations.

All personnel should be present for the platoon leader's AAR, which should take the form of an initial debrief and focus mostly on the mounted element and its coordination with the kill teams. The platoon leader should review the mission, beginning with the planning process and walking through each step. The platoon should discuss both the positive and negative aspects of the mission, noting what to sustain and what to improve. It is important that all soldiers feel comfortable enough to participate; many times, junior soldiers feel intimidated and their voices go unheard. As with any AAR, the platoon leader should conclude the discussion on a positive note. Once the AAR is complete, vehicle crewmen may begin conducting recovery operations, preparing vehicles and equipment for the next operation.

The kill team and key leaders must then begin the mission debrief. A well-structured debrief is important; it may expose unreported details from the operation. These details, when combined with other information, may shed new light on the enemy situation. The debrief will also highlight shortcomings in pre-mission planning and unit standard operating procedures, which will help reconstruct the mission if casualties were sustained, and provide a historical record of the mission for post hostilities analysis.

The debrief should be attended by all members of the kill team, as well as key members of the mounted element, such as the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and RTO. Typically, the S2 or company executive officer serves as the debriefer. If no electronic recording devices are available, a soldier should act as a dedicated recorder. The unit commander and other interested units or staff members may also attend the debrief. Only personnel with a valid need-to-know should be allowed to attend as an excess of personnel can often be distracting and place additional pressure on the team conducting the debrief.

The debrief should be conducted in a quiet and secure location and have overhead cover, chairs, tables, and sufficient lighting. Imagery, maps, overlays, and other materials used in the planning process should be posted for the team and debriefer to review. Additional materials, such as the kill team's surveillance log, the mounted element's patrol log, communications logs, and all photos taken by the kill team or mounted element, should be present for debrief as they may help reconstruct the actions that occurred. Water, coffee, and a small snack may also be provided to help keep personnel comfortable. Normally, a side room located at the company or battalion tactical operations center can be dedicated for the purpose of conducting debriefs.

Regardless of rank, the debriefer is in charge at all times and is the only one who can address the team. Any questions the observers or staff have for the team should be submitted prior to the debrief, which keeps the debrief structured and prevents the team from having to answer a barrage of questions from various sources. Various techniques may be used to conduct the debrief; however, the preferred method is to use a predetermined question format in which team members are asked various questions designed to draw out details not previously reported. Another technique is called "map tracking," in which the operation is retraced from insertion, infiltration, actions on the objective, exfiltration, and extraction to draw out additional intelligence. No matter what technique is used, any information collected during the debrief should be thoroughly reviewed and evaluated — this information is invaluable when planning future operations.

Small-unit kill teams can be a very effective method of countering IED threats, especially in rural Iraq. These operations require highly trained and well-equipped personnel to counter the high risk inherent to small units operating in a hostile environment. While not all armor or cavalry units are sufficiently manned or equipped to conduct kill team operations, many lessons can be learned from this type of operation; most notably, the level of thought and planning entailed in executing small-unit operations and need for a thorough AAR and debrief. For those with the capabilities and fortitude required to aggressively execute IED interdiction operations, I hope this article has proven thought provoking and provided some ideas that may help conduct such operations. Happy hunting!

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Cultural Awareness and Understanding

by Major Klaudius K. Robinson

Current global operations highlight the need for soldiers to have a better understanding and cultural awareness of host-nation countries worldwide. This subject is under discussion to some degree by senior Army leaders; however, it is not yet a priority for junior leaders. For decades, the U.S. Army has focused on warfighting skills and its ability to kill enemy combatants and win battles and wars. The armor branch's mission, in the scope of tankers and scouts, is to find, close with, and destroy the enemy.

A nation's army, sharpened through training, is the most lethal and highly skilled warrior force it can be. As scouts and tankers, we should focus all efforts on drill and training to produce an effective fighting force that can defeat the enemy through firepower, shock effect, and pure warrior skills; what I term as "distracters" are less of a priority than sharpening our skills to defeat and kill the enemy.

According to Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41, *Defense Language Program*, it is DoD policy that: "Foreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills appropriate to the Department of Defense's mission needs. …Military units deploying to, or in transit through, foreign territories shall be equipped, to the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or transit. The commanders of the combatant commands shall determine what is appropriate based on current situation and circumstances."[1]

This, my brethren, is the future. It is a well-known fact that we are asked to perform a myriad of missions and assigned various tasks in the current operating environment. We are also asked to accomplish missions that involve diplomacy, to which anyone who has sat through a local Iraqi council meeting can attest. However, it is difficult to be diplomatic if we do not understand local culture sensitivities throughout our areas of operation.

As an Army, we recently did a lot of catching up on cultural awareness, specifically in Iraq. General George Casey's implementation of an in-country insurgency academy was a step in the right direction. More importantly, cultural awareness training, now mandated for units prior to a rotation in country, is also helpful, but these initiatives only skim the surface of how we can prepare. In my experiences, this training is highly lacking and is only an introduction to becoming a true regional cultural expert. In a recent article by Ullrich Fichtner, he discusses the "crash course" method of instruction in the U.S. Army's efforts to catch up on its lack of cultural understanding: "The group of instructors sitting around the conference table is responsible for the new Army's core issue, cultural awareness, or the art of handling multiculturalism and practicing tolerance and respect for foreigners. The people sitting around

the table have served as diplomats and intelligence agents in Israel and Jordan and as military attachés in Syria. Their job is to give these young soldiers a crash course in how to deal with other cultures, in general, and Islam, in particular."[2]

This is not the way we should conduct business or prepare for future wars. As a nation, we are aware of who might be our future enemies, as well as the locations of the world's hot spots. There should be more of an emphasis placed on educating our soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in cultural studies of identified regions in which we, as an Army and a branch, might operate.

I understand the mountainous piles of work placed on today's combat formations and I know that today's company commanders have many more requirements and deadlines compared to the same position 30 years ago. This is exactly where command emphasis comes into play and where a push from Army leaders must bring cultural awareness and understanding training to the forefront. The Army is taking steps to document and categorize soldiers with foreign language proficiency through a self-assessment survey, which is a result of the changes directed by DoD. However, this is only one step and barely skims the surface of its true intent, which is to become, at a minimum, not only culturally aware in our lowest formations, but also to strive to achieve cultural expertise. Knowledge of a foreign language helps in this regard, but it does not constitute cultural awareness. As an example, you can learn a foreign language sitting in a classroom, but your knowledge will be limited and will not reflect cultural nuances that can only be experienced through immersion or interaction with a local populace.

I am by no means an Arabic culture expert; however, I eagerly shared my limited knowledge (cultural awareness) with the soldiers in my command. It was a constant challenge to explain the Iraqis' conduct and reasoning to my soldiers who were trained in discipline and Army values. Justifying lateness, dishonesty, and other corrupt behaviors that we, as a military culture disdain, was a definite challenge. What is viewed as normal behavior in an Arabic culture, or more specifically, the Iraqi culture, is not viewed in the same light through the eyes of a soldier.

Contrary to popular belief, and from an isolationist viewpoint, Americans are not held in high regard in some cultures — most of these cultures do not like us because we are Americans. This view of

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Americans by other cultures and our own prejudices can be mended and a bridge of understanding built by interaction and cooperation. We, as an armor force, were truly unprepared for the culture shock faced in Iraq. Factually speaking, we made cultural mistakes that set good-willed efforts back. An article by Tom Regan of the *Christian Science Monitor* points out that we realized our mistakes and are attempting to fix the problems.[3] Another example of our past failures is in the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*: "Language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills and are not sufficiently incorporated into operational or contingency planning. As a result, there is insufficient effort under the current 'requirements' determination process to prepare for support of deployed forces. Much language talent resident in the force (Active and Reserve Components and civilian) is unknown and untapped. Language skill and regional expertise are not valued as defense core competencies, yet they are as important as critical weapon systems."[4]

This quote highlights the fact that language skills and regional expertise are as important as critical weapons systems; a more common term is "combat multipliers." These skills help commanders shape the battlefield and ultimately win wars. A maneuver battalion commander has a fires-and-effects cell (FEC), an S2 intelligence cell, and usually a tactical air cell (TACAIR) in a combat environment. These are all combat multipliers in a battalion, that help a unit win; therefore, re-

gional and language experts should be as important as combat assets. The armor branch must undertake language study and cultural awareness/understanding training to be successful in future endeavors.

During 2005, DoD established a goal for 80 percent of junior-level officers to demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language by 2013. According to "In Foreign Language Proficiency, Generals Should Lead by Example," in *Digital Journal*, proficiency in this case was identified as level 1+ which is a very elementary knowledge of a language.[5] Further investigation (11 May 2007) led to examining the current ten Army division commanders' foreign language proficiencies — only two of the ten speak a foreign language, all are educated and have advanced degrees.[6] "In Foreign Language Proficiency," also mentions that, "Generals in World Wars I and II commonly spoke at least one additional language, usually German or French, and often both. Major General Fox Conner, Pershing's G3 and mentor to Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall, spoke French so well he served in a French unit on an exchange program."[7] Understandably, it takes time to implement changes, but this clearly indicates that changes are not yet realized at higher levels of leadership, which is also because the current group of senior officers is not being affected by the changes. It is obviously difficult to redirect senior officers for language study (successfully undertaken, it takes a minimum of 6 months

Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba — Master of the Light Horse

by Lieutenant Colonel Prisco R. Hernández

"The Spanish light horse came upon them, and routed them, so that in fleeing toward the city, a great number of them were slaughtered."

— Crónicas del Gran Capitán[1]

Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba (1453-1515) is not exactly a household name among U.S. Army officers, which is unfortunate because he was the greatest commander of his age; an age much like our own, in which societal and technological advances inspired profound changes in warfare.[2] Perhaps military history enthusiasts remember Gonzalo (or Gonsalvo, as he is referred to in Italian references) as the first commander who successfully employed infantry firearms to defeat heavy cavalry at Cerignola (1503).[3] However, few recognize he was a master in employing light cavalry in both a tactical and an operational role. Examination of Gonzalo de Córdoba's use of light cavalry forces as part of a combined arms team reveals that, when used properly, light cavalry forces are agile, versatile, and represent a tremendous force multiplier for any army — they are truly a commander's "ace in the hole." In an age when many are seduced by the dream of technological solutions to operational problems, it is well to remember that the fundamentals of warfare remain constant because, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war is a contest of wills.[4] Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba's Italian campaign of 1495-1498 offers military professionals the opportunity to get reacquainted with the basic realities of warfare, especially the uses of light cavalry, by examining the actions of a master practitioner of tactics and operational art.

Combatant Commander

In 1495, Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba y Aguilar was summoned to appear before the king and queen of Spain, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, to accept a highly prestigious, but difficult, commission.[5] A hero of the war against the Moors of Granada (1481-1492), in which he distinguished himself in combat and served as special envoy of the monarchs to negotiate the surrender of Granada, Gonzalo was personally selected by the queen for his first independent command. He was to assume command of an expeditionary force and set sail for the Kingdom of Sicily, a Spanish possession, with the overt purpose of defending it against a possible attack by the Turks. In reality, he was to defend Spanish interests in Italy and the Western Mediterranean by limiting French adventurism in the region.[6] In modern terms, Gonzalo Hernández would act as a "combatant commander," and would be expected to "shape the security environment," and execute national policy within his assigned area of responsibility.

In the fall of 1494, the young French king, Charles VIII, decided to launch a military expedition to press his claim on the Kingdom of Naples.[7] His idea was to claim the throne of Naples, based on a weak dynastic claim, and then embark on a crusade to recover Jerusalem for Christendom. To many of his contemporaries, this idea seemed far-fetched, but Charles was imbued with the ethos of chivalry and a desire for glory. He intended to revitalize the crusading tradition of his ancestors. It was not difficult for the king to convince the warlike French nobility, bored with the pursuits of peacetime, to accompany him in this adventure. But even though the king of France operated under the traditional medieval ethos of knightly combat, the army he recruited was thoroughly modern. His heavy cavalry, made up of superb knights and their mounted and heavily armored retainers, was the best in Europe. He enrolled numerous companies of Swiss pikemen who had clearly demonstrated their superiority on many battlefields.[8] But the decisive force was the French train of artillery. Charles spared no expense to provide himself with the most modern and mobile artillery yet assembled. This would

Below, King Ferdinand of Spain. Right, Queen Isabella of Spain.

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*"…Gonzalo established a base of operations and took stock of his forces… The mounted men included a few heavily armored knights on large warhorses, but the majority were outfitted as **jinetes** — the traditional light cavalry of Spain."*

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ensure that no walled town or castle in Italy could stop or delay the French advance.[9]

The mercenary levies and city militias of the Italian principalities melted away before the French juggernaut. Milan, Florence, and Rome opened their doors in submission to Charles. The French king succeeded in rapidly overrunning any enemy defenses and entered the city of Naples in February 1495. But Charles soon tired of the pleasures of the city and returned to France with the bulk of his army, leaving the remainder of his forces to garrison his newly won realm under the command of experienced Scottish commander Bernard Stewart (French Bérault Stuart), the 3rd Lord of Aubigny. Lacking support from his subjects, Alfonso, the king of Naples, fled to Sicily and abdicated in favor of his son, Federico. The new king showed a stronger mettle than his father and began to assemble an army. King Federico sought the aid of the Spanish Gonzalo Hernández, who was in Sicily, because he was closely related to the Spanish king.[10] Gonzalo agreed to help since this was in keeping with a broad interpretation of his mission, supporting the interests of Spain in Italy against French expansionism.

The Italian Campaign of 1495-1497: Opening Moves

Gonzalo acted quickly; he assembled his forces, crossed the Strait of Messina, and laid siege to the city of Reggio at the toe of the Italian boot, which was occupied by French forces. He took the city by assault, using a ruse he had learned in the wars against the Moors. He bombarded the city's walls with artillery, leading the enemy to believe he was preparing an assault from that side, while a smaller group of *escaladores* (soldiers trained in scaling fortified walls) quickly infiltrated from the opposite side and overwhelmed the garrison.

After taking Reggio, Gonzalo established a base of operations and took stock of his forces. He counted around 5,000 infantrymen and 600 cavalry. The infantry were a mix of men equipped with crossbows and arquebuses, a matchlock firearm that preceded the musket, and close combat specialists armed with sharp Toledo swords, helmet, plate armor, chain mail and a steel shield (buckler). The mounted men included a few heavily armored knights on large warhorses, but the majority were outfitted as *jinetes* — the traditional light cavalry of Spain.

The Spanish *jinetes* evolved from the experience of centuries of warfare against the Moors.[11] During the 8th century, the Moors had overrun most of Spain and had just recently been expelled from their last redoubt — the Kingdom of Granada.[12] Warfare along the long frontier between Christian and Moorish Spain consisted mostly of guerrillas conducting raids and counter-raids to capture prisoners and booty, carry out quick incursions, and the occasional taking of castles and towns.[13]

In the broken country of the high Andalusian sierras, large set-piece battles were avoided by both sides. Ambushes, ruses, feints, and rapid maneuver were the preferred tactical methods. Light cavalry was used to reconnoiter the enemy, raid baggage trains, harass supply lines, take prisoners, and provide security for larger forces. The *jinetes* had in fact adopted the tactical methods and many of their armaments from the Moors. They were mounted on light, but hardy, horses — a mix of the spirited Arabian and the hardy North African breeds. They were armed with one or more javelins made from cane or light wood with sharp steel points used for skirmishing on horseback, and long and flexible swords suitable for mounted combat. They carried a light kidney-shaped shield — the Moorish *adarga* — and were protected by open steel helmets that did not impede their vision. Most wore steel breastplates or brigandines to protect their torsos and some also wore shirts of mail and a few pieces of plate armor. But in general, the *jinetes* traded the full-armored protection of the man-at-arms, or knight, for agility and freedom of action.

The Spanish also had men who fought in the tradition of European nobility — equipped in suits of plate armor and charging with the lance on large, equally well-armored warhorses. Although knightly combat was practiced in Spain, many Spanish nobles, even kings, would on occasion adopt the style and dress of the humble *jinete* when operating in difficult terrain or in the heat of the Mediterranean summer. Thus, the Spanish cavalryman could fight as a knight *lanza en ristre* (with the lance resting on a special hook on his breastplate), or a *la jineta* (in the style of the light cavalry *jinete*).[14]

These then, were the troops available to Gonzalo; they were few in number, but

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each of them was a proven soldier — a veteran of the war against the Moors of Granada accustomed to privations and tough field conditions. He also recruited volunteers from Sicily and Southern Italy. With this force, Gonzalo would face the combined armies of the French and the many Neapolitan nobles who supported their cause — a force three to four times his army's number. The French also had many companies of Swiss infantry, which had not yet been defeated in open battle.

With these forces, Gonzalo set out from Reggio, capturing other small towns, harassing small French detachments, and avoiding decisive engagement. King Federico of Naples joined forces with him as they began to drive north toward the city of Naples. But the French commander was not idle — Bérault Stuart, Lord Aubigny, was an old and experienced soldier. He began concentrating his troops, which were dispersed throughout Southern Italy so he could form a field army capable of defeating the combined Spanish-Neapolitan force. Gonzalo knew about the French movements because his light cavalry *jinetes* were riding far and wide ahead and to the flanks of the main body, gathering intelligence, gaining the support of small towns and castles, and foraging for food. His *jinetes* rode into the town of Seminara and convinced the townspeople to return to their king's alliance and expel the small French garrison. Shortly thereafter, Gonzalo entered the town in the company of King Federico. Soon, the scouts brought intelligence that the French main body was marching on Seminara. After a careful estimate of the situation, Gonzalo advised that it would be better to withstand a siege than risk open battle. King Federico thought it dishonorable to adopt a defensive posture, perhaps remembering his own father's disgraceful flight before the enemy, and decided to seek out the enemy in battle.[15] Many of the hot-headed Spanish captains agreed. Bowing to the inevitable, Gonzalo prepared for battle.

The battle of Seminara ended quickly. The combined Spanish and Neapolitan

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forces were quickly overcome by the French heavy cavalry and the Swiss infantry. The Neapolitan infantry, in particular, became confused and fled when they saw what appeared to be the flight of the Spanish *jinetes*, unaware that it was standard practice for them to charge and break contact before reforming and charging again from a different direction. Even King Federico narrowly escaped death or capture when his horse buckled and fell. Complete disaster was avoided only by the heroic action of Gonzalo Hernández and his *jinetes* who fought a tenacious delaying action, which allowed the bulk of the defeated army to escape.

After this fiasco, the Spanish forces returned to their base near Reggio while the Neapolitan king went back to Sicily. There, he received news that the French were guarding Naples with only a very small garrison and that the population had turned against them. He decided on a bold course of action and sailed to Naples with his available forces. The Nea-

politans received their king enthusiastically and the besieged French were forced to surrender.

Gonzalo decided to continue operations to retake Southern Italy since the French field army had again dispersed to hold on to their territorial gains and take control of a restive population. Again, the Spanish *jinetes* rode far and wide, gathering intelligence and launching limited attacks wherever they found a weakness to exploit. The French could not match this level of operational mobility and were put in a defensive, reactive mode. By operating within a large screen of light cavalry, which served as his eyes and ears, Gonzalo seized and maintained the operational initiative and set the terms of conflict by operating inside his enemy's decisionmaking cycle. The lack of an effective enemy light cavalry only worsened the French situation.

For his part, King Federico marched east from Naples and entered the mountainous province of Basilicata where he found a strong French force near the town of Atella. The French were entrenched inside the strongly fortified town and prepared to stand a siege. The king did not have enough forces to completely cut off supply routes to and from the town nor did he have enough experienced soldiers to attempt an assault. He therefore called on Gonzalo for help.

Fighting March and Checkmate

When Gonzalo received the request for assistance from King Federico, he considered three options: continue his current successful strategy of methodically taking towns and castles; shadow the main French force under Lord Aubigny, whom he knew was to his north, to harass him and prevent him from relieving Atella; or honor the king's summons and ride to his assistance. As was his practice, he carefully considered the potential costs and benefits of each option and decided to ride to the king's assistance. This course of action seemed the most profitable since he would help capture an important French base in another province, defeat a major French force, and assist the allied king in his hour of need. In addi-

tion to these practical reasons, Gonzalo thought this would also be the most honorable course of action, and the one that would do the most to heighten the prestige of both the Neapolitan king and his own king and queen, as well as bring other recalcitrant cities into the fold. In modern terms, he had a sound appreciation for the second- and third-order effects of an operational decision and its likely political impact.

Having made his decision, Gonzalo acted with his customary energy. He quickly marshaled his forces, sending out the *jinetes* as a covering force far ahead and to the flanks of the main body. He then conducted one of the most remarkable fighting marches ever. His small force crossed the mountain wilderness of the Aspromonte, beginning on the Tyrrhenian coast and ending at Atella in the rugged mountains of south-central Italy. This is, even today, almost impassable terrain crisscrossed by narrow steep paths that are often no more than goat trails among the rocks. Along the way, he fought off ambushes by French sympathizers, captured many important towns, including, once again, Seminara, and routed a large French camp, which included many Neapolitan nobles who had rebelled against their king. Chief among them was Agostino da San Severino and members of his family. This action was a night attack in which Gonzalo's hard-marching force first

identified the enemy position without being seen and then informed their commander who rapidly reconnoitered the terrain and launched a coordinated assault from all sides, completely surprising the enemy — a renaissance example of the principles of see first, decide first, and engage on your own terms, achieved without the benefit of modern technology. This was made possible by the intelligence furnished to the commander by his light cavalry scouts.

Finally, Gonzalo's reinforcing force reached the town of Atella. Upon arrival, he deployed his army in order of battle straight from march column. His intent was to impress friend and foe alike, and prepare for any opportunity that may arise. His *jinetes* continued their unceasing reconnaissance, riding around the perimeter of Atella and studying the lay of the land.

The King rode out to greet Gonzalo, accompanied by Cesare Borgia — the Pope's son and a distinguished captain — and the most senior captains of the Neapolitan army.[16] After the usual pleasantries, Gonzalo, rather than allowing his soldiers some well-deserved rest, immediately launched an attack on an outlying French outpost. His *jinetes* had once again gathered critical intelligence, and noticed that the French position had not been fortified against the type of forces the Span-

ish had available. The French had occupied a series of watermills near a stream that provided them with water and ground flour. The garrison consisted of French crossbowmen and Swiss infantry. They were not vulnerable to King Federico's Italian infantry and small force of knights; however, they were not prepared to confront the tactical combinations devised by Gonzalo Hernández.

Gonzalo sent his close combat sword and buckler infantry against the mills, followed closely by pikemen. He sent a mounted force of *jinetes* and a few heavy men-at-arms to interpose between the mills and the town to block any attempts by a relief force to relieve the defenders at the mills. The bulk of the *jinetes* were to ride along the other flank of the mills and cut off any retreating French. The Spanish infantrymen, protected by their shields and armor against French crossbow bolts, closed quickly on the crossbowmen before they could fire more than one or two arrows each. The Swiss did not have the time or space to properly form into their fighting phalanxes and were cut down individually by expert Spanish swordsmen. Those who fled were then run down by the *jinetes* and no relief could be found in the city. In short, the Spanish victory was complete — a fine example of a tactical opportunity exploited by *Auftragstaktik,* before the word was coined. The French were deprived of their supply source and demoralized by the tactical superiority of the Spanish. The Neapolitan army received a needed boost in morale and now had the manpower to completely seal off the town of Atella. Indeed, a few days later, Gonzalo led a force that captured the small town of Rivacandida, which dominated the only possible route from which the French expected reinforcements. Faced with an untenable situation, the French garrison of Atella surrendered.

With the Spanish-Neapolitan victory at Atella, the campaign was essentially over. The French soldiers were allowed to return to their homeland; however, very few were able to do so. The defeated army was plagued by various outbreaks of malaria and other fevers, and was harassed by a vengeful population all the way back to France.

Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba was recognized by both friend and foe as "the Great Captain," a title by which he would always be known. Other honors followed: he was awarded the "Golden Rose" by the Pope; and King Federico rewarded him with various towns and castles, and the titles of Duke of Terranova and Duke of Sant' Angelo. The "Great Captain"

"Armor and cavalry officers will notice that Gonzalo's use of light cavalry jinetes *gave him a decisive advantage over the enemy at both the operational and tactical levels of war. His light cavalry allowed him to see the battlefield and extend, in modern terms, his "area of influence" and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Many military historians fail to give proper weight to the value and versatility of light cavalry, basing their assessments only on the contributions of light cavalry to set-piece battles."*

soon returned to Spain where he was received with great honors by the king and queen. He was destined to fight another war in Italy against another French king in just a few years — the one in which he would distinguish himself in the use of hand-held firearms (arquebuses) in battle, and in which he would make excellent use of his light cavalry.

Assessment and Lessons Learned

Modern officers can draw many lessons from this campaign, first of which is the importance of flexibility in selecting the appropriate course of action to accomplish mission-type orders. Gonzalo Hernández assumed a role very much like that of a modern combatant commander. He received broad guidance on his mission from the heads of state and was allowed a great deal of latitude in its execution. However, he did not receive adequate resources to deal with the potential threat in a rapidly changing situation. Gonzalo Hernández succeeded only because of his superior ability to "do more with less" — a situation that is hauntingly familiar to commanders at every level in today's contemporary operational environment (COE). Once more, a strong commander's character rises above all other considerations and becomes the crucial determinant of victory or defeat. Gonzalo's ability to minimize the results of defeat in the Battle of Seminara, and his ability to sustain the morale of his troops and organize a new offensive are truly the marks of a "great captain."[17]

Second, Gonzalo Hernández demonstrated a mastery of the operational level of war. He was very thorough in his intelligence gathering and used all the means at his disposal — light cavalry, informers, and political channels. When determining which course of action to select, he was cautious and carefully considered all options, but once he made a decision, he acted with great energy and speed. This allowed him to operate inside his enemy's decisionmaking cycle, gain and maintain the initiative, and pose operational and tactical problems to the enemy, which were difficult for him to solve.

Finally, the "Great Captain" understood the capabilities and limitations of his forces and those of his enemy, down to the smallest details. This allowed him to take advantage of fleeting tactical opportunities, which he was quick to exploit with innovative and effective combined arms combinations, such as those in the action before Atella.

Armor and cavalry officers will notice that Gonzalo's use of light cavalry *jinetes* gave him a decisive advantage over the enemy at both the operational and tactical levels of war. His light cavalry allowed him to see the battlefield and extend, in modern terms, his "area of influence" and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Many military historians fail to give proper weight to the value and versatility of light cavalry, basing their assessments only on the contributions of light cavalry to set-piece battles. For modern students of the art of war, Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba serves as an ideal example of what a great commander can achieve when he understands the capabilities and limitations of light cavalry and uses it appropriately.

Notes

[1]Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Crónicas del Gran Capitán,* Bailly-Ballière, 1903, translated by author, p. 292.

[2]Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800,* 2d ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; and David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe,* Barnes and Noble, New York, 1995.

[3]Hans Delbrück, Archer Jones, John Keegan, Charles Oman, F.L. Taylor, and Robert O'Connel are some of the best known among many military historians who mention Cerignola as a significant battle in the history of warfare. Typical of their judgment is the entry in R. Ernest DuPuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History,* s.v. Cerignola, Harper Resource, 4th Edition, April 1993: "This was probably the first battle in history won by gunpowder and small arms."

[4]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* introduction by Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Classics, New York, 1982, p. 101, "War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. […] War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill [sic] our will."

[5]The king and queen of the newly confederated Spanish Kingdoms were Fernando of Aragon and Isabel of Castile — the famous royal couple who were known as the Catholic Monarchs. Spain emerged as a major player in the European stage in 1492 with the final conquest of the Kingdom of Granada and the "discovery" of a "New World" by Columbus — a protégée of Queen Isabel. The best narrative history in English of the period of the Catholic Monarchs is William H. Prescott, *The Art of War in Spain: the Conquest of Granada 1481-1492,* ed. by Albert D. McJoynt, Stackpole Books, Philadelphia, 1995; a good one-volume history is Felipe Fernández Armesto, *Ferdinand and Isabella,* Taplinger, New York, 1975.

[6]Details of Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba's first Italian campaign are based on the three historical sources compiled and edited in Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Crónicas del Gran Capitán.*

[7]Charles VIII was 22 years old at the time and not in very good health, but he was ambitious and was led to believe he was capable of heroic deeds in the tradition of his knightly ancestors. In addition, the French king was invited into Italy by Lodovico Sforza, ruler of Milan as an ally against his Italian rivals. This act was the beginning of many years of misfortune for all the Italian states. See Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy,* translated and edited by Sydney Alexander, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, pp. 21-24.

[8]After the Swiss established their independence from their Haspburg overlords and the Burgundian and Italian princes that surrounded their Alpine homeland, they offered their services as mercenaries and were employed as such by the French kings. See Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,* 1937; reprint Greenhill Books, London, 1999, p. 69 ff.

[9]For an overview of the changing relationship between gunpowder weapons and fortifications in Italy, see Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660,* Barnes and Noble, New York, 1996, pp. 9-22.

[10]The line of Spanish Neapolitan kings of the House of Aragon began when Alfonso V of Aragon conquered the Kingdom of Naples after a power vacuum in 1443. He did not have legitimate children by his wife, María of Castile, but he named Fernando (Ferrante), his "natural son" by a Neapolitan mistress, as heir to the throne of Naples. Ferrante reigned from 1458 to 1494. His son, Alfonso II, reigned briefly, but was mentally unstable and abdicated in favor of his 22-year-old son, Fernando II (Ferrante II). King Fernando of Aragon was the son of Juan II of Aragon the younger brother of Alfonso V. Thus, he was the uncle of Alfonso II and great uncle of Ferrante II. But Fernando of Aragon considered his nephews illegitimate monarchs since they were descended from the "natural" or illegitimate branch of the Aragonese family.

[11]The best study in English of Spanish frontier warfare in the late 15th century is William H. Prescott, *The Art of War in Spain: the Conquest of Granada 1481-1492,* ed. by Albert D. McJoynt, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1995, see especially pp. 20-21 for a discussion of the role of Spanish light cavalry.

[12]The Spanish monarchs, Fernando and Isabel, entered the conquered city of Granada on 2 January 1492. Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba had been instrumental in negotiating the surrender conditions between them and the last Moorish King, Boabdil. Prescott, *The Art of War in Spain,* pp. 240-242.

[13]Most military historians associate the term guerrilla (literally "small war" in Spanish) with the fierce resistance put up by Spanish peasants and townsmen against the invading armies of Napoleon in the early 19th century. However, guerrilla tactics and wars have been common in Spain since time immemorial. Among the invading armies who have been harassed and, at times, defeated by guerrillas in Spain are the Greeks, the Carthaginians, the Romans, and later Christians and Muslims used guerrilla tactics extensively against each other in the rugged terrain of the Iberian Peninsula. See Prescott, *The Art of War in Spain.*

[14]The lance rest, a steel hook attached to the breastplate of a suit of armor, became important in the 15th century as the lance became heavier. For a survey of technical improvements in armor and the techniques of war of heavy cavalry, see Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages,* University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia, 1981, pp. 100-128.

[15]Ferrante of Naples, Federico's father, fled from the French and sought refuge with Gonzalo in Sicily. He died shortly thereafter. It was said that he believed that the French invasion was God's punishment for his many sins. He abdicated in favor of his son, Federico.

[16]Cesare was perhaps the most notorious scion of the notorious Borgia family. He was the son of Rodrigo Borgia, who took the name of Alexander VI when he was elected to the papacy. He was created a cardinal by his father, but preferred the life of a warrior. For a balanced treatment of the Borgia family and their times, see Michael Mallet, *The Borgias,* Academy Chicago Publishers, Chicago, 1987.

[17]It is interesting to note that, in both current and emerging U.S. Army doctrine, leadership is the most critical of the elements of combat power. It ensures the other elements, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and command and control are used in a coordinated way to accomplish the mission. See Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations,* U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, July 2007, p. 4-1. FMI 3-0 will replace U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations,* GPO, Washington, DC, June 2001, which defines combat power as maneuver, firepower, protection, and information brought together by leadership.

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THE GROUND

by Captain Anthony Rose

The ground has forever been the one element of warfare that commanders strive to control. Over the years, terms, such as "good ground," "bad ground," "worst ground," "lost ground," "gained ground," and "bloody ground," have been used to describe battle ground conditions. Technology has allowed mankind to extend the ground over which he fights, to include the sea and air. The three levels of warfare — strategic, operational, and tactical — all have to consider this 360-degree horizontal and vertical battlefield.

Terrain

The most important aspect of discussing terrain is defining terrain. The U.S. Army has three categories of terrain: restricted, severely restricted, and unrestricted.[1] The terrain definitions below cover every type of terrain on the planet, but do not address climate or vegetation because they are not as important to military planners as movement and maneuver.

Restricted terrain. Restricted terrain hinders movement in some way; little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but elements may have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. It also slows movement by requiring zigzagging or frequent detours. Restricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces typically consists of moderate to steep slopes or moderate to densely spaced obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings. For example, swamps or rugged terrain may restrict dismounted infantry forces, or logistics or rear area movement may be hindered by poorly developed road systems.[2]

Severely restricted terrain. Severely restricted terrain will hinder or slow movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. This may require committing engineer assets to improve mobility or deviating from doctrinal tactics, such as moving in columns instead of line formations or at speeds much lower than those preferred. Severely restricted terrain for mounted forces is typically characterized by steep slopes and large or densely spaced obstacles with little or no supporting roads.[3]

Unrestricted terrain. Unrestricted indicates terrain free of any restriction to movement. Unrestricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces is typically flat to moderately sloping terrain, with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks. Unrestricted terrain allows wide maneuver and unlimited travel by forces and is supported by well-developed road networks.[4]

Micro- and macro-terrain. Two other terrain factors include micro- and macro-terrain. Micro-terrain describes those small folds on the Earth that are not visible on a 1:50,000 map with 10-meter contour lines — it is a rock, ditch, tree, forest, or jungle, or city block structure with windows, alleys, and walls. It is where a person or small-unit element can be concealed from long-range observation, or close observation for that matter. It is the modern domain of the infantryman.

Macro-terrain is large-scale terrain that can be seen from an observation point, unobstructed, and is dominated by the tank. Most of history's battles have been fought on macro-terrain — whether at sea to control trade or on land to control avenues of approach and trade routes on unrestricted terrain. Armies designed to fight on macro-terrain were often slaughtered by an enemy that fought on the micro-terrain of severely restricted ground. For example, the Romans learned this les-

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son in the Teutoberger Wald, and the British relearned it in the forests outside of Fort Duquesne.[5]

Gaining Global Dominance at the Three Levels of War

The strategic level of war is the national level, which is defined as, "the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans."[6]

The strategic level is most concerned with what is collectively known as maritime mediums of transportation: air, sea, and over continents. This means that at the strategic level, the airspace and sea lanes of the entire world are in contention, and control must be gained — controlling the sea often means controlling the land.[7]

The Roman road system was a strategic asset that allowed Rome to control the whole of the Mediterranean and Western Europe, which has been a truism throughout history. The Greeks understood the importance of gaining the upper hand on the sea to gain and maintain control of the land. Their victory over the Persian navy at Salamis ensured their eventual land defeat.[8] The Romans gained control over the western Mediterranean Sea from Carthage in the Second Punic War, which put them in position to invade North Africa, take the fight to them, and end with the Roman Victory at Zama.

In the modern era, the British controlled the sea, which gave them the freedom of movement they needed to move armies to operations in India and North America. The U.S. Navy's control of the sea strangled the Confederacy during the Civil War. The British navy starved Imperial Germany during World War I and the United States did the same to Japan during World War II. The sea is 90 percent macro-terrain and technology is the key to its domination.

During World War I, the British gained control of the sea through the use of superior ships. The HMS *Dreadnought* serves as a perfect example of gaining the upper hand in technology; the minute she was launched in 1906, all other battleships were rendered obsolete.[9] Once all of the industrialized nations had their own fleet of battleships, the utilization of that technology is what counted most. By the time the British navy hunted down and sank the Kriegsmarine Ship *Bismarck* in 1941, British fire control was a generation ahead of the Germans and made a difference in the ability to hit a target.[10] Sinking the *Bismarck* demonstrated the latest technology, which soon came to control the macro-terrain of the sea — the airplane. British Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers, launched from the HMS *Ark Royal*, were instrumental in sinking the *Bismarck*; aircraft sank the HMS *Prince of Wales*, HMS *Repulse*, the Italian fleet at Taranto, and the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet at Pearl Har-

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bor. The turning point of the Pacific War was at Midway in 1942 when three U.S. aircraft carriers ambushed and sank four Japanese aircraft carriers. Just as the *Dreadnought* eclipsed its contemporaries, the aircraft carrier now eclipsed the battleship.[11]

The air is also primarily macro-terrain — the airplane is the technology that allows the warrior to exploit the complete circle. At sea, the vast openness allows aircraft to move unobstructed toward their target; the better fighters with the better pilots gain domination over an entire battlefield. Yet, lack of air dominance will completely paralyze a fleet (Truk), or an army (the German army during the Normandy Campaign).

The Normandy Campaign is one of the best examples of how a military must set conditions strategically and operationally to fight tactically. The battle of the Atlantic had to be fought and won; this meant that sub-hunting strategies, such as convoys, sonar, hedgehogs, and radar-equipped aircraft, were needed to end the submarine threat and bottle up Germany's surface fleet. The airspace over Western Europe had to be dominated. This required superior aircraft, such as the P51 Mustang and the B17 Flying Fortress. Further proof of this dominance is in the fact that only two German aircraft sorties and one group of German E-boats (torpedo) attacked the flotilla at Normandy. Only this level of air and sea dominance allowed the allies to gain a toehold on the Norman coast. Once on land, forces began to move in, only to discover why micro-terrain truly is "in the form of a hedgerow."

Normandy is crisscrossed with walls of dirt and shrubs. French farm fields are surrounded by hedges, which made perfect defensive positions. The terrain was classed as restricted and had a high percentage of micro-terrain. Every square field had to be attacked and taken with a combined-arms force at the lowest level of command, the platoon.[12] Platoons required three squads of infantry and a section of tanks set in a support-by-fire position, which was a painstakingly slow process. When the British army attempted to break out at Caen, it moved three divisions of tanks into the unrestricted high-speed avenues of approach north of the city into macro-terrain. The Germans used the micro-terrain and the higher technology of their 88mm antiaircraft/antitank guns to stop the attack well short of its objective.[13] The air superiority of the allies allowed them to fly interdiction missions against German reinforcements and isolated the Wehrmacht and Schutzstaffel in Normandy. Once the infantry fight in micro-terrain during the Battle of Villers-Bocage had set conditions, U.S. armored divisions were in position to break out of Normandy into unrestrictive terrain to the south that had a higher ratio of macro-terrain, surround the Germans, and destroy an entire army group. This scenario was attempted again on the Rhine with very different results.

The question of technology in macro-terrain requires a look at the tanks used during the Normandy Campaign; particularly, the Sherman and Panther. The M4 Sherman was originally designed to be an infantry support vehicle and therefore was armed with a short-barreled 75mm main gun. This weapon had an excellent high-explosive round ideal for the infantry support role. Combat experience in North Africa reinforced this role as well, as the 75mm was powerful enough to destroy Panzerkampfwagon IIIs and IVs.

In the Battle of Villers-Bocage, the Sherman met a new adversary, the Panzer-

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kampfwagen V Panther. This vehicle, with superior firepower and frontal armor, was designed as an answer to the Soviet T-34 tank. On the defense, it was vastly superior to the Sherman, sometimes requiring five Shermans to destroy one Panther. The Tiger was a more formidable foe; one Tiger, commanded by Hauptman Michael Wittmann fixed an entire British brigade.[14] However, there were only 93 in the Normandy Campaign; the Panzer Division had two battalions on their table of organization and equipment. The only solution was superior close-air support, numbers, and creative tactics leading up to the breakout in July and August 1944. Interestingly, by September 1944, the Sherman proved its worth during the defensive against the Panther.

During the Battle of Arracourt, in the Lorraine region, the 37th Armor Battal-ion, 4th Armored Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams, was faced with the attacking 113th Panzer Brigade. The 113th and several other brigades like it were tank heavy and designed specifically to counterattack Soviet armored thrusts on the Steppes of the Ukraine — a perfect mission for an 85 percent macro-terrain environment. Unfortunately, the Lorraine is not macro-terrain; it is very dense restricted terrain. When the Panthers attacked 4th Armored (one-fourth of its force was dedicated reconnaissance), they lost contact with the Shermans, still armed with short-barreled 75mm guns. As the Germans continued to attack, they regained contact with the Americans, who were now behind them and on their flanks. The Americans had used the micro-terrain to their advantage and wrecked the German formations.

By the time the allies reached the Rhineland and Huertgen Forest area, the terrain was so restricted that the fight quickly became micro-terrain. The Germans realized they were in no position to fight on macro-terrain against the American's air, artillery, and overwhelming armor, so they moved to the restricted forest terrain, with its high ratio of micro-terrain, where they could force the battle into a squad-on-squad fight; and they still had the best squads. The Germans kept the Americans fixed in the Huertgen Forest for months until they were ready to unleash their offensive in the Ardennes. This micro-terrain fight became a common theme in armies that were beset with no air technology dominance.

The micro-terrain fight can also be seen on other battlefields where one side is totally dominated by sea and air. Iwo Jima

"During the Tet Offensive, the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] took over the old colonial capital of Hue. Once the NVA infiltrated into the city, U.S. and ARVN forces moved in column to dig them out, which gave the enemy an extraordinary advantage in defense. This style of defense was also similar to Iwo Jima; tank canalization, standoff fire, strongpoint matrix, and repeated ambush."

is one of the best examples. The Japanese carved out fighting positions in volcanic rock on Iwo Jima and set up their defense in depth, arranging their machine gun positions so they could not been seen by U.S. Marines. The plan was to attack the Marines from flank and rear.[15] However, the positions were overcome by the incredibly valiant effort of the Marines on the ground. The volcanic rock positions fit perfectly in the severely restricted terrain of Iwo Jima.

The United States' experience in Vietnam illustrates both situations. The Vietnamese had been fighting against foreign armies for some time; they had fought the Japanese and French before the Americans. The Vietnamese used techniques from the Chinese idea of death from one-thousand cuts (lingchi). This style of warfare was designed to fight small-squad through battalion-sized battles in heavily micro-terrain areas and wear down an opponent's resolve, set the conditions to move an opposing army into macro-terrain, and destroy the remnants of the invaders outright. In the jungles of the Mekong Delta and along the coastal plain, the Viet Cong dug tunnels and fighting positions that were reminiscent of the Japanese on Iwo Jima. The Viet Cong often fought in squad- and platoon-sized elements to harass, demoralize, and spread U.S. and Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces thin. They used underground positions and avenues of egress and ingress to prevent fighting to the death. The U.S. forces often assaulted through a position only to find it abandoned.[16] These tactics set the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) into position to attack cities all over South Vietnam in the 1968 Tet Offensive.

During the Tet Offensive, the NVA took over the old colonial capital of Hue. Once the NVA infiltrated into the city, U.S. and ARVN forces moved in column to dig them out, which gave the enemy an extraordinary advantage in defense. This style of defense was also similar to Iwo Jima, characterized by tank canalization, standoff fire, strongpoint matrix, and repeated ambush. These techniques, along with the ability to exfiltrate out of battle positions, effectively abandoning stubbornly defended positions, wreaked havoc with the attacker's mind set, confusing and demoralizing him.[17] These same tactics are presently being employed by insurgent forces in Afghanistan and Iraq against U.S. forces.

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Cobra II in 2003 are excellent examples of war in the macro-terrain. Both of these operations first gained air dominance and were supplied by U.S. dominance at sea. The land combat was mechanized with superior U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks gaining dominance over Iraqi Soviet-made tanks.[18] Supporting infantry cleared the terrain once it had been taken, but they did not need to set conditions prior to movement. The loss of the Iraqi army in the macro-terrain in 2003 toppled Iraq's government. After the end of major combat operations in April 2003, there was a relative calm, at least until 4 April 2004, when the first Sadr insurgency began in Sadr City and Fallujah. This insurgency lead to others erupting all over Iraq, and they continue to this day.

The current insurgency in Iraq has lead to the strategic, operational, and tactical overhaul of the U.S. military, most notably, its Army. These changes focus on modular combined arms brigades that can be assigned to a division headquarters. A typical division could have two heavy brigades, a Stryker infantry brigade, a light infantry brigade, and a local Iraqi brigade. In the past, a division was either heavy or light, not mixed for specific missions. The present insurgency in the micro-terrain of the cities of Iraq and Afghanistan require more infantry than armor, but still requires an armor force for true combined arms. Military organization is not the only answer to fighting an insurgency in the micro-terrain.

A micro-terrain fight is one of soldier against soldier, not machine against machine. The better led, motivated, and trained squads will win the tactical fight. The better supplied force will keep the squads in the fight, which is an operational dilemma due to the asymmetric style of the combat, and the country must mobilize its economic, military, and media forces to win the hearts and minds of its own populace, as well as that of the enemy. As long as the enemy has the will to fight, it will; all it has to do is exist.

Sun Tzu once said that there are two types of combat, orthodox and unorthodox; they way one mixes and matches these two fights are infinite. Today, this translates into the macro- and micro-terrain fight. The decision to take a country to war depends on several factors, but how it fights depends on terrain.

A war against another nation state's army means that it is necessary to first gain global dominance over the macro-terrain of sea and air. The operational level of war must be prepared to fight in the macro- and micro-terrains, which means the right mixture of the combined arms force and the right logistics tail to move it to the battlefield and keep it supplied. The tactical fight means maneuvering the right force to gain dominance over the micro-terrain and macro-terrain, with technology dominating macro and the human mind dominating the micro. A micro-terrain fight is between squads, and the men who serve in them. The fight is won in the hearts and souls of those men. A nation must be completely prepared to fight in these venues — being unprepared will result in losing to an enemy who is fully prepared to fight to the bitter end.

Notes

[1]U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,* U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 8 July 1994, chapter 4.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]J.F.C. Fuller, *Military History of the Western World: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto,* Volume 1, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, August 1987; and John Keegan, *Fields of Battle,* Knopf, New York, 1995, p. 110.

[6]FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics,* GPO, Washington, DC, September 2004, pp. 1-177.

[7]*Roots of Strategy: 4 Military Classics: The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Command of the Air, Winged Defense,* David Jablonsky, ed., Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, August 1999.

[8]Fuller, *Military History of the Western World.*

[9]Wikipedia, "HMS *Dreadnaught* (Battleship, 1906-1922)," online at *http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/uk/uksh-d/drednt9.htm.*

[10]Wikipedia, "KBismarck," online at *http://kbismarck.com.*

[11]Tom Clancy, *Carrier,* Berkley Books, New York, 1999, pp. 13-16.

[12]Michael D. Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy,* University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1994, p. 37.

[13]Hans Von Luck, *Panzer Commander,* Cassell, 1989, p. 193.

[14]Patrick Agte, *Michael Wittmann,* Volume II, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006. p. 33.

[15]H. John Poole, *Phantom Soldier,* Posterity Press, Emerald Isle, 2001, p. 63.

[16]Ibid., p. 124.

[17]Ibid., p. 163.

[18]Tom Clancy, *Armor Cav,* Berkley Books, New York, 1994, pp. 57-58.

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Rush Hour:

24 Hours of Route Security along MSR Tampa

by Captain Amos Y. Oh

Iraq's Highway 1, known as Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa, is a six-lane highway that runs north from Syria and south to Kuwait. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MSR Tampa has been the main logistics pipeline for the entire theater of operations. In April of 2004, Iraqi insurgents, collectively known as anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), conducted a series of coordinated attacks against coalition logistics convoys, resulting in a temporary suspension of all nonessential movement along the route. Since that time, a sizable number of U.S. forces have been dedicated to securing MSR Tampa. During the months from April 2005 to February 2006, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/3 ACR), was responsible for securing a portion of the route that ran from southeast to northwest along the outskirts of southern Baghdad.

Staging out of Forward Operating Base Falcon in southern Baghdad, each of the three cavalry troops and one tank company was responsible for securing a 15-kilometer stretch of MSR Tampa in conjunction with conducting offensive and stability/reconstruction operations. Also assisting in route security were various military police (MP) and aviation assets which received their missions directly from division and corps level.

By July 2005, each 3/3 ACR troop was required to continually have two tracked vehicles along its assigned portion of the route. On 17 July, 1st Platoon, I Troop, 3/3 ACR, was tasked with the route security mission. Within a 24-hour period, the platoon discovered one improvised explosive device (IED) prior to its detonation; helped secure an adjacent unit that had suffered a catastrophic IED attack, and coordinated close air support (CAS) to destroy insurgents conducting a complex attack against a contract logistics convoy. During this series of disjointed engagements, the AIF continuously had the advantage of choosing the time and place of the battle, and displayed

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a heightened level of military skill. However, these advantages were negated by superior U.S. firepower, situational awareness assets, and the ability to rapidly mass combat power, rendering the AIF incapable of accomplishing its mission.

The Mission

At approximately 1200 hours on 17 July 2005, 3 weeks after our unit arrived in Iraq, two of our M3A2 Bradley sections departed FOB Falcon to relieve one of our other sections, which was patrolling MSR Tampa (led by our senior scout, Red 2). These patrols were never routine; we would typically face a gamut of civilian traffic, and occasionally be engaged with small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the ubiquitous IED. Invariably, we would normally encounter at least one form of contact; however, on this particular day, we would encounter all three.

By this stage of the war, the AIF clearly realized the value of MSR Tampa to U.S. forces. Improved to western standards during the 1980s, the portion of MSR Tampa on the outskirts of Baghdad had all the features of a California interstate, to include a divided highway, complex interchanges, and American-style signs posted in Arabic and English. Logistics convoys, mostly civilian contract tractor trailers, were slow and vulnerable targets. If this vital artery was severed, U.S. operations throughout Iraq would quickly be halted. Securing the entire MSR consumed vast amounts of combat power, but there was simply no alternative. For the duration, every kilometer of MSR Tampa would be contested.

By July 2005, civilian traffic on MSR Tampa was limited to travel during daylight hours. Debris and brush were constantly being removed and the roads were cleared of vendors and bystanders. Conversely, military logistics convoys would travel almost exclusively at night. However, patrols were continuous throughout the day in an effort to prevent AIF from emplacing IEDs and preparing ambushes to attack convoys later in the day. These patrols routinely operated for 12 hours and patrolled to identify IEDs, conducted random vehicle searches, and established overt short-duration observation posts (OPs) to overwatch the route (often on overpasses).

Earlier on the morning of 17 July, Red 2 identified an IED, which was successfully rendered safe by explosive ordnance personnel. At approximately 1200 hours, I (Red 1) relieved Red 2 and began patrolling the route with my wingman. At 1550 hours, approximately 4 kilometers to the south of our sector, an IED destroyed a HMMWV (M1114) that belonged to 1st Battalion, 108th (1-108) Armor, 48th Brigade Combat Team. Although the unit did not need direct assistance, we temporarily closed the MSR to prevent the enemy from driving by and video recording the attack site for use in propaganda videos (a common enemy tactic in our area of operations).

After the medical evacuation was complete, we continued our patrols and established an OP as darkness fell. At 2200 hours, approximately 2 kilometers to the west of our position, the enemy launched a complex ambush against a 50-vehicle contract convoy with an IED attack on the lead vehicle. This effectively brought the convoy to a stop, at which time it was engaged with small-arms fire and what was later confirmed as RPG attacks. The escort vehicles began suppressing an enemy they could not effectively engage, as the enemy emplaced their positions behind a canal, which ran parallel to the MSR.

Our section began to move toward the ambush site, along with an MP platoon located in the vicinity, which caused the enemy to slow its rate of fire. Due to the terrain, we could not maneuver toward the enemy, so I requested rotary wing close-air support (CAS), which continuously remained on alert over Baghdad. Within minutes, two Apaches (AH-64s) arrived overhead, which the enemy uncharacteristically began to engage. The contract convoy took this opportunity to rapidly move out of the engagement area. One aircraft sustained minor damage, but destroyed the pickup truck in which the AIF were attempting to escape.

This attack marked the beginning of far more concerted efforts by the AIF to disrupt U.S. operations along MSR Tampa. The enemy displayed a surprising level of proficiency in terms of small-arms fire accuracy and selection of terrain, and displayed knowledge of military tactics far superior to that which we had previously encountered. Over the next 8 months, the amount of combat power we devoted to secure the route continually increased.

Lessons Learned

During our mission, we quickly realized that air assets (push CAS) were an invaluable asset. While the squadron had a standardized detailed air-ground integration (AGI) checklist, it proved to be difficult to execute while in contact. Instead, we used a simple task, purpose, and orientation to the battlefield that explained the composition and disposition of friendly and enemy forces, which proved sufficient. Much of this coordination was unofficially done in advance; the air assets habitually operating in our area of operations had our frequency and call-signs and vice versa, which often circumvented the lengthy and cumbersome process of passing requests through multiple echelons of command.

Every vehicle in the platoon carried an AN/PEQ-2A in its turret, which was an

invaluable tool that served as an aiming light for air assets, as well as land forces. In addition, Blue Force Tracker (BFT) was used to help verify that friendly forces moving to the area were not within the aircraft's engagement area. Although the convoy was transiting through our battlespace, we were unable to coordinate with it because we did not have their frequency and call signs. As a result, the only alternative was face-to-face communication, which was not practical. Later convoys with BFT capability were "free-texted" our contact information as they approached our area of operations. Frequency modulation (FM) coordination helps reduce fratricide by alerting transiting convoys where OPs are established and affords them the opportunity to receive details on recent significant enemy activities.

Mission Analysis

The complex attack along MSR Tampa was well planned and would have been more devastating if multi-national forces had not reacted so quickly with overwhelming combat power. The attack occurred in the same vicinity as the IED attack on 1-108 Armor, which indicated a large portion of the local populace supported the AIF. The source of the two initial explosions was unknown, and since there was no indication of an IED, it is possible the initial attacks were carried out with RPGs. The small-arms fire did not start until after the convoy had slowed down or stopped, so it is likely that the initial attack was intentionally directed at the front of the convoy to facilitate a linear ambush. Also, since the tracers were moving at different speeds, it is possible that at least two different weapons systems were used (AK-47s and light/medium machine guns).

The AIF used the terrain to its advantage; the canal that runs parallel to MSR Tampa prevented ground forces from maneuvering onto the enemy. The terrain also provided ample vegetation to the south to conceal enemy forces. The AIF firing at the air element was highly unusual and indicates they were extremely audacious or were concerned their withdrawal was compromised. However, the AIF were astute enough to know not to shoot until the trail aircraft had passed; unfortunately, the night's high level of illumination silhouetted the aircraft and facilitated the AIF attacks.

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"Our section began to move toward the ambush site, along with an MP platoon located in the vicinity, which caused the enemy to slow its rate of fire. Due to the terrain, we could not maneuver toward the enemy, so I requested rotary wing close-air support (CAS), which continuously remained on alert over Baghdad. Within minutes, two Apaches (AH-64s) arrived overhead, which the enemy uncharacteristically began to engage."

for level 1 languages such as Spanish and French) when their skills are needed elsewhere. We may see this transformation when current mid-level officers begin reaching levels of brigade and division command within the next 10 to 15 years.

Solving the void of cultural awareness and understanding in our formations is not simple. As mentioned before, it starts at the top; priorities must be placed on training our soldiers, at all levels, in understanding various cultures. A basic understanding of culture must begin with language and may lead to interaction during training with foreign nationals or, optimally, a cultural immersion in the target language country.

Recently, commanders began sending junior-level soldiers to study language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, California, in preparation for future deployments. These soldiers are primarily assigned to combat formations and are infantrymen, tankers, scouts, and artillerymen. This is quite a shift from sending only linguists or cryptographers for language study. Language study at DLI not only teaches languages, but immerses a student in the culture through various means. It is difficult to release a group of soldiers from your ranks

during deployment training; however, these soldiers will be a tremendous asset to the unit and during deployment. We attempt, as much as possible, to not hinder other schooling opportunities, such as Sniper School, Air Assault School, Ranger School, Warrior Leaders Course, and noncommissioned officers courses. The same effort should be applied to cultural awareness/understanding schooling opportunities. As a caveat, DLI does a wonderful job of implementing cultural studies into language training. The school is well aware that language study alone does not constitute cultural awareness.

The U.S. Army, as a whole, needs worldwide cultural awareness and understanding because it is not just in the business of killing a faceless enemy. Our ignorance of other cultures and the impact of misperceptions of what we perceive as "normal" actions will undermine our mission success and waste resources through failures. The tip of the spear is the soldier who interacts with local nationals while conducting daily operations. That soldier's actions will likely have a tremendous impact on the unit's overall success, just based on what he or she does or says.

Based on recent DoD directives and studies (2005 to present), it takes time and

resources to implement programs, which explains why cultural awareness/understanding and language proficiency is stressed at the Army level, but is not yet a priority at the junior level. More importantly, it takes effort to prioritize this type of training; there are those who think it is a waste of time and just one more thing added to an already-overfilled plate. This thinking will take time to transform.

The reality is we can no longer afford to focus only on warfighting skills and killing the enemy; we are tasked to do more. We took on peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and there were arguments about the military's role during these operations. Judging by our current doctrine, we accepted that role and will continue to accept it into the foreseeable future. Consequently, we should accept our global role and teach our soldiers to be diplomatic, proficient in foreign language(s), and culturally aware. The battlefield is evolving and the armor branch has an obligation to prepare its warriors for that evolution — we will continue the spearhead tradition by leading the charge in this new task.

Notes

[1]Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41, Subject: Defense Language Program, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 21 October 2005, paras 4.1 and 4.1.3, pp. 2-3.

[2]Ullrich Fichtner, "The U.S. Army Learns Mistakes in Iraq, *Spiegel Online*, 18 December 2006, URL: *http:/www.spiegel.de/international/Spiegel/0,1518,455165,00.html.*

[3]Tom Regan, "Pentagon Studies Examine 'Mistakes' in Iraq, Afghanistan, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 August 2006, URL: *http://csmonitor.com/2006/0816/dailyUpdate.html.*

[4]Department of Defense, *Defense Language Roadmap,* U.S. Department of Defense, January 2005, p. 3.

[5]"In Foreign Language Proficiency, Generals Should Lead by Example," *Digital Journal, Open Source Media,* 11 May 2007, URL: *www.digitaljournal.com/article/180520/In_Foreign_Language_Proficiency_Generals_Should_Leade_By_Example.*

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

"Contrary to popular belief, and from an isolationist viewpoint, Americans are not held in high regard in some cultures — most of these cultures do not like us because we are Americans. This view of Americans by other cultures and our own prejudices can be mended and a bridge of understanding built by interaction and cooperation. We, as an armor force, were truly unprepared for the culture shock faced in Iraq."

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REVIEWS

Slaughter Over Sicily by Charles Whiting, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., South Yorkshire, England, 2006, 179 pp., $14.74 (paperback)

The well-entrenched mystique, in our current Army notwithstanding, concerning the efficacy of large-scale airborne operations is still a subject of debate in some circles. The largest and most well-known airborne operations in military history were executed more than 60 years ago with mixed, perhaps even disastrous, results. Assaults on Crete, Sicily, Normandy, and Arnhem were victories bought at high and questionable prices. British author Charles Whiting tells one of these stories in the 2006 reprint of his 1992 book, *Slaughter over Sicily*. No comparable airborne operations have been successfully executed since World War II. Dropping airborne divisions into the middle of hostile formations of significant size and ability will always be a controversial tactic. Yet, armies worldwide continue to devote assets and expend resources maintaining large airborne formations.

The allied invasion of Sicily had a significant airborne component that was rife with problems from the beginning. Intelligence, training, equipment, planning, and coordination shortfalls and failures caused hundreds of deaths among the airborne troopers and flight crews from accidents and friendly fire before they reached the invasion beaches. The result was a fiasco that placed the entire operation at risk. Post-operation investigations and analysis resulted in finger pointing between the Army, Navy, and Air Services, and between the British and Americans. The exact cause of the debacle has yet to be agreed on to this day. In the aftermath, General Eisenhower cancelled all future British and American airborne operations and privately wrote, "I do not believe in the airborne division." Although he would later lift this ban for the invasion of Normandy, the future of airborne operations was in doubt and has been under scrutiny ever since.

Slaughter over Sicily is a well-written, but loosely constructed, narrative of these events. Rather than a solid history, the style applied reduces this book to an entertaining, but hardly elucidative, series of anecdotes, in many of which the author frequently strays from his topic causing the reader to wonder where he is going with a particular line of examination. For example, the chapter on military intelligence attempting to glean information about Sicily through contacts with New York mafia families is interesting, but seems out of place in a book on airborne operations. The occasional notes only serve to further the anecdotal information. The index is incomplete and the source list is nothing more than a small, but decent, reading list. Not one primary document, other than a few memoirs, is referenced.

The bottom line is, *Slaughter over Sicily* is a good read for one with a casual interest in World War II, but is hardly the final word on the subject. It does not answer the question of what went wrong in Sicily or examine the larger questions of airborne operations. Serious students of World War II or airborne operations would

probably be disappointed by this book and should seek more significant studies on the subject.

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George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership by Stewart W. Husted, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006, 300 pp., with B/W photos, notes, bibliography, and index, $23.95 (hardcover)

George C. Marshall is perhaps the least known of America's great military leaders of World War II. Wartime Army chief of staff, post-war secretary of state (where he advocated America's rebuilding of war-torn Europe in what is known as the "Marshall Plan"), and later secretary of defense during the Korean War, General Marshall has been frequently and favorably compared to George Washington. Professor Stewart Husted's *George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership,* presents Marshall as a "case study in how leaders are developed (made) after years of experiences that shape their character, develop their values, and challenge their decisionmaking and problemsolving skills."

The Random House College Dictionary defines "rubric" as "any rule of conduct or procedure." Washington's own character, according to some biographers, was shaped during his formative years by the repetitive copying of such rules of conduct or "civility." Husted has attempted to distill lessons from Marshall's life into his own "rules" of character and leadership and, while he does not advocate that readers copy the rubrics he's drawn from Marshall's example (good thing because there are over 180 of them!), Husted does suggest that they are "tools…to build or 'reconstruct' a career based on a Marshall servant-leader model." Husted has arranged his material in convenient and easily digested topical chapters, such as "Building and Maintaining Morale," "Communications," and "Conflict Resolution and Negotiation," and he makes a good case for their applicability to military and civilian leaders alike; although, the utility of his last chapter on civil-military relations may be limited to those leaders who work in that environment.

This book is not history; it is a leadership text and Husted does not claim it to be anything else. The examples drawn from Marshall's life are used to illustrate the various rubrics outlined by the author, which does lead to some issues. For example, the reader might wonder about General Marshall's example of selfless service as touted by the author in Chapter X: "A Life of Selfless Service," when a few pages earlier, Marshall is portrayed using his connections with his mentor, General Pershing, to wrangle Pershing's support in securing Marshall's promotion to brigadier general. Husted also suggests that Marshall is an example of correct civil-military relations, yet cites an event during his tenure as Army chief of staff where, not having been consulted in a matter involving the Army Air Corps, he files a directive, signed by Secretary of War Stimson, in his desk draw-

er rather than publish it. In these, and some other cases, the author's rubrics work at cross purposes and the supporting examples drawn from Marshall's life seem contradictory because the vignettes are taken out of their historical context.

The book is also marred slightly in places by spotty editing. Professor Husted could have used the help of an editor to double-check facts, spelling of names and other minor details. Examples include Marshall receiving two awards of the Distinguished Service Medal, not the Distinguished Service Cross, which is given for valor in combat, and John Foster Dulles never served as secretary of the Navy, although he was President Eisenhower's secretary of state. For the general readership, these details are minor and will most likely go unnoticed, but those who are well-read in history may find such lapses annoying.

For the Army officer wishing to examine the life of a great American soldier-leader, a more complete telling of General Marshall's story, like that found in Mark Stoler's fine one-volume biography, will perhaps be more satisfying. But for those who are looking for general leadership lessons, which are easily read and understood, Professor Husted has succeeded in drawing them from someone deserving of study and an exemplar of great leadership and character, and has made them accessible to everyone.

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Colt Terry, Green Beret, Charles D. Patton, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2005, 227 pp., $18.95 (hardcover)

As members of the U.S. Army's elite Special Forces continue to pursue jihadists in Iraq and the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda outlaws in Afghanistan, one is reminded of a not too distant war where Special Forces carried the war to another foe. This war, of course, was Vietnam, and it proved to be the incubator of today's Special Forces operations. Leading this first transformation in land warfare was Lieutenant Colonel Curtis "Colt" Terry, one of the original U.S. Army Green Berets. Author Charles D. Patton's book, *Colt Terry, Green Beret*, is a masterful account of this legendary soldier, who overcame personal adversity to rise to become one of the Army's premier Special Forces' soldiers during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Indeed, as the author concedes, this is a story "of an ordinary man who performed extraordinary deeds" in two wars and in many training exercises, and in time, became a pioneer in the techniques and practices of special operations used today by Special Operations Force soldiers on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the burning plains and deserts of Africa, and in the jungles of South America and Asia.

Born and raised in Florida, Colt Terry entered the U.S. Army in 1946 after a troubled childhood and adolescence. After basic training at Fort Hood, Texas, Private Terry attended the Army Air Force Radar School, located in Boca Raton, Florida, and received training as both a

radar operator and repair technician. Colt later volunteered for and completed airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, where after graduation the Army assigned him to the 82d Airborne Division as a signal technician.

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Corporal Terry volunteered for duty with the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and reported to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where he prepared for combat duty in Korea. After training in California, Terry and the rest of his platoon left for Korea. Assigned to "George" Company with the MOS of radio repairman/rifle squad leader, Sergeant Terry entered combat near Taegu as leader of the 3d Squad. Here, Sergeant Terry had his first taste of combat during the bitter, hard-fought advance past the 38th Parallel. After surviving the harsh winter attacks of November-December 1950, Sergeant Terry and the remainder of the 187th Regiment conducted their first airborne operation near Munson-ni, North Korea, in March 1951, to drive both the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and Chinese Communist forces (CCF) away from the South Korean capital of Seoul. Here, Colt and the members of George Company fought off a series of nighttime counterattacks of Chinese and North Korean soldiers, who attempted to drive the Americans off a hill near the drop zone. After a night of bitter fighting (24-25 March 1951), the paratroopers fell in behind an American tank unit sent to break the siege, and acting as assault troops, the paratroopers "double timed" alongside the tanks as they drove off the enemy.

It was during these early engagements in Korea that Colt Terry began to earn the respect of his superiors and his subordinates as a competent noncommissioned officer. After the airdrop at Munson-ni, Sergeant Terry and the rest of George Company became involved in Operation Ripper (20 February–6 March 1951), General Matthew B. Ridgway's counteroffensive that eventually drove the CCF and NKPA away from Seoul and back across the 38th Parallel.

Colt volunteered for a special unit that was being formed by a then relatively unknown U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, William C. Westmoreland, to conduct special operations behind North Korean lines. After maneuvering his name to the list of qualified candidates, Terry, now a master sergeant, was shortly thereafter off to train with a unit known only by its numeric designation — Miscellaneous Group 8086th Army Unit. Thus began Colt Terry's experience with the Army's Special Forces — little did he realize then that the formation of Miscellaneous Group 8086 was the birth of today's Special Forces.

After being extensively trained by both U.S. Army and CIA instructors, Colt Terry and his fellow soldiers were soon sent into action behind North Korean and CCF lines, to gather intelligence and conduct sabotage operations against enemy facilities and their logistics infrastructure. Terry, placed on Nan-do Island, carried out clandestine operations, along with several other operatives until being slightly wounded. After a quick recuperation, Colt rejoined his special operations group on Nan-do Island until the Army evacuated him in July 1952.

Commissioned a second lieutenant, Colt volunteered for a new group called "Special Forc-es" being formed. Assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) under Colonel Aaron Bank, Lieutenant Terry had just volunteered for what became one of the world's "most elite military forces." Here, the author, relying on interviews with Terry and other members of the original Special Forces group, provides excellent details on the diverse training Lieutenant Colt and his fellow "Green Berets" received as the new unit stood up. Indeed, as Patton writes, the Army underwent a significant "transformation" as it trained this new elite body inside the Army.

Fortunately for the reader, Patton, unlike other authors whose books on the Special Forces deal primarily with the Vietnam War, instead concentrates on the men who made up the first Special Force units — hard men, tempered by war and in possession of a desire to make the Special Forces succeed. Indeed, Patton's book concentrates on what this reviewer terms the 'lost years' of the Army's Special Forces during the 1950s. Indeed, it is here that *Colt Terry, Green Beret*, surpasses other studies, in that the author demonstrates that contrary to the popular mythology of the 1950s, the Army, in fact, underwent a significant "transformation" not unlike the one presently occurring amidst the backdrop of the current Global War on Terror (GWOT).

While Army forces in both the United States and Europe experimented with the so-called "Pentomic" army, built around the premise that the service would operate on a nuclear battlefield during the 1950s, thoughtful leaders in the U.S. Army saw the Special Forces as a more effective means of battling the Soviet Union and communist China in their own backyards. It is here that one notable omission by Patton appears — his failure to point out that the U.S. Army was well positioned to deal with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's call for "Wars of National Liberation" against the West in the Third World. Despite this omission, however, Patton proves a wealth of information on the different types of training Colt underwent as a member of the Army's Special Forces during the 1950s and early 1960s prior to his deployment to Okinawa and Southeast Asia in 1961.

One strong point of the book is the author's attention to detail, particularly in his description of the organization and composition of the Special Forces and the different teams (A, B, and C) that comprised the 10th Special Forces Group. These teams, each charged with a specific mission, suited Colt's talents naturally, for he had served in a variety of units and, as Patton writes, received countless hours of specialized training. This training, Patton writes, was what made Colt Terry different from any other soldier; as a Special Forces officer, the first and foremost requirement was that a leader "had to be a good soldier."

Sent to Okinawa, Japan, and then on to Vietnam, where Colt and his C-Team worked among the Montagnards prior to the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in late October 1963, the Special Forces captain became acquainted early on with the complexities of waging war in South Vietnam. In nearly three tours of duty in Vietnam, Colt Terry fought not only the Viet Cong, but also the hard-core North Vietnamese Army (NVA), as well as in the conflicts that arose among the Montagnards and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In fact, on several occasions, this in-fighting among the Montagnards and ARVN nearly cost Terry and his team their lives, as the South Vietnamese government resented the military assistance being funneled to the Montagnards by the Special Forces and CIA teams. As Patton points out, due to Saigon's oftentimes heavy-handed approach toward the Montagnards, Terry, on more than one occasion, had to use his connections in Saigon and personal diplomacy to keep the Montagnards fighting against the NVA and VC. It is at this juncture that Patton's book has much relevancy to our ongoing war against al Qaeda and jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Terry [and his superiors in Saigon] understood it, counterinsurgencies are oftentimes won at the village level and not at the national level. Patton establishes that the U.S. Army did, in fact, have it right in Vietnam, as the war, demonstrated by the battle at Plei Me, was a mixture of counterinsurgency operations, special operations, and conventional battles.

Yet the war was not totally asymmetrical, as Patton acknowledges, for it oftentimes required combined arms to defeat the enemy as Colt Terry himself experienced during the battle for Plei Me (19 October-4 November 1966). In fact, it was during the battle at Plei Me that the soldiers on Colt Terry's C-Team and their Montagnard allies required assistance from ARVN units to break an enemy siege of their Special Forces camp. Here, an ARVN armored column spearheaded by M113 carriers, M41 tanks, and Huey gunships "punched" through an encircled Special Forces camp located there and, as the U.S. Army's official history of the battle at Plei Me states, "after two hours of battering… [by the ARVN relief column] … the attacking force [NVA] withdrew."

This is a timely book as the Army continues to transform the training of soldiers and officers, while simultaneously fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The one serious shortcoming (in an otherwise excellent book) is the lack of maps that would have made it easier for the reader to have an idea where Colt Terry and his Special Forces group operated in Korea and Vietnam. Nonetheless, this is a book that all soldiers, enlisted and officer alike, should read and have in their professional libraries, as it provides valuable insights into how to fight and win in the contemporary operating environment. With this in mind, company-grade officers and sergeants deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan should read Patton's book, as it is a masterpiece on how to conduct small-unit operations. Indeed, as Patton indicates, Vietnam is a war from which the U.S. Army can learn much about transformation.

The Vietnam War served as the incubator for today's victories in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the GWOT. Indeed, in reading *Colt Terry, Green Beret*, one will come away with the impression that the war in Vietnam was, after all a "win," and that by all accounts, was a war that changed the U.S. Army, the Nation, and a soldier — Colt Terry, for the better.

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2008 Armor Warfighting Conference Frederick M. Franks Jr. Award

The 13th annual Frederick M. Franks Jr. Award will be awarded during the 2008 Armor Warfighting Conference, "Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Conflict." The award is named in honor of now retired General Frederick M. Franks Jr., and awarded to an outstanding leader who has demonstrated a longtime contribution to the ground warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Army. This award signifies the same steadfast devotion of the U.S. Army's principles as exemplified through General Franks — duty, honor, country.

General Franks is revered for his brilliant command of the VII Corps during the coalition's main effort in Operation Desert Storm, defeating 14 Iraqi battalions, including the elite Republican Guard, while receiving less than 100 American casualties. General Franks' "Hail Mary" maneuver feat has gone unmatched in modern warfare.

His achievements in the Middle East were the result of proven combat leadership, as further evidenced by his long history of successful battlefield accomplishments. He saw intense combat in Vietnam, where he earned the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star with V Device, 43 Air Medals, and 2 Purple Hearts.

Because of General Franks' devotion to his country, his knowledge of the battlefield, and his valorous actions, an award was created in his name for soldiers exemplifying these same characteristics. Maintaining the example so well demonstrated by the award's namesake, any soldier can recommend another soldier or civilian for the award. Brigade-level commanders may nominate soldiers, and division/post-level commanders must endorse the nomination and forward it to the U.S. Army Armor Center. Major commands are not limited in the number of nominees they may submit.

To receive a nomination for the Franks Award, each nominee must have offered a vision that significantly improved the combat survivability, lethality, or mobility of the mounted force; developed an innovation in equipment, materiel, or doctrine that significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the mounted combat-arms elements; exemplified professional excellence in demeanor, correspondence, and leadership on issues relevant to mounted warfare; and displayed a love of soldiering through leadership skills, recognition of the sacrifice and achievements of subordinates, and attention to the intent and directions of higher commands.

Eligibility is awarded to mounted active duty and reserve officers, infantry officers, mounted noncommissioned officers, Department of the Army civilians, and anyone who has demonstrated a longtime contribution to the ground warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Army.

Nomination packets must include, at a minimum, an ORB/ERB with photo, a letter of recommendation stating how the nominee met the above criteria, and letters of endorsement from brigade and division/post level. Additional information, such as video or pictures that highlight the character, leadership abilities, and contributions, regarding the quality of the nominee is highly recommended. Past awards have gone to the following distinguished leaders for their contributions to the U.S. Army's warfighting capabilities:

2007 - Armor and Cavalry Soldiers for their dedicated service during the Global War on Terrorism.

2006 - 1SG Richard K. Johnson for his key role in the training, development, and dissemination of TTPs and related information that affects hundreds of thousands of coalition force soldiers.

2004 - LTG William S. Wallace for his command of V Corps and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime.

2003 - MG Julian H. Burns Jr., for a multitude of high-level positions he held throughout his career.

2002 - MAJ Michael C. Kasales for his work in developing IBCT and reconnaissance doctrine as part of the transformation process and its monumental impact on how the IBCT fights and trains.

The Franks Award winner will be presented the award during the 2008 Armor Warfighting Conference and the Armor Center will pay the TDY costs of the award recipient. Nominations must be submitted to the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-O (Franks Award), Fort Knox, KY 40121, no later than 1 March 2008. Alternate submittal is encouraged via e-mail to *armor.conference@conus.army.mil.* Packets will be evaluated in a competitive board process with the recommendation forwarded to the Chief of Armor for review and final approval. Please identify potential nominees and submit nominations as soon as possible. Incomplete packets will not be accepted or processed.

194th Armored Brigade Hosts Combatives Tournament

On today's battlefield, hand-to-hand combat is a fundamental requirement for soldiers at all levels. Our soldiers face situations daily where they must rely on their physical abilities to disable an enemy without pulling a trigger. Combatives training builds competence; confidence comes from competence. The current operating environment requires soldiers to be aggressive; they must have a faith in their abilities, which is built through hard and arduous training and the confidence in knowing they are going to win.

On 16 and 17 November 2007, Fort Knox soldiers were given the opportunity to showcase their combatives skills.

Soldiers from the 194th Armored Brigade combatives team put a different twist on this event. The tournament marked the first time Fort Knox invited soldiers from outside installations to compete. Soldiers from Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, Fort Hood, Illinois National Guard, Camp Atterbury, 95th Division (USAR), and 100th Division (USAR) competed in the event. More than 300 people showed support for soldiers who competed in 7 weight classes. The tournament was a great success and a proven measure in the success of the combatives training program.

Thanks to everyone for your support.

PB 17-08-1

Headquarters, Department of the Army
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