

# ARMOR

May-June 2007





# ARMOR

*The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-3*

Editor in Chief  
**LTC SHANE E. LEE**

Managing Editor  
**CHRISTY BOURGEOIS**

Commandant  
**MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS**

*ARMOR* (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

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
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Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

USPS 467-970



**“From My Position...”**

*“Few men are born brave; many become so through training and force of discipline.”*

Flavius Vegetius Renatus  
*Military Instructions of the Romans,*  
 c. AD 378.

The pages of *ARMOR* are normally devoted to articles gathered from the operational force, historical analyses of previous military operations, or descriptions of the latest developments in armor technology. We rarely discuss the fundamental component of the armor force: the mounted soldier and his training. As indicated by the cover, this issue focuses almost exclusively on individual training.

Soldiers who received basic combat training at Fort Knox prior to 2004 will be amazed at the changes in the 1st Armor Training Brigade’s (1ATB) program of instruction. During the Cold War, initial entry training was conducted with the assumption that there would be plenty of time for the operational force to train advanced Soldier skills not covered in basic training or to enhance those already introduced. As a result, basic combat training was just that — basic. It was designed to turn citizens into Soldiers while offering the basic skills necessary to take advantage of the more advanced collective training they would receive during their first assignments.

Today’s graduating Soldiers leave basic combat training better prepared to face the challenges they will encounter while deployed than their Cold War predecessors. They are much more proficient with their personal weapons, have been trained on a number of crew-served weapons, and are highly capable of administering life-saving first aid. If you are not familiar with all of the changes to individual training that have taken place over the past few years, this issue provides an overview of the current training conducted in 1ATB. Colonel Peter Utley’s article on initial entry training, and Captain Anthony Rose and Staff Sergeant Travis Brandon’s article on urban combat training provide both a comprehensive introduction to the brigade’s operations and a detailed look at how the brigade prepares Soldiers for close quarter battle. The articles be-

tween these two provide additional detail on armor crewman, cavalry scout, and vehicle recovery training.

British soldiers are justifiably proud of the history, heritage, and proficiency of their army. Like the U.S. Army, the British army is a highly professional and effective combat force that places a high priority on individual training. Few Soldiers in our Army, however, have the opportunity to experience their distinctive version of individual training first hand. Sergeant First Class Matthew Hite, a 19K master gunner, is one of those Soldiers who has not only personally experienced the British army’s individual training, but has also trained Royal Armoured Corps soldiers on the Challenger 2 main battle tank and the Scimitar reconnaissance vehicle for more than 2 years. Assisted by his British counterpart, Staff Sergeant Karl Hilton, Hite provides us with a unique perspective on the merits of the training philosophies of both armies, and offers his insights in “An American in Lulworth: Comparing British and American Armor Training.”

This issue of *ARMOR* also contains several articles consistent with those we have published over the past few years. They address topics, such as the use of a ground cavalry troop in Afghanistan and a recommended organization for a unit rear detachment. They are relevant and practical articles written by authors willing to share their hard-earned experiences for the force’s benefit.

To paraphrase Vegetius’ ancient quote, “bravery is the product of good training and discipline.” Individual training, the foundation on which all other training is built, deserves much more attention than we have given it in the past. If we are truly to produce the “decathletes” and adaptive leaders the current operational environment demands, then we should spend at least as much time discussing individual training as we do discussing the latest concepts in maneuver doctrine or the newest combat vehicle. Although this is the first issue in a long time that focuses on this subject, our intent is to continue the discussion long into the future.

S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.  
 General, United States Army  
 Chief of Staff

Official:

*Joyce E. Morrow*  
 JOYCE E. MORROW  
 Administrative Assistant to the  
 Secretary of the Army

# Points of Contact

DSN prefix – 464-  
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

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## ARMOR Editorial Offices

---

<b>Editor in Chief</b> LTC Shane E. Lee E-mail: shane.lee@conus.army.mil	4087
<b>Managing Editor</b> Christy Bourgeois E-mail: charlotte.bourgeois@conus.army.mil	4582
<b>Editor</b> Vivian Oertle E-mail: vivian.oertle@conus.army.mil	2610
<b>Art Director</b> Mr. Jody Harmon E-mail: jody.harmon@conus.army.mil	3923
<b>Editorial Assistant</b> Kathy A. Johnson E-mail: kathy.johnson5@conus.army.mil	2249

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**EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS:** *ARMOR*, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

**ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE:** Visit the *ARMOR* magazine web site at *www.knox.army.mil/armormag*.

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## U.S. Army Armor Center

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<b>Commanding General</b> MG Robert M. Williams E-mail: robert.m.williams@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-CG) 2121
<b>Deputy Commanding General</b> VACANT	(ATZK-DCG) 7555
<b>Chief of Staff</b> COL Russell Cloy E-mail: russell.cloy@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-CS) 1101
<b>Command Sergeant Major</b> CSM Otis Smith E-mail: otis.smith@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-CSM) 4952
<b>Command Sergeant Major to DCG</b> CSM Raymond Chandler E-mail: ray.chandler@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-DCG-CSM) 7091
<b>Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG)</b> COL Marlin Levendoski E-mail: marlin.levendoski@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-SA) 1315
<b>Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development</b> COL Richard G. Piscal E-mail: richard.piscal@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-TD) 8247
<b>TRADOC Capability Manager for Heavy Brigade Combat Team</b> COL Jeff B. Swisher E-mail: jeff.swisher@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-TS) 7955
<b>Experimentation and Analysis Directorate</b> COL David Hubner E-mail: david.hubner@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-UAE) 7809
<b>TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle Command/Combat Identification</b> COL Alan Mosher E-mail: alan-mosher@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-PBC-CID) 4009
<b>Office, Chief of Armor</b> Aubrey Henley E-mail: aubrey.henley@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-AR) 5155 FAX 7585
<b>Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab</b> Joe Hughes E-mail: henry.joseph.hughes@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-UA) 5050
<b>Assistant TRADOC Capability Manager Soldier - Mounted Warrior</b> Larry Hasty E-mail: larry.hasty@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-ATS) 3662

---

## U.S. Army Armor School

---

<b>Director of the Armor School</b> COL Robert Valdivia E-mail: robert.valdivia@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-DAS) 1050
<b>1st Armor Training Brigade</b> COL Peter D. Utley E-mail: peter.utley@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-BAZ) 8736
<b>16th Cavalry Regiment</b> COL Robert R. Naething E-mail: robert.naething@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-SBZ) 7848
<b>NCO Academy</b> CSM Samuel Wilson E-mail: samuel.coleman.wilson@conus.army.mil	(ATZK-NC) 5150



# LETTERS

## Short-term Focus at the Expense of Long-term Technical Competency

Dear *ARMOR*,

After reading the January-February 2007 issue of *ARMOR*, I am encouraged to see that there is some concern with the Armor branch and the mounted maneuver community maintaining their core competencies. Major General Williams' column and the article by Captain Dan Helmer go hand in hand; if we don't maintain our basic skills, all the counterinsurgency knowledge and experience in the world won't amount to a hill of beans.

As a tank company commander, I saw my company do well during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, but there were clearly 19K-specific technical skill shortfalls that became evident, mostly at the junior rank levels in the areas of boresighting, gunning, platoon maneuver — in short, tanking. In my own analysis, I think we have ultimately focused on short-term combat operations in Iraq at the expense of long-term technical competency, which leads me to wonder what we teach in the military education systems. Most courses have been reduced in length for a number of reasons to include keeping more soldiers available for deployment and reducing costs. Why are we shortening leadership and MOS-specific courses? Can't we support the GWOT while simultaneously maintaining the foundation for success against another armored threat? If anything, I'd recommend revisiting what we've eliminated from our professional education courses and add more content to the courses, even if that means a soldier won't be available for every collective training event. We have no idea where the next battlefield will be or what it will require, but if we can't execute the basics, we're asking for trouble. We have cut too much and may pay a high price if we don't consider our long-term prospects.

IRVIN OLIVER JR.  
CPT, U.S. Army

## Scouts Out!!!! Four Decades of Studying the Wrong Problem

Dear *ARMOR*,

In his March-April 2007 article, "Scouts Out — But Not in HMMWVs!" Dr. Robert Cameron lays out an excellent history of the heavy battalion scout platoon's current vehicle dilemma, but I suggest that he missed a key issue. I contend that the doctrinal role of the scout platoon is generally misunderstood and until it is articulated correctly, all proposed organizational and equipment solutions are moot. While I agree that the HMMWV is unsuitable, so is the cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV). The battalion scout needs the M113A3 armored personnel carrier (APC), or something similar.

The doctrinal role of the battalion scout platoon is distinctly different from that of a cavalry scout platoon of a cavalry troop. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations* (December 1996), clearly spelled it out in Figure 1-4. Battalion scouts have a distinctly limited mission profile of route, area, and zone recon,

and security screen. The battalion scout platoon does not do recon in force, guard, cover, or area security (including route and convoy security, or hasty attack). It does not perform attack, movement to contact, defend battle position, defend sector, or retrograde (delay).

FM 17-98, *Scout Platoon*, is likely a major source of confusion as it addresses all scouts together in one volume. It should be revised into separate volumes to create "heavy battalion scout platoon" and "cavalry scout platoon" versions.

Dr. Cameron mentions the various Rand Corporation studies concerning practices at the National Training Center (NTC) and the scouts' generally poor results under all organizations. I contend that they studied the wrong issue. Instead of "stealthy recon" versus "fighting for information," they should have asked, "Why are scouts in front of a heavy battalion that is executing a movement to contact?" An Abrams/Bradley company team does not need a Bradley or HMMWV "point" to show where to engage the enemy. That's what movement techniques and gunnery are for. Once the main body crosses the line of departure, the scout platoon should be executing its flank screening mission or revert to battalion reserve.

The issue of battalion scouts "finding the enemy" is nothing but a "brigade and above" leadership and command problem and an artificiality of battalion-level training. If you don't think the enemy is there, why are you attacking with heavy maneuver battalions? If the brigade commander is ignorant of any enemy situation, he requests and deploys armored and air cavalry. If he assumes there is an enemy presence, he templates it and then launches a movement to contact or a deliberate attack. At this point, the maneuver battalion and company commanders have specific objectives. They don't need scouts to lead them to the objective.

Regarding equipment, it is not even a question of finding the proper mix. Neither the HMMWV nor the M3 CFV is suited for the battalion scout platoon. We should never have withdrawn the M113 APC scout platoon.

I reject the argument of inadequate mobility. If the main body is outrunning the scouts, they are being employed incorrectly. And I have never read where the NTC opposing force (OPFOR) was outmaneuvered or lacked mobility while most of its vehicles were modified M113s.

I also challenge the need for the 25mm cannon. As I read Dr. Cameron's article, I doubt that any of the various studies identified a deficiency in firepower and a need for the 25mm. It just happened to come with the M3 CFV because that was part of the infantry's Bradley fighting vehicle program.

But let's set aside all of this stuff about doctrine, training, organization, equipment, studies, profiles, and requirements. Here's what I think really happened:

In the early 1970s, infantry had a perfectly satisfactory APC, but wanted an armored TOW variant for mechanized infantry. The original unprotected pedestal mount was exposed and after a ludicrous half-measure called "TOW-Cap" (a Kevlar "pup tent") the Army finally de-

veloped and fielded the M901 ITV with its complicated, top heavy, slow-to-erect hammerhead turret. This was acceptable to the weapons platoon of the mechanized infantry company, which generally overwatched maneuvering platoons. The M901 also suited the antitank platoon of the mechanized battalion's combat support company. Unfortunately, the proliferating M901 was now the *only* choice available, so the scouts got it, and their mobility and readiness suffered dramatically.

Failing to recognize the specific problem, over time armor grew dissatisfied with the APC scouts overall. Armor then jumped at the next item, the bigger, faster, and heavily-armed Bradley. Though the Bradley is an excellent infantry, and even cavalry, fighting vehicle, it still makes for a poor scout vehicle. So in desperate confusion, they jumped to the other extreme, the HMMWV, and got still worse results. Since then, they have been repeatedly, desperately, maniacally, trying various combinations of the HMMWV and CFV. And still it doesn't work.

Meanwhile, the original problem simply involved getting a suitable long-range overwatch weapon, while the solution — the troubled ITV — was a failure. The correct solution then was to employ the platoon correctly; continue to use the APC for scouting; and fix or replace the M901 ITV. The same problem exists today; however, by simply applying those three things, the battalion scout platoon would be successful. As an *interim* fix, I suggest the CFV for the ITV's overwatching role.

Four decades of studying the wrong problem.

CHESTER A. KOJRO  
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

## Saint George's Rules of Engagement


Dear *ARMOR*,

Saint George is the Patron Saint of Cavalry and Armor. The image of Saint George is a knight on horseback running a lance through a dragon. According to legend, Saint George killed a dragon in the defense of virtue. It is told that near the end of the third century, George the knight rode his horse into a small village. As he entered, he saw the villagers dragging a woman off to be sacrificed. When he asked what was happening, the villagers told George of the terrible dragon that would terrorize the town if they did not sacrifice a maiden every so often. George replied that the villagers should stand up for themselves, but they were too weak — many had tried and many had died. At that, George grabbed his lance and charged off to the dragon's lair.

On his arrival, the dragon came out to kill the young knight, but George, the defender of the innocent, was victorious and slew the dragon. The villagers were so impressed and thankful they gathered all the money of the village and gave it to George as a reward. George, being a saintly knight, could not accept reward for doing the right thing. George redistributed the monies to the needy members of the village and rode off to his next mission.

*Continued on Page 49*

Major General Robert M. Williams  
Commanding General  
U.S. Army Armor Center



## Mastering the Transition

Leaders at all echelons are judged by how well they accomplish difficult tasks and react to change. The toughest part of a fight, whether during training or combat, is at the transition between phases of a plan. Making a transition quickly and successfully can be the difference between success and failure. Champion football teams drill the quick transition from defense to offense that occurs during an interception, knowing that capitalizing on that transition could result in a quick score. This switch is not just a physical shift from tackling to blocking, but also a mental shift that enables players to view the field from a different angle.

Transitions between types of military operations are similar. They involve mental and physical shifts — tied together by leadership. Several books have been written over the past four years analyzing the shift from high-intensity combat operations to stability operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Recently, our allies in the Israeli Defense Force experienced the opposite transition — one from stability operations to high-intensity combat against a well-equipped, well-trained irregular force. If history serves as a good example, we will experience that same shift on a future battlefield.

The challenges we face when transitioning between types of operations is due, in part, to shifts in rules of engagement, amount and types of intelligence, and time constraints. For example, when a

platoon is ambushed en route to a meeting with a local city council, it transitions from security to combat operations. A well-trained platoon will react with a battle drill, transitioning quickly. When a battalion or brigade is given a mission to halt a humanitarian assistance operation and attack a known terrorist training camp, a similar transition occurs. When our Army faces its next foe on the battlefield, it may very possibly require transition from stability-focused, full-spectrum operations to combat-focused operations. In each case, tactical, operational, and strategic, mental and physical shifts are necessary.

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, one of our most recently republished manuals, highlights mental agility as a key facet of a successful leader. Mental agility is essential when shifting from a mission that places primacy on casualty avoidance to a mission that focuses on destroying the enemy. In addition, the flexible timelines generally associated with stability operations require leaders to understand conditions-based operations, ensuring near-perfect conditions are met prior to launch. This flexibility is not a luxury usually associated with high-intensity combat operations. The mental shift between types of operations requires a leader capable of overcoming the individual and organizational inertia that plagues large formations. The mental domain is shaped by the knowledge and skills of the organization as demonstrated by their readiness level


and a host of other factors. It is the enlightened leader, who, through the use of his battle command systems, can communicate the appropriate operational picture to his subordinates and focus their efforts on the changing situation.

The physical domain is much more concrete and is always tied to logistics and geography. The shift in physical assets, usually identified during mission analysis, requires a hard look at the assets needed at each phase of the operation. The appropriate use of fire support assets, maneuver assets, and countermobility assets are just a few examples of the physical assets whose roles must be redefined when transitioning. Lines of communication and logistics estimates are additional physical constraints that may affect the unit's ability to shift missions quickly.

The key to any operations transition is the leader's ability to see the enemy, see himself, visualize the future, and ultimately communicate his vision to the force. As an Army, we will be faced with making this transition on a global scale. While we are currently engaged in stability operations at the strategic level, we must be prepared to transition quickly to offensive- or defensive-focused operations. Essential to this transition will be the knowledge and skills of the force and the ability of our leaders to harness those skills at the appropriate time.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

CSM Otis Smith  
Command Sergeant Major  
U.S. Army Armor Center



## Improved Combat Vehicle Crewman's Uniform

The U.S. Army Armor Center is working in conjunction with Program Executive Office (PEO)-Soldier to improve the combat vehicle crewman's (CVC) flame retardant uniform. This effort, known as the improved CVC (iCVC) uniform, updates the current one-piece flame-retardant CVC uniform, which provides improved flame protection, increased durability, incorporates design changes for improved fit and function, and is crafted using the universal camouflage pattern. With these upgrades, the uniform meets the Mounted Soldier System program requirements.

During user evaluation, we will be looking at an alternate fabric called "Abrams," and at anti-abrasion technologies to improve the durability of the seat and back area of the CVC uniform. The alternate fabric is a little heavier than Nomex material, but should provide better durability, withstand abrasion, and offer better resistance to fading.

Some changes have already been made to the CVC uniform, which are currently under an ongoing user evaluation program and include:

- Modifying sleeve pockets to the same size and shape of the Army combat uniform sleeve pockets; for instance, including the loop fastener tape for patches, glint tape, and flap closure. This pocket is laid over existing sleeve pockets and the pocket combination is now located on the upper sleeve of both arms. The original CVC sleeve pocket has been moved to the lower arm.
- Adding waist-adjustment tabs and elastic back waist with fastener tape closures.

- Using the new universal camouflage pattern on the uniform.
- Increasing the size of the seat patch to provide improved coverage and increased durability.

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) is currently contracting with manufacturers to produce existing CVC coveralls with the universal camouflage pattern. The Project Manager-Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-CIE), along with the Armor Center's support, is evaluating both the new iCVC uniform design and the new Abrams fabric by issuing the uniforms to Soldiers assigned to the 2d Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division, and the 16th Cavalry Regiment. These evaluations are scheduled to run from March through June 2007. Based on these user evaluations, any recommended changes will be reviewed and a final new design will be determined. Once the new design is determined, PM-CIE will provide the new iCVC specifications to DSCP, who will then contract to purchase the new iCVC uniforms. As older CVC uniforms are expended over time, the new iCVC will be fielded Armywide to units that order the CVC uniform from DSCP.

Another PM-CIE program currently underway, "Flame Resistant Environmental Ensemble (FREE)," will provide armored crewmen and aviation crew members with an updated multilayered, versatile, all-climate, flame-retardant system that will be adaptable for use in varying mission requirements and environmental conditions. The FREE system will consist of a base layer, a mid-weight under layer, a light-weight outer layer, an intermediate outer layer, an extreme outer lay-


er, cold weather gloves, balaclavas for hot and cold weather, a rigger belt, and wool socks. The outer layers will provide protection from wind and rain.

This effort, along with the iCVC uniform, is designed to provide specialized Soldiers, who need flame-resistant clothing, the same type of modern cold weather gear as the Generation III Extended Cold Weather Clothing System, which will soon be available to the rest of the Army. During January 2007, testing began on several versions of this experimental system using Soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Feedback from this user evaluation allows the product manager and the user community to shape the final design. A final FREE user evaluation is also scheduled for later this year.

Special thanks to Mr. Larry Hasty, Soldier Project Officer, Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL); Major Clay Williamson, Product Manager; and Ms. Rosemary Lomba, Natick Flame Retardant Clothing Engineer, for their contributions to these Soldier efforts. For additional information on these new products, please contact Mr. Hasty at DSN 464-3662, commercial (502) 624-3662, e-mail [larry.hasty@us.army.mil](mailto:larry.hasty@us.army.mil); Major Williamson at DSN 654-3813, commercial (703) 704-3813, e-mail [lannes.williamson@us.army.mil](mailto:lannes.williamson@us.army.mil); or Ms. Lomba at DSN 256-4048, commercial (508) 233-4048, e-mail [rosemary.lomba@us.army.mil](mailto:rosemary.lomba@us.army.mil).

"Teach our young Soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think."





# Initial Entry Training: Producing Army Strong Soldiers!

by Colonel Peter Utley

In 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed major changes to initial entry training (IET) to meet the realities of the contemporary operational environment (COE) experienced by soldiers during combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The end state of this effort has enabled the training base to produce soldiers who can meet the demands and accept the challenges associated with full-spectrum operations both today and in the future.

Some described the changes to IET as being revolutionary; others felt they were evolutionary. Regardless of how the changes are described, they occurred, were significant, and clearly required. Initially, changes in IET focused on training content used to train the Army's newest soldiers, and the new training base was essentially completed during the latter part of 2004. The change in content is never final as lessons are learned and obser-

vations are continuously made by the operating force, and this valuable information ensures the training content of IET remains relevant.

During 2005, a change to the culture of IET was started, and at the beginning of 2006, the effort hit its stride in the 1st Armor Training Brigade (1ATB). This effort continues today and will do so for the next few years.

This article describes how 1ATB conducts IET — specifically, the 1ATB mission and task organization; how training content, approaches, and techniques are used to transform civilians into soldiers; and the professional culture in which IET soldiers are immersed during their training experience. As the reader will see, the 1ATB takes its mission very seriously and understands its responsibility to provide our Army its most precious resource — an American soldier ready to join the operating force in support of an Army at war.



## Mission and Task Organization

**Mission.** The 1ATB conducts IET to produce soldiers who are technically and tactically competent, focused on teamwork, infused with the warrior ethos, capable of meeting the demands of full-spectrum operations, and ready to take their place in a values-based Army at war on their first day of assignment to the operating force.

**Task organization.** The 1ATB has seven battalion-size units, consisting of 38 company-size units, with five of the battalion-size units being training units. The brigade has an authorized strength of 1,857 soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians. The training base has seen increased training requirements, in terms of students and content, and the integration of U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units has been essential to mission accomplishment. The 1ATB has been fortunate to have great USAR soldiers from institutional training (IT) divisions supporting its missions, with the 100th Division (IT) and 104th Division (IT) being its primary support units. Without these great soldiers, the 1ATB would never accomplish its critical mission. We are truly one team engaged in one fight.

The training units of the brigade support the full range of IET course constructs, which includes basic combat training (BCT), one station unit training (OSUT), advanced individual training (AIT), and additional skill identifier (ASI) or functional courses. IET soldiers attend ASI courses following graduation from OSUT or AIT, based on their first unit of assignment in the operating force. During FY06, the 1ATB trained more than 12,000 IET soldiers and approximately 1,200 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets.

**Training units.** The 1st Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment (1-81 AR) is an AIT battalion assigned the mission of training Abrams system maintainers with the military occupational specialty (MOS) 63A and Bradley system maintainers, with MOS 63M. It is the only battalion in the Army with this capability. IET soldiers join the battalion, following completion of their BCT at one of the other Army training centers (ATC) or in one of the BCT infantry battalions in the 1ATB, to complete their AIT. The 63A IET soldiers receive 16 weeks of training and the 63M IET soldiers receive 14 weeks of training. The battalion has responsibility for training three functional courses, which award IET soldiers an ASI on graduation. These courses include the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) System Maintainer ASI (K4) Course for Abrams System Maintainers, the M3A3 System Maintainer ASI (B9) Course for Bradley system maintainers, and the Recovery Specialist ASI (H8) for both types of system maintainers.

A U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) company is also assigned to the battalion. This company trains Marine armor crewmen and Marine Abrams system maintainers. The USMC company is self-contained with Marine noncommissioned officers who are responsible for training, but 1-81 AR provides the necessary support to accomplish their assigned mission. The annual training load for 1-81 AR is approximately 700 IET soldiers and 300 Marines.

The 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment (2-81 AR) is an OSUT battal-

ion assigned the mission of training Abrams armor crewman (MOS 19K), and it is the only battalion in the Army with this capability. IET soldiers join the battalion and do their BCT and AIT in the same tank company with the same cadre, creating the OSUT construct. 19K IET soldiers receive 15 weeks of training in OSUT. The battalion has responsibility for training one functional course, which awards IET soldiers an ASI on graduation. This is the Stryker Crewman ASI (R4) Course for armor crewman and cavalry scouts. At present, the battalion only has the Stryker reconnaissance vehicle (SRV), but it will begin training the Mobile Gun System (MGS) Crewman ASI Course in early FY08. The annual training load for 2-81 AR is approximately 1,700 IET soldiers.

The 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry Regiment (5-15 CAV) is an OSUT squadron assigned the mission of training cavalry scouts (MOS 19D), and it is the only cavalry squadron in the Army with this capability. 19D IET soldiers receive 16 weeks of training in OSUT. The squadron did train the R4 ASI Course from its inception, but the mission transferred to 2-81 AR in early 2006 for two reasons. The first reason, involving the current and projected high demand for cavalry scouts, required the brigade to maximize 19D instructors in support of OSUT, so 19K instructors were given responsibility for the course. Secondly, 19K IET soldiers are assigned to Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCT), so they require the R4 qualification. From a unity of command and unity of effort perspective, it made sense to give the R4 ASI Course to 2-81 AR. The annual training load for 5-15 CAV is approximately 3,000 IET soldiers.

The 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment (1-46 IN and 2-46 IN) are BCT battalions assigned the mission of training IET soldiers with combat support and combat service support MOSs. The other four ATCs have battalions similar to these two infantry battalions. These battalions train IET soldiers for 9 weeks in basic soldiering skills. Training BCT skills is essential to the transformation of a civilian to a soldier, and the OSUT units train these same skills during the first half of their courses. The only major difference between the two infantry battalions is 1-46 IN has the additional mission of supporting ROTC cadet training during the Leader Training Course (LTC) in the summer. ROTC runs the LTC Camp for approximately 8 weeks during the months of June and July. IET soldiers graduating from BCT in these battal-




Figure 1



*"The 1ATB conducts IET to produce soldiers who are technically and tactically competent, focused on teamwork, infused with the warrior ethos, capable of meeting the demands of full spectrum operations, and ready to take their place in a values-based Army at war on their first day of assignment to the operating force."*

ions depart Fort Knox for their AIT courses located elsewhere in TRADOC, or they will move to 1-81 AR for training, if they are 63A or 63M IET soldiers. The annual training load for the infantry battalions is approximately 7,000 IET soldiers, and 1-46 IN trains approximately 1,200 ROTC cadets.

**Support units.** The 3d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment (3-81 AR) is assigned the mission of training every IET soldier in the 1ATB on various common core subject areas and associated tasks. These subjects include first aid; land navigation; communications; marksmanship for individual and crew-served weapons; improvised explosive devices (IED) training; and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense. This equates to approximately 15,000 soldiers a year receiving invaluable training from the battalion. 3-81 AR provides training, when requested by the training units, to support cadre proficiency on selected subject areas, which include urban operations and marksmanship. The battalion oversees and maintains some of the unique training resources necessary for conducting IET across the brigade. If the brigade did not have this unique battalion, it would have an extremely difficult time providing IET soldiers the realistic and relevant training required by its programs of instruction (POI) and the operating force.

The 46th Adjutant General Battalion (Reception) (46 AG) is assigned the mission of receiving and processing all IET soldiers, approximately 15,000 annually, when they arrive at 1ATB for training. When IET soldiers arrive in the battalion, they go through an effective and efficient process designed to get them screened and entered into the personnel system, the finance system, and the medical/dental system. IET soldiers receive their first haircut, some of their initial issue items, and a series of briefings on mandatory subjects. Once all soldiers assigned to a scheduled class are received and processed, they are shipped to a company-size training unit for BCT or OSUT. AIT soldiers do not process through the 46 AG, because they report directly to 1-81 AR. The 46 AG has the responsibility for discharging IET soldiers who are unable to complete training. This is an important function, because it takes some burden off the training units and allows them to remain focused on their missions. The 46 AG has the unique organic capability to provide injured IET soldiers the ability to undergo physical rehabilitation, so they can over-

come injuries and resume training. Without this extremely unique and very diverse unit, 1ATB could not accomplish its mission.

### **Training Content and Training Techniques and Approaches**

**Training content.** The focus of changes in IET center on the content of BCT because this training supports every junior enlisted soldier in the Army, regardless of MOS. The content of AIT or the AIT portion of OSUT falls under the purview of the respective center and school commandant. This is not to say the observations and lessons learned from OIF and OEF were not examined by center and school commandants and evaluated with respect to AIT and OSUT, because they were used extensively. The best source of the observations and lessons learned came from the veterans of OIF and OEF, and this is where TRADOC went for insight as it started the process of changing IET.

These veterans were asked, "What would you change in IET?" The operating force spoke loud and clear, offering the following key comments:

- Train in an urban environment to include patrolling and manning a checkpoint.
- Increase training during periods of limited visibility.
- Train to be a member of a convoy.
- More weapons training, to include weapons maintenance and reducing malfunctions.
- Train key combat survival tasks, such as combat lifesaver, combatives, and IEDs.
- More field time (emphasize field craft, field hygiene, and field sanitation).
- Reduce the garrison focus (less drill and ceremony, fewer classes in a classroom environment).
- Focus on what counts in combat — accomplishing the mission and staying alive!

From these and many more comments, the warrior tasks and battle drills (WT&BD) became the foundation on which the IET changes were built. The WT&BD are skills every soldier, regardless of MOS, must possess if they are to fight and win in any operational environment, and these tasks and drills clearly meet the demands of the COE. There were originally 40 warrior tasks and 9 battle drills, commonly referred to as 40 and 9. They changed to 39 and 9, and today in TRADOC, there are 40 and 11. In 1ATB, there are 40 and 12, because the brigade feels the battle drill, "React to a Sniper," is a critical skill every IET soldier must have based on the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's most recent OIF after-action review (AAR).

To provide a sense of the WT&BD's relevancy and their importance to IET, the following tasks and drills are listed:

- Conduct tactical movement (dismounted)
  - Occupy assembly area.
  - React to contact.
  - React to ambush.
  - Avoid/detect ambush.
  - React to indirect fire.



- React to chemical attack.
- Break contact.
- Secure at a halt.
- Navigate from one point to another.
- Establish a checkpoint
  - Handle enemy prisoners of war/detainees.
  - Determine location on ground.
  - React to media/civilians on the battlefield.
  - React to IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO).
  - Perform first aid.
- Tactical movement in built-up area
  - Enter and clear room/building.
  - Engage targets in urban operations.
  - React to direct fire ground.
- Conduct tactical movement (mounted)
  - Prepare vehicle for convoy.
  - Dismount a vehicle.
  - Evacuate casualty from a vehicle.

To keep the WT&BD relevant, the U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC) leads a semiannual review process with the operating force. The result of the review process is a series of additions or deletions to the WT&BD. USAAC takes the changes and incorporates them into all IET POIs across TRADOC.

In addition to the WT&BD, IET has a very heavy emphasis on discipline and what it truly means to be a soldier. The 1ATB describes it as, “Conduct Soldierization” and involves three critical tasks:

- Instill the Army Values/Warrior Ethos.
- Perform standardized physical training.
- Master the individual weapon.

Many commanders in the brigade describe the content of IET as the “Big Four Priorities,” which include discipline and physical fitness, first aid, marksmanship, and the WT&BD. Clearly, when you look at the allocation of time in the BCT POI or the BCT phase of OSUT, 90 percent of the available time is given to these four priorities. In general, dialogue with the operating force regarding the tasks trained in IET, using a variety of feedback mechanisms, indicates we have it about right. Based on this fact, the training techniques and approaches used in 1ATB are critical in creating the correct conditions to replicate the COE and ensuring IET soldiers are confident in their abilities.

### Training Techniques and Approaches

To effectively complement the change in content of IET, the learning environment presented to IET soldiers is designed to replicate the type of training they will experience in the operating force. The 1ATB uses tried-and-true training techniques and approaches to facilitate learning. The learning environment is characterized by more field training, situational-based training, realistic conditions, training by platoon, and maximizing the precious training resource of time. These new training changes place the training environment in context for IET soldiers; in other words, IET soldiers understand the rela-

tionship of the various tasks they have learned relative to how these tasks can be used in combination to support the team in accomplishing its mission.

One common suggestion from the operating force regarding change was to increase field time. IET soldiers spend approximately 40 percent of their BCT time in the field learning their craft. This time includes training events requiring extended days in the field to complete an event. This field time does not include training conducted daily at local training sites or on ranges. Regardless of the duration of an event, IET soldiers are outside applying skills they have learned and not sitting in classrooms receiving computer-generated briefings.

In the past, IET soldiers would experience one extended situational-based training event at the end of cycle. Today, situational-based training is the standard. The IET soldiers experience a number of situational training exercises (STX) and field training exercises (FTX) during their time in the brigade. Each BCT and OSUT class culminates with a 7-day FTX, following occupation of a forward operating base (FOB) by a troop or company, designed to put their entire training experience in context. The occupation of an FOB for this training event is illustrative of the realistic conditions afforded IET soldiers by the cadre.

An important aspect of IET training in 1ATB is incorporating realistic conditions in training. As stated earlier, the tasks trained in IET are accurate, but conditions under which these tasks are performed make the difference. In the past, IET soldiers were trained in a very sterile environment focused on performing discrete tasks. Today, IET soldiers perform these tasks under stressful conditions in tactical settings. For example, during first aid training, soldiers learn the basic task of properly evaluating a casualty in the first aid instructional facility. As a part of this first-aid training, soldiers are required to perform this task, wearing tactical equipment, while the team is under fire. The 1ATB uses the combat casualty care site to apply these conditions. The IET soldier very quickly learns the other factors he must consider when his battle buddy is wounded and bullets are flying. To achieve these realistic conditions, training is performed at a



*“Training in the 1ATB is primarily conducted at the platoon-level or below. This approach is important, because it sets conditions for other techniques and approaches to be effective. Training at this level facilitates quality training and effective learning. The involvement of drill sergeants, as assistant instructors, in the training of common core tasks greatly enhances the quality of the training.”*

level where the instructor-to-student ratio is as low as possible, based on resources, and performance oriented training can be accomplished.

Training in the 1ATB is primarily conducted at the platoon-level or below. This approach is important, because it sets conditions for other techniques and approaches to be effective. Training at this level facilitates quality training and effective learning. The involvement of drill sergeants, as assistant instructors, in the training of common core tasks greatly enhances the quality of the training. These ratios ensure quality practical exercises are performed and multiple repetitions of the tasks are given to the IET soldiers.

The importance of hands-on training goes without saying and every experienced soldier knows repetition is “the mother of all training.” A vivid example of repetition in training involves the brigade’s weapons immersion program. The program directly supports the IET soldier in his ability to master the individual weapon. The IET soldier is issued his weapon on the second day in the training unit. He keeps the weapon with him at all times during IET; each time he enters a building, he clears the weapon. Drill sergeants require IET soldiers to change their weapon control status throughout the day. Magazines and blank rounds are issued, following weapons qualification, to further stress the importance of this task. The only time the IET soldier will not have his weapon is during church services, during sick call, and on selected days of the course. This program has received very positive feedback from the operating force as indicated by the reduction of negligent discharges by young soldiers in theater. Training at the platoon level is extremely beneficial, but it requires leaders at all levels to truly maximize training time.

A commander cannot give his subordinates more time for training, especially in IET, because they must live by a structured training schedule. There are only so many hours in a day and so many days in a course — initiative and innovation become very important traits every cadre member must possess. With these traits in the forefront of their minds, administrative time during the training day can become valuable training time. For example, instead of marching IET soldiers to and from training, drill sergeants can move them tactically as squads or platoons. During the same movement, the cadre evaluates the soldiers’ situa-

tional awareness by incorporating an IED along the axis of movement. A drill sergeant can very easily introduce a casualty and require an IET soldier to react and apply immediate aid to his battle buddy. This approach has proven very valuable and beneficial to IET soldiers because it forces them to draw on earlier training events and apply that learning experience throughout the breadth of the course by reinforcing critical skills.

The rigor, relevance, and realism of IET have increased significantly in the past 3 years. The changes in the training content of IET are all about the conditions and putting the training in context for the Army’s newest soldiers. What makes IET very exciting and extremely rewarding is the fact that 1ATB has an extremely professional cadre, comprised of countless OIF and OEF veterans, who bring combat experiences and vast knowledge to the training base. The benefits of this are boundless, and the cadre truly puts the training experience in technicolor for IET soldiers through dedication, commitment, and professionalism.

### **The Culture Change — Closing the Transition from Training Base to Operating Force**

Complementing the change in the content of IET was a focused effort to change the culture of IET, which was designed to create an environment where the transition from training base to operating force is as seamless as possible. It is not possible to make this transition completely seamless, but it is possible to make the transition less dramatic for young IET graduates. The essence of the change in IET culture centers on professional leadership, nothing less and nothing more, with the end state being a soldier who can contribute to the team on arrival at his first operational unit. The cadre of 1ATB clearly understands the results of their efforts are tangible and will have a lasting impact on the future of our Army. Changing the IET culture to meet the intent and desired end state requires the following.

- Command teams establishing a climate where professional leadership is the standard.
- Drill sergeants and instructors taking a squad leader approach.
- Drill sergeants and instructors instilling discipline by placing the stress between the IET soldier and meeting the standard.
- Drill sergeants and instructors training IET soldiers in accordance with established regulations and using all leadership tools at their disposal.



*“The importance of hands-on training goes without saying and every experienced soldier knows repetition is “the mother of all training.” A vivid example of repetition in training involves the brigade’s weapons immersion program. The program directly supports the IET soldier in his ability to master the individual weapon.”*

It all starts at the top. Commanders and command sergeants major must establish a command climate where professional leadership is the standard. The cadre must immerse the IET soldier in an environment where they see what right looks like all the time. An important component of professional leadership is acknowledging that every IET soldier deserves an opportunity to succeed, even though there will be some that do not graduate. IET soldiers want and deserve the knowledge and experience found in the minds of the cadre, and a passion for the profession found in their hearts. The real measure of effectiveness is determined by the subordinate leaders of the cadre, especially the drill sergeants and instructors, and their ability to perform as squad leaders.

The most important responsibility a squad leader has is to know his soldiers. Before leaders can lead, they must know their soldiers. This approach is not new to our Army, but it is new to IET and reflects a key component of the change in IET culture. In the past, IET soldiers were viewed as a group of



individuals. Today, they are members of a team, and their leaders know them as individuals. The image cadre members present to IET soldiers is one of a coach, teacher, mentor, and role model. The cadre uses four guiding principles when leading and training IET soldiers:

- Be fair, firm, and professional in your approach.
- Treat them with dignity and respect.
- Use positive reinforcement, where appropriate, to recognize them for meeting the standard.
- Follow the golden rule: “do unto others as you would have done unto you.”

The squad leader approach in IET produces soldiers with a passion for the profession of arms, because he believes that he is part of something larger than himself. In other words, it will not be just a job; the soldier will view it as a profession — a calling. To be an effective member of our profession, IET soldiers must learn and embody discipline to meet and uphold the standard.

It is very important to constantly challenge IET soldiers and maximize their performance. Soldiers who have more skill, knowledge, and talent than other soldiers are given more responsibility and are pushed to maximize their full potential. Drill sergeants, in particular, develop an attitude of self-adherence to standards through self-discipline in IET soldiers. This approach is best understood by observing an IET class. For instance, when a cycle (class) starts, IET soldiers have very little responsibility and the tasks are very basic, but they quickly learn the standard from their drill sergeants. As the cycle progresses, IET soldiers gain more personal responsibility, because they know the standard and are being held accountable. As tasks become more complex, IET soldiers are required to draw on earlier training experiences to meet training requirements later in the cycle. As mentioned earlier, success rests in the hands of the subordinate leaders of the cadre. If they enforce the standard and hold IET soldiers accountable for their actions, they will produce a disciplined graduate who is technically and tactically competent. The art of this transformation process involves leadership.

The cadre members of 1ATB are well versed in the regulations governing IET and are proficient with the leadership tools at their disposal — no cadre member in 1ATB is prevented from using the full authority of his position. The guidance to the cadre is simple — use all leadership tools and regulatory authority available, just ensure the right tool is used for the job. Each IET soldier is unique and what motivates one individual may not motivate another. It is very easy to choose the easy, ineffective wrong over the hard, very effective right. Professional leaders will always carry the day in IET, because the young men trained by 1ATB are extremely impressionable. Having the type of professional leader in the training base that they will have when they arrive in the operating force will enable an effective transition for IET graduates.

To recap the discussion on IET culture, the following guidance was given to the 1ATB cadre in January 2006:



*“The rigor, relevance, and realism of IET have increased significantly in the past three years. The changes in the training content of IET are all about the conditions and putting the training in context for the Army’s newest soldiers. What makes IET very exciting and extremely rewarding is the fact that 1ATB has an extremely professional cadre, comprised of countless OIF and OEF veterans, who bring combat experiences and vast knowledge to the training base.”*

- Treat IET soldiers as soldiers from day one — members of a team — we have ownership and responsibility — like squad leaders.
- Remain oriented on the IET soldier’s success — invest in them. Inspire your soldiers to succeed. Use the “insist and assist” approach.
- Train the IET soldier how to think, rather than what to think — avoid using an assembly-line approach.
- Use small-unit leadership techniques and approaches. They affect how the IET soldier will perform in his first unit. Overcontrol is bad and stifles his initiative.
- Foster an environment where IET soldiers take the initiative by entrusting responsibility from the start and encouraging ideas, thoughts, and feedback.
- Ensure the stress is between the IET soldier and the task (standard), not between the IET soldier and the drill sergeant or instructor. This is done through challenging training, by upholding the established standard for every task, and through leading by example.
- Adjust your leadership style to reach your subordinates — one size does not fit all.
- Remember you are coaches, teachers, mentors, and role models, and most importantly, the most influential component of the IET soldier’s success. You are transforming lives in a very short time.

The 1ATB’s cadre works diligently to produce a proficient soldier who will confront the demands of the COE and future operational environments characterized by violence, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. To meet these realities, 1ATB must produce soldiers who are imbued with the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos and possess the following attributes:

- Self-discipline — do what’s right without being told.

*Continued on Page 48*



# Training the Next “Old Bill” for the Contemporary Operating Environment

by Captain William F. Shakespeare and Captain Wes Loyd

The mission to train all 19D cavalry scouts for the U.S. Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard is the responsibility of the 5th Squadron, 15th (5-15) U.S. Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, Kentucky. In 16 weeks, the drill sergeants and cavalry instructors of the squadron transform citizen volunteers into the next generation of “Old Bill,” serving as the eyes and ears of our ground combat forces. The recruits must learn 134 basic combat training and 82 19D10-specific tasks prior to graduation, with the expectation that these new scouts can contribute on day one in a scout platoon conducting full-spectrum operations.

Cavalry scouts are assigned to every formation in our Army, including airborne, air assault, light infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT), and armored cavalry regiments. Additionally, “heavy” scout platoons within the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalions are assigned three M3 cavalry fighting vehicles (CFVs) and five M1114 HMMWVs per the modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE). Based on these force structure modifications (task force modularity) and the fact our Army finds itself conducting full-spectrum operations within the demanding contemporary op-

erating environment (COE), 19D one station unit training (OSUT) was modified to meet those demands.

The challenge faced within the only organization responsible for producing 19Ds for our Army remains how to train critical soldier and scout skills while meeting the needs of an ever-changing force. The aim of this article is not to merely describe the training conducted at Fort Knox, but to set a specific level of expectations maneuver leaders should have of new 19D10 cavalry scouts arriving at their first duty station.

## What New Scouts Bring to the Force

Based on the complexity and number of tasks required of today’s 19D10s, there is no way to produce expert scouts within 16 weeks. The squadron standard is to produce competent and confident scouts who can contribute on day one. Recent modifications (within the past three years) to the training program and environment include weapons immersion, combatives, more dismounted operations, mounted combat patrol live-fire exercises, urban operations, and forward operating base (FOB) operations. Fundamental scout skills, such as weapons training, first aid,

navigation, communication, and basic reconnaissance skills, remain core competencies taught throughout the cycle.

The greatest benefit of OSUT is shaping new scouts from day one. During the reception and integration ceremony, recruits are met by cadre wearing spurs and Stetsons. They are immediately exposed to the “red and white” concept, along with the soldier’s creed and Army values. Contrary to the many popular stories in the media today, discipline is instilled from day one. The Army values and discipline are critical traits for scouts in today’s COE. Scouts must prove they do not only memorize the Army values, but live the Army values; otherwise, they are sometimes recycled as a “values” failures.

Throughout OSUT, scouts remain in the same organization for the 16-week cycle; they complete a basic combat training (BCT) phase and an advanced individual training (AIT) phase. The first 9 weeks of OSUT is devoted primarily to BCT tasks; some 19D-specific skills are taught to scouts and reinforced throughout the remainder of the cycle. The remaining 7 weeks of OSUT, however, are focused strictly on 19D10-specific training (AIT).



## Physical Training

Physical training (PT) in OSUT is based on the standardized physical training (SPT) program and the Army conditioning drills. Throughout the 16-week cycle, scouts receive 60 hours of structured physical training. Additional PT is led by the cadre, and during evenings and AIT, scouts can perform PT on their own, either outside the barracks or at the squadron fitness facility. Scouts do not graduate from OSUT without passing an Army physical fitness test (APFT); most graduating classes average 230-240 points.

A scout who arrives at his duty station and cannot pass minimum APFT standards obviously failed to continue his routine workouts while on leave between training and reporting to his unit; he was not "pushed" through the system. To help combat the rise in scouts who cannot meet the minimum physical training requirements, the squadron initiated a fitness training unit (FTU). Administered by Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, this organization has a distinct role and purpose crucial to the success of the fitness program.

When any group of new scouts begins training, a certain percentage of scouts struggle with the newly imposed physical training regime based on conditioning drills 1, 2, and 3. While minor physical weaknesses are corrected within the first few weeks of training for most scouts, other scouts require extensive attention focused on their physical development. The FTU is designed for such a situation. While designed primarily to improve push-ups, sit-ups, and 2-mile run abilities, placement in the FTU can result from other physical shortcomings that may hinder a soldier during cavalry scout OSUT, or any physical difficulty that may hinder soldiers after graduation.

Entrance requirements for the FTU vary based on the individual being recommended for admittance, and many times are based on a subjective decision that placing a soldier in the FTU would benefit both the soldier and the training unit. Common triggers include failing the basic physical fitness test (BPFT) at the conclusion of BCT, failing the APFT, an inability to physically perform due to illness, or to physically keep up after continued training at troop level. Final FTU placement authority rests with the squadron commander, who oversees all FTU transfers for the sake of preserving unit integrity, and reserving the FTU as a last resort for physical success.

Typically, scouts who fail the APFT, pass within 2 weeks. On average, there

are typically five scouts assigned to the FTU with four drill sergeants serving as cadre. Physical training is conducted twice daily, with a mix of APFT-oriented training, combatives, alternate cardiovascular training (stationary bike or elliptical machine exercise), as well as strength training exercises. The FTU is an overwhelming success; within the past year, the cavalry scout OSUT FTU graduated more than 60 scouts from the program who may have otherwise failed to complete training and graduate.

## Weapons and Fighting Skills

Basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) starts in week two and ends with record fire at the end of week four. During this time, drill sergeants use all "extra" time for BRM reinforcement training. All training conducted is in accordance with regulations; scouts qualify from the prone supported, prone unsupported, and kneeling positions, using their M16A4 and iron sights. Gone are the days of using a fox-hole. Scouts are not introduced to M4s and own-the-night sights until advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) training due to the table of distribution and allowances (TDA), which allocates M16A4s to 5-15 Cavalry, though most cavalry units are now using M4s.

In an effort to ensure graduating scouts are familiar with M4s, close combat optics (CCOs), and reflexive firing techniques, scouts draw an M4 with pre-mounted optics for ARM. This training includes

simulation training with the engagement skills trainer (EST) and live-fire range time for scouts who fire at 25-meter silhouettes that have a bowling pin in the center of the target, as well as night engagements. During ARM, scouts are introduced to fundamental target acquisition using the M68 optic and PEQ4.

Scouts begin weapons immersion within the first week by signing for their M16A4s, which will be with them 24 hours a day. Weapons immersion teaches scouts everything from accountability of their assigned weapon to clearing-barrel procedures. Following rifle qualification, scouts are issued five blank rounds and their weapon control status changes daily, based on the event, condition, or scenario. Whenever scouts enter buildings, they clear their weapons using appropriate measures and a clearing barrel. By the time a scout graduates, he will have cleared his weapon to the point of automatic proficiency.

The versatility required of 19D cavalry scouts in today's organizations makes it imperative they remain proficient in various weapons systems. Weapons systems, such as the M249, M240B, M2 .50-caliber, MK-19, Javelin, and AT-4 are being used on the battlefield and will remain on the scout platoon MTOE for the foreseeable future. Scouts receive blocks of instruction on all these weapons throughout their training cycle, while conducting live-fire exercises, with the exception of the Javelin. Since some training may be



*"The squadron standard is to produce competent and confident scouts who can contribute on day one. Recent modifications (within the past three years) to the training program and environment include weapons immersion, combatives, more dismounted operations, mounted combat patrol live-fire exercises, urban operations, and forward operating base (FOB) operations."*



*"Scouts begin weapons immersion within the first week by signing for their M16A4s, which will be with them 24 hours a day. Weapons immersion teaches scouts everything from accountability of their assigned weapon to clearing-barrel procedures."*

conducted early in the cycle, reinforcement training is conducted throughout the remainder of the cycle to ensure scouts retain these skills. They must be a contributing member from day one in a scout platoon conducting full-spectrum operations.

The Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP) evolved over the course of the past 12 years and the 1st Armor Training Brigade remains at the forefront in implementing this program. MACP has two mottos: "The winner of hand-to-hand combat is the one whose buddy shows up first with a gun," and "the defining characteristic of a Warrior is the willingness to close with the enemy." Implementing MACP into 19D OSUT inherently produces a stronger, more confident cavalry scout. Combatives training is incorporated into weeks 5 through 16 of the 19D OSUT training schedule to ensure that scouts not only learn basic skills, but are given the opportunity to perfect their technique. The intent of 19D OSUT combatives training is to ensure that all scouts have combatives drills 1 through 3 embedded in their muscle memory. Initial entry training (IET) scouts who complete 19D OSUT depart Fort Knox with the basic fundamentals of combatives and are ready to fight when called on to do so. Combatives training increases the individual scout's confidence and provides him another option when confronting another person, who may or may not be an enemy, without necessarily resorting to deadly force.

### The Final Test

The capstone exercise of 19D OSUT is the End-of-Course Situational Training Exercise (EOC STX). This 7-day event is designed to replicate COE conditions in a tactical field environment executed from a FOB located in the Fort Knox training area. The event is broken down into day-long exercises with each platoon executing a different "lane" over a 4-day period. Lanes include urban operations, dismounted combat orienteering, mounted (task force modularity) 3x5 (3 Bradleys, 5 HMMWVs) maneuver training, and FOB operations. The intent of the EOC STX is to revisit as many tasks taught throughout the cycle as possible to reinforce, through repetition, the technical and tactical fundamentals that are a must for every cavalry scout. It remains the final "validation" exercise of 19D OSUT.

The intensity and level of detailed COE conditions applied during the EOC STX are left up to the imagination and creativity of the troop cadre. Some examples include: media on the battlefield where a member of the cadre will play the role of a media correspondent and question/film scouts during a training exercise. The recording is then used to facilitate the after-action review (AAR) process and pass lessons learned to other scouts who may not have been "interviewed."

Civilians on the battlefield (COBs) are used throughout training exercises to in-

crease the complexity of any given situation. One of the COE events that tests the scout's values and ethics (sometimes an intangible) is a often-used scenario where a member of the cadre's chain of command (acting with the knowledge of observer/controllers) orders a scout to shoot a wounded prisoner of war, either as retribution or stating they do not have time to care for enemy wounded. Regardless of the scout's decision (most choose the morally correct choice), the situation (ethical dilemma) is discussed during the AAR. All scouts are exposed to threat weapons, including the AK-47, PKM, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The 1st ATB had the barrels plugged, yet they provide functioning weapons to incorporate into training. The focus is on how to properly clear the weapon if recovered on the battlefield.

### Urban Operations

The urban operations lane provides scouts with a realistic scenario in which to practice urban combat skills first taught during the BCT phase of OSUT. The base scenario involves movement (dismounted or mounted in M1025s), usually to the squadron shoot house, and cordon and search operations are conducted to provide intelligence of an additional target house located at the 1st ATB military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) training facility. Once at that location, the cadre may opt to use paintball guns as an additional means to reinforce urban initial military training (IMT) with an instant feedback mechanism. Paintball operations are limited by weather conditions, require additional safety procedures, and sometimes focus scouts on getting a "kill," rather than applying appropriate tactical fundamentals. Nonetheless, paintball remains a very popular training tool for new cavalry scouts. The urban operations lane forces scouts to use a myriad of tasks they learn over their first few weeks of training, while providing an evaluation tool for cadre to ensure the scout is proficient in those tasks.

### Combat Orienteering

The dismounted combat orienteering lane is designed to challenge scouts' dismounted skills. Platoons normally break up into two dismounted sections and must conduct reconnaissance of specified named areas of interest. Student leaders plan missions and routes to develop junior leadership skills while the cadre assists as observers/controllers. The focus is placed on short-duration dismounted movement in a tactical environment to



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test navigational skills and patrolling techniques. Opposing force (OPFOR) requirements are often eliminated by using other 1st ATB training events to collect intelligence while adding realism and gaining resource efficiencies.

### **Mounted Modularity Tactical Training**

Over the past year, 5-15 Cavalry implemented the mounted tactical training lane during the EOC STX to expose scouts to the mixed CFV and HMMWV section/platoon formations found in combined arms battalion scout platoons. The training concept uses the framework of a combined arms battalion scout platoon zone reconnaissance or screen mission to validate individual scout tactical tasks. This lane also provides excellent multi-echelon training opportunities to simultaneously refresh the cadre's warfighting skills. Training typically consists of a force-on-force maneuver, with an OSUT platoon split into two maneuver sections, organized with mixed sections of one M3 CFV and one M1025, while conducting a screen and a zone or area reconnaissance. This force-on-force, heavy-light training enables both sections to practice and experience mounted maneuver in numerous duty positions, to include terrain driving experience on both vehicles, operating the M2 and M240B machine guns, and the 25mm chain gun as a gunner,

and while serving as a "light" or "heavy" dismounted scout.

A secondary benefit of the mounted maneuver lane is the refresher training it provides for the troop's cadre. Throughout the lane training, troop cadre fill roles as section sergeants, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders. They develop five paragraph orders, direct maintenance, control direct and indirect fires, and maneuver vehicles. This second-order effect enhances the cadre's readiness as they practice section/platoon-level troop leading procedures. In one training day, the mounted modularity lane provides a phenomenal training event integrating dozens of training opportunities from tactical terrain driving, establishing an observation post, call for fire, and operating a long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3) to vehicle maintenance and recovery.

### **Forward Operating Base Procedures**

During the EOC STX, the entire troop operates out of FOB Saber, deploying from the FOB daily to one of the other three STX lanes. Each platoon conducts a rotation of 24 hours on FOB security while the other three platoons conduct training in other locations. The intent of the FOB lane is to test soldiers' proficiency at guard duty tasks and 19D10 skills required to conduct entry control point

(ECP) operations, security patrols, and quick reaction force duties, all which reinforce the mentality of maintaining continuous security.

While on the FOB lane, scouts are charged with manning guard positions, an entry control point, a tactical operations center, and securing/defending the FOB. Troops gain training efficiencies by using the constant movement of cadre and training platoons to provide the realism of "daily life" at a FOB. OPFOR and aggressor forces act against the FOB at all hours of the day and night. Because of this constant probing, scouts are exposed to repetitious tasks, such as challenge and password, vehicle/personnel searches, guarding enemy prisoners of war, and reacting to indirect fire contact. Scouts also conduct field expedient construction of the FOB facilities and perimeter, and maintenance of equipment, weapons, and vehicles while they rotate shifts. Many troops also use this time to conduct a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) exercise; reinforcement training on construction of a sector sketch; or troop leading procedures for future STX lanes.

Operations in and around FOB Saber lend themselves naturally to exposing scouts to COE conditions. While on the FOB, scouts react to indirect and direct



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*“The final exercise for 19D OSUT is conducted at the Burcham Urban Assault Course. This exercise is intended to expose scouts to a troop (-) mission, combining two OSUT platoons to execute an urban raid mission. While this is a collective-level training event, the emphasis remains on “grading” individual skills. To demonstrate what tactical NCO leadership should look like, drill sergeants and cavalry instructors serve in platoon leadership roles.”*

fire engagements against the FOB and run a 24-hour traffic control point (TCP) where they react to civilians, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, conduct personnel searches, execute self- and buddy-aid tasks, and call for medical evacuation.

Perhaps the most important and overlooked COE condition these future cavalry scouts encounter is learning to live on a FOB. The FOB provides shelter and security, but little else in comfort. This austere environment forces scouts to learn good field hygiene and sanitation. Reinforcing discipline, they assist the cadre in servicing generators, heaters, and tents. With each platoon assigned a sector for security, they learn to improve their assigned fighting positions throughout the STX.

By using FOB Saber to replicate an austere FOB, the squadron maximizes training opportunities to expose new 19D scouts to realistic and demanding COE conditions during the EOC FTX. Every soldier is required to perform 24-hour FOB security training, which is tough, realistic exposure to conditions and situations scouts face daily.

#### **Burcham Urban Assault Course**

The final exercise for 19D OSUT is conducted at the Burcham Urban Assault Course. This exercise is intended to expose scouts to a troop (-) mission, combining two OSUT platoons to execute an urban raid mission. While this is a col-

lective-level training event, the emphasis remains on “grading” individual skills. To demonstrate what tactical NCO leadership should look like, drill sergeants and cavalry instructors serve in platoon leadership roles.

At Burcham, scouts conduct a four-phase operation with two platoons. Phase I begins with platoons transported via truck to a nearby assembly area adjacent to the urban assault course. The first platoon then conducts a security halt inside the wood line, conducts a leader’s recon to the objective, seizes a three-story building by infiltrating through a sewer system (start Phase II), then secures and establishes a strongpoint in the building. At this time, the second platoon passes through the first and clears a hostile marketplace to end Phase III of the operation. Phase IV involves consolidation and reorganization on the objective.

Unique to the Burcham Urban Assault Course is the ability of the full-time staff to design a wide-range of tactical scenarios and use the latest in training aids. To accommodate a brand-new platoon of scouts conducting collective training during this mission, the number of live (human) OPFOR is minimized on the objective. The role of OPFOR is primarily filled by motion-sensor activated pop-up targets. These targets are used in conjunction with automatic paintball guns to provide ‘feedback’ and realism to scouts as they clear rooms and seize buildings. Improvised explosive ‘chalk bombs’ and

omega devices enhance the audiovisual realism of the scenario and emphasize the importance of mastering basic 19D10-level tasks to stay alive during combat while accomplishing their assigned mission.

The EOC STX culminates with a 20 kilometer tactical foot march executed at the troop level. At the completion of the foot march, all soldiers standing receive their new cavalry scout disks in a “rites of passage” ceremony, inducting them into the U.S. Cavalry. Within a week of post operations maintenance, vehicle and equipment turn-in, and a graduation ceremony, these scouts will be assigned to any number of formations in the U.S. Army, which is where the most important part of the recruit’s transformation occurs — at his first duty station. “Old Bill” must take “New Bill” along for a ride and show him the ropes. His new first-line leader will complete the transformation, taking a competent and qualified 19D10 and turning him into an expert and member of a new team. The new scout has been taught the fundamentals and can now focus on the specific equipment, weapons, and tactics of his new organization. Likewise, “New Bill” can help “Old Bill” transform by accepting the institutional changes not yet fully incorporated by the force, including new rifle qualification positions, Army conditioning drills, and the MACP. What the force can expect are disciplined, competent and qualified 19Ds who are ready to make significant contributions on day one in a scout platoon conducting full-spectrum operations. SCOUTS OUT!



Captain William F. Shakespeare is the troop commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 5th Squadron, 5th (5-15) Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S4, 5-15 Cavalry, Fort Knox; XO, B Troop, 5-15 Cavalry, Fort Knox; and platoon leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq.

Captain Wes Loyd is the troop commander, B Troop, 5-15 Cavalry, Fort Knox. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, F Troop, 4th Cavalry, Vilseck, Germany; and platoon leader, 1st Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, Vilseck.



# 19K One Station Unit Training: The First Step in Forging the Thunderbolt

by Captain Michael A. Porcelli and Lieutenant Andrew Van Den Hoek

The foundation for every enlisted tank crewman is 19K one station unit training (OSUT). This 15-week course is taught by 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, Kentucky. This is the only battalion in the U.S. Army that trains tankers and it is the one unit that all 19K enlisted tankers must pass through as they start their careers on the finest tank in the world. 19K OSUT combines 9 weeks of basic combat training (BCT) and 6 weeks of advanced individual training (AIT).

A typical class is 165 students; most are active duty with a smaller percentage from the Army National Guard and the military occupational specialty transfer (MOS-T) program. With current assignment procedures, there exists a 100-percent chance of Active Duty and MOS-T graduates being assigned to deploying units. It is not uncommon for drill sergeants to receive letters from recent graduates who are in combat zones less than 3 months after departure. The seriousness and importance of this is not lost on the drill sergeants and tank commanders who train these new tankers.

Although the focus of this article is not on the BCT portion of training, it is important to note the continuity between the two phases. The tasks trained and tested in BCT are not left behind in lieu of learning the tank crewman tasks in AIT. On the contrary, many tasks from the BCT phase are reinforced throughout the “gold

phase,” as the AIT portion is called. Discipline, physical conditioning, first aid skills, weapons skills, and loader and driver skills are trained and reinforced continually throughout the 15 weeks. Additionally, every drill sergeant and tank instructor is a 19K and remains with new tankers from the first training day until graduation. The majority of drill sergeants and tank instructors have Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom experience, which ensures tankers not only receive technical training, but also current tactics, techniques, procedures, and the realities of battle.

The main focus of the 6-week gold phase is proficiency in those skills associated with loaders and drivers of the M1-series tank. Tankers become familiar with gunner and tank commander duties; and excellence in armor (EIA) candidates and MOS-T tankers receive additional training. All technical training is taken directly from the M1-series technical manuals with the majority of training conducted onboard M1A1 or M1A2SEP tanks in the motor pool or in a field environment, as well as a small amount of time in simulators. Tankers must pass three gate tests during the gold phase: the armor crewman test (ACT), which tests in-

dividual tank technical skills to tank crew gunnery skills test (TCGST) standards; the armor stakes, which tests additional TCGST skills and reinforces individual BCT skills in a collective environment; and finally, the gold field training exercise (FTX), which tests skills from throughout the 15 weeks in a collective environment. EIA candidates and MOS-T tankers must also complete unit conduct of fire training, tank boresighting, engagement procedures, and gunnery training.

The gold phase FTX is an 8-day capstone field exercise that challenges 19Ks to demonstrate proficiency of individual skills with hands-on application. Tankers will perform proficiency tests under a variety of day and night conditions, which include a modified gunnery table, dismounted patrols in an urban environment, occupying a forward operating base (FOB), tank section movement, a 15-kilometer combat foot patrol, and tank recovery. Tankers begin their final exercise rotating between a modi-





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fied gunnery table and the basic driving course/advanced driving course (BDC/ADC). BDC/ADC training builds on motor pool and tank driver simulator (TDS) training. The ADC has 90 connexes lining the course to replicate close urban terrain. Every tanker receives 21 miles of actual driving during the gold FTX.

During conduct of the modified gunnery table, each tanker trains on individual loading and driving skills while becoming familiar with live-fire crew duties. Each will experience as many as 18 main gun firing events while rotating between loader, driver, and gunner positions. They will also engage targets with the loader's M240 machine gun, M9 pistol, and M4 carbine. The loader's M240 is fired day and night. Again, EIA candidates and MOS-T tankers will spend more time in the gunner's seat and may fire as many as 30 main gun rounds.

Once the 3 days of BDC/ADC and gunnery are completed, tankers then transition into 4 days of lane training, which includes field driving, field maintenance, FOB, and urban training. The field driving lane tests individual loading and driving skills while a tank section moves cross country and reacts to opposing force (OPFOR)-induced scenarios, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms fire. The maintenance lane provides instruction to the tankers on typical field maintenance. Tankers will break both tracks and walk them completely off

a tank, then reattach them after training on short tracking. They will also prepare a tank for towing and inspect V packs. Additionally, if a tank breaks down, the tankers participate in the repairs. There is no better training than replacing a torsion bar or fixing an inside thrown track in cold mud to gain an appreciation for doing things right.

Tankers will conduct a FOB lane where they exercise individual skills while conducting entrance control points (ECPs), performing as a quick-reaction force, and conducting patrols while reacting to contact such as IEDs, indirect fire attacks, snipers, and the local population. The urban lane enables tankers to exercise individual skills by clearing rooms, performing dismounted patrols, administering first aid, and reporting, among other tasks. Focus is not only provided on proficiency of individual skills, but also on making sound judgments and decisions based on the rules of engagement and the Army values.

On completion of lane training, tankers conduct a nighttime 15-kilometer combat patrol where they demonstrate their ability to react to five situational-based scenarios, including an IED attack, a near ambush, the media, and an angry populace. All tankers wear full body armor with small-arms protective insert (SAPI) plates, as they do during the entire FTX, along with radios, weapons, and the typical gear they will see in combat.

The field portion ends with a 15-kilometer patrol, but the testing and training does not. Tankers are given 5 days to recover their tanks and all equipment used in the FTX, which culminates with the battalion commander and command sergeant major's inspection of all tanks, weapons, and TA-50. Tankers learn about wash rack operations and are trained by tank instructors and drill sergeants in after-operations maintenance.

19K OSUT also awards the K4 and R4 additional skill identifiers. During week 7, tankers destined for M1A2 SEP units will be separated for assignment-oriented training to allow focus on SEP-specific tasks. Following graduation, tankers destined for Stryker-equipped units conduct 14 additional days of training, which is focused on maintenance, driving, and basic Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) operation. Similar training will begin within the next year for the Stryker mobile gun system.

Every month surveys are reviewed from recent graduates, first-line supervisors, and the installation's combat leaders. Based on the feedback from these surveys, training is continuously altered to support the force's needs. Through *Mounted ManeuverNet*, feedback and comments regarding training can be directly sent to 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment. As the modern battlefield evolves so will 19K OSUT, but one thing will not change — we will continue to produce well-trained, innovative tankers who will crew the world's most lethal tank across a full-spectrum of operations.



Captain Michael A. Porcelli is the company commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from the University of Mississippi. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3 (Plans), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS; J3 (Operations), Joint Task Force Bravo, Honduras; mortar platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 12th (1-12) Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, 1-12 Cavalry, Fort Hood.

Lieutenant Andrew Van Den Hoek is the XO, A Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from Central Washington University. His military education includes Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) II; BOLC III, and Scout Leaders Course.





# Track Vehicle Recovery Training

## *A Fort Knox Institution Continues to Train Ordnance Soldiers in the 21st Century*

by Captain Chad Ryg

As the U.S. Army transforms to a lighter, more mobile force, soldiers will continue to need formal maintenance training on the M88-series vehicles and recovery fundamentals to accomplish their mission. Recent experiences in Iraq demonstrate that solid tracked vehicle recovery skills are extremely valuable combat multipliers on the battlefield.

The 1st Armor Training Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, presides over the training division responsible for the highest volume of soldiers trained in tracked vehicle recovery. Successful students are awarded with the H8 additional skill identifier (ASI). The 1st Battalion, 81st (1-81) Armor Regiment's Ground Mobility Division provides this training to initial entry soldiers, noncommissioned officers, reservists, and national guardsmen on the fundamentals of tracked vehicle recovery

operations. It also provides tailored training to allied foreign national students. Soldiers receiving this training take a valuable and in-demand skill to their units. In addition, H8-trained initial entry soldiers, trained as 63-series Abrams tank or Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) mechanics, arrive at their first duty station with training above and beyond what is required and expected from their advanced individual training. When an Abrams tank or BFV becomes disabled due to terrain, mechanical malfunction, or combat, these soldiers use the M88 recovery vehicle to either return the vehicle to the mission or evacuate it to a maintenance repair site.

In broad terms, ASI H8 comprises the knowledge of recovery vehicle characteristics, recovery fundamentals, operating tactical communications equipment, and operating the auxiliary power unit

and hydraulic systems of an M88. Hydraulic power controls the spade, boom, and winches used in recovery operations. H8 training extends over a period of nearly four weeks and consists of 154 hours of classroom instruction, hands-on training, testing, and priceless "mud up to the armpits" experience.

A typical class has 12 soldiers and four instructors in the ranks of staff sergeant or sergeant first class. Training is conducted with two M88A1s and two M88A2s on 6,500 acres of varied terrain, including steep hills and swamps. The instructors integrate risk management and safety into each block of instruction. Instructors are all H8 graduates and must be certified to train all blocks of instruction prior to training.

During the first week, operating tactical communications equipment is covered.

Students are also familiarized with using oxyacetylene cutting equipment and learn to determine basic recovery methods and rigging techniques. This phase of the training culminates with their first written exam.

Students progress to familiarization in almost every aspect of operating the M88, to include conducting preventive maintenance checks and services, cross-country driving, rigging the boom, hydraulic operations, and maintaining components of end item (COEI) and basic issue items (BII).

The course continues with the use of recovery methods and rigging techniques to tow or recover mired, nosed, and overturned heavy vehicles. Students end this phase with both an individual knowledge test and a crew knowledge test.

The final phase of the H8 course focuses on in-depth maintenance requirements for the M88 recovery vehicle. Students remove, test, and install the powerpack; maintain the starting and charging system, suspension system, brake system, micro-switches, and nose-cone assembly; as well as perform winch ground-hop procedures on an M88A2.

In the past fiscal year, the Ground Mobility Division trained just under 400 soldiers. With each new fiscal year, 1-81 Armor receives allocations and funding based on the number of soldiers that will be trained as determined by the needs of the Army.

According to the director of the Ground Mobility Division, H8 training could be a huge benefit to commanders if they were to authorize soldiers to attend once they complete Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC). Transportation and other costs are already paid, making the unit's cost minimal. Housing and meals are already provided by military training service support (MTSS) and the dining facility.

The Army appears to have an issue across the board with the Hercules M88A2 and the soldiers who operate and maintain them. Leaders should be reminded that the vehicle has been improved to include an increased horsepower to 1,050; an auxiliary winch that is not even present on the M88A1; an extremely complex main winch system that demands skilled attention to maintain functionality; a new hoist boom with a 10-ton increase in lifting capacity; improved brakes and steering; and an overall improved ballistic protection system, designed to keep the crew safe in harsh environments.

The Army fielded these vehicles to limited units and trained them with a new-equipment training (NET) team. Once those trained soldiers depart the unit, however, the experience goes with them. We provide commanders a viable solution to that loss by teaching soldiers recovery training, as well as specific M88A2 technical training, which will prove to be invaluable to units with M88A2-trained

soldiers. The true training audience for H8 training is a senior sergeant or new staff sergeant leading a recovery section or maintenance team.

If commanders are interested in follow-on H8 training for an NCO attending 63-series BNCOC at Fort Knox, contact SFC Paul Willis at (502) 624-5623. H8 training does require an additional four weeks of TDY away from the unit, but the value added to the operational unit and to the individual NCO is well worth the investment.

As the Army transitions to a lighter force, the need for trained recovery soldiers remains high. With the impending move to Fort Benning, Georgia, expect the Ground Mobility Division to remain the Army's premier H8 training division.



Captain Chad Ryg is currently serving as commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 81st (1-81) Armor Regiment, 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATB), Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. in History from Montana State University. His military education includes the Ordnance Officer Basic Course, the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include deputy J4, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), Afghanistan; commander, A Company, 1-81 Armor Regiment, 1st ATB, Fort Knox, KY; and battalion motor officer and adjutant, Support Battalion, XVIII Corps, Germany and Iraq.



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# An American in Lulworth: Comparing British and American Armor Training

by Sergeant First Class Matthew T. Hite and Staff Sergeant Karl Hilton, British Army

*“England and America are two nations divided by a common language.”*

— George Bernard Shaw

While the British and American armored forces share some common traits, there are areas, which are vastly different. This article illustrates some of the key differences between our two armor corps.

## **An Introduction to the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC)**

To begin to compare the British and American armored forces, you must understand some key differences in organization and terminology. A regiment is the standard battalion-sized organization in the British force structure. Each regiment has a long history, in most cases, dating back before the Revolutionary War. Due to force reduction in recent years, many of the regiments have undergone amalgamation. This is the combining of two existing regiments into one new unit. The British army, to avoid losing hundreds of years of regimental history, adopted this practice. Each regiment has its own tradi-

tions, customs, and to a varying degree, distinctive uniforms, which includes different colored berets, cap badges, or regimental crests, and other distinctive devices. The major differences are only apparent when wearing formal mess dress.

A British tank regiment contains several squadrons. These are company-sized elements, each commanded by a major with a senior captain serving as second in command. Each regiment usually contains four maneuver squadrons and one command squadron. The command squadron is similar to a headquarters and headquarters company organization. This includes a close recce or scout troop (platoon), fielding eight Scimitar combat vehicle reconnaissance (tracked), or CVR(T), scout vehicles. The line squadron consists of four maneuver platoons, or troops, with three Challenger 2 tanks. The squadron also contains a command troop consisting of the command tanks, a Spartan used by the squadron sergeant major (1SG), a Sultan ambulance and a number of Land Rover utility vehicles. The troop leader, the troop corporal, and the troop sergeant operate the maneuver platoon’s three ve-

hicles. This is not a hard-and-fast organization; some regiments vary the table of organization and equipment to support individual missions.

Formation reconnaissance regiments carry out similar roles of U.S. cavalry units. These regiments are reconnaissance pure with no organic tank support. The standard organization for a formation reconnaissance regiment is normally three maneuver squadrons and one command squadron. The squadron is further broken down into three troops, consisting of four Scimitar CVR(T)s. The Scimitar is equipped with a 30mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine gun. The command squadron contains a guided weapons platoon with the Stryker antitank guided missile (ATGM) CVR(T). There are several sighting systems available for CVR(T). The first is enhanced sight periscopic infrared equipment (E-SPIRE), which contains an enhanced thermal sighting capability, improved surveillance, and crew interface capabilities. Formation reconnaissance regiments field E-SPIRE Scimitars. The second is battle group thermal imager (BGTI), with which close reconnaissance



units are currently being equipped. BGTI features a combination of enhanced daylight and thermal sighting systems, and interfaces with the new Bowman communications system, which is the British army's version of Force XXI battle command-brigade and below (FBCB2) platform-based situational awareness (SA) system.

### Institutional Training

Institutional training is the cornerstone of the British armored corps as it is with the U.S. Army; however, the British adopt a very different approach. Firstly, the training is broken down into distinct phases at separate schools. For instance, a troop leader begins his training at the Command, Information, and Signals (CIS) School. This phase lasts approximately 2 weeks and covers the basics of communications equipment and digital SA systems. Next, the troop leader progresses to the Driving and Maintenance (D&M) School, which covers basic driving, recovery, and maintenance tasks. Students leave the school after approximately 4 weeks and are qualified tank drivers. Both the CIS and D&M phases take place at the Armor Centre at Bovington Camp. Following the D&M phase, students move to the Gunnery School at Lulworth for a period of 3 months. Here, they learn all gunnery subject matter to include maintenance, servicing, and drills lessons. This phase culminates with a live firing exercise, comprising an annual crew test (ACT) similar to tank table VIII, and an annual troop assessment (ATA) similar to tank table XII. Once complete with the gunnery phase, students transition to the Land Warfare Centre at Warminster for the tactics phase, which is the final phase of training. The tactics phase covers mounted and dismounted tactics and culminates with a 4-day exercise where troop leaders practice putting all subject matter taught into practice in a field environment.

*"Training equipment to support Challenger 2 is quite a bit different from that of the Abrams family. There are two distinct gunnery simulators. The first is the part task trainer (PTT), which consists of a central instructor's station and six student stations arrayed in one room. The student stations contain only basic controls, as the PTT trains only introductory, full-systems techniques. After completing the PTT portion of a training matrix, crewmen move to the turret gunner trainer (TGT)."*

Secondly, the regimental chain of command selects soldiers in the early stages of their careers for a specific discipline of gunnery, CIS, or D&M. These soldiers will then follow that career path throughout their subsequent training. For example, a soldier identified for the gunnery path will return to the gunnery school to become a regimental gunnery instructor and ultimately serve as a schools instructor at the gunnery school.

Finally, there are several different levels of institutional training. From a gunnery standpoint, a soldier selected will first attend the Recruit Gunner's Course, which is the first course attended by all potential tank crewmen. The gunner is the least experienced crewman on Challenger 2. The drills required by the loader on Challenger 2 require a higher degree of experience; therefore, he is generally the second in command to the tank commander.

On reaching the rank of lance corporal, which equates roughly to specialist, the gunnery soldier returns to the school to attempt the advanced gunner's course. This course provides additional instruction on gunnery techniques, introduces loader's drills and gunnery training equipment, and produces a soldier who can assist his unit with gunnery tasks on his return.

On achieving the rank of corporal, equivalent to staff sergeant, the soldier attends the crew commander's course, which is similar to the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. The commander's course

contains similar modules to the troop leader's course. Tank commanders must complete the crew commander's course and receive the institutional qualification to command a tank. A regiment will normally have more qualified commanders than open positions. The remainder of qualified commanders will serve in other positions such as the supply department or the motor transportation department. Excess commanders are used as replacement crewmen in the event of casualties.

### Instructor Training

The next career phase is a Regiment Instructor's Course, which provides in-depth training on the use of gunnery training equipment and instructional techniques. The students complete testing over the entire course in their ability to deliver lessons to an acceptable level.

The institutional approach the RAC uses in training regimental instructors provides standardization across the armored force. A typical instructor's course will begin with lectures on instructional techniques. These lectures include everything that a potential instructor needs to deliver gunnery-related training. Instructor students are taught how to teach by using demonstration lessons. The schools instructor, who is training the instructor course, conducts a demonstration of each type of lesson that students will be required to teach back. These include weapons handling lessons, servicing/maintenance lessons, vehicle-based lessons, and simulation lessons. In a demonstration lesson, the





schools instructor conducts the “shell” lesson in typical format. He then “steps into” the lesson type he is demonstrating; he demonstrates an introduction, a portion of the main lesson content, and a summary.

At each stage, students are invited to attempt each portion of the lesson, which assists with building confidence in the students and establishing a benchmark standard. After demonstration lessons, students complete 40-minute icebreaker lessons and are evaluated on all areas of instructional techniques. Following the icebreaker lessons, students receive the schedule of all lessons they are required to teach to satisfy the course assessment plan. They will then teach back a set number of lessons in each category where the schools instructors evaluate each lesson

and provide feedback. If a student cannot successfully instruct and pass assessments in each area of the course, he will fail the instructor’s course.

Another benefit of the institutional approach is the uniformity of instructional technique; a regimental instructor in any of the armored or recce units uses the same teaching techniques. This is a demanding course, requiring a copious amount of evening work preparing the lesson for the next day. On completion, the regimental instructor delivers unit-specific gunnery training and assists the regimental gunnery staff in planning and conducting gunnery training. Regimental instructors have the capability to conduct gunnery school standard training at regimental duty because all instructors have access to gunnery school approved lesson

plans, all regiments have the same training equipment available to the gunnery school, and all instructors are trained and certified by the gunnery school.

Unlike the U.S. Army system, a British army instructor will seldom return to an instructional assignment a second time; the British army continues to use the training value invested in developing the instructor. A gunnery instructor will follow a gunnery career path, beginning his career as a regimental instructor, moving up to a schools instructor. The capstone for a gunnery path soldier is to return to the Gunnery School as a schools instructor. To achieve school’s instructor status, a candidate must complete the Schools Cadre Course. This is a 4-month course broken into two phases: soldiers attending this course come from both 30mm CVR(T) regiments and 120mm Challenger 2 units. The first phase is normally the 120mm phase. During the Challenger 2 phase, students teach a number of lessons to troop leaders on every subject in the gunnery spectrum, which includes training devices, servicing, maintenance, drills, and weapons mechanism lessons. Current schools instructors rigidly assess the teaching practices of the instructor students. After successful completion of the 120mm phase, students then transition to the 30mm phase. During the 30mm phase, students teach similar lessons on the CVR (T) Scimitar and Spartan and culminate with a live-firing package. After serving as a schools instructor, soldiers can move on to assignments as wing warrant officers, branch chiefs at the Gunnery School, or members of the armored training advisory team (ARMTAT) in Germany. ARMTAT’s function is to provide gunnery support and advice to forward-deployed units in Germany and abroad, and to enforce standardization of training across the armored corps.

### Training Aids

Training equipment to support Challenger 2 is quite a bit different from that of the Abrams family. There are two dis-



*“...the TGT is contained in one room, but has three crew stations and three instructor’s stations. Each crew station contains a gunner and commander’s station with all controls. The TGT trains all aspects from full-systems gunnery through all levels of degraded mode or reversionary levels. The three separate crew stations can be linked together easily to facilitate troop-level training.”*

tinct gunnery simulators. The first is the part task trainer (PTT), which consists of a central instructor's station and six student stations arrayed in one room. The student stations contain only basic controls, as the PTT trains only introductory, full-systems techniques. After completing the PTT portion of a training matrix, crewmen move to the turret gunnery trainer (TGT). Again, the TGT is contained in one room, but has three crew stations and three instructor's stations. Each crew station contains a gunner and commander's station with all controls. The TGT trains all aspects from full-systems gunnery through all levels of degraded mode or reversionary levels. The three separate crew stations can be linked together easily to facilitate troop-level training.

One piece of training equipment usually found the most alien to American visitors is the loader's drills trainer (LDT), which consists of a fully functioning loader's station, complete with simulated movement for main armament firing, recoil of the main armament, coaxial machine gun firing, and elevation/depres-

sion of both weapons systems. The LDT is a requirement for several reasons. First, Challenger 2 fires three-piece ammunition, which is broken down into a projectile, a charge, and a primer or vent tube. The projectile and charge are manually loaded on each reload. The vent tubes are contained in a magazine fitted to the back of the breech ring and rammed by an automatic tube loader during recoil/counter-recoil. As a result, there is an increased potential for malfunctions and vent tube stoppages on the main armament. Secondly, the L94 coaxial chain gun is located on the loader's side of the turret. Therefore, the loader carries out all drills on the chain gun. The final piece of training equipment is the secondary armament drills trainer (SADT), which is a stand-alone 7.62mm coaxial chain gun trainer, consisting of a chain gun mounted to a fixed stand with a sound system, electric drive system, and a remote-control unit. The instructor can replicate all stoppages seen on the chain gun with the remote-control unit. The SADT exists primarily for employment training for entry-level crewmen such as recruit gunners and

troop leaders who can conduct sustainment training at home regiments.

Scimitar training equipment consists of three training aids. The first is the Aqualina gunnery system (AGS), which is comprised of a 30mm Scimitar turret mounted on a stand. The turret contains a drill 30mm RARDEN cannon and full controls for both gunner and commander. The crews engage stationary and moving targets placed on a board at opposite ends of the classroom. A low-power laser transmitter mounted above the gun replicates fall of shot. Crews are evaluated on engagement techniques and correcting the fall of shot onto the target. Scimitar crews train weapons handling drills on the 30mm RARDEN cannon, which is mounted on a static gun stand in the classroom. Crews train coaxial machine gun drills in a similar manner with a stand-mounted L37.

### Weapons Handling

The British cadre take a different approach to weapons handling drills, which is directly attributable to the variations in



*"During the Challenger 2 phase, students teach a number of lessons to troop leaders on every subject in the gunnery spectrum, which includes training devices, servicing, maintenance, drills, and weapons mechanism lessons."*



weapons designs between the U.S. and UK. Challenger 2 main armament drills include normal loading, reloading, and clearing guns, as well as specific drills to rectify malfunctions that are specific to the use of three-piece ammunition. The British have very specified drills for small-arms malfunctions. With the L7 general-purpose machine gun (GPMG), there are three sets of drills. The L7 GPMG is the same as the M240B machine gun. The first set of drills is for the L7 in the dismounted role. These drills emphasize speed of engagement and adaptability to a changing tactical situation. The L37 is a modified L7 used as a coaxial machine gun on the CVR(T) Scimitar. The differences include removing the foresight and bipod legs and adding a feed pawl depressor. The feed pawl depressor is a sliding metal slat that mounts to the cover of the machine gun. This slat moves across to the right to isolate the movement of the feed pawls in the top cover. The drills for the L37, when mounted in a coaxial role, differ from those of the dismounted machine gun. The drills for the coaxial machine gun include tailored stoppage drills based on the condition of the gun or ammunition. The general approach of drills training is very structured and regimented. The instructors follow a similar crawl-walk-run approach beginning with basic handling and progressing on to extended stoppages and malfunctions. One central component of drills training is the instructional technique used. Every instructor carries out drills lessons identically; there is no latitude for variation from the lesson plan. The instructor must adopt a very uncompromising demeanor throughout the lesson. This rigid approach results in a high level of standardization of weapons handling drills across the armored force.

### The Future of the RAC

The RAC is currently pursuing several avenues of mid-life upgrades for Challenger 2 and CVR(T) Scimitar. The first is the development and trial of a smoothbore main armament, which will require significant modification to ammunition stowage to allow for the size difference between current and future ammunition. Additionally, the development of an upgraded simulation system for Scimitar is ongoing, which may provide the ability to train all variants of Scimitar currently fielded, including E-SPIRE and BGTI.

The military personnel exchange program provides an invaluable opportunity to exchange information regarding training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Although, many of the British army's



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training methods are possible simply because of its smaller sized force, there are some systems that the U.S. Army could find beneficial, especially given its adoption of the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model. The British Royal Armoured Corps is a highly professional organization with a long history of excellence. At the core of this organization is the central reason for its success, a dedicated and adaptive group of noncommissioned officers responsible for the individual training of the future armored force.



Sergeant First Class Matthew T. Hite is currently a U.S. Army exchange instructor, Armoured Fighting Vehicle Gunnery School, Lulworth Camp, UK. His military education includes 19K One Station Unit Training, Warrior Leaders Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, M1A2 Tank Commanders Certification

Course, M1A1 Master Gunner School, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Stryker Conversion Training. He has served in various command and staff positions, including mobile gun system platoon sergeant, C Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry (SBCT), Fort Lewis, WA; tank platoon sergeant, D Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; battalion master gunner, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Fort Hood; tank commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Fort Hood.

Staff Sergeant Karl Hilton, British Army, is currently a staff instructor at the AFV Gunnery School, Lulworth Camp, UK. He received a certificate in education from the University of Plymouth. His military experience includes 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, Royal Dragoon Guards, and AFV Gunnery School. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include Challenger 2 troop corporal/sergeant; corporal team commander, Maze Prison, Girdwood Park, West Belfast; lance corporal team second in charge, Maze Prison, Lisburn, Northern Ireland; and trooper rifleman, Observation Post Fondant, Northern Ireland.

# Training for Military Opera





# tions on Urbanized Terrain

by Captain Anthony Rose and Staff Sergeant Travus Brandon

The contemporary operating environment and today's demographics determine that most of the U.S. Army's battles will be fought in major cities around the world. Our enemies realize they cannot defeat us on an open battlefield dominated by macro-terrain; therefore, they drag us into cities dominated by micro-terrain, taking the fight to the squad level, immensely increasing the value of squad-level training.

The 1st Armor Training Brigade (1ATB) trains the basic fundamentals of urban combat, which is the foundation for surviving urban conflict. To increase soldier effectiveness and survivability, 1ATB has tailored squad-level training based on the Warrior tasks and battle drills, which include performing movement techniques during urban operations, entering a building during urban operations, improvised explosive device detection and defeat, and urban operations target engagement. This training is primarily performed at the 1ATB's military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) site, and is designed to train new soldiers and trainers in the basics of urban operations. This training provides new soldiers the basics of urban operations, which they can successfully build on once they arrive at their unit. These skills teach soldiers how to fight and survive in the micro-terrain of the urban environment.


## The Room-Clearing Team

The most important skills taught at 1ATB are individual skills, which include weapons carrying, room entry, and actions in a room. As in all combat situations, the clearing team members must move tactically and safely. Individuals who are part of a clearing team must move as a team using synchronized doctrinal techniques:

- When moving, team members maintain *muzzle awareness* by holding weapons with the muzzle pointed in the direction of travel. Soldiers keep the butt of the rifle in the pocket of their shoulder, with the muzzle slightly down to allow unobstructed vision. Soldiers keep both eyes open and swing the muzzle as they turn their head so the rifle is always aimed where the soldier is looking. This procedure allows soldiers to see what or who is entering their lines of fire.
- Team members avoid *flagging* (leading) with the weapon when working around windows, doors, corners, or areas where obstacles must be negotiated. Flagging the weapon gives advance warning to anyone looking in the soldier's direction, making it easier for an enemy to grab the weapon.
- Team members should keep weapons on safe (selector switch on SAFE and index finger outside of trigger guard) until a hostile target is identified and engaged. After a team member clears his sector of all targets, he returns his weapon to the SAFE position.
- If a soldier has a weapons malfunction during room clearing, he should immediately announce "gun down" and drop to one knee and conduct immediate action to reduce the malfunction. The other members of the team should engage targets in his sector. Once the weapon is operational, he should announce "gun up" and remain in the kneeling position until directed to stand by the team leader.<sup>1</sup>

## Precision Room-Clearing Techniques

The urban operations training curriculum also includes precision clearing techniques. These techniques do not replace other techniques currently being used to clear buildings and rooms during high-intensity combat. Specifically, they do not replace the clearing technique in which a fragmentation or concussion grenade is thrown into a room before friendly forces enter. We simply cannot use fragmentation or concussion grenades at 1ATB's MOUT site. We can train with dummy grenades, but the effects will not be part of the training; therefore, the training is not to standard.



Precision room-clearing techniques are used when the tactical situation requires room-by-room clearing of a relatively intact building in which enemy combatants and noncombatants may be intermixed. To clear a building methodically, rather than using overwhelming firepower to eliminate or neutralize all its inhabitants, increases risk and must be carefully and doctrinally executed:

- Compared to the deliberate attack represented by high-intensity room-clearing techniques, precision room-clearing techniques are conceptually similar to a reconnaissance in force or an infiltration attack. During a reconnaissance in force, the friendly unit seeks to determine the enemy's locations, dispositions, strength, and intentions. Once the enemy is located, the friendly force is fully prepared to engage and destroy it, especially if surprise is achieved. The friendly force retains the option of not employing preparatory fires (fragmentation and or concussion grenades) if they are not called for (the enemy is not in the room) or if they are inappropriate (there are noncombatants present). The attacking unit may choose to create a diversion (use a stun grenade) to momentarily distract the defender while they enter and seize the objective.

- The determination of which techniques to employ is up to the leader on the scene and is based on his analysis of existing mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC) conditions. The deliberate attack (high-intensity techniques), with its devastating suppressive and preparatory fires, neutralizes everyone in the room and is less dangerous to the clearing team. The reconnaissance in force (precision techniques) conserves ammunition, reduces damage, and minimizes the chance of non-combatant casualties. Unfortunately, even when well executed, it is very stressful and hazardous for friendly troops.

- Certain precision room-clearing techniques, such as methods of squad and fire team movement, various firing stances, weapon positioning, and reflexive shooting, are useful for all combat in confined areas. Other techniques, such as entering a room without first neutralizing known enemy occupants by fire or explosives, are appropriate in only limited tactical situations.

- Generally, if a room or building is occupied by an alerted enemy force that is determined to resist, and if most or all non-combatants are clear, overwhelming firepower should be employed to avoid friendly casualties. In such a situation, supporting fires, demolitions, and fragmentation grenades should be used to neutralize a space before friendly troops enter.

- In some combat situations, using heavy supporting fires and demolitions would cause unacceptable collateral damage or would unnecessarily slow the unit's movement. In other situations, often during stability and support operations, enemy combatants are so intermixed with noncombatants that friendly forces cannot, in good conscience, use all available supporting fires. Room-by-room clearing may be necessary. At such times, precision room-clearing techniques are most appropriate.<sup>2</sup>

### Principles of Precision Room Clearing

Close quarter battle (CQB) is a method of conducting room combat. MOUT refers to urban warfare, but while MOUT refers to the fight mainly in macro-terrain (maneuvering troops, using heavy armored fighting vehicles, and battle management), CQB refers to micro-terrain; namely, how a small squad of troops should fight in rooms or confined spaces within an urban environment.

Battles that occur at close quarters, such as rooms or hallways, must be planned and executed with care. Units must train, practice, and rehearse precision room-clearing techniques until each fire team and squad operates smoothly. Each unit member must understand the principles of precision room clearing, which include surprise, speed, and controlled violence of action:

- **Surprise.** Surprise is the key to a successful assault at close quarters. The fire team or squad clearing the room must achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by deceiving, distracting, or startling the enemy. Sometimes stun grenades may be used to achieve surprise. These are more effective against a nonalert, poorly trained enemy than against alert, well-trained soldiers.

- **Speed.** Speed provides a measure of security to the clearing unit. It allows soldiers to use the first few vital seconds provided by surprise to their maximum advantage. In precision room clearing, speed is not how fast soldiers enter the room; it is how fast the threat is eliminated and the room is cleared.

- **Controlled violence of action.** Controlled violence of action eliminates or neutralizes the enemy while giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly casualties. It is not limited to the application of firepower only, but also involves a soldier mind-set of complete domination. Each of the principles of precision room clearing has a synergistic relationship to the others. Controlled violence, coupled with speed, increases surprise. Hence, successful surprise allows increased speed.<sup>3</sup>

### Fundamentals of Precision Room Clearing

The ten fundamentals of precision room clearing address actions soldiers take when moving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement, and after contact. Team members:



*"The mechanical breach requires increased physical exertion by one or more soldiers using hand tools such as axes, saws, crowbars, hooligan tools, or sledgehammers. The mechanical breach is not a preferred primary breaching method because it can be time-consuming and defeat the element of surprise. However, the rules of engagement (ROE) and situation may require using these tools, so soldiers should be proficient in their use."*



- Move tactically and silently while securing the corridors to the room to be cleared.
- Carry only the minimum amount of equipment. (Rucksacks and loose items carried by soldiers tire them, slow their pace, and cause noise.)
- Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct order of entrance, prepared to enter on a single command.
- Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire.
- Eliminate all enemy in the room by fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.
- Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room.
- Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm, segregate, and treat the wounded. Search all enemy casualties.
- Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.
- Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.
- Mark the room as cleared using a simple, clearly identifiable marking in accordance with the unit SOP.
- Maintain security and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do not neglect rear security.<sup>4</sup>

Precision room-clearing techniques are designed to be executed by the standard four-man fire team. Because of the confined spaces typical of building- and room-clearing operations, units larger than squads quickly become unwieldy. When shortages of personnel demand, room clearing can be conducted with two- or three-man teams, but four-man teams are preferred. Using fewer personnel greatly increases combat strain and risks.<sup>5</sup>

### Conducting the Breach

The team may be fighting just to get to the breach point; therefore, proper fire and movement will be required all the way to the breach (entry) point. The rest of the squad/platoon will provide support to secure (left, right, up, and down) the clearing team. Remember that the fight is three-dimensional and 360 degrees. If doors and windows are not used for entry, the team must remain oriented on these danger areas as they approach the breach location. The team may be required to augment or create obscurity with hand-held smoke, but must remember not to mask the fires of the support element or obscure the breach (entry) point from friendly observation and fires.

If possible, conduct the breach to allow the team to continue movement without waiting at the breach (entry) point. Deception should be used to confuse the enemy as to the location of the primary entry point. This can be achieved by using fragmentation grenades, concussion grenades, or stun grenades in an area other than the actual breach/entry point.

The two different types of breaching methods discussed in this article include mechanical and ballistic:<sup>6</sup>

**Mechanical breach.** The mechanical breach requires increased physical exertion by one or more soldiers using hand tools such as axes, saws, crowbars, hooligan tools, or sledgehammers. The mechanical breach is not a preferred primary breaching method because it can be time-consuming and defeat the element of surprise. However, the rules of engagement (ROE) and situation may require using these tools, so soldiers should be proficient in their use.



*"If there is a staircase in the building, it must be cleared. This involves the first man in the stack moving up the staircase and orienting his weapon toward the top of the stairs, pieing the staircase. The next man orients his weapon in the direction of any railings or overhangs. The third man orients his weapon up and looks for any niches along the staircase where an enemy can hide. The fourth continues to cover the rear while the third man continues searching for hidden niches and enemy locations."*

**Ballistic breach.** This method requires using a weapon to fire a projectile at the breach point. This is not a technique trained at IATB, but it is simulated.

For exterior walls, using a tank or an artillery piece in the direct-fire role is ideal if the structure will support it and if ROE permits. The main gun of an M1 tank is very effective when using HEAT rounds; however, sabot rounds rarely produce the desired effect because of their penetrating power. The 12-gauge shotgun breaching round is effective on doorknobs and hinges, while standard small arms (5.56mm and 7.62mm) are proven to be virtually ineffective for breaching. Because of their ricochet and shoot-through potential, small arms should not be used except as a last resort.

Ballistic breaching of walls by shotgun fire is normally an alternate means of gaining entry. In most cases, ballistic breaching should not be considered the primary method for gaining initial entry into a structure because it is not a positive means of gaining entry. It may not provide the surprise, speed, and violence of action necessary to minimize friendly losses on initial entry. In certain situations, ballistic breaching may become necessary as a back-up entry method. A misfire of an explosive charge or the compromise of the team during its approach to the target may necessitate the use of ballistic breaching as a means of initial entry into the structure. Ballistic breaching may have to be followed up with a fragmentation, concussion, or stun grenade before entry.

Once initial entry is gained, shotgun ballistic breaching may become the primary method for gaining access to subsequent rooms within the structure. Surprise is lost on initial entry and other breaching methods are often too slow and tend to slow the momentum of the team. If a door must be used for entry, several techniques can be used to open the door. Doors should be considered a fatal funnel because they are usually covered by fire or they may be booby-trapped.<sup>7</sup>

**Breach locations.** The success of the team often depends on the speed with which they gain access to the building. It is important that the breach location provide the team with covered or concealed access, fluid entry, and the ability to be overwatched by the support element.




Figure 1

Once a breach is accomplished, the next skill taught is the room-clearing drill. CQB procedures are those actions necessary to dominate a target site and eliminate the threat posed by the targets. There are two methods of entry in CQB; each has advantages and disadvantages, depending on the mission.

**Slow and deliberate method (typical OIF entry).** Most building-clearing operations are conducted slowly and deliberately. This affords the highest degree of safety and security for soldiers. This is a stop-and-go movement, using static or limited penetration tactics for conventional room clearing.

**Dynamic entry (typically used in military operations or hostage rescue in police operations).** Dynamic entry tactics must be more rapid and aggressive than conventional tactics, if the team is going to reach the target in time to save lives. Ideally, the assault is a continuous flow, using overwhelming force that does not stop until the threat is eliminated and the crisis site is under team control.

Personnel should be trained to maintain muzzle awareness at all times. They should never get into the stack with a weapon muzzle pointing at another team member. This is why weapons must be carried at a low or high carry with fingers outside the trigger well. When entering, the team should, whenever possible, line up on the side of the door that provides the path of least resistance. The swinging door is an obstacle that can best be avoided by lining up on the correct side. If the door opens inward, the team should line up on the hinge side. If the door opens outward, the team should line up on the doorknob side. Lining up on the correct side results in the fastest and smoothest entry possible.<sup>8</sup>

The following are specific rules of room clearing that must be followed for the team to survive and be successful in clearing operations:

**Enter the doorway.** As each team member makes entry through the breaching point, he must not stop or delay; he should continue to move out of the doorway to his respective sector so he is not silhouetted or backlit from the door.

**Clear immediate threat area.** Each individual will




Figure 2

clear the immediate threat area, within two meters, in the direction he is moving. The team is identifying hostile persons and physically clearing any obstructions that may impede entry by the rest of the team. This function is performed while individual team members move in their respective lanes.

**Clear the corners.** The corners nearest to the entry point are the most dangerous part of the room; the first step into the room places the near corners behind you. Therefore, those corners must be cleared immediately on entry. The first two team members to enter the room will generally be responsible for clearing the corners. These team members will scan the immediate threat area as they are entering the room, then immediately shift focus and muzzles to their respective corners as they are traveling in their lanes. Depending on the room's size and the door's location, they may or may not move beyond the corners before pivoting to cover the center of the room. (See Figure 1.)<sup>9</sup>

**Move to points of domination.** Points of domination are locations inside the room where team members can cover and control all personnel (targets, innocents, and unknowns) in that room. Each team member who enters the room on initial entry will assume a position of domination after clearing his sector. (See Figure 2.)<sup>10</sup>

**Establish overlapping fields of fire.** Overlapping fields of fire are achieved when each team member has cleared his sector, stopped his movement at a point of domination, and can safely scan the majority of the room without covering his teammates with the muzzle of his weapon. This provides continuous coverage of team members and threat areas. (See Figure 3.)<sup>11</sup>




Figure 3



If there is a staircase in the building, it must be cleared. This involves the first man in the stack moving up the staircase and orienting his weapon toward the top of the stairs, pieing the staircase. The next man orients his weapon in the direction of any railings or overhangs. The third man orients his weapon up and looks for any niches along the staircase where an enemy can hide. The fourth continues to cover the rear while the third man continues searching for hidden niches and enemy locations.

Once the building is clear, the next fundamental module is training movement from building to building. This is an important skill because it is the most dangerous operation — too many different angles from which the team can receive fire and streets that are essentially murder holes. During movement in an urban environment, three-dimensional awareness is paramount. Overwatch is the most important aspect of movement across open areas. Avoid areas, such as streets, alleys, and parks, whenever possible because they are natural kill zones for enemy crew-served weapons. If soldiers must cross an open area, reduce risk by taking the following basic precautions:

- Make a visual reconnaissance of the area and position.
- Select a route that has some cover or concealment. If none is available, use smoke or covering fire provided by the rest of the element.
- Move by the most direct route to the selected position to reduce the time of exposure to enemy fire. Also, moving rapidly denies the enemy the chance to place well-aimed shots.
- Move from position to position without masking covering fires. When individual team members reach their next position, they must be ready to cover the movement of other team members. (See Figure 4.)<sup>12</sup>

**Move two or more soldiers.** When two or more soldiers must simultaneously move to another position, the group must position to move, and on a planned signal, simultaneously move across the open area to the next position about 5 meters apart.<sup>13</sup> Movement in an urban environment requires the assault team (squad or platoon) to minimize the effects of the enemy's defensive fires during movement by:

- Using covered and concealed routes.
- Moving only after enemy fires have been suppressed or enemy observation obscured.
- Moving at night or during other periods of reduced visibility.
- Selecting routes that will not mask friendly suppressive fires.
- Crossing open areas quickly under concealment of smoke and suppressive fires.
- Moving on rooftops not covered by enemy fires.

In lightly defended areas, the type of operation may dictate moving along streets and alleys without clearing all the buildings. The squads move along streets



Figure 4

and alleys on one side of the street supported by an overwatching element; each man is assigned a specific sector to observe and cover. To avoid exposure on the street or to provide mutual support, the squads should move through buildings, if possible.<sup>14</sup>

Once the team has reached the building, breaching is the usual method of entry; however, it is not the only method of entry. A window is the second most likely entry point. Regardless of the technique used to gain entry, if the breach location restricts fundamental movement into the room or building, local or immediate support must be used until the team is self-sufficient. For example, when a soldier moves through a window and into a room, he may not be in a position to engage a threat; therefore, another window with access to the same room is used to overwatch the lead clearing team's movement into the room. The overwatching element can come from the initial clearing team or from the team designated to enter the breach location second.




Figure 5

Getting into a building involves teamwork. The first soldier braces his back or side against the building. He then cups his hands together to assist the second soldier. The second soldier moves forward and places his foot inside of the first soldier's cupped hands. The first soldier then lifts the second soldier up to the opened window. Once the first soldier reaches the point of entry, he enters, keeping the lowest silhouette possible. If more soldiers are involved, two soldiers, facing each other, hold a support such as a board or tree limb. The third soldier climbs onto the support. Once both of the climber's feet are on the support, the two base soldiers raise the support, pushing the third soldier upward and into the entrance. (See Figure 5.)<sup>15</sup>

Once the soldier is inside the window, he should move along the wall as closely as possible to deny an enemy soldier inside the building the chance to fire at him. Using all available cover and concealment, the soldier should move with a low silhouette, and advance rapidly from position to position. If the soldier has smoke, he should use it. Whenever possible, he should move into the shadows, which helps conceal movement.



Figure 6

ing their reflections in a window. (See Figure 6.)<sup>16</sup>

Soldiers should never just walk or run past a basement window, their legs present a good target to an enemy gunner inside the building. Soldiers should stay as close to the building as possible when passing a basement window; when approaching the window, they should step or jump above and across the window without exposing their legs.<sup>17</sup> It is best to avoid windows altogether because an enemy hiding inside the building cannot be easily seen through a window, but can easily monitor movement past them. (See Figure 7.)<sup>18</sup>

The 1ATB remains committed to providing highly developed training, which will better prepare soldiers for the contemporary operating environment. All 1ATB training is geared toward developing skilled warriors prepared to face today's challenges with the confidence of a well-prepared warrior. It also provides

When moving past first-floor windows, soldiers must remain aware that windows are danger points. Most first-floor windows are head high, and an unsuspecting soldier will expose his head, giving the enemy an excellent shot from cover. The correct way for a soldier to pass first-floor windows is to stay as close to the wall as possible, and when he reaches the window, he should duck his head well below the window sill. Soldiers should always take extra precautions to avoid silhouett-





Figure 7

gaining unit commanders a certain guarantee that these soldiers are well trained and ready to soldier.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 28 February 2002, p. 3-22.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 3-23.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. p. 3-24.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 22 April 1992, Change 1, 1 March 2001, pp. 6-16, 6-17.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-18, 6-19.

<sup>8</sup>FM 3-06.20, *Cordon and Search Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 25 April 2006, p. III-25.

<sup>9</sup>FM 3-06.11, p. 3-30.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 3-34.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 3-32.

<sup>12</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-1-Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT) *Warrior Skill Level 1*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 2 October 2006, pp. 3-140, 3-141.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-141.

<sup>14</sup>FM 7-8, p. 6-9.

<sup>15</sup>STP 21-1-SMCT, pp. 3-147, 3-148.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 3-142.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 3-143.

Captain Anthony Rose is the commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 81st Armor, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from Walsh University and is currently an M.A. student at the American Military University Land Warfare. His military education includes Officer Candidate School, Armor Officers Basic Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Fort Hood, TX; officer in charge, civil-military operations center (OIF), 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry (1-12 Cavalry), 1CD, Fort Hood; battle captain (OIF), 1-12 Cavalry, 1CD, Fort Hood; and platoon leader, C Troop, 1-12th Cavalry, Fort Hood.

Staff Sergeant Travus Brandon is currently serving as a team chief, A Company, 3d Battalion, 81st Armor, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. His military education includes the Warrior Leaders Course and Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include section sergeant, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO; and section sergeant, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA.





# The Ground Cavalry Troop in Afghanistan

by Captain Michael C. O'Neil

Much has deservedly been discussed about the participation of ground cavalry units in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, very little, if anything, has been written about the deployment of Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (A/3-4 CAV) to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) V from April 2004 to April 2005. The OEF mission is also a counterinsurgency, but there are a number of major differences in the types and conduct of missions undertaken by Apache Troop from those of its Operation Iraqi Freedom counterparts. This article serves to inform the reader of the organization and missions conducted by A/3-4 CAV during its deployment.

## Initial Task Organization

Alpha Troop deployed from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, as a part of Task Force Saber. Task Force Saber included one ground troop (Alpha), two air troops (Bravo and Charlie), one air maintenance troop (Delta), and the 25th Infantry Division's (Light) Long-Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD). This was the first HMMWV-Kiowa Warrior integrated unit deployed to Afghanistan.

As the only ground elements in an aviation-centric unit, Alpha Troop and LRSD assumed control of area of operations (AO) Saber, which covered the majority of Kandahar Province.

On arrival in theater, Alpha Troop was task organized into four scout platoons with fifteen 19D soldiers and four M1114 HMMWVs assigned to each platoon; the LRSD was organized into six teams of six 11B soldiers with two M1114s assigned to each team. Two of the scout platoons from Alpha Troop



were placed operational control (OPCON) to the LRSD commander and assigned AO Saber West, which covered the Panjawai, Maywand, and Zari districts. Similarly, three LRSD teams were placed under the Alpha Troop commander and assigned AO Saber East, which covered the districts of Shah Wali Kot and Khakrez. Thus, both Saber sub-AOs were each commanded by one company grade officer and patrolled by two scout platoons and three long-range surveillance (LRS) teams.

#### **Kandahar Reconstruction: April 2004-August 2004**

At the troop level, the counterinsurgency mission was divided in four subtasks: reconstruction, disarmament and demobilization of Afghan militias and reconstitution of the Afghan army and National Police (DDR), counternarcotics, and offensive operations against anti-coalition militias, which were later relabeled “insurgents,” and included Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) forces. Enemy contact was enough to keep soldiers vigilant, though at times, complacency was a leadership challenge. Platoon leaders were frequently reminding soldiers that while the populace was, on average, far less educated and appeared to be steeped in disarray, there was

still a very focused enemy in their midst that would like nothing more than to kill foreign troops.

Task Force Saber’s initial focus was the reconstruction effort. Soldiers used a robust reconstruction plan to gain favor with local leaders in hopes of gaining a positive relationship that would facilitate the divulgence of actionable intelligence. This tactic generated mixed results. Some district leaders and council chiefs received coalition support warmly, but others were very hesitant to engage in even passing conversation with soldiers out of fear of anti-coalition militia reprisals. Districts were patrolled daily and interaction with local nationals occurred regularly.

As the populace grew accustomed to seeing the same coalition faces every day, they slowly warmed up to their presence. Every district in Afghanistan holds a weekly shura, which is a meeting of the district’s village elders. These shuras were always attended by coalition forces and were an excellent forum to gather intelligence, understand and interact with the culture, and broadcast the coalition message. As more time was spent with district elders, attitudes throughout the district toward coalition forces noticeably improved. The relationship continued to

grow when money exchanged hands and local nationals observed the beginning of reconstruction projects. However, anytime one of the coalition elements came into enemy contact in its district, funding for that district’s reconstruction projects was immediately, albeit temporarily, halted until either the district leader issued a public statement condemning the violent act or an individual approached the coalition with valid intelligence on who was behind the attack.

Though reconstruction was the focus of Task Force Saber during its operations in Kandahar province, platoons often conducted other types of missions. In keeping with the counterinsurgency tenet of gaining and maintaining popular support, platoons conducted medical civilian assistance programs (MEDCAPs) in various villages at least every other week. Narcotics, grown and used extensively in Kandahar province, were noted during intelligence debriefs, but otherwise left alone. At the time, U.S. forces were told that other coalition forces would handle the counternarcotic mission.

Not unlike the situation in Iraq, actionable intelligence was difficult to acquire. However, platoons occasionally conducted cordons and searches after gathering enough corroborating evidence indicating the presence of a person of interest and/or an illegal weapons cache.<sup>1</sup> Leaders had to be skeptical of the credibility of the intelligence they received. Frequently, Afghans would attempt to get coalition forces to arrest a person who was nothing more than an Afghan’s tribal rival. Leaders always assessed the source and worthiness of the information and, if the mission was approved, they made every attempt to bring a district leader with them to deconflict potential friction points and give the operation the face of Afghan authority up front.

When conducting cordon and search missions, platoons usually operated on their own or with a team of Kiowas from the Task Force’s Bravo or Charlie Troops. Built-up terrain in the Kandahar province is usually characterized by narrow dirt paths, lined by deceptively sturdy mud walls and irregular urban planning. When a platoon could control each corner of a targeted compound, the cordon was obviously successful. If they could not (which was usually the case), a team of Kiowas was employed to provide overhead observation of the targeted area and could vector ground forces to the location of an



*“Task Force Saber’s initial focus was the reconstruction effort. Soldiers used a robust reconstruction plan to gain favor with local national leaders in hopes of gaining a positive relationship that would facilitate the divulgence of actionable intelligence. This tactic proved varied in terms of success. Some district leaders and council chiefs received coalition support warmly, but others were very hesitant to engage in even passing conversation with soldiers out of fear of anti-coalition militia reprisals.”*



escaping element. For this reason, air-ground integration was absolutely essential to accomplishing the decisive point of cordon and search operations. The knee-jerk reaction to solidify a cordon is to add more ground forces, but, in this case, such a solution would have proven futile as the confined dirt paths were unable to provide adequate avenues of approach to and from the objective, while still maintaining some form of surprise. Furthermore, if ground forces had been required to quickly extract themselves from the objective area (to conduct a pursuit or medevac personnel), their movement would have been further restricted by the traffic jam created by an excess of coalition ground vehicles.

Cordon and search missions were usually conducted during the day to provide the least level of interference to the local populace. In rural parts of Kandahar province, local nationals usually take naps at their residence soon after lunchtime. This is especially true during summer months, when temperatures regularly reach 120+ degrees Fahrenheit. Coalition forces took advantage of this cultural practice by conducting most of its search missions during this time. This method was advantageous because the target would most likely be home, it lessened the chance of the coalition forces' approach being identified by anti-coalition militia sympathizers, and the routes were mostly free of traffic, as most Afghans were inside and asleep.

### **Green-on-Green Fighting in the West: September 2004**

After approximately 4 months of counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar province, Task Force Saber relocated to western Afghanistan in response to open hostilities between rival warlords in the Herat-Shindand area. The two warlords were Ismail Khan, a Tajik, and Amanullah Khan, a Pashtun. Both of their respective forces possessed substantial numbers of soldiers and weapons, to include surprisingly well-maintained tanks left behind by Soviet forces. Though the task force's only anti-tank weapons were tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles, .50-caliber machine guns, and Hellfire missiles, the two rival factions were successfully separated with only one day of riots (12 September 2004).

The riots were reportedly incited by Ismail Khan, who had been a significant, long-term leader of the Herat city and province and possessed close Iranian ties.



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During the riots, Task Force Saber elements secured the Herat Airport, United Nations compound, and other key government-related structures. Though the task force's air and ground elements frequently came under fire from unidentified individuals in the rioting crowds, coalition forces stayed off their triggers and focused on their area security mission. Because of this discipline, it is now largely believed that a conflict, which could have easily been a large-scale urban battle, was instead de-escalated relatively quickly. Diplomatic efforts by senior Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 leaders and other government agencies (OGAs) greatly contributed to the riots' quick conclusion. Afghan President Hamid Karzai invited both of the former warlords to join his newly formed national government in Kabul (the capital of Afghanistan), and coalition forces began the long process of disarming the two warlords' robust forces.

### **Economy of Force: September 2004-December 2005**

As the DDR process of the two rival warlords concluded, Task Force Saber remained in northwestern Afghanistan as the only element larger than a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or Special Forces A-Team. The LRS detachment moved back to division control and began a counter-improvised explosive device (IED) mission based out of Bagram Air Base. At this point, Task Force Saber's

AO included the provinces of Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor. To accomplish its mission, Task Force Saber assigned Alpha Troop a substantial economy-of-force mission in which each scout platoon was assigned an entire province as its AO.

### **Execution**

Platoon missions during this phase of the deployment typically lasted 5 to 6 days, followed by 3 days of maintenance, rest, and troop leading procedures. Interaction with other elements within Task Force Saber, and even with outside coalition elements, was minimal. The task force's Kiowa Warriors could not support missions in Ghor due to the elevation — air support for the platoon assigned to this province came from fixed-wing assets based out of Bagram Airfield and took about an hour to arrive on station.

It was common for a scout platoon not to see its troop command element for days, if not weeks, at a time. Platoons would base operations out of a C-130-capable airstrip, which served as that platoon's lifeline for supplies. Fuel blivets were established adjacent to the airstrip. Personal hygiene, already a significant necessity anywhere in Afghanistan, became an even more important facet to mission readiness, as substantial quantities of clean water were not always readily available to platoons that deployed to the more remote areas of an already desolate and austere country.

Still, platoons were able to accomplish a remarkable amount in their respective AOs. Presidential elections were held in October with no reported violence in Task Force Saber's AO. Later, in Ghor province, one platoon leader developed a "snitch plan" with the provincial governor. In this plan, the governor wrote down names of various friends in his province's districts, who, in turn, would link up with and guide coalition forces to compounds concealing weapons caches. Great care was taken to conceal these individuals' identity inside the platoon's HMMWVs. The snitch plan yielded almost daily seizures of large quantities of high-caliber weapons and ammunition that usually required renting one or two local trucks, as well as drivers, to haul confiscated munitions back to the platoon's forward operating base (FOB). These weapons were then turned over to the UN's DDR program.

During these missions, it was common for coalition soldiers to eat and sleep in local establishments while pulling local security in conjunction with local law enforcement personnel. Not only did this quasi-"Lawrence of Arabia" approach give the local populace a view of the "human" side of the high-tech ground force that was maneuvering through their land, but it also helped legitimize the strength of the newly elected government by showing that the Americans were willing to respect and work with the Afghan populace, not conquer and change them.

### Service Support

Resupply methods became unique during this mission. In cases of emergency resupply, the troop first sergeant would load needed supplies in the back of a Polaris vehicle or Gator, back the vehicle into the cargo area of a CH-47 or CH-53, then fly with the aircraft to the platoon's designated emergency resupply location. Upon landing in the designated landing zone, the first sergeant would drive the vehicle out the aircraft, drop the supplies, and drive back into the aircraft. This resupply process took no more than 5 minutes from when the aircraft landed to when soldiers began distributing the requisitioned Class I, III, and/or V.

Throughout the year-long deployment, but especially at this point with the task force dispersed over four provinces, platoons relied on the highly effective tactical satellite radio for long-range communications. Each platoon had two complete tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios in ad-

dition to Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) capabilities.

### Platoon Augmentation

As is the norm, platoons were assigned one medic, who would go with them on all missions. Soldier casualties requiring care beyond the medic-care level were evacuated by C-130 from the airstrip directly to the nearest combat support hospital or by UH-60 to the task force aid station at Shindand Airfield. On-scene medics were, at times, required to stabilize casualties for periods up to 90 minutes, as air evacuation assets were usually a substantial distance away from some of the platoons. Local national medical facilities and personnel, and sometimes non-government organizations, were enlisted for aid as needed, though their actions were closely observed by U.S. soldiers.

Maintenance support came in the form of two mechanics per platoon. Typically, one would stay at the FOB while the other went on the mission and served as that platoon's maintenance support. If the mechanic could not fix a disabled vehicle on site, the platoon self-recovered with the tow bar or, if necessary, a tow strap. The mechanics would then take the HMMWV back to its FOB and required parts were immediately flown in by C-130. If the platoon could not self-recover its disabled vehicle, a sling-load extraction was requested.<sup>2</sup>

### To the Taliban Birthplace: Helmand Province, January-April 2005

At this point in the deployment, health considerations and Afghan mountain winter conditions brought the entire troop to Shindand Airfield. Reconstruction efforts in the Shindand area were started, but soon after, the task force relocated to Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. Three of the platoons operated out of a FOB in Gereshk, collocated with a Special Forces detachment. The troop's remaining platoon operated out of the PRT in Lashkar Gah. Operations during this part of the deployment were significantly more enemy oriented, as Helmand Province is widely known to be the world's opium growing capital and is often the site of Taliban activity. In this AO, Alpha Troop operated as a unit, closely integrated with the Special Forces team, interdicting enemy movements into Afghanistan from its southern border with Pakistan. Alpha Troop also employed a Rivet Joint aircraft to identify enemy communications in reaction to the troop's move-

ment during a mission throughout the province.<sup>3</sup> This mission resulted in a number of intelligence hits that were passed on to relieving forces from the 173d Airborne Brigade's LRSD.

Alpha Troop redeployed to Schofield Barracks after accomplishing a mission in which a number of high-level leaders expressed pleasant surprise at the effectiveness of an air-ground cavalry unit in Afghanistan. Task Force Saber was given a mission that would normally be executed by a brigade. The unit's ground cavalry troop proved to be absolutely indispensable in accomplishing the unit's mission and giving the CJTF commander a highly effective and self-sustaining additional ground maneuver force that successfully applied emerging counterinsurgency doctrine. Without Alpha Troop's independent operational capability, Task Force Saber, in the words of its aviation-branched squadron commander at the end of the deployment, "would have been just another aviation unit."



### Notes

<sup>1</sup>At the time, each Afghan household was allowed one small-arms weapon, such as an AK-47, with two magazines, ostensibly for self-protection.

<sup>2</sup>Prophetically, great effort was taken to send as many soldiers from the troop as possible to Schofield Barracks Air Assault School before deployment. For its operations in Afghanistan, the sling-load phase of this paid great dividends for the troop.

<sup>3</sup>Rivet Joint, an asset based on a U.S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, orbits a large pre-designated area at high altitude and employs various sensors to detect cellular phone traffic and other transmissions. This asset is best employed as ground units maneuver through the area that the aircraft is monitoring. At the conclusion of the flight, pattern analysis can be applied to determine possible enemy presence, based on the volume of transmissions detected in response to the proximity of coalition ground units. For the mission referenced here, Alpha Troop conducted what amounted to be a very large presence patrol throughout Helmand Province. Each scout platoon was given a different circuitous route to generate potential communications throughout the area. Rivet Joint collected a large amount of communications "hits" as the troop maneuvered through the various parts of the province.

Captain Michael O'Neil is currently the S1, 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Hovey, Korea. He received a B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military education includes Airborne School, Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Leaders Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including squadron maintenance officer, 6th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, Wheeler Army Airfield, HI; executive officer, Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th (3-4) Cavalry, Schofield Barracks, HI; and scout platoon leader, Alpha Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, Schofield Barracks.



# An Ad Hoc Motorized Platoon in Tal Afar

by Captain Gavin Schwan

On 20 December 2005, our platoon parked four fully mission capable M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and began patrolling the Sarai and Hassan Qoi neighborhoods of Tal Afar in unarmored high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). We went from having more firepower than an infantry company to swinging unstabilized .50-caliber machine guns on rolling boxes of dubious survivability. The last time we conducted missions in these neighborhoods was during Operation Restoring Rights when Sabre Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in conjunction with a battalion from the Iraqi army, cleared the insurgent stronghold during a house-to-house mission.

While much changed in the three months since that major operation, resulting in a far more stable and far less hostile environment, our platoon did not forget the improvised explosive device (IED) attacks or the hours-long firefights of earlier months. Following Operation Restoring Rights, Grim Troop handed over control of the worst Sunni neighborhoods to a battalion assigned to the 82d Airborne Division

and began operating exclusively in the Shia communities further south. Over 800 light infantry soldiers were regularly patrolling an area, approximately 2 kilometers in size, and were unable to completely pacify the area's neighborhoods.

When the 82d Airborne Division redeployed and we resumed control of Sarai and Hassan Qoi on 17 December with only 110 cavalry troopers, it did not take long to understand that we were not going to achieve the same level of coverage as our light brothers.

The Sarai and Hassan Qoi neighborhoods are part of the old city, marked by an irregular network of narrow roads, which are very difficult to navigate for armored vehicles in most places and impassable in some. HMMWVs, despite the lack of firepower and armor protection, as compared to other weapons platforms, were actually preferable as a result, and provided the advantage of dismounts. We quickly became the commander's favorite new toy because of our speed and mobility and were equally as quick to recognize our permanent status as the quick re-

action force, though our principle mission was area reconnaissance to protect friendly forces and allow freedom of maneuver.

The tankers of Grim had already shared ideas and worked out crew sectors of observation to fit the urban counterinsurgency (COIN) environment and we quickly modified these for the HMMWV. The drivers studied the roads, memorizing every turn and every length, knowing when "that pile of trash over there has been disturbed," or "that hole was not there last time." Gunners covered the rooftops dominating the roads, truck commanders (TCs) scanned to the front, and rear passengers watched the flanks and alleys, each studying the people intently, wondering "what is in that guy's hands," or "why is that man on the roof?"

Of course, the world goes by pretty fast, even at 10 to 15 miles per hour, and it does not take long to drop a grenade onto a gunner from a rooftop, fire a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) at a passing HMMWV from an alley, or signal a triggerman to detonate an IED. We felt com-





*"We felt comfortable with our sectors of observation and were confident that they achieved the kind of situational awareness we wanted to achieve for the crews and the platoon. It was our reaction time that we wondered about because the urban COIN environment negated the see first-shoot first paradigm since the enemy always had us under observation. Fortunately, our HMMWVs provided us the ability to dismount quickly, allowing us to talk with the only people who were regularly (and knowingly) observing the enemy — the local population."*

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Given the HMMWVs and an entirely built-up area of operations (AO), I initially and incorrectly interpreted my platoon's mission as reconnaissance of all roads within Grim's AO, or more simply as a route reconnaissance or route clearance mission. Understanding that interacting with the locals to obtain intelligence on enemy activity was the only way we were going to "observe" the enemy quickly led me to two realizations. Number one, I had been thinking like a tanker. Our mission was definitely not route reconnaissance. It was, in fact, area reconnaissance, but area reconnaissance via engagements with the local population, as opposed to the more traditional methods taught at the schoolhouse. Number two, I had no idea how to do that.

During our months in the Shia south, our platoon conducted numerous dismounted and motorized patrols and executed a number of humanitarian missions. While

the platoon gained some experience interacting with the locals, I never had reason to practice my skills at tactical questioning and actually try to obtain information from the people. Up to this point, our interactions with the people had been largely limited to handing out claims cards immediately following Operation Restoring Rights, distributing information operation (IO) leaflets and pamphlets, and controlling crowds of people waiting to fill their water tanks.

The threat profile was wonderfully low — no one ever shot at us; there were no IEDs or even reports of IEDs; we never detained anyone; and we did not conduct any raids. Most of the time, we did not even have an interpreter as there were so few and priority went to the scouts in the troop. In December, searching for the knowledge necessary to accomplish my task, I turned to the scout platoon leaders and the regiment's common troop tactical SOP for tips and guidance. The SOP focused on which questions to ask, how to ask them, and came with a list of dos and don'ts. Easy enough; any old soldier can follow instructions. I went to work and immediately got into trouble.

Two weeks prior to the transfer of authority, an IED was detonated on an 82d Airborne Division convoy in the vicinity of a school. Since this was a common location for IEDs and the site of the most recent attack, I decided to focus my initial efforts there, but to no avail. My list of tactical questions was utterly useless.

I could never follow up with anything because every local I talked to denied even the possibility of insurgent activity in his neighborhood, or responded aloofly to my questions. While distributing tip cards on a street opposite the school, I came across an elderly gentleman. He studied the card for a moment and put it down next to him on the steps where he was seated. The tip card was a business card with a phone number and an email address printed on it that locals could use to anonymously inform on insurgents. "I have many of these," he told me, "and I do not need even one of them. I do not know any terrorists."

"Well, perhaps you may see or hear something suspicious," I replied.

"Maybe, but I do not think so. There are no terrorists here," my interpreter translated for him. "We do not allow terrorists here in our homes or in our streets. They are not welcome here."

"Well, there must be terrorists here somewhere, because an IED exploded against an American convoy 2 weeks ago by the school just across the street," I retorted.

The man stood up, shouting and waving his arms around. The interpreter rapidly translated, but I did not need help to understand that challenging his neighborhood watch program was a bad idea. After apologizing profusely, I calmed the man down, thanked him for his support and cooperation and hurried away.

A few days later, following reports of anti-coalition messages coming from a mosque just down the street from the school, our platoon stopped a man in the area who claimed to be the mosque's caretaker. When asked about the messages, he grew angry as well, declaring in English, that "this mosque does not support terrorists. There are no anti-coalition messages that come from this mosque. Anyone who says this is a liar."

Clearly, my engagement techniques were not working. In fact, they were very likely working against the entire platoon. No one else in the troop seemed alarmed by these reactions, but offending the locals could not possibly improve the platoon's survivability. However, I had learned something important: broad, non-specific discussions of enemy activity drew aloof responses from the people, and indications of specific instances of enemy activity offended the locals and induced emphatic, rage-filled denials from a people supposedly opposed to the word "no." In both cases, no intelligence on enemy activity was provided and the venue made no difference.



Whether talking to people on the streets or in the comfort and protection of their homes after being invited in for tea, the results were the same. I was reminded of a scenario presented during one of my college classes where a Westerner came to a stop at a traffic light in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. An Arabic driver crashed into him while making a left turn and the Westerner was at fault because Westerners do not belong in Saudi Arabia. This scenario reminded me that no amount of tactical questioning was going to charm the people of Tal Afar into turning in insurgents who were likely their brothers, fathers, and uncles.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom I, Grim Troop patrolled Fallujah with virtual impunity. According to one of our section sergeants, the locals gave them thumbs up, declaring “G good,” in reference to the large, black “G” painted on the sides of Grim Troop’s vehicles. Eagle, Fox, and Heavy Troops were not so admired; the “E,” “F,” and “H” were detested and regularly targeted. Somehow Grim Troop had managed to establish a rapport with the people of Fallujah, and earned their respect and trust. Developing a similar relationship in the Sarai and Hassan Qoi neighborhoods of Tal Afar became my new goal.

Patrols were conducted as usual, stopping along routes to talk to small groups of men, but this time with the intent of


simply having conversations instead of seeking actual answers. We began memorizing names and faces and sometimes stopped the patrol just to say hello to a familiar person or ask someone how his father was doing because I remembered he was sick in bed the last time we met. People waved and smiled smiles of recognition as we patrolled the shops on the main street. We spent our money at their shops, buying eggs, potatoes, and canned meats. We bought cigarettes and offered one to the men standing with us as we conversed (a very common custom among Iraqi men who smoke).

Arabic culture loves the café scene. Men love sitting and talking over tea and cigarettes and that is exactly what we did. I asked questions, only a few, and was no longer frustrated with the aloof responses. We talked about everything, including the forbidden topics of religion and politics, which the Iraqis typically brought up. We shared with them lessons from America’s history regarding its struggles with disruptive local identities, and how we learned to overcome problems. I indicated the progressive nature of our military and compared it to the Iraqi army, bringing Sunni, Shiite, Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman together toward achieving a single united Iraq.

While I was not gaining intelligence, I found that I was countering enemy propaganda by influencing the discussion and

acceptance of new and democratic ideas. The locals would not tell me where the insurgents lived, but they would challenge me with their ideas, and concede when I made a legitimate point. The locals also began coming to us with their problems, and while we rarely succeeded in solving them, our obvious interest and willingness to go to great lengths to resolve issues seemed to endear our platoon to them. According to the interpreter, I was becoming permanently red in the face because so many people were telling me what a good man I was.

Not everyone seemed to think so, however. On 3 January 2006, the enemy exploded an IED on an Iraqi police dismounted patrol just outside of our patrol base. Given its location at the very end of the wheeled route out of our patrol base, our platoon could not help but think that we were the intended target. As Grim Troop learned later that same day from an anonymous informant, the IED was emplaced by two individuals who had initially attempted to emplace it near the school, but were run off by a shop keeper. Evidently, our new methods were working. On the following day, we began focusing our efforts on developing relationships with the people in the vicinity of the new IED site to prevent future emplacements there. We also conducted intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) based on the enemy’s preferences for IED



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sites as we were able to understand them from earlier pattern-analysis work. This helped further focus our engagement efforts, and the 3 January IED was the last one emplaced in the Sarai and Hassan Qoi neighborhoods in the southern portion of Grim Troop's primary AO. Having unlocked the secrets behind engagements with the local population — a focus on developing relationships rather than getting answers to a list of tactical questions — did not resolve all our problems. On 20 January, the enemy fired mortar rounds into Grim Troop's patrol base.

Our platoon was already suiting up after the first hit, and when the call came for us to move, we were practically heading out the gate. We drove directly to an area already indicated by the 82d Airborne Division as a suspected enemy mortar firing point and began scratching together stack teams to raid a building. This was not our platoon's first hasty raid, but it does illustrate a recurring problem. A tank platoon usually has only 16 assigned soldiers; our platoon had only 15 to begin with. Subtract the two required for an ongoing guard requirement, leaving only 12 for any given mission. This means we can take only three HMMWV's total, and unless we take the drivers out of the vehicles, we have only six soldiers with which to conduct the actual raid — in an ideal situation. Now, throw in environmental mid-tour leave, sicknesses, or injuries; factor in a deadlined HMMWV; and leave a seat open for the interpreter

in one of the remaining two vehicles. Under these circumstances, we will *have* to take the drivers out of the vehicles. What if a vehicle has to move; what about the sectors of observation; what about local security and crowd control? As an ad hoc motorized platoon leader, I had to accept weakness in my cordon or stack teams.

It was great having the ability to dismount and interact with the local population. Our platoon became so much more flexible and could, in many ways, more efficiently accomplish a wider array of missions as a result. For instance, gaining the support of the locals through contact resulted in preventing IED emplacement; whereas earlier, we had great difficulty in identifying IEDs prior to their exploding against our tanks. We were also more useful in a cordon because our ability to dismount assisted in crowd control and apprehension of people attempting to run the cordon. Initially very concerned about driving through the enemy's most notorious kill zones in nothing but an uparmored truck with only a single weapon system, the platoon came to love our new wheeled equipment. However, I never lost sight of the disadvantage of the HMMWV, and frustrated myself and my soldiers wondering how best to capitalize on the benefits of the vehicles — the dismounts — to reduce that disadvantage.

It is essential to understand that for the ad hoc motorized platoon — the tank platoon stripped of its tanks — there are re-

ally only enough dismounts for local security. Clearly, using these few dismounts for other tasks reduces the overall effectiveness of the platoon. Success in the urban COIN fight hinges on a unit's ability to act imaginatively and unconventionally, but too many times we fail to understand exactly how much risk we assume by our actions in this environment.

Security is always vital and is of twice the importance in the urban COIN fight. Where I assumed risk — foolishly — was in my security during hasty raids such as that conducted on 20 January. We tried to mitigate the risk during hasty raids by ordering the women and children into the courtyards and the men outside. Before entering, the men were searched and briefly questioned. The HMMWV drivers, even though I preferred to leave them inside the vehicles, were often guarding the men, leaving the vehicles outside, while the rest of us searched the building.

During the search, we occasionally questioned the children or elderly women before leaving. We always knocked first on our target buildings, explained the reason for the disturbance, and thanked them for their patience and cooperation before we left. Buildings that remained silent after our knocks (our AO was filled with several abandoned homes and shops) were subject to an actual raid, as opposed to a platoon-size cordon and search, in which case the drivers entered the buildings as well. The threat profile in the area allowed these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and our methods enabled us to retain the respect and trust of the people. We were never far from our patrol base and Grim Troop. Other units were also patrolling in the area, so we were never really alone. The search teams were generally able to quickly secure the rooftops of our target buildings and provide overwatch of the HMMWV's from dominating terrain. Still, I made a terrible decision in weakening my cordon — something could too easily have gone wrong.

On 20 January, we chose our target building based on the suspicions of my platoon sergeant after seeing various men lingering in the street in the vicinity of the area we were patrolling. When asked to clarify, he could not point to anything beyond certain movements and facial expressions of the people, but I knew that his suspicions came straight from the gut and could only have developed after patrolling the neighborhood and getting to know the people as we had. I trusted him and radioed for the platoon to halt. When



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# Governance Development

by Captain Irvin Oliver

As my tour of duty in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07 winds down, it is time to reflect and begin the post-deployment after-action review process. Every unit's experience in Iraq is different. Our unit's mission along the Sunni-Shia fault line south of Baghdad is quite distinctive from elsewhere.

The Musayyib District is a religiously diverse area with a Shia majority and a very large Sunni minority. This diverse area straddles the Sunni-Shia fault line. The lessons our unit learned this past year resulted from a wide range of missions in which we participated. Some were quite evident and fundamental, but others required the best and cruelest teacher — experience. We achieved many of our initial goals and set the conditions for the next unit. One of my key tasks was establishing the district government for the Musayyib District of the Babil Province in Iraq. This area of operations presented many challenges to developing a viable governing body that represents the entire district.

Foremost, the Shia majority distrust the Sunni minority and are reluctant to put the past behind. On the other side of the coin, the Sunnis distrust their Shia neighbors and are not willing to assume the role of minority after being the controlling demographic for more than 35 years. The

seeds of distrust blossomed after the initial invasion in 2003 and have continued to grow with every sectarian attack, even if it occurs elsewhere in Iraq. This is, by far, the most difficult obstacle we faced in establishing a functioning government. There were other difficulties, such as political infighting and corruption, but those took a backseat to the distrust between the Sunnis and Shia.

## Commander's Intent and Implied Tasks

Units and commanders must know and understand the higher commander's intent. The task of governance development takes place within the context of other military operations, and because it also is a military operation in a counterinsurgency, the same rules apply as if a unit were to attack an enemy position. Just as in conventional combat, one must always know and understand the commander's intent.

Governance development should be treated with the same preparation and aggressiveness as would offensive or defensive operations. Commander's intent is critical for this imprecise task, because it defines mission success. The commander's intent must clearly define success for all lines of operation, and subordinate commanders have to understand that intent. It is impossible for any commander

to specify every task or forecast all of the opportunities or obstacles that will inevitably arise.

Junior commanders must act decisively with little or no guidance; they can best do this with an understanding of the commander's intent. Junior leaders (lieutenants, sergeants first class, staff sergeants, and sergeants) must also understand the commander's intent and must operate using it and their own initiative for mission success.

Operations are very decentralized and junior leaders are where the rubber meets the road. A common perception is that OIF and counterinsurgencies are company and platoon fights; it can be narrowed down to platoon and squad fights. When we conducted company-level operations, squads and platoons maneuvered and operated independently with the company headquarters tasked with an objective or simply command and control of the operation. When you add in the integration and/or coordination with Iraqi Security Forces, junior leaders will be on the ground to make some big decisions. They have to understand the commander's intent, how they fit into it, and its overarching purpose. They have to be clear on what equals success. This is difficult enough during a conventional fight — it can be a significant challenge in counterinsurgency.

When junior leaders can act with minimal supervision within the commander's intent, you are well on your way to reaching the objective.

The other implied task is to embrace whatever mission you receive. It may not be the sexy mission you or your unit prefers, but it's just as important. This may not be evident, but most missions in a counterinsurgency are not very sexy and will not have an immediately visible impact. Fight the urge to find a substitute for the Vietnam-era "body count." Most efforts take time to develop and results usually do not make their appearance until a fair amount of time has passed. Because of this, it can be easy to say, "I'm not making a difference," or to view your daily operations as a waste of time. Do not lose sight of your long-term objectives and tackle all of your "nonkinetic," "nonlethal," or "touchy-feely" operations with as much energy as you do the lethal operations. More so, you have to sell it to your soldiers, which will probably be the toughest sell — few men joined the Army to provide clean water and electricity to a developing nation.

Units must also have support from their higher headquarters. Just as governance development does not exist in a vacuum, neither do units. The higher commander must evaluate and determine the priority of governance development and allocate

resources accordingly. Those resources may be a diverse lot, such as discretionary funds or micro-rewards, which allow units tasked with governance development to better adhere to the local customs and culture or to request rotary-wing aviation for a demonstration of force. The higher commander must also be prepared to reinforce the efforts of the subordinate commander personally. Experience shows that rank and position matter in the developing world and Iraq is no different. We send a message by sending differing ranks to accomplish certain missions.

A personal visit from the company commander working on governance issues carries more weight than sending a platoon leader or platoon sergeant. At the same time, when I wanted to send a threat-of-force message, platoon sergeants achieved our desired effects. At times, Iraqi leaders questioned the credibility of a message from one of my junior leaders, but would take the same message from me "to the bank." Leaders must know who is the best person to accomplish a given task; this is just an extension of the old *be, know, do*.

Leaders of all ranks must get to know the key people in the area of operations (AO), and they have to know the ethnic, religious, and tribal makeup of the people, which is critical to understanding the dynamics of the AO. Personal involve-

ment from the next higher level may be very helpful when conflicting parties are reluctant to meet on common ground or when subordinate commanders face excessive resistance. This can be a challenge because commanders have full plates, but they must keep in mind that:

**Governance development does not exist in a vacuum.**

Governance development cannot be viewed or attempted as a separate task apart from security. Economic development is also closely linked — without a relatively secure environment, governance development is destined for failure. For example, who will collect the trash if it is not safe to pick up the trash? Units undertaking governance development must also play a starring role in providing security to the same segment of the population. This achieves two effects. Firstly, it provides the commander and unit credibility in the eyes of the population because the commander can immediately demonstrate effects and alter security operations without coordinating outside his unit. Destroying, defeating, or neutralizing an enemy force will establish the authority needed to further governance development. The people (key terrain) have to view the unit from a position of strength, which sanctions credibility; in that, the unit can provide required goods and services.



***"When we conducted company-level operations, squads and platoons maneuvered and operated independently with the company headquarters tasked with an objective or just command and control of the operation. When you add in the integration and/or coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces, junior leaders will be on the ground to make some big decisions."***



Secondly, it provides leverage against the population if the commander deems it necessary. In our case, the ability to immediately modify, increase, or decrease the security presence within our AO was one of the primary “sticks” used to bring about change. This ability provided me personal credibility with the Iraqi people and officials. Security must be present before any real governance can develop and the same commander must have primary authority and responsibility for both, at all levels, to adhere to unity of command. This may conflict with my next point ...

#### **Military units should have other government agency (OGA) support.**

When possible, commanders and units at the lowest possible levels should coordinate their efforts with all relevant OGAs available. With the increasing presence of the U.S. State Department and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), coordinating military efforts and support can be decisive. It may enable commanders to increase or decrease reconstruction resources (read \$) in which they would not ordinarily be involved. Imagine how much more effective security operations and governance development would be if the military landowner had some say in what happens on the civil side of this counterinsurgency. In my opinion, one of the ongoing problems in OIF is that while we somewhat realize the importance of the “nonkinetic” or “touchy-feely” side of counterinsurgency operations, military landowners do not have an adequate voice in what happens on the softer side. This sends mixed messages to the local population and causes disunity of command and internal bickering on our side, which takes one of the most important tools we have — money — and negates its effectiveness. OGAs may also be helpful in establishing smaller levels of government. How much more could be accomplished if some state civilian on the PRT was assisting each battalion at the district level? Having someone with background and experience in developing political bodies would likely limit the discovery learning that military commanders are forced to do in Iraq. No matter how well read commanders may be, governance development is not a primary task; it’s not on the mission-essential task list, nor will it be anytime soon. In addition to having OGA support ...

#### **Governance development requires local support for success.**

Governance development cannot succeed without the support of the population. We constantly hear the local people referred to as “key terrain,” and this holds true in governance development. The purpose of governance development is to



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create a political body that will preside over the people. Without the peoples’ support, they will reject any and all governance development efforts. Americans think of governance development as the establishment of some form of democracy — arguably the most challenging form of government to institute.

Democracy simply cannot exist without the people’s support and involvement. To gain support from the people, evidence that the process is moving forward is required. When this evidence is clearly demonstrated, we can leverage the other enablers previously discussed to show progress, even if those enablers do not directly translate into voting blocs and hanging chads. People tend to get easily frustrated when they see no progress, especially in a place like Iraq where bad news dominates the media, even if that bad news is not local.

Even after tangible examples of progress, such as elections, we must immediately go on to the next step because questions, such as “What was the point of me voting? What did it lead to?” inevitably arise. We must have a positive response to those questions, even if the answer is barely adequate, as long as the results are real. We have to cultivate reasonable optimism among the people to gain and maintain their support.

Governance development is a challenging task with occasional operational or strategic implications. It is inextricably linked to the other lines of operations and we cannot treat it as a secondary or tertiary effort if we want to achieve positive

results from our work. Even when addressing governance development early in the orders process, we must do more than just provide lip service; we must ensure everyone involved understands its intent and that it is adequately resourced. Because of the bigger picture, governance development should include as much expertise as possible, even if that expertise is not in uniform. As long as we maintain unity of command and effort, we can make it work. As we progress through the process, we must never forget that governance development will succeed or fail according to the people who will be subject to the established government. We have to bring the people in early and keep them interested in the successes of our endeavors. Governance development is not sexy and can be tedious; however, it is one of the main avenues to our success in Iraq.



Captain Irvin W. Oliver Jr. is currently serving as company commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Prairie View A&M University. His military education includes Combined Arms Services and Staff School, Armor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3 plans officer, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; S3 Air, Task Force 1st Battalion, 37th (1-37) Armor, 1st Armored Division (1 AD), Baghdad, Iraq; mortar platoon leader, 1-37 Armor, 1 AD, Friedberg, Germany; and tank platoon leader, 1-37 Armor, 1 AD, Friedberg.

# Building from Scratch: One Method for Success in Structuring a Rear Detachment

by Captain J. Clinton Tisserand



— *Gone are the days when commanders leave “sick, lame, or lazy” soldiers in the rear!*<sup>1</sup>

In today’s Army, overseas and combat deployments are a fact of life and rear detachment units are being established to project power and maintain stability on the home front for deployed units. To assist in developing these rear detachments, several documents have been published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The Department of the Army has initiated a program called “Operation Ready,” and most installations are training rear detachment leaders in family support program management. Although these initiatives have helped rear detachment leaders better understand family support issues, they provide limited guidance on techniques for organizing a rear detachment and have largely ignored the personnel issues faced by rear detachments such as training soldiers for deployment, removing poor performers from the service, and caring for injured soldiers.

This article focuses on assisting newly appointed battalion rear detachment com-

manders (RDCs) with structuring a rear detachment to support deployed units and sustain home front operations.

**Common rear detachment structure.** In the absence of any existing field manual (FM) or modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) directing the structure and operation of a rear detachment, it is important that RDCs consider their element and create structures to manage the soldiers and operations of their rear detachment. Common organizational structures used by many rear detachments are often unknowingly limiting.

The most common method RDCs use to structure rear detachments is generically based on the parent battalion’s MTOE. U.S. Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108 generally supports this structure.<sup>2</sup> According to this regulation, “Company-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as normal (enhanced) platoons; battalion-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as normal companies, and brigade-level rear detachments should be structured and operate as battalions.”<sup>3</sup>

For short duration deployments (approximately 60 days), the common rear detachment structure works well. If the parent unit is not deployed for a long duration, this structure effectively enables a rear detachment to maintain accountability of its assigned soldiers and accomplish assigned garrison tasks.

During a long deployment, however, the common rear detachment structure can become inefficient. While it still enables the RDC to maintain accountability and accomplish garrison tasks, it does not provide him with the flexibility needed to effectively accomplish training and take care of soldiers’ needs. The common structure is limiting because it is based on a unit’s MTOE designed to provide commanders with command and control over healthy soldiers fighting in combat. The MTOE is unit oriented and focused on retention and training soldiers for combat.

Rear detachments do not deploy to combat; they do not have a plethora of healthy soldiers in their ranks and retaining soldiers assigned to the rear detachment is the last thing any commander needs. The



objectives of a rear detachment are very different from a normal combat-focused battalion, and as a result, require a different organizational structure.

The generic mission of a rear detachment is to support the operations of the deployed parent unit. The mission essential task list (METL) for a rear detachment is generally to manage personnel actions, support the unit's family readiness group (FRG), facilitate medical care of injured soldiers, manage the reception, training, and forward movement of replacement soldiers, and manage out processing of soldiers who are departing the unit.<sup>4</sup>

Soldiers assigned to a rear detachment can generally be categorized into four elements: rear detachment cadre, medically nondeployable, pending separation from the Army or unit, or newly assigned replacements. By using the common structure, which places soldiers in a rear detachment platoon that is affiliated with their parent company, operations tend to become confused and RDCs may have difficulty accomplishing their METL tasks. This structure breeds a lack of focus — each platoon has several soldiers from each general rear detachment category, making it difficult for the acting platoon sergeant or platoon leader to provide his element with a collective focus. For example, a platoon leader cannot tell his soldiers they are all going to qualify their weapons today because only a handful of them need to or are physically or mentally capable of firing. The other soldiers in the platoon probably have scheduled doctor's appointments, medical evaluation boards, legal appointments, or are out processing. The conflicting needs of soldiers in this type of organization make conducting collective training frustrating and difficult to accomplish. More often than not, leaders rely on noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from other units to conduct training for deployable soldiers because their NCOs are escorting soldiers to legal appointments or are attending their own doctor appointments.

**Recommended structure for a rear detachment.** Every rear detachment should have a RDC and a rear detachment first sergeant (1SG) command team. It is important that RDCs and 1SGs recognize the various needs of soldiers assigned to a battalion rear detachment. It is important to design their organization to effectively support these needs, as well as the




Figure 1. Common Rear Detachment Organizational Structure

deployed unit's needs. A RDC can accomplish this by recognizing the four general categories of soldiers under his command and using a generic company structure to organize his element.

When assuming command of a newly formed rear detachment, the RDC and 1SG should identify early on why each soldier is assigned to the rear detachment. Once this has been identified, the RDC and 1SG can begin to separate soldiers into the four categories of cadre, medical nondeployable, administrative discharge/loss to unit, and replacement soldiers. Once these categories are identified, the RDC and 1SG should form three separate platoons and a headquarters element

based on these categories, thus not allowing troop or company affiliation to dictate the platoons in which soldiers are placed. The platoons should be structured based on soldier needs.

The general organization of this recommended structure is quite similar to that of an armor company. The organization should have a headquarters element with a minimum of a personnel clerk, mail handler, supply sergeant, first sergeant, and commander; additional personnel, such as a mechanic and arms room specialist, may be necessary, depending on existing stay-behind equipment (SBE) and brigade rear detachment support structures.<sup>5</sup> The headquarters element should



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be considered the cadre and the only permanent party members of the rear detachment.

In addition to the headquarters element, the organization should have three platoons: a medical platoon, an administrative discharge platoon, and a deployable platoon. Soldiers in these platoons are not permanently assigned to the rear detachment. The RDC should choose two capable soldiers from each of these platoons to serve as respective section sergeants in charge of each platoon. This does not mean that a soldier pending administrative discharge should be in charge of the administrative discharge platoon; rather, use two good soldiers from the medical platoon to be in charge of the soldiers pending discharge. The soldiers in charge of these platoons need not be permanently assigned to the rear detachment. By having two soldiers serve as section sergeants in charge of each platoon, they will maintain better accountability of their element. The battalion would generically resemble the organization represented in Figure 2.

In this lean rear detachment organization, the RDC acts as the unit liaison to the FRG, has responsibility for command and control of the rear detachment, and represents his deployed unit's interests at the home installation. He is also responsible for planning and providing training guidance and focus to the section sergeants of the deployable platoon. When considering the selection for a RDC, Colonel Thomas Gannon, et al., recommends in the *Battalion Commander's Handbook* that a battalion commander, "appoint a rear detachment commander who can handle the job. This should be one of your

best officers. Although leaving him/her behind from a deployment will be hard, remember that the selected officer is your personal representative at your home station."<sup>6</sup>

It is further recommended that the officer not be more than two ranks below that of the unit commander.<sup>7</sup> U.S. Army Europe Regulation 600-8-108, requires that battalion rear detachment commanders be captains.<sup>8</sup> This rank is recommended because captains generally have the experience and knowledge to better facilitate unit and family needs. Also, most units provide their RDCs with authority to administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to maintain discipline in the unit. While a lieutenant can be authorized UCMJ authority, it is not recommended. Captains generally have more experience and knowledge to wisely implement UCMJ.

The rear detachment 1SG is responsible for managing and maintaining accountability of nondeployable soldiers in the medical and administrative discharge platoons. He is also responsible for providing guidance to the headquarters element. When selecting a rear detachment 1SG, U.S. Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108 requires the rank of sergeant first class (SFC), master sergeant (MSG), or higher.<sup>9</sup> Appointing an NCO with the rank of SFC or higher is helpful to successfully operate a rear detachment because senior NCOs are typically familiar with running large organizations and managing soldier and family issues.

In the headquarters platoon, the supply sergeant is responsible for fulfilling normal supply activities such as maintaining accountability of stay-behind equipment

and coordinating for and ordering supplies. The personnel clerk is responsible for recording rear detachment personnel status, overseeing financial issues of the rear detachment and FRG, maintaining records of all deployed soldiers, and assisting the 1SG with daily management activities. The additional duty of mail handler may be assigned to either the supply sergeant or personnel clerk; however, if the additional duty of mail handler overwhelms these soldiers, then the unit should appoint someone else to this important duty.

Section sergeants of each platoon are responsible for maintaining accountability of their personnel and providing leadership. Section sergeants of the medical platoon must keep track of their soldiers' medical appointments, therapy, and medical evaluation board (MEB) and medical review board (MRB) progress. Section sergeants in charge of the administrative discharge platoon must track the progress of their soldiers' administrative discharge with the staff judge advocate (SJA), generate paperwork to assist with the discharge, and track soldiers' clearing process from the installation. Section sergeants in charge of the deployable platoon must assist the commander in planning, coordinating, and executing training for the deployable soldiers. They also must be prepared to act as primary instructors for training.

**Benefits of the lean structure.** The three most evident benefits of the lean structure are seen in size, focus, and flexibility, which enable the unit to accomplish the important missions of preparing replacement soldiers for combat, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of deployed soldiers' family members.

The lean structure requires a minimal amount of permanent cadre to manage the rear detachment, which is a great advantage for a deploying unit because it limits personnel commitments to the rear. Since the Army has not developed an MTOE for unit rear detachments, each soldier remaining in the rear counts against the deployed unit's personnel strength. This situation makes it difficult for the deployed unit to receive replacement soldiers. The Army generally only considers the aggregate number of soldiers on the unit identification code and does not provide replacements for assigned soldiers who are not deployed. Therefore, by minimally staffing a well-structured rear detachment, the unit can keep its combat strength while deployed.

By placing soldiers into specific categories and assigning them to platoons that reflect their status, such as soldiers pend-




Figure 2. Lean Battalion Rear Detachment Organization



ing administrative discharge in one platoon, medically nondeployable soldiers in one platoon, and deployable soldiers in one platoon, the unit gains focus. Each platoon can be assigned one specific mission, whereas with the common structure, platoons had three missions to accomplish and leaders had to learn to manage legal, medical, and training issues. With the recommended lean structure, section sergeants in the administrative discharge platoon focus on legal issues, section sergeants in the medical nondeployable platoon focus on medical issues, and section sergeants in the deployable platoon focus on training.

The lean structure also fosters institutional knowledge within the rear detachment and provides focus to the cadre members in the headquarters platoon. By assigning members of the cadre to the unit rear detachment for the duration of the deployment, they learn how to best use existing support structures and focus on their mission of training soldiers, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of families. Lessons learned by the U.S. Census Bureau, in regards to contingent staffing, indicates that a core staff is important for temporary organizations, such as a rear detachment, to retain institutional knowledge necessary to successfully sustain operations.<sup>10</sup> An article written by Patricia Schaefer echo's this notion by identifying that there are training needs required to prepare a new member of an organization.<sup>11</sup> Such training can detract from the current operations of an organization. With so few people actually running the rear detachment, changing out a member of the cadre can be a significant event.

Another consideration is if cadre are not assigned to the rear detachment for the duration and expect to deploy soon, they may have a tendency to focus more on their own personal needs rather than the needs of the deployed unit.<sup>12</sup> Irene Padavic cites several studies that are available to contradict this notion, but it may still be a valid concern.<sup>13</sup> Assigning cadre to rear detachments for the duration of the deployment increases the likelihood that they will diligently work to support the forward element.

For a rear detachment organization, garrison taskings and other training distracters provide some of the greatest frustrations.<sup>14</sup> In the common structure, RDCs often find that healthy soldiers preparing for deployment are executing red-cycle taskings rather than training. This is a great disservice to these soldiers — they deserve the best training prior to combat and a RDC owes them his greatest attention.



*"In this lean rear detachment organization, the RDC acts as the unit liaison to the FRG, has responsibility for command and control of the rear detachment, and represents his deployed unit's interests at the home installation. He is also responsible for planning and providing training guidance and focus to the section sergeants of the deployable platoon."*

The lean structure provides RDCs and ISGs flexibility to accomplish the never-ending garrison tasks without degrading the unit's ability to accomplish its most important responsibilities of training replacements, supporting the deployed unit, and taking care of families. Rather than interrupt healthy soldiers who are training for deployment with a garrison tasking, the ISG can now task the medical or administrative discharge platoons to provide available soldiers to execute a given task. This unit organization enables ISGs to complete tasking requirements without interfering with training deployable soldiers or important unit responsibilities.

To date, there is not much documentation available to guide newly appointed RDCs in organizing their unit. This article serves as a guide to assist new RDCs with establishing rear detachments. The details of the lean structure described in this article were tested by 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry during phase one of their second deployment to Iraq and have proven valuable to the unit. Thus far, the unit has accomplished daily training for its deployable soldiers, efficiently out processed discharged soldiers, assisted soldiers with medical issues, maintained accountability of spouses in the unit, and fostered a strong relationship with the FRG. The structure proposed in this article is not the only successful method to organize a rear detachment, but it offers advantages in size, focus, and flexibility that many other structures do not.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Family Readiness," CALL Newsletter No. 01-3, January 2001, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108, *Rear Detachment Command*, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army, Heidelberg, Germany, August 2004, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>5</sup>"Family Readiness," p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>T. Gannon (ed.), *The Battalion Commander's Handbook*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1996, p. 147.

<sup>7</sup>CALL, "The Yellow Ribbon: Army Lessons from the Home Front," CALL Special Bulletin No. 91-2, June 1991, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>Army in Europe Regulation 600-8-108, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>N. Fangenson and M. Holdrege, "Contingent Staffing: Lessons from Census," *The New Bureaucrat*, Spring, 1999, pp. 23-27.

<sup>11</sup>P. Schaefer, "Management and Human Resources: the Pros and Cons of Hiring a Temp," 2005, accessed online 28 September 2006 at <http://www.businessknowhow.com/manage/hire-temp.htm>.

<sup>12</sup>R.S. Belous, "How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift toward Contingent Workers," *Monthly Labor Review*, March 1989, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup>I. Padavic, "Laboring Under Uncertainty: Identity Renegotiation among Contingent Workers," *Symbolic Interaction*, 2005, p. 112.

<sup>14</sup>J. Meyer, *Company Command: The Bottom Line*, Byrdd Enterprises, Inc., Alexandria, VA, 1996, p. 113.

Captain J. Clinton Tisserand is currently the rear detachment commander, 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry, Fort Lewis, WA. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and is currently completing an M.A. from Chapman University. His military education includes Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, Scout Leaders Course, and Rear Detachment Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including platoon leader, 1st Platoon, B Troop, 1-14 Cavalry (RSTA), Tal Afar, Iraq; platoon leader and assistant S1, 1-14 Cavalry, Mosul, Iraq; and XO, C Troop, 1-14 Cavalry (RSTA), Fort Lewis.

## Initial Entry Training *from Page 11*

- Mental agility — adapt to the operating environment with intuitive decisionmaking.
- Initiative — see what must be done — do it — and take charge if necessary.
- Physically fit and mentally tough.
- Technical and tactical competence.
- Teamwork — willing to be a member of standing or ad hoc teams.

For 1ATB to keep producing the caliber of soldier the operating force requires, we need your continued support and constant feedback. In terms of support, the drill sergeant has historically been the most influential noncommissioned officer in an enlisted soldier's career. This remains true today, but the first squad leader or tank commander the IET graduate receives in the operating force will be an equally influential leader in the soldier's development and career goals. For this reason, it is important for junior leaders in the operating force to understand the content and context of IET and the approaches and techniques we are using to transform civilians into soldiers. Armed with this information, the transition from the training base to the operating force will be more seamless than it has been in the past. As this article points out, IET is not soft. The requirements and standards IET soldiers must meet to graduate produces high caliber soldiers who meet the Army's needs.

The 1ATB very much appreciates constructive feedback. We use various forums to gather comments, which include the web-based annual field surveys sent to IET graduates and first-line leaders (supervisors) in the operating force. We administer the same web-based supervisor survey to the Maneuver Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (M-ANCOC) and the Basic

Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) for 19Ks and 19Ds. To support the collection of valuable feedback, 1-81 AR has a 63A and 63M BNCOC web-based supervisor line leader survey. The 1ATB has a forum site on *MountedManeuverNet* with discussion threads posted. Of equal importance is the feedback we receive from IET graduates as they prepare to depart for the operating force. We use web-based surveys to gather feedback on IET with a focus on how well the soldiers learned and the type of leadership they experienced during training.

The soldiers of 1ATB know we perform our mission day in and day out for the operating force. It is essential we remain partners with the operating force in this effort because we all have a vested interest in the future of this great institution. With this in mind, 1ATB remains focused on producing soldiers who know "how to think," who possess the ability to be a combat multiplier, and who will be contributors on arrival at their first operational unit.

### SOLDIERS OF STEEL!



*Colonel Peter Utley is currently the commander, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from The Citadel and an M.A. from the Naval War College. His military education includes The Naval War College, Armed Forces Staff College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Armor Officer Advanced Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Current Operations and Contingency Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3, Washington, D.C., director of training, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany; commander, 2d Battalion, 63d Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; and assistant operations officer, U.S. Central Command, J3, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.*

## Motorized Platoon *from Page 40*

the men responded in the typical aloof manner to our tactical questioning we began executing our raid/search TTP, separating the men from the women and children. We executed perfectly, but anticlimactically, found nothing. Later that day, however, an anonymous tipster directed Grim Troop to the mortar firing point, which was approximately 10 feet from the building we had searched, in an abandoned building sharing a wall with it. The mortar tube was hidden inside of partially buried PVC pipe. It is worth noting that we came very close to stumbling over it because we had accurately read the people, but I was wrong to order a search of the building. It would have been far smarter — and safer — to cordon off the area and await the arrival of the scouts who, with the proper manpower, could have more thoroughly searched the area.

The ultimate strength of the motorized platoon in the COIN environment is not its ability to conduct hard attacks. It is, in

fact, extremely limited in this ability, and is far better suited to a supporting role during searches and raids. The key strength of the HMMWV in this environment is executing soft attacks via engagements with the people. Our platoon positively influenced Grim Troop's AO by using its newfound mobility and flexibility to reach the people in the irregularly built-up terrain off limits to armored tracked vehicles.

The limited combined arms capability afforded by the HMMWV allowed our platoon to establish security on the ground and manage crowds while conducting engagements. I violated the limitations of this combined arms capability by conducting hard attacks, and lucked out only because of the low-threat profile achieved by Operation Restoring Rights.

The HMMWV also served as a reconnaissance vehicle in the COIN fight. Effectively engaging the local population allowed our troop to accurately read the human terrain, which should have en-

abled me to provide key information that would have allowed my commander to act on enemy locations with forces more suitable to the task of raiding and searching an objective. The HMMWV, despite limitations in lethality and survivability, is still an effective option in the urban COIN environment, but does not complete the combined arms equation.



Captain Gavin D. Schwan is currently serving as opposing forces (OPFOR) commander, 21st Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), Fort Hood, TX. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course; Armor Captains Career Course; Scout Leaders Course; Airborne School; Voice Interceptor Electronic Warfare Course; and Spanish Basic Course, Defense Language Institute. He has served in various command and staff positions, including tank platoon leader, G Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation Iraqi Freedom III, and at Fort Carson, CO.



# LETTERS from Page 3

The legend of Saint George uses common symbols of that age to convey deeper meanings. Virgins or maidens (depending on the story) represent the innocent, the dragon has been a symbol of evil since the writing of the *Bible*, and the poor represent all those who are too weak to defend themselves and rely on the sacrifices of others. In this legend, we as modern day knights, have an example to follow. No matter what the setting or why we are there, we know we are doing the right thing. Follow the example of Saint George and you will have a very simple set of rules of engagement—protect the innocent, destroy evil, and provide for the common good.

The *Holy Bible* is filled with directions to protect innocents, to destroy evil, and to provide for the common good. The written works of other faiths echo these themes. In our many stations in life, we are each faced with decisions. Whether you are in Iraq fighting the war or somewhere in garrison, you will be in contact with the innocent, faced by evil, and surrounded by those in need. When you follow the example of Saint George by protecting the innocent, destroying what is evil, and providing for the common good, you are not simply following a moral example from a bygone era, you are also internalizing concepts that are consistent with modern counterinsurgency doctrine. In the end, you will not only help to accomplish the mission, you will also return home knowing that you did so with honor.

STEVEN RINDAHL  
Chaplain, U.S. Army

## Sending Reserve Units to Fight a Limited War is a Fundamental Mistake

Dear *ARMOR*,

In the "Letters" feature in the January-February 2007 issue of *ARMOR*, Major Aeschliman's assessment that, "The fundamental force structure of the U.S. Army ... is completely wrong for the 40-year war" on terror is overstated. Aeschliman asserts that our Cold War force structure is not "fundamentally designed to defeat an insurgency." Is this a force structure challenge or a rules of engagement challenge? Heavy forces did quite well during World War II in urban environments, but the application of that force was considerably different from how we are waging war in Iraq. I do not think it is wise to transform the U.S. Army into a border constabulary, especially given the conventional military might of our potential adversaries. You may recall Custer had Gatling guns and chose to leave them behind; thought they would slow him down.

There is nothing intrinsically defective in heavy force structure that precludes such forces from winning hearts and minds. Occupation forces that do not speak the native language and usually depart country after one year really have no stake in the country, a bit like the difference between a boyfriend and a husband.

There is little doubt that deploying Reserve forces overseas for extended periods, other than in a national crisis, is an inappropriate role and places unfair and undo stress on units, soldiers, their families. It would be equally unfor-

tunate for the Reserve Components, especially the Army National Guard, to be the repository of heavy force structure, as long as the standard of performance is decisive victory. If the Nation reaches the point where it is unwilling to fund the necessary training and operational tempo that allows heavy forces to defeat the enemy with relatively few casualties, then perhaps Major Aeschliman's solution is acceptable. However, I am sure your readers understand the cost of such a decision would be the lives and blood of Army National Guard soldiers who, by the nature of the service, cannot be as proficient in mechanized warfare as its Active Component counterparts. Consider the training goals for pre-mobilization training and those for post-mobilization training, and how long it would take to train Army National Guard companies, battalions, and brigades to achieve a standard of decisive victory — all in the midst of a national crisis with extraordinary pressures to get heavy forces on the ground now.

Major Aeschliman asserts that the Army National Guard is "second best," and is okay. He assumes that our potential heavy force adversaries will be poorly trained and equipped — beware of underestimating the enemy.

From a combat readiness perspective, I have never understood putting combat units, particularly heavy units, in the Army National Guard. They seem to have the least value to Governors, are extraordinarily expensive to maintain, and are clearly the most difficult to train.

Having served in the active Army of the '70s, '80, and '90s, I can assure you that such service did not entail a "normal civilian lifestyle."

It seems that Aeschliman's primary concern is the employment of the Army National Guard overseas for extended periods, "throwing bodies into the breach to take the load off the active Army." I agree with his point, but not his metaphor; however, his point does not require a fundamental change in roles and responsibilities of the components of the U.S. Army, nor does it require force structure changes. We simply should not send Reserve Component units overseas to fight a limited war.

PHILIP ALLUM  
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

## Adding V-Shaped Armored Bottoms to the HMMWV and Stryker

Dear *ARMOR*,

Vehicle armor protection could be improved on the HMMWV and Stryker vehicles to resemble that of the Cougar and Buffalo vehicles. These two specialty vehicles are protected against land mines, hostile fire, and improvised explosive devices. They both have V-shaped armored bottoms, which direct the force of the blast away from their occupants. This technology is over 20 years old, but has never been used on American vehicles. The flat style used on the HMMWV and Stryker could be changed to add this type of protection. Cougars are currently being produced at 50 per month, which is a relatively small amount. The HMMWV should be outfitted with Cougar/Buffalo armor protection as soon as possible.

GLENN W. BROWN

## Army Deployment Excellence Award

Active duty Army, Reserve, and National Guard units or installations are invited to participate in the Army's 2008 Deployment Excellence Award (DEA) competition, which opened on 1 December 2006 and runs through 30 November 2007. The requirement for the competition is for the unit to have executed or supported a training or contingency deployment during the competition year.

Each winner and runner-up unit in their category will send two unit representatives to Washington, D.C. for an expense paid, 4-day trip to accept the unit awards. The trip includes travel, per diem, lodging, and ground transportation costs; time for shopping; tours of the D.C. area; and a photo with the Army Chief of Staff.

To enter the competition, submit information in accordance with the following guidelines:

- **2008 DEA competition/submission period.** The 2008 competition runs from 1 December 2006 through 30 November 2007; and nomination packets will be accepted from 1 December 2007 through 31 January 2008.

- **Submitting nomination packets.** Submit packets through your chain of command. After chain of command endorse-

ments are completed, forward packets to the nominated unit's respective Army command, Army service component command, or direct reporting unit.

- **Suspense dates.** Completed nomination packets are due to the DEA board no later than 31 January 2008.

- **DEA competition board dates.** The DEA board will convene from 4 to 15 February 2008. Semifinalists will be notified by 28 February 2008.

- **Onsite DEA validation team visits.** DEA validation teams will visit semifinalist's home station to validate deployment practices from 3 to 26 March 2008.

- **Official Winner Announcement:** Release of official Department of the Army message announcing DEA winners is scheduled for 13 April 2008.

- **DEA award ceremony:** DEA awards are presented at the Chief of Staff, Army Combined Logistics Excellence Award ceremony and banquet scheduled for 3 June 2008.

DEA guidance and evaluation criteria can be found on the Deployment Process Modernization Office website at:

<https://www.deploy.eustis.army.mil>

# REVIEWS

**Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices** by Ralph H. Salmi, Cesar Abid Majul, and George K. Tanham, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1998, 220 pp., \$40.00 (paperback)

To borrow some recent advice in fighting insurgencies, cultural knowledge is a vital combat multiplier. Fighting insurgencies demands imagination and determination. If we take the pains to understand our enemy, the enemy will tell us what to do.

In the current fight against "Islamic" insurgencies, there is an argument that to win the information operations battle, you need to remove legitimacy granted by the lexicon used. Specifically, the terms of reference used by our leaders must not grant religious legitimacy to the enemy. In an effort to describe Islamic extremists, Arabic terms that have been brought into English imply righteous struggle for the cause of Islam. For example, the terms *jihad*, *jihadist*, and *mujahideen* offer the enemy legitimacy in a religious Islamic struggle. However, using "unholy war," "terrorist," and "evildoers" steers Arabic translation toward derogatory terms of *hirabah*, *irhabist*, and *mufsidoon*.

As insurgency demands no single set of tactical or operational rules leading to comprehensive success, I believe this is a tactic that Dr. Ralph Salmi (et al) in *Islam and Conflict Resolution* would support. Specifically, they suggest that conflict resolution can be achieved through meaningful dialogue gained by a thorough understanding of indigenous perspectives. Dr. Salmi (et al) establishes that the "ill-informed" impede mutual understanding by proliferation of "biased and obtuse" Islamic terminology.

Published in 1998, it pre-dates the current Global War on Terror. However, this short manuscript, little more than 200 pages, provides a significant overview of Islamic ideology and infers the basis of departure between Islam and the West. Its authors argue that to aid in conflict resolution, western decision- and policymakers must understand that misinformation is happening. From there, they must make good-faith decisions to mollify differences and misconceptions through knowledge.

The authors argue that there have been cyclical political and economic struggles between Islam and the West for 14 centuries, breeding mistrust, anger, and hate. They suggest that the West generally dispassionately observes Muslim suffering compared to conflicts involving Jews/Christians. Additionally, Islamic extremists at odds with the West were founded only as a reaction to western imperialism and secular values. Attacks on Islam by western scholars inflame anti-western stances in the Muslim world. Conflict and violence will continue as long as policymakers and pundits maintain their secular orientation.

To prescribe policy with respect to Islam parties, *Islam and Conflict Resolution* quickly explores the Islamic belief system, *shariah* ideology, international dynamics of Islamic law, and contemporary Islamic views on conflict resolu-

tion. In short appendices, it portrays the influence of Islamic organizations in international affairs. In sum, it establishes that Islam offers a host of solutions for conflict resolution. Significant to this study, it addresses the uncodified Islamic international law, *siyar*, which is based on two principles espoused by their prophet Mohammed (peaceful resolution to disputes and pragmatism in international affairs).

The authors of *Islam and Conflict Resolution* form an interesting team to study contemporary Muslim affairs. Dr. Ralph Salmi regularly champions efforts to establish Islamic studies in American universities and has been successful in developing academic bonds between American and Islamic universities. Dr. Cesar Majul is cited as the world's leading expert on Muslim-Filipino affairs. Dr. George Tanhan is a consultant and advisory trustee of the policy think-tank at RAND Corporation.

As I am not an expert of Islamic literature, my hope is that there is a similar book written for Islamic counterparts. Unfortunately, the authors establish that such research and dialogue is not well established in either culture.

Overall, my fear is that the bulk of highlighted source documents reside more in the academic realm, versus mainstream tenets, of Islamic international law. That is to say that references used that do not reside in the Koran or Sunna will probably provide little traction in the dank alleys of Baghdad. Its greater value resides in the challenge to the reader to develop a thorough understanding of indigenous Islamic perspectives. A reflection of their publication date, they characterize the dissident Islamic thought of the Muslim brotherhood and Jamat Islamiah as "modern conservative activism." It would be interesting to see a reevaluation of the "modern conservative activism" with respect to Osama Bin Laden, Amin al-Zawahiri, and Muklada al-Sadr.

JOHN P.J. DeROSA

**Leaders of the Lost Cause: New Perspectives on the Confederate High Command**, edited by Gary W. Gallagher and Joseph T. Glatthaar, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2004, 294 pp., \$24.95 (hardcover)

In the spring of 1861, the Confederate Congress established a senior military command structure more logical than that used in the United States. In the Union Army, major general was the senior rank; in the Confederate Army, a general was to command an army, a lieutenant general a corps, a major general a division, and a brigadier general a brigade. Prior to the first battle of the Civil War, President Jefferson Davis had filled four of the full-general vacancies; that summer, he added a fifth. During the remainder of the war, three more would be added.

In this unique collection of essays, distinguished Civil War authors have considered each of the eight southern generals. They have

drawn from a wide range of source material, as well as their own considerable expertise, to summarize the lives of their subjects and their contributions to battlefield defeats and victories.

Robert E. Lee is the subject of the first essay, written by Gary W. Gallagher. Gallagher begins with a brief summary of Lee's early life, showing how he developed into the most promising senior officer of the U.S. Army before hostilities began. Then the author traces Lee's Confederate career, discussing the general's understanding of the need for Confederate victories, even at the cost in casualties, always with the hope of wearing down Union will and possibly bringing in foreign support. While Gallagher acknowledges much modern criticism of Lee, it is clear that he believes Lee understood the war and what the Confederates must do to win independence, and properly implemented necessary strategy and tactics.

Compared to most of the other generals, P.G.T. Beauregard comes off well in the essay by Charles P. Roland. Following the pattern of these essays, Roland summarizes his subject's pre-war career and then discusses his duty performance in the variety of command situations he faced. The author's conclusion is that Beauregard "represented a mixture of outstanding ability and limiting weaknesses ... brilliant, bold and energetic, capable of flashes of keen strategic insight, yet ... mercurial, erratic, and visionary."

James I. Robertson begins his essay on Braxton Bragg by pointing out that his subject "was the most hated field commander in the Civil War." Yet, his friend Jefferson Davis stood by him as he incurred the scorn of the Nation for his failure in four consecutive campaigns. Despite great skills in organization and discipline, Bragg never gained the confidence of his subordinates in the Army of Tennessee and was repeatedly undercut by them. How much better another commander could have overcome the obstacles faced by Bragg will never be known, but Bragg was certainly unable to do so. Clearly, though, he had an inability to win battles, even when he appeared to have the upper hand.

The senior ranking general in the Confederate Army by virtue of his U.S. Army seniority, Samuel Cooper is certainly the most unknown of the Confederate generals. Appointed adjutant and inspector general, Cooper, in his sixties, settled comfortably and effectively into his job as chief, Confederate Army administrator. William C. Davis could find little fault, nor anything outstanding, in the general's wartime performance.

Albert Sydney Johnston, of whom Jefferson Davis expected great things for the Confederacy, never lived to realize his potential, whatever it might have been. Stephen Engle finds enough in his essay to cast doubts on how great a general Johnston might have become had he lived past the Battle of Shiloh. Yet, his months of vast geographical command and limited manpower resources may not provide sufficient grounds for particularly adverse criticism.



Joseph Johnston commanded both of the short-lived Confederacy's most prominent field armies and directed some notable campaigns. Robert K. Krick, points out in his essay, though, that the two most notable features about Johnston were his "prudence to, and perhaps beyond, the threshold of timorousness" and his "ineradicable inability to get along with President Davis and the government at Richmond."

Edmond Kirby Smith is almost as obscure in history as General Cooper. He never led either of the Confederacy's major armies and, promoted to general to command all Confederate troops west of the Mississippi, he had little impact on the ultimate outcome of the war. His vast duties as Trans-Mississippi Department commander, the limited resources available to him, and the secondary nature of the region to the conduct of the war, provided challenges almost guaranteeing a less-than-stellar performance. Joseph T. Glatthaar is careful not to be too harsh in his assessment of General Smith and is certainly economical in any praise.

Physically handicapped by the results of two serious wounds, John Bell Hood was advanced beyond his abilities when promoted to general and placed in command of the Army of Tennessee. Lee characterized him as "very industrious on the battlefield, careless off." His appointment in the hopes that Atlanta could be saved placed him in an impossible position. His aggressively launched invasion of Tennessee soon resulted in the destruction of his army. Keith S. Bohannon has provided a balanced look at this bold fighter, but tragic figure.

There is no new factual history in this volume. What it does provide, though, is a series of well-written, straight-forward assessments by knowledgeable historians. The well-read can decide for themselves if they agree with the opinions expressed; the Civil War novice will find the essays informative discussions of each of these senior Confederate leaders. This is a valuable contribution to Civil War literature well worth reading.

PHILIP L. BOLTE  
BG, U.S. Army, Retired

**Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943** by David M. Glantz, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2005, 807 pp., \$39.95 (cloth hardback)

If one accepts the conservative estimate that the Soviet Union lost 20 million people during World War II, then the Soviet dead accumulated at a staggering average of over 15,000 losses per day during the war. To put it another way, between June of 1941 and May of 1945, the Russian people endured a loss of life equal to the 11 September 2001 attacks every 5 hours for 4 years. In *Colossus Reborn*, David Glantz chronicles the Red army's dramatic recovery from its devastating losses of manpower, equipment, and resources in 1941, and its ultimate transformation into an organization capable of turning back the tide of German attacks, while

also mastering the art of operational maneuver. Glantz, the foremost American historian of the Soviet army of World War II, recounts the monumental mobilization and restructuring that the Red army underwent to change from the flat-footed and faltering institution of 1941 to the deadly and confident force of Stalingrad and Kursk. This institutional examination provides a vivid example of the cost and challenges of a military undergoing transformation under grave duress.

Despite the Red army's incredible recovery, Glantz is quick to point out that this renaissance came at a steep cost. One of the great strengths of the book is his efforts to reconstruct the "forgotten" battles of 1941-1943. Glantz argues that Russian historians have "downplayed, ignored, or covered-up" approximately 40 percent of the battles of the Eastern Front to safeguard military reputations and national pride. His effort to recover these "forgotten battles" greatly increases our overall understanding of the course of the Great Patriotic War.

*Colossus Reborn* is an important and meticulously researched addition to the historiography of the Eastern Front, but it does have some shortcomings. Glantz is most at home describing the intricacies of high command and the "big arrow" movements of the armies. Like many historians of the Eastern Front, he is held captive by the vastness and scale of the fighting. Although Glantz makes an effort to "put a human face" on the war by discussing the everyday lives of Red army soldiers and officers, he fails to capture the human drama of the Great Patriotic War. His narrative gets bogged down in an exhaustive statistical encapsulation of the Soviet war effort and the minutia of organizational change. While these facts are necessary to understand the scope of the Red army's transformation and the fighting on the Eastern Front, it comes at the price of the work's readability. This encyclopedic coverage of the Eastern Front is a must for any serious student of the Soviet army or the Eastern Front, but will likely overwhelm the casual reader.

RICHARD S. FAULKNER  
LTC, U.S. Army

**No Substitute for Victory: Lessons in Strategy and Leadership from General Douglas MacArthur** by Theodore Kinni and Donna Kinni, Financial Times Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2005, 266 pp., \$27.95 (hardcover)

Bring up the name Douglas MacArthur in a conversation and varied opinions are sure to follow. Perhaps, one area of agreement in the discussion will be that there is much to learn from MacArthur's long and remarkable career. Theodore and Donna Kinni (spouses) have taken this premise in their book, *No Substitute for Victory: Lessons in Strategy and Leadership from General Douglas MacArthur*. This book focuses on what leaders in both the civilian and military sectors can emulate from Mac-

Arthur and put to future use in decisionmaking and leadership practices.

In reviewing the credentials of the authors, one realizes that *No Substitute for Victory* is in essence the authors' first venture into writing with a military theme. Potential military readers should not let this dissuade them from reading the book. Theodore and Donna Kinni more than compensate for this in a number of ways. First, their vast experience in the corporate world makes them well grounded in what makes any organization work effectively and what role leadership plays. Second, they are seasoned writers, who have published well over 100 articles and 11 books on business-related topics. Third, they have conducted extensive research on the career of MacArthur. Finally, the authors used several highly regarded military historians and leaders in writing the book. These people read the galleys of their book to ensure the military aspects of their work were correct. In total, these factors add to a book that is well researched, superbly written, and credible.

One of the key factors in making this book useful and bringing clarity for the reader is the organizational skills of the authors. They begin the book with a concise biography of MacArthur, which provides all readers baseline knowledge of MacArthur's military and civilian career. After providing this background, the Kinnis provide 52 lessons from MacArthur's life that as they say, "...you can use, no matter where you lead and what you intend to accomplish." They divide these lessons into the categories of principles of strategy, inspirational leadership, organizational management, and personal traits of a leader. The author's package each lesson with vignettes in which MacArthur exhibited skill or attribute, some appropriate quotes from MacArthur, analysis from the authors, and conclude with two reflection questions for the reader pertaining to the lesson. All told, it is an excellent formula that makes for outstanding reading.

Certainly, there are many powerful lessons throughout the book that will benefit both civilian and military leaders. However, I believe there are some key lessons that should greatly interest the military leader at any level. These include define and pursue victory, use surprise, invest in training, take initiative, learn continuously, study history, get the athletic advantage, and develop your media savvy. These lessons and many more should make you think and perhaps generate some changes in your leadership practices and decisionmaking.

In conclusion, *No Substitute for Victory* will have appeal and benefit to a wide range of readers. After reading the book, it is no surprise that it has generated a great deal of early praise from political leaders, corporate executives, and retired military generals. Perhaps, one of the side benefits of the book is that it exposes the extraordinary life of Douglas MacArthur to groups of individuals who may not have otherwise been exposed to him. Truly, there is much to learn from MacArthur!

RICK BAILLERGEON  
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

## From the Boresight Line:

# LFAST: A Combat Multiplier

by First Sergeant Robert Hay and Sergeant First Class Michael Lucas

The live-fire accuracy screening test (LFAST) is probably one of the most important steps in preparing for live fire. Failure to properly conduct the screening test, which ensures that the tank can fire accurately using the fleet zero, computer correction factor (CCF), method of calibration, leads to missed targets. The criterion for passing the screening test requires that one round of the first two rounds of each type of ammunition fired hits fully within the ST-5 circle. The test also must be conducted using the entire fire-control system. Often, crews use the manual controls during LFAST, which overrides the ability to detect any fire control system problems that may arise during screening. Success of the screening test depends on the proofing team and crew members eliminating mechanical faults and crew errors prior to firing the first round.

This article discusses steps necessary to eliminate those faults and errors — a process often referred to as “the calibration policy,” which includes collimation checks of the muzzle boresight device (MBD), preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), armament accuracy checks (AACs), and boresighting with an MBD. The M1A2SEP consists of the same steps with the additional requirement to verify plumb and synchronization.

### Muzzle Boresight Device (MBD) Collimation

Although the master gunner is overall responsible for MBD collimation, every tank commander should know how to perform collimation. Many crewmen shy away from MBD collimation because they lack experience and confidence, or they have a fear of breaking the MBD. This simple procedure is found in Chapter 2 of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.12, *Tank Gunnery (Abrams)*. A collimated MBD increases boresight precision and speeds up boresighting procedures by eliminating the requirement to calculate a mean reading. Once trained by a master gunner, tank commanders should feel comfortable and confident collimating a MBD.

### Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)

This step should be easy because crewmen should be routinely conducting PMCS; however, ensuring they are performing all checks and services by the book will identify maintenance shortcomings early. PMCS is also a good training tool used to familiarize crewmen with the tank and its fire-control system. In addition to our PMCS, prep-to-fire checks should be incorporated in this phase since our prep-to-fire checks are derived from portions of the technical manual. Tasks, such as prepping the gunners' station, should also be incorporated to verify the functionality of the fire-control system and to further familiarize crewmen with it. Conducting these simple procedures allows crewmen to identify deficiencies *before* proceeding to the range, saving valuable range time.

### Armament Accuracy Checks (AACs)

These checks should be done monthly by the crew and all records should be kept. This is another area in which many tankers fall short. Some crews may jump in the tank and “run the numbers,” thinking that is all they are required to do (M1A1 specific). The tank may pass the solutions checks in the computer, but the gun may or may not be looking at the correct block on the AAC solutions board, a deficiency that will not be identified until the tank reaches the range and fails the screening test.



There is an updated ballistic solution card in the computer electronics unit (CEU) that incorporates the new M1028 and the M829A3 rounds, and crews must ensure they use the correct table when conducting checks 4 and 5. This is done by selecting “sabot,” pressing the “ammo subdes” pushbutton on the computer control panel (CCP), and pressing number “7.” If the number does not flash, then the latest version has been installed and crews should use the appropriate table in Chapter 3, FM 3-20.12 to complete the check. As an additional note, there is a common misconception that an AAC solution board is not required for M1A2 SEP AACs; checks 4 and 5 require the use of a solution board to ensure the tank is applying the correct ballistic solutions in all main gun channels.

### Boresighting

Boresighting is probably the most critical task crews are required to perform without assistance to achieve success and survive on the battlefield. Boresighting establishes a relationship between the bore axis of the gun tube and the sights at a known range, which provides system parallax corrections to the gunner's primary sight (GPS) and thermal imaging system (TIS). Boresighting should be conducted weekly and all results should be recorded and maintained. Basically, crews are playing “Russian roulette” if they are not conducting accurate boresighting by the book.

### Plumb and Synchronization Verification

On the M1A2, the final step is to verify plumb and synchronization. Some tankers are under the false impression this procedure can be overlooked or omitted, if a good boresight is performed. Plumb and sync verification must be done after boresighting; plumb and sync ensures sights — GPS dual axis head assembly (DAHA) and commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV) head mirror — and the gun move at the same rate and along the same vertical axis. This does not always happen due to specification variances during manufacturing of sights and sight mounts, gun mount, gun trunnions, and cradle. Because of these variances, as the elevation or depression angle increases, the gun will deviate from vertical center, and since the gun is fixed in its mount, this cannot be changed. So, synchronization is made with the DAHA in the GPS and CITV head mirror, which forces the GPS and CITV to follow the gun throughout its vertical range of motion.

Professional combat soldiers know that going into battle with faulty equipment significantly decreases battlefield effectiveness; more importantly, it decreases soldier survivability. Ensuring all measures of checks and balances are complete before leaving the motor pool or forward operating base ensures a successful gunner training program and victory on the battlefield.



# ARMOR STRONG

## Physical Fitness Stories from the Force

In January 1980, I was a promotable sergeant working as an advanced individual training (AIT) instructor in A Troop, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY. One day, while evaluating trainees participating in 19D combat skill testing, my first sergeant summoned me to report to the orderly room. Not wanting to keep him waiting, I quickly left the field training site and reported. As I stood before his desk at parade rest, the first sergeant pulled some paperwork from his desk drawer and casually laid it on his desk. As he did so, he looked me in the eye and asked me to identify the paperwork. Within a second or two, I identified the papers as my promotion orders to staff sergeant. As his demeanor slightly changed from "good cop" to "bad cop," he proceeded to pull another stack of paperwork from his desk drawer, laying it a bit more deliberately on his desk beside my promotion orders. When he asked me to identify these papers, I was a bit less confident and a little confused. I could not identify the unfamiliar forms.

To this day I have not forgotten his cuttingly frank words: "Sergeant Smith," he said, "this is your chapter packet. You currently weigh 209 pounds and exceed height, weight, and body fat standards. But," he continued after a short pause for emphasis, "you have been doing such a good job as an AIT instructor that I'm giving you 30 days to lose the weight." As the shock of his words wore off, I realized that my career was hanging by a thread. At that point, I had dedicated five years to the Army and loved what I was doing. There was no way I was going to give that up, so I set out to lose the weight and get promoted. I started running and sitting in the sauna twice a day, and within three weeks, I lost 21 pounds and managed to get myself promoted.

Once I achieved my goal, however, I gradually slipped back into my old ways and my weight fluctuated. Although I managed to be selected for drill sergeant, I fought a mostly losing battle with my weight until I was



assigned to Germany in September 1982. Within four to six months of my arrival, while serving with the scout platoon of 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, my weight shot back up to 210 pounds.

Without hesitation, my new first sergeant gave me an ultimatum: "SSG Smith he said, you will go to the mobile master fitness course at Hohenfels, and if you don't pass the course, I'm going to chapter you from the military." Although I had heard this before, I knew

this was my last chance and that I had to change — it was a difficult course, but I was determined to finish. Through sweat and stress, the course opened my eyes to the importance of physical fitness. It taught me about nutrition, bone structure and density, muscle fitness, running, running equipment, and most importantly, how to access, plan, develop, and evaluate fitness training at the individual and unit level. I dug deep, applied myself, and graduated. The master fitness course coupled with the Noncommissioned Officer's Creed motivated me to maintain a healthy and physically fit lifestyle.

To this day, I continue to be all I can be for this great Army. I am Command Sergeant Major Otis Smith. I am a cavalryman and I am **ARMOR STRONG!**

What's your story? How do you maintain your fitness? Better yet, how do you maintain your unit's fitness while deployed in a combat zone? *ARMOR* is pleased to present its newest section, **ARMOR STRONG**. Send us your stories and photos (please keep them in good taste and 300 dpi or better quality). If you have a physical fitness story to tell, we will be glad to print it. With your help, today's tankers and cavalrymen, and those who follow, will remain **ARMOR STRONG!**



## Patton Museum Presents “Life of the Soldier”

The Patton Museum will host its 5th annual “Life of the Soldier” living history encampment on 26 and 27 May 2007 at Keyes Park, Fort Knox, Kentucky. The event features live authentically uniformed and equipped historical interpreters from selected periods, spanning more than 100 years of military history. The event highlights mock tank battles, which will be held on Saturday at 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., and on Sunday at 1:00 p.m. The event is free and open to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Saturday, and 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Sunday. Museum hours are 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.



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